PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE



australian Psychoanalytic Congress

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC WRITINGS

AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC CONGRESS

Editor
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

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Logos

In September 1987, to mark the tenth year of psychoanalytic work since its foundation in 1977, **The Freudian School of Melbourne** organized the **First Australian Psychoanalytic Congress** in Australia. The present volume contains the proceedings of this Congress.

If 1979 was the year of the first Freudian Lacanian Psychoanalytic publication in the English world, then 1987 has been the year for organizing a forum for psychoanalytic contributions from analysts and members of **The Freudian School of Melbourne**, as well as from people working in related fields of psychoanalysis. The pivotal idea of the Congress was based on the fact that the analyst has to provide the means to further the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.

The task of the School, on the other hand, is the transmission of psychoanalysis without concessions, thus differentiating the work of analysis from the politics of diffusion, if not dispersion. Freud and Lacan are witnesses to the history of the vicissitudes and the price that psychoanalysis always pays, when the analyst diverges from his task into the fashions of the powers in office. This is the reason for Freud's words: "I succeeded in creating the International Psychoanalytic Association, but the struggle is not yet over."

From the first issue of **Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne** to the present one, one line of psychoanalytic work is being realised; the articulation of Freud and Lacan. But, as we already have said in the past, in this articulation there is neither a one-and-one-only reading, nor a revealed reading. Those who seek for such an abatement of anxiety avoid the challenge of the task. They confuse Lacan's aphorism: "The analyst authorizes from himself" with: "If I want I am able to"; asking to be authorized as university analysts, with the implicit belief that the Other exists, something to which the other lends himself gladly. Some suicide acts took place as a consequence of this belief.

What psychoanalytic discourse brings about instead is that the Other lacks, and not that it is missing. This is precisely what perversion tries to erase, and this is the disavowal of equating: "If I want I am able to" with: "If I am able to I ought to" under the guise of psychoanalysis. A return to the ideological discourse finds always a wandering mass that homogenizes

itself as soon as it can identify with the master on duty. This operation is carried out by placing the master, S_1, in the place of truth. Psychoanalysis, instead, teaches us to place knowledge, S_2, in the place of truth and not S_1. And this points to the heart of the matter ... psychoanalysis is not taught, it is transmitted. The fact that psychoanalysis cannot be taught is not of the order of prohibition but of what Freud called 'the impossible'. This order has produced a knowledge, S_2, whose characteristic consists of its location in the place of the truth. This displacement of the truth is what constitutes the discourse of the analyst, an analyst for whom: "To be able to is to have to".

This Eureka of truth is less simple to explain than the overflowing of the bath produced by the hygiene of Archimedes. This knowledge, S_2, which is in the place of and in relation to the truth, *does not contain it*, it only half says it. Here is where the consequences of the analytic work are measured.

The reason or the reasons since Freud, show that psychoanalysis does not fulfill the conditions of refutability so highly valued by the *masterlogician*. The unconscious responds to this refutability by the incessant existence of what is unable to be demonstrated.

Freud's and Lacan's theorization of this 'impossible' is the positivization of the real and not the truth. The truth is fiction, and the attempt of the discourse on the real, the point where the signifiers faint $S(\not A)$. It has been long known that the fact that the signifiers faint is not a contribution to dumbness. The real produces *Ecrits*, as Lacan pointed out.

Psychoanalysis lends its ear to this through the symptom, which is the implication of the speaking being in the conjunction and disjunction of knowledge, truth and the real.

Lastly, **Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne** wishes to thank the reader who during these ten years has read us and accompanied us.

> "The aberration consists in this idea of speaking so as to be understood by idiots. An idea that is ordinarily foreign to me, that could have only been suggested to me. Through friendship. Beware."[1]

Reading is always an analytical exercise. He who knows how to read learns to practise an act that, although not qualifying, at least prepares for that particular reading which is the analytic listening — where nothing is pre-judged or pre-empted. This is the point of division between the

discourse of religion, education and politics on one side, and the analytic discourse on the other. Sense is a condition necessary for the former and non-sense is constitutive of the latter. From this non-sense arises the meaning, yielding that unexpected encounter that Freud called *unconscious*.

What assembles us here — the *unconscious* — is not the same in Freud as in Lacan. This is what the School has been working from the very beginning. If Lacan without Freud is not only unlikely, but unthinkable, Freud without Lacan would have been reduced to the discourse of psychology. But this is already part of history.

Oscar Zentner,
Director,
The Freudian School of Melbourne.

Notes

1 LACAN,J. *Television, October 40*, p.7.

A riddle for Lacanians-to-be: Who is the friend who suggested it? It may be that the answer not only would not be superfluous but of structural importance to understand the difference between transmission and diffusion of psychoanalysis.

AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC CONGRESS

The publication of papers given at **The Australian Psychoanalytic Congress** calls for clarification regarding the transference of work within and outside the school. There are two kinds of consequences that result from the psychoanalytic work sustained by the school. One arises from the direct effects of our transmission of psychoanalysis for which we are answerable; the other we are of course attentive to though are not necessarily endorsing. Papers in the book represent both aspects.

This **Congress** *represents* a decisive moment in the Australian psychoanalytic scene; a moment when the work in psychoanalysis prevails over the 'small narcissistic differences'. It was open for work, discussion and interchange, as is the School. In this regard, the **Congress** proved to be very successful for fertile discussion: Australia (Melbourne, New South Wales and Queensland), France and the United States were present.

The untimely death of Professor Alan Davies has been a sad event for us all. We appreciate the contribution of his collegues, Professor Rufus Davis for reading an obituary and Graham Little for reading his paper, a short version of which is published here. Once more Moustapha Safouan has contributed with his work for the **Congress**. John Dingle presented his paper.

The papers published in this section contain those presented at the **Congress** in the order of reading with the exception of one, whose author withdrew it from publication.

Linda Clifton's paper *'The War is Over — the End of an Analysis'*, was already published in our 1987 volume *On Transference*, so it does not appear here.

The School wishes to thank the Conference Committee chaired by Linda Clifton for succeeding to make substantial such an endeavour.

1989, the 50th. anniversary of the death of Freud, will see in Australia the **Second Australian Psychoanalytic Congress** organized by **The Freudian School of Melbourne.** We welcome your participation.

María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner.

PART 1

AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC CONGRESS

Janet Clark Hall
University of Melbourne
5th and 6th September 1987

Antecedents of a Foundation : *The Freudian School of Melbourne*

*Oscar Zentner

> "No-one who, like me, conjures up the most evil of those half tamed demons that inhabit the human breast, and seeks to wrestle with them, can expect to come through the struggle unscathed."
>
> Sigmund Freud.

It is my task, as one may say my fate, to tell you today about the antecedents of the foundation of *The Freudian School of Melbourne*. Ten years have elapsed since this foundation; ten years of psychoanalytic work and its transmission.

In 1958, a young and promising man received from the hands of one of the leading founding members of the Argentinian Psychoanalytic Association, the seminars of Lacan. Around 1963, the first study group on Lacan was organised in Argentina — and of course, in the Americas; and it was around the teachings of Oscar Massota that the seeds for the foundation of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires were sown.

*Freudian School of Melbourne.

Studying Lacan with Massota was, contrary to the phenomena in other parts of the world, a result of having already been acquainted with Freud.

In 1974, *The Freudian School of Buenos Aires* was officially founded.

The foundation of *The Freudian School of Melbourne* in October 1977 was not only the continuation of psychoanalytic work carried out by two analysts but the affirmation that the analyst as such can work productively when the prevalence of the psychoanalytic discourse is able to resist the pressure of the psychology of the group.

In 1980, answering Lacan's invitation to his Lacanoamericans, we went to Venezuela. Meeting him with the first volume of *Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne* meant for us that the ethics of psychoanalysis — the ethics of the well said — had only one meaning for the occasion; to present to him our work rather than our intentions.

The foundation of *The Freudian School of Melbourne* was based on the continuation of a psychoanalytic work carried out in another geography by two analysts who thought in the terms given by Lacan in *L'éthique de la psychanalyse*: "If I can, I ought to".

In our own words, we made this foundation guided by the unconscious, not by calculation. We could aptly distinguish at this point the obsessive from the analyst. While the former proceeds in order to be everlasting, the latter acts in order to conclude.

Of that conclusion, one remainder continues: the psychoanalytic institution which, without being a guarantee, still remains the only place for the analyst to sustain the psychoanalytic discourse. The institution, however, is not per se the proof of psychoanalytic success. Furthermore, the work of the analyst amounts to nothing if it is not shared with other analysts.

Ten years ago we founded *The Freudian School of Melbourne*. We thought then, as we think today, that being analysts, having been analysands and giving proof of a certain desire, should be accompanied by taking responsibility for the established transference.

We came from another place, far away in geography, having analysed, studied and taught the texts. We were bringing another reading of Freud, of Melanie Klein, and we were introducing Lacan. We taught that psychoanalysis could be transmitted without concessions. A proof of that is that the School never adhered to any discourse other than the psychoanalytic one. We brought with us another practice of psychoanalysis.

In 1978 we wrote, "A foundation is a sad act when one has no illusion of the future, and the institutions as a project of the passage to the psychoanalytic act are only what an act is — a parapraxis." In psychoanalysis, we achieve more through failure than through success.

In the *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*, Freud says:

> "No one need be surprised at the subjective character on the contribution I propose to make here to the history of the psychoanalytic movement, nor need anyone wonder at the part I play in it. For psychoanalysis is my creation; for ten years I was the only person who concerned himself with it, and all the dissatisfaction which the new phenomenon aroused in my contemporaries has been poured out in the form of criticisms on my head..."[1]

> "As I have long recognized that to stir up contradiction and arouse bitterness is the inevitable fate of psychoanalysis, I have come to the conclusion that I must be the true originator of all that is particularly characteristic in it."[2]

Discouraging as it may be to say that psychoanalysis today moves over similar stumbling blocks, it is, however, a fact that our praxis reveals. According to Freud; Breuer, Charcot and Chrobak were the people responsible for leading him in the direction of psychoanalysis.

> "These three men had all communicated to me a piece of knowledge which strictly speaking, they did not possess..."[3]

Would it be excessive to state that this affirmation of Freud is not only a beautiful and accurate description but also the paradigm of the way in which psychoanalysis is transmitted? It points to the essence of speaking beings, namely: to speak always without knowing what is said.

In *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, Freud stated after the culmination of his psychoanalytic work, that there were three impossible tasks: analysing, governing and educating.

What follows now is my attempt to relate Freud's position to the four discourses introduced by Lacan in *L'envers de la psychanalyse (Psychoanalysis Inside-Out,* Seminar 1969/1970)[4].

Lacan understood by discourse a way of language as a link. There is a social link in what psychoanalysis describes as discourse, this being a quality of speaking-beings. And in psychoanalysis, the discourse is based, not in the individual, but in the structure of language which is that of the signifier. The subject speaks in what he says without knowing what he is saying: what Freud denominated the unconscious.

If the subject is born into language, language understood as signifiers, discourse is the effect of these signifiers. The four discourses to which Lacan refers, are four fixed places which by rotation of three signifiers and the *object a* produce them; that is, produce the emergence of these four discourses. Psychoanalysis may be understood as a change of discourse. The structure used by Lacan implies four places and four terms. I will now explain them briefly.

In regard to the *places*, always fixed, we have:

The agent	The other
The truth	The production

And, in reference to the *terms*, we have:

- S_1 (Master signifier)
- $\not{S}$ (The subject)
- S_2 (Knowledge)
- a (The plus of jouissance, the object of beyond the pleasure principle)

It is by relying on the fixity of the places and in the change of the terms that we arrive at the following discourses:

Discourse of the Master



Discourse of the University



Discourse of the Hysteric



Discourse of the Analyst



It will suffice for our limited purposes, to indicate that the discourse of the University is a modernization of the discourse of the Master, while the discourse of the Analyst is to transform the unconscious impotence into impossibility; hence its debt to the discourse of the Hysteric.

Concerning the discourse of the Master and of the University, they can, I think, be related respectively to governing and educating. The discourse of the Analyst will show how the Master is based upon the apparent non-division of the subject and his identity to his signifiers (S_1), repressing the truth of the division of himself as subject as the pre-condition of the speaking being.

Likewise, the discourse of the University, while repressing the division of the subject, situates knowledge in the place of the agent and the cause of desire in the other, in this case the student. In any case, nevertheless, both in the discourse of the University and the discourse of the Master, the subject as divided remains repressed.

In contrast, the discourse of the Hysteric, makes clear that the place of the agent is occupied by a divided subject who produces a Master (S_1) impotent to give a knowledge (S_2) about the cause of desire (that is, of the hysteric). It may be appropriate here to remember Lacan's description of the hysteric as wanting a master. The analyst, however, is the one who declines to be a Master.

It is a rewarding thing to realize how much of the Freudian texts Lacan was able to further. I am not suggesting that the whole of Freud is contained in Lacan's works. I am merely pointing out that the Lacanian experience is Freudian. Educating and governing are based on the impossibility of legislating happiness and *jouissance*, and this is clearly challenged by what we may call the discourse of the Hysteric.

The discourse of the Analyst, affected, produced and determined by the discourse of the Hysteric, puts the cause in the place of the agent, taking the other as divided and giving place to the production of the master signifier (S_1) as well as allowing knowledge to be in the place of truth.

We have, consequently, three impossible tasks and four discourses. It is my thesis that the impossibility of psychoanalysis is different from governing and educating. Moreover, they belong to discourses other than the analytic one. The discourse of the Hysteric questions governing and educating, turning governing into an upside down mastery and education into the impotence of knowledge. This provokes in her discourse the desire, which teaches us why education fails.[5]

Moving on to the psychoanalytic discourse, we can't fail to recognize that it was born out of listening to the discourse of the Hysteric, a discourse that, prior to Freud, was submitted to Charcot, to Liébault, and others who, in one way or another oscillated between Master (S_1) to Knowledge (S_2). With psychoanalysis, the impossibility is not so much the task of analysing as it is to be analyst. It is through the abandoning of all knowledge — thus the character of the impossible task — that Freud listens, and it is in this listening — as I said ten years ago in my first seminar in Australia — that a new discourse was born.

The impossibility of psychoanalysis resides in the fact that the analyst gives up all illusion of totality, legislation or power. Briefly, the analyst should know at least one thing if he is to remain in such a place and that is that he will become that nothing, called *objet petit a*. But as soon as this is stated, the analyst can also be "too shrewd to be honest", thus having a conception of the analysis from beginning to end in order to avoid the anxiety and the effect of the de-subjectification to which he will arrive at the end of the analysis of his analysand.

It is for this reason that we must point out here a current phenomenon in psychoanalysis. We refer to the known figure of the so-called analyst who once more has receded to the position of the Master or of the educator, thus becoming the one who possesses and delivers the goods. Psychoanalysis described this long ago as the perverse position; a position maintained by suggestion and power. It is for this reason that the analyst is not better equipped than others to avoid the phenomena of the psychology of the group whose dynamics are no secret: suggestion and idealization with the hypnotic results of living a life through the leader in question. These mass or group phenomena are what turn analysis sterile. To prove this, it is sufficient to read what has been produced by the above group phenomena.

The Freudian School of Melbourne has no particular place under the sun and no predetermined future. The only thing of which we can give a testimony today is that these ten years of existence without any external help, and moreover, without compromising our relation with the psychoanalytic discourse, give us at least the credit for the value of our work.

The sub-title of this paper, left in reserve, is: *How does the analyst work?* For this immense topic, I will examine two styles of the same ethic: one of Freud, the other of Lacan.

In 1911, Freud had in psychoanalytic treatment, a patient known as

Dr. A., referred to him by Edoardo Weiss. The only thing that we have about this patient is a letter from Freud to Weiss written on 26th June, 1919, in which Freud made it clear that Dr. A. had been in analysis with him. Four months later, on 3rd October, 1919, Freud gave a diagnosis and prognosis of this patient:

> "Since you (Weiss) asked me for my opinion about Dr. A... I will tell you at once that I think he's not adequate for psychoanalytic treatment. For it, he lacks two conditions. First, a painful conflict between his I and his pulsion, since deep down he is very happy as he is. His only suffering is the resistance of external circumstances. Secondly, he lacks a fairly normal character. Both deficiencies coincide at the end in one characteristic, the formation of a monstrously narcissistic ego, impermeable to all influence. In my opinion, it is of no use for him to be seen by myself or someone else for a psychoanalytic treatment..."
>
> "... the problem is a technical one. The second case, the Slovenian, is obviously a scoundrel who does not deserve our effort. Our analytic art fails with such people, our intelligence doesn't reach either the dynamic relations which they mastered. I have not answered him directly, and I suppose that you will get rid of him."

Now we will refer to the answer given by Lacan on *Television*, during a programme called *Psychoanalysis* in regard to three Kantian questions; "What can I know?", "What ought I to do?" and "What may I hope for?"

We are taking the third question.

> "As to 'What may I hope for?' ... I just want you to know that more than once I've seen hope — what is called bright new tomorrows — drive people I've valued as much as I value you, to kill themselves. And why not? Suicide is the only act that can succeed without misfiring ... So that Kant's question may have meaning, I'm going to transform it into: From where do you hope?' You'd then want to know what analytic discourse can

> promise *you*, since for me everything is already *sewn up*. Psychoanalysis would allow you, of course, the hope of refining and clarifying the unconscious of which you're the subject. But everyone knows that I don't encourage anyone into it, anyone whose desire is not resolute. Furthermore — and I am sorry to refer to some ill-bred people — I think the psychoanalytic discourse should be withheld from scoundrels: surely it is what's behind Freud's so-called criterion of culture. Ethical criteria are unfortunately no more reliable. They (the scoundrels) in any case, may be judged by other discourses, and if I dare to pronounce that analysis should be withheld from scoundrels it's because it renders them dumb — certainly an improvement, but without hope, to go back to your term."

I have included these two examples in order to clarify how both Freud and Lacan consider the limits of the psychoanalytic discourse as different from the psychoanalytic cure.

While the psychoanalytic discourse studies those structures referred to above, it finds its limits in regard to any possible treatment of them.

Indeed, psychoanalyis does not make better people because it's not what the analyst puts in but the stuff with which each one comes to analysis. Goodness and badness belong to other discourses, particularly that of the Master, who always offers the supreme good.

Freud's patient and the subject to which Lacan refers are not just problems of symptoms but of structure. Analytic treatment produces effects, no doubt, and even cures. However, we are always far from reaching this point.

The desire of the analyst is not self-explanatory. Even the expression *desire of the analyst* refers to the *desire of the Other*. The function of this desire is clearer for the analyst, from the moment in which he becomes the de-supposed subject of knowing, and this is so because of the correlation between desire and transference.

Taking all this into account, we may ask why there should be an institution and, moreover, why a school of psychoanalysis? Answer: Because if the analyst does not have a place where he can share his

practice, his discoveries, his stumbling blocks, with other analysts, then that practice is no more than the prestige of magic or, at its very best, suggestion.

María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner and I, both Argentinian and analysts of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires, founded in 1977 with Gayle Paull and John Dingle, both Australian, the Freudian School of Melbourne. In the tenth year of this foundation, this clarification was due.

History is not only the past, but the narration of what has been done. This marks the step from platonic reminiscence to the psychoanalytic act. *The Freudian School of Melbourne*, a school of psychoanalysis, founded without holding a relationship of dependency to the so-called metropolis of analysis, proves that the reunion of analysts is always a possibility when the horizon of work is psychoanalysis. This can be written by noting down that it is 'a' and not S_1 or S_2 which is the cause of the psychoanalytic act.

The psychoanalyst is he who follows the ethics of the well said disarticulating beliefs and opening the path for a desire.

To conclude, let us remember again Freud and Lacan at the very end of their lives. Freud said, "I succeeded in the creation of the International Psycho-Analytic Association, but the struggle is not yet over". Lacan told us, "I failed with my School, but I persevere".

Notes

1 FREUD,S. *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement,* St. Ed., Vol. XIV, p.7.

2 FREUD,S. *Idem, p.8.*

3 FREUD,S. Idem, p.13.

4 LACAN,J. *L' envers de la psychanalyse*, Seminar 1969/1970. Unpublished.

5 LACAN,J. *Radiophonie*, in *Silicet* 2/3, *Seuil*. Paris.

Freud and Janet on Organic and Hysterical Paralyses: A Mystery Solved?

• Malcolm Macmillan

When Freud reported to the College of Professors in the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Vienna on his 1885-1886 visits to Paris and Berlin, he said his discussions and correspondence with Charcot:

> "Led to my preparing a paper which is to appear in the Archive de Neurologie and is entitled Vergleichung der hysterischen mit der organischen Symptomatologie."[1]

However, as became clear later, the paper did not exist at the time Freud wrote his report. Two years later, he publicly foreshadowed that the paper was "shortly to appear"[2]. It did not. What Freud did publish in that year was an entry on hysteria for Villaret's *Handwörterbuch* that included much of the material found in the later paper. Only five years later again did the paper appear. When it did, the comparison was only of the organic and

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hysterical paralyses and the symptomatologies generally.

Freud introduced his paper by saying *Charcot had entrusted* or commissioned him with the task of making the comparison but that "accidental and personal reasons" had prevented him from carrying it out.[3]

No one has been able to identify these reasons or even hint at them. The question remains: why did Freud take seven years to complete his task and why was his eventual comparison restricted to the paralyses?

The Comparison

Let me clarify what Freud wanted to compare. It was clear enough that the characteristics of the distribution of an organic anaesthesia — its total nature and its irregular boundaries could be explained by the loss of function of sensory nerves but an hysterical anaesthesia could not. Similar differences distinguished the organic from the hysterical paralyses. But what other differences were there between organic and hysterical symptoms and what determined the peculiarities of the latter?

Freud's entry on hysteria in Villaret begins with the assertion that the essence of hysteria:

> "Should be expressed in a formula which took account of the conditions of excitability in the different parts of the nervous system."[4]

There being no such formula,

> "We must be content ... to define the neuroses in a purely nosographical fashion by the totality of symptoms occurring in it."[5]

After this apology, Freud went on to discuss the different symptoms. For the paralyses he formulated a specific, although negative rule:.

> "Hysterical paralyses take no account of the *anatomical structure* of the nervous system which, as is well known, shows itself most unambiguously in the distribution of organic paralyses."[6]

When discussing the general characteristics of hysterical symptoms, Freud went a little further:

> "They do not in any way present a copy of the *anatomical conditions* of the nervous system. It may be said that hysteria is as ignorant of the science of the nervous system as we ourselves before we have learnt it."[7]

But this generalization marks the limit of Freud's comparison.

A single point of difference between the conceptualizations in Villaret's *Handwörterbuch* and the long-delayed paper provides the key to solving our mystery. That difference concerns the contribution of ideas and affects to hysterical symptoms, more particularly how Freud brought those contributions together. But, rather than commence with that point, I shall start by considering separately how affect comes into psychoanalytic theory and how ideas contribute to hysterical symptoms.

Affect in Psychoanalysis

For most people interested in psychoanalysis, affect enters psychoanalytic theory as a direct consequence of Breuer's observations of Anna O., with the notion of "a quota of affect" being simply a conceptual refinement of these observations. This cannot be correct, however:

Firstly, Breuer's description of the treatment in the original case-notes is significantly different from the later account in placing no emphasis upon Anna O. expressing previously unexpressed *emotions*.[8] Rather, what Breuer emphasizes is *verbal* expression. The same is true of the *descriptive* parts of the published account.[9] Let me give the most striking example: the absence of an emotional reaction in the original description of Anna O.'s telling of the dog drinking out of the glass. But, in the later-published account, we find that that emotional quality has actually *been added*. What follows is a "composite" quotation, where I have added the *affective phrases* taken from the published account (in italics) to Breuer's original case notes:

> "... One evening she told, *with every sign of disgust*, how she had seen her lady companion's small dog, which disgusted her, *drink from a glass of water* and how she had said nothing, in order not to *appear rude (many weeks ago). 5 minutes later, after giving further energetic expression to the anger she had held back*, she complained of thirst, drank ½ bottle of water ... [8,9]

From this, it is clear Breuer uses the words "with every sign of disgust" to characterize Anna O.'s description of the scene before interpolating the phrase "after giving further energetic expression to the anger she had held back" between the end of the description and the request for water.

Freud, Jackson, Surplus Excitation, and Affects

Freud formally considered the possibility of the nervous system having the purpose of disposing of excessive quantities of excitation only after reading the work of Hughlings Jackson, the eminent British neurologist, in 1891, when he was preparing his monograph *On Aphasia*.[15] Jackson had argued that speech ejaculations...

> "...are all parts of emotional language; their utterance by healthy people is on the physical side a process during which the equilibrium of a greatly disturbed nervous system is restored, as are also ordinary emotional manifestations (...) all actions are in one sense results of restoration of nervous equilibrium by expenditure of energy.[16]

Freud first indicated his belief that the nervous system acted to reduce excitation only after reading Jackson's paper. Previously, he had only spoken of hysteria as being based on an abnormal distribution of a surplus of excitation.

Jackson also seems to have been the source of the notion that excessive affect could be disposed of by speech as well as by action. On the very page where Jackson spoke of speech ejaculations restoring an equilibrium, he quoted the opinions of two unknown authors, one about swearing as a safety-valve for feelings and a substitute for aggressive muscular action and the other that whoever first abused his fellow-man instead of knocking out his brains laid-the basis of civilization.[16] Freud repeated both of these points exactly in the first lecture he gave on his and Breuer's theory of hysteria in 1893.[17]

Ideas and Symptoms

At the Salpetrière Freud learned three things about the formation of hysterical symptoms: they resulted from an unconscious transformation of ideas that had escaped control of the ego[18] and they retained the sensory content of the ideas.

It was Pierre Janet, Charcot's follower, who developed the notion that hysterical symptoms were determined by ideas. Like Charcot, he was impressed by the failure of the "lesion" causing an anaesthesia to correspond with what was known from anatomy:

> "It is not the region innervated by the cubital or the median nerve that is anaesthetic — it is *the* hand or *the* wrist."[19]

He then drew the following extraordinarily novel conclusion, as illustrated in Figure 1:



Figure 1: Arm and hand as *ideas*

> "The localization is not anatomical, it is physiological, as M. Charcot rightly says. But I would like to add a word, this distribution corresponds to a very *crude*, very *common physiology*. When an hysterical patient has her hand paralysed, where should the insensitive area be? On the muscles that are not functioning, that *is* on the forearm. And yet, the anaesthesia is nearly always confined to the hand itself and to the wrist. In hysterical blindness, anaesthesia bears not only on the retina, but on the conjunctiva, and even on the eyelids: the amaurotic hysterical has spectacles of anaesthesia on the face. She has *lost her eye*, not only in the physiological sense, but in the *popular sense* of the word, namely all that fills

> the orbit. It would seem that, even in these localized anaesthesias, the habitual associations of our sensations, the *ideas* we conceive of our *organs*, play an important role and determine these distributions."[19]

Some of Charcot's patients had said almost as much. For example, one patient described his anaesthetic legs as though they were dead.[18] But, rather than stopping at a negative formula and invoking ignorance, Janet's characterization was positive: what was lost to normal consciousness was the idea of the organ or its function.

The understanding of hysterical anaesthesia had to be based on what the psychologist could contribute about the effect of ideas rather than on what the anatomist knew about the distribution of nerves or what the physiologist understood of physical function.

The Mystery Solved?

Janet's thesis is critically important to the solution of our mystery. It and its extension by Freud is all that distinguishes the long-delayed paper from the Villaret entry.

The first noticeable feature about Freud's paper is that it is in four sections, the first three probably being completed within two years of his return from Paris. The central conclusion of each of the first three sections had already been drawn in Charcot's own *Lectures*[18] and Freud himself had set them out, considerably more systematically than Charcot, in the Villaret entry.

The major and single point of difference is in the fourth section where Freud uses Janet's thesis as the basis for a physio-pathological formula. Without it he had been able only to describe the symptoms and to hint at an explanation in terms of some vaguely conceived consequences of changes in the distribution of excitation. Now he could say:

> "The paralysis of the arm consists in the fact that the conception of the arm cannot enter into association with the other ideas constituting the ego of which the subject's body forms an important part. The lesion would therefore be the *abolition of the associative accessibility of the conception of the arm.*"[20]

Affect also gained its place:

> "If the conception of the arm is involved in an association with a large quota of affect, it will be inaccessible to the free play of other associations."

Freud's development of Janet's thesis can be represented by Figure 2. Patients could not form associations between the ideas of their hands or arms and their other ideas *because* the large quota of affect made those ideas inaccessible.



Figure 2: 'Idea' of arm and hand 'cut off' by affect.

Immediately following this physio-pathological formulation, Freud emphasised its therapeutic implications:

> *"The arm will be paralysed in proportion to the persistence of this quota of affect or to its diminution by appropriate psychical means.* This is the solution of the problem we have raised, for, in every case of hysterical paralysis, we find that the

> *paralysed organ or the lost function is involved in a subconscious association which is provided with a large quota of affect and it can be shown that the arm is liberated as soon as this quota is wiped out.*"[21]

"The lesion" in hysteria was of the idea of the organ and its isolation was maintained by the intensity of the emotion accompanying it. In this way, then, Freud first publicly introduced emotion, more correctly "the quota of affect", into his theorizing.

We have the solution to our mystery in our grasp. Janet's thesis, and only that thesis, allowed what could be said about the mechanism of hysterical symptom formation to be lifted from the descriptive level of Charcot's conceptualization and placed within a sophisticated theoretical framework.

By now returning to the Salpetrière we find why Freud's paper was completed when it was. On 11 March, 1892, at a regular clinical meeting there, Janet read the first of what was to be a series of papers covering the major symptoms of hysteria. After dealing with hysterical anaesthesia, he went on to cover hysterical amnesia on 17 March and suggestibility on 1 April. [19], [22], [23] It was in the first of these papers that Janet presented his hypothesis about the determination of hysterical anaesthesias by ideas. Within days of the appearance of the first paper, on 29 June, 1892, Freud set out in a letter to Breuer the proposition that the nervous system acted to reduce excitation or keep it constant. The next day, in an outline of a part of the *Preliminary Communication* he also sent Breuer, he linked abreaction to Janet's concept by making a sub-conscious affective association responsible for the isolation.[24]

Until Janet extended Charcot's theses on the role of ideas, Freud had no conceptual framework from which he could even describe the functional peculiarities of hysterical symptoms, i.e. he was limited to a purely nosographical definition. After Janet, Freud could not only describe more adequately; he could explain and he could be original. Certainly the role Freud gave affect namely, to account for the isolation of hysterical symptoms is the only original notion in the paper. It is also a much more specific role than the conventionally vague one he gave it in Villaret.

Consequently, what Freud needed to complete his paper was a set of ideas allowing him to move from description to explanation in an original way. Janet made the clarification and his thesis allowed Freud to finish his paper. We can also surmise why Freud restricted himself to the paralyses:

they were the most important of the symptoms not included in Janet's comprehensive discussion.

All Freud now needed to do was to re-interpret the cases alread investigated by 'Breuer's method' in *affective terms*. So, again within days of the appearance of Janet's first paper, he told Fliess in a letter of 28 June, 1892, that Breuer had agreed to publish "our detailed theory of abreaction, and our other joint witticisms (Germ; 'Witze') on hysteria".[25] Here also Freud used the term 'abreaction' for the first time.

Whose Idea?

If I have solved one mystery, I may be left with two more, both bearing on priority. Let me start with the more complex. When Freud announced to Fliess in 1893 that his paper was probably to appear that August he described it as:

> "... Quite a short essay, *written so to speak on a single joke* (Germ: 'Witz').[25] (Translation modified, italics mine MBM.)

There are three oddities about the part of the sentence I have emphasized. The first is its omission from the earlier translation of the Freud-Fliess correspondence[26], the second is its literal meaning, and the third its interpretation.

Although we know the first editors of the correspondence left out many passages showing Freud's indebtedness to others, especially to Fliess[27], that may not be the reason for this omission. The literal meaning of the phrase is obscure. I believe Freud here uses "Witz" as a synonym for "work" as he did when he told Fliess that Breuer had agreed to publish their "joint witticisms" on hysteria. Those preparing the German edition of the correspondence misread Freud's "Witze" as "Mitteilungen", presumably because it was abbreviated, with the consequence that the editors of the English edition rendered it as "work" (Cf. Letter of 28.6.1892 in Freud, 1950, Freud 1950/1954, and Masson 1985).[25], [26] Quite inadvertently, the effect was to disguise the way Freud used "Witz". That error in turn made it impossible to interpret the phrase in the Letter of 10.7.1893, where "Witz" *next occurred. It was therefore left out. If* Freud went so far as to use "Witze" in a self-depreciatory way to refer to his and Breuer's ideas" (and that substitution reads quite well), this description of his paper on paralyses should be interpreted as a complex word-play on Janet's insight that ideas determined symptoms. That is certainly the single idea central to Freud's paper.

Now to the second mystery. In the paper itself, Freud was quick to give credit to Janet. After concluding his description of the differences between the paralyses he raised the problem of the nature of the "lesion" in hysteria. Although he accepted Charcot's characterization of it as "a dynamic lesion" he rejected the possibility that it might be a transitory organic affection. Were it such, the characteristics of the two kinds of paralyses would be the same. Since they were not, an emphatic restatement of his 1888 "ignorance" proposition was called for:

> "The lesion in hysterical paralyses must be completely independent of the anatomy of the nervous system, since *in its paralyses and other manifestations hysteria behaves as though anatomy did not exist or as though it had no knowledge of it.*"[28]

Then, for the very first time, he said hysteria:

> "Takes the organs in the ordinary, popular sense of the names they bear: the leg is the leg as far up as its insertion into the hip, the arm is the upper limb as it is visible under the clothing."[29]

Freud brought this section of the paper to a close by fully associating himself with Janet's views as they had been presented at the Salpetrière, adding:

> "They are confirmed as much by hysterical paralyses as by anaesthesia and psychical symptoms."[30]

As we have seen, Freud devoted the concluding section of the paper to the nature of the "lesion" and the sense in which it was dynamic. Again, as if echoing Janet, he began by requesting the specific permission of his readers "to move on to psychological ground" and introduced his discussion of the affect-laden idea with a further acknowledgement of Janet, explicitly relating his formulations about hysteria being ignorant of the anatomy of the nervous system to Janet's formulation on ideas.[31]

Nearly thirty years after 1892, in *An Autobiographical Study*, Freud denied Janet any credit at all:

> "Before leaving Paris I discussed with (Charcot) a plan for a comparative study of hysterical and organic paralyses. I wished to establish the thesis that in hysteria paralyses and anaesthesias of the various parts of the body are demarcated according to the popular idea of their limits and not according to anatomical facts.[32]

No contemporaneous evidence exists of Freud's discussing the role of "the popular idea" with Charcot. All I have said speaks against it: there is no mention of it in the Villaret entry but it does have the central role in the long-delayed paper and there Freud explicitly acknowledges Janet. Why then did Freud not mention Janet in 1925? Had the passage of time made him forget? Possibly. Had the well-documented antagonism Freud held toward Janet falsified his memory? Possibly. Had his transformation of Janet's thesis tricked his memory into thinking he was also responsible for the original? Again, possibly. Was the transformation so important to the founding of psycho-analysis that the notion had to be his in its entirety? That too is possible.

It was probably Janet's conceptualization that ended the seven year delay and provided an important part of the basis for Freud to found psycho-analytic theory on the vicissitudes of affective life.

Let me finish on a more fanciful note. According to Masson,[33] Charcot marked his own copy of the journal in which Freud's paper appeared at exactly the point where Freud states the 1893 version of the hysteria-as-ignorance view. Since Masson's discussion is also in a context which represents Freud as the originator of Janet's thesis, he thereby implies Charcot's recognition of Freud's originality. Charcot's markings cannot have that significance. Freud had stated the ignorance view earlier. For Charcot to have recognized Freud's originality, he would have had to have marked the passages where Freud extended and transformed Janet's well-known thesis. However, I like to think Charcot was pointing to the locale if not the scene of a crime. Admittedly it was a crime not then committed, a potential crime as it were, but a crime nevertheless, a crime committed in what might be entitled "The case of the purloined idea".

Notes

[1] FREUD, S. (1886), *Report on my studies in Paris and Berlin*, St.Ed., Vol.1, pp. 5-15.

[2] FREUD, S. (1888a), *Hysteria*, ibid. pp. 41-57.

[3] FREUD, S. (1893b) *Some points for a comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralyses*, ibid. pp. 160-172

[4] FREUD, S. (1888a), *Hysteria*, ibid. p.41.

[5] FREUD, S. ibid. p.41.

[6] FREUD, S. ibid. p.46.

[7] FREUD, S. ibid. pp. 48-49.

[8] HIRSCHMULLER, A. (1979), *Physiologie und Psychoanalyse in Leban and Werk Joseph Breuers*, Hans Huber, Bern, pp. 360-61.

[9] BREUER, J. and FREUD, S. (1895), *Studies on Hysteria*, St.Ed., Vol. II, pp. 21-41.

[10] FREUD, S. (1888a), *Hysteria*, St.Ed., Vol. I, p. 41-57.

[11] ANDERSON, O. (1962), *Studies in the Prehistory of Psychoanalysis*, Stockholm, Srenska Bokförlaget.

[12] MACMILLAN, M. B. (1979), *Delboef and Janet as influences in Freud's treatment of Emmy von N.*, J.Hist.Soc.Sc.,15,299-309.

[13] BREUER, J. and FREUD, S. (1895), *Studies on Hysteria*, ibid. Vol. II, p.135.

[14] FREUD, S. (1888b), *Preface to the translation of Bernheim's "Suggestion"*, St.Ed., Vol.1, pp. 75-85.

[15] FREUD, S. (1893a), *On Aphasia: A Critical Study*, (E. Stengel, Transl. 1953), N.Y: Int. Univ. Press.

[16] JACKSON, H. (1878-80) *On affections of speech from disease of the brain, Brain*, I (pp. 304-330), *Brain*, II (pp. 203-222 and pp. 323-356).

[17] FREUD, S. (1893a) *On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena*, St.Ed., Vol. III, pp. 27-39.

[18] CHARCOT, J.-M. (1887) *Clinical lectures on diseases of the nervous system*, (T. Savill, Transl. 1889) London: New Sydenham Society.

[19] JANET, P. (1892a) *L'anesthesie hystérique, Archives de Neurologie*, 23, pp. 323-52.

[20] FREUD, S. (1893b), *Some points for a comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralyses*, St.Ed., Vol. I., p. 170.

[21] ibid p. 171.

[22] JANET, P. (1892b), *L'amnesie hystérique, Archives de Neurologie*, 24, pp. 29-55.

[23] JANET, P. (1892c), *La suggestion chez les hystériques*, ibid pp. 448-69.

[24] FREUD, S. (1892), *Sketches for the Preliminary Communication of 1893*, St.Ed., Vol. I, pp. 147-54.

[25] MASSON, J.M. (1985), *The Complete Letters of S. Freud to W. Fliess 1887-1904*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press Letter 13 of 28.06.1892.

[26] FREUD, S. (1950), *The Origins of Psychoanalysis*, N.Y., Basic Books.

[27] SULLOWAY, F.J. (1979), Freud: *Biologist of the Mind*, N.Y. Basic Books.

[28] FREUD, S. (1893B), *Some points for a comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralyses*, St.Ed.,Vol. I, p. 169.

[29] ibid.

[30] ibid.

[31] ibid p. 170.

[32] FREUD, S. (1925), *An autobiographical study*, St.Ed., Vol.XX, pp. 7-74.

[33] MASSON (1985), op. cit. p. 22.

Desire and its Interpretation

• Moustapha Safouan

The idea of the subject arises from the Freudian distinction between a line of discourse which progresses in its own way and another line which



Schema L

• Analyst, ex *L'Ecole freudienne de Paris.*

crosses it and which represents the *I* in so far as it cuts across this line. This intersection is given expression in the following ways — in forgetting, omissions, silences, mutism, feelings of presence, acting out, etc. The schema L of Lacan is made up precisely of these two intersecting lines.

Since it is always a desire which is represented in the line O—S, we can define the subject of the unconscious as one who desires, a *desidero*.

Now, just as wit is found to reside in the subtlety of what Freud calls its verbal technique, to the point that this technique cannot be dispensed with by reduction to retain only the meaning of the *Witz* without suppressing the humour at the same time; so desire cannot be separated from the misleading detours of the discourse in which it is signified and without which it would evaporate (*sans qu'il se volatilise*).[1]

The structural affinity between the dream and the joke is Freud's major discovery. It is *major* in the sense that he says that the *Traumdeutung* is his major work.

It is this affinity which allows us to conclude on the subject of either formation of the unconscious, that all lies in the technique. This is what Lacan means when he says that desire must be taken literally (*à la lettre*). Undo the play on words in which it is signified and it is desire itself which disappears (*...c'est le desir comme tel qui s'envole*).

All that remains is a signification which reduces it to a demand.

If the wit who remarked of the seizure of the estates of the d'Orleans family in uttering the joke quoted by Freud, "*C'est le premier vol de l'aigle*" ("This is the first flight/theft of the eagle") had said rather: "This Napoléon III is a thief" he would have provoked a riposte from his adversaries. It could even have come to blows. By calling upon the resources of wit, he turned his adversaries into an amused audience. He succeeded here, in so far as he was addressing himself not to the opinions they held but to what could be called their better knowledge *(savoir)*.

It is in addressing this better knowledge and not their person that an accord becomes possible.This is something approaching what could be called *analytic reasoning* at least in the framework of our experience.

For example, an analysand who works in what is known as a "big business" (*une grosse boite*) received a circular from his boss which ended with these words, *Croyez, cher Collegue, à l'expression de ma parfaite vigilance*". Be assured dear colleague of my complete vigilance.[2]

That night he had this dream : "I was in a waste land with a crowd of people all employed by the company. The boss was giving flying lessons (*leçons de vol*). Mme. Z. (who was known to be the boss' mistress) was flying with extraodinary ease, whizzing through the air. The others could fly quite well. In my case, however, it was a pathetic effort. I could hardly get myself off the ground without immediately falling back down." If the analysand, when he received the circular, had simply said indignantly: "*Ce voleur qui ose parler de sa vigilance, etc.*" ("This thief who dares to talk about his vigilance...") one could infer the existence of a wish repressed with all the energy he spends on condemning the dishonesty of his boss. But it is precisely this wish which has found the means of being signified in the dream thanks to the above mentioned technique of the play on the double meaning of the word *vol*. "*Si je savais si bien voler*" ("If only I knew how to fly/steal so well!"). The interpretation should be worded in the same terms as the recounting of the dream, that is to say, by keeping the same technique which in this case is that of double meaning. Otherwise the desire to steal would be reduced to a wish to fly.

Thus it is proper to unconscious desire to be inarticulable, just as the joke is irreducible. It follows from this: a) that desire is in no way demand, and b) that one should not simply be content to describe its object as belonging to the register of the imaginary, since one can just as easily say what one imagines. Can we conclude from this that it is without object? This would be to disregard psychoanalysis which is nothing if not the discovery of the object.

Now psychoanalysis describes the relationship with this object in terms of identification. It concerns itself particularly with phallic identification. Consequently, if a male subject identifies with the phallus, it means that he is not simply satisfied with having it, but still more (*encore*) wants to actually be it. So we are dealing with an incompleteness which is situated on another plane entirely from that of possessing it ..., and which cannot be adequately described by the term "*Penis-neid*" in the case of she who does not possess it. It is also obvious that identification cannot annul this incompleteness. On the contrary, the more the subject, male or female, is led in the direction of identification as a negation or attempt to surmount this incompleteness, the more this feeling becomes aggravated and perpetuated.

Beyond this, it is understood that this incompleteness gives rise to a libidinal structure such that the subject would not be content with being for the Other the object of its need or of its love, but would take the place of the cause of this incompleteness. And it is here that sexual desire is revealed in

its unconscious foundation. The identification of the *I*, not with the object by means of which sexuality is introduced into the human being and to which Lacan has given the symbol $-\varphi$ but more precisely with the image of the organ to which this object is linked, means that the subject uses his own incompleteness, his *manque-à-être* (his want to be) to interpret the lack in the Other. This is a process which does not occur without some deception concerning this lack, which presents itself in this situation as a lack of... whatever it is that he is identified with, and identifies as his ego ideal, both together. I would go so far as to say that the purpose of this identification is precisely to identify the lack in the Other, to *intentionalise* it in such a way that it takes on the form of a lack of; in other words to reduce the unknown to the known. The obsessional is exemplary in this; he who imagines not that the woman has it, but that she desires to have it.

It is from this identification or from this intentionalization of the unspeakable of what the subject is, that what we might choose to call benign fears (*les craintes heureuses*) are born (although these may turn into *Angst* to the extent that they carry the threat that the object that I am may appear) : fear in the male that it might be taken from him, fears shared equally in the male and female of being raped, of being impregnated, not forgetting fears of being devoured or discarded as waste (*jeté(e) aux ordures*).

These latter examples remind us that what applies in the case of phallic desire goes equally for the other regressive desires, oral and anal. In fact, one could even ask whether the purpose of castration or of $-\varphi$ isn't to assimilate genital desire into the structure of desire in general. We must make explicit the conditions which dictate this structure of desire.

In articulating the demand, replies Lacan, the subject has the experience that he is. This experience is of no great novelty,as one could say that he has already had it when confronted with his specular image in the mirror before being capable of articulating any demand whatever. What is new here, is that he does it in the form of a question, or from a desire to know what he is. Desire which is addressed to the Other which has mediated his return to the field of language and which is for the subject, the place of this language. So above all, he experiences at the same time the fact that there is no reply to this question.

Indeed the Other submerges him with its: "You are this or that," or again: "Be or don't be this or that," and these words whether he adopts them as his own, or whether he takes exception to them, can only describe him as the subject of the statement (*sujet de l'énoncé*). (I am or am not what you

say.) Far from finishing there, the subject of the enunciation (*le sujet de* l' énonciation) will rebound from beyond the words. Henceforth, why not define the subject by the negativity which goes beyond all definition, and define desire as the concern which surpasses all limits?

This reply would hold if psychoanalysis had not shown that there is no such thing as infinite desire, by discovering a limited number of objects, which because of their very loss become part of the being of the subject which escapes the bounds of what can be covered by language. It could just as well be said that they become the reason for the division of the subject while at the same time marking with their distinctive stamps the subject of the enunciation.

In so far as the breast is concerned, it seems likely that this object is detached from the infant, (even before weaning) and that it is by virtue of this that he finds it again....in his thumb or in some other "transitional" object. Likewise, the erotisation of the scybale (stool) is inseparable from its undetachable aspect which destines it to be symbolised as a gift. The phallus itself is not detachable. But it is precisely this which makes it imperative to introduce a symbolic lack on this level.

So it follows that one could say that these objects cannot be articulated because they are articulated in the unconscious as a means of recovery or cause of desire. Far from having to reduce desire to a demand, even if the element of need be taken from it, or even if it were "archaic" as we say, the function of the interpretation is to preserve the unspeakable place of desire.

The foregoing allows us to be brief about the construction of Seminar XI. The ideas introduced in this seminar at the same time move away from the preceding concepts and yet reiterate them in a more rigorous way.

The definition of the signifier as being that which represents the subject for another signifier relates to the moment of alienation, where the subject disappears under S_2, the binary signifier, which is the *Vorstellungrepräsentanz*. It is apparent that it is in this moment that the *objet a* is articulated in the unconscious as cause of desire.Can we speak here of identification? Yes, in so far as the desire as *want to be* is sustained by this unspeakable object that the subject loses as part of *himself*. There is here an identification in the sense of the mark that the subject receives from the signifier at the level of enunciation, but also in the sense of the impossibility of identity. Perhaps the real is to be sought in relation to this impossibility. The identification here is first and foremost a function of the symbolic or of introjection.

The return, not without torsion and trickery of the lack of the alienation in the time of separation, corresponds to the moment in which the subject identifies *himself*, *i.e.* identifies his *I* as well as his ego ideal with the image of the organ linked to the *objet a*. The identification here is above all a function of the imaginary or of projection.

It is obvious that we are not referring here to two successive times, since it is with his *I* that the subject automatically thinks his being to be. I would even say that the removal of the *want-to-be* from the alienation is the essential process of analysis.

To give an idea of this process, we must recall Lacan's formula where the subject is situated in an undetermined position under the network of signifiers that S_2 produces. In fact, it is possible for the subject to appear in any or all the forms which emanate from the signifier *vol* (theft/flight) in the dream I have just recounted — the boss, the mistress, the employees. This does not necessarily mean that the dream is pliable in every sense. There is only one of these "which must not be missed" — which does not necessarily mean that it must be communicated.

Besides, what is vital in the interpretation, what is essential for the realisation of the subject, is not the meaning as such, but the bringing of the signifier *vol* into prominence.

This way of realisation of the subject leads to the discovery of the *non-sensical* signifier where a regressive desire, caught in the nets of narcissism defines itself by identification with the object which corresponds to it.

According to Lacan, the moment of this discovery is the one in which it becomes apparent that the act of desiring is that of a want-to-be excluding the *explanation* as well as what G.Poulet calls "non-determined thought", whose negative theology gives us the prime example.

It is also the moment where in the same way the non-essential of the supposed subject of knowing (*sujet supposé savoir*) becomes apparent... in other words when the pointlessness of waiting for a meaning, bearing on the being of the subject becomes apparent that is to say a meaning bearing on what he represents or desires to represent.

Seen in the light of transference, one can say that the subject of the transference, in accordance with the algorithm of the *proposition* is free in relation to the signifier i.e. free of all meaning, except the desire to know what is separate from this very relationship. This latter is resolved in the hole which is in the centre of the place of the Other. It is a moment when it

could be said that the subject is this very hole or this unrepresentable-φ.

Translated by Sylvia Sagona.

Notes

1 Translator's note: Just as a joke cannot be explained without losing the humour, a pun cannot be translated. This is the first of several in the paper based on the two meanings of the word *vol*, i.e. flight and theft.

2 Translator's note : Presumably intending to convey concern, but correctly indicating mistrust.

Transference, Suggestion and Acting Out

*Alan Large

"I had not expected that anyone who had reached a certain depth in his understanding of analysis could renounce that understanding and lose it ... I had to learn that the very same thing can happen with psychoanalysts"

Sigmund Freud [1]

"There is nothing for which men's capabilites are less suited than psychoanalysis"

Sigmund Freud [2]

"A certain use of interpretation as the sleight of hand of comprehension. An interpretation whose effects are understood is not a psychoanalytic interpretation"

Jacques Lacan [3]

"Schemes of improvement are very laughable things"

Dr. Samuel Johnson

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This paper is an effect of my reading of The International Journal of *Psychoanalysis on the subjects of Transference* and Acting Out. Many writers show concern with achieving therapeutic benefit as the prime function of their psychoanalytic work. The wish to move the analysand in a desirable direction permeates these papers. Sigmund Freud warned about therapeutic zeal. He placed therapeutic benefit as an after effect or side effect of psychoanalysis.

The zeal Freud warns against enters when there are injunctions to therapists to facilitate results from psychoanalysis that are in the direction of adaptation and less destructive compromises with so-called reality. It also enters when psychoanalytic concepts become taken up in the practice of a technique, become operational utilitarian concepts that impose a direction on the analysis.

Suggestion is at work, in psychoanalysis taken as a therapy, by the way in which the analyst works with transference and acting out. The wish to move, to heal, to synthesize remains powerful despite Freud's warning. All analysts are repelled by the idea of therapeutic zeal and all will disclaim it, but everyone endorses the value of psychoanalysis as a therapy.

It is not always easy to recognise the instrinsic moral position in the practice and theoretical formulations of those analysts who, in the interest of those who suffer and are called patient, exercise power. The wish to have power can use transference, that condition within which a psychoanalytic discourse may unfold, not to permit unfolding, but to impose change. Here, in the analyst, the wish for power is opposed to the desire to hear.

Suggestion refers to the insertion and imposition of ideas, to exerting influence toward change; to procedures and schemes of improvement; to the facilitation or enhancement of an idea of health; to the diminution of what is "objectionable and abnormal" and of what is designated as bad as opposed to what is designated good. Suggestion is a transference of authority from an Other.

Most writers take interpretation of the transference as the lynch pin of the therapeutic effect. There is a workman-like neatness, simplicity and hopefulness about the use of intepretation of the transference as a tool by which hitherto repressed impulses, ideas and affects can be made available to the synthetic function of the ego and thereby provide insight and understanding.

Psychoanalysis practiced in this way as a therapy becomes an attempt to protect the I from the unconscious. What better way *not* to approach the unconscious than to claim to be doing so on its alleged central path, the

interpretation of the transference.

Transference was discovered at a time when psychotherapeutic approaches were based entirely on suggestion. Transference was first seen as an obstacle and then as an aid to the psychoanalytic cure. For many analysts the concept remains at a utilitarian level for the benefit of the patient. It is even said that analysts who do not use it in this way deprive their patients of their chance of cure, that it may be unethical not to provide the understanding that relieves the sufferer. These ideas derive in large measure from a captivation of psychoanalysis in systems based on values and a naive pre-Freudian biological and reality based ideology. In this model, transference is to be recognised, known, understood, stated, expounded and if the interpretation is correct the transference will be *liquidated.*

Acting out is to be recognized, known, understood, announced, denounced and thereby undercut as an opponent of the forward movement of the treatment. Analysis using transference in this way must surely be one of Dr. Johnson's "schemes of improvement" and lies in the field of suggestion.

Sigmund Freud began a struggle. In 1938 he said that "the struggle was not yet over". Psychoanalysis as a method of therapy was taken by well meaning persons to respond to the demand for relief of suffering. There was a melding of psychoanalysis into a psychoanalytic psychiatry. In some circles it lost all its particular characteristics and the Freudian unconscious became the pre-Freudian romantic unconscious of the poets, eclectic psychiatrists and psychologists. Transference became that mistaken displacement of recognition that could be corrected by accurate interpretation from the stand point of the analyst's reality.

In 1920 Ernest Jones[4] referred to the way in which acquiescence to new ideas rests on the condition that their value is discounted and their meaning diluted until harmless. An example of this is the dilution of the concept of transference as being simply an inappropriate repetition and a practical idea in the service of therapeutic goals, thus rendering harmless the consequence of Freud's discovery.

Interpretation of the transference became that tool that claimed to mollify early life traumas and their consequences by bringing to consciousness for detoxification and synthesis what was chaotic and dangerous in the Id by deliberate and systematic work by trained and empathic psychoanalytic practitioners. Transference interpretation could be taught and learned. Transference interpretation captured analysts in its promise of

effectiveness, potency, good effect, earning one's fees properly, fulfilling one's responsibility to the patient and society. Its ethics is based on morality, the morality of good bowel movements, not an ethics based on the desire to speak to one who desires to listen to the unconscious.

The history of suggestion at work in psychoanalysis may be traced back to 1781 when Anton Mesmer[5] wrote "magnetism must be transmitted by feeling. Feeling alone can render its theory (of therapeutic effect) intelligible".

Mesmer postulated a fluid to account for the action of the magnetist - physician on his patient, perhaps as an attempt to depersonalise the powerful affective relationship he recognized. Colleagues of Mesmer made their magnetic passes at two inches from the patient's body in order not to make physical contact. In a secret report on Animal Magnetism or Mesmerism made to Louis XVI in 1784 it is stated, "Whatever the illness may be, it does not deprive us of our sex and it does not entirely withdraw us from the power of the other sex. The magnetic treatment must necessarily be dangerous to morality". The power of what was later called transference love was clearly felt and known.

In 1787 Charles De Villers believed that the curative factor resided in the will of the therapist to cure his patient and in the affection he felt for him. "I carry within me the where-with-all to relieve my fellow. The most sublime part of my being is dedicated to that purpose. In the feeling of the most tender concern my friend is assured of finding a remedy for his ills." He warned against the relationship assuming an erotic character. "The very strong affection for the magnetist persists even after the treatment has ended."

In 1818 Jean Jacques Virey wrote, "Magnetism is nothing more than the result of emotions produced by imagination or by the affection between individuals, principally that which arises from sexual relations.

The subject becomes attached to his magnetist as to a caressing angel, a being sublime in his benificence. Magnetism is solely the action which sentient beings exert one upon the other".

Animal magnetism was a powerful therapy. A wish to heal operated together with a desire to exercise power, to remove symptoms and to install health. All this resonates with the attitudes found in the papers I will refer to.

In the second half of the nineteenth Century magnetism became hypnosis and suggestion was confirmed as the explanation for its effect.

Suggestion, however, was regarded as a neurophysiological influence which was another attempt to depersonalise the relationship between doctor and patient. Bernheim was finally to state, "There is no hypnotism, there is only suggestion".

In December 1887 Freud introduced hypnosis into his regular practice and stated, "There was something positively seductive in working with hypnotism. For the first time there was a sense of having overcome one's helplessness". One reason he abandoned hypnosis may well have been the episode in which a female patient flung her arms around him. She was one of his most aquiescent patients, with whom hypnotism had enabled him to relieve her by tracing back her attacks of pain to their origins. He said, "When she threw her arms around my neck I did not attribute this to my own irresistible personal attraction and I now grasped the mysterious element behind hypnotism". He envisaged a third person interposed between the patient and himself and this may be regarded as the starting point of the concept of transference. Freud told the story to Joseph Breuer in order to reassure him about his misadventure with Anna O.. Breuer's response was, "This is the most important thing we two have to give to the world". Therapists who had been haunted by the possible erotic complications of their relationship could hence forth feel as reassured as Breuer had been by Freud. Transference was a means of defence against the potential erotic demands of patients and against the analyst's own temptations. In an article in 1963 Thomas Szasz[6] saw a practical use for the concept of transference in preserving psychoanalysis as a therapeutic enterprise. He said it detached from the analyst the sexual temptation in the love offered to him by patients. He traced this from the time when Freud used it as the way of allaying the anxiety of his colleague Breuer and of his own fiancee Martha.

The question of the "reality" of the love in tranference love is not open to answer. It is a matter of each party's opinion. What is in question is the desire and the act of each party and the consequences of it. Freud began to think in a new way about the patient's action. By displacing the patient's demands to another he was able to remain with and question his position in relation to the patient.

Freud used the concept transference as a shield in his courageous investigations by calling transference a false connection. My contention is that the whole therapeutic enterprise can be used as a shield behind which we may advance, but often do not, in the field of the unconscious.

I trace this history to show that suggestion was in psychoanalysis from the beginning in association with its therapeutic aims. In my view, that psychoanalysis that is the heir of the transmission of Mesmer is a therapy that uses technique towards results expressed in terms such as development, adaptation and maturity. That psychoanalysis that is the heir of the transmission of Sigmund Freud makes therapeutic benefit an after effect.

Suggestion is centrally important to effective work in the fields of medicine, politics and the theatre. It has remained in psychoanalysis in forms such as in the medicalisation of psychoanalysis, in the moral underpinning of psychoanalysis as a profession which addresses those who wish to have psychoanalysis as a treatment, and in those training analyses by which it is hoped to eliminate obstacles to the achievement of therapeutic powers within trainees.

I want to comment on the therapeutic enterprise embedded in the practice and theory of psychoanalysis exemplified in some papers. I can only tell you that this is what has been written. You may not wish to believe that this is what was meant but nevertheless it is what has been written. In quoting these authors I am transmitting a selection of words they used. This selection has the quality of an interpretation, in that you are hearing a message returned.

In a symposium entitled *The Curative Factors in Psychoanalysis*, held in 1961 at Edinburgh at the 22nd Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association, the first paper was presented by Maxwell Gitelson, an eminent American psychoanalyst.[7] He gives some degree of support of the thesis of my paper. "Analysts have leaned over backwards to avoid the formal appearance of being interested in cure as such but a goal directed point of view tends to characterise much of what passes for psychoanalysis today. Some analysts have been content that with the application of correct technique the patient has got well. Disappointment in therapeutic results and a wish to diminish the narcissistic wound to the analyst has led to the introduction of some kind of therapeutic activity as opposed to the so-called passivity of psychoanalysis". He describes a therapeutic intention present in the "normal" psychoanalytic situation and he compares psychoanalysis to the situation of a child developing into adulthood. He touches on a major confusion between the field of psychoanalysis and the field of development, of maturation of functions in biological terms and in psychosocial adaptation. This confusion with a neighbouring but essentially unrelated field has led to the formulation of

goals for psychoanalysis as aims of treatment to do with facilitating development and maturation.

Gitelson quotes Anna Freud that, "The aim with a child in psychoanalysis is to lift the child to a secondary level of development through the use of the analyst as a new object". This model of psychoanalysis is that of the more or less good mother/child relation. Gitelson takes the curative factors in psychoanalysis to be the analyst's personal qualitites and the patient's intrinsic potentiality for development and maturation. He refers to the analyst's "compassionate healing intention" and to the analyst's "expectations and anticipations of what the patient might become" and says this desirable stance is a response to the patient's need for help and is the basis of analytic empathy. It converges with the patient's need for ego support and the analyst, like the mother, assumes the function of an auxilliary ego. He concludes, "This is the basis of a good psychoanalytic situation". Like the mother, the analyst provides the erupting instincts and revived developmental drive with direction and purpose. He says, "The analyst's task is equivalent to the steadiness of the effective mother. The analyst provides a sustaining grid of understanding which leads towards co-operation and identification.

Another speaker Sacha Nacht of Paris[8] asks the question, "If the analyst is not perceived as a good object and behind the necessary benevolent neutrality to have a genuine benevolence, how can the patient himself become better?"

The third major speaker on this panel was Hanna Segal, the English analyst of the Kleinian school.[9] She said, "The analyst must never lose sight of the fact that his contractual relationship to his patient is therapeutic. Our acceptance of the patient and his fees implies that we believe psychoanalysis is, for him, the treatment of choice." I read this to mean that the analyst is obligated to be therapeutic. She claims that Freud stated that the primary aim of the analyst is to know and that all interventions, all active participation with the patient except interpretation will blur the transference and therefore interfere with the clarity of the *analyst's* vision and undertanding. She is saying then, that it is the analyst who is the one to know, understand, and see clearly.

She continues, "There is no contradiction between psychoanalysis and being psychotherapeutic if we accept that insight is the central factor in the therapeutic process and a precondition of lasting personality change. Insight is the acquisition of knowledge about one's unconscious by experiencing consciously and being able to acknowledge explicitly and

verbally hitherto unconscious process. Insight must be correct and deep enough to illuminate the early processes in which the ego is structured." She places central importance on knowledge, knowledge that comes first to the analyst. It is a knowledge which brings about personality change i.e. in ego structures, i.e. in the identifications. She continues, "The deeper the insight, the richer and more stable will be the therapeutic result. Such insight can only be experienced in the transference in which the patient can relive his past and present, real and phantasied". She is saying that psychic structure is modified through the analyst's understanding conveyed to the patient. "The analyst shall be there as a person whose sole function is to understand sympathetically and communicate to the patient such relevant knowledge that the analyst has acquired, when the analysand is ready to understand it".

She says insight is therapeutic in that, "It helps regain and reintegrate lost parts of the ego. This is inevitably accompanied by a more correct perception of reality. It replaces omnipotence with knowledge and enables a person to deal with his own feelings and the world in more realistic views". This is to take transference as a displacement that can be corrected by interpretations in accord with the analyst's reality. She makes a disclaimer when she says, "Cure does not mean conformity with any stereotyped pattern of normality prejudged by the analyst". She then says that cure *does* mean restoring to the patient the capacity to assess correctly internal and external reality. My questions of this model of psychoanalysis are, "Where is the unconscious except as a container of resources of knowledge revealed for the analyst's understanding which is then presented to the consciousness of the patient?" In my view the unconscious is *never* revealed nor addressed in this way, that is, sensibly. I ask also, "Where is the analysis in this, the openings of the unconscious through its formations in the discourse, heard and returned but never known and understood by the surprised analyst?"

Hanna Segal presents a case to show how beneficial change follows insight. In this she reveals something of her view of an analyst and the aim of analysis. A young man dreams that his flat is invaded by dirty and greedy friends who smoke. He cannot get rid of these people in time to attend his analytic session. He makes many associations to this dream but with one glaring omission. He does not refer to the fact that his analyst smokes heavily. She interprets the transference here that she represents someone dirty and greedy to him because he has projected this part of himself into her. As a result he has been unable to establish a fruitful relationship with her. In projecting his greed and envy into the analyst and into others in his

life he has deprived himself of his appetite for the good things that others enjoy and, she says, has weakened his ego.

She says that her interpretations enabled him eventually to own the dirty, greedy destructive part of himself and to establish a more real relationship with his analyst, that is, to appreciate that she is not dirty and greedy but is good and helpful, with a lessening of his sense of persecution and a strengthening and development of his ego.

My concern is with this analyst's assumption of goodness and fruitfulness in her analytic work, which the patient was required to acknowledge by taking back his projected feelings of envy and his sense of being persecuted into himself. The aim was to establish what the analyst regarded as a real relationship with her and hopefully with others, based on the acceptance of the goodness and fruitfulness of real relationships. This case is an example of the operation of the assumption that the analyst knows not only what has been transferred but what consequences should follow.

From her interpretations of the transference will come a desirable therapeutic result that the patient accept with ambivalence and as normal both his envious and destructive and his good feelings towards the analyst and others. The result is to attain a preconceived status of normality. These views are confirmed when Hanna Segal reports that at the end the patient felt more whole and in less danger from his unconscious now that he knew more and could tolerate more. This makes the ending of an analysis to be when an illusion of wholeness is achieved and one can tolerate one's badness and be grateful for goodness in oneself and others.

The precursor of Hanna Segal's approach lies in Charles deVillers. To believe that psychoanalysis should lead to a better relation with reality is how suggestion enters when psychoanalysis becomes a means for change toward definable and desirable results. Leo Rangell says, "Psychoanalysis has goals". Psychotherapy has goals and football has goals but psychoanalysis does not. Psychoanalysis is not about fruitful or fruitless relationships nor about real relationships. Conventional reality has no place in psychoanalysis yet it is vital to the therapeutic interests of analysts. A psychoanalysis founded on real relationships is firmly grounded on quicksand.

Another conception of the ending of analysis is with the analysand in increasingly differentiated pieces, not with an illusory togetherness, although this can follow, but always afterwards. I notice the assurance with which Hanna Segal holds a view of what she calls normal feelings. This, for

me, cannot apply in the field of psychoanalysis but can in the field of adaptational psychology.

Hanna Segal speaks of replacing omnipotence by realistic attitudes, the patient being able to use the analyst's help to achieve an increased capacity for love and confidence in himself and others. She says that at the end of the analysis the patient's unconscious remains in constant and free communication with the conscious.

Jacques Lacan in the Preface to *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* points out, "There is no friendship in that space that supports the unconscious".

Segal says that psychoanalysis is specifically different from other psychotherapies. "That we set ourselves up as people searching for truth. I do not wish to convey anything idealistic, metaphysical or religious. The patient is ill insofar as he is under the sway of the Pleasure-Pain Principle. It is the task of the analyst to *make* him gradually relinquish this for the Reality Principle, that is, the truth. The patient has been able to deal with reality only by denial. The analyst's task is to show him, by intepretation and by living through situations of anxiety with him and by the analyst himself facing unpleasantness with the patient, that dealing with reality is not a hopless but a hopeful undertaking. Whenever the analyst deviates from the simple but difficult task of making the patient acquainted with reality he is, in fact, impeding the process of psychoanalysis"; and, she could have added, ought to be ashamed of himself.

In the model Hanna Segal is presenting, interpretation of the transference is offered as a gift "too good to refuse" or that which could not be refused without offending the offerer, the analyst, who is not above interpreting a refusal as an attack on the analyst and her work. The analyst is saying "You don't take what I say because you are envious of the good things I contain and can offer to you, therefore your refusal is an envious attack on me".

Acting out is taken in a similar way: "You act to spoil what is offered to you, the value in my mutative transference interpretations which offer to normalise your life for you". In such a position lies the power that is spoken of in other contexts as suggestion. All this occurs out of the wish to cure.

"You have come here to gain something, to become better, to restore your health and to learn how to live in harmony with yourself and the world, yet when I wish to help and I offer you something you spoil it and you reject my work". When the analyst says, "You are angry with me for smoking and

being dirty and greedy because you can't stand these qualities in yourself", what is this but a condemnation from which there can be no effective disagreement? If the patient disagrees he is being hostile and denying his hostility.

This kind of work exemplifies so-called psychoanalytic interpretations that are from ego to ego and that cannot but work from hostility and arouse hostility. Such interpretation meets what it expects to find. It produces a mutual phantasy of imagined understanding and explanation that elides the unconscious which, as is its nature, is not to be known. In my view interpretations can only point to the formations of the unconscious. The analyst can say, "Look at that", "Look what you said". He does not say, "That is what that is". It may then be asked, "How does one know that analysis is going on?" The answer is that one does not and one cannot — because knowing can never be more than prejudice.

Tranference provides the condition for psychoanalysis to occur where formations of the unconscious make their appearance in the discourse of jokes that are told, lapses heard, bungled acts seen, accounts of dreams and the myriad symptoms and symptomatic acts which may be open to interpretations of significations. Interpretations of transference that are the speculations of the analyst cannot be anything but agreeable or disagreeable constructions imposed from the place of the one supposed to know upon the one supposed to lack and replacing one imaginary with another. It is my view that a great deal that purports to be analysis is suggestion in subtle guise.

A commentator at this Symposium, Pearl King of London,[10] said that the analyst can only really help if he can enable the patient to understand and accept the reality of his unconscious experiences. "As the analyst becomes aware of the role assigned unconsciously to him he can try to show the patient what the analyst *thinks* is happening, what unconscious impulses and phantasies are in action". My comment here is that an analyst listens and speaks. One who analyses does not think or believe.

I quote M. Safouan who said, "You cannot believe and analyse at the same time". The analyst does not know or understand. Understanding is not a currency valid in the unconscious. We talk about psychoanalytic ideas and as such it is the science of the subject as object; but that is not the work of analysing. Nothing can deal wih the unconscious. The field of psychoanalysis is a field not entered by any other. There is no overlap with psychology or philosophy except in an imaginary and speculative form of conscious conceptualisation.

Pearl King also states, "The crucial point of the psychoanalytic relationship is its function as a therapeutic tool".

Another commentator, Paula Heimann,[11] says that all significant insight needs the stamp of immediate emotionally charged reality otherwise what is learnt will only be added to the store of resistance. I question this by asking what immediate reality has to do with the unconscious. She continues, "It is not the analyst's task to present explanations or solutions to the patient but to make contact with the patient's actual point of growth after which the patient's ego will reach toward the depth of experience and be active in a creative manner". I question this highly poetic formulation as having any meaning on the grounds that the ego is no more than a system of scars.

James Strachey[12] said, "An improved sense of reality is the whole point of analysis. Interpretations are small doses of reality." Strachey also said that what distinguishes the results of psychoanalysis from the results of other methods is their depth and permanence. I draw your attention to my opening quote from Freud about patients and psychoanalysts renouncing and losing understanding.

Leo Rangell[13] has written. "Only as the analyst establishes and maintains reality as a base can he detect and interpret the transference distortions which emanate from the patient's unconscious".

Hans Loewald[14] says in a paper on the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis that the classical model of the analyst as a mirror is not tenable, that the analyst is the mediator of undistorted reality to the patient to reach higher levels of organisation and integration. He says, "In not acknowledging the moral aim of psychoanalysis our theory falls behind the best in practice".

In a Symposium at the 25th IPA Congress on Acting Out, in 1967 at Copenhagen, one speaker, Vangaard,[15] said that "Interpretation of acting out means questioning the relation to reality of the patient's actions and making him see them at a certain remove". He adds, "Any interpretation implies that the action concerned is unrealistic and undesirable. This is the aspect that may primarily influence the patient to stop his acting out."

Phyllis Greenacre[16] says that psychoanalysis is essentially a progression of growth liberated to take its course, a reinstatement of maturation that has been interfered with, reminding us of the biological basis of maturational change. She says emotional growth requires another person to be regularly on hand, ever watchful, ever listening and occasionally explaining. The responsiveness of the analyst resembles very

much that of the ideal mother or teacher. She claims that Sigmund Freud fashioned the methods of psychoanalytic therapy after the principles of growth, undoing the distorting and impeding strictures of the past to allow normal psychic development to proceed. I believe that this describes not the field of psychoanalysis. She describes it as the most economical, quickest and clearest way of getting a message across and deplores its misuse for magical assertion as a substitute for so-called "reality tested fact".

John Klauber[17] speaks of the analyst's need to constantly scrutinize the transference to avoid unpleasant surprises from the patients. This implies that the analyst ought to be aware of all that is going on and ought not to have to be surprised. This could only be done if the analyst's task was to find only that which he was looking for.

Psychoanalysis is an interminable laying out of the word. Psychoanalysis opens history. Psychoanalysis that is imbued with therapeutic intent restructures history, replacing one imaginary with another. In psychoanalysis as therapy the unconscious, transference and acting out become operational concepts. Some analysts believe the analysis is finished when they have heard something plausible and, like Joseph Breuer, they prematurely leave the scene. The analyst occupied with thinking about the transference and acting out may well stop listening to the unconscious of the patient's discourse. Psychoanalysis follows only from the desire of one to speak his story and of another to hear and return something, and something else, of what has been heard.

No one can want psychoanalysis. Why then does psychoanalysis exist? Because Freud heard the unconscious and spoke of it. Everybody has been trying not to hear it ever since and some even become analysts not to hear it. Psychoanalysis occurs occasionally and in response to a desire transmitted originally from Sigmund Freud. It by-passes many.

In psychoanalysis, the unconscious is, transference is, acting out is. Transference is the condition which makes it possible for the place of the analyst to be addressed and so makes possible the return of the unconscious to the one by whom it is spoken. Interpretation cannot therefore ever be anywhere else but within transference. The analyst does not occupy a place of comprehension. The analyst does not and cannot know what is being transferred. If he assumes he knows he is in speculation. The only relevant question is whether he hears anything. He may be able to return some of that. The analyst is a dummy, not a healer. Changes that follow any analysis do not need to be assumed to have been caused by it.

Conceptualising transference as a tool for theapeutic change or as a resistance to that therapeutic change places it in the field of suggestion. One may ask, "What, then, is the use of transference?" as one may ask, "What is the use of a joke?" The answer is to both questions is, "No use at all". The field of psychoanalysis has no business in the field of therapy. The field of therapy is at liberty to make use of psychoanalytic ideas.

Transference manifestations and acting out, which form part of the psychoanalytic discourse, need not be interpreted any more than other formations of the unconscious. Some analysts believe that if you fail to interpret the transference at every possible opportunity the patient will act out the transference and you won't have an analysis. What you won't have is a therapy. If you impose your transference speculations on the patient you may save it as therapy but that will have nothing to do with analysing.

Transference, not reality, is the condition by which psychoanalysis is possible because transference is everywhere and reality is nowhere in psychic life. Transference, Freud's discovery, is the evidence of there being no relation between the psychic and reality. Transference is a condition converted into reality in the field of suggestion by some analysts to give it the quality of being familiar. Psychoanalysis cannot convert transference into reality. Transference can never be resolved or liquidated. In reality, *conventional sense, 2+2=4. In psychoanalysis, in psychic life, 2+2=5* because one must include the speaking subject who is forever divided.

Notes

[1] FREUD,S. *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement.*

[2] FREUD,S. *Letter of Binswanger*, 1911 — quoted in Logos of the Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, 1985.

[3] LACAN,J. *Responses to Students of Philosophy Concerning the Object of Psychoanalysis*, 1960.

[4] JONES,E. Editorial, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.1, p.3-5, 1920.

[5] CHERTOK,L. *The Discovery of the Transference,* International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.49, p.560, 1968.

[6] SZASZ,T. *The Concept of Transference,* International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.43, p.432, 1963.

[7] GITELSON,M. *The Curative Factors in Psychoanalysis,* International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.43, p.194, 1962.

[8] NACHT,S. Idem, p.206.

[9] SEGAL,H. Idem, p.212.

[10] KING,P. Idem, p.225.

[11] HEIMANN,P. Idem, p.228.

[12] STRACHEY,J. *The Theory of the Therapeutic Results of Psychoanalysis,* International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.18, p. 139.

[13] RANGELL,L. *The Psychoanalystic Process,* International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.49, p. 19, 1968.

[14] LOEWALD,H.W. *Some Considerations on Repetition Compulsion,* International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.52, p. 59, 1971.

[15] VANGAARD,T. *Symposium on Acting Out and its Role in the Psychoanalytic Process,* International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.49, p. 206, 1968.

[16] GREENACRE,P. Idem, p.211.

[17] KLAUBER,J. Idem, p.225.

Omnipotence as a Resistance in Transference and Countertransference

*Sabar Rustomjee

OEDIPUS AND THE RIDDLE

At dawn four-footed, at midday erect,
And wandering on three legs in the deserted
Spaces of afternoon, thus the eternal
Sphinx had envisaged her changing brother
Man, and with afternoon there came a person
Deciphering, appalled at the monstrous other's
Presence in the mirror, the reflection
Of his decay and of his destiny.
We are Oedipus;

J.L. Borges [1]

Oedipus solved the riddle of the Sphinx and freed Thebes only by humbly remembering the pierced wounds of his swollen feet — his Oedi...pes. And

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similarly, in his ruthless search for truth at the final moment, rather than 'turn a blind eye' away from reality as others around him may have done,[2] he pierced his eyes, so as never to forget, that the following of an action of omnipotence, in the murder of his father and marriage to his mother, was no answer at all to escaping the ultimate fate of his destiny. Hence, like with Oedipus, any quest for freedom needs to be freedom within limits, there being no such thing as a total freedom of the autonomous ego at the expense of a complete dissolution of the super ego.

Omnipotence exists as a part of a manic defence against the development of depressive anxiety in varying degrees in our everyday life. It is seen in one's phantasy, in dreams, jokes, parapraxes, in the magical omnipotent thoughts, words, and gestures of children, in certain religious beliefs as well as in the thinking of primitive people. It is also observed in delusions in psychoses, e.g., in mania and paranoia, along with magical thinking in obsessional neuroses, and with disavowal in perversions. It is an integral part of the narcissistic and borderline states. An ommipotent thought hence, is one endowed with a limitless illusory power to produce a desired phantasied effect. It follows that when a child is forced to give up his narcissistic omnipotence and primary state of fusion with mother, it projects this onto an object which then becomes his ego ideal and from which his ego remains divided by a gulf which he then spends the rest of his life trying to bridge. The ego ideal now, being the heir of primary narcissism, i.e . of the infantile illusion of omnipotence and blissful feelings bound up with it.[3]

Freud describes Man as an ailing animal seeking after a time when "he was his own ideal".[4] Some of these issues are well illustrated in the following abstracts of case material of patients who vigorously attempted to safeguard a very vulnerable sense of their narcissistic omnipotence which served to bridge the gap between the ego and the carriers of the ego ideal.

X was referred to me for urgent help with vocational guidance, having studied part of a tertiary course and passed with excellent marks following which she had become acutely depressed, taken the following year off studies and was still undecided re her future. Her father was a well known, highly respected gentleman. She arrived just before the end of the session, looking bedraggled and absolutely exhausted and soon burst into tears. She said the majority of her previous teachers and students were not at all compassionate, and were in her words 'narrowminded and cruel' and 'looking down on human suffering'. She said she was keen to transfer to another closely related even more exacting profession. Both career

choices were those of successful male family members indicative of her narcissistic identification with them. At her next session once again, she arrived shortly before its end, saying she had now finalised her transfer and it appeared as if she required nothing more of me especially as her mood was also improving. By her lateness, I was aware of her resistance at attending, and also that merely changing courses of study due to unconscious repetition compulsion was certainly not going to be a magical solution to her problems, as the extreme cruelty she saw in the other was possibly due to projection. I felt controlled by her fragility and vulnerability but it was mainly after she left that I developed an increasing uneasiness about the interview and regretted not having explored her illusion of omnipotence and self-sufficiency. I felt as if I hadn't been there at all. Freud describes this so aptly in his description of Narcissism.

> "The charm of a child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his self-contentment and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as cats and the beasts of prey. Indeed even great criminals and humorists, as they are represented in literature, compel our interest by the narcissistic consistency with which they manage to keep away from their ego anything that would diminish it. It is as if we envied them for maintaining a blissful state of mind — an unassailable libidinal position which we ourselves have since abandoned."[5]

X presented to me some months later, once again arriving in the last minutes of the session and bursting into tears now saying that she had broken off a relationship with a boyfriend. The following day, she was involved in a serious accident involving a collision with a bus and only then was able to admit to having long-standing ideas of suicide. She accepted the offer of hospitalisation, which lasted for a period of 3 months and here regular psychoanalytic psychotherapy was finally able to be commenced, — 6 sessions weekly with the majority well over an hour. Although she never openly acknowledged any help given, she was always on time and an idealising transference was established in which she was able to work on her very early losses, perhaps partly being able to experience the early mothering care, the "protective shield" missing in her infancy.[6] Subsequently, I was aware of my own needs to become her provider.

In all X's relationships there appeared initially the fear of the phantasied omnipotent, 'narrowminded' cruelty of the Other succeeding at the

expense of a meek helpless Self and later her identification with the same cruel aggressor as the carrier of her ego ideal. This was evidenced in both her career choices. It is also similar to the Oedipus myth where whatever the powerful, cruel 'narrowminded', omnipotent God Apollo had ordained, no mortal intervention could prevent, and even the counter-cruelty of Laius in abandoning his son Oedipus and wanting him dead is seen merely as a justification.[7]

As a consequence of X's discharge from hospital, there was reduction of the number of sessions, which led her to experience both separation and loss. The idealising transference collapsed and I too was now perceived in her words as 'smug', 'cruel', 'narrowminded', 'grandiose', 'wanting blood' from her, etc., whilst she persistently dismissed any interpretations that were at all painful, especially interpretations within the transference, which were responded to as useless' and meaningless', while she flew into rages, lapsed into long silences, missed sessions or arrived very late, all without apparent guilt. e.g., when exploring the reasons for her lateness said, "Oh, I was quite happy talking to my budgie and my doggie, and forgot the time". This phase continued for over two years while she moved flats, changed boyfriends and deferred her studies once again. It seemed she was attempting to create for herself an illusory 'state of needlessness', and 'unconditional omnipotence' [8] based on denial of need whilst alongside remained the narcissistic demand of wanting to be loved as perfect.

Similar borderline patients, those with a narcissistic personality, perverse and psychotics who cannot develop a classical transference neuroses are described as being different "qualitatively and not quantitatively", by Little.[9] Various aspects of these transferences have been termed Narcissistic Neurosis by Freud[10], Transference Psychoses by Rosenfield[11] and Little[12]' Delusional Transference by Little [12], Externalising Transference by Berg[13] Idealising and Mirroring Transferences by Kohut[14], the three phases of Therapeutic Symbiosis by Searles[15] and the Erotized Transferences, where "the desire being to erotize — make pleasurable the analysis thus depriving it of a learning experience and reducing it to absurdity".[16] The common feature being the absence of the "as if" quality in the transference, so that the analyst is actually perceived with certainty as being the omnipotent idealised and deified, or diabolised parent. e.g., a patient once revealed, "I come only because I'm afraid of what would happen to me if I didn't."

In the case of X, she sought after an "illusory omnipotent blissful state" during her analysis by means of denial of all separateness, dependency, loss or lack, and by repression of painful ambivalence, and affective

relatedness. This resulted in her recurring absenteeisms, lateness, prolonged silences, and even falling asleep on the couch at times. The aspect of perfect harmony was described by Freud as "oceanic feelings", — "something limitless, unbounded"[17], by Lacan[18] as the "triumphant jubilation" of the mirror stage, by Balint[19] as "primary love" and by Winnicott[20] in "primary maternal preoccupation".

Another patient A treated by me in group psychotherapy, who had been brought up in an orphanage at the height of her paranoid anxiety and envious rage towards me, bought and wore to a session, an identical dress to one of mine saying timidly, "I thought I can be Dr. R. too" while she admitted feeling alienated by her phantasy of my omnipotence. She feared I was giving away to another member what belonged to her, and revealed an incident where her Mother Superior had taken away her brand new dress, made by her mother, and given it to another inmate. Here identification with myself both as her mother and as Mother Superior were a substitute for object love, thus alienating herself.

Lacan[21] defines very explicitly the function of the analyst as being neither to attempt to meet the patient's demands, nor make any demand, but to ask the patient 'the question of the Other "What do you want?" which best leads him to the path of his own desire' as he finally becomes aware of the lack of the Other (Ø) and thereby the lack in himself.

It is imperative that the countertransference be continuously screened for evidences of the narcissistic omnipotent demands of the analyst, e.g., his indulgence of His Majesty the Baby — patient, leading to regression in the patient and unnecessary prolongation of recovery, by locating the narrowminded, omnipotent Other outside the transference and thereby alienating the subject. There are also numerous examples in the literature of the defensive and raging battle for the struggle for supremacy between the two Gods as the analyst finally becomes aware of the full extent of the patient's scorn towards the analytic process, which alienates him from the analyst, both then projecting onto each other the non-compassionate omnipotent aspects of themselves. Finally, in these cases with the resolution of the symbiosis, the analyst feels a 'sense of outrage' as he realises how 'illusory has been his subjective omnipotence and how groundless his guilt'.[22]

In contrast the classic example of Guntrip's second analysis with Winnicott[23] well demonstrates that the latter did not make demands of his analysand or have a need to present himself as the omnipotent other when he said to Guntrip "You don't have to be good for me, I don't need it and can

cope without it, but in fact you are good for me." Nevertheless it was only by self-analysis of dreams which occurred after Winnicott's death that Guntrip, at the age of 70, finally believed he was cured.[24] The only person who could fully analyse Guntrip being Guntrip.[25]

In this paper I have attempted to demonstrate some of the implications of omnipotence as it affects both analyst and analysand, and how the fear of the "elephantine feet of the Other's whim" trampling the desire of the subject, introduces the phantom of the omnipotence not of the self, but of the absolute Other.[21]

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Identification: Theoretical and Clinical Aspects

* George Halasz

"The antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there"

S. Freud.[1]

Identification has been recognized as a basic psychological mechanism at least since the time of Aristotle. He thought Man to be a "mimeticon zoon" which has been translated as 'an animal that identifies with others'.[2] Identification, both as a concept and a clinically recognizable phenomenon

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has been most systematically elaborated in the science of psychoanalysis. In psychoanalytic theory, the process of identification holds a central position amongst the many psychological processes. In fact Laplanche and Pontalis[3] claim that identification is "not simply one psychical mechanism among others, *but the operation itself whereby the human subject is constituted*".

Freud introduced the concept of identification in his classic *Interpretation of Dreams*.[4] The process was introduced as a "highly important factor in the mechanism of hysterical symptoms" and he drew the distinction between identification and the similar process of imitation and "psychical infection" in hysterical symptom production. He concluded that:

> "...identification is not simple imitation but assimilation on the basis of a *similar aetiological* pretension: it *expresses a resemblance* and is *derived from* a common element which remains in the unconscious".[5]

Freud's substantial elaboration of the process of identification was in Chapter VII of *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*[6] where he underlined the profound significance of this process by declaring that:

> "Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie *with another* person".

He postulated the existence of two psychologically distinct ties for the developing child. For the little boy, one tie is the sexual object-cathexis (with the mother), the other an identification (with the father). Indeed, the Oedipus Complex, according to this early formulation, originated from the confluence of these two emotional ties resulting in the changing emotional colourings from the positive to the negative, from love and tenderness, to hostilities and hate, from incestuous to murderous wishes. Freud characterized the distinction between the emotional ties of object relations and identification by describing the former as the wish to have (the object) and the latter as the wish to be (the object). This "wish to be" is the property of identification that so distinguishes it from the other psychological mechanisms. Unlike the other mechanisms, for example, the system of defence mechanisms which in normal development defend the ego and in pathology contribute to symptom formation, the process of identification takes part in the very constitution of the human being.

Freud delineated three different modes of identification which have been

succinctly outlined by Laplanche and Pontalis as:

i) The primal form of the emotional tie with the object.

ii) The regressive replacement for an abandoned object-choice. (It may be this regressive identification that contributes to the so called "imitative suicides" to be discussed later.

iii) In the absence of any sexual cathexis of the other person the subject may still identify with him to the extent that they have some trait in common (e.g. the wish to be loved).[7]

Maria Ines R. de Zentner[8] has elaborated on this third aspect to suggest that it is the "other's desire" or the "unconscious longing for the desire of the other" which is achieved by such identification.

* * *

The history of psychoanalysis is characterized by theoretical developments and changes that have resulted in changes of meanings and multiple meanings for some terms. One of the "prime examples" of multiple meanings is for the term "identification."[9] I wish to highlight two major sequences of development in psychoanalysis that seem to have influenced and been responsible for the confusions and multiple meanings associated with the term identification. The first influence I shall term 'the temporal shift' and the second 'the semantic shift'.

The Temporal Shift

Since Freud's theorizing at the turn of the century, the over-riding psychoanalytic development has been the progressive relocating of the significance for later maturation of the earlier stages of development in the child's mental life. The early writings on identification clearly had as a reference point the Oedipus Complex, while more recent and the contemporary views hold that the first few hours of the infant's relationships and mental life are legitimate foci for theory, therapy and research. This shift in temporal emphasis has resulted in a schism between the meanings of identification between early and current writings.

Winnicott[10] provided a clear formulation of the recent position of parent-infant interaction at the earliest phases of development. In his elaboration, the role of maternal care is "holding" the absolutely dependent infant where "good enough" maternal holding and care exists, the baby's inherited potential will progress to relative dependence and if the environment affords continuity of such care, the development will be towards independence. Amongst the important characteristics of the infant at this earliest holding phase, Winnicott lists:

1. Primary process
2. Primary identification
3. Auto-erotism
4. Primary narcissism

But beyond the importance of identification for the baby, Winnicott notes the central role of maternal identification with the infant to allow mothers to "achieve a powerful sense of what the baby needs".

Stern's[11] integration of recent psychoanalytic views with evidence from developmental psychology has articulated some of the nuances in the earliest emotional ties of maternal-infant relationships. He describes a spectrum, at one end emphasizing the external qualities of the observable behaviours while at the other the internal, intuited emotional states. First, *imitation* which needs to be a reasonably faithful reproduction of the original model behaviour being re-enacted and also maintains a focus of attention upon the forms of the external behaviours. Second, *affect* matching or contagion — an extension of the term "psychical infection" as used by Freud[12] to describe the genesis of hysterical symptomatology — as occurs in normal mother-infant relationships, has also been shown to occur in new born infants who are able to display contagious crying, while older infants show infectious smiling.[13] Third, *intersubjectivity,* a term that captures the sense of mutual inner states, but according to Stern without much specificity. Fourth, *mirroring and echoing* are familiar clinical terms and they certainly do refer to inner states (in fact the "mirroring" metaphor is well polished in psychoanalytic reflections). The disadvantage of the term "mirroring" is the implication of a complete temporal synchrony, which at least is not implied in the term "echoing". Fifth, and most importantly the term *empathy* which is used to apply to three different situations:

a. To overlap with true imitation (as representing external similarities)
b. To refer to true affect attunement (and focus on internal states)
c. To refer to verbal relatedness (but missing the resonance of feeling states).

From a consideration of the above terms, Stern felt the need to describe a distinct form of affective transaction although with close and overlapping aspects with the above phenomena. He coined the term *affect attunement* and in essence, imitation and attunement occupy;

> "Two ends of a spectrum ... imitation renders form: attunement renders feeling"[14]

For the purposes of our discussion it is interesting to note Stern's omission of any reference to the process of identification, yet I would suggest that clearly the processes described could be included under the generic term of identification of affect.

So far I have outlined some of the salient points in the temporal shift in psychoanalytic theory that have contributed to some changes in meanings for the term identification.

Next I would like to turn to the second source of confusion, which I have called the semantic shift.

The Semantic Shift

The second influence contributing to the multiple meanings of the term identification arises from the invention and evolutions of the psychoanalytic concepts around 1909 and the subsequent decade.

Ferenczi[15] introduced the term "introjection" to describe a process revealed by analytic investigation to refer to the subject's transfer of objects and their qualities from the "outside" to the "inside" of himself. It is important to emphasize that this process occurred in *phantasy* without any implication to the body's real boundaries. In this clinical usage the term was devised as an opposite to the process of "projection" (which similarly does not necessarily imply reference to the body boundary).

Freud[16] introduced the term "incorporation" in the theoretical context of the phases of development of the sexual organization in infantile life (p 197-8) especially in the pregenital organization, first the sadistic-anal[17] and later the oral organization.[18] The process of incorporation in the oral stage is characterized, par excellence, by thumb sucking, which clearly has reference to the subject's own (physical) body and psychical equivalents. In fact on a phantasy level incorporation may refer to any penetration of the body confined neither to oral activity proper nor to the oral stage ... and other functions may in fact serve as its basis (incorporation via the skin, respiration, sight, hearing).[19] Freud notes further that the activity of incorporation of objects is a prototpye of the later process of identification. Gaddini[20] expanded that:

> "...imitations and introjections are constitutive elements of the process of identification, which aims at fusing and integrating the phenomena of the perceptive imitative (sensory) area with those

of the incorporating-introjecting (oral) area, in the function of the superior processes of the ego in the relationship with objective reality".

Therefore, the basis for one of the semantic confusions with the words introjection, incorporation, identification and internalisation — the last being a term that is commonly used as a synonym for introjection, whilst all the terms describe similar processes of "taking in", — is that some inherently emphasize the earlier "somatic" aspects of physical taking in, whilst others refer more to the psychical equivalents of "mental" ingestion of sights, sounds, smells or generally, parts of objects (part objects). In current practice these words do have overlapping meanings and are sometimes used interchangeably.

The Clinical Setting — Identification After A Teenage Suicide

The process of identification has been implied in developmental phases from earliest infancy throughout the life cycle; to clinical conditions that include the character disorders, neurosis, perversions and the psychosis[21] and to the analytic setting itself, to describe processes both in the analyst and the analysand.[22]

Now I would like to turn to some aspects of the management of the after-effects of a teenage suicide in an Adolescent Psychiatric In-Patient Unit. In such a setting, the regressive identifications, mentioned earlier, may contribute as one of the mechanisms for further suicides by "imitation". Management directed at prevention of further suicides should take into account such identifications.

A Brief Description of the Context of the Suicide

The 17 year old boy was an in-patient in the Unit concerned for a number of months. During that time he had benefited from the therapeutic relationships with the staff, and it was felt that he was ready to be discharged home to the continuing care of his parents with regular follow-up as an out-patient at the hospital. It was following his discharge from the unit that I arrived to take up my position as Senior Registrar nearly half way through that phase of my training some years ago, which was ending my official professional apprenticeship. In fact I first became aware of this 17 years old, when I received a phone call at home on the week-end to inform me that the boy had suicided by hanging shortly after the last out-patient visit, when he was seen by a senior member (not generally regarded as having a dynamic orientation) of the Unit.

Clearly as I had just arrived on the Unit, not only was I unfamiliar with the

people in the organization, but they were experiencing the shock that accompanies a suicide — the first suicide to occur in the history of that Unit (although they had a patient who had died from a medical condition some years ago). Not an easy time for staff to welcome a new team member and it was not going to become easier.

The staff were dealing with their inability to comprehend how the suicide occurred so soon after the out-patient review, and the conscious and unconscious sense of rage and frustration was clearly aimed at the professional, who in a position of authority, was expected to have foreseen such an event and certainly to have prevented it. This obviously did not happen. Fortunately for me, in an otherwise difficult position of carrying a considerable clinical responsibility for the day-to-day running of the Unit, yet with little experience with that large organization, guidance in the important management issues that arose in the weeks following the suicide were provided by a consultant in child psychiatry/analyst/family therapist in a weekly Consultation meeting.[23]

At one such consultation meeting,[24] the recommendation was made that all drawings and paintings belonging to the dead youth be destroyed by burning. Otherwise there was a possibility that a "shrine" would be created to his memory, thereby legitimizing the suicide and (covertly) sanctioning the suicide act.

Though sounding harsh and possibly medieval advice, and obviously not carried out, partly because the parents in fact removed all the youth's belongings, I would like to discuss some of the issues arising from such advice in relation to the process of identification and the prevention of suicide clusters in a hospital setting.

The suicide provided a model of identification for other patients on the Unit and the above mentioned management advice was offered in an attempt to "neutralize the identification with the act by suggestible patients".[25] From what has been described above, it is obvious that the process of identification requires at least two people, one providing a model, which may be offered by the person's beliefs, actions, physical or other qualities and the other a recipient, as it were, to whom this model has significance through meaning. Further, the setting or context of their relationship should allow the impressions of one on the other to develop through a dramatic impact or a less intense but sustained impression over time. A Psychiatric In-Patient Unit provides all these conditions for identifications and when a suicide occurs, surviving patients, through identification with the person and/or the act are also at an increased risk for

suicide. The management staff needs to be aware of this added vulnerability in patients with the possibility of further suicide attempts and to institute preventative measures to avoid the possibility of suicide clusters.[26] The great danger for staff is that during the phase of their shock and disbelief in the event, which leads to much questioning of professional competence and personal re-evaluations, the clear boundaries of professional roles become blurred, authority in senior staff decision making is eroded, other management decisions lose clarity and the risk for suicide clusters increase.

One possible mode of identification with the suicide act by young people is through the glorification of death or martyrdom. This may be enhanced in the hospital setting where the passive (victim) aspect of the suicide is more easily acknowledged, at a time of mourning and compassion for the surviving relatives. However, this ignores the murderous rage and active (perpetrator) self-murder that is suicide (sui-of oneself, cidium — kill). If the staff actively discuss the less-than-glorious aspects of such a death, as the possibility of burning the suicide victim's belongings clearly raises, one potentially potent part — identification is readily neutralized. In fact I doubt if any staff member seriously considered the "bonfire" option, but the way I made use of this piece of consultation advice was to appreciate that an active , even aggressive staff reaction (some may say an unthinkable repose) was possible and this opened a range of creative management ideas that I could use as I became responsible for further day-to-day management issues. Of course it should be mentioned that alongside these preventative measures of neutralizing the identifications with the suicidal part of the boy went much grief work and on-going mourning that was directed at the identifications with his valued, healthy aspects. Thus the resultant management became a synthesis of valuing the identifications with life, as in the memories of the boys admired qualities, and the staff's re-establishing and re-affirming their commitment and skills to the care of the living patients, and at the same time attempting to neutralize the identifications with the murderous/suicidal part of the boy to prevent the possible occurrence of further suicides or a suicide cluster. In fact no further suicide attempts occurred in the following months.

In a vulnerable situation which accompanies hospitalization, re-enactment through the process of identification is one mechanism for further suicides by suggestible young people. This potential was partly diminished in a hospital setting by repeated assertive declarations from the staff, in group and other settings, of the unacceptability of such behaviour. These clear statements provided unambiguous expressions of the staff's

expectations and attitudes towards self-destructive behaviour. At a deeper level it was an attempt to prevent propagation of suicides by suggestible young people through neutralizing identifications with the suicide act.

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The Limits of Discourse Structure: Obsession and Hysteria

• Ellie Ragland-Sullivan

Based on Jacques Lacan's theory that there is a passage from one discourse structure to another, and a progression toward proximity to the unconscious, I am interested in examining how the obsessional structure differs from the hysterical one. This difference should tell us something not only about different functions of the unconscious, but something about the split in the Other that Lacan wrote as S(Ⱥ), stressing increasingly in his teaching that structure belongs to *jouissance*, to the Real, to a hole or split in the Other. Although he wrote out the formula for hysteria, Lacan called obsession a "jargon" of hysteria and did not write a separate formula. I would suggest, for the moment, that a consideration of the progression from the academic structure which Lacan also wrote out, to the hysterical one, might shed some light on the differences between hysteria and obsession beyond the usual asymmetry in sexual development pointed out. Most hysterics are female, while most obsessionals are male, although there are obsessional females and hysterical males. It has been suggested that insofar as the obsessional does not communicate with others — but with himself and himself alone — he speaks the master discourse. Indeed, his speech may produce just such an effect on others. Paradoxically, the

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obsessional's goal is not to show others his mastery, but an unconscious desire to screen out his unconscious *mi-dires* in order that he be left alone in his attachment to the suffering he loves more than (as) himself. If the obsessional identifies with the silence of the drives, his language is meant to keep others out, to allow himself to identify in being and fantasy with the $\mathcal{S}$. While this identification with lack looks like the hysteric's famous identification with lack, the obsessional's teleological intentions are different, and so are the objects at which he directs his desire.

In the essay *À Jakobson* in which Lacan sets forth his four discourses, he explains the positions occupied differently within the four structures.

The legend: $\frac{\text{agent}}{\text{truth}}$ $\frac{\text{other}}{\text{production}}$

can be used to look at obsession in terms of the university discourse structure which Lacan wrote as follows:

$$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \longrightarrow \frac{a}{\mathcal{S}} \text{ (p.21).}$$

In the position of truth, the ideal ego in Lacan's schéma L, one finds the S_1, Lacan's denotation for the master signifier.[2] Now the master signifier is the one linked to Symbolic castration or the eclipse of the subject by the signifier. Lacan explains in his Seminar on *Identification* (1961 — 62) that identification with the Other is an identification with the desire of the Father. That is, the obsessional's demand for love is a demand that identifies itself with a paternal metaphor.[3] The obsessional identifies with what is lacking — in the Other — that, nonetheless, pronounces interdiction or taboo. The master signifier is the "no" of the father. In the Symbolic where the "no" is ennunciated, and in the Real where the no delimits desire, the obsessional has taken his ideal ego to be a "no". It is not surprising that Lacan tells us the obsessional's fundamental question is whether he is alive or dead. He is biologically living, but unconsciously identified with the presence of death. Under the bar of consciousness, the obsessional's unconscious productions — like those of the university person — aim to block out the source of what constitutes his individuality, the Other. Since this is not possible, the ideal ego finds itself impotent. Sexual impotence is one form such unconscious effects could produce. But, generally speaking, at a structural level, the impotence is that of the impossible Real. The Real is the impossible, or a double-bind. The obsessional's double-bind derives from his effort to tailor his narcissism or demand — that he be seen as a perfectly desired (desirable) object, to the paradoxical desire to identify with a rigidly fixed ego.

One sees that the S_2 in the academic formula would stand for the subject's knowledge rather than for any subject matter meant for classroom distribution. In the academic discourse, knowledge is placed in the position of agent whose chosen object is desire itself: to impose one's knowledge as the other's desire. Now Lacan made it abundantly clear that the obsessional wants to avoid desire at all cost. One way to do this is to try to make one's knowledge equal to one's desire. Mind would then master body and others would be asked, perhaps directed to follow the master(y). Such subjective fascisms do indeed characterize university discourses. The structure is not so very different from the way obsessionals use language and knowledge in an effort to exclude the otherness that might interfere with their dedication to keeping control of things around them lest some surprise make them think they are alive.[4] Although the obsessional's masterly tone suggests the master discourse, the difference between normative and obsessional is important. The master discourse excludes lack and seeks closure because ignorance of the unconscious is that subject's desire. The obsessional's mastery is always overkill, too much, a revelation that knowledge is used in the service of supplementing an unconscious signifier that is weak; inadequate identification with a Father's Name. The "normative" use of a master discourse can rely effortlessly on a discourse of opinion to provide authority, while the obsessional speaks a master discourse lest the lacks and gaps that invade him, that make him constantly anxious, appear.

We remember that Lacan saw feminine *jouissance* as relating to the Other as such, while masculine *jouissance* has no such direct access to the unconscious. Insofar as most obsessionals are male and most hysterics female, what constitutes the limits of each structure? Indeed, the phallus, taken as the mark of lack(s) in the Other, serves as the positioning agent around which an unconscious subject of desire will organize the face it shows in conscious life: the *semblant* that represents that subject. Perhaps we can learn more about the limits of each neurosis by looking at the role of the phallic signifier for castration where one refers to the disappearance of the subject behind signifiers that denote sexual difference (an effect of the Oedipal complex that produces the subject as signified) in relationship to the key signifier supporting a Symbolic order, the Name of the Father.[5] The phallus object of desire or mark of lack — is the result of the relationship between Symbolic castration and the Name of the Father for each subject. Russell Grigg has argued that the phallus is "impure", however, because it can never be clearly distinguished from its imaginary connections with actual fathers (Grigg, p. 121). One might

consider that in obsessional neurosis a minimal inscription for lack in the Other is ordered by an unconscious denial (*Verneinung*) of the importance of the signifier of the Father's Name. Unconscious guilt regarding an Imaginary father (dead, denigrated) places the obsessional male in full debt to a Real father's *jouissance*. In childhood the structure elaborates itself in making the little boy a "Mama's boy". For the pleasure of occupying the place Daddy should occupy in relation to his wife, the obsessional male later pays by identifying with the very structure of the Real: a place where the Father imposes the double-bind phenomenon of showing the limits of of (incest) desire as a "no," a taboo, a law.

The effect of the paternal metaphor on the obsession is a relocation of the phallus merged with the ideal ego such that the obsessional lives his guilt and anxiety at the level of ego. Having shifted the stress from desire (in its intimate link with death), his ego bears the burden of his exclusions. The symptom of narcissistic grandiosity, always threatened by the anxiety just beneath, is a small price to pay to allow the obsessional to keep his ideal ego complicitous with his mother's desire. The Other is barred off as a hallow shrine built to her image or memory (*8*). Insofar as such blockage is intended to keep the male from becoming hysterical, from revealing his identification with the feminine, it seems logical that certain goals or symptoms of obsessionals will be: 1) to keep the ideal ego intact by avoiding judgment and criticism at all cost; 2) to exclude otherness and thus retain an incestuous bond with the mother, aunt, sister, etc., and thereby reject the substitutive partnership of exchange that threatens to break up an unconscious pact with suffering and death; 3) to pin down ideal fathers in the outside world insofar as unconscious representation for the signifier of the Father's Name is so feeble.

But the ruses do not work. All efforts go toward keeping desire complicitous with the ego in order to buy peace in the name of stasis. Instead of keeping the peace, a sacrifice of the obsessional's being to the Other's desire ensures that he is always waiting, waiting for his unconscious guilt to disappear so he can become a man. As the obsessional wields his knowledge (S_2) in the service of the S_1 (the signifier for difference), one sees the knowledge, not as a thing in itself, but as the *matheme* S_2 that Juan-Carlos Indart calls the representing of the represented, or the suspended unconscious.[6] In the academic structure the professor uses his dais of phallic authority to back up a knowledge whose "truth" will be validated insofar as others believe it or desire it. But academic discourse is not obsessional neurosis. Academic knowledge — body of opinion and information — is communicated. Obsessional

knowledge, whatever it may be, is not meant for communication. Such men use their knowledge of languages, cooking, expertise on making money, descriptions of cherished rituals, and so on, to demand confirmation of their perfection. While the academic discourse is a style adaptable to many contexts, the obsessional's knowledge that he was his mother's favorite keeps him from having to communicate with anyone. His intense suffering comes from this impossibility. His very being is meant to close up the lack that is the unconscious. Once he "leaves home," or comes of age, he is confronted with a world that will not treat him as the cherished object he fantasizes himself to be. Why not just give up the fantasy? Lacan goes beyond Freud here. The reason, he says, is that the early experience of being smothered with "love," is concomitantly balanced by an excessive quantity of unconscious guilt. *Jouissance* or the death drive underlies the fantasy protecting the obsessional from facing his guilt which hides his anxiety over his "crimes" against the "fathers".

The impasses from which obsessional suffering arise are clear. Insofar as his unconscious requirement is that his own narcissism become the other's law, lest he face the Real of his unconscious debts, then the game of Imaginary exchange is deadly. Others constitute the risk of disagreement, criticism or judgment and thus threaten to damage the multi-layered fortresses that defend him against the gaze and voice of the Other, superego effects. The world of words and gazes is reminiscent of the mother's withering gaze which made her small boy her phallus, but at the price of a sacrifice of his being to her demands, and his virility to her whims. In later life, his sexual relations remain marked by the erotic components that kept a young boy's body identified with the feminine rather than the masculine. Yet, obsessionals are not homosexual. So, one is confronted with a man with feminine desires. The conscious subject takes up the burden of conducting his identity quest for a substitute (ideal) father somewhere in the world. Finding little representational material on which to lean for a masculine identity within his memory bank, the obsessional male is driven to look for "stand in" ideal fathers. Yet, he can allow few others in his cramped psychic space, and those others are relentlessly tested. One way the obsessional mollifies the anxiety surrounding his unconscious identification with death is by rituals that tame the world by providing a false order. So the obsessional fills the world with the otherness of objects arranged just so, counted up, like the furniture crammed into Eugene Ionesco's *Nouveau Locataire*.

Whether a range of actions are pinned down, routines enshrined, or a group of others commanded to silence, all activities and objects become

candidates for screening out the lack closed off and walled up by the *obsessional. Every issue regarding order or ordering dramatizes his* problems of a fundamental order gone awry, a masculine identity blurred. Living desire is stamped out so that archaic desire may remain in place, entombed in the Other like Miss Haversham's rooms in Charles Dickens's *Great Expectations*. Speaking his demand for love to the other as a command — "accept my inability to desire" — the obsessional's quest for love is a parody of itself. His request for love comes with a cold tone, or in baby talk that replaces the boy with the impotent baby rather than a potent man, or from an immobile, aloof, impersonal place. Indeed, it must be difficult to make any request for love from a place where one is identified with the already dead. Given the paradoxical task of reconstituting himself *for an other whom he must simultaneously reject in order to retain his* fragile sense of masculine identity, one can see why the obsessional male makes great efforts to keep the very intimacy he seeks at bay. The goal is to keep the ego impenetrable, keep fantasies intact, lest unconscious truth peek through the cracks.

Not surprisingly, the obsessional treats his love objects as he treats his own unconscious formations: by exclusion and rejection, or as alternately glorious or guilty. *He is driven to wage war on two fronts. First he is guilty of* "psychic" incest, of repudiating the primordial law of separation, thus annulling the sign which is sign of exchange.[7] Not only is the obsessional burdened with the shame of his father's betrayal, death, debt, dupery — which his suffering is meant to appease — he is also guilty of having tasted the fruit of sexual *jouissance* too early, at a moment when he still should serve others as a child, and not as an object of their pleasure and frustration. The suffering which ensues — the impossible bind — derives from his having been sated with a nostalgia that nothing else will ever equal. In unconscious memory he *is* the object that fulfills his mother's desire. Jacques Lacan has written that the obsessional's cure requires him to dismantle the fantasies attached to his phallicism.[8] *One might suggest that* the phallus and penis are welded into a holophrastic fantasy for the obsessional male where the sexual member takes on the meaning of his being. Whether his sexuality is ritualized in relation to an other, or around masturbatory activities, the penis/phallus bears the weight of his confused masculine/feminized identity. It is small wonder that obsessionals avoid the gaze, even to the point of trying to build an Other of the Other to place distance between themselves and the impossible burden emanating from the Real. Nor is it astonishing that obsessional aggressiveness is omnipresent since ego narcissism must bear the whole burden of

substitutive scanning, while substitutes are not really welcome. Excessively exposed to the Real, — to constant anxiety — obsessionals flee like Camus's Mersault in an effort to embrace the mark of being *l'étranger* — others to themselves. Any semblance of order, any posture of fixity, is preferable to the horror of unconscious truth.

The sense of imminent doom or threat that hangs over the obsessional's head is an admission that the impotence he keeps at bay is death itself. This dark threat is what he represses, is the truth in his unconscious. The Ratman *fixated on the sexual organ under the female's skirt and displaced* his castration anxiety onto his anus. Castration seen as subjugation to the mother's desire, ends with the obsessional identifying with the mother's body (phallus=*Mädchen*) rather than with his father's name. The Ratman wanted no reminder of his unpaid debt, no *Raten* (no advice/Rat) insinuated into an ideal ego he labored to keep intact as an object merely playing at being a subject of desire. For desire is the obsessional's enemy. Desire is illicit, brings surprises, subverts control. He lives close to the objects of the Real, the void and the gaze.

When the analyst tries to bring about a disjunction between subject and object(s) of desire by breaking up the obsessional's fantasies of being special—exempt from the castration imposed by identifying with a Symbolic father's Name in the unconscious — the analyst confronts a jungle of externalized fortresses and taboos. By clinging to fantasies of "self" sufficiency, and by projecting blame onto others, the obsessional forestalls castration, avoids the surprises of the Symbolic by mastering the Imaginary. In so doing he remains true to the Other's desire $\left(\frac{a}{\not{S}}\right)$. By erecting monuments of every sort between the the Real Other's *jouissance* and his ideal ego in order to preserve the illusion of distance, as well as his tenuous identity grounding, obsessionals determine that their badge of alienation will be an increasingly burdensome inscription for masculinity. The American billionaire Howard Hughes, for example, seems to fall within the structural purview of obsession. Despite his marriages to beautiful film stars, his control of communication networks (film, television and newspapers) — *itself revelatory of the obsessional's efforts to defeat desire* by mastering the Symbolic order — his power over one American president and ownership of an international airline (TWA), he spent his last years ensconced in a hotel room with blackened windows. Isolated from living others, he lay in bed surrounded by newspapers and televisions — surrounded by words and images — spending day and night in elaborate rituals designed to protect himself from germs. In Las Vegas,

Mecca of gambling (risk taking) he lay motionless, his body deadened with drugs and malnutrition. Surrounded by a few pure (Mormon) young men he tried to ensure his masculine identity by replicating the boyhood group, beyond the impurity of female demands. His last powers were concentrated on issuing commands to television networks to purify their programs of racial taint.

Typical of other obsessionals Howard Hughes was obsessed with questions of stasis. He wished to remain in one place, fixed in sets of recognizable rituals. Yet movement itself obsessed him. Travelling into "foreign" (other) territory gives the obsessional the illusion of being alive. Once in a new place, obsessionals tend to hole up in small spaces to resume their isolated lives. Since obsessionals do not really welcome Eros, it is not surprising that Hughes left no verifiable will, no legacy, no children. While Hughes's untimely and unnecessary death remains an enigma to American commentators, perhaps some light can be shed by the idea that Hughes was not his own master, but was mastered by the final *jouissance* of an absolute Other who required his death. Hughes is the neurotic who loved his suffering as his "self". The signifier that represented him was the death signifier.

At the limits of the obsessional's unconscious structure, the hysteric's discourse structure begins. Where he blocks the Otherness of desire with his ego, crowds out others with his (assumed) certainty, and solidifies rituals of all sorts to bolster a flagging mastery — that is eschews commuication as best he can — she communicates by her silence, her vacuous speech, by her body, by her emptiness. And what does she communicate? Lack. Pain. Her structure is written as follows:

$$\frac{\not{S}}{a} \longrightarrow \frac{S_1}{S_2}$$ ("A Jakobson," p.21).

At the limit of his unconscious structure one finds the gaze. At the limit of hers one finds the void. If it is true that the obsessional makes a merger between phallus and ideal ego, identificatorily becoming alternately the mark of lack, the object of desire, and finally the masculine organ itself, the hysteric's structure makes a similar move. By identifying herself with a master signifier she allows her voice to be appropriated by someone else. She represents herself as a subject who lacks, who does not know, but who can find a representative in an alternate ego (a double). The obsessional fakes a "master" tone to pretend to a masculinity he lacks. The hysteric cannot even fake this. She goes in search of a "master," not realizing that in evacuating her being, she is sacrificing herself to the desire

of the Other. Her impossibility — the Real — is that her unconscious desire motivates her to remain lacking. The knowledge produced by her unconscious tells her she is no-body. Her life quest will be a repetition of this *savoir*, this truth. The *impuissance* in her structure shows up in her impossible desire to be by not being. She wants to be an object of desire by replicating the lack of the Other. The risk incurred in trying to live as lack(ing) is that she must live close to the hole in the Other that Lacan called the Real. Thus, she lives close to symptomatization, if not annihilation.

Despite the particularities in each hysteric's story, the proximity of this discourse structure to the structuration of the unconscious reveals more dramatically than obsession that the neuroses, seemingly pieces of enigmata, derive from structures put in place in the childhood Oedipal taking on of a sexual identity. While obsessionals err by Imaginarizing everything, the hysteric is always at risk of losing her place in the life game if she loses the denigrated father her unconscious upholds, or his stand-in. This proximity to loss ensures that one class of hysterics will end their lives by suicide: a somewhat more radical encounter with death than obsessional anxiety, morbidity, or psychosomatic dissassociation. While the foreclosure of the father's Name removes a key signifier from contention in psychosis, the Name of the obsessional's father is all too dead, a rotting corpse. But the Name of the hysteric's father will not die. It is so palpably inscribed in the Other that she organizes her desire around fidelity to this Name. Both the hysteric and obsessional eschew castration — submission to the Symbolic law — to tally their demands to the Real father as desiring. The hysteric risks her life on the bet she can always find a man to supplement her lack, paying the price of her own subjectivity and and relative freedom. Indeed, if one sacrifices body and being to the family drama, how much is left to ask of her?

Jean-Claude Milner has described hysteria as "a paradoxical class whose elements can only be predicated by this: to be the most singular".[9] The mystery of the unconscious spoken by the Real on the hysteric's body is the secret that her body and being coalesce to make her the quintessence of sexuality, both guilty and glorious. While obsessional males can identify with the word to supplement their problems around the father's Name, hysterical females do not take on a conquest of the Symbolic order to supplement their lack. While definitive editions, multiple languages, fancy methodologies, linguistics, knowledge as a province, offer themsleves to the obsessional to screen out Otherness, the hysteric cannot close out the Otherness whose object she is. Paradoxically, the obsessional male's refusal to relinquish the bond with his mother robs him of a confident place in the Symbolic order, while the hysterical female often

seems a confident master of the Symbolic. She may appear self-sufficient, calm, even superior and communicate that she has no need to speak, or that her words are themselves authoritative. Her knowledge (S_2) emanates from the unconscious, the ultimate place of knowing. But the different movement of her discourse from her obsessional counterpart's is telling. While he seeks to attach himself to some ideal father — some idealized body of knowledge — to give him the credential he lacks in the place of the signifier for the Father's Name, she needs no credentials for her knowledge. "It" is spoken in the name of an unconscious knowledge, whether it be that she knows how to thwart lack by filling up the other's lack, or that the Other fills her lack, she communicates a confidence that sets her apart from her normative sisters. She knows this: that she is desire(d). The hysteric's neurotic problems begin when the Symbolic order and the others in that order begin to chip away at her certainty.

What the obsessional and hysteric have in common is an alienating complicity between $\not{S}$ and *a*. The structure of the fantasy shuts out any knowledge of the truth of their desire. Narcissism and desire do not fight each other, and thus, these troubled subjects seek no dialectical exit from the family novel or the primal scene. Life itself becomes a perilous game for the hysteric when her mastery of Symbolic matters is subverted, revealing to her that she is not really *in* the Symbolic game. Moreover, her desire makes living (moving, changing) impossible. Just as the male obsessional smothers within the Imaginary closet of his mother's desire, the female hysteric is only alive when spurred on by the gaze of male recognition or sexual desire which she, in turn, rejects or manipulates. Insofar as hysteria turns around the Real of the gaze, to cease being desired can cause such a woman to fall out of a tenuous connection to a Symbolic signifying chain. It is in this sense that I understand Milner to call the hysteric a "one issue" person.

While male obssessionals can rely on the identity base of a merger between an ideal ego and phallic privilege, the hysteric who loses her supplemental supports falls into the void of the Real. Perhaps one might view hysterical daughters as abandoned daughters. Their mothers are absent in ways that allow these daughters to make psychically incestuous liaisons with their fathers. In adult life, the hysteric's precocious knowledge *of having been preferred by a Daddy who looked to his small daughter* to compensate for what life did not give him keeps her from repressing her childhood in a way that will allow her to make exchanges into the world of otherness. When confronted with knowledge of what she signifies — lack-of being — her social game of cool mastery can rapidly dismantle. Indeed,

hysterical symptoms of anxiety, anorexia, silence, or suicide all shout one message: the fragility of hysterical subjects. It is not surprising that issues of motherhood or marriage are problematic for these women who live on the side of Thanatos rather than Eros (as it seems). Nor is it surprising that many hysterics dress in black. The secret side of many such ideally slim beauties often turns out to be a toxic diet, itself an admission that there is a disturbance at the level of primary need. Love and food are intertwined by rejection of nurture, whereas obsessional males are troubled differently by food. While the hysteric often "eats" air, the obsessional ritualizes eating, thus trying to control food (love).

Hysterics who succeed in committing suicide often leave others surprised and stunned, searching for a motive. Indeed it matters little to these women if they initiated the rejection of Daddy (or his stand-in), for if he withdraws his (already denigrated) gaze, the power base of their mastery collapses. Death seems the only course open. What has been at stake, after all, is "life or death". Insofar as a hysteric's *jouissance* does not reside in the sex act, but in the fact of having sexual power, of being looked at, *there is a logic to such suicides.*

One may conclude that the position of the phallus — the mark of lack — in the Other determines a subject as hysterical or obsessional, not gender difference *per se*. Its face in conscious life differs, however. For the hysteric the phallus shows up as lack itself when her desire manifests her demand: for "self" annihilation. Her being and body merge into one sacrificial offering to the lack of a representational signifier for her identity. Obsessionals try to skirt around feminine desire so as to avoid the gaze of the Other, also revealing by furtive gestures that lack is omnipresent in their lives. *Clearly, both obsessionals and hysterics are uncertain about limits to* their actions, or foundations for their identities. This pair represents the neurosis of living the Other's desire at the level of demand. Their demands reflect uncertainty about their sexuality, about the limits of their being, about the debts owed to the Other. One begins to understand why Lacan insisted that the treatment of neurosis proceed from the theory of a structuring of desire in order that the treatment might be directed toward a possible cure whose timing the analyst cannot fortell rather than remain mired down in the narrative "therapy" where analysands tell "tar stories" *and pretend they are getting better to please their doctors. If the neurotic* prises himself away from the desire that speaks him, if he or she changes his or her words, will desire follow suit? Will the mark of lack play a less burdensome role in the life of these sad men and women whose lives dramatize the brutality and alienation of the living for Other?

Notes

1. *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan Livre XX: Encore* (1972-73), text established by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: *Editions du Seuil*, 1975, p.2.
2. LACAN,J. *On the Possible Treatment of Psychosis*, in *Écrits, a Selection*, translated by A. Sheridan, New York: W. W. Norton & Co.; 1977. See the Schema L, p. 193.
3. *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan: L'Identification* (1961-62), April 4, 1962, unpublished.
4. MILLER,J.A. *How Psychoanalysis Cures According to Lacan*, Newsletter of the Freudian Field, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1987 18.
5. GRIGG,R. *The Function of the Father in Psychoanalysis*, Australian Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1986), 121.
6. INDART,J.C. *Etude d'un symptom obsessionnel*, Omicar?, No. 28 (Spring 1984), 78-79.
7. *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Livre VII: L'éthique de la psychanalyse* text established by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: *Editions du Seuil*, (1959-60), p.85.
8. KAUFMANT,I. *Clivage de l'obsession par l'interpretation*, Omicar?, No. 40 (Spring 1987), 50.
9. MILNER,J.C. *Le maître et l'hystérique*, *L'Âne*, No. 7 (Winter 1982), 3.

Metaphor in Agoraphobia

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Walking gingerly along the corridor, occasionally stretching her arm to balance herself on the side wall, she entered the room, body rigid, and sat down. Fear and panic were all around. Twisting a handkerchief, she spoke of her present impossibility of leaving her apartment, inability to phone for a taxi, enter shops, banks, use money and generally walk about and do her daily business without a feeling of paralyzing fear. In particular she complained when out, of the sensation of pins and needles in her legs and at times, when in absolute terror, of being "blind with fear", saying: "I cannot see anything".

For Lacan: "... the symptom itself is structured like a language ..."

The use of words was not her problem. She spoke copiously about her current difficulties, crying, trembling and demonstrating her real fear, in a flow of text that could be read if properly, that is, psychoanalytically punctuated. To liberate the words from the symptom, after listening to and reading her discourse in the analysis as a text, was our task.

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What was it in this discourse of complaints that could lead us back, as Freud states on many occasions, to, at the very least, an over-determination in a symbolic double meaning? Two nodal points of conflict, one long since forgotten and a current ever-present one, that are now both symbolic.

Lacan states:

> "... that if Freud has taught us to follow the ascending ramifications of the symbolic lineage in the text of a patient's free associations in order to locate and mark in it the points where its verbal forms intersect with the nodal points of its structure, then it is already completely clear that the symptom resolves itself entirely in a language analysis, because the sympton itself is structured like a language, because the symptom is a language from which the Word must be liberated."[1]

Today, I wish to highlight such a chain of signifiers liberated from the *history of this case of anxiety hysteria and particularly those related* to this 64 year old woman's agoraphobia and illustrate the nodal points of the current conflict which lead directly to the conflict of long ago. Of course, many interlinked threads in the analysis will not be touched upon; I will trace only those directly related to the agoraphobia. In particular I want to trace the metaphor that underlies the symbolic structure of her language. Phobia is characterized by metonomy but the stagnation of the phobia, I will show, occurs through metaphor formation and so the symptom, a substitute, the consequence of repression and excluded from consciousness. We also need to remind ourselves that "the ego is the seat of anxiety"[2] and that "inhibition is a restriction of an ego function"[3] differing from a symptom, as a symptom does not act upon the ego.[4]

In cases of agoraphobia, often an anxiety attack occurs when out in the street and is the precipitating cause for the onset of agoraphobia, the symptom being constructed to avoid further outbreaks of anxiety.[5] This patient used many devices to avoid tasks and places throughout her life and over the last eight years attempted to remove all sources of anxiety, but at the cost of placing many restrictions upon her life. As Freud pointed out:

> "... one can save oneself from an external danger by flight but fleeing from an internal danger is a difficult enterprise."[6]

The more frequent cause of agoraphobia according to Freud lies in

abnormalities of sexual life,[7] the anxiety being related to the functioning of the body and it seems to depend upon the romance of prostitution.[9] The present case confirms this but what I would like to show is that even though there is transformation of affects,[10] the underlying structure is metaphorical and the symptom, a substitution for the prevented desire.

Let us read the text in the order with which she presented it:.

She is fearful of shopping, using money, *walking along the street*, usually in a panic with pains in her legs to a point where she cannot see; *a blindness*.

Tracing her history was a difficult enterprise as she could not leave the "here and now" of her distress and panic; her history was irrelevant to her, *she couldn't see*. One had to literally break through her empty chatter to grasp meaning in her non-sense.

She found it difficult to look at what was trivial, the rubbish of psychoanalysis. But one day she arrived in what she flippantly described as *comfortable shoes*. Psychoanalysis seizes such trivial rubbish, the throw-away words, and they are punctuated into the text. She broke through and listened and traced her words leading to the shoes, shops, money, banks, Safeways, men's shops. She spoke of the death of her husband when *she was not accompanying him*, and her marriage to this *impotent man*. Then her discourse jumped to when she was sixteen years old. A boarder bought her new, small-heeled, *blue shoes*. Later she lived with him after he took advantage of her under a table during a London bombing raid. He gave her the gift of the blue shoes.

Still earlier, she remembered always *running to school late in panic*, after *her crippled and bedridden mother had either kept her late, or at home for* many days.

She remembered never being allowed out *beyond the gate into the street*, as beyond was the fearful world. She was only allowed to run fearfully to school. The old fears returned. But earlier still, a fear of *the corridor leading to her* parents' bedroom, and a fearful darkness is remembered.

She presented her poems to me in sessions as if I was the safekeeper of the word. Shoes, Anger and The Gate appeared as if written to her mother; "May I go out to play..."; ".. oh, please let her say yes.."; ".. let me go beyond this gate .."; or ".. set me free, let me go .."; ".. I can see an opening, is it too late, am I too old?"; "..why should I leave now, yet yes, why do I want to fly, but not alone, so maybe it is best to stay. If I try to fly and fall and fail, what

then?". Suddenly she realizes that it is *people* that she is afraid of *in the street*.

She looked after her *bedridden mother* from an early age, even changing *the period pads*. "I think through my stomach ..", she says — a fear of pregnancy. She remembers that she screams and jumps if someone approaches her from behind. A fear of her father even in adulthood is confessed, "even though he was always a perfect gentleman to me."

She has had some difficulty for most of her life, the agoraphobia erupted dramatically after the death of her husband and the subsequent move interstate eight years ago. She still converses with him, saying, "it is painful enjoyment". "I am not worth very much you see .. now his *cheques arrive*, it is *blood money*, I don't want it". She feels cheated by him. A bush scene at home was often commented upon by him: "Listen to the sound of silence", he would say. She questions her marriage, never having had *a woman's love from a man*, and is angry. She writes a poem ending ".. it is forgiveness and love".

One day she waits in fear *on the corner*, another punctuation mark in her text. Thoughts occur in the session, "Am I a loose woman? .. The whole world is looking at me, as if I am picking up a man".

She comments, "I am only feeling strong when I am wearing high heels in the street." She puts on the shoes and goes past the gate.

She remembers her mother forcing her to put her *shoes and socks* on in front of her and immediately complains in the session "Why does it always have to be sexual?" She doesn't know where her sexual knowledge came from but remembers missing a period at 14 years of age and living in *fear that she was pregnant — a late period*.

Often when upset she recalls going into the room of lodgers to get comfort and at about 15 years of age, her mother screams accusingly that she has had sex with a boarder, and she recalls being in *absolute horror of the thought*. Again, "Am I never going to get away from this sexual thing?" she asks. She makes the connection between *leaving home and a woman walking the street*. There are too many foreigners where she walks and *"cannot make contact with anyone"*.

We see that there is a transportation of signifiers tracing a lineage of fear that is always of the same colour — blood red, *period-pads*, *late periods* and *blood money*. A lineage of anxiety is traced, associated with her legs, *the dark corridor*, *lateness*, *running to school*, *going beyond the gate* and of *walking the street* and the preparations to do so, *shoes and socks*, *blue-*

shoes, *comfortable-shoes*, and finally *high-heels*. The inability to walk the street and the blind panic attempt to stop the anxiety in *shops*, *banks* and *money dealings*, and of her seeing that the sexual commerce was all around.

The symptoms, rather than being those of an hysteric, are phobic, the anxiety withdrawing her from objects associated with her desire.

> "We should be struck, too, by the fact that it is the co-extensivity of the development of the symptom and of its curative resolution that the nature of the neurosis is revealed: whether phobic, hysterical or *obsessive, the neurosis is a question that being* poses for the subject 'from where it was before the subject came into the world' (Freud's phrase from Little Hans)."[11]

The set of ideas from the past are intersected with those of the current crisis by metaphor, metaphor hooked by language around desire (object a). The metaphor, *blood money* is constructed around her husband's cheques. *Blood money* condenses the history with its multi-meanings. *Blood*, object and nodal point of the past conflict, *money* object and nodal point of the present conflict; *sexual ideas*, repressed, are the intersection by which the past and present take on the over-determined symbolic new meaning, *blood-money* — the phobic object. The metaphor *blood-money* arises from the intersection, substituting then for all the sets of previous ideas, so that the symptom crystallizes to phobic objects not in her body, as in hysteria. The sexual (blood) commerce (money) is to be avoided on the street. The anxiety caused by such objects and the arrival of cheques announcing her lack is so great it inhibits her walking and seeing.

Diagrammatically;



Her lack, via a dead husband and blood-money cheques, allows the re-emergence of sexual ideas and the mystery of long ago surrounding the parental bedroom. The final metaphor formation stabilizes her fear in agoraphobia and now functions to block her desire. To walk in the street in fear links the present fears and the horrors of long ago in the legs, that is to stop being sexual. The fear blocks this desire as she saw the blood of a crippled mother and wondered in fear, what her father did to her; this is the unconscious idea that is repressed.

In phobia, the object substitutes for the unconscious idea, in hysteria the symptoms of the body substitute for the unconscious idea. This substitution of an object for the unconscious idea has the claim of being a symptom.

The final moment of punctuating her text came when she gave meaning to having been given an "ale and tonic" (drink) some time ago, which she had kept in the fridge ever since. She was unable to drink it, as she would only have this drink with her deceased husband. The time came when she was able to let go of the dead husband, acknowledge her lack, and drink it. She asked for her poems back. And so the words were liberated from the symptom. Finally, being able to accept her own message in an inverted form, the analysis ended.

Notes

1 LACAN,J. *The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis* in The Language of the Self. Transl. by A Wilden. Delta Books, p.32.

2 FREUD,S. St. Ed., Vol. XX:93.

3 FREUD,S. Op. cit., p.89.

4 FREUD,S. Op. cit., p.90.

5 FREUD,S. *The Interpretation of Dreams,* St. Ed., Vol.V:581.

6 FREUD,S. *Anxiety and Instinctual Life,* Lecture XXXII, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, St. Ed., Vol.XXII:84.

7 FREUD,S. Preface and Footnotes to the Translation of *Charcot's Lectures,* St. Ed., Vol.I:139.

8 FREUD,S. *Draft B. The Aetiology of the Neurosis,* St. Ed., Vol.I:182.

9 FREUD,S. *Draft M.* St. Ed., Vol.I:253.

10 FREUD,S. *The Anxiety Neurosis,* St. Ed., Vol.III:97.

11 LACAN,J. *The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud,* in Ecrits, a Selection. Transl. by A.Sheridan. Tavistock Publications, 1977, p.168.

How To Give a Pail of Milk, Then Kick it Over
...Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of Envy.

• Dr. Eleanor Sebel

Introduction

While this folk saying may well express the envy the therapist perceives in the patient, I would suggest that it aptly describes the effect of an interpretation of envy which is premature or mistimed on the part of the therapist.

Melanie Klein in her major work *Envy and Gratitude* has given us a very clear distinction between envy and jealousy: "Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable — the envious person wishing to take it away or spoil it. Moreover, envy implies the subject's relation to one person only, and goes back to the earliest exclusive relation with the mother. Jealousy is based on envy, but involves a relation to at least two people: it is mainly concerned with love that the subject feels is his due, and has been taken away, or is in danger of being taken away from him by his rival."[1] Envy, Klein highlights, is not satisfied to rob the other of what is desirable, but involves destruction and spoiling of what is good.

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As to its origins Klein suggests "envy is an oral sadistic and anal sadistic expression of destructive impulses, operative from the beginning of life, and that it has a constitutional basis."[2]

How does this connect with Freud's hypothesis of the life and death instincts, to which Klein alludes?[3]

Is envy an innate constitutional neuronally programmed emotion present at the beginning of life?

Or does the extreme intensity and length of the human infant's dependence on its mother inevitably provide a setting where there is prolonged experience of being little in the presence of someone bigger, being needy in the presence of something more resourceful? And in such a setting, then, is the potential to experience frustration at being small and needy what is really "constitutional"?

Perhaps this idea lies more as a bedfellow with Winnicott's concepts of early aggressive behaviour being traced to prenatal motility, ie. the first evidence of muscular eroticism.[4] His suggestion is that if destructiveness occurs, it is *without intent* in the expression of the infant's "instinctual love" in its earliest forms, ie. the infant's ruthless, crude way of loving.[5]

I would suggest that in order to envy another (or part of another) there has to be *some* concept of SELF and of OTHER. Winnicott suggests that the skin, under healthily facilitating circumstances, comes to delineate the BODY (SOMA) and the PSYCHE becomes located within the SOMA.[6] By PSYCHE he means the imaginative elaboration of bodily experiences.[7] This would suggest that the location of the PSYCHE within the SOMA underpins the development of a sense of SELF.

It seems paradoxical to me to suggest that an infant can envy someone or something which he cannot yet distinguish from his own self — surely some rudimentary self-object differentiation has to occur before one can speak of an infant envying some object or part object.

These issues as to when, developmentally, envy occurs, and to the relative importance of "innate constitutional factors" and environmental *difficulties in provoking envy, profoundly influence one's clinical* approach.

Clinical Illustrations

With this in mind, I would like to present some clinical illustrations.

I have drawn heavily from Klein's invaluable clinical descriptions of envy and its manifestations. Winnicott's emphasis on facilitating the patient

in finding his/her own interpretation as far as is possible, is central to the interpretive approach I have adopted.[8] In particular, difficulty arises when one intrudes an interpretation onto a patient, rather than allowing the patient to discover it for himself, granting nonetheless that there are some interpretations that one never desires to hear.

Certainly as language became available for emotional expression in the clinical work presented,[9] the patient moved into a position where he/she could make use of this language and find his/her own "words to say it."[10] Here then the ideas of both Winnicott and Lacan can be linked.

Thus while it is always important to recognise the occurence of envy in the transference to the therapist, I suggest that what the therapist chooses to do with this recognition is NOT fixed. Here I differ from Etchegoyen et al, who state "envy must be interpretated always and without delay, as soon as it appears and without erroneously giving way to considerations of tact or timing."[11]

I would put forward the following possibilities:

1. One may choose to know, to ensure survival of oneself as a therapist and not to intepret envy directly.

2. One may choose to interpret within the material of the patient's family history but leave for a while yet direct interpretation of feelings involving the therapist, ie. what is known as the "transference interpretation."

3. One may — in my experience — then find the patient able to raise spontaneously the issue of his/her envy toward significant others in the past, towards others in the present and towards the therapist ie. the linking of the past, present external and present therapeutic experiences.[12]

Case Study One

The material for the first illustration comes from a case where the three links above have eventually been made. The patient's reflections, however, highlight his experience of a very early stage in therapy, described in the first possibility above.

I am indebted to my patient, who, while currently working in the area of his envy towards me, reviewed the early years in therapy.

He spoke with gratitude and relief that I had not interpreted his envy of his father, or of me, then. He had hated his father and could think of his mother only as "pathetic" The qualities of competence in many areas in his father's

life and loving (if confused) concern in his mother could not be appreciated.

Likewise, he reflected, he had been infuriated when I did not conform to his expectations of being "pathetic", as a woman therapist. I would try, empathically, to interpret his hurt or anger at the holiday interruptions in therapy. He recalled his affronted rage, remembering now his desperate, but fragile, attempts to deny his need for therapy. He avoided this painful recognition by his somewhat patronising and contemptuous attitude toward me...my surgery was "bourgeois", my *lifestyle "middleclass"*. I lacked his knowledge and fine taste in art nouveau and art deco artefacts and architecture, and in movies and books.

It was, indeed, difficult to withstand the force of this ongoing devaluation, *while aware of his fragility outside therapy, his loneliness,* his search for intimacy, and his drinking.

Management was dictated by two overriding considerations:

> — The patient's position in regard to understanding his own family history, *for his hurt and his hate as yet prevented* this.
>
> — His position in the history of our therapy together ie. his need to find containment for his hate, so he could reach *down to his love, but his need NOT to have this function* of the therapy forced upon his awareness.

My essential task was to survive physically, to survive in my analytic function of thoughtful reflection and NOT to retaliate for his attacks on me. It was crucial that this survival was attained without interpretations, which while expressing my experience of him, would be phase-inappropriate and further impoverish his inner world.

Now some seven years later, *he* is able to tell *me*, of the importance of my survival, without premature interpretation of his envy, which he would have found annihilating.

Case Study Two

This describes a situation in the therapy with a single 31 year old woman, R. She had come to therapy complaining of an "emptiness always inside" and a multitude of phobic symptoms. Her mother was presented to me in an extremely idealised manner, always in the service of her children, including my patient.

It emerged over time that R. had been exposed to wild unpredictable

swings in her mother's emotions, repeated suicidal threats and actual suicide attempts by her mother, and to sexual interference, countenanced by her mother, from mid-latency onwards.

Into the second year of therapy, the patient's extreme idealisation of her mother receded quite considerably. She began to feel angry for the abuse she had suffered. Yet she could express almost no negative feelings toward me for my inevitable failures — in understanding, in ending sessions, in imposing weekends and my vacations upon her need for *therapy time with me.*

She held me in an idealised position now, using me as Alice Miller calls it, in a "trial run with figures in the outside world."[13] One area of particular difficulty was her mother's refusal to allow her daughter, R., a separate psychic existence. Any resources which R. had — capacities to order her life, save money, buy a unit — were literally devoured by her mother who required her to share these resources with all family members. Needless to say, these loans were not repaid, nor were R.'s internal capacities acknowledged.

Rather, mother's frequent refrains, gleaned from the patient's association in therapy, were:

"Jesus, R., don't be so stupid!!"

and

"You children will be the death of me!!"

It seemed to me that both comments involved the mother's intense envy of R. As a dependent infant, R. should not have the care she needed. It cost the mother too dear — "the death of me" — and linked with historical detail of the mother's own early deprivation.

As a separate individual, R. was intolerable to her mother and there was a drive to annihilate R.'s thinking capacity by devaluing her internal resources. This was very effective, to the extent that R. believed herself stupid and incompetent, while providing the major resources for the family. She could not keep anything for herself but compulsively shared everything with her family. She felt for a long period that she was so "hopeless" that if mother died so, too, would she.

At this stage, the understanding of envy was a major task in the therapy. Yet I chose to be a companion on this "trial run" so to speak, helping to unravel the spells and mystification by which mother's envious attacks appeared to produce, magically, a state of confusion and despair, in my patient.

I did wonder, how and when, her gently spoken concerns about needing me 24 hours, rather than 1 hour, a day might involve some display of envy within the therapy toward me. Yet still the concept of envy was outside this patient's consciousness. We discussed the fairy tale, Cinderella...

Why, I wondered, did the ugly sisters banish Cinderella to the cellar, dress her in rags, hiding her away, so as not to be considered for the glass slipper.

"Because they didn't like her, they were jealous."

And these things they did to Cinderella? What effect did they have? Why did they do them?

"Cinderella was unhappy because she couldn't have pretty clothes, but I *don't know why they'd* be jealous."

The idea of the ugly sisters wanting to SPOIL what they ENVIED in Cinderella was beyond my patient's comprehension.

Here the patient was in the process of unraveling her own personal history *before therapy, and in this way the situation differs from* that presented in the reflections of the first patient. I had concluded that here, while language was gradually developing for expression of emotion, I was still required in an idealised way. Furthermore, in the developmental history of this analysis, I wasn't yet felt as clearly separate in the therapy, and it was inappropriate yet to speak of her envy of my resources which I locked away at the end of sessions, weekends or vacations.

She continued to develop more of a capacity to set a firm boundary with her mother, and to recognise the effects of mother's envious attacks on her. Yet a highly unsatisfactory relationship with a man *continued outside* therapy. She felt devalued, misunderstood, "jealous" if his gaze turned to any person or activity other than herself. In return, he did devalue her, provoke her by his indifference and show contempt for her capacity for introspection.

Case Study Three

This example involves a situation where R. has now explored quite considerably her history in her family before therapy.

She had made calls to me, out of session times for some two years now, aware of our agreement that she should contact me if possible, before she acted out her distress by drinking alcohol and starving herself of food.

After a weekend when she had called me twice to handle her despair, *she commenced the Monday session spontaneously:*

"I'm embarassed to tell that I remember and appreciate your being there at the weekend."

Embarassed?

"Yes....I feel ashamed...I want to let you know...I often don't say anything but I do appreciate it..."

The session then subtly turned to people who ate too much, who enjoyed themselves too much at other's expense. Toward the end of the session, I said:

You spoke of your appreciation of me at the beginning of this session...but soon afterward you recounted how your friend eats and gets fat, your boyfriend enjoys himself and neglects you. It seems the pleasure in having some of me for yourself has been spoiled.

"Yes....."

I wonder what has happened? You have acknowledged you enjoyed my feeding and care at the weekend?

"*I don't know*" *(a particular tone indicates she wished to close off* consideration of the issue.)

(I persisted) I wonder if you are afraid you'll use me up, I'll be all drained, the death of me.

"YES!!"

A fortnight later the struggle to separate from her boyfriend continued to evolve.

"I'm driven MAD by my jealousy of him. I watch him like a hawk. I can't stand it. I've told him to go — but he's still there and I can't stand feeling so jealous. I really can't bear being so jealous."

I wonder whether we can work on why it's like that?

(Both of us have attempted this task before. Yet now, with the evidence that she has some capacity to remember me over time (the weekend) I feel freer to wonder with her if the sadistic envious feelings provoked to an extreme degree in the relationship with the boyfriend, have their counterpart in our relationship.)

I said: You see me as being good to you and tell me there's no point being angry that I don't care for you 24 hours a day. You feel our relationship has much potential for good — and it has.

"YES."

Yet, parallel in time, you tell me of rage, the hurt and hurting in the *relationship with your boyfriend.*

"Yes."

I wonder what this means? These parallel relationships.

"I don't know" (in the particular tone, indicating a wish to close off consideration).

Could it be that you split off, out of consciousness, most of the hurt and hurting feelings between us?

"You're so good to even see me, how can I complain?"

But perhaps you do...about the lack of 24 hour day care...when we talk of your jealousy of your boy friend's attention *anywhere else but on you? And* you feel this is so crazy?

"Well I want to disagree with you..."

(Silence)

"All my relationships have been like this one where I felt the other person doesn't care about me, and I go crazy with jealousy."

(Silence)

Sudden vitality appeared in her voice.

"Could it have something to do with my mother?"

What do you mean?

"Well, something to do with how it was with her when I was little."

Keeping her ideal like you did when you first came — and keeping me ideal now?

"YES!!"

A week later, after a fight, the date is set now for his departure. She rings on the weekend, preoccupied by cutting her own wrists, taking pills, praying she will have a heart attack and die, sick of needing me, she tells me.

We arrange to meet.

"I feel melodramatic — I felt a bit better after I spoke to you so I shouldn't be here."

Then followed a prolonged period where any response of mine was useless. There was no point to anything. I felt tempted to agree with her. Anything and everything I did with her was useless. Eventually I said:

You felt you did feel a bit better after agreeing to meet — some hope — but the rest of the time now you show me there is no hope.

"YUP!!!"

"I tried to ring you for forty minutes — your telephone was engaged — then I thought of cutting my wrists."

So my unavailability links with ideas of cutting yourself?

"Yes."

I was unavailable — it must have been difficult to keep trying.

"Yes. I must have dialed thirty times."

Yet you did make contact, and you did feel better now there's no hope, you say.

"Yup! It just boils down to the feeling that if I can't have exactly what I want I won't have anything."

Yes..it does seem that way...but it's not only the infant, it's all the environment, me, my unavailability that's involved.

"Yes"

(Silence)

If I have resources and they are not there when you want them.. then as you said you feel "I'm sick of needing you."

"Yes."

And then what good you do remember you spoil...as in this session.

"Yes I do."

And this is like the mother spoiling your good things.

"Yes, it is...."

So your baby not only needs me, she also envies me, and spoils what good she's found in me, like mother spoiling the good things in you.

(Silence)

The patient began to settle toward the end of this session.

Here is an example where the patient's history in her own family has been explored far enough and where the history of the analysis has developed to the point where envy of the therapist can be interpreted and linked with family history.

Conclusion

The delicate interplay between the individual's history in his family of origin and his unfolding history within the analytic setting is a vital factor in the management and interpretation of envy. Where this is understood, the therapist is best able to offer a "pail of milk" (ie. the analytic understanding of envy) and because it is phase-appropriate for the patient developmentally, not "kick it over" (ie. spoil it for the patient's use.)

Three different clinical examples are given, illustrating developmental situations in therapy:

1. In the first, the exploration of the individual's history in the family of origin and in the analysis are both very early.

2. In the second, considerable work has been achieved in understanding the history in the family of origin, but the history of the analysis is still very young and unfolding.

3. In the last, considerable work has been achieved in understanding the individual's place in his family of origin and in understanding the unfolding relationship in the analytic setting.

Where this last situation is reached, it is possible to interpret envy in the transference to the therapist and link it with the individual's history in his family of origin.

Then, hopefully, a full pail of milk can be offered; neither therapist nor patient need kick it over.

Notes

[1] KLEIN,M. *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*, The Hogarth Press, 1980, p.181.

[2] KLEIN,M. Op. cit. p.176.

[3] KLEIN,M. Op. cit. p.177.

[4] DAVIS,M. & WALLBRIDGE,D. *Boundary and Space*, H.Karnach Books Ltd., 1981, p.69.

[5] WINNICOTT,D.W. *The Depressive Position in Normal Emotional Development* in Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis, Hogarth Press, 1978, p.265.

[6] WINNICOTT,D.W. *Ego-Integration in Child Development*, in The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, Hogarth Press, 1982, p.61.

[7] WINNICOTT,D.W. *Mind and and its Relation in the Psyche-Soma*, in Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis, Hogarth Press, 1978, p.244.

[8] WINNICOTT,D.W. *The Use of an Object and Relating Through Identifications*, in Playing and Reality, Pelican, 1985, pp.101, 102, 108.

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[10] CARDINAL,M. *The Words to Say it*, Picador, 1984.

[11] ETCHEGOYEN,R.H., LOPEZ,B.M, and RABIH,M. *On Envy and How to Interpret it*, in International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol.68, Part I, 1987, p.59.

[12] MALAN, D.H. *Individual Psychotherapy and the Science of Psychoanalysis*, Butterworths, 1979, p.80.

[13] MILLER,A. *Prisoners of Childhood*, Basic Books, 1981, p.81.

Psychoanalytic Development Theories : an Australian Tourist's View

* J.R. Grimwade

Psychoanalysis originated in Vienna, written in German and linguistic, geographical, temporal and cultural translations have followed. The displacement of Freudian thought to Britain, the United States, France, Australia and elsewhere has led to conflicting theoretical formulations. Psychoanalysis has travelled.

The Machine in Different Lands: Stanton[2] applies a special machine to understand the international psychoanalytic family: psychoanalysis. With Lacan, he returns the problems to the family, to Mummy and Daddy.[3] But he interprets the intra-familial conflicts and anxieties ahead of the defences (principally, cultural origins). This paper interprets these defences by connecting developmental theory with cultural attributes.

A Psychoanalytic Tour of the Western World: What is needed on this brief tour of France, Britain, and the United States (with a stopover in Vienna)? Maps (theories), a list of people to visit (major theoreticians), information about the country; the people and their origins, what they value and how they treat their children, and a camera (as observers of family processes, we will use video).

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Britain: Why did Melanie Klein choose Britain after leaving Germany? Klein and Anna Freud were bitter enemies, yet both went to London. Is there a fit between a culture and a person? Certainly, Klein's theoretical concepts have formed the British School, while A. Freud's ideas were better received across the Atlantic.

The child's first relationship is with the totally loved, feeding breast. Being hungry is an experience of another realm, totally hated and full of pain. With development the rapt feelings of feeding are tempered by the knowledge that the hated breast is identical with the loved breast. Hateful feelings are muted to prevent the destruction of the good.[4] Object-Relations is a theory of moral development — good/bad, right/wrong, liberal compassion and a stiff upper lip. Britain was a natural environment for Klein's theories.

United States: With *Ego Psychology and The Problem of Adaptation*[5] Hartmann created a movement. "Erik Erikson was a young analyst, and an American, when Anna Freud[6] and Hartmann published their books... they sanctioned in theory what he was beginning to do in practice.[7] Previously, Erikson had taught at the A. Freud — Burlingham school and had trained as a child analyst under A. Freud. Erikson published *Childhood and Society*[8] in 1950 and entered mainstream American Psychoanalysis. Subsequently, he was induced to "review his own concepts and fit them into the changing psychoanalytic theory of the fifties".[9]

The fifties in the United States saw the (inexorable)[10] rise of Ego Psychology. For Jaccoby,[11], [12] the fifties mark the end of radical psychoanalysis and the medicalization of psychoanalytic practice. Contemporary with this were McCarthyism, the Cold War, a massive expansion of the American economy and a large scale exporting of American cultural values.

A biography title, *Erik Erikson: the Growth of his Work*[13] reflects Erikson's notion of psychosocial development throughout the life cycle and implies the continued grow of his thought, without apparent limit. Ego Psychology is an economic theory of mind with secondary gains, defence mechanisms and a conflict free sphere of the ego. Profit, tariffs and taxshelters form part of a capitalist theory of unbounded growth. By placing the accent on social adaptation, through the more or less successful negotiation of life stages by the individual, Erikson ignores the critical edge of psychoanalysis and renders the theory after the image of the dominant culture.

France: Jacques Lacan's contribution to developmental theory is his description, not discovery,[14] of the Mirror Stage.[15] In Anglo-Western

cultures this "commonplace" of French childhood has not been widely recognised.[16] The Mirror stage begins at about six months of age with the infant seeing the mother as an image of the future and becoming the image. The mother makes a reciprocal identification with an image of the child. This symbiotic relationship is dissolved when the child develops primitive language.[17] Through language, the Name of the Father intervenes, and thus, begins the critique of patriarchy.

Psychological development, from this view, involves a dialectic between the needs of the Self and the needs of the Other. Elsewhere in French society there continues the debate between existentialists and structuralists. Some say that given certain conditions, the individual is able to create a worthwhile project and others say such achievements prove the indomitability of society. The opposition of individual and society reflects the opposition of Self and Other. The cultural debate reflects/is reflected by developmental theory.

A Projection: A map has an edge, a scale, a directional orientation, and a date. The various dots, lines, and patches of colour are read through knowing the constructional syntax. Maps vary in detail, but all details are representations of physical features.

The child's body is like a map. If one charts development in terms of the boundary of the child, one has to differentiate the object from the field (Self from Other). If one charts development in terms of the child's growth, growth, like any interval scale, continues forever. If one charts development in terms of the contours of feeling, moral judgements predominate. If one charts development in terms of genital anatomy, anatomy becomes destiny.

The child's perception of internal and external stimuli, of physical growth and integration, of pleasure and pain, and genital anatomy are markers of psychological development. The child is involved in forming the effect of these markers — unlike a map, a child is self-reflective.

There are other physical markers of psychological development. Birth is an initiating experience with which the neonate has minimal active involvement; the neonate comes into being without choice. Being is a physical state with the incomprehensible opposite yet logical possibility of not being: consciousness implies unconsciousness. Birth is the marker of separation, and, therefore, as Freud[18] observed, of anxiety.

Beyond the individual are the family and the group: the repositories of history and the vehicles of survival. The family oversees the child's development until reproduction and the group protects its members from

external danger.[19] But what constitutes external danger, what is feared? Perhaps, the British fear moral decay, the Americans, economic stagnation and the French, a dissolution of their identity.

Video Clip: Culture and developmental theory provided camera angles, with close ups of prominent theoreticians and the body of the infant. Another angle was from down under. This tourist's view of psychoanalysis dialectically maps the differences in cultural and physical terms, and opens psychoanalytic rivalries to interpretation.

Notes

1 BETTELHEIM,D. (1984) *Man's Search for Soul*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

2 STANTON,M. (1983) *Outside the Dream: Lacan and French Styles of Psychoanalysis*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

3 Ibid, p.63.

4 SEGAL,H. (1980) *Klein*, London, Fontana.

5 HARTMANN,H. (1939) *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, London, Hogarth.

6 FREUD,A. (1936) *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, London, Hogarth.

7 COLES,R. (1970) *Erik Erikson: The Growth of his Work*, New York, Da Capo.

8 ERIKSON,E. (1963) *Childhood and Society*, 2nd.Ed., New York, Norton.

9 COLES,R. Op.cit., p.250. David Rapaport was a key influence.

10 FINE,R. (1979) *A History of Psychoanalysis*, New York, Columbia University Press.

11 JACCOBY,R. (1975) *Social Amnesia*, New York, Beacon Press.

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13 COLES,R. Op.cit.

14 WILDEN,A. (1980) *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Change*, 2nd.Ed., London, Tavistock, p.463.

15 LACAN,J. (1949) *The Mirror Stage as formative of the Function of the I, Ecrits, a Selection* (1977), London, Tavistock.

16 Some argue that Margaret Mahler's work on *Separation-Individuation* is similar — see Mahler, M., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975) *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant*, New York, Basic Books.

17 LACAN,J. Op.cit., pp.1-2.

18 FREUD,S. (1936) *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, London, Hogarth.

19 BION,W. (1961) *Experiences in Groups*, London, Tavistock. Ultimately, Bion regards group behaviour as based on the herd instinct.

Freud on *Triebe* — The Concept of Instinctual Drives

*Dr. Thomas Robb

> When I was young, the only thing I longed for was philosophical knowledge, and now I am going over from medicine to psychology I am in the process of attaining it.[1]

Much has been made, of late, of the frequently noted distinction between the meanings of the words *Triebe* and *Instinkt* in Freud's work. Humanistically inclined analytic writers from Bettleheim (1983) to Lacan (1977) have emphasised this distinction as a means of forcing a cleavage between the psychological, represented by the *Triebe* or drives, and the biological, represented by *Instinkt*. The consequence of this manoeuvre is to remove psycho-analytic theory from the ambit of the physical sciences and into that of the human sciences, or, simply, the humanities.

One difficulty with this approach is that it renders the status of biology problematic because it excludes the *concept* from the theory of psycho-analysis as irrelevent, and yet has to acknowledge the obvious effects of

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biology in the functioning of the mental apparatus. More generally, however, it unnecessarily concedes too much ground to the critics of psycho-analysis who would use the alleged "unscientific" status of analysis to discredit it.

At bottom, the scientific attitude is one which seeks to resolve disputes by appeal to some set of empirical circumstances, however broadly defined, rather than by appeal to authority and, if the latter criterion has predominated at times in the history of psycho-analysis, so much more reason for encouraging an emphasis on the former. A "return to Freud" then, is not intended as a mere lauding of the founding Father, but a return to the *evaluation* of the concepts he forged from what his patients told him. For the speech of the analysand (and, indeed, of anyone) is an "empirical circumstance", not simply because it is a disturbance of air molecules or the fingering of a reticule, but because it reveals that which is the raw material of both metapsychological theory and human action — the wish.

To say that psycho-anlysis should be an empirically based, scientific discipline is not, however, to say that it should adopt all the practices, methods and prejudices of the physical sciences. After all Freud, who always professed that analysis was at least a fledgeling science, was hardly likely to confuse the analytic process with the methods of physical science, in which he was one of the most highly trained and promising practitioners of his day (Clarke, 1982) — something which, incidentally, many of the so-called scientific purists critical of psycho-analysis cannot claim.

Every science contains concepts or theories which are not evaluated by that science; they are the givens upon which that science is built. In physics, the usual examples are the concept of matter or space etc., and a similar place is held in psycho-analysis by the *Triebe*. Whereas, however, at least the applied physicist leaves the investigation of such concepts to philosophers (or to those doing philosophy), Freud and many analysts since him, have drawn inspiration or insight into the occurrences in the analytic session from speculation about what has been dubbed "the metapsychology": the theory of mental functioning; what Freud called *die Hexe*, the witch.

Again, this practice of "philosophical" contemplation is not confined to psycho-analysis; physicists and mathematicians, for example, are not altogether immune from what is, strictly speaking, "extra curricular" activity. A well known example of this is Kepler's astrological investigations

or his contemplation of perfect solids. And, while scientific theories are rarely if ever rejected because they are philosophically unsound, if such speculation is to be carried out, it should subject the theory to an evaluation rigorous enough to remove at least the major logical inconsistencies and absurdities. After all, no logically inconsistent theory can possibly provide a correct account of events, however "useful" the theory is. Such a logical purge of one part of Freud's metapsychology is the goal of the present paper. As indicated, however, this is not just idle philosophising; no part of the analytic endeavour, whatever its distance from another part, is wholly unconnected to it.

In his monograph "On Aphasia", Freud (1891) rejects the materialist thesis he attributes to Meynert, that word presentations are "contained" or enclosed in nerve cells. Noting the tendency of "earlier medical periods" to localise whole mental faculties in cortical centres, he contends:

> "It was bound to appear a great advance when Wernicke declared only the simplest psychic elements, i.e., the various sensory perceptions, could be localised in the cortex ... but does one not in principle make the same mistake irrespective of whether one tries to locate a complicated concept, a whole mental faculty or a psychic element?"[2]

Later he goes on to say that every attempt to:

> "Discover a localisation of mental processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as migrating along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely."[3]

His alternative proposal was that:

> "The psychical is a process parallel to the physiological — a 'dependent concommitant'."[4]

Having thus divided the structure into two separate parts — the psychic and the physiological — Freud, in a number of later works, marks out the territory of psycho-analysis:

> "*Triebe* and their transformations are at the limit of what is discernable by psycho-analysis. From that point it gives place to biological research."[5]
>
> "Psycho-analysts never forget that the mental is based on the organic, although their work can only carry them as far as this basis and not beyond it."[6]

Yet the mental is still "based on" the organic, it is a "dependent concommitant" of it. But the particular relationship between these two which is of import for psycho-analytic theory, is that of 'representation' for, according to at least some of Freud's statements, it is the ideational representative of the *trieb* which is the only aspect of it that can be known. Indeed:

> "A *Trieb* cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea... If the *Trieb* did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state we could know nothing about it."[7]

Thus, without *mental* representations of the *triebe*, psycho-analysis could not function; it would have no subject matter.

In adopting this solution, Freud goes some way toward resolving the problematic status of the biological in a psychological theory. But he does so at some cost. Despite rejecting a physical representation of the idea (the nerve cell) he goes on to accept a "mental" representation without attempting to say anything about the nature of the mental, thus asking us to accept a more obscure theory in place of a simpler one. In addition, speaking in terms of 'mental representations' opens a Pandora's Box of philosophical objections to such notions (e.g. Wilcox and Katz, 1981, 1984). Only one of these objections need concern us here, which is that mental representations cannot do what is expected of them; they cannot *represent* anything at all.

When one thing represents another a *relationship* is set up between the two to form the state of affairs "X represents Y". In the everyday use of this formulation, the relationship exists because of some convention; people agree that the symbol X, when it appears, in some sense "takes the place" of the thing Y. And it is, perhaps, something like this that Freud has in mind when he talks about the symbolic representation or things and events as a result of repression (e.g. in dreams, or in symptoms), indeed Freud's word for repression — *Die Verdrängung* — means, literally, "to put in place of".

This would be all very well if *mental* representations could derive their alleged ability to represent things from such conventions, but it is quite plain that they do not. No one has ever sat down and said, "Every time I have *this* mental state, I shall agree that it refers to *that* physical thing". Even if such a project were to be undertaken, it would be self defeating, for in order to be able to compare a mental state with the thing, our mythical cataloguer would have to be able to know about the mental state and the thing

independently of one another in order to make his comparison of them, but to do this he would have to be able to be directly aware of the things he is contemplating and if he can do that, then the need for mental representations (as the means by which things are known) is removed.

One attempt to avoid this dilemma has been to claim that the relationship of "representation" between a mental image and the thing is not the result of convention but, in fact, exists because of the nature of the mental image itself. In this scheme the mental image somehow contains within itself the relationship of representation to some particular thing, it intrinsically refers to it or, as Brentano put it, the thing "intentionally inexists" within the mental image. Apart from the difficulty in seeing how such a mental image could have arisen, the argument for it contains a fatal logical flaw. In attempting to reduce a *relationship* between X and Y to a *property* of X, it commits the error of reification (or hypostasisation) — attempting to turn, in this case, a relation into a "thing".

Clearly then, the notion of a mental representation is unsatisfactory as a tool for understanding the mental apparatus, but this is not to say, as many so-called psychologists have thought, that the notion of "the mental" must be given up, nor that all theories couched in terms of mental representations are equally bad.

For example, the traditional view of the mind holds that it is composed of three parts: cognition, conation and affection or, loosely, thinking, striving and feeling. It has been equally common, however, as Anderson (1962) points out, to regard cognition as the *sine qua non* of the mental and to disregard, or downplay, the remaining faculties. In eschewing this "mistaken cognitionalism", Anderson adopts a position (summed up in the title of his paper "Mind as Feeling") in which he attempts to substitute "affection" for cognition as the basis of mind. This idea has much in common, it could be argued, with the notion that Freud has in mind when he speaks of a *trieb* as:

> "The psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation... "[9]

But this "psychical representative" is, to Freud, the *Triebpräsentanz*, which he is careful to distinguish from the idea *(Vorstellung)* that represents a *trieb* (e.g Freud, 1915c, p 179). Although Freud's statements here somewhat conflate a *trieb* and its representative, Freud offers further clues to his thinking about the nature of the *triebpräsentanz*. He writes of this representative as "an idea or group of ideas which is cathected with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido, interest) coming from a *trieb*", and he further states that:

> "Besides the idea, *some other element* representing the *triebe* has to be taken into account"

i.e. the "quota of affect" (*affektbetrag*). The *triebpräsentanz* can now be seen as an amalgam of affect and idea, and it becomes merely terminological convenience if we wish to distinguish a *trieb* only by the ideational part of its representative, since the *trieb* can also be known by its manifestation as an "affective state"[10]. In effect, Freud has introduced a new denizen into the panoply of mental creatures, a representation charged with affect. All this is certainly an advance on the theory that the mind is composed of, or is only concerned with, 'ideas' or mental 'pictures', etc.

Yet Freud's theory, at this point, has not gone far enough in overturning the Humean notion of the mind as a collection of ideas. For while we go on trying to think of the mind as a collection of representations or 'images', it is difficult to see how the notion of "psychical energy", "affect" or "instinctual representative", can be made to fit into the picture. What is the substance of these new "affective" representations? How are they formed from other, ideational representations (cathexis)? Why is the affective part of the representation, unlike the ideational part, not able to be repressed? And so on. In short, how can the entire economic view of the mind be fitted to the *'mental representations'* account of the mind? The problem is rather like trying to get a picture in a book to feel 'angry'.

These problems, however, disappear once we abandon the 'mental representations' theory of mind and substitute for it a picture of mind which, in fact, has been intimated by Freud and later expounded by Anderson (1962) and Maze (1983).

The ego's tendency to overvalue cognition has been exposed as such by Freud, but Anderson's suggestion — of simply substituting "feelings" for "ideas" — may be dismissed as 'mistaken affectionalism' unless a fuller account of "feelings" can be given. The account to be advocated here gives pride of place in the psychical apparatus to Freud's *triebe*. But, rather than asking whether thinking or feeling is *the* characteristic of the mind, the question to be asked is, rather: '*What* thinks, or *what feels*?'

Rather than interpose 'the mind' between the world and the biological, so that some sort of 'representation' is required before reality can be dealt with, surely the most parsimonious course is to follow our earlier argument in rejecting ideational representations as well. That is, why not simply say that *what* thinks or feels is not some abstract theatre, "the mind", but the *triebe*

themselves or, to put it in Anderson's graphic phrase, that "we are lived by our instincts".

To eliminate mental representations in this fashion might be seen as an attempt to equate the *triebe* with the biological and to thus advocate a reductionist theory of the mind. But this is precisely what is *not* being advocated here. Like Freud, we have rejected 'brain states' as possible mental representations, for we have rejected *all* such representations. On the other hand, this does not mean that 'the mental' has been eradicated. Instead, in the system proposed here it appears as the situation created when the *relationship* of knowing is set up between the *trieb* and some state of affairs external to it. This may be expressed, somewhat unconventionally, as "hunger knows where food is" (Maze, 1983), a formulation which emphasizes that there is no 'self' over and above the *triebe* which 'owns' those *triebe*, and it reminds us that it is the *TRIEBE* which knows, not 'the person'. And it is because the mental relationship between the *triebe* and another part of the world *cannot* be reduced to either term of that relation (on pain of the logical error of reification of the relation) that the present thesis is *not* reductionist.

Again, in the present scheme, the notion of cathexis or the welding together of an 'idea' and a 'charge of affect' is no longer mysterious. In fact, no mental activity can be *free* of cathexis since it is the *triebe* which is the knower; loosely speaking, that which is uncathected is unknown. Another way of stating this is to say, as we have at the beginning of this essay, that the fundamental unit of mental life is the *wish*, the connection of an instinctual impulse with some state of affairs.

This way of looking at the mental apparatus is, at first blush, rather unusual. However, Freud's most detailed description of *instinctual life* (Freud, 1915a) can be read as suggesting some not dissimilar points — though I am not, of course, advocating that the following account is what Freud, in some sense "really" said; it is only one reading of his sometimes contradictory statements on the *triebe*.

In considering "mental life from a *biological* point of view"[11], Freud points out four "terms which are used in reference to the concept of *triebe* — for example its 'pressure' (*Drang*), its 'aim' (*Ziel*), its object (*Objekt*), and its 'source' (*Quelle*)". Keeping in mind Lacan's contention (1977) that Freud's text is to be read as saying that these properties are *not* typical of *triebe*, the descriptions Freud gives can be seen as offering broad support for the current thesis, though they are, of course, coloured by Freud's 'representationist' language.

According to Freud, all the *triebe* are active; they exert a "pressure" for discharge or a "demand for work", indeed, this:

> "Characteristic of exercising pressure is common to all *triebe*; it is in fact their very essence."[12]

And this "very essence" is a "motor factor", an impulse to muscular movement i.e. an impulse to perform what Maze (1983) has called a "consummatory activity".

The biological basis of the *triebe* is further underlined in Freud's description of the source of a *triebe*.

> "By the source (*Quelle* — literally 'spring') of a *triebe* is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in the mental life by a *trieb*."[13]

As Freud notes, it does not matter what the exact nature of the somatic process is, but what *is* important is that;

> "*Triebe* are *wholly determined by their origin in a somatic source*."[14]

If Freud's comments on 'pressure' are accepted, then neither source nor pressure of the *triebe* appear in mental life and what remains to be *known* of a *trieb* in mental life is the "aim" of the *triebe*. This aim is (somewhat confusingly for those who might wish to try and identify the *trieb* by its aim) the same for all *triebe*, it is:

> "In every instance satisfaction which can only be obtained by removing the state of stimulation at the source of the *triebe*".[15]

This 'ultimate' aim is unchangeable, but:

> "There may yet be different paths leading to the same ultimate aim; so that a *trieb* may be found to have various nearer or intermediate aims, which are combined or interchanged with one another."[16]

In other words, it is behaviour, in the very widest sense of that term, which comprises the intermediate aims of the *triebe*. This behaviour may be eating, or phantasising, or thinking, so long as (in the long run) it is "effortful", thus satisfies a "demand for work" and, finally, removes (or at least reduces) the persistent stimulation created by some biological mechanism at the source of the *trieb*.

Now, although Freud says that the source of the *triebe* (and, hence, *what trieb is*)may sometimes be inferred from its aim,[17] he is *not* making the mistake (which 'instinct' theorists frequently do) of identifying, or defining, a *trieb* by the behaviour it produces. Such an argument would be a circular one of the kind lampooned in a famous quote from a character of Molière's, in which the ability of opium to put people to sleep is ascribed to its possession of a "dormitive virtue" — the sole evidence of such a virtue, of course, being opium's ability to put people to sleep.

Just as importantly, a *trieb* is not to be defined by its "object", that:

> "Thing in regard to which or through which the *trieb* is able to achieve its aim."[18]

That a triebe is not to be identified with its object is clear from the fact that:

> "It is what is most variable about a *trieb* and is not originally connected with it, but becomes assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible."[19]

The picture Freud is presenting of *triebe*, then, is one in which it is identified by its biological source, creates a demand for work (or, more precisely, for satisfaction) which is experienced by the mental apparatus in various ways (which, incidentally, have much to do with the particular source of the *trieb* in question) and with the "amount of excitation they carry."[20] This, in turn, drives the various behaviours of the organism, which derives satisfaction to the extent that it can find objects particularly suited to its needs. 'Particularly suited', in this case, means that an empirical relation exists between the biological source of the *trieb* and an object, by virtue of the physical properties of each term in that relation, not because of some intrinsic "merit" of the object nor because of any inbuilt "goal directedness" of the *triebe*.

Such a schema for the mental apparatus has a number of virtues. As already pointed out, it avoids the circular definitions of 'instinct' frequently given in other places, and it also avoids the problematic notion of 'mental representations': the philosophical problems of which overwhelm any intuitive appeal they may have as a method of describing mental life in a systematic way. On the other hand, the scheme explicitly prohibits (on pain of the logical error of reification) the reduction of 'the mental' to the biological source and 'gratifying' objects. In addition, it somewhat clarifies the basic psycho-analytic notion of cathexis, by making the link between the energy of the *trieb* and the state of affairs which is connected with it in an

inevitable relation between two physical entities, rather than a mysterious melding of ("psychical") energy with a 'mental' image. An interesting corollary of this point is that we can never 'do' anything, not even 'have an idea' which is not 'wished for' i.e. which does not satisfy some *trieb* though, of course, the gross physical expression of that wish may be inhibited by a different impulse finding expression instead. Such a notion is, obviously, complementary to the principal (in which Freud held great store) of "psychic *determinism*", the notion that no mental event is 'accidental' or without cause for, in this case, all actions are motivated.

Furthemore, the proposed scheme reduces the problem (noted by Lacan, 1977) of how sublimations can be alternative means for satisfying the same *trieb*. This is because no particular importance is now attached to the object or aim of the *trieb* per se. The Lacanian formula (which I owe to Dr. Zentner)is, after all, correct in pointing out, albeit somewhat cryptically, that the 'trieb has no object' i.e. it has no particular connection, by its nature, with any given object. It might be further added that a *trieb* has no aim i.e. none particularly associated with it, at least as far as intermediate aims are concerned.

Thus one basis or possible confusion in our understanding of psychoanalytic theory may be removed. Critics of Freud often claim that he gives too much prominence to 'sex' in his explanations of human actions. However, proponents of this view usually mean that Freud *overestimates* the importance of disturbances in sexual *behaviour* or, alternatively, that the 'ulterior' motive for much behaviour is to obtain sexual rewards. If Freud's work is read from the point of view that 'sexual' means 'anything which occurs as an expression of the *trieb* defined by the stimulation from certain parts of the body', then the interpretation of 'sexual' takes on quite a different sense — one not committed to any object or behaviour.

The particular process giving rise to the *trieb* is "outside the scope of psychology"[21] but Freud's discussion does not depend upon knowing what that process is (it is 'topic neutral' in philosophical terms), and such study can be profitably left to the neuro-physiologists (who Freud thought would one day clarify the relationship between biology and psychoanalysis).

Another point to be made, as Freud does, is that the scheme proposed (and, indeed, considerable parts of Freud's work) does not rely upon a commitment to any *particular* set of *triebe* which are primary. His classification of primary *triebe* into ego, or self-preservative, *triebe* and the sexual *triebe* was, in *Triebe and Triebschicksale*, only a:

> "Supposition (which) has not the status of a necessary postulate . . . it is merely a working hypothesis, to be retained only as long as it proves useful, and it will make little difference to the results of our work of description and classification if it is replaced by another."[22]

Such a substitution would, in fact, be attempted by Freud in his later works.

As a final note, we are now in a position to make some comments upon the most appropriate way of translating Freud's word *triebe*. As Strachey has pointed out[23], the word *'drive'* is inappropriate as a translation, as it has been invested with a number of unfortunate connotations by various branches of psychology. Today, in the post-behaviourist era, the word has acquired meanings beyond those contemplated by Strachey. On the other hand, the word 'instinct' has equally unfortunate overtones, derived mainly from biological science (as well as some derived from biological pseudoscience), of fixed, unavoidable, behaviour patterns contingent upon some stimulus.

Given the foregoing discussion, however, a more satisfying translation might be along the lines of *"instinctual drives"*, which has elements of each sense, but is sufficiently different from either to prevent either sense from dominating. Pragmatically, and provided the meaning elaborated above is kept in mind, it may be convenient (at least for grammatical purposes) to speak of 'instinctual' impulses or urges etc. as no adjective is readily derived from *'drive'*. Again, brevity may dictate the occasional use of 'drive' alone but, surely, the compound 'instinctual drives' is to be preferred, carrying as it does that implicit reference to something:

> "On the frontier between the mental and the somatic."[24]

Notes

[1] FREUD,S. Letter to Fliess, April 2nd. 1896.

[2] FREUD,S. 1891, p.55.

[3] FREUD,S. 1915c, p.176-177.

[4] FREUD,S. 1891, p.55.

[5] FREUD,S. 1910a, p.229.

[6] FREUD,S. 1910b, p.113.

[7]	FREUD,S.	1915c, p.179.
[8]	FREUD,S.	1905, p.83.
[9]	FREUD,S.	1915b, p.152.
[10]	FREUD,S.	1915c, p.179.
[11]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.118.
[12]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.118.
[13]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.119.
[14]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.119.
[15]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.119.
[16]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.119.
[17]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.120.
[18]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.119.
[19]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.119.
[20]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.119.
[21]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.120.
[22]	FREUD,S.	1915a, pp.120-121.
[23]		Standard Edition, Vol.I:xxiv-xxvi.
[24]	FREUD,S.	1915a, p.118.

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WILCOX,S. and KATZ,S. *Can Indirect Realism be Demonstrated in the Psychological Laboratory?* Phil. Soc. Science, 1984, 14, pp.149-157.

Narcissism, Negation and the Ontogeny of the Ego

• B.W. Balleine

> No mental activity has a special monopoly over regulation and admonition. We may speak of a life dominated by prudence, or by a love of truth, or by fear where one force tends to assume a special position of control in the mind, but we always have alterations, various forces obtaining dominance at different times and checking other forces.
>
> J.A. Passmore[1]

I

By 1923, in a return to the type of thinking engendered in the *Project*[2], Freud is speaking of the ego in neurological terms as being an adaptation out of the id's cortical layer brought about through contact with external stimuli and therefore as "that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world"[3]. The ego is thus considered to be an actual organ, an agent of reality, whose aim is to substitute the reality principle for

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the pleasure principle in "ever larger regions and deeper strata of the *id*"[4].

The most common criticism of this position is the problem of determining the source of the ego's energy so as to resolve how an agency consisting of no substantive entity might come to control the powerful instinctual drives[5].

Freud's (1923) solution to this kind of difficulty is wholly unsatisfactory and has generated confusion. Through the process of identification, the ego assumes the features of an object for the id. With this action, the ego forces itself upon the id as its 'love-object'. With the cathexis of the ego by the id which is hypothesized to occur as a result of this process, the ego gains control over a quantity of libido which, having been desexualised (converted to narcissistic libido), is then used to combat the unregenerate object-libido of the instinctual drives. Freud speaks of the ego in this process, in line with his hydraulic model, as becoming filled with desexualised libidinal fluid through cathexis by the id.

However, a constant ambiguity arises in this proposal. In 1915, in a new section added to the 3rd edition of the *Three Essays*, Freud wrote:

> "Narcissistic or ego libido seems to be the great reservoir from which the object-cathexes are sent out and into which they are withdrawn once more."[6]

In 1920 Freud again repeats this position;

> "Psychoanalysis (...) came to the conclusion that the ego is the true and original reservoir of libido, and that it is only from that reservoir that libido is extended onto objects."[7]

However, by 1923 this position has been drastically corrected:

> "Now that we have distinguished between the ego and the id, we must recognise the id as the great reservoir of libido."[8]

Soon following this pronouncement and later in 1938 Freud bewilderingly reverts to the original position, again locating this hypothetical reservoir in the ego, stating:

> "All through the subject's life the ego remains the great reservoir of his libido, from which object-cathexes are sent out and into which the libido can stream back again from objects."[9]

Even if we were to concede the ego to be the location for this reservoir of libido a further ambiguity arises as to how the ego may be said to supply both libidinal energy and to cathect itself at the same time. This kind of explication of the source of the ego's energy thus becomes ultimately incomprehensible.

Freud himself was highly critical of Jung's notion of a single primal libido which might be sexualised or desexualised stating that this position:

> "Reduced the term 'libido' to the level of a superfluous synonym and one was still in practise confronted with the necessity for distinguishing between sexual and asexual libido. The difference between the sexual instints and instincts with other aims was not to be got rid of by means of a new definition."[10]

Freud's own notion of a desexualised narcissistic libido is certainly not free of this criticism and may thus be said to suffer at least the same fate as Jung's 'superfluous synonym'.

While it is possible that some resolution of these difficulties might be proposed, it must be emphasized that a solution to the problem of where the ego gets its energy from will not, on its own, be sufficient to fully determine the ego agency of Freud's later theorising.The question is not only one of from where the ego gets the energy to implement its policies, but also of from where its policies originate in the first place.

Freud, by 1923, considered reality testing alone to determine the ego's policy stating that "for the ego, perception plays the part which in the id falls to instinct."[11] The role of policy is to impel the organism to some *specific* course of action, which is easy enough to understand with the instinctual drives, but for perceptual information such a position is problematic because it is not clear how facts may come to determine a course of action. Factual information does not in itself imply policy. Any piece of information which can be put into the form 'X leads to Y' can be used either to approach or to avoid Y. Those who take the motivating force of the ego to be perception are therefore forced, in explaining why the organism came to do X rather than not to do X, to resort to a notion of a personal agency which just *chose* to do X. Such an account is incompatible with any form of determinism. To account for behaviour by reference to 'personal agency' allows no basis for either explanation or prediction.

One solution to this kind of difficulty is put forward by the psychoanalytic ego psychologists who hope to resolve this problem by proposing an

autonomous ego which develops independently of the id and whose only function is that of adaption. In common with Freud's later conception of the ego is the notion of a structural agency whose main task is to adjust the contradictory forces of the id and the super-ego to each other and to the life situation.[12] The ego is considered to be the cause of the emergent behaviour of the organism and this behaviour is seen as the product of its influence over the other psychic agencies and of an adaptation between the ego and reality in such a way as to maximize survival.

The two positions diverge with regard to specifying the ego's origins with Freud proposing a development out of the id while the ego-psychologists[12, 13, 14, 15, 16] propose an autonomous, 'conflict free' ego present from the beginning of life. In this way the ego psychologists have divorced the ego from the drives of the id (following Freud's revision of 1920) intending that it be seen to function autonomously from the biological drives. This ego consists of no substantive entities whatever, being proposed merely as a set of functions: essentially those of perception, memory, anticipation, rational planning, and control of motility.[12,17] Criticisms applied to Freud's later position are equally applicable here and in many ways may be extended because of the appeal by these theorists directly to agency, in the form of an autonomous ego, and because of the emphasis upon the adaptive function of the ego, an emphasis which is both teleological and morally prescriptive.

Hartmann suggests that the ego as a specialised organ of adaptation is responsible for the mastery of the external world. He states of this that "the process of adaptation always implies reference to a future condition"[18] a situation guaranteed by both the autonomous ego apparatus and "those ego-related actions which counteract the disturbances in, and actively improve the person's relation with the environment."[19].

This reference to future conditions implies a striving to bring something about in a way which is believed to promote that outcome. This introduces an ability to direct one's own behaviour, to cause changes in oneself. A literally self-produced change would be an event without a cause, a notion which conflicts with any form of determinism. An autonomous ego is, therefore, not an adequate construct upon which to base the explanation of behaviour.

Further, the concept of adaptation is relativistic. Any thought that one form of adaptive behaviour is intrinsically superior to some other entails the notion that facts may, in some way, imply a course of action for any 'right thinking' person. Such an attitude can always be shown to conceal some

moralism or other.[20] An analyst who suggests one solution to the analysand's problem of adaptation as being superior to another, is merely presenting a new set of rationalisations in exchange for an old. In such a case this analyst is effectively aligned with the analysand's super-ego treating its demands as part of the reality situation to be adapted to, a course of action which results in re-establishing repressions rather than in disburdening the analysand of a set of moral fictions.

In offering an account of the ontogeny of the ego we have first to free ourselves of these logical difficulties. Yet any proposal must also take into consideration that series of observations and theoretical formulations involving the central notion of narcissism which prompted Freud to revise his earlier views.

In 1920, Freud came to feel dissatisfied with the earlier proposed ego-drives/sexual-drives dichotomy, becoming less convinced that libido was not a more general psychic energy. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, having established that narcissism refers to libido which is lodged in the ego, Freud asks the important question.

> "If the self preservative instincts too are of a libidinal nature, are there perhaps no other instincts whatever but libidinal ones?"[21]

He goes on to answer:

> "We suspect that instincts other than the libidinal self-preservative ones operate in the ego and it ought to be possible for us to point to them. Unfortunately, however, the analysis of the ego has made so little headway that it is very difficult for us to do so. It is possible, indeed, that the libidinal instincts in the ego may be linked in a peculiar manner with these other ego-instincts which are still strange to us."[22]

Using this argument, Freud goes on to deny the theoretical value of ego-drives and, having let them drop from sight, is committed to a position weakened by the problems already considered.

The solution to these difficulties is to reinvest the ego with a motivational base. Not only is this central to any logically coherent account of the formation and development of the ego, but in fact it can be shown that the difficulties which the attempt to explain narcissism brought about in Freud's earlier position, and which resulted in his subsequent

reformulations, are quite soluble within a conception of the ego as consisting of instinctual drives, a conception implicit in Freud's earlier work.

In coming to explicate my position with regard to narcissism, I wish first to briefly outline a concept of the instinctual drives and what they entail.

For Freud (1915) the instinctual drives are physiological structures which operate through specific biochemical input and through registering specific environmental facts. Their energy comes directly from the physiology and their policy is directed by the consummatory activity peculiar to each drive. Now, each instinctual drive must be thought of as an information registering entity, retaining predominantly information relevant to its gratification.[23, 24] Conflict in the mental apparatus is due to the conflicting interests of the instinctual drives with the effect that one will come to suppress another's activity in competition gratification. It is only through some influence external to itself that a drive's activity may be arrested and it is only another instinctual drive which has the available energy and the motive to bring this about. However, the drives are not homunculi. They have only one motive, know only a portion of the aggregate body of information and suffer no internal conflict. Thus, at any particular time, depending on the prevailing conditions, certain mental tendencies (i.e. some instinctual drive) will be dominant and, acting as the ego, will claim to constitute the entire person. Any other interest impinging on this drive may be treated as external sources of stimulation and disowned as foreign. They are thus descriptive of what is id.

II

What sense can be made of narcissism within this context?

Freud did not consider narcissism to be a pre-ego organisation but to be dependent upon the ego's formation. Narcissism represents a development from the previously disorganised auto-erotic behaviours. This particular line of thought is clearly expressed in *On Narcissism* when Freud states that:

> "We are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be something added to auto-eroticism — *a new psychical action* — in order to bring about narcissism."[25]

On this new psychical action depends, not just the formation of the narcissistic organisation, but also the development of the ego because it is through this same process that the ego comes to be differentiated from the id.

It is to this fundamental question of the ontogeny of the ego that the following discussion is addressed, although a solution to the problem of narcissism is thereby entailed and will come to be further explicated.

The child is born with a complement of instinctual drives and may initially be described as all id because, so far as the activity of some external agent is successful, the drives remain satisfied. At some time, whether at weaning or earlier, the hunger drive, which is dependent upon this external agency for the delivery of its object, will become dissatisified or frustrated because that object which satisifies it, milk or some substitute, is not present. Now, at this stage, hunger is dependent for contact with its object upon the oral zone which is also the leading zone for the sex drive. The object of gratification for the sex drive, being auto-erotic, is ordinarily freely available but, within this anaclitic organisation conflict develops because hunger comes to spit out objects which do not conform with its wish, objects which are quite adequate for the satisfaction of the sex drive, with the result that sex also comes to be frustrated at this time. The only recourse for sex to safeguard access to its object is to defend against the strong endogenous stimuli of hunger. Sex in this example is learning that one instrumental act necessary for its own gratification is the suppression of the influence the hunger drive has over the oral zone.

Of course, the experience of the infant is merely one of an external stimulus impinging from without because, with this defensive action, for the first time one drive institutes (unknowingly) a defence against another and, in acting as if it were the whole person, may be said to constitute the ego, disowning other impulses as foreign.

It is this process of defence which I am proposing as the new psychical action required to bring about narcissism. This defence is introduced with a conflict between those instinctual drives anaclitically organised upon the oral zone.

Now, Freud used this same kind of notion in reference to the defence instituted agains endogenous stimuli. He states that:

> "A particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations which produce too great an increase in unpleasure: there is a tendency to treat

them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside."[26]

The formation of the ego may be said to be brought about with that defence instituted against some unregenerate mental impulse which is productive of unpleasure and which is thus treated as being foreign or 'other'.

In later functioning, particularly following the Oedipal period, this defensive process may very well be instigated at the behest of the introjected moral beliefs of the super-ego and yet, as outlined above, it is the early interaction and conflict between the instinctual drives in their sometimes abortive attempts at gratification which provides the model for these later acts of repression. Freud considered there to be a danger in over estimating the part played by the super-ego in repression proposing that:

> "The earliest outbreaks of anxiety, which are of a very intense kind, occur before the super-ego has become differentiated. It is highly probable that the immediate precipitating causes of primal repression are quantitative factors such as an excessive force of excitation."[27]

It is just an excessive force of excitation or anxiety which, it has been argued, prompts the sex drive to secure access to the oral zone by defending against the activity of the hunger drive. This primal defensive action, which brings the sex drive into dominance as the earliest ego formation of the developing organism, does not generate some primary self imago but demarcates that which is 'other' or external. This accords with Freud's notion of this narcissistic phase where "the ego coincides with pleasure, and the external world with unpleasure."[28]

It might be argued that, in the earliest activity of the drive, any notion of what is 'other' requires, *ipso facto*, some sense of 'self', but this need not be so and, in any case, is not logically coherent. It is sufficient to propose that one may know an object without necessarily being aware that one knows it. Any attempt to posit some 'sense of self' as primary must ultimately formulate some self-reflexive entity proposing thereby that 'to know' means in fact 'to know that I know'. This can only result in an infinite regression of known selves with the 'to know' necessarily becoming 'to know that I know that I know' and so on. To persevere with this position would only serve to deny the existence of unconscious mental processes which is not a sensible position in view of the corpus of clinical observation.

The formation of the ego may thus be seen to declare, not so much a love directed towards the image of oneself, as the myth of Narcissus might lead us to suppose, but a defence by the sex drive against what is unpleasurable, by identifying it as being foreign. In maintaining an *identification* with, and in therefore *introjecting*, what is 'not foreign' (i.e., what is pleasurable) by failing to cognise its separate existence, we have precisely the conditions required for the formation of what Freud came to call a pleasure ego. He states that:

> "For the pleasure ego the external world is divided up into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder which is extraneous to it. It has separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the world and feels as hostile."[29]

The activity of the sex drive as that currently dominant drive operating as the ego may be seen to accord with this notion of the pleasure ego in the way it derives auto-erotic satisfaction from objects which it mistakenly believes to not be extraneous (which are thereby incorporated into it) and by the projection of the impulses of the other drives into the world and treating them as hostile.

Narcissistic object choice, at this stage of libidinal development, may be stated as the introjection of pleasurable objects and the derivation of auto-erotic satisfaction from them through the mistaken belief that these objects do not have a separate enduring existence of their own.

It is in this way that sense may be made of such notions as *primary identification*.

III

The reason for this mistaken belief, and this leads me to my third and final point, is that, at this early stage, the pleasure ego has no need for reality testing. The object-choice which gratifies the sex drive, being narcissistic and therefore not a part of what is foreign to the ego, is not differentiable from a 'presentation'. The process of reality testing is the recognition of objects as having a separate enduring existence. It is only through the development of this process that the drives which are dependent upon such objects may refind them and thus gain satisfaction.

Now, Freud observed that:

> "The closer the relation into which an organ with a dual function enters with one of the major instincts, the more it withholds itself from the other."[30]

For example, the object of gratification for the hunger drive will come to be completely displaced for that drive from the oral zone. Hunger will lose contact with its first object, and yet refind it in some other form. It will come to attend to other sources of information from the sensory apparatus. To illustrate this type of activity we might say that, in being displaced from the oral zone, hunger will come to attend to some other sensory quality such as some visual quality and so, rather than closing the eyes to defend against a source of strong stimulation, will tend to open them and examine the visual aspect of the object.

It is through this type of development that there comes to be a strong over-determined motivation to register facts about the world because to do so warns of dangers to come and shows where objects of gratification might be found. For Freud, this motive to turn out onto the world is known as the 'reality principle' and those impulses which operate under its influence might be descriptively called a *reality ego*.

A mistaken belief that the object is present, which is brought about by an increase in a drive's activation leading to a wish for that object, will result in an abortive consummatory action. The increasing frustration of, and the consequent defence against, the drive brought about by this error creates the conditions necessary for the development of the process of reality testing, which, in effect, suspends the consummatory response of the drive until the sought for object is *judged* to be present.

Now, *judgement* relies upon negation because it is through knowing that the object is *not* present that the primary defensive process is avoided through suspending an attempt at consummation. The successful test of reality thus requires the ability to cognise an absence or lack, and it is this ability which frees the drives from the reflexive defence of the pleasure ego while allowing a binding of interest until the object is refound.

We know of negation that it is obviously not a primary process because an absence requires more than a single perception and is known only by implication. Further, we know from clinical evidence that a negative is not revealed in the unconscious. Freud stated of this that:

> "In analysis we never discover a 'no' in the unconscious."[31]

However, the exception to this rule, which was first found by Freud in the dream work[32] and later by him in semantic primitives[33], is in the juxtaposition of two antitheses, and it is this fact which points the way to a solution. The two antithetical states of affairs are simply facts, and do not contain judgements. Negation, however, *is* a judgement, and, as such, involves some comparison, some judgement formed about the difference between two antithetical states of affairs. Further, I would propose that one of these states involves the perceived, the other, the wished for, because the only negation worth establishing for a drive is that one which informs whether the object of its striving conforms with the actual state of affairs.

This point serves us with another reason to emphasize the importance of coming to know the world for those drives which rely upon refinding their object in order to gain satisfaction, because to do so not only gives rise to a knowledge of where these objects might be found, but also allows the distinction to be made between the real object and the wish.

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An Attempt at Freudian Consciousness Raising in Tertiary Education

*Gary Embelton

On May 10th 1933 in Berlin, 40,000 people cheered as 5,000 swastika-bearing students burnt some of the great books of the western world. The announcement preceding the burning of Freud's books proclaimed:

> 'Against the soul destroying over estimation of the sex life — and on behalf of the nobility of the human soul — I offer to the flames the writing of one Sigmund Freud!'[1]

Freud's response was:

> 'What progress we are making. In the Middle Ages they would have burnt me; nowadays they are content with burning my books.'[2]

Perhaps if Freud had sat in the crowded lecture room with three hundred undergraduate students and heard the lecturer outlining the course in psychology say, 'He (Freud) only talked about sex and nobody believes

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that stuff any more", he might have replied, "My! Academic psychologists are still so threatened. It seems that this gentleman's father has a lot to answer for."

This paper highlights the attempts to raise the consciousness of post graduate counselling students in a tertiary institution to the significance of Freudian concepts in counselling and psychotherapy. The process of consciousness raising, Prochaska[3] claims, "sounds contemporary yet therapists with a variety of persuasions have been working for decades to increase the consciousness of clients". Consciousness raising can be levelled at the patient's experience and/or environment. The approach taken in the counselling programme was to focus upon the student's experience of the historical development of Freud's thinking as well as invite students to participate in a group conducted psychodynamic orientation. It was hoped that the comments of Friere[4] about gaining a "perspective that lifts people's consciousness out of the dailiness which all too often they are immersed in and to which they attribute an aura of permanence" would be partially achieved in the counselling course. In tertiary education, it is often the painful experience that what we teach has little effect on the way people behave, relate or feel.

Freud was also aware of this problem of impact when stating "theoretical instruction in analysis itself fails to penetrate deep enough and carries no conviction".[5] Furthermore, the importance of self analysis was well documented by Freud:

> "...we have noticed that no psycho-analyst goes further than his own complexes and internal resistances permit and we consequently require that he shall begin his activity with a self analysis and continually carry it deeper while he is making his observations on his patients."[6]

Of course, Freud (1914)[7] highlighted the shortcomings of self analysis and the need for training analysis (Freud, 1912[8],1937[9]).

It could not however be assumed that post graduate students were going to practice psychoanalysis even though a number of them would accept the clinical realities of transference, resistance and the importance of the unconscious.[10] Paolino[11] correctly adds also that Freud considered the frequency of sessions, the appreciation of sexuality, repression and the Oedipus complex; the therapist's attitude and training; and the utilization of free association as fundamental and inflexible criteria by which a treatment is called psychoanalysis. The dilemma between the principles of

psychoanalysis and raising the consciousness of students was always present in developing the teaching unit. These issues were raised by Solnit[12] who considers that psychoanalysis and its practitioners have failed to foster the enthusiasm, curiosity, originality and versatility of the original European trained group because of the concerns of diluting the science, and diffusing of energies. Settlage[13] perceptively comments that psychoanalytical literature is distinguished by the absence of formal statements articulating a philosophy of psychoanalytic education even though it is clearly inherent in the tripartite system of training analysis, the sequence of seminars and supervision. So with few guidelines apart from the author's own analysis, and clinical practice and training, the following theory and practice teaching unit was developed.

The Teaching Unit

The students were given the following rationale and objectives for the unit:

(i) **Rationale**

So far units in Theory and Practice of Counselling in the Graduate Diploma in Counselling have focussed upon humanistic and existential and behavioural approaches to helping. The theme of this unit is *Reflecting on the Counselling Relationship*. Consequently, as a way of reflecting, this unit will utilise dynamic and psychoanalytic insights. Students can expect to experience difficulty initially as the immediate application of the learning will not necessarily be apparent. As a way of making the process seem on the surface more remote, critical incidents in the life of Sigmund Freud will be the major theoretical focus. From these incidents students will be encouraged to read the original work of Freud and application will be made to current clinical practice. Throughout the unit emphasis will be placed on self-examination as students endeavour to understand the implications of psychoanalytic concepts on their own counselling practice.

The unit will be intellectually and emotionally demanding with a strong insistence on mastering and understanding basic concepts and their clinical realities. Students will also be invited to experience a group based on psychodynamic principles.

A critical examination of the scientific credibility of the psychodynamic and psychotherapeutic approaches to counselling will also be undertaken. This will be contrasted with clinical

application and what the counsellor actually does with such approaches.

One important aspect of this until will be reflecting on the understanding of abnormal behaviour and treatment implications for practice.

(ii) **Objectives**

At the conclusion of this unit participants should be able to:

1. Describe the major critical incidents in Freud's life and how this developed into psychoanalytic principles. (Essential Objective)
2. Demonstrate familiarity with psychoanalytic literature and the historical development. (Essential Objective)
3. Articulate with clarity the implications of psychoanalytic principles for current clinical practice. (Essential Objective)
4. Creatively synthesise these incidents and practices and relate them to other analytic, humanistic and behavioural theories. (Advanced Objective).
5. (a) Participate at a cognitive and affective level in a psychodynamically oriented group.

   or

   (b) Show evidence of a cognitive and affective understanding of an appropriate counselling situation. (This will be conducted in consultation with the lecturer.) (Essential Objective)
6. Assess the implication of 5(a) or 5(b) for their own counselling practice and investigate the psychodynamic roots of these implications. (Advanced Objective)
7. Describe the major neurotic and psychotic conditions and assess treatment strategies. (Essential Objective)
8. Display a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of neurotic and psychotic conditions and relate them to wider treatment issues. (Advanced Objective)

(iii) **Content and Process**

It was essential that students were exposed to the writings of Freud instead of secondary sources. This was achieved by material circulated one week prior to the topic being discussed. In order to capitalize on current (overseas) interest in Freud and his

work and also on a revival of understanding psychodynamics among clinical hypnosis practitioners and strategic therapists,[14] it was decided to examine the critical incidents in Freud's life and the associated clinical implications.

To capture the vitality of Freud and his life and times several sources were tapped (Clark[15], Marcus[16], Zanuso[17]). Lectures were also aided by the fascinating BBC television series "Freud" by Harrison[18] where specific interactions with patients, friends and foes were shown. The content of the course is shown in Table 1.

The clinical issues arising from Freud's life were discussed in class along with the way these are used in current practice. A critical look at clinical hypnosis was pursued as well as application of self hypnotics and the multi evocational work developed by Erickson and Condon[19]. Students were invited to participate in a trance induction using a tape. This experience coupled with some video case studies of application of hypnosis to asthma, burns and skin disorder patients displayed the powerful aspects of the unconscious mind. What was also encouraging was after the students felt it was psychologically safe to share thoughts and feelings, a great amount of clinical material that they shared was then related to the issues the class were studying. This was particularly true in the presentation of dream material. Other students had a further experience of group psychodynamically orientated supervision throughout the semester. They claimed that this developed further their own insights into the value of such dimensions as transference and countertransference.

Inviting students to participate in a group experience conducted on psychodynamic lines during the semester proved to be most valuable. They were able to experience for themselves transferences, countertransferences, regression, interpretation and resistance as they participated in the group. Again, students regarded this experience as essential in order to fully appreciate the academic content presented in class.

(iv) **Evaluation**

At the conclusion of the course, twenty out of twenty-four enrolled students very positively evaluated the unit in terms of content, presentation, academic demands, Freud the person and his work.

Table 1

Content of Teaching Unit

1. Introduction to psychodynamic therapy and psychoanalysis.	Examination of the contribution of psychoanalysis to clinical practice, art, literature and drama. Emphasis will be placed on comparing research in psychotherapy and the scientific and clinical credibility of psychoanalysis. Some bibliographic background on Freud's life will be presented.
2. Critical incidents in the Life of Freud.	
(a) Prospecting the unconscious.	Examination of the discovery of the unconscious and the formulation of the clinical application of hypnosis.
(b) The Royal Road	Understanding the nature of dreams and how they can be helpful in determining the process of therapy.
(c) Friends and Foe	Freud's relationships with particularly Breuer, Fliess and Jung had a dramatic impact upon him personally and professionally. The impact upon the cause of psychoanalysis will be examined and the growth of other analytic therapies. The phenomena of self analysis will also be mentioned.
(d) Of Totems, Taboos and Illusions	The theme of death was continually re-emerging itself in Freud's personal life and clinical practice. *Totem and Taboo* was an important work for Freud because it enabled him to engage in bold and wide ranging speculation. Associated with these thoughts will be Freud's struggle against cancer and the search for an heir apparent.

(e) Both sides of the couch	Freud in his clinical work was aware that unconscious dimensions of transference and countertransference were ever present in analysis. These concepts will be examined and participants will be encouraged to focus upon these realities and work on certain aspects of them. Other themes of treatability and ongoing clinical assessment will be discussed.
(f) The final conflict and passionate growth	Freud fled Europe and arrived in London. He died on September 23, 1939 (3.00 am). His last words were "Sagen sie es der Anna." ('Tell Anna about this.') Subsequently, the work of Freud has grown and developed. During this theme emphasis will be placed on the area of object relations as a dynamic bridge between individual and family treatment.
3. Neurosis, psychosis and treatment issues	Emphasis will be placed on understanding the major psychotic and neurotic conditions. As outlined, the information will be presented by students. The lecturer will give a general introduction.
4. Integration	The theme of "being in the counselling relationship" and interviewing and reflecting will be examined and issues of counselling practice will be examined.

Where to Now?

There are still many more dimensions that could be added to the unit but constraints of time and resources prevent this at the moment. A number of research possibilities come to mind when reflecting on the unit.

There has been little follow-up of students on a longitudinal basis (six, twelve, and twenty-four months after graduating). Questionnaires and interviews could be developed to assess graduate counsellors current

counselling styles and what particular models, techniques and insights they achieved during the course they still find helpful and what areas they have discarded. Other possibilities centre around a pre- and post-test of students' knowledge and insights in order to get more substantial data as well as to assess any possible development.

It is interesting to note that the unit has partially contributed to a number of students seeking their own personal psychotherapy. Some students have affirmed that there have been a number of issues in their personal and professional life they wish to explore more fully and that during the course they could see the value in Freud's comment:

> "But if a doctor is to be in a position to use his unconscious in this way as an instrument in the analysis, he must himself fulfil one psychological condition to a high degree...
>
> It must be insisted, rather, that he should have undergone a psycho-analytic purification, and have become aware of those complexes of his own which would be apt to interfere with his grasp of what the patient tells him. There can be no reasonable doubt about the disqualifying effect of such defects in the doctor; every unresolved repression in him constitutes what has been aptly described by Steke! as a "blind spot" in his analytic perception."[20]

It is the author's view that consciousness raising has been achieved in the unit. For a number of students it seems that the outcomes of academic study, stressed by Lewin and Ross [21] of maturity, mastery and scholarship are in the process of being achieved. But more importantly, perhaps, the consciousness of counsellors has been raised in their encounters with their patients with whom they have been privileged to share the experience of living and dying.

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Culture and Leadership: Mystics and Professionals in American Psychoanlysis

* Douglas Kirsner

Whenever Freud mentions Australia or Australians anywhere in his writings, it is always in relation to primitive culture, tribes and kinship systems. It is perhaps then poetic justice — or is it just retribution? — that an Australian turns to investigating organized psychoanalysis itself in such terms!

In this paper I will focus on some important tensions in the contemporary American psychoanalytic culture. These tensions revolve around the contrasts between the roles of 'mystics' in Wilfred Bion's sense (1970), innovators, reformers or geniuses on the one hand and on the other the roles of professionals in the culture. I will also discuss some consequences for the role and tasks of leadership in the psychoanalysis of the American Psychoanalytic Association which has thirty or so institutes and around 2500 members.

Organized psychoanalysis is faced with a central problem: how to organize itself as a profession without destroying its critical perspective. Is

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it possible to have an organization which assumes a body of knowledge at the same time as allowing the other side of the importance of an unknowing attitude? Is it possible for the organization as establishment to value fundamental critics, outsiders, reformers and geniuses rather than expel them? If the fundamental critic is no longer allowed to surface, then the future and even the present of the profession is stymied. It simply becomes a rote technical and routine administration of a theory. What has eventuated in psychoanalysis is the domination of the profession by professionalized technical psychoanalysts (mainly medical) who have taken the role of what Lacan calls 'the subject supposed to know'. The problem for leadership in American psychoanalysis is how to move the profession beyond a purely professional, therapeutic, technical view of psychoanalysis which punishes those that disagree with current orthodoxy to a profession that welcomes such disagreement and grows from it.

Freud sharply distinguished the science of psychoanalysis which was a procedure for the investigation of the unconscious from the therapy which was a method based on this procedure for treating neurosis and from a body of knowledge based on the procedure (Freud, 1922). Here we have distinctions of great importance: the procedure is paramount and the therapy and the body of knowledge are both *derived* from this investigative procedure — they do not have validity in themselves. The profession of American psychoanalysis is based on the principles of the therapy and the body of knowledge while concern with the investigative procedure is very secondary. I would make a distinction here between what I call *critical* psychoanalysis and what I term *professionalized* psychoanalysis. Critical psychoanalysis focuses on an open investigation of the field of the unconscious using the psychoanalytic investigative procedure while professionalized psychoanalysis treats the derivatives of this procedure — the therapy and the collection of information — as primary. Professionalized psychoanalysis does not question its theoretical underpinnings, regarding them as received truths. Thus while sometimes superficially appearing empiricist and using quasi-scientific jargon, it actually bears an uncanny resemblance to a secular religion.

Wilfred Bion (1970) discussed the relation of the Establishment in any group to forces which appear to threaten established ideology and power. He used the term 'mystic' to refer to anyone who seemed to be a potential disruptive force in the group. These could be reformers, critics, geniuses with a different viewpoint — in fact anyone who seems to have a competing set of beliefs on what the group is about and threatens to upset the present

arrangements. The mystic is necessarily seen to be disruptive to the group as such rather than present contingent arrangements. Yet the Establishment needs to provide for the possibility of the emergence of the mystic and be able to absorb the shock of the mystic's arrival- that is, if the group is to have a future and not simply become an ossified bureaucracy or secular religious cult. In this paper I will use the terms 'mystic' and 'Establishment' in Bion's sense.

This is very much the situation of contemporary American psychoanalysis. The Establishment has resisted change so much that it is in danger of having stifled progress and may be a danger for the future of the profession. By defining psychoanalysis as a particular set of theories and techniques which are approved by the Establishment rather than as a field of inquiry and clinical approaches, it discourages the development of mystics within the profession.

Psychoanalysis is a difficult profession relying as it does on being in touch with deep feelings and living on the edge of them. It is not in its nature secure but is always critical of the given, whether it is of the patient's or analyst's speech or symptoms. There is no possible fount of wisdom or code or set of beliefs or doctrines which have been proven true and take the role of normal science- i.e. established truth. Every session ideally is an investigation from basics and it is very difficult to contain the anxiety involved with either patient or analyst. Retreat to theory or organization can be a way of containing that anxiety for the analyst who deals with it so many hours a day. In other words there is a strong emotional need for the organization, theory, truth, or whatever, an especially strong need in psychoanalysis. Furthermore there are in fact no really prima facie empirical truths in the field as there could be in natural sciences. That is difficult to accept at the same time as having a good feeling of professional identity. The expectations of cure are great from patients who pay and expect a service which will aid in the relief of their suffering. Analysts are trained to learn things handed down to them as established truths and this easily fills the emotional vacuum of the unknowing which it is so difficult to maintain. Faith in Freud, his theory and the sanctity of professional standards and authority can act as a container for anxiety and may constitute a reaction formation against the doubts and real difficulties of analysis. Method has been seen as a defense against anxiety in the behavioral sciences (Devereux, 1968) and analysis is especially vulnerable to an idealization of method and authority as a reaction formation to anxiety.

Leadership centrally involves the management of organizational culture. As Schein (1985) observes:

> "Organizational cultures are created by leaders... Culture and leadership, when one examines them closely, are two sides of the same coin, and neither can really be understood by itself. In fact, there is a possibility, underemphasized in leadership research — that the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture and that the unique talent of leaders is their ability to work with culture.'

In a recent article in the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association,* Otto Kernberg (1986) asks what model American psychoanalytic institutions take. Are they seminaries, trade schools, art academies or universities? Kernberg argues that American psychoanalytic institutions occupy the terrain somewhere between a seminary and a trade school whereas they ought to lie somewhere in the domain between a university and an art academy.

The psychoanalysis practised by the institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association is under threat in America today. The threats are of both internal and external origin and of course have important repercussions on each other. Leadership must manage the culture of the organization and this implies attitudes to external and internal factors.

Let me start with the external factors. The impact of psychopharmacology, the plethora of alternative therapies, the burgeoning number of alternative analytic institutes which undercut the American Psychoanalytic Association institutes, the problems of the economy and insurance company payments which have brought a much smaller analytic load are all external problems and threats which threaten the professional growth and importance of the institutes affiliated with the American Psychoanalytic Association. The prestige of the profession has been considerably diminished and biological approaches now dominate psychiatry. To make matters still worse the American Psychological Association has instituted a lawsuit against the American Psychoanalytic Association for monopoly trade practice in excluding psychologists from their institutes on the grounds that they are not medically qualified.

But there are also many major related internal problems these institutes have to face. Partly because of the fall in prestige of psychoanalysis relative to other methods in psychiatry there has been a marked falloff in the

number of medical graduates going into psychiatry and a further falloff in turn within that diminished pool of psychiatry residents going into psychoanalytic training. The lack of infusion of young blood into mainstream analysis has many negative consequences including fewer new ideas and developments in theory and practice. But the ossification in the institutes has important internal origins.

In the mid 1920s the American Psychoanalytic Association made a very important leadership decision which was to define the nature of the culture from then on. This was very much against the views of Freud and the European analysts who were in favor of lay analysis. The American analysts even used the pretext of a nonexistent New York law to deceive the International Psychoanalytic Association that analysis in America had to be carried out by medically qualified practitioners. Analysis thus was to take the route of an alliance with psychiatry rather than taking a separate and independent path. By linking its fate with psychiatry at that early stage the medical orientation of American psychoanalysis was enshrined. A major consequence of this was the enormous rise in power and influence of psychoanalysis to the extent that in the postwar years analysis dominated psychiatry. The professional guild aspects dominated and psychoanalysts tried their level best to exclude others from the psychoanalytic field.

There has been a growing orthodoxy in institutes and the mainstream of American psychoanalysis has been ego psychological — much of the migration of European analysts was by Anna Freudians and there was an adaptation to the new environment which Russell Jacoby (1983) calls 'the repression of psychoanalysis'. If the resistance to change has been paranoid following Freud's own attitude, it has been aided considerably by a top-heavy administrative arrangement which allows relatively little autonomy to individual institutes in educational and training matters. Training problems have been a constant issues of 'quality control' and standardization have been paramount. By throwing its lot in with psychiatry American psychoanalysis obtained influence and power at the expense of an open development of the field.

The issue of professionalization in psychoanalysis is intimately linked with the nature of analysis itself. Professionalization has mainly to do with the practice of psychoanalysis, with psychotherapy — i.e. an application of psychoanalysis. Freud was afraid that the therapy would destroy the science of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis as an institution is run in the name of medically oriented therapy. Freud (1926a) was in favor of lay analysis partly because he did not see psychoanalysis primarily as a

therapy. Indeed he believed that the true line of division is between *scientific* analysis and its *applications* alike in medical and non-medical fields.' (1926a. Emphasis in original.)

The greater the emphasis on therapy, the more psychoanalysis becomes wedded to and defined by its therapeutic side. Institutes of psychoanalysis become more interested in a training which focuses on therapy and in training people who wish to become full-time analytic therapists. 'Real' analysts are defined by a full-time clinical analytic practice and the 'science' is defined by the 'laboratory of the analytic hour'. Power in institutes is generally with Training Analysts and the issue of becoming a Training Analyst is paramount in many 'ideological' and scientific issues. Those that are involved with universities, other institutions or approaches are not applauded for their openness but generally rather denigrated as analysts and are not the ones in power. The structure of the institutes encourages the focus on therapeutic technique as what analysis is really about. Freud wrote (1926b): 'Psycho-analysis finds a constantly increasing support as a therapeutic procedure, owing to the fact that it can do more for patients than any other mode of treatment.' This was written when there were no serious alternative psychotherapies and before the advent of psychotropic drugs. If the emphasis is on psychoanalysis as a therapy rather than as a method of understanding primary process, psychoanalysis will stand or fall with how effective or ineffective its therapeutic status is in society and the professions. Unfortunately for analysis the more seemingly effective and attractive therapies may well replace analysis and bury it as obsolete. But this was not Freud's model. He predicted (1926b): 'The future will probably attribute far greater importance to psycho-analysis as the science of the unconscious than as a therapeutic procedure.'

Psychoanalysis can be seen as a science, a therapy, a theory of civilization, a profession and a movement. These aspects are often at loggerheads with one another. The growth of the movement might depend on a unity of purpose from the members with relatively little dissent. The guild issues of fees and livelihood may be paramount in a profession whose income derives from private practice rather than paid university positions. As a profession, the skills of psychoanalysts are imparted by an exclusive institution and certified by its own professional agency. These skills have been seen as monopolized by the members of the American Psychoanalytic Association and have been accorded high social status and rewards. In the professional organization of American psychoanalysis there is a tension between a fundamental interest in its perpetuation as a movement and its advance as a science or body of knowledge.

A basic concern of any organization is the issue of its future. American psychoanalytic institutions are professional organizations whose basic aim is to reproduce analysts. Analysts are seen basically as practitioners of clinical psychoanalysis who practice in the tradition of Freud. Freud is seen as a charismatic leader who has set the parameters of the psychoanalytic field — and more to the point, set up the traditions of theories and practice within this field which are to be honored and reproduced — at least in name. A big issue in psychoanalytic discourse today is still: Is it a deviation or is it a development of Freud?'

Psychoanalysts have sequestered themselves in institutes which are difficult to enter and which have little contact with the outside world and rarely bring outside experts in to teach candidates in areas such as sociology, anthropology, history or philosophy. The institutes are far from Freud's ideal of institutes which included the study of anthropology, history, biology, civilization, &c. (Freud, 1926a) and have become basically guilds for technical training following the works of Freud and certain designated epigones. From an early date Freud saw psychoanalysis as a cause to be defended against external attack and analytic institutes were the bastions of this defense. The gold of psychoanalysis was to be kept pure and undiluted through the institutes. But this has the consequence of excluding much of the outside world as a threat to shielding the orthodoxy. This all bears an uncomfortable resemblance to institutional religion, which is no accident and it will be recalled that Freud set up 'The Committee' to guard the faith in 1911 and gave rings to its members.

The reaction to the anxiety of analytic work is an important reason behind the drive for professionalization and respectability as a 'real' science, medical specialty, &c. This insecurity also has the consequence of splitting the analytic movement into 'those that know' — or 'those that suppose themselves to know' and perhaps also, following Lacan, 'those that are supposed to know' and 'those that do not know'. Those that do not can serve the projective function of carrying the uncertainties, insecurities, ambivalences, &c. of those that know! Those that know can feel that they are carrying the truth — or at least that one thing they know is that the out-group is totally misguided, evil, too interested in money, not sufficiently realistic, a cult, not taking theory seriously enough, no longer doing analysis (if they ever really did), were not sufficiently analyzed or trained, or whatever. In any case the very real problems with the profession itself can be put out on to the Others as scapegoats for group anxiety. This projection can bond a fragmented and uncertain profession or group and allow a greater ability to deal with anxiety. The embattled or siege mentality has

long been an intrinsic part of psychoanalysis — people are always supposed to resist and oppose psychoanalytic truths and the profession has been often paranoiac about outside assessment and criticism (see Cooper, (1984)). There has been a good deal of persecutory anxiety on both sides of disputes

A major task of the Establishment is to resist change — or rather catastrophic change. It is a matter of judgment how much change needs to be resisted to resist catastrophic change. But there is another task of the Establishment, namely to encourage change, to assimilate the vision of the mystic and make it accessible to other members of the group.

The basic assumptions of the culture are medical professionalized ones which are powerfully influenced by a quasi-religious ideology. In allying itself with psychiatry it has become fully institutionalized and professionalized and has resisted change. Leadership in the institutes and in the American Psychoanalytic Association has seen itself as simply administering a profession, ensuring quality control and attending to the livelihood of its guild members. In this it has not seen its task as innovative with regard to new ideas and practices but rather negatively resisting potentially catastrophic change brought about by dissidents who are suspected as out to destroy psychoanalysis.

Yet it is precisely insofar as there has been relatively little significant scientific ferment in American analysis that its future is threatened. The organization should be requisite in encouraging the role of the visionary or dissident and somehow providing for the interpretation and assimilation of these ideas to the normal discourse of the organization. Of course the Establishment must prevent catastrophic change but generally it has attempted to prevent *any* change at all with rationalizations such as those who are interested in new ideas diminishing its standards and diluting and destroying analysis. Psychoanalysis should be seen as a field with theories which can be debated rather than a particular set of theories to be followed. Change is not a threat to psychoanalysis: rather the problem lies in the continued resistance to new ideas which asks first, 'Is it analysis?', 'Is it kosher?' and only secondarily if at all, 'Is it true?' Researchers investigating diseases are more prone to ask, 'Does it work?' than 'Is this a deviation or a development?'

The very success of psychoanalysis which has been due to its political success as a movement which has ridden on the back of psychiatry and has brooked little dissent within its ranks is precisely what may be its downfall. Institutionalization may have gone too far in discouraging and

punishing criticism of the mystic. It may be a good thing for the American Psychoanalytic Association that there is such an onslaught on its exclusivity in that it may force some re-evaluation of theory and practice. Kernberg's ideal of an analytic Institute lying somewhere between a university and an art Institute may slowly replace the combination of trade school and seminary that is the prevalent though not exclusive model of the American Psychoanalytic Association today. Psychoanalysis aims to examine the self that seeks illusory answers to questions about our human condition. Insofar as a path to reach such a goal is erected the goal recedes still further, but the profession's task is to transmit and feels more comfortable in possessing a 'truth'. It is also less threatened by the enormity of the discomfort of the discovery by its institutionalization. Yet it is precisely in its almost total institutionalization and professionalization that the danger to the future of psychoanalysis lies.

But the issue goes deeper. Groups operate through their basic assumptions which are generally very difficult for members to confront- they are what are taken-for-granted and tell the members of the group or culture how to think, perceive and feel about things and are nondebatable. (Bion, 1961). Unfortunately the structure of institutes and psychoanalytic culture remains quite closed and the space and tasks for innovative leadership are as great as ever. Generally psychoanalysis in America is seen as a therapy rather than a science of the unconscious which means that the guild aspects largely predominate over the university aspects of Institutes. The external threats to psychoanalysis are issues beyond the immediate control of organized psychoanalysis although an internally renovated institution would be able to deal with these external issues far more adaptively. Let me recall the statement I quoted by Schein at the beginning of this paper: 'the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture and that the unique talent of leaders is their ability to work with culture.' If the American Psychoanalytic Association is to become a living force the leadership of the American and the individual institutes need to actively manage the culture by providing rewards rather than punishments for innovation and new ideas and treating psychoanalysis as a science rather than a therapy. Perhaps somewhat ironically the best chance for the future of the profession is to replace professionalized psychoanalysis with critical psychoanalysis.

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Obituary
Professor Alan F. Davies

* Rufus Davis

It is a great sadness to his colleagues,to his friends, and to his many admirers that Professor Alan Davies died so untimely and so unexpectedly just a few weeks ago. Had he been here today to deliver his paper to this conference, you would have gained some glimpse of all the things that grace a very distinguished scholar — gentility, modesty, wit and humour. It is a great and irreparable loss — requiescat in pace!

It is never easy to gauge the worth of a scholar's contribution to a field so volatile, so intemperate, so ideologically saturated and impassioned as politics. It is a vast and restless arena where the play of all the drives we have been told of, are magnified and enlarged in a way that make the hurt of private quarrels, though similar in their ingredients, puny in their scale and puny in their consequences. Politics, public or private, is a stage where fact and non-fact, logic and non-logic, fiction and reality, truth and lies, mingle and co- exist in a continuing process that is without end. It is like the hot geyser springs of Rotorua, never at rest, never tranquil, never cool — always bubbling, full of menace, full of destructive omens. It is a field of

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study where one may enter it uncontaminated, but rarely leave it without contamination.

Alan Davies knew all this well. Whereas the main stream of political scientists addressed themselves to the conventional curriculum of government and politics — to the why, the how, and the whereto of parliament, parties, and administration, to the ends of the state, to the purposes of rule, to the rights and duties of princes and subjects, Alan Davies chose to illuminate the subject of politics by addressing his life to the questions that burned in Freud's mind: What are the internal well-springs of man's urge for political engagement? What is the psycho-genesis of man that drives him to political reformation rather than conservation? Why and how do men seek to rationalize their will to save, destroy, or subdue others?

Alan's choice of subject matter committed him to a lonely pursuit, in which only a very few in Australia and abroad were engaged. Political psychologists — if this is the way to speak of them — form a select and rare elite. And while his colleagues paid him homage, they did not always understand the relevance of his pursuit of the ongoing political play. If politics is the study of the state, what light can psychoanalytic concepts throw on the Congress of Vienna, how can the Freudian concepts illuminate the foundations and practices of the League of Nations, how does it enrich our understanding of the League of Nations that Woodrow Wilson imagined himself a redeeming Christ on the cross of salvation?

As acutely aware as Alan Davies was of the great hurt that men inflict on others in their quest for significance, he was rarely attracted to political salvation. Perhaps very early in his life, the political enthusiasms of his friends may have touched him. Yet he knew too well that whilst one might solve the mysteries of human disease, one could not exorcise Oedipus, nor could one ever hope to bring id, ego, and super-ego into perfect equilibrium. What greater task then for a scholar than to illuminate what the great triadic struggle in man is about in the infinity of his daily relations.

We are indeed very much the poorer for the death of this very considerable, kindly and gentle scholar. The originality of his insight enriched all of politics.

Guilt in Politics

• A.F.Davies

I summarise here a paper that is in the original inexcusably long and inclusive. I had two particular reasons for writing it, which it might help to confess at once. First, a Melbourne colleague, the sociologist John Carroll, suddenly published a small book on *Guilt,* treated in very broad cultural terms and resting to some extent in psychoanalysis, which I thought very clever and interesting, but so wrong-headed that it would all need to be done again from the ground up. And his book convinced me that I had been very foolish and cowardly myself to have written a book 10 years ago on the main affects engaged by politics *which left guilt out altogether.* I'd classed it with grief and hope as an affect chiefly on personal relations, without any great impact or bearing on politics; and I'd privately decided it was even more slippery than envy to analyse, since it was so inadmissable, so regularly and automatically denied. Also I'd found no analyst who had broken a path through into guilt, as, say, Melanie Klein had with envy, which made it fairly easy to see how it could be traced in outline in society and politics (which is odd, because Roger Money-Kyrle, to whom I now in this paper allot this role, was not only well known to me through his

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Psychoanalysis and Politics (1951) but had been for a year my own analyst *in 1978, when I was finishing the affects book).*

I begin the paper with a short phenomenological account of the sense of guilt — 'self-disappointment, a sense of having done badly, fallen short, of having betrayed a personal ideal, standard or commitment' — shading at one edge into fear (even dread) of punishment, awesome and justified, and at the other into depression and a general sense of failure and inferiority so painful we deny it and the tell-tale circumstances, rationalise it away, or project it onto others (enemies, scapegoats).

Still guilt silts up in high concentrations in certain social sites. Grinstein's *Index of Psychoanalytic Writings*, for example, shows psychiatrists reporting excessive guilt in criminals, in adolescent suicides, in cancer patients, in unwed mothers, in non-breast-feeding mothers, in parents of retarded or defective children, in the relatives of suicides or the dying, in children from broken homes, in puberty, in five year-olds, in masturbators, in ex-soldiers, in working mothers. Hendin's *Suicide in Scandinavia* demonstrated startling differences in the character of background, pre-suicidal guilt in Denmark, Sweden and Norway.

Lewis Feuer (*Psychoanalysis and Ethics*, 1955) pointed to three main sociological guilts: the guilt of generational impatience and frustration, the guilt of social inequality and status privilege, and the guilt of fratricidal struggle and competition (for which, he argued, the Old Testament was a showcase).

In a social frame guilt comes up less as a reflex twinge or jerk on the feelings over some specific act, than as a life-long regulatory process, a figure involving the whole personality and its pattern of concerns, thus many life-projects and/or character types can be interpreted as at bottom strategies in guilt limitation or avoidance — the paranoid, for example, anticipating accusation, goes over to the attack, indicts the judge; the suffering servant repudiates greed and egoism; the obsessional repudiates fantasy, rage and sloth. Guilt sits near the heart of manic depressive cycles: in the self-accusations of the depressive phases and in the active denial of guilt (and of all inner values) in manic phases...and whole areas of contemporary culture and national mood show such cycles. And, in this largest frame also, great swathes of our social practice — law, religion, philantropy and possibly art — can be plausibly interpreted as collective manoeuvres, more or less direct, more or less effective, to deal with guilt.

I pass then to a review of psychoanalytic findings on guilt, an affect it has

probably devoted more attention to than to any other, since it happens — apart from its dominance of routine practice — to have been at the epicentre of such momentous theoretical moves as the discovery of the Oedipus complex, the 1923 shift from the topological to the structural mode of the mind, and the post-Freudian elevation of 2-body object-relations to pride of place. I single out for special notice the three childhood models of the guilt experience psychoanalysis postulates: 5 year-old Oedipal guilt 6-12 months mother-concern (or depressive position) guilt, and, more vaguely dated — and focussed — separation/individuation guilt, *that* lodged in concern for siblings and family substance generally, induced by the sense of thriving at someone else's expense, since what is good is a concrete substance in limited supply and to obtain more for *oneself means that someone else has been deprived (which is clearly the* basis for adult survival or guilt, and much else).

Moving to political applications, I summarise Roger Money-Kyrle's steps in papers over 10 years to his 1951 *Psychoanalysis and Politics* classification of political situations in which the actions of decisive groups of protagonists may confidently be interpreted as defences against the registration and full acknowledgement of guilt. This scheme ('by their defences shall ye know them') separates persecutory from depressive occasions and distinguishes several clear kinds of denial and projection (on to especially enemies and scapegoats) and several forms of counter-identifications. I then show its extraordinary compatibility with Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich's analysis of pre- and post-defeat German manoeuvres in misplacing or denying guilt *The Inability to Mourn* 1967/1975. And I can report that since writing this part of the paper I have begun to come upon several small but very neat instances in domestic politics which are lit up by subsumption into these rather bare-seeming analytic categories. Perhaps the heart of the scheme then, is *misperception* — we badly construe situations where our fear or our hate is compounded by guilt, and our own rationalisations veer into severe distortion. I believe it is in the patient exposition of such cases that the way forward lies.

But imputing unconscious guilt to political actors or groups is, of course, itself a political act; and we see that a great swathe of our politics simply consists in exactly this — attempts by groups and actors to demonstrate other groups' and actors' guilt — and much of the traffic runs in channels of organised adversary sets, automatically ruling out admissions of guilt exactly because the accusation has come from the other side.

I tell in rather ample detail though a different story — the one I recalled from the time as being the most protracted and niggardly admission of

national guilt, the French-New Zealand *Rainbow Warrior* affair of 1985-6, where the 'accuser' was quite novel and no previous background of enmity existed at all. It illustrates, I think, some of the expectable trappings of a massive refusal to admit guilt — the initial phenomenon of guiltless aggression, the early defensive rationalisations of raison d'état and of agents merely carrying out orders, the stylistics of official resignations and the national guilt carapace — who it's seemly to apologise to and how fulsomely, the strengthening of hostility to the moral accuser with the refusal to accept guilt — and, finally, the make-shift character of denial as a defence against guilt (in politics as in private life).

Finally, I raise some questions about historical shifts in cultural guilt on a much larger time-frame, significant movements of guilt themselves carried forward by large generational changes in model character (based, as psychoanalysis alone tells us, on changes inside the family): the translation of Ancient Greek society from a shame culture in Homeric times to a guilt culture of outstanding dimensions in the full flowering of tragedy in the 5th century B.C.; the rise of the Puritan character in the 17th century (Carroll's informing focus). What also of the low guilt eras of daring invention and unusual creativity? and of the regular alternation in advanced Western countries over the last two and a half centuries of moods of optimism and pessimism — the former associated with confidence about, and absorption in, technology, the latter with a collective guilt towards nature and concern with wasteful appropriation and with the bounty running out through human ignorance and greed. Nature-concern peaks in 1750-90, 1890-1914 and (with a trial run in the late '60s) 1980 onwards; technology booms run from 1840-70 and 1945-80. We apparently have here a large-scale cultural analogue to the manic-depressive cycle in the individual, but we have everything yet to learn about how the constituent affects and perceptions coalesce and cohere, how they are articulated and how the balance is tipped.

Reality and the Transference: Reparation or Degradation?

*Julia Hamer

> ". . . A viewpoint can be developed that . . . the corrective emotional experience, or the therapeutic or working alliance . . . take place essentially not on the basis of a transference relationship but rather within the context of a new reparative object relationship . . .[1]
>
> A. Roland
>
> "In analytic practice, mapping the subject in relation to reality, such as it is supposed to constitute us, and not in relation to the signifier, amounts to falling already into the degradation of the psychological constitution of the subject."[2]
>
> J. Lacan

The words "reality" and "real" come from the Latin "res" meaning "thing": and the thing in its many forms, whether as fact, or as actual

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existence, or as truth, or even as bearing a close resemblance to what is *real, has enormous attraction. We stick to it; it has adhesive power,* and this insidious attraction is bound up with a certain flight away from the full implications of the Freudian discovery, and towards the mundane, the known world of common sense. This failure of the intellect and the imagination that forbade entering a new territory was what so plagued Freud and made Lacan so acerbic at times.

There is one stream of psychoanalytic theory that illustrates this predilection for sticking to reality and which emerges clearly in discussions of the transference in the fifties and sixties. At this time, many theorists were trying to examine the idea of non-transference or *real* interactions as they called them, existing alongside transference interactions in the analytic setting. Greenson and Wexler quote Anna Freud as a seeding influence in this area:

> "We see the patient enter into analysis with a *reality attitude* to the analyst; then the transference gains momentum until it reaches its peak in the full blown transference neurosis which has to be worked off analytically until the *figure of the analyst emerges* again, reduced to its *true status*. But... so far as the patient has a *healthy part of his personality*, his *real relationship to the analyst* is never wholly submerged... *we should leave room somewhere* for the realization that analyst and patient are also *two real people* of *equal adult status*, in a *real personal relationship* to each other."[3]

I have underlined certain phrases here, because later this paper will refer to ideas of which these phrases are a good expression. Greenson and Wexler picked up Anna Freud's indication of making more "room" for a real relationship and developed it. They and others like Alan Roland and Sydney Tarachow thought that the healthy, *real*, non-transference reactions alongside the transference reactions (which are by implication unhealthy and unreal?) should have more attention paid to them if the transference reactions are to be resolved and the real aspects of the patient are to come to maturity. Such theorists are often particularly concerned that these healthy, real aspects are nurtured in extremely neurotic patients before the rigours of true analysis can be embarked upon. Roland says further,

> "... the corrective emotional experience, or the therapeutic or working alliance takes place essentially not on the basis of a transference relationship, but rather within the context of a new, reparative object relationship, wherein the analyst, by his therapeutic intent, compassion and understanding, his being non-judgemental, ... natural ... an authority but not authoritarian, friendly but not gratifying of neurotic wishes ... gradually establishes himself as a new figure to the patient ..."[4]

He also says it may be necessary, in the case of severely neurotic patients, for the analyst to bring to the fore certain good *real* aspects of himself so that the patient can differentiate him from the "internalized representatives of her familial objects". This is "... not meant in any way as role-playing ... but rather emphasizes aspects of any decent human relationship..."[5]

So what do we have here? Really, a kind of sampling of a certain way of conceiving the analytic process that I want later to put up against a very different set of concepts. For the moment, let us pick out certain salient points in what has been quoted and described: that there is a real side to the patient; that this is equivalent to the healthy part of him; and that this real side of the patient may form some sort of connection with an equally real part of the analyst. These ideas are placed alongside phrases such as "true status", "adult status", and this real relationship is reparative and therapeutic. In other words, it is the part the analyst must strive to increase and augment. How is this real part of the patient to be recognized? By its close resemblance to what the analyst divines as reality. How is the patient to be made to let go of his unreal, transferential, illusional aspects? By the model offered to him by the analyst, the compassionate, understanding authority (but not authoritarian) figure sketched by Roland. The measuring stick for therapeutic progress is reality — but whose? And what is it? And even if we know what it is, should patient and analyst be aiming for it?

What underlies the tone of my descriptions is the suggestion that all this is a slide away from the discovery and exploration of a new territory and a strange one (as we begin to see when we move towards the unconscious via dreams, whose "scene of action" is "different"),[6] a slide away from the risky and unknown back into something safer, a giving in to the attraction of the already established thing, so that analysis changes from a "plague"

that made its first exponent "a solitary", into "an anodyne in the land where he brought it."[7]

These sort of conceptions, of analysis being a process of revealing reality, of stripping away illusion through the guidance and example of one who has already attained a close relation to truth, are open to direct criticism, but I would like instead to step into another land (or perhaps I should say, go down under), into a very different body of theory, that puts such conceptions on their heads, namely Lacanian theory. Here, analysis is not to be a process of making alliances with common-sensical, close-to-the-truth parts of a patient. For Lacan, analysis is the making conscious the unalterable split in the subject, the unbridgeable gap between consciousness and the unconscious, so that there is no possibility that common sense can be brought to bear on the unconscious or its products.

In fact, Lacan sees common sense, the "healthy" part of the subject, as having quite a different function. Transference, he says, appears at the moment of what he calls the "closing up" of the unconscious (a "temporal pulsation" of the unconscious)[8], and the healthy, clear sighted part of the subject that forms a real relationship with the analyst is hand in glove with the transference:

> "... it is precisely this part (the healthy part)... that closes the door... or the shutter... and the beauty with whom one wishes to speak is there behind, only too willing to open the shutters again. That is why it is at this moment that interpretation becomes decisive, for it is to the beauty that one must speak."[9]

Speech is not to be with the healthy part, we notice, however beautiful this may appear. Lacan holds that appeals to the common sense of the patient, attempts to make him see that certain of his acts are illusory, undermine the whole analytic process. At the end of the analysis, the subject "recognizes the inevitable non-sense of his history",[10] reproduced by lapsus, bungled actions, jokes, dreams, and symptoms. This is a far cry from those analysts who seem to see the unconscious almost as an enemy, to be beaten and diminished, being encouraged to appear in the transference only to be knocked out by a sense of reality.

Another objection to the idea of the analyst's speaking to the common sense part of the subject and encouraging it to act as a judge over the subject's relations with the analyst, is that the analyst-patient relationship

then consists of ego addressing ego; the analyst, rather than being in fading, is prominent, the judge and yardstick of reality and the subject is without the chance of listening to the unconscious. Safouan puts into question the whole idea of the subject's addressing the analyst directly in any real sense at all when he talks of its being a mistake to see love as a transitive relation, a mistake to see love as going to the object. Ego to ego transactions make this mistake.

Behind the setting up of reality as a goal to be attained in analysis is the idea that there is a prefigured, already existing reality, supplying the possibility of a real relationship, which may be striven for, and the analyst will steer the patient to this goal. This is quite different from Lacan's idea of therapeutic success being an "extraordinary benefit" or a "surplus" of analysis, analysis itself being a process where the subject receives his *own* message in an inverted form, *not* the message of the analyst.

What I have been trying to describe is an almost perfect inversion of ideas between two sets of theorists. The American theorists are interested in pointing out to the patient where his perceptions are illusory, and to do this must pre-suppose a fixed reality to measure the illusion against. Reality and truth are to be found in consciousness; the unconscious is misleading. Lacan attacks this "mapping of the subject in relation to reality", calling it a "degradation of the psychological constitution of the subject", and sees intellectual certainty as the illusion, always and irretrievably, while the unconscious is the real. The subject cannot be the centre; consciousness is not in command, and in fact meaning only appears when the subject is not in command. What Lacan is attacking is part of a sliding in the apprehension of what analysis is, away from the full strangeness, newness, danger of Freud's discovery, towards something easier, already known, really, ending in a sticking in notions of attainable reality and truth, something graspable, controllable, able to be guided — something close to the thing at the base of the meaning of real.

Perhaps the weightiest single expression of Lacan's attempt to overturn conventional notions of the place of consciousness in analysis is voiced in his famous sentence, "There is no truth that, in passing through awareness does not lie."[12]

Notes

1 ROLAND,A. *The Reality of the Psychoanalytic Relationship and Situation in the Handling of Transference-Resistance*, in International Journal of Psychoanalysis. Vol. 48, 1967, p.508.

[2] LACAN,J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Penguin, 1979, p.142.

[3] GREENSON,R., and WEXLER,M. *The Non-transference Relationship in the Psychoanalytic Situation*, in International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 50, 1969, p.27.

[4] ROLAND,A. Op. cit. p.508.

[5] ROLAND,A. Op. cit. p.508.

[6] FREUD,S. *Interpretation of Dreams*, St. Ed., Vol. V., p.536.

[7] LACAN,J. Op. cit, p.vii.

[8] LACAN,J. Op. cit. p.129.

[9] LACAN,J. Op. cit. p.130.

[10] ZENTNER,O. Seminar, held at the Freudian School of Melbourne, 9.7.1987.

[11] SAFOUAN,M. *Transference and Acting Out*, in Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne: The Freudian Clinic, P.I.T. Press, 1982, p.127.

[12] LACAN,J. Op. cit. p.vii.

Aphanisis and the Masking of the Jouissance of the Woman[1]

• David Pereira

Ernest Jones coined the term aphanisis in 1927, in his paper, *The Early Development of Female Sexuality*.[2] He borrowed it from the Greek and took it to mean the total extinction of the capacity for sexual enjoyment. In this paper he sought to render symmetric the question of development for both sexes. So, Jones posed the question: ". . . what precisely in women corresponds to the fear of castration in men?" Thus, the problem for Jones is what can persist as a threat to the girl when she finds herself already castrated. With his desire for symmetry Jones proposed the concept of aphanisis, making of castration only a partial threat against enjoyment as a whole. Aphanisis was to be what both sexes feared. From this position Jones could only arrive at the conclusion that men and women were created as such.

In reference to this, Lacan states: "For, in positing so correctly the problem of the relation between castration and desire, he demonstrates his inability to recognize what he nevertheless grasped so clearly that the term that earlier provided us with the key to it seems to emerge from its very

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failure."[3] For Lacan, aphanisis referred to that movement of the fading or disappearance of the subject, if the subject is viewed as appearing on one side as meaning and on the other side as fading.

The question which remains and which the enterprise of Jones occludes, concerns how the woman comes to be. The fact that the question was posed by Freud and rendered problematic suggests that it is hardly answered by a hasty retreat to symmetry. Now, for Freud things were very different. This was patent when he declared that: "We have, after all, long given up any expectation of a neat parallelism between male and female sexual development."[4] For Freud, the essential difference in the course adopted by the girl and by the boy was that "... the girl accepts castration as an accomplished fact, whereas the boy fears the possibility of its occurrence."[5] Thus, while for boys the Oedipus complex is destroyed by the castration complex acting as threat, for girls it is made possible by such, acting as fact. It is from this point of essential difference, orienting itself around a fact and a fear or threat, that we may begin to explore the question of feminine jouissance and the place of aphanisis in relation to it.

For Freud, the absence of the penis in women is significant only in that it makes meaningful the father's prohibition of incestuous desires. It is therefore, as Oscar Zentner has said in his *Presentation of the Freudian School of Melbourne* (1979), not of the order of mutilation but that of prohibition.[6] What makes matters more complex for the girl, for Freud, is that in as far as her entry into the Oedipus complex was achieved via an accession to the fact of castration, she found herself outside of the prohibitive margins of the phallic function. So, the question posed by Jones — what can persist as a threat? where does she find her limit?

It is this problem which appears to be addressed in the seminars *God and the Jouissance of the Woman*[7] and *A Love Letter*[8]. In these papers Lacan locates the female subject in all her complexity. For Lacan, both the male and the female speaking beings were such — speaking beings or beings in language — in as far as they were both castrated. The man share of speaking beings are inscribed within the prohibitive margins of the phallic function. The woman share of speaking beings only come to be inscribed in the phallic function as not all - $\overline{\forall}x.\Phi x$.

It is this not all that alludes to the fact that there is more to her; there is a part of her that does not come down on the side of the phallic function. Thus, for Lacan she was dually inscribed. One cannot therefore speak of the woman, where this 'the', the definite article, stands for the universal — she does not exist — this 'the' appearing as crossed through. Now, this the

keeps a relation with the signifier O when it is crossed through. Thus, part of the woman, the part inscribed outside the limiting margins of the phallic function, relates to S(Ø), that place of the lack of the signifier. It is this part *where of this the nothing can be said.*

Lacan states that: "Ultimately, the question is to know, in whatever it is that constitutes feminine jouissance, where it is not all taken up by the man — and I would say that feminine jouissance is not taken up by him at all — the question *is to know where her knowledge is at.*"[9] So, what is the nature of that part of the woman that is inscribed outside the margins of the phallic function, that keeps a relation with S(Ø) that part where we locate the jouissance particular to the woman?

In being inscribed outside the limiting margins of the phallic function, this part of the woman is located in the face of an unmitigated lack, a lack which Rúpolo identifies as being without possibility of occlusion.[10] She is thus located in relation to a supplementary jouissance, one which cannot be spoken of, *in the face of which the subject fades.* That is, a jouissance outside the margins of knowledge, leaving no subject to speak of enjoyment. Safouan speaks of it as an enjoyment which, in exceeding the limits of pleasure, "makes us enemies of life."[11]

Now, this jouissance is barred to him who speaks. And for those subject to the law, Lacan says "it can only be said between the lines." He continues: "But it is not the Law itself that bars the subject's access to jouissance — rather it creates out of an almost natural barrier a barred subject. For it is *pleasure that sets the limits on jouissance, pleasure* as that which binds incoherent life together."[12] Freud himself had earlier invoked the notion of a necessary obstacle which guaranteed enjoyment, leading him to conclude that "something in the nature of the sexual drive itself is unfavourable to the realization of complete satisfaction."[13]

Thus, coherence — an articulatable knowledge — is achieved at the price of an accession to the prohibitive margins of the phallic function, locating the subject in the field of articulatable pleasure. Jouissance is incoherent. *It is the one for whom castration has no meaning,* the one encountered as the psychotic, where we typically witness such incoherence — an idiolect. The psychotic, taking the form of an emasculated Schreber for example, is played by this feminine jouissance, culminating only in a delusional metaphor of divine proportions. It is thus castration which is ultimately structuring. The law of castration preserves the subject from the excesses of jouissance - preserving it in the place of a pleasure barred from the beyond of desire. For Lacan desire itself was a

defence, with its attendant prohibition of the excess, the beyond of jouissance. Then, if as for Jones, aphanisis was somehow beyond castration, it can only be in terms of what awaits the subject who fails to be located within the prohibitive margins of the phallic function.

Let us persist then, before it disappears altogether, with this aphanisis. Now, *aphanisis* also connotes, by virtue of the vagaries of its etymology, a notion of being speechless, or better, out of discourse. The Greek, $\alpha\phi\alpha\upsilon\eta\zeta$, variously refers to obscurity, or a quality of being unknown, unseen or insignificant, which Heidegger[14] notes, when fully concrete may *be located within the discursive arena*; that is to say, as pertaining to an utterance through which something is or is not sighted or made known. It is here then that we find some point of relation between aphanisis and this jouissance of the woman of which Lacan says, nothing can be said. It represents precisely that *locus where, because there is no one* to say no to, to negate, the phallic function $-\overline{\exists}x.\overline{\Phi}x-$ the subject, as subject in discourse, fades. Thus, the jouissance of the woman, the jouissance particular to that part in relation with S(Ø) is a jouissance which silences her; pointing to the limit of her existence, *the point at which she is eternally* receding or fading.

Safouan[15] has written of this in the following way. He has interpreted Freud's question concerning what the woman wants as implying a separation of demand on two levels — demand small d and demand capital D. The first category are those demands that can be articulated, can be spoken of. It is from this point that subjectivity, in as far as a subject is a desiring subject, comes to be articulated. The second category, that of demand capital D, remains the unarticulatable, surplus element of all demands. Safouan calls this "unknown Demand, which language does not allow to be spoken and for which there are no words." This is where *demand reaches its limit, the limit point* of its asymptotic relation to desire, the point at which the subject appears as ineffable. It is here that we come to locate feminine jouissance, a jouissance of which nothing can be said.

The part of the woman inscribed outside the margins of the phallic function, belongs to that level of being where the utterance does not allow a sighting or a making known — words fail — there is only a fading of meaning there. It is a place where nothing can be said — the realm of the ineffable, the point of aphanisis. Lacan states that: "the being of the subject...is there beneath the meaning. If we choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes us, it falls into non-meaning."[16]

For Lacan the enigma of sexuality was to be interrogated at the level of *the play of the signifier*. It is with reference to the double play of metonymy

and metaphor that we come to speculate on the place of aphanisis in relation to the jouissance of the woman. To metonymy as an infinite sliding, and metaphor as a *point of arrest, the point of the production* of meaning. The part of the woman which keeps a relation with S(Ø), by virtue of being situated in such a way in relation to the signifying chain, is compelled by the confluence of demand and desire that renders impossible the articulation of her wants and the speaking of her jouissance; a *confluence which robs* her of her fluency. It is where we witness the failure of metaphor and primacy of metonymy that impedes her testimony.

Aphanisis also finds its place here, an effect of the confluence of demand and desire. A relation — asymptotic — where demand approaches its limit — the point of the metonymical sliding of desire. This demand is of the order of, as Safouan says, a "pure and empty want",[17] the want around which Freud interrogates the woman. Thus, aphanisis pertains not to the disappearance of desire, but to the level of unspeakable Demand.

With respect to the question of meaning and its disappearance or fading, Lacan,[18] in relation to the formula of the metaphor, delimits two functions of the bar that separates signifier and signified, only one of which has the effect of the production of meaning. The other involves the manipulation of the bar so that it adopts the form of a fractional transformation. Manipulated in this way, this formula may become witness to a collapse of meaning, when in the form of a fraction, if zero appears in the denominator the fraction becomes meaningless in as far as its value is infinite. Lacan describes in this way one stage in the formation of the subject, noting that the subject comes to be located within the sphere of meaning only from the place of its aphanisis, the locus of which is on the side of the relation to the Other.

For Lacan, the mediation of such an infinity, the constitution of the *subject in discourse on the turns* of metaphor, is achieved via the introduction of a negative quantity into the denominator of this fraction. A negative quantity which Lacan designates as one of the supports of the castration complex; that which inaugurates the coming into being of the *subject in discourse by virtue of their inscription* within the prohibitive margins of the phallic function such that there exists at least one to say no to it $-\forall x : \overline{\exists} x . \overline{\Phi} x$.

That part of the woman which is inscribed outside the prohibitive margins of the phallic function is in a place which is outside discourse. This

is not to say that women have a different speech or language, but rather that the one in relation to S(Ø) is suffused with that of the truth which remains outside discourse; she thus appears as ineffable. It is here then that we can come to understand why Jones produced aphanisis, and the women analysts to whom Freud addressed his now famous question produced silence. Thus, Lacan states: "There is nowhere any last word unless in the sense in which word is not a word."[19]

Aphanisis then, may be read as referring to the essentially metonymical structure of desire in terms of its incessant sliding; a sliding and a metonymy without arrest to be located outside the limiting margins of the phallic function. It is where the subject is confronted by the unspeakable nature of the metonymical structure of desire — this being the place of that part of the woman located outside the margins of the phallic function and in relation with S(O). Aphanisis may be located at that point of the collapse of significance; a point outside discourse, where the subject succumbs and fades in the face of an excess.

Lacan,[20] in his *Guiding Remarks for a Congress on Feminine Sexuality*, comments that it was the unchecked 'conceptual sliding' which led to a lull in the original debate on female sexuality. The silence that was produced attests to such a sliding. And here we have captured the very essence of the debate — that of the sliding or escaping of meaning which the feminine implies — a metonymy which renders the subject ineffable.

How then do women come to be inscribed within the margins of the phallic function and so take up a place in discourse and articulate their desire? It is an answer to this question that Lacan arrives via Rivière[21], and her notion of womanliness as masquerade, which Lacan notes has meaning at the Symbolic and not at the Imaginary level; that is to say, it is more than display. Masquerade has meaning in as far as it orients itself to the phallus. With reference to the way in which the function of the phallus governs the inscription of the subject, Lacan delimits a 'to be' and a 'to have.' To these he adds a 'to seem' which replaces a 'to have' and serves the dual function of protecting it on the one side and masking its lack on the other. Masquerade belongs to this order of seeming.

For Rivière, the structure of masquerade was a double action — an alternation between masculine and feminine. Now, of the woman Rivière cites in her paper — a propogandist, principally involved in speaking and writing — she says that she was almost akin to the position of the man, and, despite frequent orgasm, it was not of the order, Rivière says of, "pure enjoyment." Thus, it seems that this woman in lining up on the side of the

phallic function, reminding us that phallic jouissance was equally her affair, was not able to avail herself of the excesses of feminine jouissance. She was located, rather, within the field of coherence, meaning and articulatable pleasure. Through the movement of masquerade, she assumed a having which afforded an inscription within the margins of the phallic function.

In this movement the woman inscribes herself in the knot to which castration subjects her — she orients herself around the phallic term and is so able to speak her wants. It is this inscription on the side of the phallic function that arrests an infinitely sliding metonymy of Being. Within the prohibitive margins of the phallic function she finds the limit which locates her in discourse. For the part of the woman outside the margins of the phallic function, the question of what she wants remains as enigma, she is to be found at that limit point we have located as aphanisis.

Thus, it is only as a failed femininity as such that the female subject comes to exist, in so far as the subject only exists as supported from discourse. A failed femininity in as far as she comes to leave behind the supplement of her jouissance in order to inscribe herself within the margins of the phallic function. It is through masquerade that the possibility of escaping her own aphanisis, her fading from discourse, occurs. For Lacan, "femininity finds its refuge in this mask."[23]

Notes

1 The present paper finds its point of departure in an attempt to work some of the ideas emerging from a series of seminars on *Psychoanalysis and Female Sexuality* given by Oscar Zentner in the Department of Psychological Medicine, Prince Henry's Hospital, Monash University in 1987, whose comments and suggestions concerning the present work I am additionally grateful for. The paper constitutes an attempt to explore the concept of aphanisis and to speculate on its relation to the place of the, woman, the one Lacan says does not exist, and her *jouissance*.

2 JONES,E. *The Early Development of Female Sexuality*, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1927, pp.459-472.

3 LACAN,J. *The Signification of the Phallus*, in Ecrits, a Selection (trans.A.Sheridan). Tavistock, London, 1977, p.283.

[4] FREUD,S. *Female Sexuality*, St. Ed., Vol. XXI:226.

[5] FREUD,S. *The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex*, St. Ed., Vol. XIX:178.

[6] ZENTNER,O. *Presentation of the School*, in Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne, p.9, PIT Press, Melbourne, 1979.

[7] LACAN,J. *God and the Jouissance of the Woman*, in Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne. Feminine Sexuality. (Ed.) J.Mitchell and J. Rose. Macmillan Press, 1982.

[8] LACAN,J. *A Love Letter*, in Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne. Feminine Sexuality. (Ed.) J.Mitchell and J. Rose. Macmillan Press, 1982.

[9] LACAN,J. Ibid, p.158.

[10] RUPOLO,H. *The Non-Simple Borders of a Letter*, in Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne, p.145, PIT Press, Melbourne, 1985.

[11] SAFOUAN,M. *Pleasure and Being. Hedonism from a Psychoanalytic Point of View*, Macmillan Press, London, 1983.

[12] LACAN,J. *The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire* in *The Freudian Unconscious*, in Ecrits, a Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). Tavistock, London, 1977, p.319

[13] FREUD,S. *On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love*, St. Ed., Vol. XI:188.

[14] HEIDEGGER,M. *Being and Time*, (trans. by J.Macquarrie and E.Robinson). Blackwell, 1962.

[15] SAFOUAN,M. *Feminine Sexuality in the Psychoanalytic Doctrine*, in Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne. Feminine Sexuality (Ed.) J. Mitchell and J. Rose. Macmillan Press, 1982.

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The Cause of an Individual Myth

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"Therefore, myth and fantasm coalesce"

J.Lacan[1]

Karen, 13 years of age, and her mother, arrived in Casualty at the Royal Children's Hospital. There was urgency. They described perceptual distortions, confusion, slowness and eccentric behaviour that had worsened considerably in the last two months since Karen's tonsils and adenoids had been surgically removed.

They brought with them a letter addressed to the Department of Psychiatry from the psychiatrist of the neighbouring town, several hours' drive away. The letter was dated two years before. It read: "...this girl has become abnormally quiet and withdrawn during the last five months, she has also become a slow eater and sometimes avoids meals altogether. She takes particular care with her appearance. She is coping at school although the teachers have noticed that she has become much quieter than before. My attempt to interview Karen was a dismal failure and I got no information out of her whatever, just a monosyllable here and there and a tear now and again. I suppose that Karen is suffering from an obsessional

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illness but the possibility of schizophrenia has to be thought of. I can only hope that you can communicate with Karen in a useful way..."

Karen's admission to the Psychiatric Unit was organized within the next few days. On arrival I met Karen and her mother. I obtained the following data. Karen was the third daughter born to the family. She had two sisters, Jane 18 and Sue 16. Her father, a 41 year old grader driver, was a loud and bossy country man. Karen didn't see much of him during the week. On return from work he drank his beer, watched television and went to sleep. Mother, 35, was employed full time.

After Karen's birth and the consequent disappointment for the arrival of another girl, her parents decided not to have any more children. Karen, in any case, had always been the favourite for being the youngest. Her mother described her first 11 years of life as normal ; she had many friends, was popular both at school and in the town, an excellent student, a tennis and swimming champion. She had always been very meticulous with her personal appearance and hygiene.

In the last two years though, her mother described a history of withdrawal and isolation, brooding and rebellion; she was rude with her parents and rejected members of her extended family. She had stopped seeing former friends because they were nasty to her and criticized her with obscenities. She was heard talking to herself, muttering her concern at being looked at and judged by others who believed she was a *tomboy*. She complained that her family wronged her, that they said untrue things about her, that she was mad. Karen claimed she was neither in the wrong nor that she was mad; she insisted that the others were mad — particularly her mother. She said nobody understood her nor her need for privacy.

She spent hours gazing at herself in front of the mirror. She took ages to dress, finally to wear the same old pair of jeans. She would sit in bed for hours staring into space. She used to stand fully dressed in the shower. At school she would leave the classroom to go to the toilet and return only when fetched, sometimes half an hour later. She just sat on the toilet. She had no idea of the passing of time. Having been a school swimming champion, she now claimed to be unable to swim.

Difficulties seemed to have begun when Karen, at 11 years of age and in grade 6, started her periods and very suddenly developed into being at once taller and fatter than both her sisters. With the onset of menstruation she became more fastidious than ever with her hygiene. Her periods, regular for almost two years, had stopped two months prior to admission, at the time her tonsils and adenoids were removed. The history given by the

mother seemed to indicate the culmination of what is usually called the outbreak of a psychosis.

Karen's mother, always on the verge of tears when not crying copiously, was an anxious and guilt ridden woman. She was the younger of two girls born in her family. Her father, maternal grandfather of Karen, died of leucaemia when she was 15. Soon after she turned 20, Karen's maternal grandmother had a psychotic breakdown just after having had herself a tonsillectomy. She was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for a year. According to Karen's mother, "Since then, people say she is a bit weird, a bit odd, because she smiles to herself".

Karen's mother always feared -wished?- that Karen would have inherited a mental illness from her maternal grandmother. Nobody in the family — not even her husband, Karen's father — knew of the psychotic breakdown of the maternal grandmother. This meant that she couldn't speak of her fears with anyone. This was the *secret* of Karen's mother.

Karen's mother also feared -wished?- that she had contributed to her daughter's deterioration and therefore had damaged her by postponing the hospital consultation for two years. The unutterable fear of Karen's mother was to find her own origin in her daughter's mental illness or 'madness', as she felt herself trapped between the ghost of her mother and the illness of her daughter.

Karen's phrase, "I am not mad, it's the others who are mad", is not resolved by saying that she projected what was happening to her or vice versa. What Karen wanted people to hear was the place she occupied in the desire of her mother, as if Karen had said with her symptoms, "My mother has kept something *secret* to herself which makes me occupy her place there where she felt she had not fulfilled the demand of her own mother to identify with herself". Therefore, "My mother makes me the daughter of my grandmother and wants me to carry the burden of being the same as her mother, that is, mad".

I saw Karen three times weekly for eight months until her discharge from the Psychiatric Ward. She mistrusted me. Her gaze alternated between being elusive, uninterested, almost blind, and stereotyped, doltish, *la bouche bèante*. She stared through a transparent world. The first time I saw Karen I asked her whether she knew why she was being hospitalized. She answered, "Mum brought me because I don't *mix* with people". That day when she left my consulting room I thought that her apparent uninterest in *mixing* with people — including myself — was no more than the repetition in her discourse of her impossibility to speak other than through the

maternal words, words that had constituted her in a position close to that of the object of the maternal desire in whose immobilization Karen recreated an order, necessary for the mother. Her slowness was the reassurance that no disaster -in a scatological sense- would happen. While Karen didn't *mix* with people, her mother was *mixing* them up.

Regarding sexual information, Karen said that at 11 years of age her mother gave her a book that . . . "said it all". Consequently, there was no space for her in it. Karen's reference to "the book that said it all" was the *condensation of that which I would have to address in order to know* that she was not there but in another place. Information didn't resolve the enigma of sexuality, among other reasons, because of the difference existing between the demand to know and the desire to ignore. She said "Babies are born through the bottom . . . it's dirty. I'm not interested in it. I'd rather go horse-riding". And she went on to say "I'm not interested in anything of the body. I don't have to look after it anyway, because Mum says that she owns it".

Freud defined the phallus as the penis of the mother. Karen represented this inexistent organ. The phallus was to set the structure to functioning. Karen-phallus reassured the father regarding women on the one hand and she reassured the mother regarding her lack on the other. Karen was then an element that was only appraised for revealing either what the Other lacked or what the Other was not.

Mother's disappointment with this third-female-daughter (for "not having given my husband the male-son he so much wanted") was made evident in what Karen represented when separate from her mother by stressing the lack in her; while united to her, she covered the lack.

Karen came to the sessions but I had to fetch her. The few metres from her room to my consulting room were traversed in a painfully slow way. Masturbatory movements were evident most of the time. She appeared dispassionate, dull, detached, she held herself aloof, she was inaccessible and remote. Gradually she turned her quasi paralysis, her catatonia, into slow languid movement, and the languid drawl with which she spoke turned into a perseverative and pressured discourse.

With a frown she pointed at her head in one session and said "There are far too many things here, pain and strain". I interpreted that her stillness was aimed at stopping everything, tons of dirty ideas. Once stopped, she was then able to discard them. Being still diminished pain ...sometimes being still stopped pain altogether. She referred to visual and verbal hallucinations saying, "There are dark spaces and broken walls and

sounds like echoes that the walls return". But even her suffering seemed opaque, lifeless, like all of her.

She stared at her image in the window pane ceaselessly, with devotion, she combed her hair and caressed her body in ecstasy. She had to recognise herself permanently in order not to lose herself and even so, she was unsure. I interpreted that with her gaze she tried to find a specific place outside those nominated by "The book that said it all".

The mother of Karen had a *secret* that she couldn't share with anybody, not even with her husband, Karen's father. *The father himself was a sort of secret* for her. I interpreted to Karen that with her torpor she herself was like a *secret*. I thought that this identification made her rather *be* than *have* a *secret*, of which she spoke.

Starting from here, I selected certain data in order to take Karen at that point, as effect of the parental discourse. I decided that what she asked me at the beginning of that particular session would be the starting point. With great difficulty and through the space of several minutes, Karen had asked me if she could sit in my place. I interpreted that she was telling me that if I couldn't realize what was happening, I must, in reality, be extremely stupid. I started then to talk in a monotonous, slow, paused manner, telling her that she, Karen, "my analyst", was the only one who knew my story, my *secret* —allowing in this way to make of "The book that said it all", a book that was not all. I proceeded to narrate her history in first person singular. For the first time, Karen smiled. From that day on, I didn't have to fetch her from her room to come to the sessions any more, she remembered to come on her own and never missed a session. She was never late. The *secret* I told her was the construction of my hypothesis based on what I heard from her and her history.

Months after I initiated the treatment Karen walked into my room at the start of another session and asked me if I wanted to listen to her story, her *secret*, since the one I told her was not the true one. Freud distinguished between the *no* of negation (the *Verneinung)* and the *no* given in front of an incomplete construction.[2] Karen told me that my narrative of her story was not false but incomplete. Only from her own lips could be expressed what was missing so that she could find herself in her discourse.

Karen began her individual myth "My mother and father married and had one daughter and then they had a second daughter. Then . . . well, Mum decided that she'd give it another try to see if this time they could have a boy and then they had another girl. They thought it could have been a boy, they thought they would have a boy, that is why they tried again. So it was that then there were three girls, Jane, Sue and me then. I had tons of friends then

. . . and when we were shifting to a new house, my two cousins used to *come to our house then . . . and they used to always teach me to do boys* things, things that only boys do and all that . . . and I liked it. I made the most of it. And it was then . . . it was then that then . . . I mean it was then . . . (pause) . . . that I grew up and Dad used to teach me men's things and he used to tell me "You should have been a boy, Jack" and he added "You're a tomboy". And at that time I enjoyed it. Then I sat on the kitchen table and we talked of things, of animals particularly, and I liked that too. "You should have been a boy and now you're a tomboy", he used to say, and I went along with that and I used to go to my friend's house and by then I had a friend, my best girl friend Susanna . . . I picked her up from her place and brought her to my house. And when I grew up I was interested in animals and reptiles and all that. *By then in grade 4, I was really wild. And then . . . one day . . . then one* day I decided that I didn't want to be a tomboy anymore and then I decided to be more silent, less loud. I wanted to be quiet, silent. Then I started not to talk to people and didn't talk to my family because they all used to say that I was a tomboy because I talked too much. Then I became very quiet and it was then that people began to ask me "Why don't you talk?". And afterwards, when I was in grade 6, I almost didn't talk at all. By then I used to take records to school. I liked the music of Susie Quatro and I used to pretend that I was being myself. And I used to talk a lot all the time and all the kids knew that it wasn't me then and they said, "Stop talking like that ...". And it was that then that it was Tom . . . I mean . . . I wasn't a tomboy then. And it was that then that *I . . . that I pretended to be myself but I wasn't. When I* was in Form 1 Mum used to say, "Be friendly and talk to the kids". And the kids got sick and tired because they knew it wasn't me then. And then I used to talk to Susanna . . . I leaned on the entrance gates and I talked to her and she talked to me. When I was in Form 1, I was somebody different. I got used to not talking much, actually, I didn't talk much at all. I began to be someone different again. And then I started to talk with the kids instead of doing my homework. They got sick of me . . . and I . . . and I got sick of it too . . . talking all the time. I got sick of talking all the time. When I was in Form 1, I had four friends and I was also friendly to the others. And it was then that I was lending them my pencils and texters. And so I somehow arrived to the end of Form 1 and I was that way and I couldn't be someone different and I began to be myself again. It was then that I moved away from my friends and then ...then . . . then . . . they called me a 'slut' and a 'mole' and that was that then ... that I grew out of having friends and I didn't have any more friends and I started to be on my own in the porch at school. Some girls would speak to me. In Form 2, I used to copy a girl I knew . . . I copied the clothes she wore and the things she did. Then we went on holidays and I

began to copy a girl who was in Form 5 . . . I did everything she did . . . and my sister Sue did it too . . . but she thought copying somebody was something natural ...but that had nothing to do with me. Then Form 2 started again and I was myself again and nobody wanted to be with me and nobody wanted to be friends with me. It was then that Mum said we had to come to town ...to the Hospital. This is the story."

Such the inexorable price for her endowment.

What was remarkable in this narrative was not only its richness but its abundance and the spirit and speed displayed for the first time since the her admission to the Psychiatric Ward and the beginning of the treatment. Karen was overwhelmed and oppressed for years by this history, a history that condensed as much the desire of the parents as her own. Both she and I had survived her movement, her exit from lethargy and torpor. I was still alive and she could turn into active that which for years she had lived in the passive. Removed from the immediacy of her family, Karen was able to request by herself, to demand treatment from me. The transference was made evident when Karen believed that she had finished her story, a story addressed to the Other who was myself in that moment. At the end of the treatment she was to find her desolation and intense grief, the desolation of being sustained only by her own discourse. Myths — *secrets* before — were now talked about though they were not known.

I spared Karen no pain. She suffered the pain of realizing that I was not going to turn her into an effect of my discourse, repeating in this way her mother. She knew no differently. I refused to mother her. Her solitude consisted in knowing that I finished my function as analyst there where she received the effects of her own word. We both knew sufficiently — though not enough — as to know that this journey would bring pain.

Often Karen accused me of knowing her thoughts and not communicating them to her. She wanted me to reassure her that she wasn't a *tomboy*, that she wasn't masculine. It was at this point that she brought about her hysterical pregnancy. For her, being masculine was the guarantee of not breaking the imaginary pact with her mother, being therefore her phallus. In this manner she reinsured herself in front of her castration, her lack. The slowness of her movements and words were due to the immense effort put into paralysing the effect of being neither man nor woman, or both, which amounts to the same.

Karen's mother brought her to Hospital two months after the surgical removal of her tonsils and adenoids — because this episode brought to light once more the maternal grandmother's operation when Karen's

mother was 20 years old, following which she was hospitalized after a psychotic breakdown.

Karen's menstruation — identification with the maternal fantasm intervening — was interrupted by the operation. Between the mother who didn't allow her a space other than the obliteration of the lack in her body, and the father who couldn't tolerate the castration of his wife, Karen appeared like a phallus, the *secret* in which both parents coincided. Karen then, in her paralysis (catatonia) tried to avoid all movement that would return to her the image of a being neither man nor woman.

The final part of the treatment was centred in the working through of the following material. Karen's father used several nicknames to name his daughters. The various nicknames chosen however, were all boys' names. So:

> Karen was *Jack*, also *Jackie*.
> Jane was *Juckie*, also *George*, also *Jack*.
> Sue was *Tom*, also *Spider* because she used to climb trees.

Superposition and lack of discrimination between the women[3]-sons. The name of both parents also started with the letter J, as if to underline that in the unconscious everything is overdetermined. Both parents kept telling their daughters that they shouldn't worry about their father using these nicknames, that they really shouldn't mind, it meant nothing after all, and it wasn't relevant anyway. Karen hated being called like that. She would have liked to have been called Elizabeth, for instance. Karen's surname denoted a heavy object, something unbreakable, a rock, immobility. Metaphor of a metaphor.

We are tempted to repeat that which for Freud constituted the end of an analysis: to arrive at the bedrock of castration. Except that in this case, for us, this was also a starting point. The structure Karen presented through the first interviews was one of the effects of the foreclosure of the name-of-the-father.

If we separate the word *tomboy* into the two nouns that compose it, we see that *Tom* is Sue's nickname, Sue, who sometimes behaved as other people did, whilst Karen saw herself as being a *Tom* (a male, tomcat) and a *boy (Tomboy)*, as the locus where the desire of the parents met. The sadness brought about by the end of the treatment was to de-centre herself from the point in which, as we said, *the desire of the parents met*.

Notes

1 LACAN,J. *El mito individual del* neurótico *o "Poesía y Verdad" en la neurosis* (The Individual Myth of the Neurotic or "Poetry and Truth" in the Neurosis), *Ficha No.1, Serie 12, Cuadernos Sigmund Freud,* Buenos Aires. Translated by Pedro Steiger.

2 FREUD,S. (1937) *Constructions in Analysis*. St.Ed.,Vol.23.

3 Women = (phonetically) "We-men", as her parents so much wanted. One of the questions the hysteric ponders about is, "Am I a man or a woman"? This was a crucial part in her analysis as Karen didn't know whether to align herself as a woman or as a man.

PART II

SEMINARS OF THE SCHOOL

The Names of God

* Bernard Rechter

My interest in the *Names of God* stems from the study of biblical history, particularly Jewish biblical history and therefore my comments will be limited to the Judaic tradition, though not necessarily to the Bible itself.

Those of you who have read any of Isaac Asimov's science fiction stories might remember a very early one set in the distant future, with super computers built high on mountain tops. The computer programmers, being sceptics, decide to test the validity of a legend that, should mankind ever decipher the name of God, the universe will end. They go up to their mountain (a little like Moses retreating to Sinai) to their consoles and start working on the problem. Nothing happens much; they don't seem to be able to reach a conclusion. After several months of very hard work, if I remember the story correctly, they finally give up, close down their computer and start walking down the mountain, and the story ends with the words, *"and as they walked down the mountain and looked up at the sky, one by one the stars began to go out"*. Perhaps there's a moral in that story related to what we're talking about today.

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I also found, when I started reading, that Thomas Mann's novel about Joseph and his Brothers came to mind. Mann wrote a very long novel, weaving from a few pages in the Old Testament a remarkable tapestry. He begins with the sentence *"Very deep is the well of the past, should we not call it bottomless"* and certainly, when I started delving into this topic I began to realise just how bottomless it is. What I can do today is to point the way to some of the relevant issues.

What I would like to do is to deal with a number of periods, the main one being the early, biblical period. I will then briefly deal with the *names of God* in relation to the Talmud, the Mishna, the rabbinical period, and the Kabalah, ending with a very brief reference to some modern Jewish philosophical comments on this issue. I think it's necessary to say that much of Jewish religious history focuses on either the *names of God or the attributes of God* and it's often difficult to separate them.

Let me start with the early period, that of the second millenium B.C. The so-called Patriarchal period which is reflected in the biblical stories of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, is set, judging from the context, in the early Bronze Age, in the middle of the second millenium roughly about 1850 B.C.E. to 1500 B.C.E. The history of Israel itself starts nearer the end of that millenium with the period of the Exodus. At that time some of the Israelite tribes came out of Egypt, according to the record in the Bible, and entered Palestine, Canaan. That was about 1250-1230 B.C.E. and marks the beginning of the historical record of Israel. There's much debate about what actually happened and because there are very few extra-biblical sources for that period it's difficult to be too certain. There's an enormous amount of material available to us from other written texts from that second millenium, from outside Palestine, from places like Mari, Ebla, which is in Syria and from Ugarit which was in Phoenicia, in the present vicinity of Southern Lebanon. There are numerous materials which have been deciphered and published which, while they don't confirm the biblical story directly in the sense of telling us for instance about Abraham or the exodus, certainly confirm much of the background of the biblical stories suggesting that they are based on genuine records, originally oral. I think it's important to be clear that what we're dealing with initially stems from the biblical record. In fact, in attempting an interpretation of the biblical record we run immediately into the matter of the *names of God*.

The first five books of the Old Testament are referred to as the Pentateuch, called the Torah in Jewish tradition; in the very orthodox tradition they were given to Moses on Mount Sinai, although, as early as the Middle Ages at least, some Jewish scholars questioned the possibility of

Moses writing a book in which his own death is recorded, as it is in Deuteronomy, the fifth book.

It was left to the Europeans in the period of the enlightenment to begin to sift through the biblical record analytically, and the names of God play a significant role in such analysis as evidenced by the fact that the hypothesis developed originally in France by Astruc and later in a more elaborate form by Welhausen in Germany, was based on the finding that there are sections of the early biblical text which used one name of God called J (for Jehovah) and other sections called E which use a different name, El. That was the beginning of a very detailed dissection of the sources of the early books of the Bible on the assumption, a rational one, that it is an edited work, probably edited around 400 or 500 B.C.E. and that one can detect by careful textual analysis the hands of a number of different authors.

The other major source that we have is, of course, archaeology, which not only provides new texts, but also material artefacts which can flesh out some of the story. We do now have a fairly detailed picture of the material and spiritual life of the peoples in the Middle East, in the fertile crescent between Egypt and Mesopotamia, in the second millenium B.C.E. which is where and when much of the early part of our story is centred.

What is clear is that all parts of the Old Testament are peppered with a huge range of names for the Deity, and in particular the God of Israel.

It's interesting that if you look at an English translation of the Old Testament, and particularly the Authorised Version, it is well-nigh impossible to get even a glimpse of this cornucopia of names, because what the translation does is avoid naming names. For instance, you will see phrases like "the Lord God Omnipotent", or simply, "the Lord", and then, in the very next sentence place names occur which clearly refer to the previous sentence but which, given the bowdlerization of the name, make little sense in English. An example of bowdlerization may be found in the book of Genesis (chapter 14, verse 18) which reads *"And Melchizedek King of Salem brought forth bread and wine: and he was the priest of the most high God."* In the original Hebrew, the last phrase is *El-Elyon*, a recurring deity in both biblical and extra-biblical texts. What the translators usually do is to take a name for a Deity and avoid using it by substituting the phrase "The Lord". In a sense, reading the Old Testament in translation means one misses the whole of this complex pantheon. So just as we are familiar in Greek history with a whole host of names of gods, one can trace a parallel development in the Middle East Orthodox Jewish

historians and philosophers have had not a few problems with this, *because clearly one possible interpretation of the existence of these* various names, is that they do represent what were originally a whole range of worshipped gods rather than the various names of the one god; in fact, there's no doubt that that is their original function.

There are several basic strands in names that we ought now to consider. One relates to the god El, which name, with its variants, is a continuing thread; the word El or Il occurs through the whole biblical text. The name recurs frequently in all the textual material from the ancient Middle East, whether it comes from Palestine, later from Israel, or in earlier texts, from other parts of the crescent. It clearly represents the most powerful Deity in the Middle East. There is evident a gradual process whereby the god El of the Canaanites and the Phoenicians (as seen in the Ugaritic texts) in particular, and the other peoples who inhabited that area, becomes absorbed into the Israelite name system to the point where the word El becomes a synonym for the God of Israel. Clearly the name El is a critical one for us.

El and its variations, some of which we will look at, became accepted as equivalents for the specific name of God which developed later in the Israelite religion, whereas worship of Baal and Hadad, who were the other major deities of the region in that period, and who were often associated with feminine gods like Ashera and Astarte, tended to be seen as *idolatrous. The biblical text is filled with battles between the worshippers of* Baal and the worshippers of the God of Israel, whereas the god El who is the Zeus of the Canaanite pantheon is somehow assimilated into the Israelite culture.

There may be many good reasons for that, one of them being what actually happened when the Israelites conquered Canaan according to the biblical account. You will be familiar with the story of the fall of Jericho and other stories of the Israelite conquest. What happened is hard to determine, given the paucity of the evidence and its contradictory nature. It may have been less a real invasion and more an internal revolt catalysed by a small number of invading tribes. There is in any case clear evidence of a very strong continuing Canaanite influence even in the period when the Israelites occupied the whole of the land. While the Israelites developed a particular name for their god, there was a continuing use of the name El and the legions of gods with El-related names and I want to just refer to some of these.

For instance, you get key names like El Elyon, El Berit, El Olam, all of

which are variations of the god El but in the biblical text are all acculturated into the Israelite pantheon and Jewish philosophers have been at pains to explain that these are not different gods, simply different names for the one god. It is, however, clear that in early Israelite history (i.e. from near the end of the second millenium B.C.E.) there was competition between various gods, whose names enshrined different origins, different places over which they ruled and the different powers with which they were endowed. One name, El Elyon, which is translated as "most high God" or "the most high Lord", has already been mentioned. Another, again linked to El, is El Berit which is translated as God of the Covenant, but is again, a name for the deity. El Olam ("the everlasting god") is referred to quite a number of times (e.g. Genesis 21:83). Most of these names occur a sufficient number of times to be regarded as different names for god. El Roi is the "seeing god", from the Hebrew word for "seeing". El Shaddai, or simply Shaddai is of particular interest. There's quite a literature on what this name means, but what's fascinating is that the name Shaddai doesn't occur only in the Bible and in the rabbinical literature but is found in a most solemn prayer recited on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement. The Rabbi or Cantor, in his supplication, makes clear he is addressing Shaddai rather than Yahweh. The meaning of the name itself is very unclear and there are many explanations. The letters SD usually refer in Semitic languages like Akkadian to "mountain", and Shaddai is often seen as the God of the Mountain. Another explanation is also based on the letters SD, but this time the S is sounded like SH and SHD is the basis for the word "breasts", and some analyses of the word even link the two together as related concepts.

El is the oldest semitic term for god but the etymology of the word is obscure. The term probably derives from a root meaning "to be powerful". The name Elohim is a plural form of the name of god although treated as a singular noun. The singular form Eloha is also found often in the book of Job. Incidentally, in Job we find "Shaddai is with me" translated as "the almighty is with me".

If you look through the Bible you find remnants of many names, both direct names of God or theophoric names, that is names used for individuals or for places, which link up with a god name.

It is fascinating that the name Israel itself comes from the story where the patriarch Jacob changes his name to Israel after wrestling with the angel of god. Now the word Jacob — Jaakov in Hebrew — has the letter root of the later accepted Israelite name for God, i.e. Jehovah or Yahweh. Oddly, in this

very central story, Jacob changes his name to Israel, which contains the name El. It's a rather odd inversion.

The frequent occurrence of variants of the names Baal and El in Israelite personal names indicate the strong hold that these names had on the peoples of the period under discussion. However, the name that came to be most directly identified with the God of Israel and which is the major one in the Judaic tradition is the name Yahweh. It's called the Tetragammaton, a four-letter word, I suppose the first important four-letter word and what it means or signifies has been energetically debated, as has its history. In the Bible it appears first early in the book of Genesis, but that stems from the fact that part of the book was written, probably in the 9th century B.C.E., by the Yahwist author whose contribution can be identified in the accepted text.

The origin of the name is recorded in the story of Moses, in the book of Exodus. As Moses spent much of his time with the Kenites, the so-called descendants of Cain, and married into that tribe, it's usually assumed that Yahweh was the name of the god of that wandering semitic tribe, and that the word was simply taken over from *that* tribe.

There are, as usual, many theories. There are names not unlike Yahweh in tablets dating as far back as the beginning of the second millenium, but most scholars assume that that is a coincidence, because the letters YHWH are fairly common. So its origins are uncertain, nor is anybody quite sure of its meaning. The simplest explanation is that the four letters are all variants, in Hebrew, of the verb "to be", and therefore the term is often translated as "I am, that I am".

Northrop Frye, a literary critic, not a biblical scholar, has written in the book called "The Great Code":

> *"In Exodus 3:14, though God also gives Himself a name, He defines himself (according to the A.V) as 'I am that I am'", which scholars say is more accurately rendered "I will be what I will be". That is, we might come closer to what is meant in the Bible by the word "God" if we understood it as a verb, and not a verb of simple assertive existence but a verb implying a process of accomplishing itself. This would involve trying to think our way back to a conception of language in which words were words of power, conveying primarily the sense of forces and energies rather than*

> *analogues of physical bodies. To some extent this would be a reversion to the metaphorical language and the primitive communities, as our earlier reference to a cycle of language in the "primitive" word mana suggested. But it would also be oddly contemporary with post-Einsteinian physics, where atoms and electrons are no longer thought of as things but rather as traces of processes. God may have lost his function as the subject or object of a predicate, but may not be as much dead as entombed in a dead language."*

Hebrew grammarians have pointed to the fact that one can interpret the name Yahweh as "He who causes to be", based on the grammatical structure of the word. Unfortunately, Hebrew is written only in consonants, leaving the vowels out, and that often results in a number of interpretations and readings.

It might be useful at this stage to move from the biblical period and look at other aspects of the *names of god*. A reiteration of some historical fixed points might be useful. Israelite occupation of Canaan began in about 1250-1230 B.C.E. The time of King David, who was the first great king of Israel, is 1000 B.C. and the earliest biblical material probably dates from about 900 B.C. The Book of Deuteronomy, which is the fifth book of the Pentateuch, the five books of Moses, was probably written about 620 B.C. when there was a cleansing of the Temple and a re-establishment of the Yahwist faith, which had been polluted by the worship of other gods. Finally, the editing of the Bible itself took place about 200 or 300 years after that.

The Israelites, by then split into two states, were then expelled from their land in about the 6th Century B.C., returned, and were finally exiled a second time with the destruction of the temple in the period at the beginning of the common era.

From then on Jewish history takes a rather different turn, away from a cult based religion (the religions of Yahweh and of El, Baal, Shaddai and the other gods were all cult religions) based on a range of cultic activities. The religion of Yahweh, for instance, was centred on the recognition of a place or places holy to the deity. Sanctuaries like that at Shiloh gave way to a movable Ark, able to be taken into battle (it was a great advantage to have God with you at a battle, although not so when the Ark was captured by the enemy, which is the basis of another fascinating biblical story). Finally the

cult was centred in a Temple, a magnificent structure, built by David's son Solomon, an empire builder of note. That Temple was destroyed and, when the Jews were allowed back into the country by Cyrus, King of Persia, they built a second Temple which was made even more impressive by yet another grandiose builder, Herod. It's ironic that the present western praying wall in Jerusalem, which is holy to very orthodox Jews, is actually the wall built by Herod, not exactly the most savoury character in anybody's history and certainly not in Jewish history. When that Temple was destroyed by the Roman Emperor Titus in 70 of the common era, that was the effective end of the cult of Yahweh. It was no longer the focus of obligatory pilgrimages (several times a year, all Jews had to make a pilgrimage to the Temple to sacrifice to God and the High Priest went into the centre of the Temple, the sanctum sanctorum, to pray and there, by tradition, the name Yahweh was uniquely pronounced).

Frequently, the destruction of the cult centre signalled the end of a religion. What happened in this case was an extraordinary religious revolution, for the Jews were able to transform the cult into a religion which didn't need the cultic trappings. However, key elements of the cult were retained and one was the name of Yahweh.

Modern Judaism evolved out of that development, instead of dying with the death of the cult, it changed its nature and lived. Instead of the Temple in Jerusalem there were Synagogues, places of meeting which could be built anywhere where Jews lived, and where Yahweh could be worshipped. God became separated from his holy place, became in effect a different God. The transformation was made possible, in part as a result of the work of the earlier 7th and 8th century (B.C.E.) Prophets who translated the God of Israel into a universal God.

A vast religious literature developed from this process. Because the words of God were enshrined in the Torah, the five books which became central to Judaism, there grew an enormous edifice of study devoted to interpreting them.

The Mishna was a body of interpretations of the Torah divided into six basic tracts. Then in Jerusalem and in Babylon, where many of the Jewish intellectuals lived, the Talmud was developed — in turn an interpretation of the Mishna. In fact there arose two Talmuds, one identified with each centre. Neither of the Talmuds is a comprehensive interpretation of the Mishna, though together they elaborate on all the six tractates of the Mishna in great detail.

Interestingly, what happened is that the Babylonian Talmud, rather than

the Jerusalem one, became the focus of Jewish religious study for it was a much more elaborate work, more detailed, much cleverer and subtler than the Jerusalem Talmud.

All that is by way of introduction to the fact that the Talmud, and the Mishna, had much to say about *the names of god*, elaborating on the original biblical text in analysing the name.

Central to the Talmud analyses of *the names of god* are two prohibitions — one being a prohibition on pronouncing the name. It is from this source apparently that the prohibition which orthodox Jews now accept comes, rather than from the Bible itself. To avoid the use of the prohibited name several replacements were instituted, including the word Hashem, which simply means "the Name", and which is used by modern Jews who want to avoid saying the name Yahweh.

The second prohibition that the Talmud brought into the religion with respect to the name of God was a prohibition to use the name in the course of daily writing, except in a sacred context; that prohibition also is observed by orthodox Jews, who use circumlocution to avoid writing the name. This practice appears to stem from a misinterpretation of one of the Ten Commandments: *"Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain"*. Synagogues, for instance, don't destroy liturgical books, as this would be destroying the name of God which is contained in them. One significant historical fallout of this was the discovery in the old synagogue Genizah in Cairo at the end of the 19th Century, of texts and manuscripts dating back over a thousand years, an extraordinary source of invaluable source material, which had never been destroyed nor touched for generations.

Incidentally, when the Greeks in Syria occupied Palestine early in the common era under a king called Antiochus Epiphanes, this pagan also prohibited the pronounciation of the name of God and when the Jews reconquered the country under the Maccabees they started pronouncing the name in response to the prohibition. However, the priests soon re-established the ban.

Following the Talmud and based on it, came a vast rabbinical literature. Since Jewish tradition tended to de-emphasize secular study there grew up a body of writing analysing, re-analysing and re-interpreting the original texts and then interpreting and re-interpreting the interpretations. This body of writing started developing yet new names for God, although these were interpreted as different *attributes* of God.

For instance, a word much used is Hamakom, which means "the place"; that was used in the extensive rabbinical literature as the word for God, to

avoid using the textual names, but also having a particular relevance. Thus a Rabbi explains in the Mishnah *"Why do we use a circumlocution for the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, and call him Makom? Because He is the place of His world, but this world is not His only place."* Another name used was Harahamon which means "the merciful" or "compassionate one". It needs noting that they are not used as adjectives, as if to say "the compassionate God", but are used as names of God. Another name is Yirat Shamaim, "fear of Heaven", as a way of addressing God, but using those words as the form of address.

Another source relevant to the topic is the Kabalah which had a long evolution as part of the mystical tradition in Judaism. Mystical ideas in Judaism can be traced back to the period at the beginning of the common era. There were mystical threads in Judaism even before the final exile. In the so-called inter-testamental period, the Jewish religion began to sprout a number of different traditions. Christianity, at least as exemplified in the Jerusalem church, was one of these versions of Judaism. Again, to digress a bit, what seems to have happened is that that church in Jerusalem was almost totally destroyed "and the revived church outside Palestine developed quite differently. Yet the early church was a branch of Judaism, one of a number vying for the heritage of the Jewish religion in the period when the cult died, and new forms of Judaism had to be developed for the religion to survive.

The sect of the Essenes, which seems to be coincidental with the group that lived in Qumran near the Dead Sea, left behind in some earthenware jars most of their literature which when rediscovered in the 1940s provided us with manuscript material nearly two thousand years old, quite extraordinarily preserved — the so-called Dead Sea Scrolls. The Dead Sea Scrolls consist of many texts, including most of the biblical texts. Interestingly, there are sufficient differences to indicate that the text itself had not by then become fixed. For instance, there are several versions of the Book of Isaiah which differ in many small details from the canon that we now have. More importantly for our discussion, is that there are also other texts which are peculiar to the mystical sect that lived near the Dead Sea. The origins of Jewish mysticism, which eventually led to the various forms of the Kabalah, and books like the Book of Zohar and so on, may be traced to that tradition, dating back to the beginning of the common era.

The Kabalah has a number of points that are relevant for our purposes. One of them is a numerological approach to the name of god. For instance, the question in Hebrew "What is the name of God?" starts with the word "Mah" which is the word for "what". Now "Mah" has the letters "M" and

"H". The Hebrew letters each, like the Latin, represent a number. The letter "m" is 40, and the "h" is five, as it's the fifth letter in the Hebrew alphabet, and so the number 45, i.e. the word "mah", i.e. "what is the name of God" became associated with the name of God. However, the Kabalah is nothing if not prolix and we also have the name associated with the number 42 and other numbers. In fact, the Kabalah uses various numerological interpretations of sentences, words and so on to associate the name of God with various letters and hence numbers.

Also notable in the Kabalah is that it does use a number of particular epithets like "Temira de Temirin", "the hidden of the hidden" for the name of God, or "Atika de Atikin", "the ancient of the ancients", and a range of similar epithets.

Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, there are sections of the Kabalah which treat the whole Torah, the whole of the Pentateuch, literally as the name of God, so that the whole text somehow enshrines the name.

Important, in relation to the Kabalah, are the so-called Sefirot, which are ten "emanations" by which the Deity is characterised. They're usually depicted in the form of a circle or tree (the Tree of the Sefirot). One of the Sefirot, for instance, is Binah, which is Wisdom, another one is Gedulah, which is power, another at the bottom is Malkhut, which is Kingliness. These are the names which in the Kabalah text are written in diagrammatic form, associated with significant numbers and conceived as characteristics or attributes of God and as progressive manifestations of the names of God. In fact, in analagous circle or tree diagrams, the various names of God we have already spoken of are linked to these characteristics. For instance, Binah (Wisdom), is linked to the name Yahweh, although it's always vocalised and read Elohim to avoid saying that name. The name "Yah" is associated with "Hokmah", which is Cleverness. The name El is usually associated with Power, which is not surprising given its origins. One name which I should mention is Yahweh Tsvaot which is another god name which appears frequently in the Bible and in the liturgy and is always translated as "the Lord of Hosts". In fact, it is clear from the contexts in which it occurs that it is a name of God and not simply a description, and is associated with the god characteristic of Eternity. Shaddai, which I have previously mentioned, or El Shaddai, is characterised by Majesty or Kingliness, and so on. In sum, the Sefirot, which are a central feature of the Kabalah and in which the various attributes of God are expressed are linked quite formally to the various names given to the deity and the characteristics which are associated with a particular name have a natural connection with attributes of these Gods in

the biblical text. For example, as the God El has the attribute of power it's not surprising that the attribute of Power or Greatness in the Sefirot is associated with that particular name of God. It is not insignificant that these very central features of the Jewish mystical texts are all associated with *the names of God.*

It may be of interest that the attributes themselves, those characteristics of God, are also often related to, for instance, the human form, so that the first represents the head, others the cavities of the brain, the arms, torso, and legs. The ninth Sefira relates to the sexual organs, while the tenth refers either to the all embracing totality of the image or, in another text, to the female companion to the male, since both together are needed to constitute a perfect human.

I have barely touched on a complex literature in which the attributes of the godhead are associated on the one hand with various aspects of man and on the other with the range of names of god.

I think, to finish, it's worth mentioning that there are two strains in modern Jewish religious philosophy which reflect some of the problems that we've referred to with *the names of God.* One treats *the names of God* as descriptions of different attributes of the one God and plays down the polytheistic pantheon view; the other sees the names of God as a process of evolution from a period of polytheism, a period when the Gods were associated either with specific places, or even with particular persons. God names in the biblical text are often associated with individual persons or with particular natural forces. The God Hadad, for example, was a storm God. In fact Yahweh himself is seen by some as a mountain God or a storm God. Polytheism evolved into henotheism (the worship of one God only) and then into monotheism, the belief that there is only one God. It is this evolution, which can be traced in the biblical texts, which has been at the basis of the issues we have been considering.

PART III

THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE

Paranoisation
Simple Indication of the Direction of the Cure

* Jean Allouch

A village . . . A strolling visitor, a little lost, but aware that the presbytery (in French "la cure" which means both "presbytery" and "cure")** is worth the detour. He stops a **passant**, a passer by. "Sorry to bother you, but would you please indicate to me the direction of "la cure"?

Can one ever do more when it is a question of "direction", than offer a "simple INDICATION"? Thomas Bernhard's novel, whose title I am shamelessly plagiarising here, suggests not.

* * *

But here I am taking at one, dear reader, the liberty of addressing you intimately. Have no fear, I shall return as soon as possible to a more neutral style of address, more consistent with what you'd expect to find in a psychoanalytic review. This informal tone will only last the space of a few lines; but it is unavoidable for the kind of experiment in which I am inviting you to participate (you will realise at once that it would not be the same experiment — for we are already in it — if, in the sentence you have just

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read, I had addressed you more formally). Besides, this intimate tone is not the intimacy of any collegial structure. No, it is the tone of shared confidences, of softly spoken words; the quasi-friendly (for I cannot call us "friends", we who do not know each other), personal tone that is a sign that with regard to what is in question here, we are — you and I — on the same side.

Well then, let me ask you to hold our the fingers of your raised left hand (if you are right-handed, that is, and are holding this copy of the *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne* in your right hand; if you are left-handed, do all this the other way around) about ten centimetres above the page that you are busy reading, and be prepared to bring it down briskly, as soon as I tell you to, on the rest of the page so as to cover it temporarily. I should have preferred to save you the trouble of this gesture; I even did all I could in order to do so. The editor of the *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, to whom I considerately gave prior warning, tried to set this all up, but after many telephone calls to the printer, was unable to have inserted, at the right place, a detachable sheet of blank paper which you would have simply have had to tear off. This was too complicated and too expensive. Really, printers are enough to drive one to despair. But if you are now feeling the beginnings of a cramp in your arm, don't blame me: take it up with them. For you've done as I asked, haven't you? Your arm is raised and your hand is spread out above the page? Good. After all, this is merely bedroom gymnastics and, I promise you, I shall be brief.

I admit only that besides your being neither one-armed nor the victim of one of those hysterical paralyses so dear to Charcot, you have, on a particular day for the first time, stretched out on the couch of a psychoanalyst. And I am asking you this simple question: what was the reason for your finding yourself there? Now, quickly slam your hand down over the rest of this page and note down your response (two blank lines have been left for you — this should be more than enough); the first one that comes to mind.

.....

.....

Finished? Good. I release your hand to your own use. You see, I was right, that didn't take long. One result will be that from now on you will not be able to lend your copy of the *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne* to just anyone.... But this is not the aim of our research.

Of course, not being telepathic, I do not know what your response was. To tell the truth (for how can I not be frank with you?), I do have an inkling of an idea; but as this conjecture is not based on anything that concerns you personally — you, dear reader, for whom I am writing this article — I have to admit that my little idea isn't worth any thing, and all I can therefore do with it is to consign it to the waste-paper basket.

Everything is now set, however, for me to make a bet with you. I bet that your response will **not** have been the one that I am now going to give you; although it ought to have been yours in the sense that it precedes yours, in the sense that it has value (without either you or I being able to do anything about it) as its condition of possibility.

I am telling you that if you found yourself in psychoanalysis one day, it was for this reason: that you had heard of psychoanalysis.

The bet having now been made, two cases present themselves, according to which I have won or lost. The reader who has made me lose the bet, has demonstrated by that alone that he was fully immersed in what I am going to say. He can therefore interrupt his reading here, sure of not gaining much unless, being amused, he continues to read just as a so-called "author" somethimes reads one of his own texts (though not without some sense of unfamiliarity).

But let us envisage the other case, let us say that I have won my bet. It is clear that such a result establishes, between this reader and myself, a certain disparity. The reader (we are now no longer on speaking terms, so I can no longer address him in the second person) has good reasons to be annoyed with the writer of this article who did not recoil from making him realise to what degree he (the reader) has remained at the point of fixation in his subsequent (a-posteriori) elaboration of the inaugural moment in which he engaged in his analysis. This is not so much a wild interpretation as one might think. But he will say, I am being deprived of what I believe to have been an initiative of my own; one does take at least a part of this initiative in the place of the Other, and this, I must admit, not without reason. Thus he will be all the more justified in not pursuing his reading any further and I can only, in this case, express the wish that he will not — seized by some hidden impulse — throw the work that he has in his hands into the bin: this would be a grave mistake.... not in regard to **this** paper, but in regard to the others in the volume. Let us say, rather, that a certain curiosity will overcome the murderous act, which will only be manifested from now on in the form of that mistrust (**méfiance**) which Thomas Bernhard compels us to admit is justified.[2]

Yes, each individual engages in an analysis only inasmuch as he has heard of psychoanalysis. This is a stupid thing to say, let us admit it, but this stupidity for being such, is not the less decisive. I call it decisive in that this hearsay (**ouï-dire**) survives as the implacable consequence of the analytic device itself: of the strict closure of this colloquim of two which does not tolerate any other presence, be it of a third person, a tape-recorder or a one-way mirror. Very early on, Freud takes this consequence of the device he invented into account. "You cannot," he said to the audience of the very first introductory lectures on psychoanalysis, "be present as an audience at a psychoanalytic cure. You can only be told about it; and in the strict sense of the word, it is only by hearsay that you will get to know psychoanalysis."

"That which one knows by the report of another person", the word **ouï-dire** presents a remarkable and pertinent ambiguity in French: a common spelling error is to omit the diaeresis, resulting in **oui-dire** (to say yes). Although the diaeresis opposes this ambiguity, there is in spoken language — and this is what matters here as it concerns **l'ouïe** (hearing) — an impeccable homophony in the words ***ouï-dire*** and ***oui-dire***. *I can never* say **ouï** (hear) without pledging, ipso facto, my saying **oui** (yes).

This sometimes occurs to such a degree that these two assertions, on certain terms chosen by the hearer, are absolutely equivalent. Something about psychoanalysis has been related to us, to which we have said: "...ah well, it so happens that I can't write it down since a certain depth of field is necessary in order to superimpose '**ouï**' and '**oui**'."

In going, one day, to knock on the door of a psychoanalyst, we have been coherent with something of psychoanalysis that has been reported to us, and to which we have said: "It is understood/heard" (the French phrase **c'est entendu** comprises both meanings.) Our "**ouï**" has authenticated, if not the analytic discourse as a whole, at least the nodal point of that discourse: a point that has been heard ("**ouï**"); a point whose persistence, indeed truth, we have acknowledged; and *which has been so important* that we have not hesitated to put into action this authentication. "You might as well trust in this," we have said to ourselves.

What is the status of such a acknowledgement of a piece of hearsay about psychoanalysis, and of the act which is the consequence of this? It is not certain that there may be a possible response which would be of value for any and everyone. Nonetheless, it strikes one that this mode of acknowledgement and this engagement in an act are of a remarkable proximity to the paranoid experience as it is described, for example, by

Sérieux and Capgras (henceforth S + C) in their major work on *Les folies raisonnantes*.

They observe, indeed, that it is by hearsay that the paranoic learns, generally to his greatest astonishment, that someone wants something of him; even if, in this inaugural event of his psychosis, he does not really know how to state precisely what it is. It is not a matter of his own discourse, he testifies, but of the discourse of an other that he is going to authenticate; which, he admits (reluctantly or not), does in fact concern him personally.

Would we claim that we, however, are not in the same boat for the following reasons: *that the delusional interpretation is erroneous while the* one that we have isolated from psychoanalytic discourse as concerning us personally is not? We must do better than this if it is a question of a discriminating for, as S + C observe, "the delusion is almost exclusively supported by the precise data of the senses and of sensibility".

After this feature of the primacy of hearsay, the second feature that we have noted makes our position as analysands no less near that of the "interpreter". The seriousness which we displayed in drawing the consequences of our authentication of a certain piece of hearsay about psychoanalysis is of the same nature as that of paranoics, about whom S + C remark — rightly, in my opinion — that they "conform their acts to their thoughts" (p. 124).

Evidently, if we commit ourselves to this way of conforming acts and thoughts (*which was, ideally, the choice of the stoics and of the cynics, too*), God knows where it may lead us.

"It is true that he who took the initiative of putting into play a certain discourse - let us say, the psychoanalyst — was alerted to the danger, that he anticipated this beforehand, and that he has therefore a ready-made response in the event of our taking it upon ourselves to start from scratch. "During your analysis, you are not allowed," he tells us, "to take a decision that involves . . ." (here he is somewhat embarassed . . . that involves what? He can hardly say "your life" for that would be to forbid suicide, nor "your subjectivity" for that would be to admit that the analysis must go on in neutral gear....so, involves what? He extricates himself with a pirouette) "... your future" (this is mother's milk to the obsessional, for is it not upon the invocation of a shining tomorrow that his neurosis feeds?) "I don't mind your having been, at least once in your life, coherent with what you have heard but, in any event for the moment, do not take it upon yourself to begin again from scratch."

Am I then going to shelter my self, from now in, in the cosy warmth of this interdict? In these days when analyses rarely last six months, everyone knows that it is not as simple as that. But let us say . . . Yes, I'll play the game (**je joue le jeu**: Lacan wanted to make a verb out of this: **je joulje, tu jonljes, il joulje** . . .) [I playthgame , you playthgame, he playthgames . .] and from now on I shall limit myself to uttering whatever drops into my head. But it is then clear that, in itself, my acceptance demonstrates that I am leaving the initiative to the other, that he is in charge at the very least until . . . well, I'll be damned if I know.

Here, then, is a third feature common to both the analysand and the interpreter: the acknowledgement of the fact that the initiative is left to the other: thus of an essential disparity between the subject and the other. But is it so simple?

To be deprived of the initiative opens the door to a whole series of questions, beginning with this one: should I have been trapped by the other? Am I caught like a rat in a trap by the other?

We are not too sure about **l'homora (l'homme aux rats** — the Rat Man), but it is clearly so for **l'homolou (l'homme aux loups** — the Wolf Man) who was well and truly caught like a **lomolou** in a trap, to the point of perversely believing it himself. "My reflections of Sigmund Freud, by the Wolf Man": it's enough to set your teeth on edge, isn't it? And we have Ruth Mack Brunswick and Anna Freud adding to this, as if it were not enough that Freud blundered in naming, with this name of Wolf Man his not yet "famous patient". Is that the direction of the cure, is that the inclination which leads up towards it?

Let us note that there is no essential difference in being caught in a trap like a **lomolou**, like an S.P. or like a janalouch. As predicate it is, compared with the subject, just as inconsistent, just as improper. This is not as it should be. Would the effect of the operation according to which a subject "casts himself adrift in language"[2] in abdicating before the fundamental rule be his vampire-like attachment to a signifier which would **properly** represent **him**? But how can one not see that the proper name, taken in this swindling of proprietors, is — precisely — no longer a proper name? ("**propre**" comprises the meanings of both the English adjectives "proper" and "own": hence "**nom propre**" = "proper name", and "**propre nom**" = "own name"). **Lomolou**, a name of phantasm, would be the damned truth of "janalouch" if, by chance, janalouch took himself for himself. This is the reason that it is out of the question that a psychoanalyst should nickname an analysand, even if it be in the name of protecting him

from the inevitable secretion of clues resulting from the publication of the case: naming, he predicates; predicating, he fixes a phantasm and closes the question of the subject, a question that is only attained beyond all predication. There is nothing in the psychoanalytic device that suggests to the subject that he is speaking in his own name, speaking for himself; that his utterance would be anything other than an utterance which falls upon him (cf. the Freudian Freier Einfall); an utterance which has been "imposed", Lacan said (this utterance itself had just been imposed upon him by a presentation of patients).

* * *

What is, in fact, the status of the discourse that is uttered in an analysis? We are going to show, point by point, that this status is that of the discourse of the interpreter.

1) First common feature: this discourse is revealed as being allergic to persuasion. "All discussion with the interpreter thus remains futile: it often irritates, it never persuades" write S + C; thereby rendering null and void the idiotic notion of "the criterion of delusion". The acknowledged futility of all discussion or critical study of discourse is something that the analyst admits at once: the bias of his intervention is not, with certain exceptions, that of persuasion. Analysis is characterised by the refusal of any form of suggestion whatsoever and this refusal is an historically constituent part of the invention of its device.

2) For the analysand, as for the interpreter, the interpretation is characterised in being literal: its validity is established not according to sense but to the letter, a sense only being momentarily stabilised by virtue of the support of a literal operation. "We want you to recover.", a brother writes to an interpretess. Reading that, she notices that the full stop which ends the sentence is abnormally large; she therefore reads, "We do not want you to recover at all". This is one example of many: the work on *Les folies raisonnantes* swarms with Freudian interpretations.

There is here a style of characterised "penetration": "I really feel," says an inter pretess, "that with the penetration that my unlucky stars have given me, which always impels me to scratch the surface to see what there is beneath, it is better for me to live alone and far away." Who, then, is wise — the psychoanalyst scratching the surface in search of the undiscoverable kernel or the psychotic who infers the tiresomeness of her inclination in deciding to live alone and far away?

As in analysis this penetration has its chosen objects (dreams, lapsus, bungled actions, but also proper names/nouns), and as in analysis a play

on words is as good as an argument, there is no essential difference between the interpretation of the dream in analysis and this reading of the dream, reported by S + C: a German woman named Katzian saw in a dream her foster-father in prison, with a dog at his right and a cat at his left. How will she read this dream? The dog is a symbol of faithfulness and the cat a symbol of unfaithfulness (such symbolism, although it was glorified by Jung, was not totally rejected by Freud). And since "Katz" means "cat", she concludes from this that she is an unfaithful Katzian:

> *In wishing to define more precisely the meaning of his formula which* posits the unconscious as the **"discours de l'Autre"** ("discourse of the Other"), Lacan (p.814 of *Ecrits*) declares that this **"de"** has the value of the Latin **"de"**. Unfortunately, this Latin **"de"** means both "with regard to" and "from", which causes us to retrieve the ambiguity which we wanted to raise. He elucidates his observation with the aid of a Latin sentence which *he gives in interrupted form and which, moreover, he does not link as its* completion remains in parentheses: **"De Alio in oratione** (complete: **tua res agitur)"**. His intention is to give the status of a subjective genetive to this **"de"**: it concerns your thing, with regard to the Other in discourse. But which discourse? That of the subject or that of the Other? The appeal to this Latin sentence, then, does not resolve the matter either!

But why **this** sentence, and why **this** particular scansion? And to whom is the imperative "complete" addressed? Who would have been in a position to "complete", if Lacan had not had the deceptive kindness ("deceptive" in that it spares us from searching ourselves) of giving us the second part of the sentence? It is known that in his study of psychoses in 1955-56 Lacan discusses the status of interrupted sentences. As for the second question, let us note that Sérieux, Capgras or any one of their contemporary colleagues would have been able to respond to it, confirming by this that they were in a position to be able to "complete". S + C in fact mention a certain number of cases such as this one (p. 115). An interpreter indulges in a real experiment: he goes to the theatre several times, knowingly choosing a different place to sit each time so as to establish his certainty that the kiss blown by the leading lady at some precise moment of her performance is well and truly directed at him. This series of proofs presents all the requisite qualities of an experiment: the variation of a certain parameter, everything remaining equal elsewhere, has the function of discriminating a constant. This case, and others with it, cause Sérieux and Capgras to write "One may see that it is a question of a true delusion of personal signification: **tua res agitur** — it has been said that this could be

the motto of the interpreter." (p. 31). Thus the Lacanian definition of the unconscious as the "discourse of the Other" (written elsewhere, in his very first formulation, as "other") is clearly found to be attached to the discourse of the interpreter.

3) One cannot fail to ask, what results from the accumulation of such local and partial interpretations or experiences? In psychoanalysis, we say that the subject thus constitutes his own history, fills in its blanks, thus rendering it coherent, indeed comprehensible. But then one must ask oneself whether a history that has been rendered absolutely coherent is not exactly what one calls a systematised delusion? This is, in any case, the function that S + C point to as being that of delusion: to provide the subject with a history in which everything is linked:

> Everything holds together, everything is linked in his history; in this view, there is no superfluous detail. If you contradict him, he stops, surprised, wondering if you are sincere. He accumulates proof on proof; for each objection he has a ready made response; he knows how to turn arguments against you. He quotes dates; specifies every minor point; relates confirming statements; poses dilemmas; seizes upon the most minor fact in order to use it skilfully as his needs require. He calls upon the information of his associates, of his family, who are often subjugated by the strength of his reasoning (p. 49).

4) The quotation of "confirming statements" sends us back to Freud's paper on *Constructions in Analysis* in which he takes the emergence of such a confirmation as the most fitting criterion of the accuracy of an interpretation. If the analysand aquiesces, he tells us, this is not worth much; if he responds by saying no, that is a little better; but only the confirmation gives proof.

The horizon of this problematical question remains no less the "heads I win, tails you lose" that Freud brings into play at the beginning, and which takes up the precise point of his rupture with Fliess; the rupture which cost the psychoanalytic approach to the psychoses so dearly. According to Freud, Fliess would have, from a particular time, gone so far as to manipulate his figures in such a way that no matter what the given account of a single observation might have been, this account would have confirmed his theory. By this, in the eyes of his ex-friend ("ex" because of

this) Fliess revealed himself as paranoid. And now, some decades later, this same reproach is made of Freud!

I am not unaware that Freud emphasises in this article the **newness** of the confirming material; and that there is here a criterion differentiating the paranoic, who is right always and in no matter what, from the psychoanalyst, who is always surprised — just as surprised as his analysand — by the emergence of new material. Such a differentiation, however, which certain hysteric-analysts gloat over, is not worthwhile as it does not take into account the time of the interpreter's experience. There is a time (let's say . . . yes, the time of an analysis of today) when, for the interpreter, the confirming material really presents itself as totally surprising. There is even a form of reasoning madness (cf. the title of Sérieux and Capgras' work), the "delusion of supposition", in which things remain the object of a sustained astonishment; a form which S + C tell us is "as incurable and as pervasive as the best organized delusions".

What is remarkable is that here, the discourse of the analysand/analyst or persecuted/persecutor is dependent on the same, shall we say, epistemological vein. In the one and the other case the status of knowledge is recognized as being that of conjecture, and its production is of the order of invention. Paradigm of the index, says C. Ginsberg. We say: discourse of the interpreter.

5) A confirmation (**oui**. . .) is given to us in this fifth point which, for all that it corresponds with a counting of the fingers of one hand, will not lead us to believe that we shall be able to close our hand around it, and so grasp from now on some or other concept. It is a question of temporality, but perhaps not exactly the temporality which we have just evoked.

Freud discerned, a-posteriori, a specific mode of temporality which alone was capable of accounting for the contribution of traumatic experience. But still it was necessary that this invention of Freud's should be pointed out by someone. I conjecture (**oui**. . .) that if Lacan was able to read Freud's **Nachträglich**, over and above his interest in temporality in itself which his study on *Le temps logique* reveals, he owes this to his training as a psychiatrist and, more precisely, to the notion (then clearly stated) of "retrospective delusion": "Certain insignificant phrases" (insignificant in the sense of any and every one, that is the signifier in Lacan's sense . . . and the interpreters's), "spoken a long time ago come to confirm the statements of today, to clarify implications. Puerile reflections of childhood, little compliments, caresses or reprimands suddenly take on a precise signification" (p. 43). And the term of "romance" itself will

naturally be penned by Sérieux and Capgras ("retrospective romance" they even write, p. 102) just as it imposed itself, in spite of his "scientism", on Freud's writing. In the analytic colloquium, what comes into being concerning the childhood of the subject, if not this "sudden taking-on" of a precise signification of precisely those little events of childhood the list of which, established here, is perfectly apt in its designation of that which analysis compels the analysand to examine and question?

It seems to us, then, that the discourse of the paranoic and the discourse which, on the authority of the fundamental rule, is forged in analysis are of the same stamp. Each one of them may be designated as the "discourse of the interpreter". Nothing at the level of the symbolic (but of course such an affirmation implies that one has distinguished this dit-mention as such, which was the act of Lacan) allows for a differentiation of the persecuted/persecutor colloquim and the analysand/analyst colloquim.

* * *

This only makes a question that analysis has actually come up against all the more urgent. It could be formulated thus: how is it possible, in an analysis, to not make the subject paranoid? Would this "paranoisation" give the cure its direction?

One may say, there are the facts of structure: or further, what Lacan said: **"n'est pas fou qui veut"** ("no one is mad who want to be so"). However, we cannot have, as Freud did, only one unitarian vision of the field of psychoanalysis; we cannot be satisfied with the clinical affirmation of a variety of species which have no relation to one another. In Freud, the notion of a psychic apparatus as well as a certain number of fundamental principles, without which this notion loses all its weight, claim to be worthy of whatever the considered psychopathological structure may be. Although this ambition is certainly unbounded if confronted with what happens in physics, it is inevitable failing the renunciation of all the theory of analysis. Thus Lacan, in the very last time of his work, situated the discourse of analysis as — **"un délire dont on attend qu'il porte une science"** ("a delusion which one expects will comprise a science"). This was to reformulate in more precise terms Freud's confidence to Jung in a letter dated 26 May 1907: "Others before us have had to wait for the world to understand what they were saying".

It is true that today in France, a whole stream takes cognizance of theoretical dissensions, of there being no possible transmission of psychoanalysis but that each individual must re-invent it for his own use: this is, in fact, the zero degree of transmission and is linked to what Valéry

articulated concerning the "delusional professions".[3] But is this renunciation necessary? Is it necessary to slide from fact to ritual? It is notable that those who take this step, who attempt to institute analytic practice alone as being liable to provide a criterion which would assure the consistency of the Freudian field (as if there were, among psychoanalysts, any more unity on that register, as if this unity were not that of a ritual emptied of its substance and instituted as such by the I.P.A. — and from there, the scandal of punctuated sessions which touches in fact, in the I.P.A., a point that is all the more neurotic the less it is established) have not themselves renounced in any particularly noteworthy way, in the view of those who are willing to pay them attention, their personal theoretical cognitations. It is, in fact, out of the question to renounce the incidence of the horizon of "scientificity" which made the invention of psychoanalysis possible, just as it remains out of the question that we have a theory of the structure of the subject that is only valid for some or other given illness.

Following an exposition by P. Aulagnier at the time of a session of his seminar,[4] Lacan gave the following commentary: "What appears eminent to me is precisely that by which this also reveals the psychotic structure as being something in which we should feel at home. If we are not capable of perceiving that there is a certain degree which is not "archaic" (to be placed next to birth) <but> structural at the level of which desires are, properly speaking, mad; if, for us, the subject does not include in his definition, in his primary articulation, the possibility of the psychotic structure; then we shall never be anything but **<aliénistes>** (traditional psychiatrists)." (I have put this word in parentheses as the typescript reads "**analystes**"! The brackets around "but" indicate an additon on my part.)

Simple indication: I am saying, therefore, that only a definition of the subjective structure which includes the possibility of psychosis can allow us to pose, in a formulation that will render it soluble, the problem of the direction of the cure.

In a letter to Jung, 15 October 1908, Freud, after having propounded some elements of the case of "the anxiety man" (undoubtedly!), writes: "There is so to speak an unconscious paranoia (**Es gibt also sozusagen unbewuste Paranoia**) that we make conscious in the course of psychoanalysis. Incidently, this case provides excellent confirmation of your *aperçu* that in analysis we guide hysteria patients along the path of dementia praecox." Here there is the indication of a path (Weg), of a direction of the cure and, at the same time, the assertion of a certain reservation: to lead along a path is not necessarily "to lead to". And if one

remembers that for Freud the term "dementia praecox" is particularly unwelcome, that from his point of view this is not an essentially different kind of paranoia, one will conclude that all the subtlety, all the difficulty of the problem that is evoked here is to be found condensed in the phrase "so to speak". "Sozusagen", colloquially: "as one might say". Who will say it? No one: this is a conditional. No one, that is, except perhaps someone ill-disposed to psychoanalysis, an interlocutor of Freud writing up his work on *Constructions in Analysis*. But that someone should be able to say it, and that Freud should admit it can be said, is not to be discounted.

Our pinpointing of the psychoanalytic discourse as the discourse of the interpreter lends all its weight to the Freudian indication of this "path of dementia praecox". In adhering to the only category of the symbolic such as it is isolated and refined by the putting into practice of the rule of free association, we agree with Freud that it is along this path that we engage the hysteric: analysis is concerned, in fact, with a "so to speak unconscious paranoia" and the fact of recognizing it as such is not without both theoretical and practical implications.

Wherein, then, lies the deviation which leads to the fact that every hysteric that comes to analysis is not transformed by it into a paranoic? Let us suggest that the phrase "so to speak", as being in a position to localise the perceptible reservation in the Freudian text at this point, essentially has to do with the subject's mode of inscription in the transference; that a neurotic inscribes himself there in the same way as a paranoic — even though in both cases it is well and truly a matter of transference.

It is not possible to relate in a few sentences or even paragraphs what has been for me the object of a seminar for several years; some publications have resulted from this to which I can only refer the reader.[5] I shall conclude, therefore, in order to adhere at present to a simple indication, by presenting a case which I have chosen as representative of that ensnarement by which the transference link is maintained when the incidence of the "so to speak unconscious paranoia" is not taken into account. Training analysis is especially exposed to this. Let us note that Freud's remark, related above, is not without repercussions for the psychoanalyst: if he leads the hysteric along the path of dementia praecox, where does that lead **him**?

This question has been answered, as a matter of fact, answered by means of declaring it improper and, if necessary, of excluding those for whom it was not possible not to ask it. And too bad if, all of a sudden, psychoses had to be proclaimed analytically untreatable. And too bad

again if, all of a sudden, training became the business of administrators.

Here then is an example of this "cutting of corners"; in our attempt to grasp the thing in the present way, we shall be helped by going back a little, both historically and geagraphically.

Richard F. Sterba, through the bias of **éditions Privat**, has just presented us with what he entitles his "Reminiscences of a Viennese Psychoanalyst", a book which he finished in 1982 at the age of 84 years. The pretext (and I call it such) of this work: to bear witness to what was the life of the Viennese group which gathered around Freud between 1924 and 1938. But this book does more than interest us; it touches us. Sterba, who was not just anyone, who would have first formulated (three years before Freud, cf. p. 53) the theory of the **Ichspaltung**, who has arrived at the venerable age when the end of life seems near, Sterba still has — and perhaps more than ever — something to tell us.

From the very first pages of his testimony we find a confirmation of the primacy of hearsay as far as the engagement of an individual in analysis is concerned. While in the army at the time of the First World War, he met Adler's son, who spoke of a certain Sigmund Freud and his theories. "These conversations," writes Sterba, "gave me the inclination to read certain of Freud's works" (op. cit. p. 21). What precisely gave rise to such an inclination? We do not know. By way of compensation, Sterba gives us the very feature of Freud's work which had, on him, an effect of "seduction" (that is his own term).

This feature is Freud's literary style, the extraordinary clarity and beauty of the expression of his ideas. This "fascination" (p. 28) is at once too much and too little when it is a question of taking into account the degree of commitment which will result from it in whoever receives it at full blast. Sterba studied medicine; attempted to self-analyse his dreams; married a psychologist who was Rank's secretary; undertook a training analysis (for which, it was agreed, he would only pay afterwards by taking over the poor patients from the psychoanalytic clinic); made all his friends within the Freudian group, sharing his leisure time with them; received his psychoanalyst's diploma, signed by Freud himself...etc. The more Sterba intimates to us the intensity of his commitment to Freudian analysis as he proceeds through his narrative, the more evidence he gives us of his absolute fidelity to Freud, of his unwavering "devotion" to "the cause" (p.65), the more it becomes clear that he would have followed Freud in each of the changes of direction in his theories, that he would have been "constantly busy trying to understand and assimilate his new ideas" (p.63).

the more enigmatic does the motive — if not the reason — for **his** presence in the savage horde appear to us, his readers of today.

Certainly there is the joy of "living close to the source" (p.65) in the Mecca of psychoanalysis (p.82); also the joy of having in Freud a model who "set the tone" (p.65); the joy of admiring the "amazing" "fertility of Freud's genius" (p.63); indeed, the joy of being permanently "bombarded by that deluge of new ideas" (p.63). But what of **him**, Richard F. Sterba, in all of this? Well, the extent of his commitment appears to be precisely that of his own disappearing act!

. . . At least right up until the last phrase of the final assertion which, like some dramatic turn of events (**un coup de théâtre**), at least gives us the key. Brigitte Bost, the French translator of the original edition in English, proposes a translation of this phrase (as of the rest of the work) but she also gives it in German, which leads one to suppose that she also found herself (and not in a footnote either) in this language in the English edition. Sterba's whole book seems to have been made in order to introduce this single sentence, an assertion which is all the more personalised as it is . . . a quotation:

Gegen grosse Vorzuege eines anderen
(In the face of the immense pre-eminence of an other)
gibt es Keine Rettungsmittel
(there is no other refuge)
als die Liebe.
(than love.)

This love which engulfs a whole life, which makes a militant of the cause; this love which can only be allowed at the last moment of this life, but not to him who was its object; this love which was thus never really declared . . . against what kind of hell does this love set itself up as a last hope of salvation? What is the status of the aura of otherness whose "presence immediately dominated the scene" (p. 88)?

We neither have the power, nor are we in a position, to be able to reply to this question accurately. It is of **père- version** (this is how Lacan writes it), the account-of-the-father, the **"Mein Vater hat gesagt . . ."** from which Anna Freud drew her authority and of which Sterba (still joyful!) notes (p.88) that she made a moderate usage? Is it a matter of transference love coming to permit the subject to keep in reserve what his "so to speak unconscious paranoia" would include of the properly delusional? Lacan, with his "proposition of October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the school", attempted to coin a term for the sustained avoidance of such questions,

which are initially only relevant case by case. To coin a term is also to coin a word, and the word which this proposition introduces is that of "subjective destitution" coupled with the "un-being" (**désêtre**") of the analyst. There we have the indication of a direction of the cure which certainly has a paradoxical aspect since the institution of subjectivity consists in its destitution. However, isn't this extreme the solution which suits the "so to speak unconscious paranoia"? Correlatively, isn't it the obstacle encountered on this "path of dementia praecox" along which Freud tells us analysis leads the hysteric, to be found in the un-being of the psychoanalyst? And is it not in this also, in the strange proximity of normality and psychosis, that the indication (and not the least decisive, at that) that the psychoanalyst may authorise himself to no longer refuse analysis to the psychotic when hearsay of analysis has touched him in such a way that he chooses it as the place in which he can take his experience into account?

I am not expected to give here an exposition of what Lacan named "the pass". This is right, at least in this: that what is in question here, namely the examination and interrogation of what may be the direction of a cure (and especially the direction of a training analysis), has remained — for Lacan and also for us today — beyond the reach of any theoretical meanderings; this being the reason that it was a matter of proposition, to be put into action as such.

Let us, therefore, simply note a feature of this device which is linked with our introductory remarks above. This feature is in fact that of hearsay. It is upon the hearsay of **passeurs** that the analysand relies in order that others should evaluate whether, in authorising himself as an analyst, he is doing so only from the position of analyst;[6] and it is upon this hearsay, and upon it alone that those who have to judge this step of the **passant** rely. It is up to them now — a formidable reversal of what was for him his point of attachment to analysis — to say . . . well, I cannot write it either, and for the same reason as before. But besides, by what right would I do so, here?

Notes

1 "Who is the master?" I asked insistently. It is not Montaigne, nor Pascal, nor Schopenhauer (names which I often hear) who teach me. I draw an oil lamp (faithfully) and receive (at primary school) a public distinction. I see: mistrust is justified. Thomas Bernhard, *Ténèbres*, p.50.

2 LACAN, J. *L'acte psychanalytique*, session of 7 February 1968, an unplublished and "non-established" seminar.

3 I name as such (ie: "delusional professions"). All those professions whose principal tool is the opinion that you have of yourself, and whose primary material is the opinion that others have of you. People who, pledged to an eternal candidature, carry out these professions, are necessarily always afflicted by a certain delusion of grandeur which is traversed by a certain delusion of persecution. In this population of unique individuals reigns the law of doing what no one has ever done and what no one will ever do. This, at least, is the law of the best of them: that is to say, those who have the courage to definitely wish for something absurd. Paul Valéry, quoted by Jacques Lacan in *De la psychose paranoiaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité*, Seuil, Paris, 1975, p. 278.

4 LACAN,J. *L'identification*, session of 2 May 1962, an unpublished and "non-established" seminar.

5 cf. *"Freud ou quand l'inconscient s'affole"* (a study of the Freud/Jung rupture as revelatory of the idea that the Freudian unconscious excludes paranoia); *"Vous êtes au courant, il y a un transfert psychotique"* (on the disparity of the modes of inscription in the transference of the neurotic and the psychotic); *"Tres faciunt insaniam"* (on the last writings of Lacan on that which would give to psychosis its conditions of possibility): in *Littoral* No. 19-20, 21 and 22, éd érès, Toulouse, April and October 1986, April 1987, respectively.

6 Let us give the exact formula, taken from a directive of Lacan to the Italian group (cf. *Lacan in Italia*, La Salamandra, Milano, 1978, p. 156): "What it (the Italian group) must see to (attend to) is that in authorising himself, the analyst does so only from himself."

**Translator's note: Square brackets enclose additons/clarifications by the translators.

Translator: Carolyn Parker

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