


**PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN
SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE**



On Transference

HOMAGE TO FREUD

**PAPERS OF THE
FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE
AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC
WRITINGS**

ON TRANSFERENCE

**Editor
Oscar Zentner**

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CONTENTS

	Page
LOGOS	Oscar Zentner
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD — ON TRANSFERENCE	
Narcissistic Neuroses	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 1
Transference to the Other	Gayle Paull 11
Transference and Identification	Rob Gordon 19
Transference	Moustapha Safouan 29
Fantasm, <i>Passe</i> and <i>Impasse</i>	Oscar Zentner 37
PART II	
LACANOAMERICAN REUNION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS	
PUNTA DEL ESTE — URUGUAY — 1986	
The End of an Analysis	Linda Clifton 51
The Analytic Section	Héctor Rúpolo 57
A Dream of Freud	Celia Calvo 63
A King of Shreds and Patches: The Super-Ego	Sergio Staude 69
Tulips and Two Lips or Dying of Metonymy	Nora Marina Menéndez 75
Miss ? ABCDEF — A Case of Multiple Identifications	Alan Large 85
Topology in an Analysis: A Hole in Spacial Dimension	Ilda Sara Levin 91
The Psychoanalytic Mass.	Ricardo Estacolchic 103
On Hysterical Madness	Daniel Alberto Deluca 109
Between the Signifier and the Letter	Jorge Rizzo 117
<i>Lacanianas</i>	Isidoro Vegh 119
Strachey and the Transmission of the Freudian Field in the Anglo-Saxon Tradition	Rob Gordon 127
Sublimation in the Reverse of the Psychotic Thing	John Muller 135
The <i>Decentration</i>	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 143
The Feminine Position and the Woman's <i>Jouissance</i> — The Devil in the Body	Benjamin Domb 169
Notes Towards the End of an Analysis	María del Carmen Meroni 177

CONTENTS

Ethics and <i>The Lacanoamerican Reunion</i>	José Zuberman	189
Topology in the Relationship Between Structure and Theory	Carlos Ruiz	197
Non-Resisted Psychoanalysis: Iatrogeny	Leonor Torres	205
Inhibition	Cristina Marrone	211
Beyond the Author — An American in America	Luis María Bisselier	219
The Scenes of a Fetishist To Read Oneself	Oswaldo Hugo Aprea Pablo Kovalovsky	227 235
Phantom Member and Hallucinatory Fulfilment	Lidia Lourdes García	243
Presentation/Unveiling	Luis María Bisselier Marta Erramuspe Cristina Marrone	247
Presentation of Patients: Notes of a Teaching	Daniel Alberto Deluca Alejandro Sayús	255
To Speak About the Impossible: To Make it Possible	Clara Kruglak	263
The Desire of the Analyst <i>A-Nuda</i> (a-knots) — Between the Signifier and the Letter	Ricardo Landeira	269
Pandora	Lía Quijano	277
Fantasm, <i>Passe</i> and <i>Impasse</i>	Oscar Zentner	37

Logos

"To take an analysis up to its end requires not to
prejudge in any case or moment its result."

Lacan

In the tenth year since its foundation; The Freudian School of Melbourne, publishes the present volume with the contents of the Homage to Freud *On Transference* and some papers given at the *Lacano-American Reunion of Psychoanalysis*, Punta del Este, Uruguay, December 1986. This Reunion showed that even when different aspects of practice and theory were stressed the meeting of analysts is always a possibility when the horizon of work is psychoanalysis.

The analyst in order to be able to work with other analysts needs something other than autonomy of thought. Psychoanalysis with the discovery of the unconscious, advanced far beyond contemplation and platonic meditation; thereby establishing that the psychoanalytic act becomes necessary because there is sufficient reason. The project of the School is open to all of those who, as we said ten years ago, are able to sustain their desire. That is, to take responsibility for the established transference. It follows then, that the direction of our work is dictated by the unconscious. We have attempted no other path. Thus accompanying critically the interrogation inaugurated by Freud and Lacan, this is the meaning and the cause of the *raison d'être* of the School.

Oscar Zentner
Director

The Freudian School of Melbourne

PART 1

HOMAGE TO FREUD

ON TRANSFERENCE

Narcissistic Neuroses

María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner

Analytic work is carried out in a field full of risks where a proportion between success and failure is difficult to establish. So let us accept the challenge that this thought implies and allow me to share with you my own ideas and some problems. We will return to the successes and failures in psychoanalytic treatment but, for the time being, it seems appropriate to begin by looking into the classification that distinguishes transference neuroses from actual neuroses, narcissistic neuroses and psychoses.¹

Freud formulated his metapsychological conceptualization of transference in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Transference in dreams explained the passage from an unconscious to a preconscious representation. The interpretation of dreams, royal road of access to the unconscious, was the symbolic retracing or undoing of the road of transference since the dream, in order to avoid censorship, had been subjected to displacement and condensation. Censorship in dreams corresponded to repression in the neuroses.²

The model of the dream,³ in this way, provided Freud with a metapsychological explanation of the transference neuroses. These

neuroses were characterized by the fact that all withdrawal of investment from objects would produce a later investment, a transference onto another object, this time the analyst. Analysis borrowed this situation to create an artificial neurosis, an organiser of the manifestations of transference.

What was the nosology proposed by Freud when distinguishing transference neuroses from actual neuroses, narcissistic neuroses and psychoses? He clearly established that the grounds of the Freudian analysis covered the transference neuroses, that is, conversion hysteria, obsessional neurosis and anxiety hysteria or phobia. Exceptions to this are some cases he researched like *Schreber, A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the Disease and A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis*. He seems to have left the rest apparently unattended. The actual neuroses find virtually no mention beyond 1920 and they were also abandoned by later analysts when the overdetermination of the unconscious was explicitly or implicitly accepted as the cause at play in the psychoneuroses.

Freud insisted in the investigative value of psychoanalysis regarding the so called narcissistic neuroses (paraphrenia or schizophrenia and paranoia) but he never pretended that it could play the same role as it did in the field of the transference neuroses without significant modification.⁴

Although encouraging other analysts like Abraham, Jung or Ferenczi in the study of psychoses, Freud preferred, on the basis of his clinical impressions, to devote himself fully to the neuroses, the transference neuroses. Many years later Lacan will come to say that the analyst should not recede from psychosis, however stating that their treatment remains to be an open question.

But let us return to Freud's nosology which he based both in his psychoanalytic work and in the theoretical possibilities that the metapsychology opened to him. The psychoses — as we said, — have in recent years awoken a renewed interest in psychoanalysis. Narcissistic neuroses, melancholia specifically, has been left aside and re-translated as cyclical psychosis, manic-depressive psychosis or psychotic depression.

Let us take melancholia for instance, and try to understand why Freud did not equate it with psychosis, as some analysts did. In principle, melancholia (one of the narcissistic neuroses) is opposed to the three great neuroses of transference.⁵

The introduction of the notion of narcissism in 1910 but principally in 1914 bore important consequences because the old conflict between the repression exercised by the I and sexuality was effaced. If the I could be sexualized — as in the case of narcissism, that is, if the I as an object could take itself as the object of its love — then the opposition, the dualism we mentioned above ought to have been looked for elsewhere. Freud did this by situating narcissism within the drives of self preservation.⁶

A first and obvious opposition stands then between transference and narcissism because, if the libido is in the I, the I is invested, libidinally invested as an object, therefore precluding transference to other objects.⁷ Transference neuroses rightly fit to explain the libido theory because they show the opposition between object libido and the repression exercised by the ego. Object libido here standing for unconscious and sexuality, while the ego standing for self preservation and repression. Narcissistic neuroses imply that this opposition proves insufficient because in them, libido or sexuality is also present in the ego.⁸

Transference occurs precisely in the passage from the unconscious to the preconscious — as explained in *Dreams* and as I have referred to above. Object libido (unconscious) opposes the I (repressor). The repressed returns (under the form of the formations of the unconscious, symptoms, dreams, jokes, parapraxes, bungled actions...) in the transference onto an object displaced and condensed. And it is precisely that return that is called transference.⁹

In this nosology¹⁰, Freud started from the apparent dualism offered by the drives of the I (or self preservation) and the sexual drives (or unconscious). And even when sufficiently advanced in the theory this opposition seemed to crumble under clinical and theoretical evidence, he managed by a sort of scientific stubbornness to maintain the dualism of the drives which he resolved in 1919 with the introduction of the death drive as antithetic to the life drive (now encompassing both the previous drives of self preservation and the sexual drives).


Let us consider the mechanism and the destiny of the object both in transference neuroses and in the narcissistic neuroses. The loss of the object in transference neuroses is manifested through the different forms that the return of the repressed takes in the various symptoms that distinguish hysteria, obsessional neurosis and phobias. In psychoses, the object is not lost but foreclosed and re-appears for example in hallucinations, delusions, etc. In melancholia the subject identifies with the lost object, the mechanism is identification and the destiny of the lost object

is to become the I. This explains, at least in part, why Freud insists in saying that what is lost for the subject in melancholia is not known to him, since what he ignores most is himself, and his I becomes the lost object through identification. The I in this regard, is the decantation of past object choices. Freud does not confuse melancholia neither with neurosis nor with psychosis.⁹

The transference neuroses lean on the repression of the loss, the narcissistic neuroses lean on an identification of the loss with the I — the place where “the shadow of the object will fall” — and psychoses in the foreclosure of what has never been lost simply because the subject never separated from the object.

What is then a narcissistic neurosis characterised by the libido being in the I? If, in fact, and beyond its destiny, a subject is such if and when the object is structurally lost for him? Things are apparently not so simple.

Freud seemingly hesitated between a general denomination distinguishing transference and narcissistic psycho-neuroses, the latter comprehending melancholia, paranoia and schizophrenia, designed in 1914 and a later classification, put forward in 1924 where he distinguished transference neuroses, narcissistic neuroses comprising melancholia only, and psychoses including paranoia and schizophrenia.



It seems very appropriate today to rescue the freshness and originality of this nosology, notwithstanding the fact that it never pretended to be exhaustive. And following the line introduced by narcissism, in the narcissistic neuroses, we would like to move on to the aspect of melancholic identification in narcissistic neuroses.

The identification in this position is explained as a regression from *having* the object, to *being* it. This, however, must be understood not as the

mythical infantilization of a time, past and gone, that becomes present once more, but as the clear result that sorrow (consequence of the loss) in melancholia is replaced by self-reproach. Self-reproach in melancholia is unbearable, but the affect of sorrow or sadness is felt as something even more unbearable. In the reproach then, the identification appears. The sadness disappears together with what has been lost and through identification the subject will also lose himself, clearly as it occurs in suicide.¹¹

In 1970 I published a paper from where I would like today to rescue one line. I said that in the origin of the I we can find the explanation of suicide. In effect, melancholia magnifies this question in that the I is the residue of object identifications. And if this is so, why should we be surprised in view of the fact that “*the shadow of the object falls on the I*”. Obviously, the structure itself of that I allows that the object that is lost be found in the I. Freud’s statements are not simple. Melancholia is not a structure based in the loss of an object but a recovery of that object in the I. That is to say, from the I as a residue of objects to the object as I. The peculiarity of the object in melancholia is that it is a narcissistic object choice.

This paradoxical rejection of a loss through identification seems to be the exact opposite to Meynert’s amentia.¹² The predominant element in this psychosis consisted in the fact that the loss of the object was always of the present time and the conditions were usually of toxic origin, as was the case with certain drugs.

The supposed loss in melancholia or, better, what we recognize as melancholia is nothing else but the process of restitution in the I of what Freud referred to in the *Project as the thing - das ding*. Melancholia is not a psychosis but a narcissistic neurosis that implies the delusional restitution of that *thing* in the I through identification.

Lacan’s criticism to the concept of ambivalence, that has been very loosely used to explain many things, finds a place here. The ambivalence hate-love is opposed to indifference. Freud uses the concept of ambivalence for the first time in 1912 in *The Dynamics of Transference* to explain the phenomenon of negative transference. It is not that transference can lack or be absent, it is that it is not addressed to us, which is an altogether different story. What cannot be created then is the artificial neurosis of transference.

Here is where I suggested at the start that we should take up Freud’s challenge. Evidently, the mechanism of repression that explained the neuroses of transference excluded the narcissistic neuroses, and among

them, melancholia. All the theory of transference neuroses found itself at ease within the boundaries marked by repression. But only when it proves insufficient to explain other affections, the analytic work really expands the horizons of the theory.

The legacy of Lacan — that the analyst must not recede from psychosis — does not mean that he can cure it. Moreover and foremostly, it implies that the analyst, in order to be one, can't ignore what the unconscious disputes him: his supposed-knowledge.

NOTES

- ¹ In transference neuroses the subject demands. . . What? He demands to know. This is what has to do with transference. In narcissistic neuroses instead, the subject neither hates nor loves, therefore he ignores, as Empedocles said, quoted by Freud.

LACAN, J.

"Last time I remarked why Freud had taken up Empedocles as saying that God must be the most ignorant of all beings, to the point of not knowing hate." *Encore, Le seminaire, livre XX, 84. Seuil, Paris, 1975.*

- ² FREUD, S.

"Finally let us once more glance at the significant light which the *topography* of the process of repression throws for us on the mechanism of mental disturbances. In dreams the withdrawal of libido affects all systems equally: in the transference neuroses, the *Pcs.* investment is withdrawn, in schizophrenia the investment of the *Ucs.*; in amentia that of the *Cs.*" *The Unconscious. St.Ed., Vol. XIV, 235.*

- ³ FREUD, S.

"...We assume that the same need for transference on the part of repressed ideas which we have discovered in analysing the neuroses is also at work in dreams..." *The Interpretation of Dreams. St.Ed., Vol. V, 235.*

- ⁴ FREUD, S.

"As regards schizophrenia, which we only touch on here so far as seems indispensable for a general understanding of the *Ucs.*, a doubt must occur to us whether the process here termed repression has anything at all in common with the repression which takes place in the transference neuroses. The formula that repression is a process which occurs between the systems *Ucs.* and *Pcs.* (or *Cs.*) ... must in any event be modified, in order that it may also be able to include the case of dementia praecox and other narcissistic affections." *The Unconscious. St.Ed., Vol. XIV, 203.*

- ⁵ FREUD, S.

"Observations show that sufferers from narcissistic neuroses have no capacity for transference or only insufficient residues of it. They reject the doctor, not with hostility but with indifference." *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Lecture XXVII, Transference. St. Ed., Vol. XVII, 447.*

- ⁶ FREUD, S.

"...the group described as 'transference neuroses'... showed that at the root of all such affections there is to be found a conflict between the claims of sexuality and

those of the I. It is always possible that an exhaustive study of the other neurotic affections (especially of the narcissistic psychoneuroses, the schizophrenias) may oblige us to alter this formula and to make a different classification of the primal drives." *Drives and Their Vicissitudes*. St.Ed.,Vol.XIV,124.

- 7 FREUD,S. "An ordinary dementia praecox, a paranoia or a melancholia are essentially quite unsuitable material for demonstrating the validity of the libido theory or for serving as a first introduction to an understanding of it; and it is for that reason that psychiatrists, who neglect the transference neuroses, are unable to come to terms with it." *Introduction to Psycho-Analysis and War Neuroses*. St.Ed.,Vol.XV II, 209.

- 8 FREUD,S. "It only became possible to extend the libido theory to the narcissistic neuroses after the concept of a 'narcissistic libido' had been put forward and applied — a concept, that is, of an amount of sexual energy attached to the I itself and finding satisfaction in the I just as satisfaction is usually found only in objects." *Idem*, 209.

"Transference neuroses correspond to a conflict between the I and the id; narcissistic neuroses, to a conflict between the I and the super-ego; and psychoses, to one between the ego and the external world." *Neurosis and Psychosis*. St.Ed.,Vol.XIX,152.

- 9 FREUD,S. "In conclusion, there remains to be considered the question of what the mechanism, analogous to repression, can be by means of which the ego detaches itself from the external world. This cannot, I think, be answered without fresh investigations; but such a mechanism, it would seem, must, like repression, comprise a withdrawal of the investment sent out by the I." *Idem*, 153.

"Where the capacity for transference has become essentially limited to a negative one, as is the case with paranoics, there ceases to be any possibility of influence or cure." *The Dynamics of Transference*. St.Ed.,Vol.XII,107.

- 10 FREUD,S. "Just as the transference neuroses have enabled us to trace the libidinal instinctual impulses, so dementia praecox and paranoia will give us an insight into the psychology of the I." *On Narcissism: an Introduction*. St.Ed.,Vol.XIV,82.

- 11 FREUD,S. "In the two opposed situations of being most intensely in love and of suicide the I is overwhelmed by the object, though in totally different ways." *Mourning and Melancholia*. St.Ed.,Vol.XIV,252.

- 12 FREUD,S. "Amentia is the reaction to a loss which reality affirms, but which the I has to deny, since it finds it insupportable."

Transference to the Other

Gayle Paull

Transference and resistance. "Any line of investigation which recognizes these two facts and takes them as a starting point of its work has a right to call itself psychoanalysis."

Freud.¹

"As soon as there is a subject who is supposed to know, there is transference."

Lacan.²

Dr Safouan last visited in 1981/82 and after a seminar to the school titled, *The Place of the Analyst in the Transference*, published in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, I asked him the following question. "Can you relate the Internal 8, the diagram of Lacan, to this dream and yourself?" He answered, "Yes, well I found that the dream was almost a theory in itself. I was astonished myself. I mean I had to spend some time thinking about this

object. The question is I would say, that what is specific about Lacan's theory is that you won't find it unless you forget all knowledge and approach it from this point. . ." (of signifiers). I continued asking and he answered "... I would say that it is because there is a point of transference that the demand doesn't make a full circuit, it conveys more. And what is conveyed is precisely something that you can consider as a point of identification, which is implied in the image. . . you can consider it as a point of desire. Now if we go back to the idea that identification does not give the being identity, it organizes lack. . ." Dr Safouan then made the joke "even Napoleon wants to be more Napoleon." He continued, "because there is a point of transference, demand is not simply demand, it implies an underlying movement, which can be expressed or considered according to two facets, as a point of identification and as a point of desire." I pressed on, that is the overlap?" and "so that is the function of the transference?" The function of the transference he answered "is that it makes the interior circuit because without transference the demand is simple give me this means give me this and that is that." The discussion continued a little further and can be read in the book.


But attempting an understanding of this topology of the transference has remained a resounding question and one which I will explore with you today. I can only liken this quest to the story of Moby Dick and thank a friend for finding the words for me to express it:

"And the only mode in which you can derive even a tolerable idea of his living contour, is by going a whaling yourself but by so doing, you run no small risk of being eternally stove and sunk by him."³

As you all know from my past papers, I like to work as a second working, the psychoanalytic text with the aide of topology, it helps organize the lack. We will therefore chase the best and you may then wish to go a topology-ing yourself.

The *Internal δ* that I am referring to is represented as a three dimensional figure of two overlapping loops, based on the topological figure of the moebius strip.

D: line of demand.
I: line of identification intersection.
T: point of transference.
d: desire.⁴



For an understanding of the *Internal δ* we will trace a brief course through the works of Freud highlighting aspects of transference that this δ is based upon.

In the course of an analysis, the transferences are not created by it, but the process Freud says, "... merely brings them to light..."⁵ This mere bringing to light is no simple matter for an attempt to structure this bringing to light topologically, particularly as this transference onto the person of the analyst takes place through a false connection. The analysand is repeated in a new substitutive symptom, the deception merely takes on a new form — a transference.

To obtain the analysand's co-operation in this process Freud teaches us that a sacrifice is required, "a personal sacrifice, which must be compensated by some substitute for love."⁶ The analyst "plays the part of a catalytic ferment, which temporarily attracts to itself the affects liberated in the process."⁷

Within the new transference symptom which takes the form of the oft repeated model, the analysand can re-experience what the memory has failed to recall. By this memory substitution of the transference the analysand's "re-experiencing in the 'transference' convinces him of the existence and of the power of these unconscious sexual impulses."⁸ The analysand re-experiences this in the continual looping of demand into desire many times within the course of an analysis. By this looping we can "...oblige him to transform his repetition into memory."⁹

It is through this process of repetition and continual looping of the outer circuit of demand to the interior circuit of desire within our Internal 8 that "these recurring instances of the ways in which the love characteristic of the age of childhood is brought to a conclusion."¹⁰

"The phenomena of transference are obviously exploited by the resistance which the ego maintains in its pertinacious insistence upon repression; the compulsion to repeat, which the treatment tries to bring into its service is, as it were drawn over by the ego to its side."¹¹

What is of interest is that the compulsion to repeat these early events of childhood within the transference is the therapeutic tool itself. The transference "becomes the most powerful therapeutic instrument,"¹² to be used against the resistances.

Of further interest is that although the analyst can act as a catalyst in this process, the actual path chosen is indifferent as to object. The transference arising develops "inevitably, irrespective of the persons who are their object."¹³ Freud relates the comic story of the three village tailors to this unconscious process:

"one of whom had to be hanged because the only village blacksmith had committed a capital offense. Punishment must be exacted even if it does not fall upon the guilty."¹⁴

Freud likens the struggle between the mental impulses, of what is preconscious or conscious and what is unconscious to the polar bear and the whale. "A true decision can only be reached when they both meet on the same ground. To make this possible is, I think, the sole task of our therapy."¹⁵ The 'points' of the circuit of demand and the circuit of desire meet on the same ground at the point of transference.

How then does the analyst act as a catalyst which obliges the analysand to finally deal with earlier memories by substituting a transformed neurosis? Let us return to Lacan's Internal 8 and my questions to Dr Safouan.

The questions that psychoanalysis ask, deal with that of a central lack, in which subjects experience themselves as desire; a movement from unconscious to conscious occurs.¹⁶

It is object a "in actual experience, in the operation and process sustained by the transference"¹⁷ that is the cause of desire and which organizes the lack. Lacan explains:

"The subject becomes an object worthy of love. From his reference to him who must love him, he tries to induce the Other into a mirage relation in which he convinces him of being worthy of love."¹⁸

From this perspective it is a supportive identification that is chosen by the subject in the field of the Other. This Lacan calls the Ideal point, capital I, a place "from which the Other sees me, in the form I like to be seen."¹⁹

Lacan teaches, that it is at this point of the I that:

"convergence to which analysis is called by the element of deception that there is transference."²⁰

But what is encountered here is paradoxical — the analysand discovers, not the person of the analyst, but a beyond. The paradox is the discovery of the object a situated in alienation to the analyst. Lacan expresses it thus:

"I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you — the *objet petit a* — I mutilate you."²¹

Within the transference the object a is discovered beyond the analyst. The subject comes and demands that the analyst should know his desire — he is the subject who is supposed-to-know. The analyst manipulates the transference to keep a distance between the point at which the subject sees himself as lovable and the point where he sees himself caused as lack by object a.

This is supported in the field of the gaze, it is the narcissistic function of desire; it remains a signifier so never graspable. The subject must come to recognize himself at this point of lack.

Lacan constructs the internal 8 by two loops, looping back upon themselves. The doubling back upon itself represents this line of identification, the inner circuit which signifies a crossing from demand to desire and so, recognition as lack. The rim of the loop rests upon the plane of the locus of the Other, where the demand addressed to the one who is supposed of knowledge is looped into identification. It is here that the subject who recognizes himself as lack, by realizing himself in his speech and his signifiers, is now at the level of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge, the point T, transference.

But there is a beyond the point T, which lies between the I of identification and desire, object a. "The mainspring of the analytic operation is the maintenance of the distance between the I — identification and the a."²² The analyst therefore must fall from this place so that the analysand can recognize a beyond. And what is experienced in this continual looping of the demand to desire? What is repeated in the transference? What is brought from childhood? — the paternal metaphor.

After several loops of the analysand's history telling circuits the analysand loops his own metaphors from demand into desire. The analyst falls from the place of the Ideal point and idealization and identification — it is the only outcome of the analytic process possible. The analyst becomes the support for the separating a. The analyst moves from being the supposed subject of knowledge to the semblance of the object a then falls — a residue.

It is with this beyond that Lacan closes the loop of desire back upon itself, "where nothing is ever said as to the outcome of the analysis that is, after the mapping of the subject in relation to the a... the experience of the fundamental fantasm becomes the drive."²³

Lacan's topology shows that transference operates to bring demand to the same ground as identification, the whale and the polar bear meet. But in as much as the analyst's desire remains a constant, an unknown, and not as someone once said without realizing that it was a perverse position, that the desire of the analyst was to have a patient; the transference works towards destroying the identification, forcing the subject back beyond the T, to desire, back to the plane at which drive may be experienced. The loop is finally closed and an end to the analysis is marked.

NOTES

- 1 FREUD, S. *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XIV, p16.
- 2 LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.* Hogarth Press, London, 1977. p230.
- 3 MELVILLE, H. *Moby Dick.* Signet Classic, p262.
- 4 LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.*
- 5 FREUD, S. *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria.* Stand. Ed. Vol. VII, p117.
- 6 FREUD, S. *The Psychotherapy of Hysteria.* Stand. Ed. Vol. II, p301.
- 7 FREUD, S. *Fifth Lecture.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XI, p51.
- 8 FREUD, S. *Fifth Lecture.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XI, p51.
- 9 FREUD, S. *Lecture XXVII. Transference.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XVI, p444.
- 10 FREUD, S. *Lecture XXVII. Transference.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XVI.
- 11 FREUD, S. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XVIII, p23.
- 12 FREUD, S. *Two Encyclopaedia Articles.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XVIII, p247.
- 13 FREUD, S. *The Ego and the Id.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XIX, p45.
- 14 FREUD, S. *The Ego and the Id.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XIX, p45.
- 15 FREUD, S. *Lecture XXVII. Transference.* Stand. Ed. Vol. XVI, p433.
- 16 LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,* p265.
- 17- LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.* p267-273.

Transference and Identification

Rob Gordon

When Jeffrey was thirteen, he developed an acute psychosis. He heard voices urging him to preach the gospel to passers-by, he was tormented by thoughts and visual disturbances, and was unable to make even the most elementary decisions such as getting dressed or eating breakfast. He presented a bland demeanour, but in moments of distraction was deeply troubled, immersed in thoughts and images that were only revealed much later.

A quiet, pleasant boy, Jeffrey was a docile patient who communicated a small amount of information in each interview, and compensated for his indecisiveness by an unswerving adherence to his own ideas. His discourse, such as it was, consisted of brief statements of the erotic images which stood before his mind's eye, moral judgements about other patients and staff or representations of his world view. If these statements were questioned, extended or cross-referred to each other, or if obvious affects were articulated, he became blank, even incredulous. He had no access to language representing the conflicting elements of his world.

If asked a question, or if an emotion he was quite evidently experiencing was acknowledged, his face would assume a stereotyped composure and he would utter a measured "No." It was delivered with such a finality that it was revealed not as a no of negation, but as a repudiation of the idea and the whole dialectic that carried it. If pressed, his discourse was suspended as he became distracted and disorganised, unable to think or remember what had just been said.

Whenever he revealed something, he scanned the therapist's face hungrily for cues of acceptance or rejection and would construe the slightest movements as evidence on which he imagined an elaborate opinion generated by his statements.

The three conditions of his discourse were thus established. First he would tell certain selected elements — ideas, memories or judgements; second neither he nor his interlocutor could be permitted to represent his desire; third he required utter expressionlessness on the part of his interlocutor. These conditions marked the domains of his existence at that time. First there was the system of representations and memories that burdened and preoccupied him and formed the basis of his moral dilemma. Second there was that which existed but was unable to be articulated — his desire and its permutations, which was not simply a container of repressed instinctual emotion, but involved the abolition of a state of being in which he allowed himself to have a point of view about himself. Third there was his gaze which bound him to the object where he searched for a response, but found only his own dread, and it trapped him in an unresolvable confrontation with his ideals.

Jeffrey was the second child. The first had been aborted and the father consented to the marriage out of guilt after the second conception. There was another brother two years younger. In the early years, there were several separations, then the mother embraced an evangelical religion and restructured her life around God and the Bible. Previously it had been centred around the conflict with her husband, who vacillated between guilty attachment and an angry sense of deprivation. Then he incorporated her religion and began to activate the paternal function through his rigid application of Biblical law and christian conduct. He conducted regular Bible study with Jeffrey.

The father left the family when Jeffrey was twelve. Some months later, having had negligible contact, he took his son, unprepared, to meet the woman with whom he was living, and revealed his erotic involvement by his


behaviour. Jeffrey had suddenly to reckon with an adulterous father who by his actions had put himself outside his own law.

At this time, Jeffrey was passing through puberty. He found pornographic pictures in his maternal uncle's bungalow. His mother had refused to accept the father's departure and had responded with characteristic emotion, intensifying her attachment to Jeffrey through a close physical relationship — entirely proper, if more than a little ambiguous and infantilising. Jeffrey's construction was that it would be his responsibility to fill the position vacated by his father as his mother's sexual partner. His masturbatory activities accentuated these apprehensions to an agonising pitch.


He tried to resolve the problem in two ways. First he equated sexuality with birth and breast feeding and concluded that all mammals were bad. He stopped eating all milk products. Then he identified himself as a reptile, experimented making reptilian movements and went out onto the lawn on summer evenings and practiced eating insects. He could not stem the tide of his sexuality however, and after trying other ploys, he finally staked all he had on one last throw.

One night he prayed earnestly that if he masturbated again, he should be transformed into the Beast of the Apocalypse with 666 on its forehead — the companion to the Antichrist. He hoped to frighten himself into abolishing desire. Of course it failed, and on the following day he was admitted to hospital. Instead of becoming the Beast, he became the unwilling servant of God, struggling between the inner command to preach and the recognition that this behaviour was impossible. But this had done the trick. In hospital he lost all vestige of his sexuality, together with all other spontaneous expression.

We can represent the structure of Jeffrey's state at this time by recourse to Lacan's Schemas R/and I.¹



In Schema R, he portrays the structure of the subject organised through the polarity of the Phallus and the Name of the Father. Each of these signifiers subtends a delimited field. That of the Phallus (Φ), indicates a set of identifications building up the image of the body (i) and the ego (e), and giving rise to the field of the imaginary, (I). The Name of the Father (F), determines a set of relations to signifiers of the object of desire, (or primordial object, M) on the one hand and the ego ideal (I) on the other. These relations are bound by the function of language and the law of which the Name of the Father is the signifier. This becomes the field of the Symbolic (S). The subject is constituted by these two fields and the gap separating them (R). This is the real, the domain of what is not symbolised and beyond the representations of the imaginary.



Schema I is the metamorphosis of Schema R portraying the end point of psychosis based on the case of Schreber. Here the Name of the Father (F_o) and the Phallus (Φ) have been detached from any determinable fields. They no longer operate within a set of stable relations either symbolic or identificatory. They are rejected so effectively that there lacks even the memorials to their existence that repression and denial provide. The subject does not know what he has lost.

The effect is to transform the set of bounded fields of Schema R into three unbounded spaces: S, I and R. The signifiers which determine the boundaries of the real in Schema R have been dislocated by the asymptotic relations which prevent the closure of the field. They are displaced such that the ego ideal (I) has moved to the position previously occupied by the Name of the Father (F), and the image of the body (i) shifts into the place of the Phallus (Φ). The object of desire (M) while maintaining its position, has been ruptured by the deformation, and the signifier of the ego (e) has shifted into the position vacated by the ideal (I). The porosity of the structure deprives the subject of location.

The fundamental signifier, the Name of the Father has been foreclosed for Jeffrey, it no longer orders the relations which include the father, the mother, (the object of desire) or the ego ideal. This failure activates a similar abolition of the Phallus as signifier of the relations which identify body image and ego. It is enacted in the formation of the idea of the Beast 666 and he is deprived of his *jouissance*.

The function of the father is replaced in its crucial aspect by God who also constitutes the ego ideal. The signifier of the mother (M) is bound with the pornographic images which he cannot remove from his mind, and which will much later be described in relation to the gaze of a female patient. He imagined she looked at him when he was urinating and he imagined he put his fingers into her bright green eyes to prevent her seeing his penis, and then he imagined her eyes turned into vaginas and his fingers into two penises.

Once in hospital, Jeffrey's father became deeply involved, visiting frequently and instituting a series of arbitrary and secret autocratic regimes of diet and behaviour. His mother also intensified her contact, sitting holding his hand and whispering to him. His father's view was that since Jeffrey became sick after he left, it must be due to the mother and she should relinquish Jeffrey. His mother said he became sick when the father left, so he should return and reconstitute the family.

Jeffrey became the shackle and go-between for his parents which seemed to be articulated by mother when she gave him a tracksuit for his birthday with the word "COURIR" emblazoned on it.

His relations became structured around two sets of polarities. The first was his parents. He followed his father's instructions obediently and tried to impose them on the rest of the ward, berating nurses for using two paper cups instead of one, tuning off lights and condemning smoking. He maintained a slavish devotion to his mother, patiently listening to her homilies and accepting her affection, but also asking his therapist about the possibility of having an operation to be spayed.

The second polarity was imaginary, with his father's God and religious precepts on one hand and on the other a preoccupation with horror stories and films, occult phenomena and the wish to be demon-possessed and commit depraved acts. Between these two came a series of heroic figures of his imagination, epitomised by Conan the Barbarian, cleaving his way through oceans of ghouls with battle-axe dripping with blood.

These relations can be seen as a set of competing identifications. Not being ordered within a bounded structure, they are not as it were ego-constituting. Instead they become mutually exclusive, fragmenting his psychic constitution and causing him to take on a series of alternating statuses for himself. They are in Lacan's terms specular or immediate identifications² but they lack an essential organising structure. Jeffrey's identifications have become the strands of a net that traps him in the real, beyond symbolisation.

In his therapy, the three features of his relation to the therapist — discourse, its abolition and the gaze also functioned as dissociated elements. He moved unpredictably between them. His discourse was maintained provided he received no interpretations; affectively charged ideas could emerge provided they were not symbolised nor given verbal representation; and he could continue to relate to the therapist on condition that his gaze detected no trace of response to his discourse, except an attentive interest.

Attempts at interpretation or explanatory intervention, to use Nasio's term,³ resulted in fragmentation of his discourse and a series of intrusions which, while not expressed led to an immersion in his imaginings. It was a case of on his own terms or not at all. This negativism and narcissism of the psychoses had led Freud to his initial formulation that they are not amenable to analytic treatment because of the failure to form transference.⁴

Yet transference does not just refer to the repetitions of earlier templates of intersubjective encounters. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud also uses the word to describe the process by which an unconscious idea can enter the preconscious by establishing a connection with an idea already there and *transferring* its intensity to it and "by getting itself 'covered' by it."⁵ Transference refers to the process of movement between unconscious and preconscious. Lacan carries this metapsychological characteristic into clinical transference by asserting it is not the enactment of an illusion, but of the reality of the unconscious. It is not a set of transactions with the analyst, but an artefact of the treatment not reducing to the actualities of the situation. It is instead what structures the relation to the analyst.⁶

Thus clinical transference can be conceived as the structure of the therapeutic situation which permits the movement from unconscious to preconscious, or to put it another way, to facilitate a transfer from Schema I to Schema R, from a set of dislocated, asymptotic relations to a bounded structure.

But this structure only exists because the therapist does not respond to the demands of the patient. For Jeffrey's psychosis incorporated the conflicting demands of his parents: his father's demand that Jeffrey conform to his ideal in order to appease his guilt and function as a barrier against the deprivations of his former wife; and his mother's demand that he draw her former husband back to the family again. Jeffrey was their courier, and he searched for the same mission in his therapy.

But transference, Lacan says, operates to bring demand back to identification,⁷ and Jeffrey, denied the fulfillment of his own demand formed an identification in the transference. It was not a specular identification aimed at incorporating a feature of the therapist, but that primary identification described by Freud in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*,⁸ as "the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person;" which is the precondition for an object relation and a specular or secondary identification. It is not the means of forming accretions to the ego or the image of the body, but a fundamental constituting identification with the Father and the circumstance for the formation of a symbolic order.

The field of the transference which, to quote Nasio again, "is equivalent to the unconscious," insofar as it respects the conditions of Jeffrey's discourse, provides an impetus for a grounding identification which spans the terms of Schema I and permits him to work on the transfer between it and Schema R with emerging anger and rejection of the father and his values, and disputing his independence with the mother.

NOTES

- ¹ The Schemas R and I are presented in *On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis*, in LACAN, J., *Ecrits, A Selection*, Tavistock Publications, 1977.
- ² See LACAN, J., *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, The Hogarth Press, 1977, 268. 3. See Juan-David NASIO'S account of silence, explanatory intervention and interpretation in: *The Unconscious, The Transference, and the Psychoanalyst's Interpretation: A Lacanian View*; in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, 1983/4, 105.
- ⁴ FREUD, S. *The Dynamics of the Transference* (1912), St. Ed., Vol XII, 107.
- ⁵ FREUD, S. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) St. Ed., Vol V, 562.
- ⁶ See *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, Ch. 6, 10 and 11.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 274.
- ⁸ FREUD, S. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), St. Ed., Vol VIII, 105.

Foreword to Dr. M. Safouan's Seminar

The Freudian School of Melbourne invited Dr. Safouan the first time in 1981 and was honoured to have him for a second time in September 1986. He worked intensely for a fortnight holding internal seminars and supervision with members and analysts of the school. The School also organized in conjunction with Prince Henry's Hospital, Department of Psychological Medicine, Monash University, a seminar on *Neurosis and Psychosis* as well as a seminar on *The End of Analysis* in conjunction with the Victorian Association of Psychotherapists at Melbourne University.

Dr. Safouan was a special guest at the VIIIth. Homage to Freud *On Transference* organized annually by The Freudian School of Melbourne. The latter is the text published in this Volume. It is incomplete, has not been revised by the author and is the result of notes taken during the conference. Dr. Safouan, analyst of the *ex-Ecole Freudienne de Paris*, has published many articles and is author of the following books:

- *Le structuralisme en psychanalyse in Qu'est-ce le structuralisme, Le Seuil, Paris, 1968.*
- *Etudes sur l'Oedipe, Le Seuil, Paris, 1974.*
- *La sexualité féminine dans la doctrine freudienne, Le Seuil, Paris, 1979.*
- *L'échec du principe du plaisir* (1979) translated as *Pleasure and Being: Hedonism from a Psychoanalytic Point of View*, St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- * *L'inconscient et son scribe, Le Seuil, Paris, 1982.*
- *Jacques Lacan et la question de la formation des analystes, Le Seuil, Paris, 1983.*

We thank Dr. Safouan for being a guest of The Freudian School of Melbourne on this second occasion to share his experience and work with us. We intend to publish the remaining seminars of Dr. Safouan in the next Volume of our *Papers*.

Transference

Moustapha Safouan

Transference is the word used by Freud to name the erotic tie of patients to their analysts. It came into the open in the guise of declared love. Can it be said that there transference if there is no declared love or sexual attraction?

The talking cure came about the first time the doctor asked what the patient knew. The answer took the form of reminiscences about symptoms and events and produced other memories. It was realised that to attribute the cause of symptoms to the recent events was a false connection. *Nothing in the situation justified the appearance of the patient's passionate love which seemed to be a misalliance or displacement.* Brentano's *Principle of Intentionality* implies that love must be the love of some object. In his *Three Essays on Sexuality*, Freud pointed out that we modern people

over estimate the object whereas the ancients overestimated the impulse. It is transference which puts into question the value of the object. Psychoanalysis takes out the sex, the age, the build, and shows the indifference of the love to the qualities of the object. Notice that we have inscribed in the language a preconceptual opposition which is love (itself) versus love of the object. In 1908 Freud took this opposition and made it the basis of transference neurosis which can occur where a person is capable of object relations as opposed to psychotics in whom libido is arrested early in the autistic and narcissistic phases bringing about autoplasmic relations. Yet even psychotics *fall in love* with physicians. Freud says all this is too versatile to be called *love* which refers to an idea of attachment where there is no element of narcissistic love. In 1911 Ferenczi in his article on *Introjection* makes the point that one loves even one's tyrant because the ego and tyrant are one and the same, through introjection, and there is pleasure to be had in one's own suffering. This produced a loss of the distinction between the two kinds of love.

The next development was Freud's paper on the *Dynamics of Transference*. The mechanics of transference seem to be no problem. *Everyone who hasn't had the love due to him is bound to find the love he wants in the next encounter.* There is the added question as to whether the way to get love is to fall in love. Transference appears outside analysis, so what is it that distinguishes it in analysis? In analysis the transference works as a resistance because it is more difficult to admit hate and love to a person with whom one speaks than to another. In analysis the affectionate transference may be what brings the patient to accept an interpretation. That is, the transference is a tool and not an obstacle. Transference is certainly seen in chronic hospital patients among those who are never cured but also never leave the hospital. It may appear as a negative transference where the patient suddenly leaves hospital.

Transferences are repetitions and represent drives 'come to life' on the principal that *nobody can be killed in absentia or in effigy.*

There are two main problems of transference. How can transference be 1) a tool and 2) an obstacle? If it is by transference that the patient accepts your interpretation what do we mean by *resolving the transference*. If we cannot answer this then psychoanalysis is no different from suggestion, that is, your interpretation is simply a suggestion.

In his paper *Remembering, Repeating and Working Through* Freud

points out that drives are not given access to consciousness because they would cause displeasure to the ego, so the subject acts instead of remembering. If things were that simple why did Freud need to go beyond his idea of the pleasure principle. Freud had a view that there were two types of memory. The first, memory proper, of what was once known, such as impressions and, secondly, remembering things that one has never known, such as fantasies and connections of thought. In regard to these two types, analysts remember in a state of knowing instead of remembering. For example, a patient doesn't remember the failure of his sexual investigations, of how his curiosity failed in his early years and, instead, he says "I know I will never succeed in anything". The interpretation is that such a patient doesn't want to know his own infantile sexual theory. He fabricated these theories not in ignorance but in spite of the knowledge he shared with others. His fabrications involved anal and oral and gaze and voice attributions and these are objects that belong to the world of perception but at the same time are in repression. As far as they are in repression they share their function with that thing that appears at the end of the mysteries, as the phallus.

The *epistemological drive or curiosity drive of wanting to know* shields knowing. There is nothing in humans of a wish to know only a *passion for ignorance*. Do the objects of fabrication have a place in transference? Let us study the object which is *Other*. In his paper *On Narcissism*, Freud starts from the concepts of the love of the ego and love of the object and step by step he faces this separation. It is the same libido that is invested in the object that is drawn back to the ego like the fluid in a U tube. That is, the love of the object is interchangeable with the love of the ego. Thus the love of parents is mainly a narcissistic love. An over-estimation of the object is a stigma of narcissism and we therefore have a terrible error here. It is an error of the ego and regarding the *otherness of Other*. Karl Abraham didn't even think to put this question. The answer is that by the introduction of the concept of the agency of the ego ideal, which is the main point of Freud's article, we have the first phase of primary narcissism where the child sees himself as realising all the perfections. Narcissism then receives repeated blows and as he gets older he sees a difference between himself and admired people. The birth of another child is another blow. To recuperate his primary narcissism he chooses to love himself as he wants to be loved. Balint made narcissism a phase in which a human is contained and enveloped in himself. This idea is completely wrong. Children attend even to the shadows of objects and Freud talks of the child seeing himself as if he

were perfection. He sees himself as *with the Other's eye*. If the child sees an object in which he sees his ideal he will love and objectify it, for example, a pop star or a political leader. The first structural definition of transference is therefore that it consists in putting the analyst in place of the ego ideal, that is, the object becomes the ego ideal. It's apparent realisation in one's self is the ideal ego.

In *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*, Freud shows that transference enables us to throw light on mass psychology. Freud tried to demystify what is called prestige, that is, the power that subjugates us and makes us lose our critical faculty making us so suggestible. Freud examined the ties that structure groups, that link members together and link all of them to the leader. A narcissistic element in this is shown by the hostility of groups to whatever does not belong to it. In the notion of idealised love or platonic love there is a narcissistic gratification by over-estimation of the love object. Without losing any energy it implies a complete renunciation of sexual desire for satisfaction and sexual wishes are pushed back so that the love becomes a pious wish and a dream. Freud questions whether we call this an object relation or identification. There are three kinds of identification. The first, that with the father which precedes even a choice of object and occurs at a mythical moment. The second is where there is already some object choice, for example, of the boy towards his mother but this object relation may regress to identification which is found at the basis of many hysterical symptoms. As if the mother says: "If you want to be me take my symptoms." Thirdly, those cases where the object is in no way a sexual object but there is an hysterical identification in which there is the idea of sharing the same desire. This is a contagious identification in which, for example, a girl gets a letter and becomes sad and there is a desire for the same by another girl. What is at stake in members of a group is that in regard to the tie with each other there is this which is called hysterical identification. The tie to the leader involves two more kinds of identification. First, regressive identification with the object but not only with one trait of the object but by a massive identification, for example, where a homosexual identifies massively with his mother and this involves even modifying the sexual character of his ego. Also for example in melancholy, except that the object introjected becomes a tyrant watching and criticizing the subject where the object is put in the place of the ego ideal.

Freud remained unsatisfied with this thinking, that perhaps he had only

solved the mystery of hypnosis. If we look at the relation to the hypnotizer we see that his power and prestige come from an object which is the gaze and can be replaced by anything bright (for the power of the gaze note the look of Hitler). Now the subject of hypnosis will not abandon himself entirely to the hypnotizer, that is, it is as if the subject has a feeling of it all being a game. Thus every suggestion is really an auto-suggestion. We notice the complacency of people in groups as well as those who are hypnotised and those who are analysands. The one in the place of the ego ideal is regarded with such little criticism that it is a sign of great regression but in fact there has never been such a person.

Freud says that this must mean that it is a regression to the *Ur* father not the real father. If the leader has his power from being in possession of an object which gives the fictitious possession of all women, that is, because the leader has the only working phallus, why not simply see this as the subject making the ego ideal into the ideal ego.

To be in love, as ego ideal, one constitutes himself as the object of the Other. One cannot go too far in that direction unless one is mad. There must be a choice between narcissism and desire. Two people love without limit and yet if they have different desires they will have to make a choice. Thus a certain feeling remains that it is a game otherwise one is mad in the sense of giving up all desire of one's own.

For Freud the transference is due to the interference of the past with your actual situation. For the observer the problem is how to convince the patient of this by reality testing. Freud tried to retain psychoanalysis as a natural science. He didn't see that if the analyst is in the place of the *Ur* father then the transference is not to the analyst but to the analysand. Transference therefore is not an error but a structure and a deceit in which you constitute yourself as an object.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

1. How do you meet the question of the analyst's desire? A condition of science is not to put such a question because if you do you're in danger of making psychoanalysis not a science.
2. Analysis with Freud always ended in the bedrock of castration, that is, the impossibility of accepting penis envy and the interpretation of accepting the father's phallus which implies castration. This is a very

curious end of analysis. If the end of analysis is that a woman realises that she will never have a penis and a man accepting an interpretation which is accepting castration then why would those people accept the profession and become analysts. It is amazing then that we have analysts. This end is not necessary but came about because Freud put himself in the place of the *Ur* father but you can get out of this if you can see that the place of the *Ur* father goes not to the analyst but to the patient, that is, it is the patient whose ideal ego is his ego ideal.

3. In the case of Freud's female homosexual, Freud told her that she was not serious and had no intention to change her object choice despite the dreams she presented. Dreams lie but they are not the unconscious. Freud did not say to her: "Why do you need to cheat me? Why do you think I want you to be heterosexual?" Perhaps he did want her to be heterosexual and perhaps he couldn't stand her.
4. The breast, faeces, the gaze and the voice have correspondences in the world. They are constituted as objects in the world in order not to be recognised as desires but, as far as they are in repression, they will not be found in the external world. An example is the demand for *Clementines*, the fruit which allows the patient not to discover his desire for Clementine, the mother. That is, we have and know demands in order not to know our desires. (This answer was connected to material given by Dr. Safouan at the internal seminars of The Freudian School of Melbourne.)
5. The purpose of repetition is not to finish some task. An object is, by definition, always a lost object. It is transference that puts the analyst in the position of the ideal ego and it is transference that attributes the analyst as being the *objet petit a* that is, the source of desire. The end (of analysis) is to get the patient to extract the *objet petit a* from an ideal ego.
6. There are two ways of answering questions; one is from one's own experience, another is from Freud's texts, to make a coherent reply from these. To me narcissism is already death in some way, for example, a man had a horrible dream that his much valued son was dead. The day before they had spoken on the phone and the boy spoke to his father as if he were completely out of time. When you love, you love an image.

Where demand looks like becoming desire and being fulfilled as desire we recoil in horror and this is one form of nightmare, for example, a dream of *clementines* produces a much increased anxiety because it

reflects not a demand of *clementines* but the desire of Clementine and the dream will break up in anxiety as a nightmare. Repetition of the theme such as the *clementines* refers to a lost object which can never appear.

7. The concept of "a passion for ignorance" simply means that a person may prefer to go no further, prefer to be sick or not cured. All the force at work here is narcissism.
8. Freud had to explain the irrational ascendancy of the object over the subject which is how things are in the common sense world. It had to be explained because here is no object of that superior dimension. So where does the idea come from? Plato observed that there were no objects equal to the ideal. Certainly the original biological father has none of the dimensions of the *Ur* father that the analyst is supposed to be. To explain it, Freud went to the primal horde and that mythical father or leader and put forward that humanity has remained in the grip of phylogenetic reminiscences, that is, humanity is hysterical. The clue that bore fruit is that an individual's relation to the leader is a narcissistic identification and that the benefit flows to the one who puts the leader in this place. Thus the analyst is made an ideal, a good, or a father for the benefit of the analysand.
9. (A question referred to the transference in borderline cases, as moving about and fragmenting like a globule of mercury and the questioner asked how this challenge could be managed in the attempt to help such a patient.) In reply Safouan said that with such patients it's no use to give transference interpretations as one would with a neurotic patient. In such cases one has to go with the surface of the actual and limit oneself to saying sensible things.
10. Ferenczi's article on introjection is very important. It points to the fact that the ego is the object. If the father is the Czar then all enjoy the fear of the Czar because each one is himself the Czar. In any tyrant and slave relation everyone plays the two roles. When the child hits the mother and then cries, claiming that he has been hit, this is not to be explained as identification with an aggressor but by identification with an authority figure. All this is a question of structure and is seen in all groups such as churches and psychoanalytic societies. It is not a question of past or present relations to authority.

11. To speak of curiosity or a burning desire to know is to describe at a phenomenological level. In order not to know a man makes himself an object and thereby does not confront his anxiety. A person may take any way to constitute himself as an object. A child does so by being the *desire of the Other*, say, by making himself the centre of the world. When it is a matter of remembering the things one never knew, then instead of knowing by remembering or saying, one acts in order not to know. A patient who makes himself the centre of the analysts and his own interest, an object of knowledge, is in defence against anxiety.

Fantasm, Impasse, Passe

Oscar Zentner

The fantasm can appear quite early in an analysis.

To say that it is mute is a logical affirmation which, however, contradicts the psychoanalytic work. What logic calls mute is, in fact, in the analytic experience, the register of a mark which only gains its signification a posteriori, and even when the analytic appointments are over.

The aim of Lacan, to traverse the fantasm, was thought by many Lacanians to be a task no sooner said than done. Or, as Freud says in *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* "Soon got, soon gone". To traverse the fantasm raises the possibility of something in play - which may be displaced, repressed, suppressed, foreclosed, etc.

To consider that the fantasm is outside the discourse would be a return to the Kleinian postulate of the psychotic nucleus of personality. The problem of this position can be weighed in reference to the theory of Lacan. To say that the fantasm is out of discourse is to repeat with other words the already classic position of Susan Isaacs on the function of phantasy.

The *Trieb* is language while the desire is its organization into discourse.

The effects of that language are or are not organized in discourse. Post-Lacanism is a return to the noumenon this time called unconscious. Freud said that the dream is not the unconscious. Thereafter, every formation of the unconscious is not the unconscious. Post-Lacanism affirms itself in this position without knowing it, saying that one can know the effect but not the unconscious. As such, it returns to pre-Freudism, since Freud already answered this question by saying that what is important is the structure of the discourse of the analysand and not a chimera beyond it. If the unconscious is structured like a language, this can only mean that any split between the saying of the analysand and his supposed unconscious is refuted.

It is not that the speech of the analysand is caused by *his* unconscious. Rather, the unconscious is the discourse of the Other of which the words of the analysand are effects.

The analytic construction of the fantasm is an attempt to accede to a real which I think sustains the theory of the practitioner.

In a paper¹ written some time ago, I developed the problematic of the *Wolf Man*. What I laid there as a collateral hypothesis takes here its fundamental signification.

What is it that makes the analysis of the *Wolf Man* an interminable analysis? I wrote previously that he wished to be the analysand of psychoanalysis — the analysand by definition. But since then, the re-reading of the text and working together with other analysts have led me to question once more the conclusions I had then reached.

Following a seminar in which I had to develop this theme, I found new connections between elements that I had previously left untouched.

Here are some interrogations:

What made Freud ask from the *Wolf Man* a *symbolic gift* to finalize his debt with him?

Why does the *Wolf Man* still answer the telephone at the end of his life with his *nom de guerre*? He arrived to the analysis with the name Sergei Pankajeff and left the analysis with the name *Wolf Man*.

If the given name is — as Lacan points out and practice confirms — of utmost relevance for the subject, not so much in terms of identity as in terms

of being identified by the Other, how is it possible that the fictitious name of a clinical case history becomes his name and surname?

What is the original *mistake* that not even his analysis with Freud can cure? — an analysis that does not leave a single stone unturned.

If Freud asked for a symbolic gift to finish off the debt — a debt that every analysand will feel with his analyst — it was because he had touched on a point, an insurmountable and turning point.

However critical this attitude of Freud might be to our hearing, it undoubtedly shows us an essential point of fixation that the analysis had revealed but not overcome. We refer to the old question of what happens when what has not been analysed is analysed. It would seem that it does not in principle or necessarily alter the structure around which the fixity of a fantasm sustains the subject in his desire.

Could Freud have been so naive as to ignore that the patient who was unable to pass a motion without an enema was the same one he was asking to give? Surely no. But the request was not only an acting-out of Freud's. It was the interpretation of that which the *Wolf Man* would never release — his faeces.

After the gift, it is made evident both for Freud and for the *Wolf Man* that there remain things both to clarify and to resolve, and the second analysis with Freud couldn't but open the fantasm at play. A fantasm that, however interpreted by Freud, does not turn into a loose knot. Quite the contrary, it becomes the fantasm constitutive of the subject in his knot. And without a knot, real, imaginary and symbolic, there is no subject.

The *impasse* of the *Wolf Man* becomes evident there, an *impasse* that impedes the *passé*. Here is the second acting-out of Freud, *passing* the *Wolf Man* to another analyst, Ruth Mack Brunswick. So, we now have in this case the third analysis and the second analyst.

Then comes the day of the session in which something insists and repeats itself: a question of the analyst in response to a comment of the analysand. Comment as true as it is paranoid: "You and the professor surely speak about me because, as you know, the Professor and I are good friends". This Ruth Mack Brunswick analysed with a cutting interpretation — an insistent truth which encounters in the analyst that *mi-dire* (half said) which made her, half lying, name that truth. Of course, it is a limping truth, since there is no doubt that Ruth Mack Brunswick only was what she herself once said: "The intermediary between the *Wolf Man* and Freud".

(one cannot avoid here the comparison between Tausk and Freud through Helena Deutsch).

Ruth Mack Brunswick remarks to the *Wolf Man*:

"I now asked why, if such were the case, he was never seen socially at the Freud's..."

"I drove home to him his actual position with Freud, the total absence (as I knew from Freud to be the fact) of any social or personal relationship between them. I remarked that he was not the only published case — this being a source of enormous pride to the patient. He countered with the statement that no other patient had been analysed for so long a period: this too I was able to contradict. From a state of war we now reached a state of siege."²

The least that can be said of this intervention is that it is brilliant, not because of what it analyses but because of its efficacy.

This is the second confirmation of a fantasm not analysed by Freud. The first being the money collection organized by Freud for the well being of the *Wolf Man*. It is not that the analysand wants the secondary benefit of the symptom and due to this he is not cured. The question, we think, is another.

If at the beginning of the end of the analysis with Freud, the latter, with the permission of Pankajeff, baptises him as the *Wolf Man*, does he not then with this name form a fantasm not of a *homo homini lupus*³ (man, a wolf to man) but rather a fantasm of a paternity which he attributes to Freud with every right, because Freud had rebaptised him.

Little consideration is needed to realize then that if the Professor and Ruth Mack Brunswick speak about him, they will do so as is always the case when parents speak about their children.

But Ruth Mack Brunswick is not taken off guard and produces then that intervention, the apparent result of which is, at least, satisfactory. There is however in that intervention, the aperture to a dimension of aggressivity which we cannot leave unnoticed without realizing its imaginary dimension, since Ruth Mack Brunswick — an analysand of Freud — couldn't have analysed the obvious situation of brotherhood with the *Wolf Man*.

What happens is that Ruth Mack Brunswick had touched, like Freud before her, the same structure of a fantasm which did not evaporate even with a correct intervention. Moreover, the analysis of the situation produces in the subject a clarification that runs counter to the desire of his analyst: the desire to cure and to dissolve the fantasm. What is at play, of course, is not the order of the ego-alliances or the will to cure. What is at play is a *jouissance* that the subject will not renounce.

The analyst correctly implies: *Freud is not your father*. To this the subject replies with his *nom de guerre*. And, who gives a name if not a father?

Isn't it interesting that Lacan remarked that the encounter with a real father could be the unleashing of a psychosis? This brings us suspiciously close to Schreber and Fleschig. Although it can be argued that there was no psychosis in the *Wolf Man* except for the psychotic episode, our reading leads us to think that from a structural point of view the *Wolf Man* was psychotic. The structure is irreversible. This is the limit of any analysis.

What constitutes the end of an analysis has always been a subject of preoccupation to every analyst. We are not going to re-count that preoccupation now, but it will suffice maybe to remember the Freud/Ferenczi polemics which under different banners still continues today. The end of the analysis was resolved for Freud in a symptom called the bedrock of castration. For Ferenczi the end of the analysis came about for the man, when accepting his fear of castration and for the woman, when accepting her penis envy. Lacan, instead, opens the possibility of carrying the analyses beyond the limits marked by Freud. And this is essential in order to understand the destiny of the *Wolf Man*. Let us look at the effect of some of the questions we posited before.

How can it be that a subject answers the telephone with the name given to him by Freud in the analysis terminated many years before? Why had this name given to him by Freud displaced the name given to him by his father? In which eminent position was Freud in regard to the *Wolf Man*?

I said I asked this question in another paper. To state that Freud was like his father would be to put the clock back again. If that was the case, it cannot astonish us nor can we think that it escaped him either.

The disclaiming of the name, instead, is what interests us. A disclaim that appears in the analysis with Freud and which is interpreted by showing that the S.P. (Sergei Pankejeff) of *espe* was a castrated *Wespe*. But then, what else could Freud have done than to produce that interpretation which

carried with it all the marks of his genius? Isn't it then, in re-baptising him that Freud offered the possibility of an entire name which made it possible for the subject to accede to the repression of his castration instead of remaining in its foreclosure?

This is, effectively, what happened. The subject is moved from S.P. (*espe*) — I don't know anything of the existence of castration to *Wolf Man* — I don't want to know anything of castration. Well now, this could be read as a passage from foreclosure to repression, though we insist, the case shows that to change a mechanism (of defence) is not the same thing as changing the structure.

Yet, if what is at play in the foreclosure is a desire without status, isn't it clear then that castration installs status in the desire? The installed desire shows, for instance, a particular destiny for the *Wolf Man*. He could not be an analysand who passes to be a lawyer (as it is in his case) and that is all, or an analysand who passes to be an analyst. The two possibilities show that the first is strictly speaking the analysis as interminable in the labyrinths of the work of transference, while the second is the passage to the transference of work.

The first reminds us of what Melanie Klein called the depressive position and of what Freud demonstrated in *Mourning and Melancholia*. The second — the passage to the transference of work — marks the end of the analysis by an ethical path, that of the psychoanalytic act which consists in analysing the unconscious of someone else and the transference of work implied in giving an account of it.

"Why does one want at sometime to speak to someone else about his past analysis?"⁴

I said, to give an account of his past analysis which made of the *impasse* of the first (work of transference), the *passe* of the second (transference of work).

The *Wolf Man* was in the work of transference, not in the transference of work. His position was that of the analysand *par excellence*, the living witness, not only of Freud as an analyst but of analysis in general. Even if it may seem exaggerated to say that his analysis was *resolved* with the death of all his analysts, the reality is that 1979 — the year when the *Wolf Man* dies — is neither an obscure nor far away date. This is why I don't think that there was a secondary benefit in his symptoms, but rather an infinite *jouissance* in occupying the place of that unique analysand.

That someone in analysis does not want to become an analyst is rare. That everyone who passes through an analysis should become one is rare too. But to be the irreplaceable witness of the analysis is not rare, it is unique.

Freud and Ruth Mack Brunswick knew this earlier. Freud showed this in wanting the *Wolf Man* to pay a debt in order to make himself free. But the *Wolf Man* was not the *Fat Man*. History shows that the *Wolf Man* never felt himself to be the debtor but rather the creditor. Ruth Mack Brunswick wanted the *Wolf Man* to be able to liquidate the transference to Freud, which resulted in its opposite, the preservation of Freud. An analysis that finishes ought to produce not the 'liquidation' of the transference but the 'liquidation' of the analyst. The transference doesn't finish, it is redirected.

Both analysts from this perspective were able to touch upon the truth, both were able to analyse it, even if deficiently, but neither of them nor all of those who followed afterwards, succeeded in moving the subject from that unique position.

This is a problem important enough to warrant further work. Because there is no subject without fantasm, but if the fantasm is a construction, then we have to answer: which kind of identification is produced by the analyst? How to differentiate construction from restitution?

In terms of Freud - from the perspective of the metapsychology - on what side is the analyst? It is not enough to say — on the side of the chair.

I am trying to underline the fact that if the clinical and theoretical work of Lacan rendered ego-psychology obsolete, it also opened a space which points towards the same path — which Freud finally attempted to clarify — the function of the superego.

The analytic construction, which is in reality the exhaustive analysis of the *Wolf Man*, finds its limits in the superego. An equivalent to the command "To enjoy!" (*jouir!*).⁵

We can now understand well that the *Wolf Man's* case is a very particular *impasse*. It is neither liquidation of the transference which is no more than a mandate of the superego disguised in a depressive relation to a unified bad and good object nor is it a liquidation of the analyst disguised in a lack of reparation. I said that the analytic construction finds its limits in the superego, because in this case the analyst is the subject who knows and then is inexorably led by the analysand towards assuming the function of

the superego for him in his construction. Debatable as it may seem, the *Wolf Man* incarnated Freud's construction, he even perfected it. The only way out would have been to have a tool that Freud lacked and that is the conception of the analyst as the supposed-subject-of-knowing, semblance of the *object petit a*, where the transference is organized. This is the particularity of the psychoanalytic discourse. The analyst is in the place of the cause, which is one of the elements of the *fantasm \$ ◊ a*. Between barred subject and *object a*, the analyst's exit of the scene has to coincide with the uncovering of this irreducible object. Like in the story *The Aleph*, told by Borges, one has to be able to go and see all the things which, without overlapping, are nevertheless in the same point and even more, to go beyond, that is to say, to witness its disappearance.

An analysis in which a subject does not propose himself as one who will one day analyse someone else - which is not the same as saying that he will become an analyst — shows the desire of perpetuating himself in the symptoms and in a *fantasm* whose de-construction does not assure its disappearance.

The *impasse* of the work of transference can only turn towards the *passe* when the object of the *fantasm* has been analysed and disarticulated. The experience of the *passe* uproots a primordial fixation. An analysis that deserves this name takes place beyond the limits imposed by the *fantasm*.

Lacan said on March 18th. 1978:

"What is that which is fixated, if not the desire?"

And where? There, where the *fantasm* appears. An analysis is not interminable, without doubt, but every analyst will find this truism... analysis is not for everybody.

NOTES

- 1 ZENTNER, O. *The Analytic Construction* in Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, *The Freudian Clinic*, p.19. P.I.T Press, Melbourne, 1983.
- 2 BRUNSWICK, R.M. *A Supplement to Freud's History of an Infantile Neurosis*, p.33 in *The Psychoanalytic Reader*, edited by R.Fliess. International University Press, New York, 1967.
- 3 FREUD, S. *Civilization and its Discontents*, p.111. St. Ed., Vol.XXI.

- 4 LACAN, J. *Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole. Scilicet N.1, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1968.*
- 5 LACAN, J. *L'ethique de la psychanalyse, Livre VII, Editions du Seuil. Paris. 1986.*

**LACANOAMERICAN REUNION
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS**

**5 — 7 December 1986
Punta del Este
Uruguay**

The *Lacanoamerican Reunion of Psychoanalysis* was held at the Hotel San Rafael, Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 5-7 December 1986.

This *Reunion* was convoked by the following psychoanalytic institutions:

Agrup. Argentina.

Centro Psicoanalítico Mansilla. Argentina.

Círculo Freudiano de Buenos Aires. Argentina.

Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires. Argentina.

Escuela Freudiana de Montevideo. Uruguay.

Escuela de Psicoanálisis Sigmund Freud, Rosario. Argentina.

The Freudian School of Melbourne. Australia.

Instituto de Investigaciones en Psicoanálisis, IDIEP. Argentina.

Maieutica Florianopolis — Institución Psicoanalítica. Brasil.

Maieutica Porto Alegre — Institución Psicoanalítica. Brasil.

Maiéutica Institución Psicoanalítica — Buenos Aires. Argentina.

VEL. Grupo Freudiano da Bahia. Brasil.

THE WAR IS OVER THE END OF AN ANALYSIS

Linda Clifton

This is an account of the end of an analysis - my own - a Lacanian analysis that ended with the enunciation of the fundamental fantasm. While the effects of this fantasm were undoubtedly seen throughout the analysis, the effects of putting the fantasm into words (and indeed the effects of the whole analysis) could only be seen afterwards. It is these effects that I intend to describe.

The uncovering of the fantasm certainly brought matters to a close in the analysis. It seemed to cast a net over the whole analysis and there was an immediate subjective effect of recognition and relief. However this was short-lived and was followed by a gradually dawning horror and *angst* at what had been revealed. Surely this was the greatest narcissistic blow of the analysis. *How could this be mine? I hurried away and tried not to think.*

This *angst* was undoubtedly a primary motivation in writing something about the end of the analysis. However, I am writing this over a year after the

analysis as it took many months before I was able to look at the questions which the fantasm posed for me. My internal protest of "how could this fantasm be mine?" became a question that I wanted to pursue using the psychoanalytic method.

It became a question of the origins of the fantasm. The means I used to pursue this question were memories and associations that emerged after the analysis in connection with the fantasm. I took this material as one would take the material of any case, not in order to produce a second "self" analysis, but as a work in itself, situated within psychoanalytic theory.

The fantasm that evoked such horror was to do with death — death and "living" death. My analyst's exact words are lost but the meaning was unavoidable. My fantasm was that I thought (unconsciously of course) that in order to be "accepted" I had to be "dead".

Immediately following the analysis I became physically ill. There was some medical anxiety as a common enough infection became more serious and the diagnosis was uncertain for a while. In the meantime I suffered from the illness far less than from overwhelming fantasies that this was the sign of some terrible incurable disease. In retrospect I think that I was in fact "suffering" from the fantasm - rather than thinking about it. The death spoken of in the fantasm - surely metaphorical death - had become death literally. I had turned the fantasm into a prophecy, or worse, a command.

I recovered and then there was a period of impasse, the words of the fantasm never far away but seemingly impossible to face or work with in any way. They were too black, too awful.

Nearly a year after the end of the analysis a conversation with my father unexpectedly started a chain of memories and associations which seemed to end the impasse and allowed me to start working with the fantasm and the question of its origins. The memories and associations were to do with my father and with war, death and love (or perhaps "acceptance"). Certainly this was also the stuff of my analysis, but I was able, after the analysis, to make some links for myself which helped towards some closure on questions left open by the analysis.

In the conversation to which I refer, I was asking my father about the death of his brother some thirty years earlier. My father had seemed close to his older brother but, while there had been gravity when he died, there was no display of grief and no words about what it was to lose a brother, the first of three he was to lose (the other two being younger than himself). My

father said to me, by way of answering the question I had not directly asked, "At that time I thought everybody was going to die." Nothing more was said.

My father's bleak words shocked me but at the same time threw light on the period in my life — my childhood — that I had returned to again and again with anguish in my analysis. For the first time, I had in his own words, an explanation for my father's way of being "at that time". "At that time" (the time of his brother's death, the time of my childhood) was the first decade of peace after the Second World War, the war that seemed to overshadow my childhood even though it ended well before I was born.

It had always seemed to me that my father's war service was the central act in his life and his statement about death implied the whole gamut of his wartime experience. He enlisted to fight the Germans, resisted promotion, remaining a private and a gunner throughout the war. He fought in the Middle East, including the famous eight month siege of Tobruk and then, when the Japanese entered the war, he traded the desert for the jungles of New Guinea. During his four years of service in the field he sustained a gunshot wound in the leg, perforated ear-drums (because of the noise of the guns), amoebic dysentery, malaria and skin cancer. Finally, at the end of the war he suffered what was termed "a complete mental and physical collapse". He was shipped back to Australia and the repatriation began.

Two years after the end of the war, on weekend leave from the Repatriation Hospital my father married. There was love but the marriage was one of intense conflict as though each partner felt that the other could destroy them and thus they had to fight to survive. I was my parent's single contribution to the post-war baby boom, the boom in their marriage always being more in the direction of the boom of distant guns or present hostilities. My father's hospitalizations for physical illnesses became fewer, but, as the body healed the anguish of the mind became more dominant. There was much talk of nerves, "happy pills" shock treatment and psychiatrists.

So "at that time" my father thought everybody was going to die. And why not? Had not his father died before the War, and his beloved mother while he was away? Had he not witnessed death again and again with the boom-boom of the guns he manned?

Had he not then returned to his nativeland and found more death in the hospital beds beside his own, most poignantly, perhaps, the deaths, not from physical disease or injury, but death by their own hands of the soldiers.

for whom repatriation and the government psychiatrists could offer no solace? These suicides were some of the stories of my childhood — the returned soldier who walked straight out of his hospital bed into the stream of traffic outside; the man who on his discharge from the "nerve" ward told my father in a puzzled way that he didn't feel any better and went home and shot himself through the head. But not only the patients died. Two of the psychiatrists who treated my father were also said to have committed suicide!

If the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, as Lacan tells us, surely the discourse of a patriotic survivor of war who sees death everywhere and fears that everyone he loves will be destroyed, will fix in the unconscious of a daughter who listens signifiers of death and love intertwined. Was I approaching the fantasm in this way?

Later another memory emerged which was connected with these thoughts. I remembered a particular photograph which was displayed in our flat when I was a child. Our way of life was austere due to lack of money and my parents' preoccupation with matters of survival in one form or another. There wasn't the usual display of family photographs typical of the era — formal wedding poses or neatly dressed children with shining faces. There were just two large photographs at the time of my early childhood — one of my father in uniform, looking strangely young and austere and one of another man in uniform, an airman with a cheerful face, his flying goggles pushed up on his head. I came to know who this man was. He was a former champion footballer and a war hero, a survivor of the Battle of Britain, who having survived the dog-fights over London, died back in Australia when he crashed his plane during a test flight. He was a good friend of my father from their youth.

With the memory of this photograph came the realization that this man had always been a puzzle to me as a child. I had wondered about this man whom I never knew.

I had wondered about his place on our bookshelf and in my father's life. A biography was published about him and as a schoolgirl, far from interested in football, aeroplanes and aerial warfare, I had read it nevertheless, and had even done a school project on it.

In pursuing my work on the origins of my fantasm it occurred to me that as a child I was interested not so much in this man but in his relationship to my father. I was pursuing the enigma of my father and the question of who he loved. My father's sufferings from the war made it difficult at times to

believe that he had any love for anyone who was alive and part of his everyday life in peace-time. Such was the preoccupation with the past and the continuation of "the war" in my parents' marriage. Surely there was love for this dead war hero. Could there not then have been a wish in a young girl, who wore her father's medals to school on Anzac Day, to be in the place of this man who was loved? Could an identification with this man — who was loved but also dead — be a partial explanation of the direction of the fantasm?

The third strand in my associations emerged in relation to my father's long, bitter and unsuccessful fight to receive what he considered was rightful compensation for his physical and mental problems after the war. He did receive a pension and certain other benefits but he was never "accepted" (the term used by the Repatriation Department) as "one hundred percent". He was never accepted as a T.P.I. As a child I found out what T.P.I. stood for but it was only after my analysis that I heard the words with such clarity — and horror. My father desperately wanted to be "accepted" as "Totally and Permanently Incapacitated". He wasn't totally or permanently incapacitated nor was he, I believe, a malingerer. He believed that he was or ought to be T.P.I. for reasons I can only guess. The closeness to a state of death of the category T.P.I. is what interests me here. My father sought to be "accepted" as T.P.I. My fantasm speaks of "acceptance" through death. Surely this similarity must speak of another identification of mine, that with my father in his quest to (almost) give up on life and become T.P.I.

Perhaps one could argue that this very personal account of the end of an analysis does not throw light on much beyond a particular analysis or analysand. However, in working in this way I was able to answer for myself the question of how an analysis can end. It did not end with the enunciation of the fundamental fantasm nor with the final session. It only seemed to end when I was able to face the fantasm and attempt to trace some of its origins. In tracing certain signifiers to do with my father (and the war) I finally arrived at a point where I felt that not only the war but also the analysis was finally over.

Linda Clifton,
Australia.

The Analytic Section

Héctor Rúpolo

The word *section* appears in the title of this paper. It sounds somewhat strange; it resembles *session*. *Section* . . . has a 't' which does not fit in with *session*. Perhaps it is the 't' of the intersection of two lines; perhaps. . .

It is obvious, however, that it relates to a Latin word *sectio*, which means a cut, a section, division . . . even a surgical amputation.

It seemed to me an adequate word to start with because it allows a certain condensation between the words *session* and *section*, in that I will refer to the closing cut of the analytic session, that is, its ending. I insist upon the subject; the end, the termination.

What I propose here is the continuation of what I presented in 1980 in Caracas. There I spoke of time in the analytic session. Does the fact of presenting a paper at this *Lacano American Reunion* which continues the one read in Caracas mean something else?

Let us listen to what I have to say: this follows on from Caracas. Why not?

What I say is of value. It is of value because it is not something I thought about as a previously planned strategy. A fact from my clinical psychoanalytic practice simply overwhelmed me and I felt like writing about it.

Afterwards, I realized — and its value resides precisely here — that this meant continuing what I had started at Caracas, and if we maintain that the Ucs. is a knowledge, why not say so? For me, the *Lacano American Reunion* is a continuation of Caracas.

It is the *Reunion* that Lacan convoked but couldn't attend . . . He died before it took place. . .

We may well imagine that had he been here, everything would have been different by his mere presence, by what he represented . . . But well, we will have to proceed alone . . . and it might even be better, mightn't it?

Why did I say with such certainty that his mere presence would have made the *Lacano American Meeting* so different? Because in Paris with Lacan's presence they did not do any better!

I only wanted to make these comments because they set up a context for what I want to say today.

Taking up the analytic session once more, I need to make a brief remark on the subject of my Caracas paper. There I showed, theoretically, how the timing of the analytic session could be founded on what I termed *the open session*, that is, I showed how the open session is founded on discourse and is therefore in correspondence with analytic practice.

I also spoke of the session I termed *closed*, that is, with a predetermined time and which is nothing else than a bureaucracy that fits in well with the analyst's convenience. As may be seen, I spoke neither of short nor of long sessions.

Today, six years after Caracas, six more years of analytic practice, six years in which I have had greater experience with open sessions, I can arrive at new conclusions other than those I expounded then.

That is to say that even if what I say today has its foundations in Caracas . . . an experience adds up and makes me speak now. The conclusion to which I arrived answered a question that I was asking myself already then, but that with time acquired even greater importance. I could formulate the question in the following way:

What is the right cut (closing)? Where is that ending founded? Was that the right moment for the cut?

There were times in which I was quite certain about the session ending at the right moment. On other occasions I had the impression that the cut was somewhat hasty. Yet in some circumstances I remained thinking that the session had been too long.

To answer all the questions which are linked with my practice, I need to say that I think differently today from six years ago.

I maintained then that we had to think of time in the analytic session as a triple time basing myself on Lacan's paper *Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certitude*. Nowadays I think that a time marked by two signifiers is much nearer to the experience I sustain.

Today I would say:

1. The cut of an analytic session cannot be anticipated. In this sense I maintain what I said in Caracas.
2. Whether the cut was or was not correct, may be measured only afterwards, by its effects.
3. During a session, it is possible to avow that the cut was not correct only in the case where it was delayed. That is to say that there was an absolutely determinable moment when the session should have finished and didn't.

That is to say that the only conclusion, the meagre conclusion I have to present today is the following:

I have the conviction that when a session stretches itself beyond a certain point, the discourse returns to the starting point. That is, it turns into a circular process and we lose the possibility of having any certainty about what is the moment to conclude.

In other words, all reference is lost; a theme appears and then another, one association is as valid as another. The analyst begins to wait for another and another, and then this one refers to such and such, and so on, etc. etc. In this case we may be absolutely sure that the moment of a cut is already lost.

In these moments the analyst is so much subject to error that when the situation I described arrives, no element appears which may help him to determine a new moment for a cut. The reason being that he is already subject to the circularity of the discourse, to a metonymy such that the differences are lost.

Let us proceed then to what I have to propose as a way of arranging our experience and grasping what I refer to when I say *the session stretches beyond a certain point*.

Let us suppose that a session starts with something that we could call a sign. What we call a sign can be either a formation of the unconscious or a question, or a theme the analysand proposes, etc. We call it a sign since it is nothing other than *something for somebody*. We could even smile in front of a very common Kleinian interpretation of the past: You brought that dream for the analyst, it is a gift, a little shit, it is an aggression, poor thing, it is the little breast he envies, etc.

And today we may say. . . Of course it is so! Only it is so because it is the characteristic of any formation of the unconscious in the first place: it acquires this form of a sign because that is what is produced with a single signifier: it tends to carry on by itself.

Then we may say: What a gift! What a parcel! And the analyst who interpreted that it was a gift. . . if only he had known what kind of gift it was for his ears! Poor analyst, it was not for you. . . I'm awfully sorry. Well, after all, they will take it into account. . .

For the time being, the analysand, as does anyone else, flatters you with a gift so that you don't open the parcel, because if opened, the level of the sign would be broken. How can that signifier converted into sign find its own insufficiency? Simply with another signifier. What? Simply an-Other signifier!

Take a dream for example. We could think that what the analysand narrates — which is called the manifest content of the dream — is a signifier. So far, we are at the level of the sign, so what do we need then? We need those of the analysand's associations which will constitute themselves in the second signifier S_2 .

But it is time now for us to remember Lacan's concept of the signifier: contrary to being something for somebody, *it is what represents a subject for another signifier*.

This is to say that in the moment in which a signifier arises which turns the first insufficient, in that precise moment the subject appears, the barred subject. In that very moment when that second signifier arises, when there is production of a subject, a time appears — not very long — which is the moment to cut the session.

Whether there is or isn't an interpretation, intervention of the analyst, etc., what is important in relation to what we are discussing here is if the moment of the cut is given or not. The structure at play here is the one I referred to at the beginning of the paper. That is, there is a return to the level of the sign.

And this is due to the fact that if a new signifier arises, the subject will start to be absorbed by that one-more and by each further one-more that arises.

So we would return to our point of departure when the subject was only supposed; supposed to whom? To the analyst. And with this return to the beginning, we see once more the 'someone who sustains the something that is, the sign'.

Otherwise, how else could we understand what Lacan said in his lecture dated 24th. January 1962 in his seminar *On Identification?* Since a signifier is a mark, a trace, a writing which cannot be read alone. It always needs the Other, but there may be an excess. Lacan said:

"Three signifiers is the return of what it is about, that is, of the first"

Lacan's statement makes it clear: three signifiers is returning to the first, back to the beginning. I use this as an instrument since it allows me to understand what happens in an analytic session when the cut was not performed at the right time and it stretched *beyond a certain point*.

Is it clear now what this point is? The point is the signifier two: S_2 . And *beyond the point* is beyond the signifier two, that is, the signifier three.

Now let us see what Lacan said in the same seminar, in the lecture of 6th. December 1961, since it will be useful to explain 'the return to the first signifier turns it into a sign'.

". . . because the signifier is not a sign. A sign, we are told, is to represent something for someone:

. . . the someone is there as a support of the sign. The first definition which may be given of someone is: someone accessible to a sign.

If I may say so, it is a most elementary form of subjectivity; there is still no object here, there is something else: the sign which represents this something for somebody.

A signifier is different from a sign, in the first place in that which I tried to convey: that the signifiers convey nothing other than the presence of the difference as such and nothing else. The first thing this implies then is that the relationship of the sign to the thing is erased. . ."

In the case of the sign, the important element is that there is someone; this is the support of the sign. But not only this. There is no object there; what we find instead is the sign. . . And what does the signifier produce? It produces the difference.

Then, the following may be thought: the sign dissolves when the second signifier appears and for a moment the subject appears. This moment may only be sustained if a cut is performed. The cut would imply the cut of *a*, that is, the fall of the object *a*.

So, a word in excess, one more word may be the way of returning to the beginning and of occluding that certain fracture that had appeared. But the analysand can't handle this. He needs the analyst to delimit that time.

It could be asked why is it necessary that it be the analyst who delimits that time. And the answer is within reach. . . if we place ourselves in the right space.

That is to say that while speaking or counting, the subject depends on the turns he gives around the surface and since for a reason of structure he depends on the word which precedes him, this dependency from the signifier is exactly the real that implies the impossibility of counting and of counting the turns while turning. The subject can't count while giving an account of it.

There, an Other who may account for what he counts becomes necessary, since in that account that he himself can't count, the subject is determined. As you see, it is preferable to err by too little than too much.

To conclude I will narrate something analysis taught me and my daughter taught me as well: It is the use of a word, the word *but*. A sort of folk legend runs among my daughter's friends because, regardless of what is said to her, whatever the remark is, she adds: Yes, *but* . . .

Well, this is something my daughter says, but the analysand always says it as well: Yes, *but* . . . there is something else, there is a signifier more. That there is always one more signifier does not cease to be true except that the analyst should not let himself be beguiled by this *but* . . . otherwise he would not give the analysand the chance to get out of the level of the sign.

At that level of the sign, the important fact is that to sustain that *something* a *someone* is needed. And you don't have to be too open-handed for that somebody to appear. However, this is precisely opposed to the place of the analyst, since the analyst is the one who is able to erase himself from this place, sustained by means of a desire: the desire of the analyst that that somebody, that pretended somebody, claimed, supposed, that somebody does not exist.

Héctor Rúpolo,
Argentina.

Translated by Roberto Neuburger.

NOTES:

¹ The word *section* is not Spanish; that is to say it has no meaning other than the condensation to which the author refers (translator's note.)

A Dream of Freud

Celia Calvo

I have often wondered what in Freud's writings produced a lineage that would lead analysts back to his name. From Freud's works we get to know a number of master-signifiers: the unconscious, the trauma, the fantasm. It is concerning this name of the father, this certain devotion to the name of Freud that we analysts are what we are. This is present in every position of the analyst. I wonder if, as Lacan puts it, there is a father to kill here. Because we know that there is no father of the signifiers; at best, there is a father because of them. I think this states a different position, that is, to work the signifiers that made Freud what he is. In this sense, Freud was not a supposed-subject-of-knowledge. He knew, and moreover, he left his knowledge in a way that it still contains unanswered questions. Maybe we could outline with Lacan

" . . . there exists a theory of the analytical practice, for certain, but not of the unconscious".

The unconscious continues its production and it is from here that Freud's writings continue to appeal to us. Because of that, we still continue to clear up matters starting from examples, for in order to grasp the order of the Freudian unconscious a different way of conceptualization is necessary. By studying his own dream, Freud invites us to search in its text, in its material significations. Let us go then, to his dream via regia of access to the unconscious. It is the *Non Vixit* dream.

"I had a very clear dream. *I had gone to Brucke's laboratory at night and in response to a gentle knock on the door I opened it to (the late) Professor Fleischl, who came in with a number of strangers and, after exchanging a few words, sat down at his table.* This was followed by a second dream. *My friend Fl. [Fliess] had come to Vienna unobtrusively in July. I met him in the street in conversation with my (deceased) friend P., and went with them to some place where they sat opposite each other as though they were at a small table. I sat in front at its narrow end. Fl. spoke about his sister and said that in three-quarters of an hour she was dead, and added some such words as 'that was the threshold'. As P. failed to understand him, Fl. turned to me and asked me how much I had told P. about his affairs. Whereupon, overcome by strange emotions, I tried to explain to Fl. that P. (could not understand anything at all, of course, because he) was not alive. But what I actually said — and I myself noticed the mistake — was, 'NON VIXIT.' I then gave P. a piercing look. Under my gaze he turned pale; his form grew indistinct and his eyes a sickly blue — and finally he melted away. I was highly delighted at this and I now realized that Ernst Fleischl, too, had been no more than an apparition, a 'revenant' ['ghost' — literally, 'one who returns']; and it seemed to me quite possible that people of that kind only existed as long as one liked and could be got rid of if someone else wished it."*

We may say that this dream is one of the three most important dreams of the *Traumdeutung* in reference to the so-called self-analysis of Freud. Writings such as the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* indicate that the limits of the field of analysis are set by the limits of the field of language. If the signifier forms the material then the signified is thought of as enunciated discourses and each time is established as a moment. The principle that rules both the condensation (metaphor) and the displacement (metonymy) says that in order to form a trope it is not enough to put a word in place of another because of their respective meanings. More exactly, the metaphor is the appearance, in a definite chain of signifiers, of a signifier that comes from another chain; this signifier crosses the bar, disturbing by its irruption the meaning of the first chain, where it produces an effect of non-sense attesting that the meaning arises before the subject, as the subject is absent in the chain, its place filled by a signifier (that's why it is $\$$). Regarding the metonymy, its function is not so much to refer from one term to another, contiguous, as to note the function of this absence inside the chain of signifiers. In the dream, the *non vixit* points out from the start what will be a succession and transformation of grammatical phrases. Its mode of construction leads Freud to suspect in it the echo of another phrase, that of Brutus, in *Julius Caesar*, the Shakespearean drama,

"Because Caesar loved me, I cry for him,
because he was fortunate I rejoice,
because he was brave, I revere him, but
because he was ambitious I killed him".

Freud then remembers that at fourteen he acted as Brutus with his nephew John, a year older than him. John, a revenant, lived in England. With him reappeared the friend of his childhood and "Until I was three we were inseparable, we loved and fought each other, and this childish relationship would determine all the future feelings derived from dealings with people of my age." At that time, when John accused him when they quarreled, Freud's defense in front of his father was: "I hit him because he hit me". And hit, *wichsen* is pronounced *vixen*. It is only here that the substitution of *vixit* for *vixit* is justified. The sequence then should go from *non vixit* to "because he was ambitious I killed him" to "I hit him because he hit me".

We can put forth the hypothesis that when Freud plays the part of Brutus the rhythm of the speech pronounced leads him to this other phrase pronounced when he was three. Here a defacing movement takes place and continues its activity in such a way that the words pronounced by

Brutus become a call that evokes an event where the sense is broken from then on. It is in the slipping of the grammatical structure that we find a trace of this deformation. Each of Freud's associations is structured on the pattern of this childhood phrase. The absence of trimming in this phrase, its simplicity, make the deformations that constitute the dream represented under the condensed form of the substitutions of X for ν in the inscription *vixit* necessary. In this way we consider the series of associations as the transformations carried out in its grammatical structure, insofar as it concerns the symbolic elements linked to the signifier. This is the nodal point of the neurosis leading then to its rigid and repetitive structure. When we are thinking about its meaning, the unity is not the sign (*vixit* instead of *vixit*), but the chain of signifiers that produces the effect of meaning at the moment when it turns on itself. Its end (the third phrase) allows us to interpret its beginning retroactively.

Now then, Freud ends this first report of his dream, saying that he will take it up again. And he does, fifty pages later. Afterwards, we will try to see why. In this second report Freud emphasizes the relationship that gives place to the dream. It is about Fliess, about his transference. At some moment, for Freud the transference represented a revised edition of an ancient text. As it represents new versions of what would be the *Urtext* of the neurosis, it makes the most appropriate subject for the construction and reconstruction of the primitive phrases which determine the structure of the neurosis. For him, the development of the neurosis of transference is that the fantasmatic structure created by the successive deformations of the primitive phrases, crystallizes around an object over which words have no effect. In the algorithm of the fantasm a designates the object of the desire. What is specific to it insofar as object, is that it can support on the imaginary the cutting relation at a point where the subject has to support itself as a cut on the symbolic level ($\$$). This structure of the subject at the time of its disappearance pertains to what Freud called the navel of the dream, the point where all the associations converge in order to disappear and not to be re-linked to anything other than the non-recognized (*Unerkannte*), the point where the unconscious desire precisely emerges. The fantasm is thus the support of the desire.

We had seen that this dream was one of the three most important with respect to Freud's analysis in regard to the subject of his self-justification, and that in this case, it finds unconscious support in the childhood memory. It is the attempt of self-justification before the justice exercised by the

father, in the event of the conflict with John. This childhood episode that I place as fantasmatic would be the scene where the impossible re-encounters of the subject with himself is displayed, because it represents at the same time, the support of its being and the reason of its demand for love directed to the Other. Freud, who at the time of the dream was worried about Fliess's health, clears up, in my opinion, the course of his thoughts in the dream with the tale of the young couple; "If one of us dies, I go to Paris". What does Freud tell us? "Let the other die, not me!" Because it is Fliess who dissolves in front of Freud's gaze. It is here when he sees that Fliess has turned into a revenant: the ghost of John. This was too important to be omitted. Anyway, he could not report it at first and maybe that is why he returns to it afterwards. Reporting this from the start would have meant: "Sacrifice to my ambition the people I love!" as "You cannot hide that it is necessary to overcome in oneself severe difficulties to interpret and communicate one's own dreams. Thus one discovers oneself as the only wicked one among all those noble beings with whom we share our life."

In a letter he will warn Fliess: "It is surprising to see how frequently you appear. In the *Non Vixit* dream I am happy to have outlived you. Isn't it terrible to have to confess something of the kind to a person who can interpret it?" But why "have to confess"? It occurs to me that in the search for the truth, Freud cannot obviate what is of the order of discovery. "Maybe the fact that I have turned out to be incapable of lying has to be seen as a consequence of my psychoanalytic occupation. Every time I pretend to disfigure a fact, I make a mistake or parapraxis that reveals my lack of sincerity." Plato used to say that the essence of language consisted in making the truth appear. I do not think that he cannot lie as a consequence of his psychoanalytic occupation. Rather, as Lacan points out, you are not the father of the signifiers but a consequence of them. However, Freud says something more in his letter; to say something to someone who can interpret it. Doesn't Freud say this from the transference? Fliess could not interpret it. Nevertheless it is the transference from Freud to Fliess that allows us in short to elucidate the dream. Lacan indicates that every time that this function of supposed-subject-of-knowledge is embodied in someone, for each subject, whoever he is, analyst or not, it turns out that the transference is already established. For this reason I believe that the analysis of his dream anticipates something. Something in the order of the breaking up of the relationship with Fliess that would take place some time later in the sense of what Lacan calls:

"... permanent elimination of this deception by which the transference tends to be exercised in the sense of the closing of the unconscious."

What happens then with the end of the dream that Freud qualifies as absurd? What do these revenants tell us and what is the cause of their happiness? He says: "So, I'm satisfied for having always found substitutes for that person, even more, also for him who, now I'm at the point of losing him, (Fliess) I will immediately find a replacement." Another association: "Nobody is irreplaceable. See, they are only revived; everything one has lost, returns." But, is it only this that Freud tells us? That in the end you get back all that you have lost? All that one has lost returns. Could it be that the end opens a new possibility? Freud says this in his own way: to live facing the inevitability of one's own end, surviving in one's sons, in one's works. Several times he alludes in his dream to death, friends, professors. Freud starts his self-analysis after the death of his father. The revenants only subsist for the time one wants them to last.

In the end, there is nothing other than the pain of existing, facing his own death. Lacan emphasizes the relationship with the dead father, that death from which, up to then, the presence of his father protected him. It is surely more difficult, yet more ethical, (in the sense of not yielding to the desire), having to witness the naked appearance of this last mystery: that when the father dies, the vow of castration returns over the son. "What is lost returns". But does it return? The anticipation of his own end, is the condition for his *jouissance*.

Celia Calvo,
Uruguay.

Translated by Laura Gioscia.

NOTES

¹ FREUD, S. *Non Vixit Dream*, St. Ed., Vol. V, 421.

A King of Shreds and Patches¹ : The Super-Ego

Sergio Staude

*Psychoanalysis can be located at the crossroads of two coordinates: the first of them, the clinical practice, outlines it with reference to its intention. The obstacles, the differences in the clinical practice have been the ones which, as indicators, have served as a starting point to those theoretical developments that shape the metapsychology.

*The other coordinate which delineates the horizon of its extent, locates it next to other structures of discourse that in their entirety form what is called culture. This location is related to the purpose and the interest heralded by Freud, who tried to avoid his discoveries being reduced to a mere chapter in psychiatry. In such a non-homogeneous reunion, psychoanalysis holds a peculiar locus as regards other discourses and

practices such as the political, the religious and the scientific. It involves a rather marginal relationship left uncovered by the other practices: either called unconscious or called *discontent*.

*My concern in the study of the super-ego is related to the possibility of articulating these two dimensions of the analytical experience in the theoretical practice.

A Significant Omission

Chance, as usually happens, prompted me to decide how to begin this presentation. When I sent the title of this paper to be included in this meeting², the word super-ego was omitted by a typing error; and thus it appears in the programme. I couldn't but associate it to the presentation into society (the analytical one) made by Freud of his psychical agency. He didn't include it in the title of his book — but in that case it was not due to a typing error. Thus, in a book outlining the elements of his second topography and in which Freud could be said to develop to the same extent the ego, the super-ego and the id, the title just mentions two of them: *The Ego and the Id*.

This association immediately poses a question: isn't there something inherent in the nature of this agency which enables it to be present even when absent? Or rather, that makes it even more present insofar as there isn't a signifier that can name it nor represent it?

I think that shortly after going into the rich and complex references this word subsumes or when thinking over matters we listen to in our daily practice, it is possible to approach this certainty. The effects produced by this agency can be very devastating, more effective in their iatrogenics, all the more because it is mute, because it exerts its action silently. Paraphrasing the poet: "When arriving so silently".

This is one of the many paradoxes which shape this agency. Linked by its origin and function to language, to the field of the word, it seems to acquire its power beyond the word itself, exactly in *that* or rather in the *Id*³ that gives it consistency and support.

But I am going too far ahead. My primary purpose was to refer to another facet of this concept. For it, I shall use the quotation in italics from the title of the paper.

Between the Ego and the Id

The phrase *A King of Shreds and Patches* belongs to *Hamlet* and it is addressed to his perverse uncle, counterpart of his idealized father, characteristics which are worth pointing out since it is through the perverse dimension of an idealized father that this agency acquires presence and effectiveness.

By the way, I want to mention that this tragedy of *Hamlet*, together with the analysis made of it by Freud, Jones and Lacan, supplied me with the canvas to start developing these comments.

The phrase we are dealing with refers to a king, a person who exerts authority, a figure which is more than a real father. We could say that he is the representation of a function: the paternal function, a function that has in the Name-of-the-Father its guarantee and its support. The fact that this signifier has been inscribed in the psychical apparatus makes discourse possible; that is, that we can speak of a subject. So it is the support of the emergence of this subject and of a particular structuring of the psychical apparatus. It is in connection with this function and this signifier that a law specifying the human condition comes into force: that of the speaking being.

The inscription of this signifier is the consequence of a metaphorical transformation. The signifier Name-of-the-Father replaces the maternal desire in determining the signification of the subject. This signifier, when splitting up the subject, makes it a desiring subject. It opens up a horizon of possible significations. This substitution is what specifies essentially the Oedipal drama.

An operation takes place around the paternal figure, the effect of which is the appearance of a desiring subject. But it is also around this very figure that another one which will be its counterpart will amalgamate: the super-ego. This fact, this double derivation from the paternal figure is what I attempt to emphasize in this comment. What I state is that the Super-Ego originates as a residue from the operation of the constitution of the subject that as such, closes the essential aspect of the said operation, and that this effect of concealment is closely related to the conditions that made the inscription of the paternal signifier possible.

I have already said that the Super-Ego originates in the counterpart of the paternal function and this is due to the fact that in its activity it sutures that which is the core of the Oedipal drama: the symbolic castration; core which implies the experience of a double acknowledgement or the acknowledgement of a double lack: that of the being of a subject and that of the consistency of the Other. That is what *the shreds and patches* precisely indicates, to veil, to disguise this double lack.

As usually happens in an analysis, to outline a significant phrase - as Hamlet's in this case - refers us to, and at the same time, allows us to display, a scene that works as an indicator. In this case, the scene shows the meeting of Hamlet with the ghost of his father, who is dead. There, when the real death of his father could have enabled a settlement of accounts in the symbolic, when Hamlet could have started the mourning for his death, the father, as a ghost — as a hallucination? — appears, perpetuates itself through a demand, a demand requested as a proof of love.

It is not by chance that Freud had referred to melancholia prior to his comments about the Super-Ego. Here too, there is a dead man who hasn't quite finished dying, a ghost who neither alive nor dead insists with his demands or is summoned by the demands of the subject. Thus, the cloth of these *shreds and patches* is being unveiled. The paternal figure that with his death could give rise to the emblematic identifications that allow the subject to come out of the Oedipus complex, ends up by blocking that very possibility when closing the locus of the ideal with an imaginary consistency.

For the sake of 'shaping' the paternal ghost, Hamlet gives up the object of his desire: Ophelia. As soon as he sealed the secret pact with the dead father, there starts what Lacan called *the tragedy of desire*.

In this way we can notice between the Ego and the Id an indefinite area, consequently, an area in dispute, an area open to the possibility of an emergence either of the subject of the unconscious or of the Super-Ego, figure and background, background and figure of a continuous dialectic.

The Function of the Super-Ego

We know that the Oedipal drama is the mythical representation of the alternatives and the successive stages in the search for a possible articulation between two orders that are heterogeneous with each other. They are the logic of the signifiers and the locus of the body insofar as the body is erotogenic. These two orders do not overlap completely; a split subject and therefore a desiring one and an object which will be the cause of desire. The fantasm will then be in charge of linking them both. But the Oedipal situation, as I have already said, produces another residue, another product qualified by Freud as the 'inheritance' of the Oedipus complex: the Super-Ego. A residue that can be identified as the difficulty and the delay in producing the fall of the Other inasmuch as consistent, incarnated ideal. The Ego is afraid of losing the locus from where it longs to be seen as lovable.

If it is insofar as dead that the father founds the Law; the nostalgia for him speaks about the difficulty in accepting that death. So the Super-Ego is that residue impossible to be elaborated in the mourning for the death of that father. Its presence becomes effective in the symptoms and resistance in the cure. From those places Freud inferred its presence.

But insofar as an obstacle, as a resistance, as a hidden *jouissance*, the Super-Ego also tells its truth; a truth which speaks of the necessary moment of libidinal investment of the paternal figure which will become the support of the effectiveness of his discourse. We know that no object, no word, will be in force for the psychical reality of a subject if it has not gone through the network of its libidinal investments. This is the thesis displayed by Freud in *Moses and Monotheism*. Only the economic benefit obtained through paternal love permits one to tolerate the displeasure produced by the renunciation of the drive, condition that makes the idealized paternal image enter the labyrinths of love and desire. A condition which, in turn, tells us about the impossibility for any subject to emerge in the domain of pure drive, in the mechanisms of pure repetition searchers of pleasure, lacking in signification. Nor will the subject be able to emerge either in the infinite displacement of the chains of signifiers; domain of language before the advent of the word. Both here and there it is necessary to suppose a subject, a-supposed-subject-of-jouissance-and-knowing. It is a way of conceiving the imaginary dimensions giving rise to conditions in which the linking of the symbolic and the real would become possible. It is necessary then to conceive this first consistency of the father which protects the subject from being torn to pieces in the *jouissance* of repetition and in the loss of 'reality' of words which do not represent anybody, a first consistency in order to be able afterwards to locate a lack there.

It is a paradox then of the condition of the desiring subject. The efficacy of the paternal metaphor allows its emergence by placing the signifier Name-of-the-Father as a guarantee. But that which permitted that inscription closes its effect with the *shreds and patches* that veil the signifier of castration. The idealized father has been inscribed in the dimension of the *jouissance* which is exactly that, the perpetuation of its consistency.

A Super-Ego linked with *jouissance* (whose maximum expression shapes that 'obscene and ferocious' figure, as Lacan defines it) is what gets clearly represented in the maternal character of the tragedy of Hamlet: to whose voracious desire without any possible type of symbolic mediation, all the characters gradually subordinate. It is the representation of that Super-Ego which, as I pointed out at the beginning, exerts its maximum power in the summoning of a demand that is made in silence.

If there is something which specifies and defines the analytical practice as different from other practices, it is the possibility of creating or of taking advantage of a fiction — the transference neurosis — to be able to achieve its goal: its own dissolution. If it has an aim, it is that of creating an ideal that does not materialize in anybody. The course of this movement is what will enable the modification of the crystallized significations of the history and the symptoms of the patient. In this practice the figure of the Super-Ego is maintained, from the neurotic dimension, by a strong longing, by a singular expectation : neurotic is he who expects to be demanded to desire in a congruous manner. He expects to suit or harmonize his desire with what is expected from him. It is the desire of the analyst which will open up the alternative of a different operation, that due to which the subject undergoing analysis will organize himself with regards to his desires, being capable of keeping them up precisely there where nobody will serve him as a guarantee for their singularity.

Sergio Staude,
Argentina.

Translated by Ana Isabel Fuertes and Graciela Bazzi.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

- ¹ From W. Shakespeare's Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 4.
- ² *Reunion Lacanoamericana de Psicoanálisis*. Punta del Este, Uruguay.
- ³ In Spanish the word for Id (*ello*) means approximately the same as It (*eso*).

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Tulips and Two Lips or Dying of Metonymy

Nora Marina Menéndez

"Someone is living my life
and I know nothing about him."
Pirandello

Lacan's teaching on Hamlet in the Seminar *Desire and its Interpretation* is the text that inspired me to write this paper. There he says,

"We have to convince ourselves that the way in which a play touches us deeply, that is, at the unconscious level, has to do with an arrangement, with a composition. . . Hamlet's fundamental reach has to do with its structure, its articulation, its machinery, its foundations, within which the true dimension of human subjectivity may be placed: the problem of desire. If a play moves us it is because it offers a staging to our problematic relation with our own desire".

I suggest the reading of a literary text written by an American poetess, Sylvia Plath (1932-1963) two years prior to her suicide. I was first moved by the poem itself, *Tulips*, which produced its impact. Later I came across biographical data, that we may well regard as ancillary in terms of the possibilities of reading that the poem in itself offers, by following certain logical articulations, shaping a structure.

This is not the presentation of a clinical case for the mere reason that it is a poetic creation where truth speaks through the interplay of the letter. Beyond her life history, her family romance, I suggest following her letters, that is to say what Lacan called *à la lettre*.

The first reading was naive, unprejudiced, but even so, it produced the effect that something was striving to be heard or read beyond the extraordinary intensity of its language. When *two lips* as homophone of *tulips* was read, a radical resignification of the network of signifiers took place. We are introduced to them in the first line of the poem and it is not until the sixth stanza that they reappear to insist until the very end. Is there any doubt that they are "two lips" if they "hurt, breathe, talk, weigh down, have sudden tongues, are like red lead sinkers round her neck, fill the air up like a loud noise and eat up her oxygen"?

Can't we read in these *two lips* the place of the primordial Other? Starting point of every subject, place where the subject meets the signifier, that is, the mother tongue. Place of the absolute demand exercised upon the subject, insofar as, at the beginning, the "infans" has no language, it is the Other who holds the storehouse of the signifiers. There is an illusion of intersubjectivity, which is nothing but a radical "otherness" that will later inhabit the subject as a discourse: his unconscious dimension. Here, in this sixth stanza, it is the absolute Other, the insatiable Other that eats the subject up for its own enjoyment. It eats (49), "swabs" (24), "swaddles" (38). The disquieting embodies the body.

Let's go back to the first stanza: "White", "snow", "learning peacefulness" (3), "I am nobody" (5), that is: no-body. She has no-body because she has lost her marks, her signifier marks to feel her body, to name it, to think about it. She handed in her name, her clothes; her libidinal investment? She handed in her history to the anaesthetist, her "real" body to the surgeons. Let's follow this metonymical chain: "nobody" (5), "nothing" (5), "numbness" (17) homophone of "noneness", "nun" (28) homophone of "none". Verse (28) "I am a nun now, I have never been so pure". Then it is only as "nothing" that she is pure. Why nobody, noneness,

nothing? Is there no possible place for this subject? Is there no place to inscribe her name?

The subject is structured in a complex relationship with the signifier. The Other, locus of the synchrony of the signifiers and the laws of its use.

We speak in the framework of two coordinates, two essential functions of the signifier: speech diachrony and signifier synchrony.

The metonymic displacement implies the concatenation, the homophonic contiguity from signifier to signifier, upholding the ego. It is the axis of meaning of the utterance.

The metaphoric operation implies the substitution of one signifier for another with the creation of a new meaning which is not yet in the code. It says more than what is actually said. It passes through the bar. The plus of signification of the metaphor is produced by the metonymies of the signifiers. The metaphoric function is the axis of the enunciation.

The metonymy is the condition of the metaphor and the metaphor conveys the metonymic remnants of the object. We can see this following the metonymic chain of: "tulips" (1), "lids" (9), "stupid" (10), "pupil" (10), "slip" (12). What do we mean by metonymic remnants of the object? All along this chain, what insists, what repeats itself, are the four letters of "lips".

Let's take verse (9) "Like an eye between two white lids". The eye, starting point of every subject, the scopic field where the "infans" will precipitate its "I". Amazing homophonic pun that the English language allows for. Eye, I radical "otherness" and I. Constituent gaze which certifies desire, that is, a place for the future subject. But this is an "I" seized between two lids, two lips. There is no loss, no fall. We shall come back to this towards the end.

Line (10) "Stupid pupil, it has to take everything in". She seems to be unable to discriminate. There is no breach, no gap, no individuation. The nurses can neither be differentiated nor counted. She cannot make out who they are. She seems to be going adrift. In the third stanza she has become a pebble, she cannot steer her life. She "effaces herself" (48), she sleeps, she "loses herself" (18) "Now I have lost myself, I am sick of baggages" (18). She is tired of baggages, of the cargo. Which cargo? We shall see this presently.

In the last three lines of the third stanza, she has plucked up or regained her self. Thus she insists on "I, my, myself". She holds on to her symbolic

marks, her libidinal investment, what is attached to her skin: "Their smiles catch on to my skin, little smiling hooks" (21).

In the fourth stanza she succeeds in naming herself through a metaphor: "a thirty year old cargo boat" (22), the cargo she has to put up with while "stubbornly hanging on to my name and address" (23). This is a pathetic allusion to her need to feel supported by a name. In what sense does she name herself in the metaphor? To the extent she substitutes herself, she is represented by the metaphor which adds extra meaning. She has been bearing this cargo for thirty years. But what does this cargo represent?

Metaphor and name, metaphORIZATION to name herself, to hold herself as a subject, to name her body. She marks her body with a metaphor to produce the fall of that real "a", that no-body, in order to produce a- φ , the phallic order that testifies the effectiveness of the paternal metaphor: the desire of the mother falling below the bar.

If the mother finds her object of desire in the father as the bearer of the phallus, then it is he who holds the clue to the mother's desire and the child is relieved from the burden of fulfilling it by offering himself to it. He will then have a name, a place, he will be a signifier among others, he will be able to count himself.

The Name-of-the-father is that primordial signifier that will put an end to the endless search for an answer to the maternal desire. A search which tends to confuse itself with becoming the object, and therefore confirming its incestuous nature. Beyond the paternal metaphor that succeeds in giving sense to the maternal behaviour and discourse, lies the abyss of the metonymic drift that symbolizes the insatiability of a desire, the indefinite slippage of signification.

Let us go back to the poem: "They have swabbed me clear of my loving associations" (24) my name, my address, my tea set, my linen chest, my books. Once again her naked body, deprived of the references that disappear from her sight.

Out of her sight... but in the fifth stanza appears the gaze that "dazes" (32), "deafens" (52), wrings her neck (42), paralyzes. The drive object returns in the real, it is not lost, it has not fallen. Failure of the signifying articulation supported by the metaphoric and metonymic operations. If the paternal metaphor is effective, this articulation must take place in relation to every drive object. It is precisely in this stanza that the *tulips* reappear and will not cease to be named till the end.

In this fifth stanza there are also four impersonal pronouns "it". What does *it* ask for? "It asks nothing" (33) *but* a name tag and a few trinkets for her tomb It asks for her body, her no-body, her pound of flesh to bear a name only if dead after shutting her mouth on the deadly tablet of "Communion" (35), common union. Let us note that "tablet" means both a pain-reliever and a tombstone. Isn't a tombstone the very place where a name is inscribed?

"Communion", common union, implies a total encounter, a total overlapping of desires, a self enclosed circuit of desire, a deadly pain killer due to the coalescence with the absolute demand of the Other. She is swallowed, "swabbed" (24) by the very same tablet she swallows.

In the sixth stanza we find "corresponds" (39) as a metonymy of "communion" through both homophony and meaning. Let us see this correspondence: "The tulips are too red in the first place, they hurt me" (36), "Their redness talks to my wound, it corresponds" (39). Red tulips/red wound: red is the binding point of communion. She is the open wound, metonymically bleeding all along the following chain, as the object "a" in the real of the Other's *jouissance*. Let us follow it: "The tulips are too red in the first place, they hurt me" (36), "Their redness talks to my wound, it corresponds" (39), "A dozen red lead sinkers round my neck" (42), "A sunken rust-red engine" (54).

This last line is a most significant metaphor. We had left the cargo floating on a ship, on the surface. In the following stanzas we shall witness her sinking. What is she loaded with? With too heavy a signification, a command of death, as she is restricted to be the mere object of the Other's *jouissance*. In this metaphor, where once again she substitutes herself, she is no longer on the surface, she is now a "sunken rust-red engine". She has been touched, split up, torn apart, trespassed, transgressed by the red, metonymic remnant. The remnants of a shipwreck after collision, communion. The tulips talk red and she becomes red. Total identification, deadly coalescence. Why does this communion, this fusion into the Other take place? We mentioned trespassing, law-breaking, trespassing of the Law. She desperately calls for bars: "Tulips should be behind bars like dangerous animals" (58). They should be. Therefore they are not confined, they are not under control. There are no bars to restrict the *tulips*, the *two lips*.

Bars stand only as an appeal. Appeal to the barred Other, to the paternal metaphor to exert the double prohibition: "You shall not lie with your mother"

and "You shall not reintegrate your product": to bar the child and the mother.

Wherever there is no bar there is communion. This can be read again in the equivocal "blooms" (61) that can be read either as a noun or as a verb. "Its bowl of red blooms/out of sheer love of me", the object is outside and blooming thanks to her love; or as, "Its bowl of red/blooms out of sheer love of me", the object has moved inside her and is blooming from her love. Can't we say, evoking Freud on melancholia, "the shadow of the object has fallen over the subject"?

Finally, let's analyse the most significant verse which gave us the clue to regard the entire poem as a metaphor of the subject: "Like an eye (1) between two white lids (lips)". Eye/lids are the metonymic remnants, the crossing points of her most tragic metaphor that tells us of her subjective position: how she places herself in to the desire of the Other where she consumes herself. "Lids", "lips", "slid". I add to this series: "lid". She opened the lid of the oven and slid her head between two white lids, lips, where her "oxygen was finally eaten" (49) in the early morning of February 11th, 1963.

Passage to the act, act of obedience to an imaginary demand, encounter with the real, failure of the prohibition: "You will not reintegrate your product". She, as an object, as a product is finally reintegrated to the lips, lids, to make them close. She stands there to obturate that gap. We had mentioned it was an "I" seized between two lips, unfallen. She must kill herself to get rid of that "a" burden. This unfortunate outcome poses an enigma: is it correct to say she killed herself if her self as a subject was lost in communion with the Other? Or was it rather a missed attempt to get rid of the Other inhabiting her?

In Lacan's Seminar *Le Sinthome* he points out that Joyce stabilized his structure with his writing. I wonder what specificity lies in his writing that renders it apt for this function. Could we say Sylvia Plath wrote repeating the insistence of the S₂ of her storehouse of signifiers, while Joyce wrote in S₁, permanently dis-completing his storehouse?

To conclude, two quotations from Sylvia Plath's journal:

"My fiction is a bare recreation of what I felt as a child and then. . .it must be true" (1958). "I am writing the best poems of my life. . .they will make my name" (1962).


Nora Marina Menéndez,
Argentina.

TULIPS

- I The tulips are too excitable, it is winter here. 1
Look how white everything is, how quiet, how snowed-in.
I am learning peacefulness, lying by myself quietly
As the light lies on these white walls, this bed, these hands.
I am *nobody*; I have *nothing* to do with explosions. 5
I have given my name and my day-clothes up to the nurses
And my history to the anaesthetist and my body to the surgeons.
- II They have propped my head between the pillow and the sheet
-cuff
Like an eye between two white lids that will not shut. Metaphor
Stupid pupil, it has to take everything in.
The nurses pass and pass, they are no trouble,
They pass the way gulls pass inland in their white caps,
Doing things with their hands, one just the same as another,
So it is impossible to tell how many there are.
- III My body is a pebble to them, they tend it as water 15
Tends to the pebbles it must run over, smoothing them gently
They bring me *numbness* in their bright needles, they bring me
sleep.
Now I have lost myself I am sick of baggage
My patent leather overnight case like a black pillbox,
My husband and child smiling out of the family photo; 20
Their smiles catch onto my skin, little smiling hooks.
- IV I have let things *slip*, a *thirty-years-old cargo boat* Metaphor
Stubbornly hanging on to my name and address.
They have swabbed me clear of my loving associations.
Scared and bare on the green plastic-pillowed trolley 25
I watched my teaset, by bureaus of linen, my books
Sink out of sight, and the water went over my head.
I am a nun now, I have never been so pure.
- V I didn't want any flowers, I only wanted 30
To lie with my hands turned up and be utterly empty.
How free it is, you have no idea how free-
The peacefulness is so big it dazes you,
And it asks nothing, a name tag, a few trinkets.
It is what the dead close on, finally; I imagine them
Shutting their mouths on it, like a Communion tablet. 35
- VI The tulips are too *red* in the first place, they hurt me.
Even through the gift paper I could hear them breathe
Lightly, through their white swaddlings, like an awful baby.
Their *redness* talks to my wound, it corresponds.
They are subtle: they seem to float, though they weigh me down, 40
Upsetting me with their sudden tongues and their colour,
A dozen *red* lead sinkers round my neck.

- VII Nobody watched me before, now I am watched.
 The *tulips* turn to me, and the window behind me
 Where once a day the light slowly widens and slowly thins, 45
 And I see myself, flat, ridiculous, a cut-paper shadow
 Between the eye of the sun and the eyes of the tulips,
 And I have no face, I have wanted to efface myself.
 The vivid *tulips* eat my oxygen.
- VIII Before they came the air was calm enough, 50
 Coming and going, breath by breath, without any fuss,
 Then the *tulips* filled it up like a loud noise
 Now the air snags and eddies round them the way a river
 Snags and eddies round a *sunken rust-red engine*. Metaphor
 They concentrate my attention, that was happy 55
 Playing and resting without committing itself.
- IX The walls, also, seem to be arming themselves.
 The *tulips* should be behind bars like dangerous animals;
 They are opening like the mouth of some great African cat,
 And I am aware of my heart: it opens and closes 60
 Its bowl of *red* blooms out of sheer love of me.
 The water I taste is warm and salt, like the sea,
 And comes from a country far away as health. 63

Sylvia Plath
 18th March, 1961



Miss ? ABCDEF - A Case of Multiple Identifications

Alan Large

"... we take for granted the synthetic nature of the processes of the ego. But we are clearly at fault in this. The synthetic function of the ego, though it is of such extraordinary importance, is subject to particular conditions and is liable to a whole number of disturbances."

S. Freud.

"... for biographical truth is not to be had, and even if it were it couldn't be used."

S. Freud.

Miss A. is a twenty-seven year old biologically female virgin who is no longer able to work as a school teacher. She lives alone with her male cat,

Phoebus, with whom she sleeps. Her name is, significantly A-MAN-DA. She spends much time alone drawing, painting and constructing lead light glass artifacts. She was born the fifth of eight children. Her father is a retired country doctor. Her mother writes books for children. When she was four years old her mother's breast was removed for cancer and the mother's arm became a grossly swollen painful stiff useless appendage which the patient sometimes bandaged. The mother suffered depressive illnesses and spent time in hospital. As a small child Miss A. saw her mother cut her wrists in the bathroom. An older sister played the role of mother over these years. When she was fourteen her mother's arm was amputated and weighed "a stone". At seventeen she completed High School and ran away from home after exploding at her father's oppressive authority. She did not see her parents for three years. She became a teacher of art to small children.

She has been in psychoanalytic treatment for four years. Her symptoms were — anxiety, mistrust and withdrawal from people, allusions to a secret world to which she withdrew, inability to concentrate and attend to her work, compulsive over-eating and self-induced vomiting and cutting of her wrists and stomach.

Up to the age of eight she had been an "impossible" child. She burst through doors, hurled her doll through a glass door, held her breath till she turned blue and was often locked in her room to control her bad behaviour. She fought with other children who teased her that her father was a bad doctor. She stole toys and food and became fat and was called greedy.

At the age of eight her sister told her that her mother hated her because of her badness. At this point Amanda — MANDY — Man-die, died because she was not loved. She recalls seeing a film at this time in which a cowboy was hurt and the girl who loved him nursed and healed him. She became a good child and began to day dream. She said "I went inward and have not come out since". The "Mirror World", which she also calls "Infinity" and the "Secret World" began.

From this time, to comfort herself, and as a ritual before sleep, she imagined cutting herself all over. She had a fantasy of her father cutting off her mother's head, raping the patient and then cutting his own throat. After this she was able to sleep.

From age eight she imagined herself to be two selves. On the one hand, a tiny black figure, one inch high, called David who lived under the footpath. The other being was rubbish. Soon afterwards she became, in addition, a small boy called Tim, as whom she explored the swamp near her home.

At fourteen when her mother's arm was cut off she became "neuter" — an "it" but also a number of other beings mostly small boys aged eight to thirteen.

The boys have various qualities. Peter destroys any love that is given. Donald has a sense of humour. David has artistic talent. When he is not present at a painting session the results are very poor. Oliver draws stick figures in the diary to illustrate the secret world which, he explained in his single communication to the analyst, is a spiral. Oliver also writes the mirror writing in which her diary is recorded. Thomas is destructive and barely controllable by the others. He insults people, wishes to destroy the analyst's room, kill Phoebus the cat and one of her sisters. Thomas is like she was as a child and as she believes her father is capable of being. Arthur "sees everything clearly". He is responsible for wrist cutting and the wish to suicide.

There are two girls. Nancy, who began at age nine, engages people and presents the image perceived by the world. She is sixteen, pleasant and tactful. She helps to protect the world and the therapist from the boys and the boys from the therapist and the world. It is she who gorges and vomits food. She is the teacher and appeared each morning with the entry to school but the effort to maintain Nancy faltered and other figures or silence took over and required my patient to hide from her class in a side room. Esther is nineteen, shy, wise and conscientious, constantly worrying and monitoring the boys. She prevents nervous breakdowns. She eats very little. Esther wants a baby which disgusts the others and takes Phoebus the cat as her baby. The Story Teller, also more recently called the analyst, is a man's voice who talks with the boys and answers some of Nancy's practical questions.

The patient says "We are a group of people. We talk to each other and several can be present at once. Some are present only occasionally and briefly. All of us fear getting better and disappearing". Nancy attends all analytic sessions sometimes accompanied by Esther or Arthur. Thomas and Oliver "leave" before sessions begin.

An important memory from the patient's early childhood is having lost a little toy pink dog in the long green grass near the church, crying and feeling alone and looking in the grass in which "I nearly saw something". The patient has expressed a wish to buy back her family's country home and live there with a dog. She describes herself as experiencing a number of states of mind. Since the time of the loss of her little pink dog she has been subject to a state of confusion, not feeling real and linked to the colour Pink and the whole world being green. This state also links to feeling helpless

before a "stone man" — a rigid and hard block which stops everything. Another state dates from age fourteen and is a "warm, safe, lower place" where she is comforted without words. Another state is a mixture of fear and embarrassment. She is able to move into her mirror world by twisting her head or by a sense of melting into the floor. She has expressed a fear of being overwhelmed by the volcano of fire and blackness inside her.

She also reports various brief but vivid hallucinations such as — just prior to sleep becoming as small as a pin; the experience of her thumb becoming hugely swollen; extremely clear vision with black and silver stripes in her field of vision; waking at night to see her bed covered by ants, bees, spiders, or mice and on one occasion a snake lying between her and her cat.

At fourteen when her mother's arm was cut off she burnt and hit her own arm and felt that her "insides began to come out".

Her mother was an only child whose father died when she was seven and whose mother was said to be mad.

The church became her mother's comfort and strict guide. The patient describes her mother as intelligent, colourful and an imaginative writer who writes stories for children "parallel to reality". She says her mother gives little love, does not listen to her children and tries to trick and control them. She seeks to use her children but the only person she wants is the father whom she claims is sick and in need of her protection. The patient says her mother has an evil look which means that she will get her own way. She keeps tablets for the time of a future suicide. She twists words and has the power to destroy men. She says the patient's ideas are rubbish. Mother's favourite child was the youngest boy of the family. Mother says that she has not "been herself for years" and to the patient her mother often seems like a little girl. The mother calls the analyst the patient's "lover boy".

Amanda's father's father committed suicide. His mother warned his wife never to cross him or he would do the same. He won scholarships to study medicine but always needed reassurance that he was a good doctor. He likes and trusts no one. No one who worked with him liked him. He is ruthless and hard and speaks with enormous spite and venomous sarcasm but never loses control of his temper. My patient says "we are both fat, ugly and dirty" and she believes she is too much for him. Father becomes depressed and locks up the house like a fortress and huddles in a blanket. He never takes holidays. He goes to church daily. He tells the patient to speak more but does not listen. He insists that she is cured or should pretend to be cured. He drove all his children out of home and cut them off.

The patient's three sisters suffer with epilepsy. The oldest sister tried to drown herself when an adolescent. The oldest brother was falsely accused of being homosexual by his father and later became an alcoholic. Another brother became mentally ill at age thirteen and continues to have grandiose delusions of holding university degrees.

The patient's only friend is a shy but warm and tolerant young mother who shares the background of an oppressive family. Other friendships have been short-lived because of the patient's mistrust and social awkwardness. Her only truly trusted companion is her cat Phoebus without whom, she says, she would not live.

She feels able to cope by watching the world from the other side of the mirror. Without understanding people she imitates them. While appearing naive she believes she is wise inside. She describes an internal state of war which is never shown outside. Her inside is green poison and she believes that her speech poisons other people particularly men. She is more inclined to claw women like an animal. She becomes very angry when people assume that they know her. She has no sense of belonging to any one. She expresses a wish to smash and slash herself to bits, to cut off her fat stomach and breasts and not speak ever about her body. She makes herself vomit food to "get rid of her frenzy" and sees this as an alternative to cutting herself. She believes that to hurt herself is the only way to be loved. She holds a belief that her gender is neuter. She says "I have never permitted myself to feel sexual before I feared I'd go crazy". She says "I was something when I was born and until I was eight. After this I became nothing".

In her analysis she was initially very distrustful and could only remain in sessions briefly. This is similar to the brief time she can stand to be with her father. She accused the analyst of tricking her to discover her secrets. She feared she would contaminate and destroy the analyst with her poison. She came to analysis to discover what she is. She believes that to become one person is impossible and fears the annihilation of being supposed by others to be one.

After one year of analysis the patient gave the analyst a gift — a box that she had constructed of opaque glass sections joined by lead. The lid was made of coloured glass fragments and was chained to the box. The interior floor of the box was a mirror.

Discussion

This patient's being centres around castration anxiety and the preservation of the phallus. Her name is significant — A man (da) which in English is shortened to Man die. She was born some-thing and until eight was able to be that thing, a phallus — a strident, aggressive and potent being. At the age of eight the early memories of 1. the loss of her little pink dog in the green grass, 2. the cutting off of her mother's breast, 3. of seeing her mother cut her wrists in her nervous breakdown, were activated when she heard her mother's condemnation of her and her father's cutting tongue and also by the film she saw of the cowboy and girl that had showed her that love can only be given and received if there is hurt, injury or loss as if she was trying to symbolize castration. This led to her identification as a secret phallus — the tiny David figure later joined by other small boys and the beginning of her own phantasies of cutting herself which became more pertinent after her mother's swollen rigid arm was cut off. Thus she became neuter — an it, and the phallus returned safely in the secret world in its multiple form of small boys (like Medusa's head). It returned also in Phoebus the male cat who shares her bed and without whom in the safety of her home, (which is another box), she declares she would be dead.

She acknowledged the badness her mother assigned to her and her inside became the green poison of the grass in which the little pink dog was lost. The secret mirror world sustains her as one who is not castrated but at the cost of the refusal of femininity, that is, identification as feminine. She induces vomiting to rid herself of the frenzy caused by her fat feminine stomach. She wants to cut off her fat stomach and breasts, that is, her femininity to retain her status as phallus. In the mirror world she has multiple states of experience by which she can escape becoming one. To become one is to risk being lost, that is to say castrated, and in the mirror world she is kept safe from the risk of castration. Nancy is the mask in response to the demand to begin to appear feminine and Esther is the mask in response to the demand to be a nurturing being. The patient declares herself to be of no value, that is, rubbish so that she may appear to be neither woman that is, castrated nor man that is, threatened by castration. Instead she becomes those beings behind the mirror in that secret place where it is safe for one who is in terror of being cut. She cannot be a woman but can only be a phallus if she is many and in secret. No one knows her because "it speaks" from beyond the mirror.

The gift of the glass box shows how she had constituted as a subject, that is, an appearance of opaque fragments behind which, and chained to it, is the safety of the mirror world inside the box.

Alan Large,
Australia.

**TOPOLOGY IN AN ANALYSIS:
A HOLE IN SPATIAL DIMENSION.**

Ilda Sara Levin

Introduction

The analysis of a child produced for him the building up of a space in which he could constitute himself; a space articulated by means of some elements which enact the function of topology and, especially, the toric structure in analytic practice.

Today we will recall some fragments which are intended to show how he situated, within transference, a discordance between the sphere and the torus which can be said to underlie the fantasmata that tormented him. The separation between desire and demand and from a hole was produced during analysis as a fact of the structure he invented — producing a fiction. This structure imprisoned him; his aims were to pierce through it partially in order to seize it and to question it.

The structure seems to present itself in his narratives in such a way that it could be possible to suppose an illness brought about by the superimposition of the real and imaginary dimensions of the knot, as well as the breaking through and flooding of the symbolic functioning. There only remained an insufficient place for desire's movement, for the a in place of the cause; for symbolizing castration.

Everything happened in a way which seemed blocked, covered or reduced to cruel and obscene limits. We are referring to that triple hole without its whirlpool: impotence arises, as well as a darkening, a horror before the movement of the drive, before the movement of desire.¹

An absence of the borromean property brought about the following consequences: mutilation, fragmentation, horror before the word of the Other, before enchainment of the real, imaginary and symbolic, which did not end in constituting themselves.

The superimposition of phallic *jouissance* with the supposed possible Other's *jouissance* seemed to be the only meaning which brought about a sequel of terror, the emptying of the body and mutism. The materiality which could constitute him — he said in a cry — was as fragile as glass, and, later on in his analysis, as compact and without fissures as lead.

During his analysis, waterfalls of anguish and panic did not prevent him from producing a certain non-penetration of the knot's circles (castrations). This happened by means of speech, perhaps by means of love. It was also possible for him to construct an imaginary space — perhaps by means of expulsions, *Ausstosungen?* in which he could project a toric structure we suppose linked to his situation, as a desiring subject, within the knot of his fundamental references.

Beginning of the Analysis

The child, aged 4 years 5 months, arrives to me regularly receiving psychopharmacologic drugs and labelled with a psychiatric diagnosis: autism, anorexia, hallucinations, i.e. a probable infantile psychosis. His father? A severe paranoid. His mother? Hysterical psychosis. His brothers? In course of treatment.

I wanted to meet him. The boy was small, very thin and of beautiful features (with that narcissistic beauty found in many autistic children). He did not look at me, he did not speak either and he did not link himself with toys. He coiled himself up and remained underneath a piece of furniture, hidden in a cleft until they came to fetch him.²

Today I will say, only in a negative way, something about the moments in which he remained motionless, overwhelmed by panic and hopelessness. During these he produced unintelligible, lacerating sounds in which he infinitely repeated numbers or words: he seemed hallucinated and out of himself. Neither will I speak today about what his relationship to language was, about the absolute univocity of words, nor about his first dreams, nor about his first dream with the analyst, but will speak about a cross-cut which finds its inspiration in Lacan's statement; . . . "I try to reduce myself not giving a name any more to that which I call, together with Freud, the *Unverdrängt*; summing up, this is nothing other than naming the hole"³. Trying to name the hole led him to produce a series of narratives in which Lacan's thesis seemed to be confirmed: "... truth has the structure of fiction".⁴ Today I will present some fragments to situate the constitution and transformation of the hole in Jacob's spatial dimension.

Fragment I.

A Surface changes its Colour. Starting to Speak. Being Made Out of Glass.

4 years, 8 months. Three months' treatment. The moment he arrives for his session he finds the toy drawer has changed its colour. He starts to shout: "... the subway has run, over it! Because he was so little . . . A kid collided with a car and broke to pieces! I could break myself because I was made out of glass . . .!" After this, calmer: "No, the subway ran above him. It did not strike him because he was so little, he laid on the tracks . . ."

He spoke an intelligible discourse. Simultaneously he put a fantasm of constitution and fragmentation at the analyst's disposal, to be listened to. The material he was made out of was glass: therefore it could shatter. A fantasm of the relationship to the Other of his collision had squeezed him to the point of reducing him to be locked up in a narrow, fragile, motionless space: a non-toric space? A subtle, and yet terrorized sensitivity to colour-change in a surface showed in act, the structure that tormented him.

In this narrative, it seemed as if a superimposition of the symbolic and the real had taken place. Would it be so, it would mean that love had withdrawn from the imaginary as a means. Perhaps his mutism was linked to the libidinal emptying of his erotogenic body. This occurred since . . . in the place where Daddy should be there is only emptiness, nothingness . . ." he said years later during a session.

While speaking, the knot turns around; this produces a non-penetration of the symbolic, which simultaneously permits another chaining, other than the one which constitutes him through what he says.

Two opposing propositions: "being made out of glass, run over, shattered" or "the subway ran above him, he was small, he was a child, he laid on the tracks". The opposition, gives way to vacillation, to a movement under which is a third proposition: the child is none other than himself, divided between being made out of glass or being a child. Beyond the passing from third person to first, everything ends up with a passage from being terrified before a smooth, colour-changing surface, to a perforated space (the subway tunnel) in which the child finds a gallery; we may say a toric structure which is able as no other to situate according to Lacan the enunciations to be found in any subject's origin. The structure is also able as no other to draw the lines of the irreducible articulation between desire and demand.

FRAGMENT II

Being a Skeleton. I Am Going to Strip My Clothes Off. I Am A Person.

6 years, 8 months. Two years of analysis. He says: "... I am a skeleton ... Mummy bought me a skeleton, his name is Little Eye, I am going to strip my clothes off ... I am afraid, Mummy is going to be angry ... Look, I am a little fish; it swims, it swims, it swims upside-down ...⁵ Lock the door, Daddy may come in ... My tail has fallen off: I will put it on again. I invented this; no, God taught it to me ... Mummy said it to me ... stop touching your little stick, it will fall off." He calls me by my name, he asks me to look at him; he is altered. Later on: "I pull off a bit of my skin. Look, it is a child, it is me, I am a person, a human being. The boy's little stick stands up". He lies down, coiling up inside the toy and paper drawer. He says: "I am going to sleep, look, look, I've got a body; it is the same body every day".

A skeleton is not a toric surface, but a body is. He has constituted identity related to his body, and placed his first references to God, death, sex and castration. He passed from an articulation without flesh; the other side of a Little Eye, without gaze; to have a body which is the same every day and not the body of an inconsistent little fish. He demanded my gaze which was significant to him. Sustained in his call, he constitutes the phallus, showing a certain non-penetration of the imaginary and the real. Something of the symbolic was piercing a hole into the real. Now he is a person, but still

something is missing beyond the mother's threat: to imagine the cut. Putting a bit of skin outside leaves him prepared to be "that lodging animal" we humans are.⁶ Now he steps towards the element whose colour-change touched him so intimately at the beginning, that so surpassed him, that he had to shout and expell a fantasm. Now he goes towards the toy drawer (towards death and dream), to find a shelter in the signifiers that produced him beyond a mother who mutilates him — beyond a father who makes him the object of his *jouissance*.

FRAGMENT III

Death is Ugly. There Are Holes. Emptiness.

6 years, 10 months. "Today I thought about something that I want you to know: Death is ugly ... I don't like the face I have when I look at myself in the mirror ... There are holes in the toilet ... Emptiness". Up to now he had shown an aspect of the hole's constitution. Now he names it, starting from ugliness in the mirror, death and emptiness.

FRAGMENT IV

A Black Hole in Spatial Dimension. Nobody Listens Out There.

6 years, 7 months. He narrates an intergalactic story: "They had to journey to the centre of the Earth ... they had to kill a guy ... no, I have to go on with the story about space: it seems nobody listens out there, I will look for a world, but I'll have to look for a direction first ... oh! I collapsed! I'm falling down into the depths of space. Oh! I fell inside a black hole. Help me, I'm disintegrating! Oh! the rope is cut ... the black hole had so much force! No, I'm getting in now. Push! Safe at last ... we managed to escape! How did they do it? The black hole was too weak, too old". (He draws it), He says: "The black hole is going to turn into white wool".

The first statement is a part of a series in which a careful topography covers up a spheric topology. In the latter, the alternative is deadly: whether to go to the centre of the Earth to commit a crime, or falling down the intergalactic space and being swallowed by a cosmic machine. The real impossibility of reaching the centre of the Earth and committing the crime is covered up by the appearance of the commandment which sends him to the intergalactic space's loneliness and death by devouring. Out there, in that intergalactic space, nobody listens. Whenever his analyst listened to he word puns, he panicked. Special attention had to be paid to this. Going towards what involved him was risking going inside the black hole. A great

patience was necessary to be with him: either leave him to build up his fictions, or to really fall down the black hole. Better to build fictions! Finally he managed to escape since the black hole was too weak, too old. With these words he starts, years later, his analysis' second phase. Now, these words refer to fantasms regarding his father.

The astonishing transformation of the black hole into white wool seems to point to a change in topology; a change which brings some risks. In a later narrative: "A bomb is set for the time in which the black hole is going to transform itself. In the end they manage to take off the bomb set by criminals". He draws. "The black hole is going to turn into a brilliant circle". By means of his writing he sustains the doubling of the transformation: white wool/brilliant circle — that is, by means of the drawing. Is there to be a happy end? No, "the brilliant circle is a light which leaves us blind!" The change in structure is a boundary to blindness? It is a tragedy in which, nevertheless, something happens beyond transformation.

FRAGMENT V

See How the Structure Was.

10 years, 5 months. He draws the sun as seen from the inside. "This is the sun as seen from the inside. They tried to reach Mars and Venus. They came to Venus by a miracle. They brought rocks and stones in order to see their structure, but . . . they miscalculated rotation. They ended in a black hole. It was Uranus' fifth satellite".

From his cure's point of view, his conquest of the inside and the place of the object was not reassuring at all to me: "I'm the only one who has looked at the sun without remaining blind". Now, "they wanted to see what the structure was like. They came to Venus as if by a miracle." But, swallowed up, broken, torn into pieces — in this way he describes the black hole's effect — this was the price they paid (sometimes he paid it himself) for wanting to see what the structure was like. He utterly disliked my pointing out to him that he was the fifth and at the same time the only son of a father who believed himself to be unique. However, he was paying a price that helped him, perhaps, and somehow, to de-centre himself: "to be Uranus' satellite".

FRAGMENT VI

It Was a Dangerous Case in the Solar System.

10 years, 8 months. "Between the orbit of Mars and Jupiter a black hole was formed. It led to Mars. It was a dangerous case in the solar system. It

turned into an object of Mars". It was the first time the black hole led somewhere.

FRAGMENT VII

Structure and Impotence. Next Session.

"I will tell you what a black hole is like. It has the effect of a funnel, it goes this way and communicates with another galaxy". He draws a funnel with a whirlpool shade: The plane is attracted, it is going inside . . . we cannot get out". "That whirlpooling hole, to make it triple in an analysis." The narrative goes on: "Earth was deformed, it passed through the black hole and another solar system was formed in Southern Cross' Alpha". Up to now, the black holes were suctioning pits which knotted themselves together by means of the Devouring Complex. Now, their function ceased to be a pit-object to give way to something whose boundary may be crossed without danger, and a communicating gallery too. The risk of going towards a unique ideal is limited by the black hole's properties of being a communicating passage between different possible galaxies.

FRAGMENT VIII

A Gallery Towards Death. Second Turn. This is the End of a Long Story.

10 years, 9 months. "They were completely disorientated . . . Should we die, watch the words we say before we die . . . and time elapsed, a more dramatic time comes to be . . . the sun was going to consume itself next to the year 100,000 . . . the sun consumed hydrogen . . . darkness was cast . . . a black hole arises next to Earth; it led to a far away place, to Alpha Centauri, the nearest star to Earth. Earth was absorbed . . . Darkness was cast . . . nothing remained of the solar system. Earth survived until Alpha Centauri. There; in a new orbit, Alpha Centauri shed heat, in this way, Earth was saved from darkness. That black hole was weak. And it was like this in its old solar system. This is the end of a long story".

A transformation had taken place, from a solar system around Southern Cross' Alpha, to a solar system around Alpha Centauri. He still performs another turn: "Only two people are left. They reproduced themselves. Alpha Centauri turns into a black hole too. However, this did not reduce the Earth, only the waters". And a significant repetition: "And they were as if in their old solar system. This is the end of a long story". To turn a second way around hopelessness, places the intergalactic story as a fantasy on the


origins of life, and a relationship to sex and castration is knotted in questionings that border death. The black hole worked as a signifier trapped by another discourse; the Oedipal discourse: "It was a dangerous case . . . object to Mars . . . Uranus' fifth satellite" . . . "the black hole was weak, too old . . ." This knots together too, and is different from the hole as an object: "A machine that sucks, that absorbs, that fragments". This refers to the father on two levels: the level of fiction of the stories he tells, and that which Freud places as the devouring complex, as father-complex. We rely upon Freud's thesis, according to which the devouring complex is a father complex, to consider that Jacob first becomes different, as a fact of structure, in a third period in which it is a gallery. To save oneself out there, it is necessary to turn around to another time. This double turn being performed, the solution appears to pass through. We may, then, suppose a triple structure to be at play.⁸


FRAGMENT IX.

Nearly 12 years old. He invents an anti-gravitational material to pass safely near the black holes, as well as an anti-radiation material which allows him to go through them with no danger of being swallowed up or disintegrated due to the not-yet-committed-crime, of killing a guy, and immediately journeying to investigate the intergalactic space in which he (his father nicknames him "the lonely navigator") asked the Other for answers to his questions.

We have tried to show the structure of the subject in the very moment of his topological constitution during an analysis, that is to say in his articulation to desire, to demand and the hole. We did it today, re-creating the fictions which projected him, in transference, to an imaginary space. If this does not find its solution on the level of a discourse where he may find another way of involving himself in his wish to murder his father, it will only remain to him the imposition of the imperative — of a sadistic superego — of always having to escape, and yet always falling into a spheric topology.⁹

Ilda Sara Levin,
Argentina





Notes

- 1 See J. Lacan: Answer to M. Ritter. In: *Lettres de l'Ecole* No 18. *Ecole Freudienne de Paris*.
- 2 LEVIN, I. "The boy who believed himself to be made out of glass". Presentation in the Seminar: "What is said in the course of a psychoanalysis", held by L. Bissierier, A. Couso, R. Estacolchic. The Freudian School of Buenos Aires, 1986. In the Library of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires.
- 3 LACAN, J. Closing speech of the Convention on *Cartels*, *Lettres de l'Ecole Freudienne*, No 18.
- 4 LACAN, J. The Seminar, No 9, *On Identification*. Lecture 13.
- 5 In Spanish this is a pun: it swims = *nada*; nothingness = *nada*, i.e. both words are written and pronounced exactly the same way.
- 6 *ibid*, Lecture 14, footnote 4.
- 7 *ibid*, footnote 3.
- 8 See C.A. Ruiz: Seminar on Knots.
- 9 GARGANO, M. Personal communication.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MASS

Ricardo Estacolchic

When dealing with a text of Freud, we are inevitably asked to consider certain examples regarded as paradigmatic among which we can find the *aliquis*. Associations lead us to the miracle of San Genaro. Freud's young friend hoped for a miracle that would spare him an embarrassing situation. San Genaro is the patron Saint of the city of Naples. It seems that this miracle occurs three times a year with surprising punctuality; it may even take place a fourth time during important visits. The last time it occurred was after a sixty-two minute prayer. The newspaper states this datum because of the variability of the length of the prayer. Now, whenever I read that groups of scientists have unsuccessfully tried to explain the phenomenon concerning the vessels which contain the blood of a martyr, I cannot help thinking about a manoeuvre in which the real appears as ordered and can be administered, manipulated; in brief, a "mystification". Obviously this "mystification", this periodical meeting with miracles is proportional to the demand, and there is nothing but mere ignorance in the active sense of not wanting to know anything. It reminds me of certain meetings I have seen in Buenos Aires, a strange phenomenon that several groups of analysts still try to explain without success.

I remember a time when I was interested in Eastern martial arts. I read several books that followed this scheme: the master had died after spending his whole life in search of perfection in his art. Fortunately, his main disciple survives and is moved by a kind of sacred task which consists in stating the words the master has said, could have said or should have said. I centered my attention on two amazing situations worthwhile to narrate. In the first one, you slap your opponent as part of a defensive manoeuvre but mind you, the slap is only secondary. What you are really aiming at is the deflection of the Ki towards your opponent. Ki refers to a kind of cosmic energy . . . you direct it with your hand!

In the second case, it was said that the master reaching the age of eighty fought against four young men at the same time. Not only could they not beat him but they couldn't even touch him!

The religious flavour implied in this situation does not differ much from what is said about Lacan's attitudes and aphorisms.

The example is good because it poses the sanctifying of a space. The square in which they fight is, from their point of view, a sacred place. There is a certain ritual to follow as to how to enter or leave the square. This evokes the space named in the Lacanian theory used in certain contexts to deflect the Ki towards the other. You must surely have come across works of refutation in which the main argument is that the character to be refuted is not "Lacanian" enough. "Enough" is attached to one's own I and the group one belongs to. Every group formed in this way thinks the others are unfaithful.

There are some other works in which the sacredness of the theoretical framework is respected to the extent that the "author" can demonstrate in a footnote that everything he is saying is based on something Lacan already said, and even going as far as being exactly the SAME. It is a way of dreaming that he as a subject is not there, a way of putting into practice what Lacan himself called the policy of the ostrich.

Well now, if what he says quotes Lacan's exact words, why say it if it is not to pray?

We find also some clinical papers where everything fits so accurately, so neatly, that they resemble a new suit worn on its first day. Everything seems to be in such perfect order that one can't but feel that something is wrong, that it is completely artificial.

Among other massive effects of loyalty to Lacan, there is a profusion of quotes that solve "every enigma that has not been solved to the moment", to the extent that the first quotation will replace Freud's first scene. This seems to occur between that actual scene and the quote. In fact, it is as reassuring as it is funny.

Let's consider the following reflection. Apparently Lacan said: "Thinking represents a mental hindrance". One may then think that, in order not to run the risk of being stupid, one should never think, or that the words "The analyst should not retreat before psychosis" may lead to a generation of brave people who will never retreat before anything. But I will not insist on this. Rather, I would now like to analyse the structural reasons that motivate this kind of situation.

In fact, these reasons exist and I will try to illustrate them through brief clinical examples:

Some years ago, I had a patient who was a writer. Among his juvenile dreams he sheltered the hope of writing a novel in which the last word, one word only, would change the whole sense of the text. Everything would shatter into pieces thanks to this last word.

You may clearly see the wish of an obsessive neurotic in the sense that the "last word" exists and that he will find it. I can imagine the conversation that could have taken place should he have met a psychoanalyst who would answer: "My dear fellow, the last word has been said by Dr. Lacan".

Naturally, in his search for this word, he could never finish anything he started to do. The fact is, that although the existence of the "last word" suited that neurosis well, I do not think it suited psychoanalysis.

Lacan himself made it clear that the *Ecole* had turned into a church.

I have also interviewed a young woman who had undergone analysis for several years. She held such an excellent and marvellous opinion of psychoanalysis and especially of her analyst, that anybody would think she would have enjoyed following her treatment till the day of the Last Judgement. In brief, she had made her analyst her ego-ideal and she was not planning to change her mind mainly because she had lately been invaded by the feeling that sometimes it was better not to insist on certain subjects. While talking with her I remembered some public statements made by a group of Lacan's ex-patients, through which one can infer that they have identified themselves with him as their ideal, even as ideal of the strong I "in Jacques Lacan's way"; this, without taking into consideration

the illusion in which "what little we are depends on him". Therefore "the sincerity in our heart is ready for the sacrifice that would renew the authority of his *jouissance*." Undoubtedly illusions of this kind have enormous value in the libidinal economy of these people but we cannot take them as seriously as they do.

As you may have seen, this is often accompanied by certain publicity for massive consumption by analysts. This publicity clearly reflects that Lacan was the owner of his own desire. In Lacan's case, the desire was not of the Other, it was his. He is the only one to whom Lacan's theory is not applied.

In this way, each one of his attitudes and public or private expressions were considered homeomorphic with his own theory, and what is more, this coincided with the conscious side of his message.

Only the strength of a non-analysed transference can sustain such a situation. Under these circumstances and because boosting one's self-esteem comes in handy, groups are formed which fervently adhere to the illusory premises mentioned above and some others which for sake of brevity I am forced to leave aside.

Lacan's theory and person acquire then the same dignity as that of the supreme good; a theory that states, paradoxically, that there is no such supreme good coming from the unconscious. The question arises now as to whether these types of procedures are not aimed, precisely, to ignore the experience of the unconscious. Of course, the answer is an affirmative one.

Jean Cuir provides a good example in his book *Psychosomatics and Cancer*. The patient faces some problems dealing with his name and the analyst is glad that the most difficult moments of this analysis take place while Lacan was giving his seminar on Joyce discussing the facts that worried Joyce concerning his name. We may then realize that the interpretation arose from the seminar, but what about the unconscious, then?

Apparently, there are cases in which the patient has heard the same interpretation twice; firstly, as a student attending Lacan's seminar and secondly, as a patient of another student of Lacan's. If the patient comes to a knowledge that has been formulated somewhere else, a symptomatic value that implies the search for guarantees in a non-castrated Other appears. Since castration in analysis also counts for the analyst as well,

why not look for shelter against this unpleasant threat? And once again, what about the unconscious?

How can one make the subject aware of the Other's desire when what is aimed at is that the Other should make his desire explicit under the form of knowledge?

I wonder now if what is repressed in this massive way does not return in a sudden outburst within psychoanalytic societies for we know that the unconscious tends to hold onto its rights and its revenges and the more one tries to ignore it, the more it fights to come to light.

If Lacan stated that the International Psychoanalytic Association was a society of mutual assistance against the analytic discourse, we must now admit that this assistance reaches several provinces where Lacanian ideas also rule.

Many of us have barely met Lacan personally. But, when getting in touch with his teaching, we felt that a breath of fresh and vital air invaded psychoanalysis.

It is true that his person did not act as a screen to his work but does this prevent the religious effects of idealization in which his discourse is obscured? I don't think so. After all, God doesn't show much of his person, aspect and manners either, and that doesn't prevent him from existing, from giving illusion to the future. This illusion embodies the implicit postulate that states that the unconscious is a mere field for the application of Lacan's theory and that in the case of something coming from the unconscious, it should have already a place in the theory. Were this not to be so, it does not come from the unconscious; thus like a monster, it should return to its depths.

Despite this being subjected to considerable negation, there are many analysts who succumb to this postulate, forming a compact and numerous mass.

Is it possible to soften the effects that obscure Lacan's teaching? I don't know but I think we should attempt it.

Ricardo Estacoloich,
Argentina

On Hysterical Madness

Daniel Alberto Deluca.

In The South Borges writes that history likes symmetries and slight anachronisms. There was a time in Buenos Aires when analysts, followers of Klein, did not sleep in order to discover the psychotic nucleus of their patients' personality. The analysis could not be finished had these nuclei not been brought to light. Some time later, Lacan intervening, some followers of his teachings made an unfortunate reading of the interesting works of Maleval and over extended the so-called hysterical madness to the field of the psychoses. Many of the in-patients in the psychiatric hospitals of Buenos Aires were re-diagnosed as hysterics.¹ In the same way that neuroses were previously "psychoticized", now psychoses were in turn, "hysterified", a symmetry which does not cease to produce a difference, since beyond the anecdotic this mistake half-says a truth about the real of clinical psychoanalysis: there are patients whose diagnoses pose a kind of paradox. Some psychiatrists did not overlook this: the diagnosis of hysterical delusion and some hallucinatory and delusional syndromes like Ganser's account for it. The unsuccessful attempt to impose the term "hysterical psychoses" literally illustrates this paradox;

also showing the failure to overcome it. Paradoxes presented by patients who, to give an example, suffered from visual hallucinations, sometimes also auditory, with delusions of possession, or with strong paranoid characteristics, and who continued their illness without deterioration. The delusion, of sudden onset, sometimes spontaneously disappeared without relapse. The patient could pass from a frankly manic state to a catatonic stupor in a few hours. Here is a remarkable semiologic polymorphism in which it was not uncommon to find either the wax-face of the schizophrenic or the absent and altered face of the melancholic. The speech of the patients did not reveal any neologism or trace of mental automatism; but some of them could not express a statement employing the first person singular, the I.

These subjects, un-analysable to many psychoanalysts of the International Psychoanalytic Association, were thrown into the confused borderline category or labelled pre-psychotic or even simply psychotic, to the point of considering the hysterics with which Freud inaugurated psychoanalysis as schizophrenic². Since Lacan, anxiety, the object a and the concept of the fantasm allowed another approach. Thus Maleval indicates that hysterical madness is not a psychosis³ but a vicissitude of hysteria when in the field of the 'I' (a) something appears that should not be there: the positivized $-\varphi$ (-phi). The subject, falling prey to the *Unheimlich*, the uncanny, is substracted from every threeness since the object which should necessarily lack does not lack⁴. Calligaris⁵ and Melman⁶ do not consider it convenient to term hysterical madness that which could reduce itself to a vacillation of the hysterical fantasm. Estacolchic⁷ in turn, suggests temporarily keeping the term hysterical madness, since he thinks it could include some psychoses, besides the hysterics in question. It is well known that the above mentioned patients seem overwhelmed by the disquieting presence of a monstrous Other who Calligaris calls *The Mother*. The imaginary lack of this Other would require a price which goes beyond the symbolic or the imaginary. We often find passages to the act: they kill themselves or drive someone else to kill them⁷. The quest for a master of knowledge about *jouissance* seems to be an attempt to break loose from this Other's *jouissance* and the results are an emulation of the psychotic or a taking part in a perverse script, according to the knowledge held by the chosen partner, S₁ either of the psychiatrists or of the perverse.⁷ It is known that when the hysteric falls out of her position of phallus, the fiction of the Other's *jouissance* ceases to be a horizon within the inverted scale of the Law of desire and threatens to incarnate itself in madness or

death. This threat fulfills itself in some of the so-called mad hysterics.

No doubt hallucinations do frequently appear in hysterical madness. Now we must ask why. As for Freud, hallucination was no obstacle to diagnose a neurosis: thus Haizmann the painter suffered from neurosis — a demonological neurosis⁸. In 1914, in *Fausse Reconnaissance* (Déjà Raconté) in Psychoanalytic Treatment Freud remarks:

“As regards the subject-matter of the patient's vision, I may remark that particularly in relation to the castration complex, similar hallucinatory falsifications are of not infrequent occurrence, and that they can just as easily serve the purpose of correcting unwelcome perceptions”

The hallucination to which he refers is one of those suffered during childhood by Sergei P., the Wolf-Man: cutting of his little finger with a penknife. Freud stresses that this finger was an undoubted equivalent of the penis⁹. At the opening of the case history of the Wolf-Man, we read that:

“We are already acquainted with the attitude which our patient first adopted to the problem of castration. He rejected castration, and held to his theory of intercourse by the anus. When I speak of his having rejected it, the first meaning of the phrase is that he would have nothing to do with it, in the sense of having repressed it. This really involved no judgement upon the question of its existence, but it was the same as if it did not exist. Such an attitude, however, could not have been his final one, even at the time of his infantile neurosis. We find good subsequent evidence of his having recognized castration as a fact. In this connection, once again, he behaved in the manner which was so characteristic of him, but which makes it so difficult to give a clear account of his mental processes or to feel one's way into them. First he resisted and then he yielded; but the second reaction did not *do away with* the first. In the end there were to be found in him two contrary currents side by side, of which one abominated the idea of castration, while the other was prepared to accept

it and console itself with femininity as a compensation. But beyond any doubt a third current, the oldest and deepest, which did not as yet even raise the question of the reality of castration, was still capable of coming into activity".¹⁰

Reading this paragraph it becomes clear that:

- 1 These hallucinations are the form in which foreclosed castration returns,
- 2 What has been foreclosed may become activated.

The castration to which Freud refers is the one he points to as the bedrock of the termination of the analysis: penis envy for women and rejection of the feminine attitude when facing another man for the male.¹¹ The limit of Freudian analysis is surpassed by Lacan by means of the invention of the object *a* which is outlined beyond imaginary castration. It follows that whatever returns in Sergei P.'s hallucination does not reduce itself to the imaginary phallus in its $-\varphi$ form, but as object *a* in the shape of one of its resemblances, the gaze. Without words, the subject sees his cut-off finger but cannot look at it — the petrifying gaze of the primal scene which insists in the wolf's gaze in the dream, the gaze seeing the window that opens up, the gaze which paralyzes him when facing a butterfly, or leaves him fascinated when the buttocks of a woman on all-fours are offered to him; a gaze he himself is insofar as the object of the fantasm goes.

Now, which is the foreclosed signifier that returns to the real under the form of a kind of object *lack*, object without essence, as are all the objects *a*?¹² Lacan's formulation which indicates that which has not come under the light of the symbolic appears in the real, requires further precision. Which is the signifier that has not been affirmed in the primordial symbolization (*Bejahung*)?¹³ No doubt it is not the Name-of-the-Father, since when this is foreclosed, the paternal metaphor becomes impossible to achieve.¹⁴ In the case of Sergei P., Freud makes it definitely clear that it is not a psychosis but an infantile neurosis. Castration gives the clue: castration always is of the Other.⁴ The foreclosed signifier is the $S(\mathcal{A})$, which is not the Φ , symbolic phallus¹⁵. If this $S(\mathcal{A})$ lacks then no other would represent the subject; a signifier that inscribes a lack in the Other, lack of a signifier not accounted for in a battery that by being so is complete. Lacan says that:

"This is what the subject lacks in order to think himself exhausted by his cogito, that which is unthinkable ... This place is called *jouissance*, and it is the absence of this that makes the universe vain."¹⁵

Let us return to Sergei P., adding Vegh's remarks:

"The fact that it does not fall as object *a* for the Other means that this signifier $S(\mathcal{A})$ lacks, because the gaze as an object, according to Lacan's definition, comes in place of what the subject ceased to be inasmuch as he is not the phallus. This returns in the real as a hole in his nose ..."

Vegh recalls here the analysis with Ruth Mack Brunswick:

"... in a dream it is in his nose that there appears something related to the earrings of a woman. The structure of a ring is a border which surrounds a hole"¹⁶

Sergei dreams, and the foreclosed signifier comes again to complete what the dream says — this is a dream of a dreamer under transference. The lacking signifier returns to the chain the way the foreclosed signifier returns in acting-out, when the analyst is restored to the place where he belongs giving place to the analytic act.^{17 18} This detour through Freud's concept of hallucination and Lacan's reappraisal, directed us from hysteria to its obsessional dialect. This movement is not by chance. Moreover, it points throughout its wanderings to something inherent in what we are trying to grasp. Thus, beside the vacillation of the hysterical fantasm, the group of hysterical madness brings together, dispersed as it is, structures which are not psychotic but in which a foreclosed current ... "undoubtedly capable of being activated"¹⁰ of $S(\mathcal{A})$ may lead to the confusion of a psychoanalysis of the gaze or of psychological sense with psychosis. It should not be forgotten that Sergei P. also was considered to be schizophrenic ...

Daniel Alberto Deluca,
Argentina.

NOTES

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Between the Signifier and the Letter

Jorge Rizzo

Paraphrasing a popular idiom as an epigram: "Good things are even better if brief."

Lacanoamerican Reunion of Psychoanalysis: about a year ago these words were said. They are now already part of what was said. And, as is always the case, not everything is said. Let those words work within us.

These are inviting hence enigmatic, words. They produce effects and it is even possible that somewhere else the echo sounds.

Once heard, how to listen to them? One possible way: like a name. And as such "Clean, fix and give magnificence . . ." such as the motto of the Royal Spanish Academy of Language. Another possibility is opened in the game of the signifier. And so it becomes evading, ex-voice, equivocal.¹

Regarding *Re-union* we should consider that if there was such an union the point is to re-turn² to it, with the parapraxis implied in it.

On the other hand quoting the letter of convocation, *reunion* refers to the heterogeneous elements of a summoning set.

And what are these heterogeneous elements?

Are they the institutions and/or schools, or are they the groups?³

Are they the analysts? Are they the analysands or aren't they?

As in the words of the convocation: "Those who consider that analysts have something to say to one another are convoked."

But, is it possible to tell about our work as analysts?

Perhaps it is the work of analysis which convokes, which generates transferences of work, and perhaps some other kinds too.

Regarding *Lacanoamerican*, metaphor of readers? A displacement of signifiers between *Latinoamericans* and *Lacanianians*.

An affiliation which sets up new pairs; for example, *Lacanoaustralians*.

Anyway, can we contribute with something profitable to the Lacanian matheme during this reunion?

I guess that only *après-coup* we can say this.

Jorge Rizzo,
Uruguay.

NOTES

- ¹ Homophonic play on words of the Spanish *esquivo* (evading), *equis-voz* (ex-voice) and *equivoco* (equivocal).
- ² To return-*devolver*; slang for to vomit.
- ³ Group-*grupo*; slang for lie. (River Plate area.)

Lacanianas¹

Isidoro Vegh

Landmarks of a teaching, points that write down Lacanian perspectives, straight lines which knot themselves in circles ad infinitum and question me in their spin:

- The unconscious is structured as a language.
- The unconscious is structured as a language and it is within analysis that it arranges itself as a discourse.
- The unconscious is a language that produces its own writing in the course of its sayings.
- Analyst and analysand only exchange writings.

Lacan's productive differences of the various moments of his work show the difference from the practice and theoretical scope of Freud's work.

These Lacanian perspectives stretch the Freudian limit beyond what Freud proposed both as a stumbling block and symptom of the analysis:

- * In *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* the intensity of the drives, of biological basis, is one of the obstacles to the termination of analysis.
- * In the Wolf Man's case history he decides to interrupt within a fixed term a cure which did not progress.

We put forward these last two statements as a symptomatic expression of the same difficulty.

The first statement even became a joke, after indicating biology as the ultimate solution for the neurosis. How is it possible that the creator of the myth which states that the Law returns from a dead father, would at the same time indicate chemistry as the means of giving an answer to the subject's immobility? Is there a remedy to silence a dead father's word and thus free the subject from the Other's overwhelming appetite or show him the inconsistency of the objects which hold him up?

About the second statement, the interruption which followed an analysis that went in circles making it life-long and interminable, stopped the barren cure which could not place its end.

From a Lacanian perspective, which aspect of his teaching is useful for us to situate the reason for these statements?

For Freud, the drive is opposed to the trauma, as the trauma is characterized by its contingent irruption, which is also the reason for its favourable resolution within analytic practice.

If, in turn, the accident is not the reason for the drive, the search for its origin tips the balance of its restlessness towards the answer supplied by heredity; the constitutional.

What makes the non-contingency of the drive slide towards constitutional biology as its cause? The absence of what a Lacanian perspective has to offer: the concept of structure, non-contingent, even if pre-subjective, and not hereditary.

Their structure takes us back to the first mentioned series: not only that the unconscious is structured like a language but also that the drive bases itself in the field of the Other.

The structure of the Other precedes the subject: structure which is absent in the Freudian saying, and produces instead its dream with biology.

Notwithstanding the message that came to Freud in his inaugural dream: *trimethylamine*, peak of Irma's dream, it pointed out to him that the subject's formula is nothing other than a cipher, a letter of the Other, which is to be deciphered.

The trimethylamine of chemical formulae, of the Other's biology in which Freud received his education, made itself a letter in which Freud, the analyst, found his truth.

It is within the question of the Other that the foundation of the demand, origin of the drive lies; (since the formula of the demand is that of the drive too) that the way of desire as well as another possible relationship to the drive is opened to the subject.

Lacan proposed a question: what will be the subject's relationship to the drive beyond the termination of analysis? A question we take over since it involves an answer: isn't there a limit here to surpass as it leaves outside something pertaining to the vicissitudes of the drive?

If a first moment of the analysis allows the analysand to straighten up his fantasm which through fixation he had lowered to the structure of the demand, then the ensuing time, insofar as it implies the uncovering of the appearance of being of the object which sustains his desire, sets him on the way of a double assertion. The Other does not exist (an Other that also was the place of the demand of the drive) and the object is nothing but an emptiness in whose border we find a line of the Other.

A line which is a letter, littoral between significant knowledge and the object's *jouissance*, places the value of the writings produced during analysis.

In a paper read before this meeting, Carlos Ruiz mentions the following sequence: line, cut, border. Should a line drawn on a surface cut it, the result would be a border.

Can't we think of the incidence of the Other that in its demand inscribes the line as the letter that cuts the body producing a border of the erotogenic zone where a *jouissance* is installed?

Its consequence is whether the interrogation of the Other regarding the diversities of the demands wouldn't imply for the subject another position in front of the pressure of the drive?

Perhaps we may use the narrative of someone who gave sufficient proof of interrogating the Other — he even made his teaching out of this: I propose Socrates, as Plato presents him. While Alcibiades stumbles drunk into the banquet, Socrates arrives sober, but given the chance he drinks more than anyone. He does not make an ideal out of cleanliness and order, but the moment he is invited to the party he wishes to attend, he carefully selects his clothes and attends to his bodily neatness. He does not conceal his preference for the beautiful Ephebes, but in certain circumstances he may restrain himself from varied and subtle seduction. He likes dialogues with his disciples and with those who approach him, but he interrupts their voices in order to interrogate the Other's knowledge.

An unfastening which does not deny the pressure of the drive (*Civilization and its Discontents* showed us the price of this choice) nor does it remain at the mercy of the letter — a letter which would seal the turning back from his desire as a destiny.

However, to my surprise, it was also in a text by Freud — in another case history — where I found the thesis we hold, explained better, even if its logic is unknown: the drive is the concept which writes down, that in the talking being the body belongs to the Other. This is why the object of his *jouissance*, the object of the drive, is also called a.

In the Rat Man's case history it is surprising to find the stressed anal fixation not to be the happy outcome of that cure, but rather the unveiling of a debt the Other had not paid. His parents had fulfilled a marriage of convenience — measured in terms of money — highlighting a relationship of exchange.

"So many rats, so many florins", isn't this the way the subject avows his place in the structure in which the Other fixed him? He was the child = rat, that the father gave his mother, receiving from her a position in exchange.

This anal fixation is not the heritage of a biology which could be solved by a delusional chemistry; but rather, the product of a love that renders positive the well known formula: "to give what one has not to someone who is not."

Here the Other keeps the object of his demand and resigns his desire (the father renounced loving the young and penniless woman for the riches of the woman he wasn't in love with).

Obsessional oblativity, faeces = money = gift = child: this makes the exchange an operation by which the object of the drive guarantees the lack in the Other.

Then, what Freud also brilliantly indicated is no mystery at all: the drive enjoys where it arises, (it was called erotogenic zone, but it is no other place than where the Other writes down his lack in the holes of the body).

Different erotogenic zones, different kinds of objects, point to the plurality of the drives which clinical psychoanalysis shows us in the variety of its vicissitudes.

The obsessional neurotic puts the anal drive in first place. But this does not do away with the difference that between one obsessional neurotic and another is inscribed at the level of the drive the other objects' vicissitudes. In a neurotic such as the Wolf-Man the scopophilic drive and its object, the gaze, is dominant. In the other, the Rat Man, the exercise of sadistic cruelty renders his object present in the efficiency of the voice.

How can we write the structure which inscribes different drives and their objects with the impasse of their vicissitudes — beyond the fundamental fantasm as an axiom?

If the Borromean knot with its three rings writes down the object within the crossing of the three circles, showing thus the Lacanian real as a real knotted together by means of three equivalent registers, real, symbolic and imaginary, it does not point out, instead, the object's differences and the variations in its vicissitudes within the arrangement of the different drives.

It seems necessary to us to write them down by means of a structure which is not a model, in order to place within theory a mistake which also risks its stumblings in practice.

Considering this, isn't it adequate to read in those subjects that succeeded during their analysis in following the path of their desire but, however, continued to drag the unquestioned remainders of some varieties of the drive — fixations of a style which finds its cause in the object?

We propose a structure that Lacan worked with for some time during his Seminar. Out of the knot of three rings, as with the knot of four rings, he accomplished his transformation to the corresponding tress. We make use of it since it shows the different intertwinings between the registers and permits by means of its enlargement, as long as the law of its composition is kept, the writing down of different logical moments which correspond to the different arrangements of the drives, altogether keeping the Borromean property of the structure.

So we write in its logic what Lacanian rhetorics said : the termination of the analysis requires to pass a sufficient number of times. This sufficiency also involves the passing through the multiplicity of intertwinings which border the different holes of the different drives.

The geography of *jouissance*, in its course through the diverse demands, invites us to a clinical psychoanalysis that beyond the well established models, between the universal and the particular, would gather the singular to build a series.


Isidoro Vegh,
Argentina.

NOTES

¹ I am thankful to N.Coatz, C.Marrone, P.Kovalovsky, my colleagues and companions of the Cartel on *Pass and Termination of Analysis of the Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires* (Freudian School of Buenos Aires), who stimulated with their thoughts and remarks the following lines.

NOTES

Figure 1




Borromean knot
of three rings

Borromean tress
of three threads
and six intertwinings

NOTES

Figure 2



Borromean Tress
of three threads
and twelve intertwining

Borromean Knot
the outcome of closing
the tress of three threads
and twelve intertwining

**Strachey and the Transmission of the Freudian
Field in the Anglo-Saxon Tradition.**

Rob Gordon.

“How few draw their inspiration from what is visible
to the mind alone.”

Goethe!

The Freudian Field originated in the experience recounted by Freud in his letter to Fliess of October 20, 1895.² In it, he describes how after a period of intense work, “the barriers were suddenly raised, the veils fell away” and he saw the entire psychical apparatus. *The Project for a Scientific Psychology* rapidly followed and although (or because) he never published it, the rest of his work drew on it, elaborating, correcting and completing it.

The metapsychology to which he gave birth in the *Project* delineated a new field; one which because of its disjunction from the disciplines of his time — namely philosophy, epistemology, psychology or physiology — founded psychoanalysis which still resists integration. He formulated the

presence of the unconscious and the structures which emerge from it constituting the human subject. He was audacious and alone in his rupture from the existing sciences, for his method segregated him as surely as it constituted the field. Freud made his discoveries through the word. He listened to his patients' discourse not in order to detect the presence or absence of discursive rationality, but as the material itself of his investigations. The word was accepted not as the agent of the subject articulating his thought, but as the *prima materia* of the subject, the presentation of the being before him, even though this may not have been entirely clear to him at the time. The word was not taken as one of many faculties of a Cartesian, thinking subject. Instead rational and non-rational thought, emotion, memory and forgetting, even perception became functions of language.

Freud's rapport with language constituted the domain in which the unconscious could be encountered. But in consequence, it denied him any escape into the unity of metaphysics (which according to Lou Andreas-Salome, he had no desire for,³ and in *An Autobiographical Study* he said, "I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper.")⁴ At the same time, he had to forgo the support physiology had provided for the *Project*, and allow his observations to exist for "the mind alone."

Freud makes scant reference to philosophy and philosophers in his writings. Nevertheless, it is unlikely he had only read the Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche he quotes from time to time. However, what is in question is not what he took from philosophy, but of the intellectual milieu in which he formed psychoanalysis. Freud's achievement was to differentiate an order of phenomena inherent in spoken discourse under free association, unsupported by contemporary scientific methodology. He had to discard the requirement for an observed, sense-based material. He could not go to Nature and return with an armful of phenomena, retire to his study and induct or deduct a theory from them, to be tested on a return trip to the field. But this was the method building up the optimistic scientific *Weltanschauung* of late nineteenth Germany, of which Ernst Haeckel was one of the most articulate spokesmen.

Freud formed ideas to designate the phenomena in the patient's discourse, and to found the Freudian Field. He had to give to them a status akin to that given natural observation in the sciences of his time; that is an unquestioned objectivity. Libido, the Trieb, the unconscious, defence, negation, denial, cease to be "theoretical constructs" for the purposes of psychoanalysis, but are phenomena to be observed, interpreted and analysed. Inherent in the formation of metapsychology is a confidence in

the Idea as an entity in its own right; and it is here that Freud's debt to philosophy can be detected.

German philosophy of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had undertaken a series of tasks through the work of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and others. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant had undermined reason as the sole arbiter of reality, and the later philosophers, now referred to as Idealists, had established a status for the Idea giving it an independence, which did not reduce to mere subjectivity. The content of experience was taken to be less primary than the Idea itself. Hegel, for instance said, "Nature has yielded itself as the Idea in the form of otherness."⁵

It is not that Freud accepted these notions in any explicit way, but in so far as they formed part of his intellectual milieu, they protected him from the deprivations of the blind positivism in the prevailing scientific approaches. The Germanic environment, we could say, allowed ideas to be taken seriously. But another thread was present in the milieu, and we encounter it in Freud's use of Goethe, through whose words he so often introduced his newest and most disconcerting insights. Although Freud exclusively draws on the literary works, Goethe's own scientific work was founded on the development of the scientific idea from the artistic imagination. Goethe's *Metamorphosis of Plants* lies at the basis of much of modern botany, and rests on the notion of the *Urpflanze* — the archetypal plant. Like Freud, this was something Goethe saw, it "hovered before my eye in the concrete shape of an ideal *Urpflanze*."⁶

The *Urpflanze* has the same epistemological status as the psychical apparatus. (As have also, we might add, the key imaginative insights of Kekulé in organic chemistry, and Einstein in physics, among others.) Goethe understood the problem Freud encountered when he said, "A man born and bred in the so-called exact sciences will, on the height of his analytic reason, not easily comprehend that there is something like an exact concrete imagination."⁷ Perhaps Freud's achievement was not so much to see the psychical apparatus, but to establish a discourse in which the experience could be transmitted and scientific work done with it.

Inherent in Freud's endeavour was his hostility to jargon and technical vocabulary in general. The Freudian Field was discovered in the ordinary speech of patients and he did not need to go much beyond it to describe what he found, except for occasionally borrowing from the classics, which anyway were a part of the common educated heritage at that time.

Instead he set about *resignifying* familiar words, (for example, *Ich, Es, Überich, Besetzung, and Verneinung*.) so they would accumulate associations or signifying chains to lead to the Freudian Field. He drew on metaphor and metonymy, literary and poetic sources, scientific analogy, mythology, and most importantly, wrote in a style which instead of formal inductive/deductive logic, allowed him to build up his theory by elliptical, circular and diversionary paths, to the point where he would allow an insight to dawn on the reader as the recognition of something by now already familiar. This is referred to as his literary style. But what is style if not to lead the reader into an encounter the writer has had before? Freud's style is part of the transmission of his discovery.

Into what was this body of text translated in the English speaking world? This question raises both the cultural milieu and the language and terminology. In Britain, the philosophical milieu was vastly different to that of Germany, British philosophy had been given its form by Locke and Hume. Other figures were of only limited influences at the intersection of natural science, social science and philosophy, where psychoanalysis moves.

At the very outset of Locke's philosophy, there is a wholly different stance to that of German philosophy. He says, "I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word idea," which for him denotes, "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when man thinks."⁸ Ideas for Locke are derived from sensations — which he refers to as the "this, *here and now*" — combined to form more complex notions. It is the sensation which is given the primary status.

Hume goes further and abolishes the distinction between sensation and idea, preferring to speak of "impressions" and ideas. The difference, he says, "consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind," those which are forceful are impressions, ideas by contrast, are their "faint images . . . in thinking and reasoning."⁹ The idea is relegated by Hume to become an after-effect of the impression. The possibility of an "exact concrete imagination" disappears, as philosophy is reduced to a science of reason, and even then Hume always remains sceptical about its results, maintaining that true knowledge is only at best a matter of probability — an insight which caused him deep depression.

German philosophy had surprisingly little influence in England before the second half of the nineteenth century. Early expositions of Kant were superficial and from French translations. Then Carlisle began translating

and representing German thought in his own writing, and T.H. Green provided the first serious studies of Hegel and Kant.¹⁰ However, with the exception of Bradley and some minor figures it had little impact.

British philosophy never threw reason into question as Kant had for the German world. Instead, empiricism purged it of imagination and intuition, and gave it the responsibility for modestly deducing abstract principles designed to render the facts of sensation coherent and logical. This demolition of the mind as an organ for apprehending the world led to metaphysics being disregarded in Britain and the emphasis was put on utilitarian ethics and political economy, epitomised by Bentham, Mill and their school. In this environment however, science flourished and philosophy relegated itself to providing methodological and programmatic support through such writers as Herbert Spencer. The same tendencies continue into the twentieth century with G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer.

When Strachey came to transmit Freud to the English-speaking world, we find embarrassment with metapsychology, and difficulty in knowing what to do with the *Idea*, constituted as it was in German thought as an entity worthy of respect in its own right, instead of the representative of the sensation. But for the Freudian Field, the sensation is discourse. Strachey hesitated before the encounter with the *domain revealed in discourse*. He rejected ordinary words as unscientific — too close perhaps, to everyman's encounter with his own discourse. Freud's words are latinised or greekified, and his language is generally tidied up to be more presentable in polite English intellectual society.

Freud's terminology was drawn from the ordinary language, but again and again we find the force of his word is softened, made less controversial, less unambiguous, more in line with *good taste*. Strachey alters adjectives and phrases to fit in with predictable English style. A random example comes from *The Ego and the Id* where Freud is translated to say, "The ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions."¹¹ The work translated as "common sense" is "*Besonnenheit*" which Cassell's German-English Dictionary gives as "prudence, circumspection, thoughtfulness; presence of mind; self-possession." For the English, there may indeed, be no difference between prudence and common sense, (the latter, incidentally, has been since Locke, the keystone and arbiter of all British philosophical thought.) but I very much doubt that this was the same for Freud. I pass over the more

glaring distortions such as "instinct" for "Trieb", "id" for "Es" and so on as already extensively discussed by Lacan, throughout his reading of Freud. More recently, Bruno Bettelheim has felt free to publish at last his own protest at the way Strachey misrepresented Freud in English, and gives numerous examples.¹²

Instead of ideas living in Freud's discourse in a manner that allowed resignification of ordinary language to provide access to the Freudian Field, Strachey invokes the specious authority of a technical vocabulary to imply an already established scientific status, as though there is some empiricist grounding for the notions of *Trieb*, *Es*, *Ich*, *Überich*, *Besetzung*. In English, the Freudian text can be read as a positivistic science if the empirical basis is not called into question; or it can be read as a speculative quasi-philosophical system by those who do not question the status of the concepts; or it can be rejected on both counts.

What has appealed to the English-speaking world is the efficacy of psychoanalysis. In the literature, the emphasis is on generating a conceptual apparatus to further the treatment by the development of technique at the expense of elucidating the Field in which the treatment occurs. Metapsychology as a topic occurs surprisingly seldom. When it does appear, it is amid controversy and criticism. Fine, for instance, viewing it as speculation or fantasy, says, "at every stage Freud could have deleted his metapsychological propositions ... without impairing the value of any of his major theories."¹³ Another group condemn it as a philosophical enterprise, (e.g. Schafer¹⁴ and Stoller¹⁵) while others (e.g. Gill)¹⁶ view it as a natural science and "irrelevant" to psychoanalysis which is a science of "human meanings."

Strachey's rendering of Freud has added an element of abstract pseudoscientific respectability to the ambiguous status of metapsychology. The disregard and disrespect for it have facilitated the popularisation of psychoanalytic ideas and methods, but it has been at the expense of a meeting with the Freudian Field proper, which is to demand a revolution in the conception of the human subject, his constitution, his encounter with the world and the categories of knowledge itself. In the Freudian School of Melbourne, we have been re-working the Freudian concepts in translation for ten years, according to Lacan's indication as to the intention of Strachey's work in its relationship to the Freudian Field. The signification in English of Freud's language to transmit this is a process which is perhaps only beginning.

Rob Gordon,
Australia.

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Sublimation in Reverse in the Treatment of the Psychotic Thing

John Muller

Working day after day with psychotic patients keeps one humble and at times makes one desperate. In such desperation, you sometimes try anything, however simple or strange, that may move the work along a bit further. I will speak today of one such apparently simple intervention that I have made with five psychotic patients and I will try to give specific indications for its use in a Lacanian framework. As we know, whenever there is reference to the Lacanian framework, especially in the treatment of psychosis, we must specify the relationships among the three registers of Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real. Lacan provided a useful way to do this when he elaborated the notion of *das Ding* in his 1959-1960 seminar on *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (Seuil, 1986).

Lacan approaches the notion of *das Ding* by examining how Freud uses it in the 1895 *Project* as he describes how a child learns to know an object, the first one being his mother. In Freud's *Project* the child comes to understand the mother as split into two portions, one of which is known by reference to the child's own body, while the other portion "gives the

impression of being a constant structure and remains as a self-contained Thing," (1895, p. 393) [*als Ding beisammenbleibt!*] (1895, p. 416). This *Ding* is that aspect of the mother that remains self-contained, set apart: it is "an unassimilable portion (the 'thing')" says Freud, as distinct from "a portion that is known to the ego from its own experience" (1895, p. 423).

The "unassimilable" portion of the mother, of the *Nebenmensch*, is that aspect of the Real that we touch in our earliest encounters and we carry its mark with us. Lacan says *Das Ding* is "an immense development of the essential, fundamental character of the maternal thing, of the mother insofar as she occupies the place of this Thing, of *das Ding*" (p. 82). The field of *das Ding* has to do with "the relation of the subject with something primordial, his attachment to the fundamental object, the most archaic object" (p. 127). In psychosis this "archaic object" occupies a special place at the edge of the Real for it can be said that it clings to the psychotic as a kind of tumor in a monstrous fusion keeping the subject from full access to the symbolic order. Now ordinarily this archaic object, the maternal thing, falls under the interdiction of the incest taboo, but thereby it does not disappear: on the contrary, the interdiction makes *das Ding* the supreme object of desire. Lacan states:

"... the Sovereign Good, which is *das Ding*, which is the mother, the object of incest, is a forbidden good, and . . . there is no other good" (p. 85).

This "good" is the lost object of desire which existed in the beginning only as "the void at the center of the real which is called the Thing" (p. 146). It has no name but lies at the early edge of signification. Lacan says "*das Ding* was there at the beginning . . . it is the first thing that was able to separate itself from everything that the subject began to name and articulate" (p. 100). But this thing as "absolute Other of the subject" (p. 65), can be approached in the process of sublimation, for sublimation, Lacan says, is the process that "elevates an object . . . to the dignity of the Thing" (p. 133). This approach to *das Ding* made in sublimation is problematic because *das Ding* "is precisely characterized by this, that it is impossible for us to imagine it. And the problem of sublimation is situated there" (p. 150). The problem is how does sublimation allow us to imagine the unimaginable, to speak that which has no name, to show us what cannot be seen. How does sublimation give us contact with the mystery that poets and artists and mystics and scientists have told us they are dealing with?

Sublimation gives us access to *das Ding* by circling around it in different ways: religion approaches it through a respectful displacement (p. 155) while science in its positivity forecloses it (p. 157), and so it returns in the Real as in the space shuttle explosion or the poison gas in Bhopal, India. In art *das Ding* is not evaded or foreclosed but rather repressed by means of a representation that serves to disguise the presence of *das Ding* but, in disguising, reveal its contours. Thus sublimation in art is not a reaction formation nor is it a form of self-expression creating an object that mirrors oneself. Art gives access to the void of *das Ding* by creating an illusion through which *das Ding* can appear.

Sublimation's mode of disguising is such that it brings about what Lacan calls "the revelation of *das Ding* beyond the object" (pp. 136-137). This revelation occurs through the imaginary representations that are contemporary to every age of art:

"At the level of sublimation, the object is inseparable from imaginary and especially cultural elaborations. And this is not because the collectivity recognizes them simply as useful objects, but finds there the field of detente whereby it can in some way delude itself regarding *das Ding*, whereby it can colonize with its imaginary formations the field of *das Ding*" (p. 118).

In Lacan's view the colonization of the field of *das Ding* is always historical, utilizing contemporary features of the imaginary register to disguise and thus reveal *das Ding* and, therefore, "This effort at sublimation," Lacan says, "it's true and it's not true. There is an illusion there" (p. 160). In this illusion the object that is represented is transformed, elevated to the dignity of *das Ding*; that is to say, in such a transformation of the object there is a partial lifting of the primal repression regarding the desire of the mother, the object of incest, and in this way some satisfaction of the drive is achieved.

If this structure of the drive in relation to *das Ding* and sublimation is valid, then we can attempt to relate it to psychosis where, we can say, the patient has been colonized by *das Ding* and the problem is the reverse of sublimation, namely, how to reduce *das Ding* to the status of an object which can then fall under the barrier of repression. In other words, the psychotic patient must somehow find a way to "murder" the Thing. As we know, Lacan took from Hegel the idea that the word is the murder of the

Thing (see Kojève, 1969, p. 140). The word overcomes the immediacy, the fusion with things, by opening the space of absence, of ambiguous reference to an other. The word transforms physical immediacy into symbolic presence and absence. The word can do this precisely because it is *not* a thing. But in the psychotic state the word *is* a thing, it stands by itself, it has lost its place in a signifying network and takes an ambivalent place in the patient's desperate imaginary register.

Because words have become things, the analyst cannot simply rely on words to intervene in the patient's psychotic state. Nor can the analyst attempt to rely on what has been called the "real" relationship, precisely because the contact will be experienced by the patient as *in* the Real and therefore promoting a fusional state between patient and analyst. Well, if the symbolic path is blocked and the way of the Real only provokes more craziness we are left with the imaginary register in which to work. And we find in this register, I think, the tools for our intervention, provided, of course, that we maintain our place in the symbolic order. In the Imaginary we can help the patient to construct a transitional object that combines elements of the other registers so that the object the patient constructs (a drawing given to the analyst) is on the way to becoming an emerging signifier. What I will suggest, as was suggested to me in the case of Patrick reported three years ago, is that during specific moments of the psychotic state the patient can be asked to draw something and bring it into the office. Or even to give some paper and pencil and ask the patient to draw something during a session. I have done something like his with five patients struggling with psychotic states and I will try to describe what happened briefly with two of them and, of course, I am not pretending that this was the only process involved in the treatment.

In the first case, a 38-year-old, unmarried woman who had earlier given up a child for adoption, was struggling with desperate suicidal impulses that accompanied states of psychotic disorganization. She described feeling that she was being sucked into a black hole and that she could "see" it and I asked her to draw it. She brought in numerous attempts at drawing it (she had never drawn before); it looked like a black tube. At this time she was talking of buying a tube or hose (and once she did buy it) to *put on the tailpipe of her car to funnel carbon monoxide into the car to commit suicide*. She also spoke of how, just before her hospitalization at Austen Riggs, following an automobile accident while drunk, she was in the hospital at the same time as her mother was recovering from pneumonia and that both of them had tubes "sticking out" of them. Later

this became associated with the tube of the vacuum cleaner which she used to masturbate with as a child and, when even younger, the various items her grandfather used to stick in her anus and vagina when he sexually abused her. In this case, we can speculate that the drawings enabled her to reduce *das Ding* as the void of death to the status of an object which could then enter into signifying associations with repressed content and subsequently allow for the retrieval of memories.

The second patient, Patrick, was described in *Interpreting Lacan*. In 1979, during his second psychotic episode, I had been advised by visiting Lacanian analysts to ask him to bring into the office some of his paintings he had done in the previous four months (he had never painted before). When he asked me to come to his room to see them, I repeated that he bring some into the office. He did bring in around twenty paintings, described their colors, and said, as he was leaving, "Maybe tomorrow we can stop the double-talk" and within three weeks he was no longer agitated but became very depressed. He later spoke of how one of his paintings showed what he said was his "pain-like castration."

Patrick had two more severe psychotic episodes and was discharged after five years of hospital treatment. He continued to draw and paint and from time to time bring his work into the office. In his final year of hospitalization, he said he thought he had changed. "We're all finite," he once said. At another moment, "Things are not black and white." He reported the following dream: His mother took him to a doctor's office which looked like a room in his old house, maybe his brother room. She took him there to be circumcised. When he heard the doctor tell him this, he said: "What the hell! What for? No way" and he walked out arguing with his mother saying: "I'm a man, I don't need to be circumcised." In his associations to this dream he spoke, with at times more and at times less clarity (to me, at least), about how in his current drawings he is dealing with the relationships between small and big, submission and dominance, big fish and little fish; he went on to speak of vision, of the muscles of the cornea of the eye, of the foreskin as being like an eye, of therapy as the place where he gets his "I's" (capital I) examined. He also stated that once again he was considering going to art school. I did not interpret the dream but I was recalling to myself the issue of castration in his painting of "my pain, like castration" and the notion of "we are all limited," that is, we are sexed beings, as if he had begun to inscribe this at the level of the unconscious. It was clear that something had changed. He said, "Something's hardened, like a scar over a wound, so that there is now a shelter inside. I'm more

comfortable being with myself." One day he declared, "I'm a painter, an artist, I imagine things" and I thought to myself that he had found an acceptable way to frame his crazy ideas — that is, he has managed to transform the field of *das Ding* into the field of art objects. I don't think what he does is sublimation, actually, since it does not seem to provide satisfaction in the sense of drive-satisfaction. What it provides for him is much more basic: "Art," he said, "is the third person, the third thing, like when you have two points, you need a third point to define a plane." He told me "I need something substantial, something concrete. Art is concrete, it helps me to decide what's real and what is unreal, what's human or not human, what's sane or insane . . . Art lets you get free of stereotypes to think in different ways." He told me that "some people can't move because they have no feelings in part of their bodies. Drawing helps me develop internal sensations." He has repeatedly told me that painting is where he can put his crazy ideas, and he stresses that for him "painting is not inspiration, it's survival." And he let me know that "when I stop therapy as therapy, painting will be my therapy."

Sublimation is never a one-time process but is repeated in different ways over a long period of time. Likewise, this intervention that can be called sublimation-in-reverse does not lead to instant cure; although its effects can sometimes be dramatic, it must be repeated and sometimes a patient will learn to continue to do it without saying more about it to the analyst. So if I propose it as a suggested intervention with psychotic states, I would suggest it be repeated but in the following way:

- 1) *When*: a) During a period of treatment when the transference is psychotic but not hostile; b) as the patient is struggling with a visual presentation (a memory, a hallucination); c) and is attempting and failing to articulate in words the pain or terror associated with the visual presentation.
- 2) *How*: a) Ask the patient to draw "it," "the Thing" "the monster," "the monstrous Thing," without further naming what is to be drawn; b) do not comment as an art critic and make no art therapy" interpretation but comment on the quality of its effect on you in the Imaginary, such as "intense," "painful," "colorful"; c) Allow the patient to offer, then or later, a signifier that goes along with the drawing; d) Say something when it's done about the drawing being a third, an other to the two of us, something that will remain.

- 3) *Later*: a) Keep the drawings in the office in a desk or closet or box; b) don't say anything for some months but wait for the patient to bring them up and then let them be forgotten; c) Don't frame them or display them or treat them like a usual gift from a patient.

In summary, sublimation-in-reverse is a process whereby the psychotic patient can transform the immediacy of *das Ding* into an object which can then be repressed. The goal of this process is not the satisfaction of a drive by lifting repression and not at all a kind of "self-expression" but rather the goal is to establish repression so that speech can function to carry multiple levels of signification and thereby sustain the subject.

John Muller,
U.S.A.

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The Decentration

Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin

"... The knowledge of German, though desirable, was, in another age, essential to the purposes of international connection related to our work, but it is now being replaced by English and it is hopeful that the growing political cooperation between Spanish and English-speaking countries be followed by a corresponding close cooperation in our scientific work."

Ernst Jones

(from the cordial message on the occasion of the publishing of the first issue of *Revista de Psicoanálisis*, of the *Asociación Psicoanalítica Argentina* [Psychoanalytic Review of the Argentinian Psychoanalytic Association], affiliated to the I.P.A July 1943).

"Just as a blazing fire expels all around it thousands of sparks of identical nature so do uncountable creatures emerge from and return to the undestroyable Being."

Mundahya Upanishad

"Everything or Nothing," Lacan's Daughter said to me.

It was in Buenos Aires, in July 1984 at a Psychoanalytic Mismeeting.

Apparently it was a question of dollars. Argentinians would have to pay 45 to enrol. Foreigners, 205. That was the reason why from Brazil, where I live, I asked a friend in Argentina to enrol me. A mistake: the criterion was geographic. Those of us who arrived from abroad were supposed to pay more. So I found out I owed 55 dollars, which they insisted could not be paid in Argentinian currency. It had to be in dollars.

Such Hamletian choice was the moment to understand that which had happened at a preliminary moment: I had tried to pay for the equivalent of my unexpected debt in Argentinian money, but according to the official exchange rate, that is to say, to the legal rate. Wide-open eyes, however, noticed the difference: they had expected the parallel rate (black market).

In parallel, while all that happened, the Argentinian women who were in charge of the admission learned that I was a fellow countryman and decided that 45 dollars was enough and, feeling confident, insisted on writing my name on a nametag which authorized me. I accepted because I assumed they knew something: there are boundaries. Nevertheless, a little later, I once more met the Daughter on a staircase, where she asked me my name.

Telling Lacan's daughter my name could no doubt be an interesting experience, mainly in such a Freudian place, where I was going up and she was coming down. I did so, amazed at her personal request and feeling more and more curious — maybe as a consequence of a non-sublimated professional vice (nobody is perfect) — I decided to serve as a means to the structure to see how far The Thing would go.

A little later, then, she made me that proposal: "Everything or Nothing."

Someone — apparently a non-everything (E.N.) — offered me Everything. Prudently, I said I would think about it (one should try everything) but it was just once. Afterwards I chose her Nothing.

On the following day I went there to withdraw my enrolment from that

Everything which I communicated to a native organizer, telling him that I expected them to refund the 45 dollars by means of which — at an already mythical beginning — I had assumed my Argentinian condition would be recognized.

And there I was, waiting for the next articulation of the structure, when the Daughter's Husband appeared — understandably nervous — to inform me (in French) of something to the effect that I owed the so-called *Fundación del Campo Freudiano* [Freudian Field Foundation] 155 dollars and that if I did not pay (in dollars), I would not be allowed to participate in any activities or enter any rooms or auditoriums. After some trouble, I managed to make him listen to me, "But, I'm going," in memory of the Duke of Wellington, while I showed him another place.

The Husband, flushed with irritation, retorted furiously, "Partez, partez," * maybe because he realized his warning was useless, since I had already left.

Time to Conclude then that there were boundaries rather than littorals, that the strip was not Moebius and that the disjunction was not vel.

By symbolically settling the matter, I decided to leave such aspirant to the Other a small portion of myself inside his boundary — in this case my 45 dollars — and I talked to some friends, bought some books and returned to Bahia, the black.

There an innocent voice told me, in a surprised way, that upon arriving in Rio, the Daughter had remarked, "To think that we have brought you the sun," or words to that effect, and the voice believed that she had meant the coincidence between her arrival and the end of some rain. Such a report was at least valid as a construction, since it allowed me to discover a luminous phantom (T.N.1) whose light did not emanate from a candle held by someone wrapped in a white shroud but from the king star itself. "Everything or Nothing" therefore meant "My full light or dark obscurity".

Aton returns.

* Could he have heard Goyim?*

Everything was turning clear. White waves and warm corpuscles bestowed their love gifts. There was even a quite fascinated fellow who proclaimed that that would be no less than "the debate of the lights".

Then, I remembered the Borges of *Historia de la Eternidad* [History of Eternity], who transcribes the remarkable "enthusiasm" of a Plotinian who says, "Everything in the intelligible sky is also sky. There the earth is the sky and so are the animals, the plants, the males and the sea. They have for a spectacle that of a world which has not been created. Everyone sees himself in others. There is nothing in that realm which is not diaphanous. Nothing is impenetrable, no thing is opaque and light meets light. Everyone is everywhere and everything is everything. Each thing is everything. The sun is all the stars and each star is all stars and the sun. Nobody wanders there as if it were a foreign land."

Benefits of the light when it comes from the sun.

Descartes no doubt took that into consideration in his *Tratado del Mundo y de la Luz* [Treatise of the World and of the Light], which is summarized in the fifth part of the *Discurso del Método* [Discourse of the Method]: "... for fear of not being able to hold in a treatise the whole of my thoughts, I have decided to widely expose whatever I believe to be right about light and add something about the sun and the fixed stars once it is from them that almost all light emanates. I will also deal with the skies, which transmit it, with the planets, the comets and the Earth, which make it reflect itself and I will particularly deal with the bodies which are on the surface of the Earth since they are colored, transparent or luminous. And at last with man, who is the spectator of all these phenomena."

A spectatōr at times quite curious.

And further on he anticipates a condition of equality: "Although I had supposed that God did not give weight to the matter of which the world was made, all its parts leant towards the center with equal intensity."

Equal parts, then, since they are centered.

And even when the light tries to show itself in a most diffuse way, its diffusion will always presuppose the existence of that center, since light "emanates from an object or point" and "propagates itself as radiation," as defined in the *Diccionario de Uso del Español* [Dictionary of Spanish Usage] by María Moliner and as it is declared in the dictionary of the *Real Academia* [Royal Academy]: "Light (. . .) 2, brightness irradiated by combusting, igniting or incandescent bodies." And also the *Aurélio*, a

Brazilian dictionary of Portuguese language, defines it as "electromagnetic radiation" and "emitted brightness".

Literature, Philosophy, Dictionaries. Ancient things, some handsome fellow, worried about fashion, might remark, just out of spite. Let us assure him then of the certainties of the clear and the distinct such as authorized by the university discourse: in 1949 Professor Antonio Carlos Cardoso delivered a lecture which was later transcribed and published by the Polytechnical School of the University of Sao Paulo.¹ It deals with Luminotechnology. In that publication it is assured that "Lumen is the unit of luminous flow emitted in the interior of a solid angle, equal to the spheroradian, by a pointed source of the same intensity in all directions and equal to a candle." That is, all luminous flow emanates from some source. Helio Credor, however, describing lumen in his work *Instalações Elétricas* [Electrical Installations], mentions a center: "Lumen is the amount of light which irradiates in all directions and with the same intensity as that of a candle, through an opening of 1m², from some source in the center of a sphere with a radius of 1m".

Would it be for that reason that in 1971, Lacan, when commenting on his own intention back in 1960 of enrolling his *Ecrits* in the "debate of the lights" admits that "they have mistaken the blow by a large margin", since "their purpose was to announce a knowledge that had not been in homage to any power."² (...) "but we regret (he goes on) to have to certify that those who have dedicated themselves to that subject matter (that of the lights) were a bit in the position of servants in relation to a certain kind — I should say quite happy and flourishing — of master, the nobles of their time, to have culminated in nothing else than the famous French Revolution, which had the results that you know of, namely, the settling of a race of more ferocious masters than any that had been known to that day."²

Then, as to the Master, "for The Thing to work" — we can add — implies that it be centered, and for that to happen, there must be slaves who demand to be centered, not for a love of life but for a desire of enjoyment.

Would it be on account of that, too, that Reason — when it illuminates — turns into a Goddess? Or is it that when it proposed to be a religion it did no more than go back to its sources? Anyway, it is convenient to remember that the metaphor of light is prior to the encyclopaedic optimism and to the Cartesian tenacity.

About 500 years before Christ, someone sat under a tree and lit up just like a small ontic lamp. Gautama Buddha, the Illuminated, had the intransmissible luck of knowing the truth of Being without working. Under a Bo tree (without Sarli) he emptied himself into the Nirvana and was thus able to reach the other margin, the unequalled one, that of the Whole One. He then learned that — in spite of the illusions of Maia and the suffering of differences — to be part of a Whole was a possibility. Thus he came to be Bodhisattva, "a being whose nature is illumination".

Illumination which, as Satori, was later sought by the Zen way of obedience and by the Koan.

Light which also awaited outside the platonic cave where the slaves of the senses, if ultimately liberated, could find it, and, careful enough not to be dazzled — this time through the mediated way of the Logos — could share in it the reality of Idea.

Illumination, at last, that indicates the meeting with the source of light, the emitting center, which irradiates in the appeasing shape of a Mandala.

Also in the Old Testament, among so many luminous examples, we begin to get light from Genesis, where God says, "Let there be light" and then, feeling satisfied, "sees that the light is good" (it is never too late to learn) and where, accordingly, Isaiah reminds us that it is in "the region of light that Jehovah is glorified." (24, 15).

And in the New Testament, John gives testimony of the "true light" that was about to come to the world" (1.9): Christ, now super-lazer, is announced. And good old Paul reminds us that "God is the one who said, 'Let light shine from darkness' and He has shone in our hearts to illuminate them with the glorious knowledge of God through Christ's face." (2 Corinthians, 4, 6).

Light, then, which comes from the East and results in Old and New Testaments to be later administered, organized and donated by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, the major church, "the true one".

It is its venerable priests who show the way to the celestial Broadway. Saint Augustine, for instance, encourages us, "We are the little lamp that will become a star." (See Chap. 13), he gives us hope: the word of the Lord is "a lamp for the steps of the soul". Thus "we changed from children of the night and of the shadows, which we used to be, into children of the light and of the day." (See Chap. 14). He tells us that he wants the light. (See Chap. 10). He tells us of the difference that existed in the past and of the light that now exists in the Lord. (See Chap. 12).

Saint Thomas Aquinas, too, the angelic doctor, clarifies the faith: besides announcing that "the formation or perfection of spiritual nature takes place through an illumination that makes it join God's word", he emphasizes that "divine knowledge" manifests itself "beginning the work of distinction through light, which is the shape of the first body and the most universal one. "And he remembers San Basil, "It is through light that all the other things reveal themselves."³

However, one should not believe that such certainties were characteristic of the 3rd or the 13th centuries. The Church, as an institution, even in the 20th century, assumes and affirms its function as transmitter of the luminous fluid. The Vatican Council II, in its Dogmatic Constitution *Lumen Gentium* about the Church, Chapter I, reveals to us that "because Christ is the light of the people, this Sacred Council, gathered under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, vehemently wishes to illuminate all men with its brightness, which shines over the face of the Church." And so on.

However, at this point we have glimpsed that it is not a question of the light but of the center, which is its truth. And if that is so, a religion would even be able to do without illuminations but not without references to a center, even though it is ordinary and mythical as, for example, the *Candomblé*.

Carried from Africa to Bahia by the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century by slaves (in this case negroes) in the name of some Good, the *Candomblé* was only permitted for having disguised itself through an apparent syncretism with the Catholic hagiology. Its entities — the *Orixás* — invoked by drums and ruled cadences, express themselves and live in the bodies of those who get ready to receive them in *Terreiros* — places where fetishism is practised — consecrated by the rituals and the wisdom of their priests, the *Pai* and *Mãe de Santo*, *Babalorixás* and *Ialorixás*.

But he who has that convocative power must be authorized. And he is required to do more than to keep the power of a knowledge of the rituals, or to exhibit an accomplished transmission, a transited pass. A lineage must also be revealed, emphasized, alluded. It has to do with the African connection. He who is a genuine *Babalorixá* or *Ialorixá* is articulated in a line of descent in which someone — at any time — had "an uncle from Africa" or came directly from there. A *Pai de Santo* even permits himself to be filmed: in a merchant ship, as a sailor, he arrives at Dahomey. He walks along its streets, talks to Africans, consults its oracles and returns. The images are permanent evidence, there is no question about that: he has

been to Africa. It is said that another well-known *Babalorixá*, Martiniano Eliseu de Bonfim, was sent to Africa by the priests to learn the traditions. By the way, another piece of evidence should be mentioned: the names of acts, rituals, functions, hierarchies, and all the *orixás* are African.

The Africa that authorizes, however, is a different one. Mythical Africa, center of origin,⁴ reproduces here what *Ilé Ifé* was there, a "mythical place of origin where *Oduduwa* was a "mythical mythological progenitor."⁵

All that can be said in a different way: what authorizes is the position in relation to a center. (It should be pointed out that the relationship with the center dealt with here is *NOT* the one of Kepler and Copernicus, about whom A. Koyre, in *Estudios de Historia del Pensamiento Científico* [Studies on the History of Scientific Thought], has said, "According to Kepler and Copernicus, the sun represents God. It is the visible God of the universe, symbol of God, creator who expresses himself in the created universe, and that is why it is necessary that he be in its center." The point is that what is considered here is not the concept of *MOVING AROUND* more or less elliptically but the determiners that define and situate the discourses in relation to an emitting center which may legalize them. Or, in a different way: how to articulate with a sector originated in the center. Or also: to have a place in the sun).

But this position, in its turn, implies a relation of direct contact — face to face — with the transmitter. For, besides a knowledge of some words, something takes place: the *Axé*. Invisible, sacred and magical power, vital energy, *Mana*, it does not arise spontaneously. It must be transmitted by contact. It is in objects, animals, people, places. The *Axé* is transmitted, accumulated and it grows. In order to receive *orixas*, a *terreiro* must be overloaded with *Axé*. A *Pai* or *Mãe de Santo* has *Axé*: The *Axé* is planted and then transmitted to all the members of the *terreiro*.⁵ And it is passed on to the successor chosen by the oracle. The symbolic ritual, in its turn, is also a way of transmitting it. For the contact necessary to its fulfilment implies that "the *Axé* be received from the hands and the breath of the eldest, from person to person in a dynamic and live interpersonal relationship. It is received through the body and in all the levels of personality (. . .)." The *Axé* transmission through initiation and liturgy implies the continuation of a practice, the absorption of an order, of structures and of the history and the future of the group.⁵

All of it is, in its turn, defined by another author as a "one-centered system of power" in which he who controls the transgressions is the head of the

group "who interprets the oracle of his doctrinal system."⁶

Hence it can be concluded, as another author comments, that "each member is convinced that his community is the oldest, the most faithful to the African traditions, the richest in eminent people."⁷

However, what the *Candomblé* refers to and connotes in its oral transmission is formalized in writing and set down as a dogma by the Catholic Church.

Dogma about what some people, at sometime, on hearing, saw too. And what is more: eyes that, on seeing, were and are a guarantee of the authenticity of the words, of the truth of the writing and certainty of faith.

According to the Ecumenical Council Vatican II in its "Dogmatic Constitution *Dei Verbum*" about the Divine Revelation, Chapter II, those who were in direct contact with the emitting center — the Apostles — "left the bishops as their successors, transferring their own teaching function to them. Therefore, this Holy Tradition and the Holy Writ of both Testaments are like a mirror in which the Church, peregrine on Earth, contemplates God, from whom it gets everything, until it can be taken to see Him face to face as He is" (in this case the image of God acts as a screen).

Consequently "the Apostles transmit what they themselves received," the foundations of the so-called "Ecclesiastical Teaching". Those who heard what they saw and saw what they heard — though the eye always authorizes the ear — have authority not only to transmit but also to authenticate the texts. And, through the so-called "Apostolic Succession," the first witnesses transmit the continuity of the genuine authorization to others. A chain of witnesses, therefore, based on faith, until the first ones who saw what they heard — seeing is believing — (in that case the Twelve Apostles) and that reproduces in the articulation of each one of its links the revealed direct contact — face to face — that those first ones had with the centered origin.

As it is made clear in *Sacramentum Mundi*, the Theological Encyclopaedia, in relation to what concerns the priest: "the ulterior diffusion made the naming of the helpers of the Apostles necessary. The former received their authority from the Apostles, and the legitimacy of carrying it out was based on their dependence upon the latter." And also: "However this ministry may appear as working in the name of Christ, to make its action and title legitimate, it is necessary that the particular ministries insert themselves in the historical series of the people

established by God Himself at the beginning of the chain (apostolic succession)."

But what would have happened if by some impossible chance of History the word of Christ had been recorded and shorthand written?

It may be presumed that the first schism in the new Church took place as early as 36 A.D. On one side, certainly, the Apostles, trying to establish their authority to legitimize, in the first place, the transcribed text since they would argue, "We have the moral right to set up the authentic text, we who saw and heard him, since . . ." — ah: — "nothing can substitute for the gesture and intonation." They would stress, therefore, the importance of scanning, once they would be the only ones who would be authorized to punctuate the true meaning of the sacred words.

That is why they would also be the ones to legitimize their successors — in this case the priests — and, chiefly, to claim the moral and juridical right to be the only ones who can authorize those who want to be called Christian. And they would also be able to appeal to the Roman justice so as to try to guarantee their possession of the written word of Christ.

On the other hand, those we could call the "Roman Christians" would argue, "When Moses got the two-stone tables on which the Law was written by God's hand, the tone and the gesture with which that Law had been written and transmitted to him, did not matter. What came to us was the engraved word of His Son, that is, His writing, before you came here with the intention of centering us. What authorizes them to call themselves Christians is not having been able to see the image of Christ but following His word word for word: "Cristo escristo" (T.N.²) (that would anticipate in over a thousand years the cathar heresy, and they might have been Luther's inspiring source). On such an occasion the Talmudist Hebrews could make the most of the opportunity and join the Apostles, reminding the Roman Christians that at Mount Sinai; Moses was not merely given the written Law but also the oral Law, the *Michná*, and that the words of the Torah are useless without Talmudic rabbis to interpret it.

The Roman Christians, in turn, could answer them, "But, have you by any chance forgotten that your God is invisible? Therefore, hearing his word does not mean you have seen Him. And what is more, in case Moses had been able to see something, it would have been a false idol, some Baal. And, finally, why did the Egyptians — Moses's ancestors — invent the magnetic tapes, unless they intended to go on recording their hieroglyphs, the writing that so much denies the images it shows?"

And who would be right? A problem for some theologian worried about a relative religious fiction.

As to us, for the time being, it is enough to remember what any "porteño" (T.N.³) with a good memory knows: that the lights of the center are bad because they make one get into trouble (meaning that when the naive dressmaker goes wrong, sometimes she becomes vicious).⁸ Or also presume what could have been a paternal warning from Lacan to the dazzled "mariposa" (T.N.⁴) when, in 1980, he said that "it is a lost bet to ascribe to the word what is unbearable in the light" since "what the unconscious shows is something completely different, that is, that the word is obscurantist" because "such obscurantism is its most evident benefit."

But what if all that were no more than a bright delusion in search of a center? Why not? In such a case, and being lucky, it could also even be something like the systematized, authorized and transmitted delusion that is the area of intersection between the discourse of the sense that is Religion and Psychoanalysis.

Therefore, with a few differences.

- "I am he who is being," God says.
- "I am he who is not being," the Unconscious repeats.
- "I am all One," God believes.
- "I am for the One that the Whole lacks," the Unconscious knows.
- "I am my own Self," God shows.
- "I am the Other," the Unconscious murmurs.

God reveals Himself so that before the reading — of the Unconscious, of the dreams, of the texts — one may believe in the Other.

That is why while the religious chain must transmit faith in a presence, Psychoanalysis transmits the certainty of an absence.

Knowledge of the Other's truth, therefore, which, for being so, cannot work as a screen (which, for instance, Minister Oskar Pfister could never understand).¹⁰

"I," the truth says, "that am not," could now be added to define its act of transmission.

First Motor, which — here — is the letter of Castration.

In place of the center, a hole.

It should be made clear, however, that it is a moving decentered hole."¹¹

As decentered and mobile as the Subject, whom it originates.

Metonymic mobility of Phallus, eccentric cause of the object (a), which determines that the transference on the sometimes fetishized couch be the necessary condition for the transmission of its borders — as it has so frequently been said.

A necessary but not sufficient condition.

As a matter of fact, in Psychoanalysis — and because it is so — there is no sufficient condition (a problem to Sufficiencies or to aspirants to being so).

For example, if taking the analyst's place — in the so-called cure — is placing oneself in the (a), no one becomes an analyst just because he has been qualified.

Because where *a-parece el sujeto des-a-parece*. (T.N.⁵)

It is also necessary — among other things — to have a knowledge of the letter of the Freudian discourse.

A discourse that at a certain moment had to be centered upon Freud's image. Because who, besides him and those who saw him and listened to him, would be able to know what was and what was not Psychoanalysis?

But it was more than just establishing the limits of the field of a discourse: "(...) How can those to whom he was the center of life go on finding sense in life?" Jones asks himself in his funeral sermon on Freud's death.

It was for that reason, maybe, that later he centred himself upon his life and — a pilgrim of what he understood as Freudian knowledge — decided to irradiate it, that is, to divulge it.

And it was also those who were close to Freud the ones who believed in the mission of recognizing, authorizing, legitimizing. Establishing. Continuing, this way, to give sense to their lives.

That which was also formalized, organized and administered at the I.P.A.

Because it was not just the case — in other countries and languages — of carrying out statutory rules, study plans, nomination of candidates, members and training analysts. Regulating the control. It was necessary — absolutely essential — to have a direct contact, some way or another, with an authorizer who would legitimize such activities. And not necessarily someone who had been with Freud, but someone who had been with someone who had been with him. Having been analyzed with. Having attended to. Having been to.

Axé transmitted. Professorship practiced. A chain of legitimizing succession.

Legalization through metonymy.

It is quite clear that there would be no necessity of such efforts at certainty, such a thirst for authorization, so many races to the center, if Psychoanalysis had the guarantee of a University: a diploma and then peace of mind. But in this damned thing, who authorizes whom? Where can one say he has been authorized? Being sylvanly authorized — by himself — is not enough. Because "himself" is "the Other." So, who is and where is the Other who authorizes?

The Other — who existed to them — was in the center.

That is why, when, in other countries and languages, a founder — or some of the first — did not have the center as his origin or transient stay, either acceptance and recognition were required of him or it was demanded that someone be sent to legitimize him with his presence. And, otherwise — or even so —, recharging the battery from time to time: a somewhat quick pilgrimage to Mecca. For example, "having visited Tavistock."

Reinforcing the phallic Axé soothes uncertainties and chases away the terrible ghost of bastardy.

Nevertheless, nearness is also a necessary topo-logic condition (though not sufficient) of treason.

Because now it is known that it was exactly his apostles who, supported by his image, deviated from his word. Having seen him did not mean — necessarily — having heard him.

And so it was that one passed from a center to another: from Vienna in German to London in English. The translations inverted their direction. And now, Paris in French?

There is some evidence that — to some — that is expected.

"I believe that it is up to us to estimate that Lacan's foreign readers who will be in Paris in February will come with some expectation — I would say very great expectations — regarding those who, in France, had the opportunity of keeping a direct contact with Jacques Lacan's seminar and practice. We will be then — actually — in a position to bear witness, on our part, about the effects of his teaching, and not to bear witness abstractly, but providing that we know how to demonstrate efficiency at a clinical level," someone said with a certain naivete in 1982.¹²

Or still another: "For, now, I believe that we have, more than anyone else, the privilege of being directly around Lacan, and that, therefore, a new phenomenon, of a certain homogeneity, will be produced between us, who have been with Lacan, and those who have not," concluding that "they expect a great deal from us because we had the benefit of the teaching to which the presence of Dr. Lacan contributed so much."¹²

And together with the centred hopes of those who wait for the hopes of others, there appear differences between his discourse and the discourse of those who saw him. For example, between the symptom and the phantom or between the signifier and the object (a) one tries to establish an oceanic distance.¹³ One says that in Lacan "not all is signifier," as if at any time he had stated — or suggested the opposite. One replaces transmission by divulgence, inevitable effect when the goal is centering.

Psychoanalysis cannot avoid being interested in such a phenomenon because, if what gives consistency to certain masses is their identification with a common trait, it is time now to know whether the place of the psychoanalytic institutions is constituted by the utterance of a tradition that may assure some kind of pertinence or by the significant annunciation and the letter.

Then, is it true that history is repeated once again, the same love, the same rain, the same mad, mad eagerness?¹⁴ Here, the tango is mistaken: what is repeated is not history. Something real goes on banging its impossibility. And the little that there may be of history in the repetition signals its failure: if something is repeated, it is only the difference.

And the difference — now — is called Lacan.

"Freud's originality — which disconcerts our feeling but which is the only one that allows us to understand the effect of his work — is the appeal to the letter. It is the salt of the Freudian discovery and of analytic practice. If, still,

nothing of that had fundamentally remained, nothing of Psychoanalysis would have long been left. There is the origin of everything."¹⁵

Appeal to the letter, we can add, that did not mean just to decipher "this Other that speaks in the Subject" in the mnemonic traces or in the dream hieroglyphs, but also in the letters that flourish in his writing, the one with which he continues transmitting, letters speaking of other letters.

This was said in May, 1956. And in February, 1986, we can add, that was Lacan's originality as well. Because, for example, what are mathemes if not also — and not only — his appeal to the letter?

Perhaps because Freud's image did not work as a screen for him.

Because his legalizing support was no allusion to a succeeding lineage — having been analyzed with Lowenstein, as it is sometimes (*h*)ippically mentioned: the return to Freud made one go back to the reading of his letter. And it is in it that Lacan is authorized.

With that act, by placing himself outside the successive chain of contact, he decenters himself.*

That is why those who look for a contrary movement, trying to find the centre again, insinuate that "it was not the result of a deliberate election (...) the way Lacan found himself chased out of the international movement," making an effort to cause the prescription of the fact that, if he was excommunicated from what he called the S.A.M.C.D.A., that was precisely the effect of that going back to the letter and the writing of Freud and not of any anecdotal "false manoeuvre". And if later one tried to offer a justification for he who shamelessly requires to become centred, suggesting that "his students throughout the years, worked hard to deserve coming back,"¹⁶ it would thus be true with the addition that Lacan named what now some call "make merits" — among other things — "negotiation" in which he was the object of interchange. And about that he commented:

"The situation concerning that, therefore, had nothing exceptional, except for the fact that the Being negotiated by those whom I have just called colleagues, even pupils, sometimes, when seen from outside, receives another name."¹⁷

* From this point of view, what is the Pass but another way of decentering?

Nevertheless, the most effective betrayal is not that of kisses and fig trees, where the evil one knows he is evil and damned forever. Sometimes betrayal is what is committed in the name of the betrayed. With the due differences, it is what Luther, Lenin and Lacan came to know.

Three I's. L of letter.

For that reason, decentering and coming back to the letter of those to whom an image — some way or another — worked as a screen.

For how to give origin without killing the Father? Every hero is a murderer who manages to have a place in the Other (that is what is believed). But not all the murderers are sure of the singing mornings. How, then, to rectify without deviating? A problem for those with urethral fixations.

As for us, let us remember that the Name of the Father is that of Knowledge in place of Truth. That is, it is a Knowledge of the Non-Everything. Knowing that the truth of S_1 is $\$$.

Written knowledge then.

And if the subject, as such, is castrated, it is because he was constituted in another, also castrated. Inexistent. Neither image nor substance. Only a mark of place, which a voice — as that of the Other — makes on the Real, and which will be recovered afterwards — *nachträglich* — as letter S_1 , of his first identification, unitary trace that will represent him — as well — to another signifier, S_2 .¹⁸

And which could be formalized this way:

$$\frac{\text{LETTER}}{\text{MARK}} \rightarrow \frac{S_1}{S_2}$$

The Letter is to the Mark as the Unitary Trace is to Knowledge.

And that is why the cry will name silence.

The Father must be dead to be able to hand over his Name.

Symbolic death, but what does this death mean?

That the Father is Letter.

Can there be, then, transference to the Letter?¹⁹

The Letter is to the writing as the signifier is to the discourse.

Discourse and writing that, on seeking sense, move towards Phallus.

Letter and signifier that make a mark by fixing the senseless, place of the object (a) that empties the bar dividing the subject.

Apposition of the letter and the signifier, therefore to the writing and the discourse.

But, on the other hand, there is a difference between letter and signifier.

Difference between differences.

To begin with, if a signifier represents a subject to another signifier, a letter seems to represent nothing.

But, when it is linked to a writing, it represents a signifier to another letter.

Because the Letter — like the Phantom — is the effect of a signifier.²⁰ In this case, residue, remainder which like (a) falls into the Real.

Falling that will not necessarily go downwards: it may be the tracks that the smoke of a plane draws on a blue sky, the quick strokes on the calmness of a wall, the badges of ambitions and memories on a tattooed body, the violent marks of a God on an indifferent stone.

And also, of course, clay, wax, parchment, paper.

Tridimension of the Borromean knot that — in its intersections — constitutes its own space.

But always a continuity disturbed by an abrupt discontinuity of a letter.

For that reason, the Letter — just like the Moebius strip — has a face, which closes itself in a symbol and cuts a difference: the signifier, like the echo of a voice. The other face — the impossible one — is turned to the continuously open, the Real of silence, mute letter always in its place.²¹

And the Letter has also an image, like Janus standing on the boundaries — doorkeeper on duty of entrances and exits, guardian of the holes, between that which opens itself and that which closes itself.

It is on account of all that, for instance, that the courteous purpose of writing a love letter with the same element as the one with which one can make some soup sometimes arouses a certain enjoyment.

Transference to the letter, therefore, when, while articulating itself into writing, it represents a signifier which is — also — a metaphor for a subject:

Supposed Subject of the Letter, who is supposed to have a knowledge.

If it is "impossible to know who reads" or will read that which one writes²², it is possible to assume that the subject of the letter has a knowledge: that of knowing about the reader's desire.²³

Because if it is true that de-supposing the knowledge may be one of the conditions of reading — to read with hatred — ²⁴, it is no less true that the reading may lead a subject's desire from the hole of his lack as could be testified by those many people who have fumbled in dictionaries, peeped at the Kama Sutra, intended to know the Art of Loving and approached Freud's and Lacan's writings in awe.

Transference to the letter, also, that explains the impossible of the "zero degree" of any writing, even that of the subjectless letters of Logic.

For both writing and reading are two acts of transference: I write to another whom I assume to have a knowledge of the enjoyment that my rhetoric conceals. I read *from* an Other whom I assume to have a knowledge of my desire.²⁵

Transference to the letter, thus, that explains what is sacred in so many books, because one goes on asking them, interpreting them, because one loves them, one hates them, passion of the Hermeneutics, niceties of the Exegesis, living books, ink-and-paper-scented fetishes. Because of the Guardians of the Letter, the fire of the autos-da-fe, the Index, any censorship.²⁶

"May heaven exist, though hell is my place. May I be offended and annihilated, providing that Your huge Library be justified in a being, at a certain moment," Borges says.²⁷

Decentration is a consequence, therefore, of the possibility of transferring — also — to the letter, and not only to the image, which does not annul, of course, the imaginary support: the Borromean property, as it does to the subject, constitutes the letter. And neither can one, sometimes, help loving the one supposed to have a knowledge.

But it now becomes evident that the psychoanalytic institutions are the effect of discourse supported in writing, and, therefore, that the direct contact with the founder does not — necessarily — guarantee the transmission.

Which, on the other hand, forces us to infer that the founders can sometimes be mistaken. Like, for instance, Plato about Speusippus or Perón about Lopez Rega.

And even if their mistake had been due to sordid manipulation or little machiavellian deeds, why did they not know of them?

The gist is that if there are no small possibilities, what to say of guarantees? (T.N.⁸)

Knowing that the Other does not exist, when it concerns a fellow human being, is different from when we are the ones who participate in the ball, whether it is on a couch, in the street or in the letter.

And now the ball seems to be the Cancan: "We are all Lacanians . . .," and so forth.

That is why there are some — subaltern, of course — who try to make merits by self-centering. Maybe because they are fond of crosseyed women, since they may be facing another Hamletian dilemma: if Erdosain had been the man that made a speech at the Sorbonne, would he have killed the crosseyed woman?²⁸

Longing for the center, impatience for the authorization, thirst for approval, passion that cannot now hide itself behind a pudic fan, because Lacan's image has not worked as a screen for Oscar Masotta in Argentina — among others in other countries.²⁹

Neither does that depreciate the probable theoretical production or even the clinical efficiency of such hedonists: there was a knowledge in the slave of Plato's *Menon*.

The situation — which is new in Psychoanalytic history — is that from Lacan's rupture, authorizing himself in the letter, authorizing oneself in relation to a centre, does not guarantee anything either.

A different story, then, in which, if the centre cannot probably be avoided, there will not be just one but many — a set of ones —, and in which the pass through the letter and the risk of the writing will be other necessary conditions of recognition.

"We wish this book would preserve its razor's edge for all men who are fated to make the furrow of a lack pass, that is, for all men, and also for those who feel miserable because of that, in other words, for many of them," Lacan asks of the readers of a book: *Andre Gide's Youth* by Jean Delay. One can also extend that demand to the letters of his words and to his own writing.

Writing to nobody, because Oedipus' sepulchre — not at all saintly — is invisible.

Joao Cabral de Melo Neto, a Brazilian poet, puts it this way:

O POEMA

A tinta e á lapis
escrevem-se todos
os versos do mundo.

Que monstros existem
nadando no poco
negro e fecundo?

Que outros deslizam
largando o carvão
de seus ossos?

Como o ser vivo
que é um verso,
um organismo

com sangue e sopro,
pode brotar
de germes mortos?

O papel nem sempre
é branco como
a primeira manhã.

É muitas vezes
o triste e pobre
papel de embrulho;

e de outras vezes
de carta aérea,
leve de nuvem.

Mas é no papel,
no branco asséptico,
que o verso rebenta.

Como um ser vivo
pode brotar
de um chão mineral?³⁰ (T.N.⁷)

Bibliography and Notes

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- 2 *The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge*. Lacan's talks at St.Anne. 1971/72.
- 3 St. Thomas Aquinas. *Suma Teológica*. Tomo III. *Cuestión LXVII: De la Obra de Distinción en si misma* [On the work of distinction itself], *Artículo III. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, La Editorial Católica, S.A., Madrid*.
- 4 *Mitológicas* [Mythological], *Lo Crudo y lo Cocido*. C. Lévi-Strauss. F.C.E. Cf. *Obertura* [Introduction], p. 15 L. S. differentiates the "Anaclastics," the science of the myths, as a "study of rays lacking any focus" (...) "that admits in its definition both the study of the reflected rays and of the refracted ones of the mythical thought which manifests itself under the aspect of irradiation, for which only the measure of its directions and of its angles leads to postulate a common origin (...)." Illusion, then, of the mythical thought about "coinciding with its object — of which it makes a homologous image — but without ever managing to fuse with it (...)."
 - 5 *Os Nagô e a Morte* [The Nago and Death] . Juana Elbein dos Santos. Ed. Vozes, Petrópolis, 1977.
 - 6 *A Família-de-Santo nos Candomblés Jeje-Nagô da Bahia: um estudo de relações intra-grupais*. [The Family-of-Saint in the Jeje-Nagô Candomblés in Bahia: a study of intergroup relationships] . Vivaldo da Costa Lima. Salvador, Bahia.
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 - 8 The Young Dressmaker who took a wrong step: a character of Buenos Aires mythology that refers to a naive girl who fell down for having opened her legs wide.
 - 9 *Light*: Talk by Lacan, on April 15, 1980.
 - 10 *Correspondencia 1909-1939*. [Correspondence 1909,1939] .S. Freud, O.Pfister, F.C.E.
 - 11 Contrary to what is claimed by the Hegelians Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in *El Título de la Letra (una lectura de Lacan)*. [The Title of the Letter (a reading of Lacan)] for whom the subjects's bar is his centre. Ediciones Buenos Aires.

- ¹² *Actes de l'Ecole de la Cause Freudienne*. Fev., 1982. [Minutes of the School of the Freudian Cause. February, 1982].
- ¹³ Cf. *Crítica en el Campo Freudiano*. Isidoro Vegh. In: *Actualidad Psicológica*: 109, Marzo, 1985. Or, in English: Critique in the Freudian Field. In: *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, 1985.
- ¹⁴ Part of the lyrics of an Argentinian tango.
- ¹⁵ *The Psychoses*. III SEMINAR. Lecture: Freud in the century. J.Lacan.
- ¹⁶ Cf. letter to *Correo del Campo Freudiano en España* [Post of the Freudian Field in Spain], by J.A.Miller, on June 5, 1985.
- ¹⁷ *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. XI SEMINAR. J.Lacan, 1964.
- ¹⁸ *Mitológicas. Lo Crudo y lo Cocido* [Mythological. *The Raw and the Cooked*]. C. Lévi-Strauss. F.C.E. Cf. *Obertura* [Introduction], p.36. L.S. differentiates musical sounds as opposed to noises, "only data sub specie naturae." From that standpoint, one can say that noise is to sound as the mark is to the letter.
- ¹⁹ I had already finished this paper — *The Decentration* — when I came to read the review *LUGYR*: 9, 1977, published by the *Colegio Freudiano do Rio de Janeiro* [Freudian College of Rio de Janeiro]. In that issue, M.D.Magno, in *Senso Contra Senso da Obra de Arte — Arte e Psicanalise* [Sense Non sense of the Work of Art — Art and Psychoanalysis], defines what he calls *Semasionomy* as, among other definitions, "a dialogue between the psychoanalytical discourse (. . .) and the letters" (of the work of art), or as "contemplation that chooses transference as its field of work." And that because "what the work of art can only represent is the subject. to another work of art." I find myself in coincidence with that definition, though, on my part, I limit myself to the transference to the writing and its letter, specifically in that case, in relation to what concerns that of the transmission of Psychoanalysis.
- ²⁰ *The Psychoanalytic Act*. XV SEMINAR. J.Lacan, on March 20, 1968, said, on referring to the phantom: "(. . .) when you see someone begin to speak of the phantom of the origin you can be sure that person is dishonest; there is no other capturable phantom but the hic et nunc, and that from the present standpoint; that is the very origin of the phantom (. . .)"

- ²¹ *La Instancia de la Letra en el Inconsciente. Escritos* [The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious. *Escritos*]. J.Lacan: "(. . .) the letter, that is, the essentially located structure of the signifier."
- ²² *Time to Conclude*. XXV SEMINAR, 1977-78. J.Lacan.
- ²³ Cf. *El Placer del Texto* [The Pleasure of the Text]. Ed. Siglo XXI. Roland Barthes. p.38: "The text is a fetish object and that *fetish desires me*. The text elects me by means of a set of arrangements of invisible screens, of selected subtleties: the vocabulary, the references, the legibility, etc; and, lost in the middle of the text (not *behind* it, as a *deus ex-machina*) is always the other one, the author. As an institution, the author is dead: his civil, passional, biographical person has disappeared; depossessed, he no longer exerts his formidable paternity upon his work, whose report was to be established and renewed by the literary history, as well as by the teaching and the opinion. But in the text, in a way, *I desire the author*: I need his figure (which is neither his representation nor his projection) as much as he needs mine (except if it merely "whispers")."
- ²⁴ Cf. Auñ, SEMINARIO XX [Encore, XX SEMINAR], 1972-73. Ed. Paidós. J.Lacan says, referring to the authors of *El Título de la Letra* [The Title of the Letter], Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, who were mentioned in item (11) above: If I say people hate me, it is because they de-suppose that I have the knowledge. And why not? Why not if it comes to be the condition of what I have called reading? After all what can I presuppose that Aristotle knew of? Maybe I can read him better as much as I presuppose that he knew less. That is the very condition of a strict testing of reading.
- ²⁵ Roland Barthes contradicts himself when he affirms in the review *Tel Quel*: 47 that "the act of writing is not transferential" (Interview with Jean Thibaudeau): Perhaps, conversely, transference differentiates the position of one who writes from that of a writer. Because, again, in *El Placer del Texto* [The Pleasure of the Text], one reads: "Writing is this: the science of the joys of language, its kamasutra," perhaps because later one comes across with "The writer is the one who plays with his mother's body (. . .): to glorify it, to beautify it or to pull it to pieces (. . .)."
- ²⁶ Among so many examples of transference to the letter is *Advertencia* [Warning] by Augusto Bunge, who made a versified translation of the first part of Goethe's *Faust* into Spanish, edited by the Anglo-Germanic Department of the Institute of Literature of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the U.N.B.A., or else, by Goethe himself, in *Memorias del Joven Escritor* [Memories of the Young Writer], book II, p.58-9, in the Austral collection.

- ²⁷ *Ficciones, La Biblioteca de Babel* [Fictions, Babel Library]. Jorge Luis Borges.
- ²⁸ Erdosain, the main character in two novels by Roberto Arlt: *Los Siete Locos* [The Seven Lunatics] and *Los Lanzallamas* [The Flamethrowers]. *El Hombre que habló en la Sorbona* [The man who made a speech at Sorbonne], a short-story — by Alberto Gerchunoff.
- ²⁹ Presenting the *Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires* [E.F.B.A.] — as Masotta did before Lacan in 1975 — did not mean asking for permission to found it. One of the differences between him and St. Theresa.
- ³⁰ Maybe not so curiously, in *Aún* [Encore], on referring to Knowledge and Truth, Lacan compares the letter to a germ which “is at a time a vehicle of life and death.”

Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin
Salvador, Bahia.
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Translation: Núcleo de Tradução do
Departamento de Letras
Germánicas da UFBA
(Universidade Federal da
Bahia)
A. Schaer
J.de Freitas
M.A.C.Ferreira Gomes
M.C.L.Dos Santos

Translators' Notes

- TN Here, as well as in other parts of the text, the author favoured the use of the word *phantom* rather than *phantasm/fantasm* to express a notion which is different from the notions conveyed by the words *ghost* (also used in his paper) and *fantasy*.
- TN “Cristo escrito” means “Christ is Christ.” Here a pun is made upon the words *escrito* (written) and *es cristo* (is Christ).
- TN Native or inhabitant of Buenos Aires.
- TN “Mariposa” is the Spanish word for “moth,” and a way of referring to a fascinated person.
- TN The author decomposes the words in order to make a pun with reference to the *objet petit a*: “a-parece” means both “a appears” and “a seems to be,” while “des-a-parece” means both “disappears” and “does not seem to be.”
- TN The original text reads “Es que si no hay garanabuelas mucho menos garantias.” The author makes a pun on the word *garantía* (guarantee) to stress the lack of both small and great certainties, by referring to them in terms which evoked the hierarchy in a family group — in that case, the one between grandmothers (in Spanish, “abuelas”) and aunts (“tías”).
- TN The Poem
- All the verses in the world are written in ink and pencil.
What monsters are there swimming in the black and fecund well?
What other ones slide sloughing off the coal of their bones?
How can a living being which is a line of verse, a blood-and-
breath organism, spring from dead germs?
Paper is not always white as the first morning.
It is often the sad and poor wrapping paper;
It is some other times cloud-like light, airmail paper.
But it is on paper, on the aseptic white, that the verse bursts.
How can a living being spring from the mineral ground?

Editor's Note

- EN Here the author introduces Lacan's formulations of the woman as being not-all.
- See Seminar *Encore, A lover letter and God and the Jouissance of the Woman*.

**Feminine Position and the Woman's *Jouissance*
"The Devil In The Body"**

Benjamin Domb

Lacan introduces the formula, *the*, in his seminar *Encore* (1972/73), after having developed his logic formulae of sexuation in his two preceding seminars.¹ Let us remember them : for those who inscribe themselves on the side *man*, we have $\forall x\Phi x$ which states that man as a whole inscribes himself through the phallic function, which in turn finds its limit in the existence of an *x*, which denies the function $\exists x\Phi x$ — this being called the function of the father. On the side *woman*, $\bar{\forall} x\Phi x$, which finds no limit in $\exists x\Phi x$, there is no *x*; this is to say, it states inexistence and denies phallic function - a formula of the Impossible.

He writes : *The*. And in a certain way, this overflows the formula $\bar{\forall} x\Phi x$; which has to be read as follows : not-all the woman inscribes herself through the phallic function; we make clear that this is not the only way of reading it, since these four logic formulae keep an inter-relationship so that each one of them re-establishes the other's place. What has driven Lacan to assert these developments after having stated the four discourses in his Seminar *L' envers de la psychanalyse*, 1969/70? We know that one of these

discourses is the discourse of the hysteric, also called the discourse of the analysand. Starting from this discourse, Lacan tries to situate what woman is, as being that which becomes the hysteric's truth, i.e. the object *a* in place of the truth. For the hysteric this meant producing a knowledge (*savoir*) about the woman, which Lacan connotes with impotence; but, at that time, it also meant to reach anything which could be thought about woman through the hysteric.

No doubt this was not enough. It is not through the hysteric that the woman is reached. This discourse does not make out of the woman anything more than her resemblance, since (as Lacan demonstrates shortly after this), the woman is not to be reached starting from any discourse at all: she is an out-of-discourse, that is, a real.

From hysteric to woman: within this split, Lacan's teaching writes down the two assertions; a fundamental starting point to grasp not only psychoanalytical theory but its practice as well:

"There is no sexual relationship"
since
"The woman does not exist"

This is written in the formulae of sexuation; and it appears on the lower part of the graph in the Seminar dated 13/3/73² which re-situates the place of the real as what does not cease from not writing itself down. This, in Lacanian algebra, is annotated $S(\bar{A})$ - signifier of the barred Other - which means that in this point the unconscious does not answer, that there is no Other of the Other; and, furthermore, the above mentioned the which points that the woman does not exist - or that there is no signifier of the woman in the unconscious.

This allows me to formulate the following algorithm, which, even if not directly written in Lacanian work, does not seem a forcing beyond limits:

a
the Here, *a* occupies the place where the woman offers herself as man's object of desire, and the points to the only place where the woman receives her certainty, that is, her *jouissance*: nothing defines the woman other than her *jouissance*. Of course, this *jouissance* is beyond words.

"There is her *jouissance*, *jouissance* of she who does not exist and who signifies nothing. Perhaps she knows nothing about her *jouissance*; except

the fact that she feels it: yes, this she knows. Of course, she knows it when it happens. It does not happen to all of them."³

What I try to write down by means of this algorithm is a split, which, in turn, intends to clear up the confusion which arises between that which seems to be the feminine position, and that other thing which is her *jouissance*: to say it in another way, it is not through her position that the woman receives her *jouissance*.

Before developing this algorithm any further, let us briefly see what Freud tells us about women. First of all, we should recall that they are an enigma; as Lacan says, E^e , an enunciation which has no statement.⁴ But shortly afterwards Freud, by means of the symbolic equation child-penis, makes of the woman a mother. This is the best outcome, since, should this not happen, the result would be inhibition of sexuality (i.e. frigidity) or masculinity-complex which would drive her to homosexuality. However, Lacan will take profit from a footnote to Dora's case history. Throughout most of his teaching, Mrs. K's example shall be the one to bear the emblems of femininity and this because of Dora's father, who had marked her out as such.

This means no less than leaving a man — not any man: a father — to solve the enigma through the way of his desire. This places us completely on the side "man" of the graph of sexuation. About this "side", Lacan says to us: finally, man does not make a couple neither with the signifier, since this one rather represents him (the phallic signifier); nor is he a couple to the woman, since she does not exist, as there is no signifier of the woman. He makes love to her unconscious, and forms a couple with the object *a*, cause of his desire, and through which he tries to reach the Other sex, this being nothing other than the fantasm which occludes the Other's lack $S(\bar{A})$. In this, man is to be considered a polymorphous perverse.

Clinical psychoanalysis yields enough evidence of this: for men, women are nothing other than objects of desire; and the women complain about this. We know which are the attributes of femininity prized by him: they are nothing other than a piece of the body; in case she dares to, she knows well how to stress the appearance of this piece; and fashion is designed to this very purpose: tight pants, mini-skirts during some periods, low-cut dresses, topless, or even bottomless bathing suits — anything within her fancy, she precisely does this to arouse desire, after which she complains about being considered as an object. Now, if by any chance, man would not see this piece of body, this resemblance of *a* in her, and would imagine

himself facing the woman in her essence, the results would not be encouraging at all: impotence or premature ejaculation would be the outcome. This is why we state that man does not tolerate the woman; he transforms her, as best he can, to object *a*. On the other hand, the statement "you are my woman" uttered by a man, constitutes his mate as a woman, let us say, symbolically, and this does not mean she reaches anything related to *jouissance*: she only succeeds in being a woman because man has determined her. This is the tragedy of many women who desperately look for a man to reach their feminine identity and who do not find it, because the starting point from which they seek it is unknown.

What happens to her when she finds herself subject to masculine desire? This is what we know as feminine masochism. The woman identified herself to the object *a* is a masculine fantasm to which the hysteric lends herself occasionally, in her attempt to reach the woman, starting from that position were she to find any satisfaction in this, thus stressing her superiority - since it is she who bestows potency to the man. In that satisfaction she hardly ever finds her *jouissance* anyway, since, identified to the object *a* what she finds is the phallus. In any case, in the non existing sexual relationship, woman is the dictator, because the same depends on her, since both are interested in her *jouissance*; and the relationship is only considered successful if it is she who reaches her orgasm: he is there only to satisfy her.

Let us consider her then; she, who is not-all-phallic, that is, she is divided/unfolded, since even if on one instance, she inhabits language, on the other, not-all-of-her inhabits it: there is no signifier of the woman. This is why we may clearly distinguish two different types of *jouissance* in her.

Some women only obtain the so-called phallic *jouissance* but do not reach the Other *jouissance*; that is to say, they never end. They may be tired, but still want to continue; but the moment they seem to reach this goal, it goes backwards, and everything starts again, as having obtained nothing. Everything is ready to start again, always leaving a remainder to be completed. It is an infinite *jouissance*, not because of its enormity, but because it is interminable. What happens to her? Like man, she looks for her object — what she lacks of — and does not give up her hope of obtaining it. In this, the hysteric remains stopped, identified to man in what Freudian theory terms the phallic phase. This is why on some occasions, clitoral *jouissance*, eminently phallic in its nature, puts an end to the matter. This *jouissance* has the same structure we find on the masculine side, and

depends on the fact of inhabiting language. Now it may happen — in fact it does — that a moment arrives in which she does not reach her goal but, in turn, becomes aware that she lacks her object, and in her despair she does not find hope any more. There, precisely, she finds her *jouissance*; i.e. she may reach the *jouissance* of this very lack. The woman is the one who accepted loss, to attain this Other *jouissance*.

The *jouissance* of the object as opposed to the *jouissance* of the lack:

"If the talking being really lacks something, it is not so much the object *a*, but this very hole in the Other which articulates itself $S(A)$, completely out of the Symbolic."⁵

It is this very absence of the Other that the woman enjoys, and the absence of the woman's signifier is useful to her in reaching it. This means that the moment she faces the emptiness of the lack of her essence as a woman, this emptiness itself covers up the emptiness of the Other in this sort of exact coincidence.⁶

Therefore, let us note down the following affirmation: it is not phallic *jouissance*, the *jouissance* linked to the signifier, which makes the access of the woman's supplementary *jouissance* possible; on the contrary, this signifier becomes an obstacle to this Other *jouissance*, since precisely the woman enjoys this very absence of a signifier. Her aim is to pierce into that place which is already interior to her, and to reach the presence of the absence which inhabits her; of an "asceticism" which finds its origin in a single movement, performed in an absolute radicality. In this moment, the woman lets herself go, extricates from man, in the sexual act; she lets herself go to enjoy the Other *jouissance*.

This access to the Other *jouissance* is a moment of unfastening of desire, of all register of demand. She does not care about not possessing the phallus. She does not claim it anymore, and she does not want a symbolic substitute for it either; a son. She gives up all projects, she gives up the future, she gives up speech and all will, even the will to enjoy. It is an absolute present — she simply enjoys.

Although in this movement the woman finds her intimate essence again, she becomes a desert, a strange nameless thing; and in this despoilment she finds her essence again.⁷

She tries to be like the very unlikeness itself, she tries to become foreign, strange to herself, to become Other, ultimately, to become this very alterity itself.

She tries to become a woman, and this is the reason why she does not exist; because the very moment she becomes it, she does not exist. It would be very difficult to say it otherwise.

However, not only does she become void, she also plunders the Other of all his qualities and defects, of all human quality; that is to say of all his difficulties for *jouissance*. The Other loses even his name; he does not have it. In theory, this is formulated $S(\bar{A})$. This movement is performed simultaneously to her own despoilment. Since what would it mean to become void herself while the Other retains his place, if it were not to make herself object *a* of the Other's desire? She would offer herself to be enjoyed by the Other, and would not reach her own *jouissance*.

Obviously — the word is missing — this means something which is not a relationship, but the covering - up of a void: *the*, by means of another void, $S(\bar{A})$.

By now it will have become clear that this also means a loss of all subjectivity, a de-subjectification. How could we not consider then, the difficulties and even the terror this means, and to a certain extent that it explains all of the problems we find in clinical psychoanalysis, involving this *jouissance*? It means nothing other than the foreclosure of the symbolic. This is the reason why it is said that some of them enjoy like mad whilst other women are afraid of this very madness. As we have said, the woman inscribes herself not-all in the phallic function: she unfolds herself: on the other hand she is related to the phallus, as the graph² shows, and on the other, being radically Other in the so-called sexual relationship, she is closely related to $S(\bar{A})$, God, without a name; *the* woman is then one of the names of God.⁸

This is the reason why I associated Marco Bellocchio's film *The Devil in the Body*, since the devil is one of God's names too. And whereas she suffers this unfolding we spoke of, she also becomes split between her resemblance — object of desire, i.e. her position — and her *jouissance*.

There are beautiful women who do not enjoy; there are also other women, not so beautiful, but with no difficulty whatsoever to reach their *jouissance*.

There are some, beautiful or not, who claim to be looking for a man they never find. Finally, other women, beautiful or ugly, young or old, never look for him and always find him. Nobody knows what they do, not even themselves, but no doubt these are women who know how to transmit


something: we "recognize" in them the devil (*the*) in the body (*a*).

Benjamin Domb,
Argentina.

Notes

This paper articulates itself, and in many aspects overlaps with my recent *The Fault of the Unconscious is "Herlove"*, soon to be published in *Cuadernos Sigmund Freud*, N°10.

- 1 LACAN, J. The Seminar, "...ou pire" 1971/2.
- 2 LACAN, J. The Seminar, *The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge (Savoir)* 1971/2.



- 3 LACAN, J. The Seminar *Encore*, p. 90, Ed. Paidós, Buenos Aires.
- 4 LACAN, J. The Seminar *Le Sinthome* 1975/6. Unpublished.
- 5 LACAN, J. The Seminar *L'Insu que sait de l'Une-Bévue s' aile a mourre*, 1976/77. Statement by Alain Didier-Weill, in the Seminar, 21/12/76.
- 6 An account of the structure by means of Heina-Boral theorem's topologic structure is found in the first class of Lacan's Seminar *Encore*. See *Topology*, Hocking and Young. Ed. Reverté S.A.
- 7 MILLOT, C. *Mystics: Phallic Jouissance or Other Jouissance*. Notes of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires, N°5.
- 8 LACAN, J. The Seminar: *Encore*; one of the chapters was titled: *God and the Woman's Jouissance*.

Notes Towards the End of an Analysis

María del Carmen Meroni

If the moments of efficacy of an analysis are a function of the variation of the subject's position with respect to the object a, which position of the analyst, what characteristic (if any) of the interpretation within transference, would promote a movement in this fixed dimension? How to conduct an analysis towards its end?

Gabriela, 28 years old, begins her analysis in July 1979. For more than a year she has been trying unsuccessfully to become pregnant. Apparently, there is no organic pathology. Her husband is by no means as obsessed with the idea as she is. (She checks her date of ovulation, registers it on the calendar and plans dates for intercourse. She does all this on her own. Her husband merely accepts it.) Added to this, Gabriela's husband, Juan, has recently got his degree as a lawyer, which is the same profession as Gabriela's mother. Now that he *has* . . . what is *she*?"

Gabriela is an architect, a graduate of the School of Architecture, which is "untidy, hippie and informal", not "cold and formal" like the School of Law. Her appearance, however, is quite the opposite of the description of her

school. She cannot stop herself from working all day long. Professionally, she is always in contact with older and more experienced architects, supposedly in order to learn from them and to develop professionally but they failed to fulfill their promises, they cheated others and they cheated her. She sticks to her guns.

Juan is her second husband. She married Gabriel, her first husband, when she was 20 years old and divorced him when she was 24. Gabriel had been her boyfriend since she was 15 and their marriage was approved with the blessing of her family. She was asphyxiating within the marriage. She was frigid with her first husband who was the only man with whom she had had sexual intercourse. He neither studied nor worked. They lived in a house at the back of his father's store, a well-known interior decoration shop. Their house was appointed with beautiful pieces of French-style furniture but the whole house was merely an enormous stage-setting, as all those pieces of furniture were merchandise in her father-in-law's store. Everything there was exhibited to clients and was on sale. The house always had to be neat and presentable, in the eventuality of a client's visit.

When I asked her for a telephone number where I could reach her, she gave me a wrong number, which happened to be the number of the house where she lived in poverty between 10 and 13. Before that, she had lived in another house, a large, beautiful house with a huge garden with shrubs and trees where later they had to hide valuable objects from the police, who had come to confiscate them when her father's business fraudulently went bankrupt. He had a jumper factory which did not actually produce anything, but simply bought pullovers, attached labels and then resold them, and it went bankrupt. Everything was sold or lost. Everything disappeared. Before that, her father had kept despotic control of money. After the bankruptcy they didn't have enough to eat. All of Gabriela's life had been marked by her father's arbitrary management of her mother's grandfather's (Julio) fortune.¹ This bankruptcy was neither the first nor the last but definitely the worst. Everything, from valuable paintings and sculptures, piped music in all rooms, expensive parties, to the smallest sum of money, went through her father's hands. When and where and how much food and clothing to be bought was also part of his domain. "He would say to me: 'Come on, get dressed, we're going out'. He would take me shopping, push me into a shop, choose a lot of clothes and buy them for me. Even underwear." Things had been this way as far as she could remember. Gabriela knows (because her father told her) that her paternal

grandmother had attempted abortion several times by inserting a knitting needle when pregnant with him. This is his *bad luck legacy*.² It is also her father's favourite joke.

In the house whose telephone number she gave me by mistake, her father lay in bed all day long and did not work. Some relatives and neighbours supported them. People got to know them in that lower-class neighbourhood and shopkeepers would give them credit. Her parents slept in the bedroom. Her maternal grandmother, who lived with them, slept in the entrance hall. She and her brother, who was three years older, slept in the living room in folding beds. While in bed her father used to keep a loaded revolver in the drawer of his night-table. He would sometimes write stories or read Hemingway, while her mother completed her studies to become a lawyer. It was at that time that her mother took her to a fortune-teller, who told her that it would be difficult for her to have children.

Nobody could speak or listen to music or watch television in this house. Silence was mandatory. Gabriela again says: "I was asphyxiated". In the midst of this silence, she remembers her continual coughing fits at night, which would go on for hours. She says, "They were a way of attracting attention". She remembers having a daily cry locked up in the bathroom, and her first menstrual period at the age of ten. Gabriela begins to find it impossible to stay in her bankrupted father's home for a long time, and she starts "moving her bum"³, as her father would call it. Bum was the euphemism, the cover term, for genitals. She had fainted several times because she had failed to be the first in the queue when running errands for him. She was well known in her neighbourhood, shopkeepers would give her credit and she was friends with everybody: in this something of not having to put on a front was finally there.

The telephone number she gave me by mistake, points to a truth: not feigning about her father's failure, not being the first in the queue: both starting points for analysis. Being able to talk about those things which could only be handled by crying or coughing.

Gabriela's mother, naturally, uses her maiden name, not her husband's. Julio, her maternal grandfather, was a Frenchman of noble descent and high social position. He died when his daughter was 5 years old. He had gone to France where he had fought in the War in the place of a brother who refused to go, and then returned home, loaded with medals, a pension granted by the French government, and the loss of an arm. He died a few years afterwards. His fortune was depleted during Gabriela's parents' marriage.

Gabriela met Juan, her second husband, in July shortly after her separation; she got her degree in July; she left her first husband's (Gabriel's) house on 9th of July (also: Independence Day in Argentina), France's national holiday is in July; her analysis begins in July. In November, shortly after her analysis begins, Gabriela becomes pregnant. She coughs continually, all day, all night, in her sessions... Her baby is due in July, of course.⁴ In December, she miscarries.

After spending Christmas with her family, including her father, depressed as usual she reports a dream: "My mother came and I asked where my father was." "I don't know, he left, I don't know where he is", she answered. There was a chest of drawers. I opened one of the drawers and there was my father, dead. Cut or folded (in two), as if his belly were very thin or very flexible. I know that they killed him, my mother and my brother. They killed him because they are in love and they want to get married. They planned it very well. I tell Juan that I must report them to the police. Juan as a lawyer, as well as a husband, tells me: "To make her fall into her own trap let's do things right: don't call the police yet". Just then, my mother makes a slip: "... when we drowned him ...", and she stops. Juan and I play dumb, as if we hadn't heard a thing. "It's true, then; they did it. Do I report them or not? I've lost my father; do I have to lose my family too?" In the end I don't report them, but the body was going to rot: somebody would realize what had happened".

In spite of the fact that neither she nor the lawyer want to speak yet, she wants somebody to realize what has happened. I tell her that being and playing are two different things. She plays when her mother makes the slip ("... when we drowned him ..."). Now when associating, Gabriela makes her own slip: What I said about being drowned (*ahogada*)... no, drowned (*ahogado*), about my father...⁵ What happens with the first *drowned* (*ahogada*)? Her mother, the brilliant lawyer (*abogada*), had seen a film, the *Diabolical Women*, when she was pregnant with Gabriela. In it there is a scene in which a woman is having a bath and a man comes in and drowns her (*ahogada*). It is similar to another, very powerful film that her mother took her to see when she was small: *Psycho*. Some of the scenes in both films are very similar. People die by *asphyxiation*... there is running water tinged with blood. I realize that she uses the words *asphyxiated* and *drowned* as synonyms. She had previously said that she was being *asphyxiated* in the house where they lived after her father's bankruptcy and she was being *asphyxiated* in her ex-husband's house. *Drowned/asphyxiated* — this is her mother's position in the associations to this dream, but this is a position that affects her as well. Besides, the scene

where a man disguised as his own mother kills a woman in the bathtub, is not from *The Diabolical Women* but from *Psycho*. When I asked which scene from the first film she was trying to describe, it turns out to be the murder of a woman carried out by her husband with the help of his young lover.

The lover feigns complicity with the wife, but is actually the husband's accomplice in killing the wife. The point is to kill the complicity with the brilliant lawyer with her father's help, especially since now that she cannot have her baby in July,⁶ the pact between mother and daughter has been broken: "I've lost my father now". In the relationship *abogada/ahogada* the mute *h* stands for the signifier that represents her for another signifier: a folded, broken (bankrupt) father.

Drowned slides to *asphyxiated*: the crime involves her as well. What is her crime? The flexible belly in the dream: "like a pregnant belly". Her miscarriage was involuntary, not desired. Was it a lapsus?, she asked herself. She coughed continually during her pregnancy; she smoked as well... she began to wonder if she had caused that miscarriage (as if she had inserted a knitting needle?).


It was better to play dumb. Alienation has made her a fool: this is a position of the subject offering itself to the Other as its prosthesis. There is a call, a dream, to the supposed-subject-of-knowing: "somebody would realize", somebody was going to take up the voice that the cough of failure in the Other insinuated; for the time being she could only play dumb. Between the subject and the Other, the silence outlines an object in the bankruptcy which is not spoken about. It is the voice, according to Lacan, the object of the masochistic phantasm.

She lets people do things to her, she lets things happen: instance of the demand of the Other without failure; she plays dumb, she refrains from speaking. But in the same fashion as the cough symbolized a moment of separation, a call ("Will somebody realize what is happening to me?") in the transference, "somebody will realize at some time", in spite of her silence.

But the analyst who is summoned to the position of the supposed-subject-of-knowing, ... from what position does he intervene? The point is: what is it that "they are going to realize"? In other words, what is she playing dumb about? This is the matter that has to do with her position concerning the object ("letting people do things to her", "letting things happen"), as the foundations for the identification of the subject (the fool). The fool, her

position in connection with a voice, is the signifier in the transference (somebody is going to realize), a crime in which she is involved.

The interpretation outlines an object, a non-trivial cut is produced, and this is the point, between $\$$ and a : the position of the analyst when the transference is put to work and the moment of separation is insinuated. I now attempt a writing of this, several years after having listened to the text of this dream:



Within the moment of alienation, the bottom half of the losange between $\$$ and a , we find: in the domain of the Other, the sense; in the domain of the subject, the aphanisis, the disappearance ("I'm not involved in this"). But Lacan in *L'Etourdit* says:

"The interpretation is of the sense, and goes against the signification ...
What does this sense mean?"

"The interpretation is of the sense": it pulls out this *drowned* (woman) (*ahogada*) from the position of the unknowing knowledge in transference, from its subjection, as signifier, to the domain of the Other, from the no-sense that makes her a fool as far as it remains non-isolated, not yet emergent: aphanistic weight of the S2. "The interpretation goes against the (phallic) signification". The point is not being the fool phallus (letting things happen to her, people do things to her, people buy her things), to allow herself to realize that far from being able to disregard the lack in the Other, it fully concerns her. I quote Lacan (*La Troisième*):

"The sense of the symptom is not the one we give it so as to nourish its proliferation or extinction; the sense of the symptom is the real, the real in as much as it is the obstacle that stops things from going in the direction in which they can give account of themselves in a satisfactory manner — satisfactory at least for the master".

To operate over the position of the fool that offers herself to the master, it is indispensable to isolate, in transference, the signifiers with which she "lets (the Other) do things to her". Not to offer herself to the Other as its phallus: it is an operation of separation and corresponds to the top half of the losange between $\$$ and a .

Two years later Gabriela, two months pregnant, reports the following dream: "I was with my parents and with Juan in the country house. We had invited you to spend the day with us there. It was a dull, grey day, and we couldn't be out in the open. When you arrived I told them to take a seat at the table. I went to the bathroom, and when I came back, my brother's girlfriend was sitting in my place and my mother said she had taken my plate away from me. We sat down to eat. There was lentil stew. Your husband arrived, and we were in your house, and you had a little girl, about 7 years old and another child, an older boy. But then she is not so young: I thought. There were pieces of gold jewellery, my mother's, strewn on the floor. I started picking them up. Suddenly my mother started raving and shouting, my voice was much lower, and then you shouted at her and she stopped. I thought: "Great! Her voice is stronger than my mother's". The consulting room appears, and I think that it must be your daughter's room. It is a grey room, just like the clothes that were hanging in the closet. You scold her. 'Don't say anything about this to me later on, because I've already warned you what could happen to you. Mind what you're going to do'. I looked at

you and thought, "She's great!" Juan wasn't well. His legs were covered with scabs, insect bites, and I was ashamed for you to see him.

The point is not only that I am "not so young" in her dream. I am an old woman⁷ who can warn her (like a fortune-teller?) of what is going to happen to her. With extreme docility she offers herself to let things happen, to let things be done to her, even by her analyst, who had while she had not. She can do nothing about her screaming and raving mother: she splits her into the fool and *the great one*, she gathers her strewn jewellery (the same jewellery that had to be sold and pawned), she is ashamed of her husband before *the great one who has*. *The doctors have just diagnosed that Gabriela's father suffers from gout: he cannot stand on his legs. Juan is not doing well in his job, he is not getting on well with her pregnancy, he discontinued his analysis. "He's not doing well".*⁸

The price to pay for this is the greyness: she's not allowed to be outside ... of the Other, the great one that has, to whose knowledge she offers herself.

But the mother (the crazy one, the lunatic, not *the great one who has*), the mother that screams and raves, also tells her that she's missed the fun (*se perdió el plato*).⁹ Here is the division, the bar, in the Other. The answer to the question concerning what was "the fun she missed" appears when associating with the following fragment: "... a little girl about 7 years old ...". This is associated with the following: her brother was about 7 (three years older than she was), when there was a scene in the bathroom Gabriela remembers quite well: she was toying with his erect penis. She remembers the scene in great detail, as if it had happened many times. She liked doing this, it was real fun.⁹

*The seven-year-old girl that, in her dream, takes the place of the boy; or its correlative, the great one who has, they both "miss the fun",⁹ (by the way ... *lentils*¹⁰) of playing games with a boy's penis, instead of being the one who has. Here is the division, the bar, of the subject. The following is approximately the interpretation: the "great one" misses the fun. Since she got pregnant, she never again experienced an orgasm. The one who appears in the greyness, inside (moment or alienation), *the great one*, is not the one who has the fun that corresponds to the top half of the *losange* between \mathcal{S} and *a*. The separation is marked by the signifier in transference (*the analyst had a seven-year-old daughter*). Its no-sense, once interrogated, points to *the fun*, and this certainly traumatic mark: the inscription of the difference between the sexes, and the relationship or*

*correspondence that "does not exist". Faced with the screen memory connected with the seven-year-old (boy), that points to a moment of division of the subject, the question is "what to do?" Should she stay inside ... the great one who has ... or have fun? This is also true of the transference: the lower and the upper half of the *losange* between \mathcal{S} and *a*, between Gabriela and the voice.*

This is a controversial point with the point of view according to which the interpretation is nothing more than a promoter of the infinite displacement of the symptom, a metonymy which leaves the position of subject and object untouched, accessible only by what turns out to be a mystification of the act in analysis, which degrades the real to reality.

When interpreting on the *abogada* or on the "seven-year-old", in the place where the fool or the great one is mute, located inside, in the lower part of the *losange*, is it not in the upper half, the separation, and therefore upon the relationship between \mathcal{S} and *a*, that the analyst intervenes with the interpretation? This is so, in as much as a miscarriage or the difference between the sexes is produced in the subject's analysis as that which has become an obstacle to allowing things to account for themselves in a manner satisfactory to the master ... to which place the analyst is also summoned (if he responds) to *miss the fun*.

While they try for a second child, a few years later, she's not so sure about wanting to "miss the fun". Another son is born. "Two days ago, mother went back home. Things were still much the same with Juan up to then, but he's fed up, and so am I". Juan leaves for five days, to think things over. When he comes back, a new period, which ends in separation more than a year later, begins.

What right does she have to divorce, considering the harm this can cause the children, and the fact that she is not sure about it? Who can tell for sure that she does not love him anymore? She begins to suffer anxious coughing fits at night. The guilt (in her mother-tongue: "What right do I have?"), is the counterpart of the persistent demand of the guarantee for her locus in the Other: if she decides because he wants her to decide, she will surely claim from the Other that which corresponds.

But, what does she want? At a party, a colleague approaches her and pays her a compliment. She likes it. She blushes and doesn't know what to do. "I don't know how I managed to end up chatting with a couple of oldies. How foolish I am. She asks me to refer them to "family therapy" ... I mean, "marriage guidance". I point out her lapsus clearly and end that session.

She pays me four *australes* more than what she owes me. At the beginning of the following session, I return them to her: "You gave me four . . . extra", I said. Two families of four members each are involved: her own family, and the one she and Juan started. I refrain from suggesting the name requested for the family/marriage therapy. All the scenes that nurture her nostalgia for Juan are family scenes.

She goes out with a friend (also called Gabriela), and meets a man who approaches her in a bar. She likes him. He seems charming, fast. A pick-up; "We made love the second time I saw him. I must have been pretty horny. I told him O.K., I just couldn't say a definite, "yes". I went to his apartment, and the thought of danger never even crossed my mind. What did I know about that man? I took a liking to him; I didn't feel watched, I felt no shame about my body, I wasn't restrained. I asked him for things, I spoke to him. I couldn't recognize myself. We arranged that he was going to call me". The woman who "recognizes herself" is not the one who has a good time.

Finally, she reports a dream: "I was in another world, underwater, where all the *disappeared* from both parties were". I appeared there, I don't know why. I was with Gabriel, he was my boy-friend. I felt very close to him. They begin to follow me, they want to catch me and kill me. They don't follow Gabriel. I was sure (*seguro*) . . . I mean sure (*segura*)¹² only about Gabriel, very close to him; but I ran away from him. Somebody asked: "Is that Ines R.?" "No, I said, no, it's not. I'm Gabriela R." (the initial R. that appears in the dream is that of her maiden name). Finally, it seemed as if there was a boss. If I punched in his left eye, I could save myself and destroy the world. I found him just as they were about to kill me, and with a pin, something tiny, I touched his left eye, and everything disappeared and I found myself in a city at the end of the Second World War, surrounded by people who are leaving their ruined homes. I am leaving too, but I feel relieved, I'd rather be in this world than in the other one." The boss' left eye is associated with Juan's problem left eye: something retarded its development, his eyeball turns to one side. He has a partial loss of vision in that eye, especially at night. Beyond that, another "boss" is also there: the "pricked eyeball" reminds one of the ways the knitting needle might have killed her father when his mother attempted to abort him. When she pricks¹³ him, he disappears. She was "sure" (*seguro*) only about Gabriel: like the "great" little seven-year-old girl who was actually a seven-year-old boy, who, she having placed herself in his position, cost her the fun. The woman who supports the position from which she can offer herself to a fallen father as he would like to keep seeing her, through the identification with a

masculine double, this woman, wavers. "Very close to him. But I ran away from him".

They wanted to catch her and kill her. Who did they want to do that to? Ines can be read as In - es, the one who is inside. Gabriela also knows two women by that name: one is Juan's aunt, a psychoanalyst through whom she began analysis. This woman is "intelligent, feminine, emotionally balanced", as Gabriela idealizes her, but she has recently found out that Ines' husband is unfaithful to his wife. The other Ines is a friend she made in kindergarten and whom she has not seen for many years. This woman is also very sweet and feminine; they continued seeing each other for some time in spite of having shared only kindergarten and the first two years of elementary school, until Gabriela left because the school was not demanding enough, she had too much free time and she was capable of making more progress. The name of this school was *Nuestra Señora del Carmen* (Our Lady of Carmen), the analyst's name. The boss who wants to catch her, the lagger with the bad eye, the woman who feels secure (*seguro*) inside; they all disappear when the time for "pricking" comes. She prefers this world to the other one. A new movement begins in the analysis, which continues; she feels that she has no time to waste. It is not the moment for silence, for "somebody to realize". Now she speaks. Between In - es, the drowned woman (*ahogada*), and the one who feels relief at having come to the end of *her* second war, a subject wavers before a fall that is hinted at, by the time Our Lady of Carmen will have become one of the *disappeared* . . . in an analysis.

Maria del Carmen Meroni,
Argentina.

Translated by Graciela Perez-Esandi.

Notes

- ¹ *Julio* in Spanish is both Gabriela's grandfather's name and the translation for the month of July (*Julio*).
- ² In Spanish *mala leche* = bad luck, but *leche* can stand for milk and milk is slang for sperm.
- ³ In Spanish, *colá* means both *tail* (or bum), and *queue*.
- ⁴ *El parto es para Julio*: also: "The childbirth is for Julio" (July).
- ⁵ In Spanish, *ahogada* is the feminine singular and *ahogado* is the masculine singular form for *drowned*. Also, *ahogada* (feminine singular form) and *abogada* (*lawyer*, her mother's profession), sound almost the same.
- ⁶ ... "no podrá tener el bebe para Julio", also: she will not have the baby for Julio.
- ⁷ *Una vieja* also, a *mother* (colloq.)
- ⁸ *Anda mal*: *he's not doing well*, but also *he walks with difficulty*.
- ⁹ *Plato* can be translated as *plate* or *dish*, but it also means (colloq.) *fun* in *hacerse el plato* (to have fun), or *perderse el plato* (to miss the fun).
- ¹⁰ *Lenteja* means *lentil*, but it may (colloq.) also stand for: *slow* (*lenta*), clumsy, not intelligent.
- ¹¹ The reference is to the events that took place in Argentina between 1976 and 1983, when many people were kidnapped and just *disappeared*. The actual term she uses (*desaparecidos* = disappeared) is the term used in Argentina to refer to these people.
- ¹² *Seguro* (masculine singular), *segura* (feminine singular) means both *sure* and *secure*.
- ¹³ In Buenos Aires, *to prick* is one of the popular terms for *to have intercourse*.

Ethics and the Lacano American Reunion

José Zuberma

"When I look back to those lonely years, away from the pressures and confusions of today, it seems like a glorious, heroic age. My splendid isolation was not without its advantages and charms. I did not have to read any publications, nor listen to any ill-informed opponents. I was not subject to influence from any quarters; there was nothing to hustle me."¹

A quote from Freud, from his paper on the *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*, 1914, where he also narrates the bitterness resulting out of the splits of the first group of psychoanalysts, the pain caused by the separation of his followers, the hard task involved in finding again the theoretical principles which support the practice he founded.

It is Freud, the same man who taught us what "infantile amnesia" means, how we build up our lost paradise, how man always needs to concoct a past "golden age", or live in hopeful illusion; it is Freud who called this past

magnificent, beautiful, heroic. Does this not recall the usual discourse held by the analysts of our days? Is it not of our daily coffee to say we are sick of so many meetings, painfully experiencing the splits of the institutions we belong to, enforced to answer to our "rivals", to hasten the writing of our paper for the next reunion, congress or public presentation? Don't we share our friends' longing for the "glorious, heroic age" when we only used to devote ourselves to our patients, to our own analysis, to prepare our task for supervision, reading some basic and necessary texts? This "golden age" is projected, sometimes hopefully, to some supposed future.

Why is it that after all these lamentations and this day dreaming, we almost naturally say: "Good-bye, until the next meeting"? What does it mean going on with the preparation of our next paper, our next seminar, our next congress whilst, simultaneously sustaining these assertions, always saying that we are fed up? What is at play when we do not count as working hours our uncanny meetings usually numerous, — even when we keep asserting the following fact: arguing with our colleagues is even more tiresome than listening to our patients all day long? The above quotation by Freud shatters even the illusion that there was an age when there were no agitated meetings, difficult congresses or even painful splits at all within the psycho-analytical movement.

It seems to be from the beginning that it was necessary for analysts to meet; however, simultaneously they keep this necessary practice as something foreign, shameful and distressing. Be it fanatics of the institution, be it the ones ashamed of belonging to it, be it "independent" defenders of their "freedom", the analysts *keep meeting*.

We shall try to frame two questions:

- 1) Are these meetings necessary?, and if they are, then why?
- 2) Considering the insistence of informal reunion-gossip, what truth does repetitive compulsion convey through this fragment of the psychoanalysts' everyday life?

Let us begin with the first one. The silence of the analyst in the session where he intends not to avow his tastes or preferences, has its ethical correlate in the act of "giving the reasons of his practice" before the psycho-analytical institution, among other analysts, in order to let it be something other than merely a personal and mystical belief. Not only the

works of the founders show that the isolated analyst cannot sustain his place: we also, daily prove it. The analyst needs to recover himself out of his own silence during the session² by speaking about his practice: thus he needs somebody listening to him, questioning him, so that a new question creates a lack within the previously constituted knowledge, and thrusts it forth again in its quest. This is why the analyst needs the analytic community, i.e. meeting with his colleagues. Naturally, this meeting produces a group with its imaginary phenomena by no means any different than any other group of human beings, mortal beings subject to the very same materiality of the signifier. This does not prevent us from acknowledging the following fact: when imaginary phenomena prevail over discourse — discourse understood as a sequence of four elements: a, S₁, S₂, \mathcal{S} , in four places: the agent, the other, the production and the truth — they obturate the above mentioned ethical foundations of the meeting, and prevent the plunge into yet another spin. When the group manages to build up its fifth, a trend appears within its space to outshine the reasons of discourse; the obscenities of the fourth, the alibis of associations and unions avoid the dimension of the third — the vertebrae of our practice — and finally turn its attention merely to second intentions. All this happens within a specularly where everybody names himself "the first" of a descending hierarchy, which in turn avoids any reference to the truth: the truth Freud opened up with the praxis he created by the name of psycho-analysis³. In this register the only prejudiced reference considered is: "tell me whom you are with. . ." a symbol of the accomplices found in society.

Now, if we assert that the subject is subject to the signifier and not to his companions, then it follows that only what he says situates him adequately, and that it is discourse only which creates the social tie among analysts. Since imaginary phenomena belong to a register, and as such their suspension is impossible, it follows that the aim becomes to sustain the ethical reasons which in turn support the necessity of the analysts' meeting. Whatever the analyst says as a subject situates him before his community; it happens in no other way with that which inscribes itself as a letter emerging out of his discourse. The suspended *jouissance* of the analyst's practice tries to find vent through "writing, which by offering him the possibility of a *jouissance* beyond, through the text whose product falls out, ex-poses him to the Other"⁴, beyond his peers. The question of the social bond among analysts is thrust forth again — supported around the possibility of social prejudice to give way to misunderstanding — by

substituting "tell me whom you are with. . ." by "I read what you have written". Misunderstanding, as talking-beings and as analysts as well: what are we if not its product?⁵ Misunderstanding leads us again to the practice of psycho-analysis, the moment we endeavour to read it. Reading what inscribes itself, since not every text is a writing, nor is everything inscribed necessarily published. During a psychoanalysis, an analyst writes down what he may only partially narrate during the pass, but through a border he will allow something to be read in the matters made public pertaining to such an individual experience. A writing not published as such, but acknowledged as such by whoever desires to read it. It is difficult for anybody to be the same before and after analysis — should anything happen in between which deserves this name. "You look different", "I find you have changed" is the most usual way of this reading.

Before turning to our second question, let us say that something is inscribed pertaining to the organization of these meetings, too. I take up again something nobody speaks about in the name of his group, nor of his institution nor of his nation, but from the place his analysis makes possible for him, since it is what I signed and gave over to the Convocation⁶, in order to say the name does not take place through the will to assemble, but by the will of the unconscious, by the will of the letter. It always speaks starting from where analysis allows; and when singularity erases itself, it fades in the anonymity of the official word that condemns to uniformity; this speaks about nothing but the lack of analysis. The fact that the analyst's analysis is singular is also disclosed through each analyst's different production, a production not being singularised indicates the failure of analysis.

The letter, litoral between the knowledge (savoir) of the signifier and the *jouissance* of the object, asks for a reading. *Lacano American* names us and simultaneously sets a limit to this Convocation: we understood the term composing a series with readers. Readers of what forms as writing, what is said in an analysis, of what we call clinical practice; readers of the letters which set the foundation of our practice: Freud and Lacan — what we term theoretical practice. Theoretical practice, clinical practice, institutional practice, all three intertwine and knot themselves together in a psychoanalysis: I put this forward sometime ago⁷. The letter, asking to be read, simultaneously acts as a *limit*: The only possible limit, since it has no other owner than the one who risks a reading. Let us turn ourselves now to the truth contained by this insistence — since it repeats itself in such different ways in the longing for a *splendid isolation*. Although we knot the three practices in a psycho-analysis, doesn't this article say as much as the

abovementioned phantasy — revealing that clinical practice has the place of privilege for the analyst? During clinical practice, each analysis leaves a remainder in the place occupied by the analyst; and isn't it this remainder which urges to read, to meet, to write? Let us take that dialogue held during coffee-break as a dream: it shall teach us about the analyst's desire, the analyst's place and the ethics which support both. Far more explicit, Lacan bestows upon us (July 10, 1980): "I thus go to learn down there (Caracas) but evidently I shall return (to Paris) because my practice is here"⁸. A lesson of the master in two phrases. The analysts' meeting is necessary and we learn from it, since it becomes our practice. "I shall return since my practice is here, and this Seminar is not of my practice, but it complements it"⁸. The practice is not everything: there is a complement, but practice locates it in a place. Practice is well-esteemed by analysts as having no substitute whatsoever: this place is well-defined and situated by an ethics, even if no opinion is delivered. Freud taught us that the ideal is a condition for repression⁹; Lacan, in turn, taught us that the ideal, being universal, obturates the practice which situates us. There is nothing prepared regarding man's happiness, neither in microcosm nor macrocosm⁹. Thus we understand that psychoanalysis is not an ideology, nor a conception of the world, nor a philosophy: it is a *practice*, acknowledging only each man's way to his own happiness as singular. The ethics of psychoanalysis does not tell anything about accommodating to the ideal; it speaks of the real; of Freudian sexuality. There is no universal goodness to which one can accommodate. *God is dead ever since man was able to speak; and his return is the word, the equivocal, the misunderstanding arising anew each time interpretation manages to dissolve it. The adjustment to sovereign goodness engenders the necessary politics of goodness — a commitment to the established and enshrined goodness; and thus it becomes quite opposed to the practice of psycho-analysis.*

The post-Freudian obturating ideals which deviated analytic practice, shrouded its progress and degraded its use, were, (as Lacan denounced in 1955):

1. the ideal of genital love which condemns psycho-analysis to be nothing other than mental hygiene, a psychoprophylaxis of love;
2. the ideal of authenticity, which locates the ego again in the place of S , and
3. the ideal of non-dependence, which makes a reason to exist out of isolation and painful engagement not to need anything from anyone⁹.

Referring to any practice whatever does not shatter the antinomy "individual-society": only the practice instituted by Freud does, since it acknowledges the singularity of the desire, in the singular way of approaching *jouissance*. The subject and his world are thus admitted as places of disorder, both as the effects of the signifier. The obturating ideals of our time — ideals put forward as sovereign goodness — are, to my understanding: 1) teaching psycho-analysis as if there could be a knowledge-to-obtain through knowing (*connaissance*), and learning on its way to wisdom as a whole. The question raised by psycho-analysis is about *knowledge that does not know itself*, and not what remains left to study. Studying is what remains as a work-to-do, by means of reading what has been instituted as knowledge; psycho-analysis may then tell something about its lack — or even create one. 2) The ideal of the subject of *jouissance*: courageous and free in his access to pleasure, is nothing but another version of the XVIIIth. century libertine, as Lacan analyses him: as much subject to the Law as anybody else. Moralities may cause the subject to stagger doubtfully the moment he meets the *Ding*, to the point of avoiding this very encounter. For the ethics of psychoanalysis, this encounter and the fall of the object it involves is its goal, and it carries forth the same — thereby exposing it even to the point of un-being (*des-êtré*).

The subject is subject to the signifier, and the chain of signifiers leads him to enjoy the object exceeding this chain. "How may the signifier proceed to encounter the object containing the Thing?"¹⁰ Through the way of singularity the potter forms the emptiness contained by the pot with his hands rather than with his spirit, and in the same way little Hans discovers — during his analysis — the lack where there was always a hole.¹¹

Out of the real, what is built up starting from the signifier, is human.¹⁰ Therefore, *jouissance* is what is human, and in that way we regain for our practice the present value of the fundamental rule. Furthermore, it is the only possible way to go, singularly, for whoever aims to enjoy the object containing the Thing — without adjusting to the politics of an ideal *jouissance*. The subject is subject to the signifier; there is no subject of *jouissance*, but a subject who enjoys (in the singular way the chain of signifiers — the chain which constitutes him — compels him, and points out to him only one way). I repeat: the subject is not the subject of his companions nor of his *jouissance*; he is subject to the signifier.

Jose Zuberger,
Argentina.

Notes

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- 4 VEGH, I. *A Reunion of Analysts?* in *Actualidad Psicológica*, Buenos Aires, March 1986, p.30.
- 5 LACAN, J. *The Seminar 7-10-1980*, translated by Juan Luis Delmont-Mauri (as submitted by the Foundation of the Freudian Field, during the *Reunion on the Teachings of Lacan and Psycho-analysis in Latin-America*, Caracas, 1980).
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- 9 LACAN, J. *The Seminar : Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, edited by the Freudian School of Buenos Aires, 1980 Lesson of 18-11-1959.
- 10 LACAN, J. *ibid*, Lesson of 27-1-60.
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Topology in the Relationship Between Structure and Theory¹

Carlos Alfredo Ruiz

We question the place of topology. This question actually places itself within a task of confrontation, testing, transmission, teaching and discussion throughout Lacan's work. Out of this task a product returns. The questioning of concepts, words, expressions and abuses of language, a part of this product, are in this way highlighted in their singularity. Taking this product again it will have to be made clearer still, explained, corrected if necessary and above all a more careful revision of its articulations should be tried precisely in so far as the spin of discourses permits it.

Once the context is given this paper supposes its audience. This paper will surely be too brief an introduction; the bibliography tries to supplement it even if the more or less accidental way of publishing and distributing it does not allow for much hope. Those with whom I share my daily work will immediately recognise the echo of external and internal controversy, even if I try to limit myself to the axis of our own questioning. Starting from the necessarily arbitrary premise that its own structure will allow it to be something more than what the others are not.²

From the Seminar *On Identification* to the Seminar *L'Etourdit*³ surfaces, torus, bands, projective planes and Klein Bottles are mentioned repeatedly in Lacan's Seminars. However, it could be interesting to try a first approach through his *Ecrits* in which there is almost no trace of all this, except as footnotes. The most famous of these asserts the "R" graph to unfold a projective plane.⁴ As may be seen, there are already references to topology even in the *Discourse of Rome*, in which : a centre, exterior to language is more than a metaphor and shows a structure.⁵ Beyond these footnotes which connect Lacan's papers with his Seminars, one can ask oneself what is it that Lacan understands as topology within his papers. Each one may have his own answer, but I cannot help giving mine. I have a quotation taken from *The Signification of the Phallus* which I relied upon several times⁶ to be indicative enough. In this quotation, I want to stress now, *topology* (in the mathematical sense of the term), *symptom* (in the analytic sense of the term), *structure* and *to write down*⁷ coexist.

We have implicitly been pointing to this *noter* (to write down). Before making it explicit we will briefly have to indicate the course of the seminars in order to show in what way Lacan's topology is linked to his theory. In a recent paper, I put forward from a mathematical point of view the properties of the torus to which Lacan refers different aspects of his theory,⁸ as I wanted to account in this way for their necessity. Let us make this clear: I am not asserting a theoretical necessity which has to be accounted for by referring to topology, but a logical necessity at the level of the structure. To produce theory about the latter would be to produce metatheory, while what I hereby call *theory* weaves a writing support to the border of what cannot be said; this support here becomes topological. In this sense necessity pertains to it.

In the seminar *On Identification* the torus, in its first appearance, is used to mark upon it the lines of synthetic enunciation which may be found in the origin of the subject.⁹ First of all the torus is used in the following way since two types of lines can be traced upon it. One type of line is the perforation. To cut along a line divides the surface into a perforated torus and a disk; cutting along the other type of line produces... a cylindrical band. Against this, on the sphere any closed line determines a perforation.

On the torus, a line which does not produce any perforation winds several times in both ways: passing through the central hole (around full circle) or by its boundary (around empty circle).¹⁰ A first rule of exclusion: a line cannot wind around a full circle more than once if it does not

simultaneously wind around an empty circle. If the loops around full circles are thought of as turns of the demand, this rule writes down a condition that there is no repetition without articulation with the desires.¹¹ To count these turns of the demand involves committing a *counting error*; the loops around the full circle (desire) are missed. As an illustration, this argument is not at all convincing. As the foregoing discussion shows, the torus as an object, seen from the outside, gives us the possibility of counting, separately and with no mistakes, the two types of loops. Intrinsically, on the torus the count is missed; however, we find here a difficulty the solution of which brings us a step forward. On the torus, nothing indicates to me when a loop is completed — there being no relationship to space or any other reference. From an intrinsic point of view our only possibility is to count *one* but we notice that if we draw an empty circle, this allows us immediately to count *one* each time we go across it. Therefore the condition that this line should exist prior to the counting in which it shall not be counted writes down the error of count.¹²

We mentioned *writes down*, but have not yet shown why it is a necessity. At a first glance we obtained an excess the moment we solved our first problem — that of synthetic enunciations. Besides having lines which are not perforations, we find these lines are classified by the number of loops. It seems natural — but arbitrary — to use them to talk about demand and desire. A first glimpse of the path we put forward will be seen if we ask about a possibility of solving the first problem by means of a surface not useful to solve the second one. It would be enough to find a surface with no boundary where some closed lines wouldn't determine a perforation but such that it wouldn't admit a classification of the lines which are not perforations. The answer: such a surface does not exist. When we accepted the lines that are not perforations, we simultaneously adapted their classification by the number of loops. The structure of lines on the torus gives us something more than just the superimposition of two illustrations.¹³

The answer we just gave supposes another condition: the surface must be able to be orientable since it should characterise an aesthetics. The development of the argument Lacan gives in a paragraph¹⁴ in order to replace the sphere by the torus would, indeed, take us several hours. I simply put forward that characterising the aesthetics of a space seems to involve orientability. Should this be supposed, the torus has again the advantage compared to the sphere: while the latter needs a space to sustain it, the torus gives us the possibility of laying the foundation of a space.¹⁵

What I have said plus some topology given in three lectures of the seminar *On Identification*, indicates to us a direction to proceed; but the results do not yet justify the effort. If we leave aside the problem by which the surface in question should be orientable then the projective plane supplies us with a structure with two types of cut. We call them unfoldings (they produce a disc) and perforations (they produce a disc and a Moëbius band). This surface and the more or less clever gadgets with which an attempt is made to spatialize it (showing, by the way, why orientability and aesthetics are linked together) are already folk-lore: their articulation to the torus is less known.

In order to grasp the details of what follows, I refer to other papers. A second rule of exclusion simultaneously writes down the articulation between the double wind of desire and the odd turn of demand, and the articulation of this structure of desire and demand with the formula of the fantasm.¹⁶ The rule says: given a closed line on a torus the number of full circles and the number of empty circles have no common divisor.¹⁷

This was an analysis of previous papers with additional remarks. Two fundamental topological structures unfold and articulate themselves. Its logical necessity lays the foundation of *non-impossibility* of writing, referring it to a mathematical discourse in which topology inscribes itself. Thus we arrive at the point we spoke of previously going from *On Identification* to *L'Étourdit*. We shall not go any further, but limit ourselves to a few remarks.

We do not call this mathematical discourse — the most empty one in regard to sense — to come to this place, *the place of topology*¹⁸ in order to avoid reality — let us call it by its name, to go beyond the fantasm. Should we set aside the prejudice that our inadequate school maths may have left us with, added to the effect of popular science — always in delay compared to the production which is efficient for us — mathematics does not appear as a model-supply but as a field in a privileged relationship to writing. The danger of supplying “a remedy to the flaw of the universe” will not be reminded by topology and it is not our duty to watch over it. But if we manage to grasp through logics how writing has its own limits, we may perhaps get nearer to it without naming it with fantastic names.¹⁹

We have only roughly sketched the relationship of topology to aesthetics. The basic reference is the seminar *On Identification*.²⁰ Whether it is a new aesthetic, or a replacing of aesthetics by topology, is perhaps greatly a question of convention. However, and without any fanaticism, I

prefer the following: the torus characterizes aesthetics in another way, while the way of the projective plane suggests an alternative outside aesthetics.

Logic has its own problems. I made a few remarks. The relationship of classical logic, from Aristotle and the Stoics onwards, with the topology of Euclidian plane, cannot remain with the mere indication of Euler's circles. Particularly, should Lacan's brief remarks not be enough, we may still investigate the turning point, the appearance of the principle of exclusion of the third means in Logic.²¹

Finally, we find ourselves within a knot (a word that by itself warns us of an abrupt closing) in which the problem of the limits of writing may start to be put forward. Its articulation between logic and grammar may be dramatised in this way: a statement the subject goes through deciphering; the subject sustains himself in a deciphering; should the latter close itself in a signification which refers to the beginning “this will be” death. Hence that is what the double loop is for.²²

Going back to our first quotation “man is a lurking-place animal”; the lurking place pierces through the sphere producing a toric surface. We may think the torus to be a metaphor of the lurking-place or the lurking-place animal as a metaphor of the toric structure. Topology is not a model: this is another way of saying our last statement. In this paper I wanted to show some consequences of adopting this point of view.

Carlos Alfredo Ruiz,
Argentina.

Notes

- 1 “Man is a lurking place animal”. Beyond its cynical aspect, this speaks about the inadequacy of the Lewinian field to place a subject who, fundamentally and simultaneously has its place outside the field.

- 2 To allow, to permit, is not always imperative. It may be subjunctive. After all, these verbs inscribe themselves in an aspect of modality. See Juan Tausk *Let it Be* and ensuing discussion. (Meetings of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires, 1984)
- 3 LACAN, J. Seminar No.9, *On Identification. L'Etourdit*, in *Scilicet* No.4 Editions du Seuil. Paris, 1974.
- 4 LACAN, J. *On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis* in *Ecrits*. Tavistock. 1977, p.197, and p.223 footnote 18.
- 5 LACAN, J. *Ecrits*. Tavistock, 1977, p.105.
- 6 For example, C.A.Ruiz, *The Place of Topology*, Meetings of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires, 1984.
- 7 "From this test, a topology, in the mathematical sense of the term, appears, without which one soon realizes that it is impossible simply to note the structure of a symptom in the analytic sense of the term." *From The Signification of the Phallus* in *Ecrits*, Tavistock. 1977 p.285.
- 8 RUIZ, C.A. *Strips and Torus, An Introduction to the Relationship Between Structure and Theory. Cuadernos Sigmund Freud* No.10, Freudian School of Buenos Aires.
- 9 LACAN, J. Seminar No.9, Lecture 12, *Editions du Seuil*. Paris, 1974.
- 10 To be short here, there is a lot to read between the lines; see note 7.
- 11 LACAN, J. Seminar No.9, Lecture 13, *Editions du Seuil* Paris, 1974.
- 12 See note 7, and Lecture 14 (Lecturer C.Ruiz) during I.Vegh's Seminar : *The Object and its Vicissitudes*. The Freudian School of Buenos Aires.
- 13 See note 11, and C.A.Ruiz *Introduction to the Relationship Between Structure and Theory*, Lecture given on 29.10.86, Freudian School of Buenos Aires.

- 14 LACAN, J. Seminar No.9, Lecture 12. *Editions du Seuil* Paris, 1974.
- 15 LACAN, J. Seminar No.9, Lecture 14, *Editions du Seuil*, Paris, 1974.
- 16 LACAN, J. *L'Etourdit*.
- 17 See note 12.
- 18 RUIZ, C.A. See note 5.
- 19 The quotations are from *L'Etourdit*, pages 33 and 34.
- 20 See C.A.Ruiz, Seminar *Logic in Lacan*. The Argentine School of Psychoanalysis (in preparation).
- 21 See note 19, Lévi-Strauss : *Savage Thought*. N.Bourbaki: *A Story of Mathematics*. Translation, *Alianza Universidad*. Chapter 1, Lacan, Seminar 9. from Lecture 12; Seminar 11, Seminar 14.
- 22 Notes 15 and 12, and *Self Reference*. The Argentine School of Psychoanalysis, Meeting, 1984.

Non-Resisted Psychoanalysis : Iatrogeny

Leonor Torres

Lately, for diverse reasons, I have been involved in multiple medical circles in Argentina; in clinics, sanatoria, hospitals and institutes where complex studies are carried out with no less complex instruments (the so-called Medical Engineering). I have spent many hours in the waiting rooms of Intensive Care Units talking to patients' relatives, somewhat of a small sample.

Stemming from all these experiences, I have had access through multiple relationships to an intense dialogue on several problems with doctors both from Argentina and overseas. The topic I will try to open up here today is one of them. It is relevant because it is related to psychoanalytic theory and I believe it is worthwhile to examine it together with you.

In Argentina there is a strong and very prestigious school of medical thought which covers a considerable number of specialties (those more likely to belong to psychosomatics). In medical practice they try to cover *the vacuum of the lack* of the medical epistemological order (given a

particular case, syndrome or family) with the knowledge of the psychoanalytic epistemological order. In the medical field this appears as *an obstacle which closes the gap* that makes the physician continue to investigate. For example a paediatrician may say, given a child with an isolated episode of high temperature: "He must have been upset". Within the medical field, this annoyance has no possible articulation. Medicine creates symptoms through this kind of statement: phenomena, aspects that "are not evaluated from the medical side" and therefore, do not have a theoretical apparatus to process them. It is like trying to weigh the soul.

It is established as an explanatory or informative discourse (obviously not interpretative) in the doctor-patient relationship. The question is why is it more convenient or easier for a doctor to use concepts foreign to him other than those in which he is supposedly trained.

In gynaecology, the following is a diagnostic observation made by a renowned specialist regarding a symptom of infertility: "Isn't it possible, Madam, that someone very close to you is sterile or can't have children, someone towards whom you would feel guilty if you became pregnant? Think about it." This is a pearl of epistemological extraterritoriality, but since there are many such pearls, one feels that it is a bit commonplace and thus loses sight of the epistemological importance it bears.

In paediatrics, given a child with persistent fever, the doctor gives his diagnosis to the child's mother: "The problem is that you spend a lot of time out of your home and the child demands (Lacanian) your presence in this manner. You must stop working (normative)". Doctor, paediatrician, Lacanian, family psychotherapist, normative, aren't these too many places?

In a confirmed neurological case, given an anxiety attack typical and normal under the circumstances, the doctor addresses the patient's companion and says: "You must calm down, otherwise the patient gets nervous".

Regarding a girl on whom a tonsillectomy was performed, the doctor said: "Her throat doesn't hurt, what hurts is the castration she underwent". You can imagine the mother's expression.

There are more serious cases. At times the doctors don't know what to do, there is no diagnosis, there is no treatment, the case is worrying, it is an in-patient: "It is better to send him home since he might be in this condition because he has spent far too many days in hospital".

We all know the Medical Order doesn't know everything . . . and there is no reason why it should, but viruses, sudden deaths, endogenous pathologies and allergic illnesses are one thing, and what I'm talking about is another, at least epistemologically. Are the psychoanalytical concepts turning out to be an order, a structure, a discourse, an ideology which is more acceptable to people? They are neither resisted nor subversive. Why does it feel so comfortable?

Facing an unresolved case in practice, the Medical Order seems to have found an ally in this psychoanalysis which completes what its episteme lacks. What is odd, what is not known, what doesn't click diagnostically, is filled in this way with knowledge of psychoanalysis. If it is not researched, if it is not looked for, if there's no money, if there is no . . . "It must be his Oedipus Complex and the anxiety he suffers from parting with his mother". The doctor told this to the mother of a seven year old boy suffering from recurrent tummy aches that wouldn't go away. Did the belly aches disappear? No. She left him on his own more often. Did the pains go away? No. She stayed with him longer, she didn't know what to do. Did they go away? No. In spite of her anxiety, she didn't go to a psychoanalyst because the symptom belonged to the child, it was he who didn't want to part with her, and she didn't take him to the psychoanalyst because he was just a child. All children go through the same thing. Some of them just *happen to have* those aches. The doctor also said they should wait and that it was better not to *mis-handle* the boy since he was very young (*mis-handle* meaning taking him to the psychoanalyst). So they waited. And what happened? Now they are waiting to hear from the gastroenterologist, since the child presented with a perforated ulcer. Now there is a medical symptom . . . In the meantime, what happened? What was done? I don't know. But what I do know is that not much was done — not much was done about either the epistemological means of psychoanalysis or about those of the Medical Order, according to what I found out.

What are the results of all this? What does this have to do with psychoanalysis? Nothing. Everything. I bring it here . . . it is here because these are the psychoanalysed physicians. I know — neither with you nor with me — obvious. But they have suffered from psychoanalytic business with somebody, in some way, and I believe we must take the responsibility in some way. These physicians have not been spared from the so-called plague.

The others have a very differentiated medical discourse.

"The psychoanalysed physicians" or those "who have a psychoanalytic line of thought" or "who understand psychoanalysis" are those who speak as I have said. And in their practice, what happens to their patients? It happens that they feel understood and supported on the non-medical side effects their suffering produces. These non-medical comments made by the physician fill the vacuum of their anxiety and pretend to answer the question every organic patient asks himself: "Why me?"

The patient remains imaginarily fixed to a knowledge of that which he as well as the physician suffer, but neither of them know anything about the Oedipus and the anxiety which we mentioned earlier.

In reading Clavreul's *Medical Order* — which I recommend to those of you who haven't read it yet — the issue he raises is really interesting. I formulated for myself the possible differences from what I've seen in Argentina, and I was able to confirm the universalities of the medical problematic.

We find a quite unusual practical consistency between the absolute of the position of the *Medical Order* and the discourse of the master, since generally French Law (according to the author) has no jurisdiction in a trial. The same thing happens here in Argentina. It would be interesting to see different situations. In the United States the matter is dealt with in peculiarly different ways. This needs further investigation.

But I would like to pause at a point I consider fundamental: this kind of medical answer issued from the medical side, but formulating psychoanalytical categories; if we consider the four discourses mentioned earlier, it would be like having to state a combination of the discourse of the master and the discourse of the analyst. At least, we would also have grounds for including the discourse of the University, and I believe we wouldn't be faced with the symptom as a result (the discourse of the hysteric) since the result would be too perverse for the hysteric. If we recall the four discourses, then we would come up with a combined discourse both of the analyst and the master.

$$\begin{array}{ccc|ccc} S1 & y & a & & S2 & y & \mathcal{S} \\ \mathcal{S} & y & S2 & & a & y & S1 \end{array}$$

Their discourse is not of the 'medical order type'; it is different, it is really ambiguous, and the same goes for their position. The example of the non-analysed surgeon — which is the type of medical discourse Clavreul described — can't be further away from this discourse. I believe that the inversion that exists between the discourse of the master and the discourse of the analyst confirms the contradiction of this operation.

It is understood that what I am posing configures a transferential field with the medical order, with psychoanalysis, with the patient and the physician in relationship to their own place, of an ambiguity impossible to maintain, drawing a unique denial of the concepts and of the positions of one episteme to another.

Clavreul questions himself consistently about why it is licit for the psychoanalysts to be completely unable to establish the internal causal articulations of psychic events with biological ones or medical diseases. And I believe the problem of the psychosomatic episteme would not be resolved. It does not seem to configure an area of articulatory consistency of the concepts in question, the epistemologists will say.

The physicians, on the other hand, have been unable to establish the biological or neurological localizations of desire, or have some of them actually found this missing link? I believe in the theoretical validity of this metaphor; there is a big step here that differentiates the areas completely.

Physicians, those well recognised and differentiated as such, function within their episteme with the solvency that the medical order and their ability to be updated allows them; they function supporting what is pertinent to them with the production, creativity, *jouissance* and repression characteristic of somebody who has been barred from a determined symbolic universe.

I also believe the same thing happens to psychoanalysts. Neither of them is the subject matter of this problematic. I am questioning myself about the alternative of a simultaneous superposition in time and space of two discourses that are inverted, and which is this virtual probability.

From what I have so far seen and thought about the effects produced by this unique position I am not very optimistic, since I believe it produces what in medicine is known as iatrogeny.

Those physicians whose discourses are from a purely medical side listen to this kind of physician refer to the typical anxiety felt by babies at

eight months of age instead of talking about Summer diarrhea and how to treat it, and they feel the same perplexity that psychoanalysts feel.

This sounds like the all embracing formation of one who bites off more than he can chew . . . and those of faint heart are those who remain subject to this discourse and its practice. Epistemologically this discourse is neither that of medicine nor of psychoanalysis.

Leonor Torres,
Argentina

Inhibition

Cristina Marrone

Inhibition appears to be one of the possible ways to consider the questions that pertain to the direction of the cure.

What is the locus of inhibition in the clinic?

Freud says:

"If this is so, it would mean that analysis sometimes succeeds in eliminating the influence of an increase in instinct, but not invariably, or that the effect of analysis is limited to increasing the power of resistance of the inhibitions, so that they are equal to much greater demands than before the analysis or if no analysis had taken place. I really cannot commit myself to a decision on this point, nor do I know whether a decision is possible at the present time."

Inhibition remains as a residue co-existing with the drive at the end of the analysis, a residue unsolved by the revision of the old repressions. This

Freudian hesitation, expressed in his *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, corresponds to a direction of the cure which presents differences and similarities with that of two other periods: namely, the period of *Studies on Hysteria* and that held at the time of his *Papers on Technique*.

But it happens that at the same time, inhibition can be located at the beginning and during the course of the cure.

We will try to point out some ideas related to inhibition in the case of Elizabeth Von R. although in 1895, Freud did not name it explicitly as such.

Freud uses with her what will later be called free association, exerting the pressure of the hands. Isn't it perhaps that whenever we prompt the patient to speak that original Freudian moment gets repressed?

What happens is that in order to speak it is necessary to forget that pressure exerted by the Other on the real body of the subject.

Elizabeth Von R. had a body, but a suffering one. That is why she consulted Freud.

She had difficulties in walking. She suffered from astasia abasia, she became tired when standing, she had to rest and not even then did her severe pain decrease very much. The hyperalgesia concentrated in the anterior of her right thigh. Freud noticed that her language emerged impoverished whenever she tried to describe her ailments and her attention was linked to an effect of pleasure. Freud's desire gave rise to the Other Scene.

The contingencies in the direction of the cure are the same as those of the desire and its dialectic. Consequently, we will locate the inhibition in the movement towards cure. The dialectic of desire is a dialectic without synthesis. This will not prevent the inevitable occurrence, for speaking beings, of the illusory effect of synthesis that can be essentially located in the lower circuit of the graph in *The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire, Ecrits*. (see Note 2).

Her father considered Elizabeth to be "a daughter who was rather a son". Teasing her, he called her "daring and argumentative" and he predicted "it would be difficult for her to find a husband". Elizabeth's father suddenly fell ill due to a heart ailment and she, his nurse, looked after him with great care. After his death, she tried to replace the lost family happiness.

At this first stage of the analysis she reported scenes full of constant reproaches towards one of her brothers-in-law, and at the same time, scenes of admiration towards the other one. Back from a walk with the latter, the pains in her legs became definitive. Elizabeth became the sick person in the family.

Freud states that up to this point, Elizabeth's cure had shown no progress. The patient complained to him, "I am not getting any better, I still have the same pains". When Freud decided to exert the pressure with his hands in search of the psychic impressions the pains were related to, new memories came up, and there began a second stage in the analysis. Freud produced an act by means of which he urged her to put into words that which implied interrogating the Other about his desire. The complaint, "I am not getting better" anticipated then what is established here, that language is ordered into a discourse; the subject poses as an enigma and looks for the unveiling of the signifiers in the Other, the master which constitutes them.

Elizabeth then reported a scene in which she met a young man who loved her and who also admired her father. Back from a walk with him she found her father's condition had worsened. She accused herself and from that moment onwards would never leave him alone. Around that time she situated the beginning of her pains. As the analysis progressed, Freud discovered that while Elizabeth looked after her father, he had rested his swollen legs on hers. Gradually, other scenes turn up in the retelling: Elizabeth was standing at the time her father was taken ill; she was also on her feet next to her dead sister.

However, it is there that she has to avoid difficult moments in the transference: Long pauses and hesitations occur. That is to say, what in *Dynamics of Transference* he would call real interruption of associations, which is not to be confused with the silence resulting from displeasure. It is an indication that what happens in the heart of the pleasure principle can only be read with the inclusion of its beyond", that is to say, in terms of the contingency of the drive that transgresses homeostasis.

To point out the relationship between drive and inhibition is, therefore, coherent with the statements presented by Freud in his text of 1926. In *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*, when describing the different procedures noticed in the disturbance of the functions, he singles out one we underline as the most significant; the libido deviation; a trait which may be located as pure inhibition. At the same time, it will be defined as a

functional restriction in the Ego. The Ego cannot make use of the drive energy. Its investment cannot be moved. Unlike the symptom, the inhibition will then be a process in the Ego.

The use of the graph² will allow us to advance further: in the short circuit from the Other up to the Ego, inhibition is located as a process revealed by the course of a cure. According to Freud, each scene must have left a mark: an indication of a fixed investment as regards the function. This is discriminated from another mechanism that contributes to determine the abasia. By the time of the analysis, Elizabeth persisted with a phrase: how lonely she was.

It is there that Freud discovers the misunderstanding between "being alone" and "being on her feet". That is, he differentiated the paralysis of the function or inhibition from the functional, symbolic paralysis or symptom.

If anxiety guides one with regards to the location of desire, inhibition is the hypostatical dialectic of desire. In our language hypostasis means the union of human nature with the word and at the same time a certain fibrous body that can be found in embryonic conditions.

The desire is frozen at its very birth, that is at the place of the Other. Elizabeth had come back radiant from her walk when the first pains occurred. It was there also, that the dialectic of her desire was interrupted, an interruption in which the successive recordings of new events would cooperate. Thus, by means of the short circuit, the desire would return to the sphere of the Ego, that surface or precipitate of shapes which is a reflection from the mirror of the Other. Clinical shaping is where the blind alley of narcissism becomes evident. The subject gets trapped in the specular tension which is eroticizing, and the circuit is therefore interrupted with regard to satisfaction.

Therefore Elizabeth, as Ideal Ego for her father, cannot desire. She tried to maintain the lost happiness. That phallic brightness is fortified in an image of herself, which really comes from the Other, from the obscure power obtained in the language itself.

The Other is also for her the locus of the word: but that word has the value of a command: it is the birth of being daring and argumentative", a son rather than a daughter".

At this level of the graph, death plays the role of the struggle for pure prestige. In the face of death, there is a void in the real Other: Elizabeth

argues with one brother-in-law and loves the other one; both of them as *i(a)*, at that time, her fellow creatures, and simultaneously, her own image.

The swollen leg of her father should be now brother-in-law in order to restore its essential phallic value. Life leading to death is that which essentially counts for Elizabeth, since it avoids her castration and that of the Other. Her abasia is the alibi located in the Ego, which enables her not to face death, and is the one that leads to life. Only except that, while the Other wants her to be a male support, she is impotent to answer the demand. Her paralysis is the tribute with which she takes the guarantee from the Other.

It is in the second stage of the analysis that a body, up to that moment left aside, or only present in a diffuse report of her pains, begins to emerge. That body, left aside, covered and introduced by the image is also a parts in the sense of the object termed *a*. That is to say that in *i(a)* the self unifying image closes itself, but encloses insofar as it is a real body. Inhibition differentiates, in this way, the real from the imaginary.

That dull real is, however, a real which questions the unifying aspect of the image even on the first occasion of the inhibition. The imaginary aspect of the Ego borders on auto-erotism, that level of the objects that are not found to be turned into components of the Ego image. They are disrupted parts, they do not enter the image. They make the good shape of the Ego stop functioning.

Freud travels along those parts with his questions: leg of a body, and even more, parts of a leg. This trip will find its climax in the discovery made by Freud of the equivocal in the signifier *Stehen*. There, inhibition shows its relationship to the symptom. This is the appearance of *lalangue* or the putting into work of the unconscious in an analysis. There in *Stehen* the equivocal between "being on her feet" and "being alone" is articulated. The real aspect of inhibition is touched and knotted in a different way, cut out by three rings: real, symbolic and imaginary. When *Stehen* goes beyond the bar, the real aspect that inhibition indicated passively is then the elaborated nucleus of *jouissance*.

The symptom would come to the locus of the drive circuit that has suffered the deviation (Freud differentiated two mechanisms in his patient). If the symptom is the return of what is repressed, the inhibition would seem to be lacking the text, that is the return of what is repressed, insofar as there is the possibility of the equivocal. That is why what is sought in the cure is to transfer the inhibition into a symptom. The abasia is in that moment a

question directed to the Other through which the sexual aspect is introduced into discourse. This passage is the shaping of the symptom. This relationship between the subject and the master signifier shows that its being is involved in the master's desire. The inhibition will have been then the sheath which contained the necrotic bone. There the *jouissance* that Freud named "beyond . . ." in its repetition arises.

In the seminar on *Anxiety*, Lacan will say: "Inhibition is a symptom kept in the museum". Storage of ruins? Residues of a first operation?

In effect, the body of the frozen symbolic shows the effect of fragmentation on the body and there it touches the real. It is worth making some comments about storage of ruins: firstly, the abasia indicates a point of libidinal fixation where we can locate an object that could come apart but has not yet fallen. If the circuit of satisfaction implies the thanatic return in the erotogenic edge, conversely, within the inhibition it is a question of auto-erotic dissatisfaction. The object is preserved, maintained in the museum, since the libido assumes the link to the object but the deviation prevents, or stops, its loss.

Secondly, the interruption of the movement could be considered as the effect of the phallic *jouissance* which exerts its heavy weight in the inhibition. The word of the Other, here the voice of the Super-Ego, crushes with its command, "You are a son rather than a daughter" and consequently, the family's support, that is, *Stehen* (on her feet). The weight of these phrases, univocal, having the value of a sign, interrupts the circuit of desire. The Ideal Ego is, therefore, the substitution, next or immediate metonymy, to the desire of the Other. This univocal sense falls on the function itself carrying the phallic ballast that the said word implies.

And what about the *jouissance* of the Other, that which exists beyond language? Inhibition would mark it in those fragments of the body which can be found, as the real within the imaginary. However, the passage of a within *i(a)* into *a* as *plus de jouir* from inhibition to symptom, will take place under the condition that is the foundation of discourse as social link: the exclusion of *jouissance*. The tie of S_1 to an ignored *jouissance* within *i(a)* gets free upon the misunderstanding: *Stehen* is disjunctive as regards *Stehen*. What happened is that the Name of the Father has cursed² her as phallus. *Lalangue* is the vehicle for the death of a sign.

The point is that as it happens with all hysterical women, Elizabeth wanted a master who knew, but not too much.

At the end of the analysis, Freud speaks with Elizabeth's mother as regards a possible coupling with her brother-in-law. His patient blows up and it is justified. Freud has sent her again to the omnipotence of the Other, restoring his sentence: "It would be difficult for her to find a husband", a univocal pact that implies in the love-hate relationship the existence of the Other and stops its fall by clinging to its guarantee.

Elizabeth's mother writes a letter to Freud, who finally decides against answering it, an essential silence which, however, is not enough for the end of an analysis. In any case the inhibition named from the equivocal reminds us that the real is never closed.


Cristina Marrone,
Argentina.

Translated by Ana I. Fuentes and Graciela S. Bazzi.

Notes

¹ FREUD, S. *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*. St. Ed. Vol. XXIII, p228.

²



³

In Spanish: *mal-dicho* can be read as both *cursed* and *wrongly said*. (Translator's Note).

Beyond the Author-an American in America

Luis Maria Bisselier

We have little time. Let's take advantage of it. Otherwise we would once again fill the emptiness of a thinking which lives within us with the hollowness of our presence.

The above thinking, let's say it at once, is that of J. Lacan, whose ideas have been proclaimed so wildly that we feel a pause is necessary — a pause that will allow us the joy of transmission of knowledge by reading his works. But what do we mean by *reading*? This is an unendingly complex and crucial matter, as far as analysis is concerned, given the fact that there is no reading without analysis, nor analysis without reading; and that to achieve its end the function we term *the desire of the analyst* must be present.

We believe it is not an elegant excuse or a Socratic trick to state that this question can never be completely answered: its answer seems to lie in being left open.

But what is reading? Reading is an act in the word, by the word and for another word. As such, it presupposes a subject and a technique to make it

possible. This technique is termed *dialogue*, which should be distinguished from *interlocution*, as this is something else. The desperate harshness of modern life is not free of the tedium caused by the search for a valid interlocutor. This search for valid interlocutors frequently means not going beyond small dissimilarities, searching for those who are similar to myself, the acme of boredom.

Dialogue is an art, a technique, an artifice which permits us to support the speech when this threatens to fall into the void of uncommunicative silence: encountering an object that is not missing, the horror of a menacing threat. Dialogue (the analyst's *savoir-faire*) is what keeps speech at its highest peak. It is realized as writing when the discourse supported this way insists on certain symbols, letters, that become fixed in graphism. It becomes real. Here we are with what we read: when we read, that real is there and we should say that *to read* is to extract, to produce that real.

It seems clear that we are situated in the field of psychoanalysis but what is this field, exactly? Psychoanalysis meets its field delineated by what is not. Analogously with this structure, the psychoanalyst arrives at the end of his analysis when the very cause for it becomes knotted. What he is not: the Un-being.

Psychoanalysis is neither science nor psychology, neither utilitarian conjectures nor intuition of the essences, neither algebra of the soul nor empiricism. Psychoanalysis finds its praxis in the empiria (what exists) of an idea, that is, unconscious thought, the reading of a text that emerges from the fissures of speech. It is a furrow drawn in the real: the Id thinks toughly. The reading constitutes the maximum difference with respect to the text that is read and that insists, and is produced by the desire of the analyst.

If this were not so, what magical effect, what capacity for incantation of all the imperfections of life, would we attribute to the word? This is the Church's duty: for the Church, the word is in itself sacred. Not all of Lacan's words convey the means of transmission for what psychoanalysis teaches. Some merely hypnotize. Thus, the belief in a sacred word or text has expedited a religious approach for many true psychoanalysts.

The reason for this deviation is in the nature of the word itself and its function. It constitutes a deviation of the word. The word is sacred in 'as' much as it is true. It is truly the foundation of inter-human pacts, insofar as they pursue the adjustment of the beings involved and not the adjustment to the object

"... The word manifests itself the more truly as a word the less its truth is based on the adjustment to the object. Paradoxically the true word is thus opposed to true discourse. Its truths are distinguished by the following: the true word constitutes the acknowledgement by the subjects of their beings inasmuch as they are interested in it; while the truth of the true discourse is constituted by the knowledge of the real, inasmuch as it is aimed at by the subject in the objects. But each one of the truths here distinguished is modified when it intercepts the other when on its way."¹

We can read: a word bases its truth as a word on *not* adjusting to the thing, to the object. If there is no adjustment, there is separation (a cutting out) of the object, a requisite for its extraction by the word and for being the basis of truth of the discourse, which goes beyond the being of the word, making it untruthful in the same way as the word, when turning back over the true discourse, allows it to find the place in which it can err.

It is in this condition in which the word finds its value in the transference, where the word is the vehicle, the material support of an operation which turns the truth into something that is only half-said. It is the effect of a fracture in the unconscious learning which makes the symptom the real that prepares its reading.

Step by step this material support, vehicle, or if you wish, transference, works in the analysis: since it is here where it conveys a signification which is destined to weaken in the silence of the associations, when they get to the knot that supports them. It is the love, so-called, of *transference*, that allows the subject to tie himself up through the word to what is impossible to signify by the word: what we call real.

It is understood, then, to be a pre-established approach, pre-established by the structure itself of the analytic situation that the person undergoing analysis, is speaking, transfers the features that structure his neurosis to the analytic situation. From the neurosis to the neurosis of transference, the analyst accompanies this movement, taking the place of the symptom. That is to say, what is to be dissolved.

Therefore, it is possible to think that we psychoanalysts establish true neuroses of transference with the consequent family romance for structural reasons, when reading texts by Lacan and Freud.

Our analysis requires a roundabout route to reach its object, for not a step forward is gained if the denouncement does not uncover the basis of the scene.

The following will serve as a reminder of some phrases that fill our jargon like stuffing and will place us right in the heart of the matter.

"This is *your* reading, *mine* is another . . ." This is what we say when introducing an intentionally eristic reply.

"Our readings are not antagonistic as each sheds some light on the matter." Here we courteously attempt to heal the wound of the difference with the sweetness of mutual condescension. The origin of this love is not hidden. (In Spanish, *condescendencia*, descending from the same father).

The point is that there are not two readings, neither contradictory nor complementary. There are not readings, there are readers, the reason for this being that there are not as many truths as readers; each reader, the truth, speaks, and the truth is always half-said.

If it is only half-said, then it is impossible to consider one's truth complete and antagonistic to another's truth, nor is it possible to believe that by uniting two different truths, one truth will result.

But what is reading? The act of reading begins only upon reading for a second time. The "begins only" of the previous sentence places us in a logical time, whose first moment is the one in which we articulate ourselves to the letters of a text to which we are driven by a special interest in its body. We lend life to the words by giving them sounds.

The signifier articulates itself to a body inasmuch as it is extracted from a letter that is its minimum expression. Lacan's letters situate us with that part of his body that we take joy in.

But the text arranges itself in the same way as his discourse with the same rhythm, breathing, pauses, peaks of rage, instances of sweetness (the few that do exist), cruelty, irony and scorn, all of which skirt two over-threatening objects: his voice and gaze.

Extraction can be described as the voice we lend him when our gaze is lost on the whiteness of the glance with which we begin the act we call reading. Until we find the place which every successful text offers — the reader's place — it is on our own bodies that the author's figure is drawn.

The author as an ideal figure occupies by retroaction the locus of the subject, the place where it had been located in its first movement. Drawn by his intention, the subject ties himself up to the text like the flow of discourse in a mattress-maker's stitch (*point de capitonne*), which makes the text become a signifying treasure. (See the process of construction of the graph in *The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious*). Where the subject was before now remains the ego-ideal — (A)—, pushing the subject to the place where his intention had been.

This Author as an ideal figure, as an ego-ideal, is found in the contemporary psychoanalytic literature. An American in Paris, has made Lacan a hero from the angle of the love — transference. From the hostile angle, a Frenchman reproaches the terrible father showing himself as his discarded thing, while imagining a Caribbean tour (the American future), the imaginary slope of the non-being.

From the above example it can be seen that the being of an analyst which suffers its alienation in the manner described above, continues to predicate its way of being with respect to the word of the Other. This is still a reading although the word is stuck with the figure of the Master, a reading that suffers but that is still possible because it is knotted to the true word.

The process of degradation that takes us from the reader, to the scholar is different. Here the teacher is supported. This place may be filled with any name desired. Somebody is always available.

The point we want to make is that this is no longer a question of knotting ourselves to a text that throws the author's shadow on its object while being read. It is a question of the link with a professor who points at the text with his index finger . . . a text which has not been read yet. This reading is put off for "tomorrow" and it is postponed indefinitely, cancelling out the possibility of ever reading it beforehand. People study a great deal, but read very little, if at all, The one who reads, the *supposed-subject-of-reading*, is the professor. He simply knows. It's just a matter of reaching the learning through effort. Just one more effort and it can be reached. Obsessively, the question about what is read and how it is read is postponed until everything is read. As we commonly hear, "he lacks reading". If we do not place the lack in the Other, then what is lacking is the reading.

The position of the lack in the Other is a place in the text, which must be produced by analytic work. This is the place of the reader, insofar as he produces a new text, one reading, which may be one but not unique, because in turn it must offer its own place for the lack.

Here the letter is a true limit inasmuch as it sets itself up as, and constitutes, the fracture that leaves the place of the Other's voice empty, creating the place in which the other lends the text his own voice. This means taking possession of the remains of this fracture, the real of the symbolic: the letter for another text. This is going from the castration in the Other to the castration in the other.

What interests us is the procedure through which the castration is effected and not the constitution of the image of the letter into an entity as the essence of a new dogma.

But the question still holds; *What is reading?* It means going beyond the Author, using his letters from a position where one lack points out the place of a new letter. Reading is extracting a new text from the text. In going beyond the Author, the Author becomes one more link in the chain. Reading means overturning the figures that were built up during the time that the analysis took place. Master, terrible father, severe or loving, figures that are sustained by identification as a defense against the Ideal father. (Refer to J. Lacan's *Proposition of October 9th.*)

The Ideal father is the screen which fills the void in which the non-existence of the Other is revealed.

But what can the non-existence of the Other mean? This phrase must be related to "there is no metalanguage", to "there is no Other of the Other". This means, or at least endeavours to, mean that the signification leads to the signification and that the structure becomes complete with the existence of the no-sense. The truth and not the Other is what is left aside. The no-sense, S_1 , is left outside the knowledge, S_2 The Other is never excluded from the chain of signifiers, and this makes it vulnerable to castration, that is, castration in the Other which makes the truth its lack: a lack in its being.

If this operation is not carried out, the Other is sustained only by the imaginary, even though this ideal may lack no symbol to animate it in turn. This ideal makes the object the exterior signifier which prevents its final disentanglement. This would break the battery of signifiers into fragments: we may place psychosis here as the Umheimlich, that is, asymmetrically opposed to the mythical moment in which we pointed out the emergence of the subject in the field of the Other.

Against this background of loss and threat, the social link is woven. Either the "a" or the "A" is lost. The I(A) is, then, a final defence which makes

the subject an object whose correlative element in the real is, as Lacan says, the concentration camp.

This object is located at a distance from the Other and the latter aspires to the former, although ideally, for achieving the object would mean its own destruction. This destruction is manifested by the explosion of the battery of signifiers which we find in the clinical description of psychosis: a final and chaotic way of producing a sort of extraction of the object of *jouissance* from the body of the Other, since it is the body of the Other, A-FATHER IN THE REAL which is there, threatening.

The correlative element of this unbarred Other is pointed out with precision by Lacan in Seminar 3:

"... a field seems indispensable for the mental breathing of modern man; a field where he asserts his independence not only from any master, but also from any god: it is the field of his irreducible autonomy as an individual, as an individual existence. This merits being compared to a delusional discourse, point by point. That's what it is."

This is the point of extension whose frightful vortex is plugged up by the "analytic ideals", in a reduction of the analytic operation in the heart of its own field.

Such is the defence function which we believe is fulfilled by the ballast of the "analytic ideals" on whose vessel the founding figures navigate like pieces of statuary, substituting for the payment of a debt of castration.

Perhaps for this reason, as Freud would have liked it, this vessel would bear the motto of the coat-of-arms of the city of Paris, *Fluctuat nec mergitur*. (It sways but it does not sink.) We can only venture on how far we can go concerning the end of an analysis.

As closing words, I would like to share an experience I consider appropriate for Lacanians. A Lacanian analyst, father of a five-year-old boy, plays with him at finding words that can produce misunderstandings. They play at speaking in Japanese. (In Spanish: *hablar* instead of *hablar*, etc.) The child finds the game very amusing. "What could a Japanese mean by: *What a terrible lio!* "Does he mean *lio* or *no*?"² This goes on until the father can find no more examples and therefore must say "I don't know". The child finally understands this, stops laughing for a while and then asks

almost seriously Daddy, why do the 'japoneles'³ speak like that?"

I now ask if it is because they are *Lacanoamericanos*⁴. Somebody could object to that and ask me "What the hell does that mean?"

Answer: Nothing. That's precisely the point.

Luis Maria Bisselier
Argentina

Translated by Graciela Perez-Esandi

Notes

- 1 LACAN, J. *Variantes de la cure-type* in *Ecrits*, Seuil, Paris, 1966
- 2 Both words exist in Spanish, *rio* means *river*, and *lío* means *mess*.
- 3 The word for *Japanese* in the plural form is *japoneses* and not *japoneles*.
- 4 *Lacanoamericanos* (See Lacan's Seminar in Caracas, July, 1980).

The Scenes of a Fetishist

Oswaldo Apreda

"Es imprescindible tener a mano una mujer desnuda"

"You've got to have a naked woman at hand"

M. Benedetti

In the frame of this meeting, the aim of this communication is to attempt to open again a topic which we come across throughout our practice: to carry out psychoanalytic practice of the diagnosis according to its relation with the direction of the cure.

My contribution is meant to provide some elements that make it possible to sustain questioning proceeding from this experience.

Some Considerations Concerning a Demand of Analysis

At the age of forty three Ismael asks for an interview with a psychoanalyst. He is going through a difficult period of his life, with strong anxiety crisis, related to a very distressing idea: "I'm afraid that I might become a homosexual".

Phobic anxiety is the halting of a certainty, which poses a question and the consequent demand of knowing.

The analyst is a little surprised about this communications, and he questions his own surprise, because these kinds of thoughts concerning doubt in relation to virility are actually not rare. Trying to get over this surprise, he says to himself, "Ideas that are thrust upon a man who looks neat and tidy, who talks carefully and precisely and is methodical and possibly scrupulous; maybe he has had an episode of sexual impotence" and then he hurries to conclude: "an obsessive".

Due to the fact that Ismael exhibits a very impressive and virile look, the analyst cannot get fully rid of his surprise, and he makes himself go on listening. He asks the man to comment on his own point of view about the origin of his "fear of becoming a homosexual".

Reports of Some Scenes

At the time this interview is held, Ismael is a top executive in a business company, a situation to which he arrived by his own merits and with great effort. After a long marriage and having had several children, he separated from his wife. Whilst he was married, he had had some isolated love affairs, mostly with work companions. These episodes never lasted long, and they were not very important to him, except for one involving his wife's sister (which seemed to have been one of the causes of his separation.)

The duplicity of women normally shows up in the obsessive's reports, and one of them usually is *The Lady of the Thoughts*.

He describes himself as a solitary man having refined tastes. He likes the fine arts, music, and especially reading. He is well informed on general subjects and mostly on those related to his work; that is why his superiors consult him continuously and he is highly respected by the people he directs. He is a very efficient worker.

He lives by himself in a flat, which is not located in the same city as the analyst's. This fact leads the latter to ask the reasons for this choice, since indeed there are analysts in Ismael's town. Once again the duplicity: two cities. His answer sounds reasonable: he has already had several psychotherapeutic and even psychiatric experiences. Moreover, he and his wife went through family therapy due to their matrimonial crisis (it is precisely his ex-wives's analyst who suggested this therapy).

He hadn't obtained satisfactory results, and his latest therapist finally became his "friend". The analyst, listening, couldn't help the evocation of Pablo Lorentz and the way he hurried to his "Friend's" home looking for consolation.

He comments on all this in a formal way, speaking clearly using a soft tone of voice, choosing his words carefully as if he were showing that he has something to say and he knows how to say it. His discourse, a little seductive at times takes up a shade of hysteria.

During the next interview, Ismael continues with his comments, especially those involving his sexual activity. His usual practice is masturbation, with a special environment, which he describes as follows:

"After work, I go home and close every window. I open the wardrobe and take out women's clothes from a locked bag. When I first feel the touch of these soft clothes, I start feeling a strong excitement. I begin to undress myself, and I dress like a woman. This excitement grows more and more when I put the stockings on (he explains that all the clothes should be silky and of the highest quality). I try to make this handling last a long time. Then I put a bra and panties on, a tight skirt and belt and do up my blouse. When this moment comes, I feel the highest excitement; I look at myself in the mirror and I masturbate, obtaining a great incomparable pleasure. Then, I cook something simple for dinner, I listen to some music or I read. But sometimes, I wear a nightie and a dressing gown. I clean up the kitchen and go to sleep. On some occasions I may put on make-up and even wear a wig."

He recounts this using the same soft voice with which he relates things about his work or his family. The analyst notes that Ismael stresses very much the excitement that he feels when the material first touches his skin, and how the clothes must be very tight on his body.

Nevertheless, Ismael doesn't seem to be sustaining his demand of analysis because of his sexual activity. He plays his scene in solitude, without a partner, and it culminates in an auto-erotic act which provides him with an "incomparable" pleasure, and with which he says "I'm not bothering anyone". A fantasy put into action, in a transvestite way but showing some kind of ritual ceremony, much like the masturbation in front of the mirror performed by the *The Rat Man*. And it is the analyst again who asks himself "What about the anxiety?"

Ismael continues "I come here when I want to buy women's clothes. Even a simple idea, or imagining myself going shopping starts arousing a slight excitation that increases. But it feels as if my personality has split: there is one part acting as a woman, and another who observes everything that goes on. This sensation disappears once I masturbate."

A split of the gaze is starting to be outlined: there's a mirror, where Ismael sees himself being looked at, and this is correlated to the split he describes as one "acting like a woman" and another who "observes". He splits as the one who shows himself to be seen by the gaze of the Other; he makes himself an object for that gaze.

When he comes for a third interview, he looks much more anxious. He describes one of his "treatments", during which a psychiatrist made electric charges flow through his hands in order to cure him of masturbation. The analyst intervenes to ask him what was the cause of his anxiety, and Ismael answers, "I feel that I need more and more pleasurable sensations and that I should increase my excitation. And so, I've started to (his anxiety increases) introduce things into my anus: first I started with a stick but I couldn't make it because it hurt me a lot; then I tried to do it with a banana, but it went soft and came to pieces; later I tried again with a stick but covered with meat. But it didn't work either, it was painful and unpleasurable. My fear (he starts sobbing) is that I might look for men and become a homosexual."

This failure in his effort to get more pleasure, becomes a symptom. He cannot get over the barriers (pain, disgust) which Freud had already pointed out. The perverse in his mastery wouldn't have failed and his determination to enjoy would have made him pass through all the barriers. Ismael could not put the *a* on his side, it stayed on the Other's side, encased by the fetish.

It appears like a hesitation of the fetish, as a pre-announcement of the impossibility of keeping the disavowal of castration. There is a cracking of his narcissism with the threat of losing the illusion of completeness, and the consequent arrival of the desire of the Other. ("The anxiety is essentially related to the desire of the Other", Lacan). When the *Che vuoi?* arises, he answers from the perverse scene, but he doesn't faithfully give himself as an instrument to the Other to enjoy.

Report Of A Primal Scene

He reports that at the age of five or six, he had a quarrel with one of his sisters. His mother reprimanded him harshly, and said to him, "You quarrel with girls as if you were a girl too, so I'm going to dress you as a girl". While his mother struggled to dress him, he tried to prevent her from doing so. He clearly recalled that his mother held him tightly between her thighs, while she fastened a belt on him in a very "tight" way, and he added that in that very moment, he felt a pleasurable sensation, much like an orgasm. When

reporting this scene, he starts crying heavily and he screams: "That bitch, look what she's done to me that bitch!". He adds that there was a neighbour who incited his mother to dress him as a girl. His father didn't intervene. Primordial mother, she doesn't put any limit to her demand, which remains inscribed as a ferocious imperative, with the adornment of a father that, because of his passivity, gives him up to that praying manits.

The contact with that body led him to a displaced *jouissance*: "silky clothes, very tight" a substitution for being held tightly between his mother's thighs.

He remained as an imaginary phallus, obturating the lack in the mother. His fear of becoming a homosexual was an effort to get rid of that, putting himself in a passive-feminine position. In order to achieve the advent of a father, to accomplish the father's function of saying "No" to his autoerotism and to the mother's demand, it is indispensable that there exists at least someone to say "no" to castration, (it is necessary that this does not cease from being written). That is to say, to give satisfaction to the mother so that this fact makes it possible for all of them to say "yes" to the phallic function, ordering the *jouissance*:

$$\exists x \bar{\Phi} \rightarrow \forall x \Phi x$$

Some Questions Arising From a Psychoanalysis

Ismael started his analysis being able to locate a supposed knowledge (*supossé savoir*). As the sessions proceeded, the image of a weak father overshadowed by the mother's personality arose; the former had left a previous family in his native country. He hadn't been able either to sustain himself as an Other of the pact, or to support the symbolic alliance. He was a "fading" father, discredited in the mother's discourse, where Ismael was the favourite. In transference the demand was for someone to carry out the separating function that would pull him away from the *jouissance* of his mother's body, in order to make impossible the non-existence of someone to say no to the phallic function, so that this would not stop not being written, so that it would be contingent that not everybody is saying yes to castration, and this stops not being written:

$$\exists x \Phi x \rightarrow \bar{\forall} x \Phi x$$

In his search, he was looking for a way to know how to silence his mother's demand, and so he supported a father who hadn't been able to

testify to his phallic attribution, and who had halted before the Law. The mother's command was ruling: "I'm going to dress you up as a girl", and his father's gaze turned to other women.

The cross-roads were : either to obey the mother's command, absolute and ferocious but leading him to *jouissance*, or to tear himself away from it with the consequent loss. That *jouissance* must disappear in order to achieve the possible *jouissance* of phallic writing. The analyst looked like the one who might know how to silence her, but he also was — to Ismael — the fear/desire of becoming feminized, with the anxiety of becoming a homosexual.

Once in a session, he had the fantasy of fellatio with the analyst. Lacan finds that this is fairly typical in obsessives, and he explains it as the requirement for the existence of a phallus beyond the child, desired by the mother and the advent of a father as a paternal metaphor.

He blamed the analyst for having torn him away from the "incomparable" *jouissance* of masturbation. He was able to come close to his father, kiss him and talk to him; he asked his parents to come to terms.

It seemed he had made a movement, finding his own *jouissance* in a woman's body : his sister-in-law's. The woman not-all is (phallic), and as there is no signifier for the feminine *jouissance*, this leads to "there is no sexual relation".

At this moment he discontinued his analysis: he won't even pay for the sessions taking place during his holidays.

Some questions arise from this psychoanalysis that takes place in the real :

- a. Dismissing the analyst as supposed-subject-of-knowledge (*sujet-supposé-savoir*), leaving him only as a remainder *a*? May be the end of the analysis?
- b. Acting out to prevent the analysis of his neurosis?
- c. Was he a perverse fetishist? And if so, is it possible to analyse a perverse? If there is any transference, what is its clinic?
- d. Was he an obsessive, perverse for moments, and performing fetishist scenes?

Oswaldo Apreda,
Argentina.

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To Read Oneself

Pablo Kovalovsky

This meeting invites us as readers and inspires me following reflections concerning the problems of *reading*, or, better still, the function of reading in psychoanalysis — considering especially what Lacan terms *the function of reading oneself*.¹

Freud pointed out the specific place reading has in analytic practice. His suggestion to consider the text of a dream like a sacred text in order to interpret it is the proof. Lacan, in turn, described his *Ecrits* as difficult to read. His warning to those eager to understand them is valid to analysts too — analysts who face the text the analysand produces during clinical psychoanalysis: *Do you hasten to understand?* This crossroad where the *subject of reading* and the *letter to be read* meet, is itself a limit, regarding psychoanalytic transmission and clinical psychoanalysis as well.

In the first place, *to read* involves a *subjective position regarding knowledge*. This position has more than one meaning: we may point out at least two aspects of an alternative found throughout the tradition of reading sacred texts. On the one hand we find the so called *allegoric* reading with

Patristics as its paradigm. To value the control of the text's meaning is itself an act of faith, when the text sustains this faith. It assures beforehand the correspondence with the Church's principles. Finally, the intention is to prevent the text from obtaining value by itself. Following the principle of contradiction between the spirit and the flesh, Saint Augustine asserts that:

"To understand an image as said in its proper sense is carnal thought"

"To the soul, then, there is no more significant death than submitting to Flesh, after Scripture . . ."

And Saint Paul: "Scripture kills, Spirit gives life".

On the other hand, the other aspect of reading, this time called *literal* refers us to Spinoza, who requires not to have pre-suppositions when interpreting, and in turn calls for a literal, scientific interpretation. As he puts forward, the text's meaning should arise from working-through, and not previously, since the latter condemns the lack of submission but not ignorance. The science of texts must resemble natural science, and objectivity of meaning should be fostered. True meaning should be equal to the purpose of the author, and bestow a coherent, univocal status upon reading. Philology should be an auxiliary science to the task of Exegesis.

Regarding reading, Lacan gives the following eloquent example: should we read a text written in a foreign language, in order to grasp its meaning, to understand it, it will be necessary to skip at least one sign. That is to say, meaning asserts itself as our understanding where transgression on literalness is done by means of elision. Should we stick to literal translation, the meaning will be lost. Within psychoanalytic experience we may place this opposition between meaning and text in the place where the vicissitudes of transference throw us. At first, the unconscious appears to the analysand as a foreign language. He comes to question the foreign language of his symptoms by means of analysis. But *the unconscious structured as a language*, and on account of the signifier's inherent formalism, causes the lack to be at the root of its display. This is the difference between *the tongue*² and a *language*: from now onwards, the tongue shall be written with only one word, *thetongue* which erases the implicit closing in the completeness of the definite article *the*. Here, there is already an inaugural want-to-be which separates the signifier from the

signified, thus shattering the consistence of the "sign" and a want-to-be which refers to its own incompleteness. The first one is the metaphoric, the second the metonymic aspect.

To skip a sign when reading a text written in a foreign language — our example above — becomes here a *structural skipping*.

Love "*makes sign*". It tries to sustain meaning where meaning fades away. In transference, when the analytic set-up (which invites the analysand to say "no matter what") is working, the formalism of the signifier is also at play; that is to say its structural lack is at play. This is an act of faith, modified deeply by the fundamental rule — from the very beginning — which separating the signifier leaves the meaning suspended within the ambiguity of words. This suspension of meaning makes it possible. What ceases to write itself down in the analysand's sayings becomes possible. Possible of what? Possible of sometimes ceasing from not writing itself down in the contingency of an interpretation. What has become possible, being suspended, is nothing other than sexual meaning. Within *misunderstanding*, it guarantees a coming-and-going of meaning where plurality of meaning nests: in "no matter what" waiting for true meaning to arise from he who is supposed to know how to read — the subject of reading (in that case, the analyst). *I love he to whom I suppose knowledge* says Lacan. *Supposed to know how to read*, as he owns the missing signifier. This is why transference-love becomes inevitable during analysis. While waiting for the lost meaning, what Freud anticipated in *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego* produces itself: the identification to the analyst — as with the identification to the leader — sustains itself in the *single feature* which in relation to the love of God would imply the possibility of the being.

By means of "participation" (a trace of Platonism in Christian tradition) it would make possible the passage from the "more perfect being" to the "less perfect being" And what this link to being sustains is that feature, which although being the mark of what being lacks, is nevertheless this structure's want-to-be. The analyst's own name, his emblems, are and shall be a guide of a practice of analysis which supposes understanding, asserting itself within a reading whose subject is the analyst. With its supposed knowledge, this practice closes the analysand's saying when it touches *misunderstanding*.³

If understanding the meaning involves a practice of reading, it is at the cost of skipping the text, that is to say, what situates the fall of the meaning,

i.e. *misunderstanding as a position* to be sustained by the analyst. Here the analyst would be on the same side as the mathematician who, in his *misunderstanding*, follows the text without any skipping, rigorously. *But there is no love without hate*. If love asserts being within identification to the ideal, hate is what actualises the rejection of being. *What is misunderstood returns as a text. I hate he whom I de-suppose knowledge*. If the analysand makes a sign, which leads to signify something for someone to whom knowledge is supposed, what arises is this *alterity of the Other of language* — *incarnated in what the analyst was unable to read: should he fail, his presence will appear as an object in which the analysand cannot recognize himself* — *it becomes hostile*. If the analysand “made a sign” the analyst occupies now the position of *semblant*, resemblance of the object *a*. This position shatters the alternative true-false which points to the last meaning of a full-truth, and deeply changes it for the division *semblant/truth*, where the latter is *not-all*. In its structure of fiction there is a remainder which prevents it from becoming complementary to a binarism, but rather turns it divergent, open to the *semblant's* correlative, *jouissance*; it becomes unable to be mistaken for knowledge. In this moment the analyst becomes a “stranger”- as Freud says regarding what he calls *negative transference*. It is the analysand who becomes a reader, while the analyst becomes, in turn, knowledge: articulated letters which must be read exhaustively, and a condition to hate in reading, which tries to master that *strange being* who becomes menacing. The analyst's gestures, his writings, (books), his decorated walls — or the worn-out paint on them, — his private life, the Other is all knowledge to be read. The supposed-knowledge is de-supposed, it ceases being sub-posed. Lacan, emphatically mentioning that hate incites reading, quotes those who adequately read *L'instance de la lettre* since they hated him. Because hate addresses itself to what in the letter does not cover-up the signifier's structural skipping: this lack arises as an unrecognizable object, to be deciphered.

*Should meaning be homologous with the register of the imaginary, we may say that love makes the symbolic of the name imaginary and generates an emblem in the place of the lack. Hate makes the real imaginary, that which is impossible to suture in the signifier's structure, but does not cease to point to the last meaning, the Other's purpose, in another ideal. This dispraise for being which becomes letter is the other side of appraise, even if they don't reach to complement each other — as Lacan says, to make *uniprize* (in *Encore*). The ambivalence love-hate is the only face of the Moebius strip. If they managed to read him correctly on behalf of*

their hatred, they did not for that reason avoid attributing to him the worst of intentions: *they mis-considered him, dis-with-stupid-sideration, “desiderium” dis-considered him as the subject of reading, of desire.*^{4,1} They accuse him of having misinterpreted Heidegger's (and other author's) texts, with the aim of convincing.⁵ The last meaning comes back as an obstacle, closing what in reading is unable to go beyond the discourse of the University, i.e., a knowledge that is inherited, which must be transmitted without any subject.

Jewish tradition of “literal” reading supposes hatred to be an obstacle to participation in being: there is no possibility of identifying “perfect being” with “radically imperfect being”. “Since they loved me too much they hate me” — says Lacan — and that is why they did not attribute to him any subject. Thus, hate-love involves on the one hand a twist of the reader's place in transference, and on the other a twist in the type of reading in question, — if we may call “reading” the action of reading looking for a meaning, understanding; since loving excludes reading. Love supposes knowledge to be in the other, but *does not wish to know anything* about it. *Reading literally*, Lacan tells us in his motto of returning to Freud, as implied in a practice where reading and interpretation knot themselves together. Does this involve the analyst being an exhaustive reader, on account of interpretation, — or even a text decipherer, or an exegetic interpreter?

The suspended attention — Freud's reference to the analyst's position — is a questioning of this very possibility, since it allows us to suppose *the analyst does not read everything*; that the skipping is already inscribed in the structure of his practice, without therefore sliding to understand in and by love. *The return of the repressed is, says Lacan, “when I see the signifier coming as a letter”. In the line of the repressed which returns, the interpretation in the way of a reading which would produce “à la lettre” the transmutation of the signifier into what? Into a letter.*⁶

“*Reading literally*”, supposes that *letter to be already there*, within the signifier, within the first meaning of *à la lettre*, because what is offered- to be read is the letter. “*A la lettre's*” other meaning deals with *the effect of changing the signifier caused by interpretation. Here, interpretation is not reading but inscription; the analyst is a scribe*. Interpretation, as mathematical writing, “is not no matter what”, it's not open to every meaning, it does not have moods as free association has. *It is apophantic*;⁷ as an act, it involves its consequence: an excess; *an excess of signifier*.

A letter-plus is produced starting from the contingency of interpretation.

A place of the signifier which lets us suppose the possibility of that which inscribed itself as contingent, having ceased to write itself down. However, it was already there. Through the interpretative act the analyst cannot place himself in the alternative ciphering-deciphering. *He is no reader in the traditional meaning of the term.* He does not take part as the supposed-subject-of-knowing. *His act de-supposes a knowledge (savoir), since he produces that knowledge as such: he makes it arise from its supposed place.* Be it only by means of a convenient question, he makes it possible to the analysand to find the letter of his fate as a subject, starting from that effect of inscription. De-supposing a knowledge - since he "makes it known" through his act — he causes to arise, in the analysand, the "function of reading oneself", the only way to confirm, to recognize an interpretation as such in its efficacy. The ensuing associations come to cut-out a change in subjective position facing that arising knowledge. Regarding this effect of inscription, Lacan compares the analyst's position and the position of that which he calls "the traumatic relative"⁸. He compares them both distinguishing them and considering them to be homologous. The traumatic relative innocently produces neurosis imposing on the body the marks where *jouissance* shall lodge, where trauma opens up repetition: the Other's letter, always the same, trying in vain, with its insistence, to knot together a relationship between that body and that frozen *jouissance*. Unlike the traumatic relative, the analyst redoubles an inscription through his act. Each repetition cancels itself when inscription is re-duplicated. *Interpretation, when it re-produces fixation (and does not produce it) turns it into a cut, in the place where that mark was a stick-on.* Freud said analysis was "directed paranoia"; we in turn point to the fact of transmutating parapraxis into a *neologism*,⁹ that is, a parapraxis in writing. *Interpretation is the basis of a new logic: a topology which opens up wider the cleft between the body of knowledge — written with sexual characters — and jouissance of the drive, knotting together a real stated as follows: "There is no sexual relationship".*

Borges announces in a Prologue:

"A book is a thing among things, a volume lost among the volumes which fill the indifferent universe until it finds its reader, the man allotted to its symbols. . ." And he ends: "May you be the reader this book waited for".

Opposite to indifference of "saying no matter what" of free association, in a first moment of analysis what gives the series its unity sustains itself: the master signifier as what is owned by the supposed-subject-of-knowledge: the name which places a difference as property, in its alibi. To the subject, the re-encounter with that letter which was waiting there, indifferently, points to an *appropriation of another order*. The "self" in "to read oneself" in its reflexive mood, points to that order of appropriation. When that indefinite cipher, an indifferent deposit ceases to be any one, it may obtain the singularity of difference, of the same-ness of difference where *the subject re-reads himself as the enactment of the cut of interpretation*. Finally in this sense all interpretations may be reduced to a single one, by which the analyst passes to that place of an indifferent anyone, a remainder of his own act. The analysand may then discard what in love unifies the series. While this de-supposition of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge does not coagulate the mastering of an uncanny alterity as in hatred. The difference between a professor and a teacher does not lie in the fact that the latter returns to his act and reads himself in what comes back from his effects — thus placing himself, in this sense, in the position of the analysand. Collecting Lacan's texts, reading them exhaustively, scientifically, is a necessary moment, as during transference, but it is not enough. The letter that waits must find a reader who turns it into his own, that reads in it again the cipher of his own fate as an analyst. If Lacan may call himself Freudian, it is because he found his own fate in Freud's letter, which was waiting for him.

A letter always reaches its destination, but when and where it's not said. The encounter cannot be calculated, as interpretation can't.

That the letter finds its reader will be proven when we may suddenly find — in a register other than *hate love* — like an event — during our practice — that letter which was already there waiting for us, supposedly, indifferent until that moment.

Pablo Kovalovsky,
Argentina.

Notes

- ¹ LACAN, J. *The Seminar, Encore, 1972/73.*
- ² Lacan's readers may be familiar with the terms *lalangue* (the tongue) *langage* (language), etc. (Translator's note).
- ³ LACAN, J. *The Analyst's Knowledge, The Seminar*, seminar dated 12.2.1971 and 5.4.1972, taken from a recording.
- ⁴ A whole chain of word-puns in Spanish (Translator's note).
- ⁵ NANCY and LABARTHE. *The Title of the Letter.*
- ⁶ LACAN, J. *The Seminar, Ou Pire*, Seminar dated 15.12.1971.
- ⁷ Apophantic: Among meaningful statements, those which may be true or false, opposed to a wish, a supplication, naming, etc. In logical theory of propositions this word is expressed as a noun. Its origins are Aristotelian, and Lacan mentions it in *L'Etourdit*.
- ⁸ LACAN, J. *The Analyst's Knowledge, The Seminar*, seminar dated 4.5.72.
- ⁹ LACAN, J. *The Seminar, 1977 in Omicar?*

Phantom Member and Hallucinatory Fulfilment

Lidia Lourdes García

Hernán was 14 years old when the Orthopaedic Ward requested consultation. Twenty-one days ago a grave accident had caused the amputation of both legs. The request was made due to incoercible pains. The shock and the anguish of the first days only allowed at the beginning a brief approach with the patient and some interviews with the family group. His mother had gone as far as to state that death would have been better than such horror.

Hernán is the third in line of four siblings and he was with his eldest brother at the time of the accident who was then sixteen. The latter was interviewed twice and referred for urgent treatment because his anguish brought about anorexia, insomnia, guilt, feelings of exclusion and rejection by the members of his family; in the actualization of feelings of exclusion and privation present from a long time ago.

Hernán's psychical evolution was stormy and he was horrified at the sight of his amputated members, present by the pain which was becoming increasingly acute. The stump of his left leg progressed well, was longer,

had its knee and had more mobility. He stopped worrying about it after the first week of treatment, but he did not feel the same with the right one, for he was afraid it might not get good mobility. The Orthopaedic team pointed out very cleverly and with much worry: "That boy overburdens that leg".

In fact, when the pain became more acute and rehabilitation through physiotherapy began, there also started a constant massage of the stumps, an autoerotic movement, almost like masturbation.

The effect of analgesics and sedatives, including opium by-products, was very poor. There was insomnia, and the report of the accident during which he did not lose consciousness brought about much anguish.

Phantom members appeared with paresthesia and pain in very precise localizations, specially in the sole of the feet.

The phantom member of the left leg was losing importance in the same progression as the right one was gaining it, turning its massage in a persistently repetitive gesture, until several days later he stated that such massage gave him much relief in specific areas, including those where his leg was no longer. When massaging what did not exist, which for the factitious reality was the sheet and for his psychical reality the sole of his feet, gave him much relief. This did not happen if someone else did the massage.

His mother's presence made the pain more acute and her absence soothed it, but during all the forty-five days of his hospitalization he persistently refused that his mother went home. This was not said by the patient but by her who stated that her son did not want to stay alone and that she did not want to leave him alone. The only time that his father stayed at the hospital to take care of him, as a consequence of therapeutical instances, he had a bad night and his mother said that he did not assist him the way his son asked for. His father was an alcoholic on a pension for handicapped persons due to circulatory and cardiac illness. At Herman's request he stopped drinking while he was hospitalized.

As the interviews were progressing they brought about an improvement in the pain and the phantom member became shorter from the sole of the feet to the border of the stump.

Because of his physical immobility and due to the imminence of the hospital discharge it was decided to continue his treatment at his home with another therapist.

Twenty-four days after initiating his treatment and after forty-five days of hospitalization, his hospital discharge came through. According to information received he had a complete psychical recovery. At his home, particular emphasis was laid in the treatment with the family group which was extremely upset.

Today Herman is a young man completely recovered from the dramatic moment which changed his life for ever.

Points of Conflict in the Symptomatic Speech

The horror: Herman's horror towards his mutilated members and his mother's horror who preferred him dead to seeing him in such a state. Fracture of a whole.

The pain: Consultation was requested for this reason. The pain varied in his mother's presence from whom he could not separate himself. There was no analgesia with medication. It calmed down with the hallucinatory fulfilment.

Parental positions: The pain increased in the mother's presence and her absence relieved it, nevertheless they could not be apart. Father's inclusion whose presence brought about a "stormy night" of pain, anguish, anxiety.

His brother: The breakdown in relation to his rival position in the fraternal level and his referral for treatment.

Pact with his father: He promised his son to stop drinking at his request.

Analytic Work

We worked with the loss which involved everyone in the family and its acceptance. His father's figure was included as a triangular reconstruction. Fracture of dual relations. His brother was referred for treatment, where the difference between both of them was pointed out. Herman, being the third in line, personified the family ideal: a student, a sportsman, happy, a bird breeder. Thus was the story.

Two moments of the conflict have been worked through:

- a) Narcissistic moment,
- b) Moment of confronting castration.

The narcissistic moment was characterised by the hallucinatory fulfilment. The pain fulfilled a function in relation to the loss giving the appearance of impossibility to what he did not really have. The loss was narcissistically compensated. Herman's frustration results from the impossibility to give his mother what she expects from him and his mother's frustration.

Through the moment of confronting castration and accepting the loss, the inclusion of the father who had been belittled by his family and the pact with him, who accepts to lose the drinking habit and its prosthesis value in order for Herman to accept his mutilation reached a high point: a double virile affirmation, his father's promise and his mother's separation.

Characteristics of the Hallucination

Painful, with pain in proportion to the privation as a phobic threat in the place which will be occupied by castration giving presence to something which does not exist, justified by the pain.

The fulfilment through action was a differential nuance with other amputations which give presence to the phantom member through self-perceptive actions, and whose solution comes through speech: patients say "I would rather rub", "I would rather stand up", "It hurts as if it were present", etc. etc.

Conclusions

The conflict was centred around four members of the family: the patient, his mother, his father and his brother. His eldest sister and his youngest brother were not relevant.

As a paradox he lost two members and recovered two: his father through the pact, and his mother on accepting the loss and their separation.

We worked with both symptom and trauma at the same time and we tried in the counter-transference not to be trapped by the fascination of reparation and work on the acceptance of the loss in the Freudian sense of acceptance.

The demand for treatment due to incoercible pains and the urgent need to solve the problem due to the critical situation and the short period of hospitalization, were very important points which should not be obturating since the commitment of the desire and its re-circulation was what interested most.

Lidia Lourdes García,
Argentina.

Presentation / Unveiling

Luis María Bissierier,
Marta Erramuspe,
Christina Marrone.

This paper is the provisional result of a bold experience in which we took part as listeners for a one-year period. Had it not been for the temerity of those who exposed themselves: patients, interviewing analysts and listeners, these considerations, this return to the starting point intended as prudent criticism, would not have been possible.

Audacity, prudence and provisionality seem to us to be in fact the concepts associated with the presentation of patients as a starting point for determining the experience and defining the set of parameters to facilitate the formulation of questions to guide the experience. This guidance is often exposed to failure whenever the experience itself is guided by an aspiration, eroded by hope and sustained by a belief. The aspiration is the

desire to unveil a structure. The hope, which at times is anguished, is the hope that drives us to demand from the one who fails to demand from us what we expect of him, that he throw off what makes him psychotic. The self-sustaining belief is that with such an extraction we could grasp the key to what is our unconfessed objective: a possible treatment for psychosis.

Without this objective (even if it exists only) on our horizon, the experience would turn into an experiment, in which the slightest perversion would oblige us to "ahaner à la rame quand le navire est sur le sable",¹ to use the well-known expression with which Lacan closes the text whose title contains the terms we have chosen to guide our observations.

The terms chosen lead us to the prudence that places the audacity of a possible treatment for psychosis as a preliminary matter.

This experience was carried out in the Borda Hospital in Buenos Aires, in the First Psychiatric Emergency Department by the *cartel*² of Clinical Practice of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires. In it, one patient chosen by members of the staff, usually due to difficulty in diagnosis, and with his acceptance, was interviewed by an analyst who conducted the dialogue according to the best of his knowledge. The auditors were condemned exclusively to observing and did their best to hear the interviews in absolute silence and under no circumstances did they participate otherwise.

This experience exists in two instances, the instance of presentation and the instance of discussion. These two instances are part of a first moment, which is the first in connection with this paper and the second as an instance of reading in itself. This is so since, as readers of Lacan's teachings, we state that no reading exists without analysis.

If the operation is extractive, *per via di levare*, at the same time it will involve the attempt to account for the obstacles in the sense of the resistance within the experience itself. This means extracting it.

This type of experience, although habitual in psychiatric practice in our country, is taken up at present by psychoanalysts for whom it constitutes a novel practice.

This reevaluation of the experience is due in great measure to the desire to take up Lacan's example, in support of the authority of his word. Not all of the words we attribute to Lacan convey what psychoanalysis may teach us; some merely hypnotize.

This is the risk that presenting patients has run and runs nowadays. On this matter, we consider that Lacan did not merely "say" the words we are basing our work on. He put them into practice in public, and this has lent increased prestige among us to what is termed the "presentation of patients". With a speaker of his stature to introduce the presentation, how could the audience not be moved. We consider this reminder necessary to place the validity of the presentation strictly as a function of the position of the analyst who is to conduct it.

Our starting point implies considering the experience as part of the analyst's training. For this reason its profile must be considered on the axis of the transference.

The conditions for the unfolding of the experience must be discriminated into two instances: the instance of presentation and the instance of discussion.

At the beginning of the presentation, some staff members asked questions about the patient. However, to the question of whether there were return effects from the staff to the interviewing psychoanalyst, the answer was negative. To this we must add the scanty intervention of the psychiatrists in the discussion, from which we could infer that physical space was conceded, but that at the same time a kind of aseptic curiosity concerning psychoanalysis was present.

What about the psychoanalysts? They could attempt to understand the psychosis, but insofar as the psychoanalyst conducts the interview with the psychotic patient, the analyst is also presented.

In this way, the analyst is placed in the position of a hinge which articulates the two instances of the experience. We sometimes forget that, because "in the beginning is the transference", this implies a function: the desire of the analyst, which is precisely the drill that bores into the transference to produce the disjunction of the Ideal and the object. There are inevitable enfeeblishments in this function which are different according to the instances of the experience in which they occur, in the presentation or in the subsequent discussion.

The etymology of the term "presentation" gives us a clue of the trap we face in the first instance. The term is inherited from Psychiatry, and its etymology reveals the extent to which the patient is considered a precious object which Psychiatry is not willing to lose.

A present, a gift which requires a special guard for its custody. The analyst who conducts the interview runs the risk of not achieving the objective: the unveiling of the structure, if he slides towards the exhibition of abilities instead of devoting himself submissively to becoming guided by the subjective positions of the person he is confronted with. This deviation can occur if the analyst is inadvertently made prisoner of the Ideal exigency and is fascinated by the audience's expectant gaze, which included that of the psychiatrist.

Lacan describes it in these words: ". . . such a finding (that of the structure) can only be the price of complete submission, even if it is knowingly, to the subjective positions proper to the patient, positions which too frequently are strained through having been reduced in the dialogue towards the diseased process. This then reinforces the difficulty in penetrating them with a provoked reticence in the subject which is not wholly ungrounded."³

In the analyst's position, the founding condition for the psychoanalytic praxis is at stake, and it is to let the person speak. "It is necessary to let the psychotic patient speak for a long time."⁴ But the point here is that the audience subsequently also speaks.

Approaching the psychosis depends on the analyst's desire. Initially and in connection with the audience, this implies keeping the effects of meaning proper to the language, which is arranged as discourse, at bay. The desire of the analyst is irreducible to the transference as a veiling, and allows the most radical no-sense to make its appearance. The above is true for both instances of the experience.

We can recall one patient in particular who was "kind" enough, in an ironic way, no doubt, but nonetheless polite enough, to return to the interviewing room after the interview had finished. He returned to correct the text that lived in him, a text made up of a purely numeric system, and which he had condescended to show us by writing it on the blackboard. Such was his language, peculiar and undoubtedly his own, and such was the key to the code which he showed us. The unconscious is structured as a language and in psychosis the language is outside the discourse.

Once we have ideally achieved the listening to the subjective positions of the patient, we come across a new risk when we produce, even fleetingly, the unveiling of the structure, and this is that we may cover it again quickly. This can occur against our will and even as a defensive reflex if we are not aware enough of what is produced on the patient's part: an attack on the analyst's being.

The certainty is on the psychotic patient's side; the interrogation is on the analyst's. Exercising the function termed the desire of the analyst means tolerating the possibility of an enfeeblement in its exercise.

Only when the interrogation about psychosis is open can the presentation of an analyst and a patient emerge together without disturbing each other. If the presentation is sustained in this way, the unveiling of the structure is produced.

Our Hypotheses

1. The experience of presentation of patients is pertinent to the training of the analyst.
 - a. The transference to the psychosis as the limit which insanity poses on psychoanalysis is at stake.
 - b. The presentation of a patient is at the same time the presentation of an analyst.
2. The unveiling is the inveiling of a structure.
 - a. Its emergence is correlative to the fall of the presentation.
 - b. What emerges is the unadorned effect of the action of the signifying machinery.
 - c. In the psychosis, there is transference to an Other, but not transference-love.
3. The above mentioned hypotheses are articulated by this third statement:
 - a. Transference and the desire of the analyst, in crossing each other doubly (in formation and in structure), in their enfeeblements show the cracks through which what is excluded returns.
 - b. The unveiling is a double one: for both the patient and the analyst, what is excluded is articulated to the Father's realm. For the analyst, this means Lacan as a paradigm of the Ideal. Basing himself on this point, he excludes the question about the end of the analysis. For the patient, the exclusion is that of a signifier, the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father.

In the first part of this paper we have discussed several points of our hypotheses. We shall now carry on with others.

We shall analyse the structure briefly, as psychosis is not the objective of our research; it is a structure that more than once showed itself clearly in the experience. The following quotes from Lacan serve us as parameters and as something to be borne constantly in mind. We believe they should also guide the presentation in its two instances.

1. "It is the register of the work that creates all the wealth of the phenomenology of psychosis. The point is to state the matter in the same register in which the phenomenon appears.⁵ ". . . It is the originating machine which places the subject on the scene."⁵
2. "The psychotic subject is a martyr of the conscious if we give the term martyr its meaning of "being witness". It is an open testimony."⁵

The signifier of the Name-of-the-Father is invoked to a third place from an imaginary couple. Only a void responds in the Other since this signifier has been foreclosed. A father in the real accedes in its place and it drags the phallic signifier in the path where a cascade of signifiers drains away unimpeded. Only the delirious metaphor in the restoring process can do this. This is a topical regression to the mirror state which, in its mortal edge, keeps the subject of speech paying the price of *jouissance* with his whole body, realized as the object termed "a". Though this *jouissance* continues to be impossible, it nevertheless marks the sinister regime of an encounter in the real with an unbarred Other. It offers itself as carrion or as a hollow in a mortal puzzle.

All the psychotic phenomena pointed out by psychiatric nosography unfold here. The psychoanalyst's ear must redefine them in terms of a Lacanian algebra. This is the substitution of a clinical practice of the gaze for a clinical practice of the word. "The unconscious is structured like a language."

Is there a better place than that of psychosis to prove this? Is not the psychotic subject the refuse produced by the signifying machinery that mortifies a body and that in its dialectics of automatism and encounter/non-encounter shows that the final meaning is only the combination which in a regime of presence/absence goes beyond the subject that supports it?

"Freud aims at the symbolic order, the non-being and at the same time the insisting on being, when he speaks of the death instinct as what is fundamental: an order being born, coming, insisting on being realized."⁶

The psychotic subject is the living corpse whose death certificate should read "He died a symbolic death", where an annihilated network of signifiers no longer records reality.

How is it possible to think of an analyst who does not weaken in his function when he is faced with his very bone, more than that, with the fleshless skeleton of the signifier? Is there a greater assault on the being than this speech which leaves the non-being uncovered?

In his enfeeblement the analyst responds with a supposedly theoretical certainty, symmetrical to the certainty of the one who produces the delusion as a metaphor in the attempt to save something from this catastrophe; a certainty which is as delusional as those explanations which attempt to give an account of a psychogenesis when, if finally something can be said, it is only about a beginning. The analyst does not produce the delusion as a metaphor; he turns a delusion into a metaphor.

In this way, the hollows were filled in by a comprehension often sustained by the figure of Lacan as an Ideal.

The criticism we could address to the one who said that for Lacan ". . . the most trustworthy part of psychoanalytic clinical background is what it owes to Psychiatry. . ." concerns us here as well.

We must acknowledge a debt, except that it will be impossible to pay it save for the symptom if we maintain the knowledge of the psychiatrist, and even Lacan's knowledge as an absolute. Note as an example of this, expressions like the following: "Lacan did it this way" or "We will never be up to the level of his work."⁷

The Ideal which is aspired to in this way does not respond to the call of a weakling; the weakness observed arises for structural reasons.

This experience accounts for a working transference, critical work from the very parameters that psychoanalysis proposes — transference and the desire of the analyst — within the austere limits of an unveiling.

For this reason, it is a testimony open to interrogation concerning the limits which insanity and the end of an analysis pose to psychoanalysis itself. If the psychotic patient is an open testimony, psychoanalysis expects the other testimony: *the passe*.⁸

Finally we believe that the questions concerning the ethics of psychoanalysis with respect to a possible treatment must be posed.

It is in this crucial place where a fruitful ignorance should be situated. In looking back over our experience and the distance travelled, we realize the danger: where the explanation leads us to interpret, we resign analytic

listening and where we resign analytic listening, we retreat in the face of psychosis.

Luis María Bissener,
Marta Erramuspe,
Cristina Marrone,
Argentina.

Notes

- 1 "Row the boat with great effort while the boat is on the sand".
- 2 Lacan defines a *cartel* as a group of 4 members plus 1 who work together on a certain topic in psychoanalysis for a minimum of one to a maximum of two years, after which each of them produces a comment or presentation about the experience and the group ceases to exist as such.
- 3 LACAN, J. *On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis in Ecrits, a Selection*, Tavistock Publications, 1977.
- 4 LACAN, J. Lecture at Yale University, 1975.
- 5 LACAN, J. Seminar III. *Les Psychoses, Seuil*. Paris.
- 6 LACAN, J. Seminar II. *Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse*. Seuil. Paris.
- 7 *Good Use and False Problems — Round table discussion published in Psicosis y psicoanálisis (Psychosis and Psychoanalysis)*, Ed. Manantial.
- 8 *La passe* in French, and *el pase* in Spanish, refer to Lacan's theory about the end of analysis and the institutional procedure created to allow the analysts themselves to report the experience of the end of their own analysis.

Presentation of Patients : Notes of a Teaching

Daniel A. Deluca
Alejandro Sayús

How is it possible to make an account of the experience involved in the presentation of patients? If in psychoanalysis not all transmission may be mathematized, this is precisely what enacts itself during these presentations. Attempting transmission without *matheme* can only be done within, and starting from, the enunciation of a witness. We believe that however impossible this testimony may be, it should not be left out without attempting to fulfil it.

We took part in the presentation of patients fostered by the *Cartel of Clinical Psychoanalysis* of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires,¹ moving from the place of spectators to that of interviewers (the latter not without inherent difficulty) What is the presentation of patients? To situate the question correctly, we must briefly describe, first of all, what we shall call a frame of reference. This doesn't imply any definition, since this reference point poses — besides and ethics — way of working which rather than using chronology put logical moments at play. Let us state it in this way:

an in-patient is called to have a dialogue with a "presenter", his back towards a silent audience. In a second moment, without the in-patient's presence, the audience tells what they read in the sayings.

Now why these presentations of patients? We may assert them as necessary, since they become a place of privilege for psychoanalysis to question psychosis as such, and vice versa. To say something about this place does not mean to lay its foundation in any origin-myth, nor to seek recourse in ineffable transferences, but rather the necessary fiction to half-say something about truth; the very truth Lacan's was on the verge of saying, sustaining through nearly thirty years his presentation of patients. We believe this is possible to situate in Lacan's very text. Thus we read in his thesis on Aimée A, — which, as he says he published not without reticence, the bias his teaching pretexts:² "However, there is a third level we may not overlook should we want to judge *the patient's actual state correctly*". Even if the subjects of her delusion do not drag after any further intellectual attachment some of them have not completely lost an emotional evocative value, in the sense of ancient beliefs. "I did that because they wanted to kill my son", she says even now, *using this type of grammatical form, directly and according to her ancient belief, during an exceptional interview performed by a superior medical authority, or in the presence of a large audience. In the first case her emotion betrays itself through a noticeable paleness and a perceptible effort to restrain herself. In presence of the public, her bodily gestures, always moderate and sober, shall have a highly expressive plasticity and an extraordinarily pathetic quality, in this term's best sense. Her head lifted upwards, her arms joined behind her back, she speaks in a low but vibrant voice; she certainly lowers herself with her excuses, but invokes the sympathy deserved by a woman who defends her son.* (We underline) we read literally, Lacan speaks here about the place of privilege the presence of a public has for his patient, to the point of dramatically invoking the audience, thus revealing a change of form and subject in what she says. How could we not read here a reference to the place of the Other's resemblance this public incarnates through its muteness. How could we ignore this threeness which moderates the specular effect of the deathly struggle for pure prestige? This threeness makes it no longer necessary for Aimée "a perceptible effort to restrain herself"; moderation of the "superior medical authority", moderation of the classic psychiatrist's *jouissance*: without even knowing it, this psychiatrist turns the patient into his object. Finally, moderation of the anti-psychiatrist or social reformator — in their hysterical identification to

the psychotic, — but also moderation of the Other's *jouissance*, about which the psychotic complains in his delusion. Does not turning around the text point to us an implicit ethics which allows us analystst to sustain the practice of patient presentations beyond Lacan himself, that is to say, in his writing? From its very beginning, this writing asserts itself pointing to the undeciphered enigma of the psychoses and this question returns in reverse since, at the end of Lacan's pathway, beginning with psychogenesis and ending with the question about how anybody may not be crazy, when the Other speaks him — the Other's desire — when the real is impossible, and when anything regarding the ego is alienating. A question the mirror does not answer, the matheme does not write down, the *topology* does not show and the knot does not tie together. The presentation of patients becomes then a practice of boundary which makes psychoanalysis in extension a limit to psychoanalysis in intention. With this, we mean that, besides being an investigation of madness as inherent to the human creature's way-of-being-in-the-world, as burrowed by the cancer of the word, the unique opportunity of these presentations is not without effect, and even sometimes it determines the destiny which awaits the patient. One of us performed an interview with an in-patient, supposedly schizophrenic; a young man age 21, carried to the hospital after having been forced by his father who beat him, to confess his "homosexuality". The patient showed symptoms in casualty which a hasty psychiatric nosology attributed to schizophrenia. At the beginning of the interview the presented patient says a lot about these symptoms, and continues with a narrative of the idyllic love he experiences with another in-patient, reporting emphatically and in ecstatic rapture having walked with him, drinking soda-pop, through the hospital's gardens; he describes the latter with exaggerated grandeur. The moment he is reminded that this seemed rather like a commercial for this beverage, and that these "gardens" are more like waste-lands, he alters his story: addressing the interviewer he asks himself simultaneously whether he desires him sexually or whether he fantasizes with this. A turning-point of discourse and a reference to the other, which permitted an unfolding of the hysteric fantasm together with the question about his sexual being; thus allowing one to discard, without doubts, any previously supposed diagnosis. Since the unsustainable identification with the psychotic had fallen down, the interviewer — we were told — had other worries in mind, at the time of going away: "How did I do... well?" The neurotic being no exception in the psychiatric hospital facing the set-up of the scene of the presentation, he is called to answer with his fantasm to the supposed demand of the audience.

Naturally, with neurotics we analysts believe we step on firmer ground. The knot knots together. With the psychotic this does not go so well. The effects are felt by the ward's therapists, since the presentation operates for them as a place where unsuspected enigmas are opened; not only because unlistened to, but because the patient did not say them elsewhere.

But the time of the presentation sometimes permits us to recognize effects in the patient's own saying, too. In this respect we cannot fail to remember a presentation which took place in two acts, with the closing scene suitable to classic theatre. A certain enunciative position of a forced misunderstanding the interviewer had, added to his ignorance of the patient's mother-tongue, "Guarani", led the patient to withdraw. But previously, he wrote down on the blackboard a series of additions and subtractions, arranged to form a pyramid. Meanwhile, some spectators centred their observations criticising the interviewer's position. The patient returns showing, *notoriously*, a cigarette he asked for during the interview — and which had been refused to him — saying he wanted to correct some the operations he had written down, since the results were wrong. This he did, and when he was asked what these numbers were for — besides being the instrument of an intransmissible personal mantics — he answered immediately: "Well, I do this to amuse myself". Abandoning the previous agreement to keep a silent place the public breaks out into raging laughter, followed by the interviewer and the patient who laugh together too. an effect of transition from delusion to joke, which is allowed only by means of the place of acknowledgement of the word, only by means of the public with its very presence; a *moderation* of the patient's "*jouissance*" and that of the interviewer too.

An enacting in which, if the word is directed to someone, it is the Other who is addressed, Other who through his laughter, says something about his lack.

From here onwards, the interviewer continued differently. The interviewer and the patient were not the same anymore.

This unexpected character the presentation has, both for the patient as for the interviewer — who no doubt exposes himself — is framed by a scene which unfolds itself with no previous text, but here, unlike a theatre piece, the actors do not know the text; this does not prevent the production of this text-to-come from giving way to a theatrical effect. In this sense, each presentation has its form, be it canonic, in its varieties; comic,

dramatic, or tragic, or even more often leaving the conclusion out as modern theatre does. In this case, the moment of conclusion is neither the patient's withdrawal nor the ensuing discussion.

Like Pirandello's characters in search of an author, each of the participants is called to risk a closing that does not stop not-concluding. We read after having written: "the presentation is a theatralisation of sayings : by means of theatralization a writing is brought out. The theatralization is the writing in the word. This *conjunction* of saying is a coming-to-be, and theatralization knots itself together in the presentation, through its different times"³

Now, what to expect from these presentations? Is there anything to hope? Usually this is what is at play in prognosis. In the presentations, this is certainly risked; we understand it in every case in its singularity, opposed to known knowledge, which looks for the pegs to fit in the right holes : sieve-knowledge, of University discourse. Naturally, there is a kind of prejudice which finds the foundations of prognosis in the specificity of clinical formations only: neurosis, perversion, or psychosis; this specificity tells how the speaking being inhabits structure; the structure of language. *We find it unthinkable to assess any prognosis without considering the determining modalities of jouissance* (modalities of *jouissance* as possible, impossible, necessary and contingent: specially in psychosis these must be situated in the relationship to the Other and to Φ ; i.e. how modalities of *jouissance* and the knot: Imaginary, Symbolic, Real and the Name-of-the-Father, intersect).⁴

We have found non-psychotic patients so strongly shielded in the symptoms *jouissance*, that their prognosis were at least doubtful. One of them, a conspicuous gambler, who gave us lectures on his knowledge about gambling — not omitting a reference to the main character in Dostoevski's "Gambler" — was so strongly involved in that passion (which he described with elegant details) that he only had his own life to lose. He had attempted this already, and unsuccessfully. We do not object. On the contrary the patient mentioned above, who succeeds in going from delusion to joke, seems to shed a favourable prognosis, even if psychotic. The joke-effect can be read as a split in the continuity of the Other's *jouissance*; this is testified by delusion. An eruption of the phallic *jouissance* which produces a cut in the psychotic's omnipotent Other. We should stress that the neurotic can play to try to confuse the different types of *jouissance*, but it is impossible for him actually to do so, while the Other's *jouissance* is not impossible to the psychotic.

Finally, what is there beyond the unique opportunity the presentation means for the patient? What about a possible treatment?

To question oneself about the direction of the cure of a psychotic does not involve healing him. The psychotic suffers the weight of a non barred Other, by the Name-of-the-Father: an annihilating completeness which draws him into the Real, to the place of object of his *jouissance*. A *jouissance* of the Other that certainty tries to turn into a barrier in the delusional restitution. This restitution must always be unstable since sooner or later the delusion fails, when the psychotic is called (as a fact of structure) to occupy the place of a remainder, object a of the Other's *jouissance*.

What is there to be done, should this fact of experience be faced within the psychiatric hospital? A possibility of this Other of the psychotic (that with its elephant's tusk throws away every possible subject-to-be to the place of a remainder) we have tried to work with, was sketched by Benjamin Domb in his opening of this year's presentation of patients. It consists simply, in the operation of *subtraction* of an object whose marks in the Other are found in the course of a history. This highly singular object — which may be constituted in every case — allows another stabilizing aspect, different from that delusion. This does not mean that delusion necessarily disappears. The constitution of an object of transition to the Other, operates as a fourth knot. Here a cut is produced, which although it does not lay any foundation, it produces a transference of *jouissance*: a transference-poiesis. Should the operation of the constitution of this object produce itself, an analyst is necessary to take care of an object that the psychotic does not cease to incarnate.

Summing up, what are presentations of patients? We begin with a teaching: Lacan's. Out of this teaching, we lacanos, to whom his person has not acted as a screen, only have some notes. The presentation of patients is one of the possible ways of reading that we enact of a clinical psychoanalysis to come.

Daniel A. Deluca,
Alejandro Sayús,
Argentina.

Notes

- 1 These presentations took place during 1986, in the Emergency ward No. 1 in charge of Dr. Nestor Stingo, José T. Borda National Hospital.
- 2 LACAN, J. *On the Paranoid Psychosis in its Relationships to Personality*. Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1976. See the patient's actual attitude of mind regarding the history of her delusion, and also that of its subjects, page 142.
- 3 PORGE, E. *La présentation de malades*. *Littoral*, No. 17, p. 40 (our translation).
- 4 This position involves a starting-point. We have quoted the remarks by Ilda Levin.

Guy Clastres, Françoise Gorog, Jean-Jacques Gorog, Eric Laurent, Françoise Schreiber, Daniels Silvestre: *The Presentation of Patients: Good Ways of Using Them and False Problems & Round table — Psychosis and Psychoanalysis*, Ediciones Manantial, 1985.

Jacques-Alain Miller: *Teaching of the Presentation of Patients*. *Omicar?* No.3.

Charles Melman: *Notes sur la Section clinique*, *Omicar?* No. 9.

Erik Porge: *La présentation de malades*. *Littoral*, No. 17.

N. De Neuter-Stryckman: *Réflexions à partir des "présentation de malades" de J.Lacan à Sainte Anne*. — *Le discours psychanalytique*. No.10.

To Speak About The Impossible : To Make It Possible

Clara Kruglak

Freud writes: "analysing, as it seems, is the third of the impossible professions in which the insufficiency of the results may be foreseen as certain".¹ Freud writes it, Lacan reads it and says, in turn: "I am the one who has read Freud".² I write these lines in order to speak about the impossible during this *Reunion* — an appointment for Lacan's "readers" — including a quotation which was distributed among those he called his pupils. This quotation³ brings me to this appointment,³ pointing out a paradox: I read what he was heard to say:

"Clinical psychoanalysis is the real insofar as it is impossible to sustain".⁴

I will start, then, with what in no way could be the beginning, and nevertheless, although one letter is written before another is should not necessarily be considered the first. Then, I continue. And this continuity engages: saying, to say, half-said, writing. . . These are all different kinds of commitment, of being-there, within the continuity of the transformations

at the right moment, with the ambiguity of not-being being. This way-of-being-there not-being, is the appearance: it means "as-if". Possibly this resembles a representation, the way actors perform: To play the role of a support, to lend one's own body and voice, to become a character portrayed by someone else, and in another scene; presenting this "other", incarnated in oneself. . . all this is the meaning of "representation" as I use it here: i.e. theatre, fiction. One is actually there (and not according to the false-true-way of propositional logic) — possibly, since one cannot do otherwise. What does one do? Clinical psychoanalysis.

This means no less than to incarnate a fictitious support, since "clinical psychoanalysis is the real insofar as it is impossible to sustain". Lacan produces fictions and invites us, he dupes us and himeself. . . in order not to err; not because he looks for certainty, but because truth is at play. It is about the "Freudian Thing", as he considers it to be "what truth itself says".⁶ He produces a fiction by means of a topological object such as the Moebius Strip — a surface with only one face and a single border; a structure impossible to materialize in three dimensions, since it does not let itself be flattened on a plane. To cover up this structure by means of a "magical trick" puts the Symbolic in play, where the imaginary exhausts the possible in order to say something about the impossible. This defect in a single spot, this point of torsion which resists being flattened — an obstacle to writing — . . . this flaw, insists on repeating itself, and makes "saying" necessary. Yes, it is necessary to say how impossible it is to plunge the Moebius Strip into our customary space, since it is a surface incapable of being orientated.⁶ An "unthinkable middle line" lends its image to that "point-less line" where a cut is produced in order to "grasp it imaginarily".

And indeed, this line is structured by this very cut. "But with this same blow, it happens that the Moebius Strip is nothing other than this very cut itself, a cut by which the strip disappears from its surface".⁷ This cut, produced on a line with no points, brings us back to the place of fiction, after turning around once. During its trajectory across a circular mark, this loop closes itself at a point, producing a border. This point is an instant: this closing is an act. And the moment it closes, the cut is made, producing a transformation.

"Freud sets us on the trail where ab-sense means sex: within this inflated sex-less sense, where the word cuts, topology unfolds".⁸

This cut, or blow, makes absence present, by saying what there is not. This is a circular movement which involves the logical time of a "saying" that emerges as necessary. Let there be a "saying" in order to say what is not and shall never in any time be:

“. . .the impossible, announced as; There is no sexual relationship”.⁹

The very moment the loop reaches its starting point, representation fails: the materiality of this covering strips off the Strip's existence, and we face the paradox between materiality and existence.¹⁰ However, the cut/saying becomes "a friction of a surface with which the structure clothes itself". This does not go on without "saying" the fiction of sustaining the impossible. Perhaps being apparent is the only chance left to us.

If we could at least agree with Wittgenstein — not to speak about what cannot be said¹¹ or even accept the fit Lacan offers us in *Ou Pire* — but we cannot. We know only too well that this offer involves the demand to refuse it. Moreover, the gift is a proposal made by a "charming woman" to him: "Nothing is impossible to man: what he cannot do, he sets aside".¹²

What there is not produces "speaking", and in order to go on "saying", I shall rely upon fiction. I will make some remarks on a humourous-mathematical novel by Martin Gardner: *The Terrible Adventure of a Non-Lateral Man*.¹³

This novel describes what happened on November 17th 1790 (Moebius' birthday), at a dinner party sponsored by the Moebius Society, to which Professor Slapenarski — an eminent topologist — was invited to read a paper. The subject he had announced — a surface without sides — was so controversial as to drive Dr. Simpson — an unquestionable authority in the topological field — to attend such a party for the first time. The lecture referred to a statement by Moebius himself, after which there was no theoretical reason for a surface not to lose both its sides at the same time: that is to say, to become non-lateral.

The audience was moved. Several attendants, including Dr. Simpson, held that what they were listening to was wholly absurd. Some of them even smiled as Slapenarski explained the complicated diagrams he had drawn on the blackboard. He started to construct one of the surfaces he spoke about: he took a piece of paper out of his pocket, along with a pair of scissors and glue. He performed a complicated proceeding of cutting, folding and pasting together: the paper strips intertwined in the strangest

fashion. Finally two ends were left: after sticking them together, there was a small explosion and the paper disappeared out of his hands.

The audience was astonished and after some minutes there was laughter and applause. Everybody was convinced it had been a joke; that they had witnessed only a clever chemical trick in which the paper had exploded leaving no ashes. But now the Professor was astonished as well!

Everybody left the room except Slapenarski, Dr. Simpson and the narrator of the novel. The dialogue between the two famous topologists turned around what Simpson considered a stratagem, and the increasingly heated explanations Slapenarski made to demonstrate, quite the opposite. This went on until the Doctor dared to say it had been nothing but a vulgar magician's trick. This, in turn, aroused the Professor, who punched Dr. Simpson on the jaw, who collapsed with a groan.

Immediately the Professor kneeled down, near the motionless body, and fantastically tied his arms and legs together; he folded the topologist together using paper pieces. Suddenly there was a small explosion, and nothing remained of Dr. Simpson but his fallen clothes. I will not narrate the end of the story except to say that Dr. Simpson did reappear — slightly bruised — in another scene; to put it more exactly, on a stage.

So far so good. . . Between Wittgenstein's "admirable asceticism", as Lacan called it, and the "vulgar magician's trick" suffered by Dr. Simpson in his own body, most of us probably have passed from one standpoint to another, annoyed at the enigmatic topological presentations throughout Lacan's text — sometimes tempted to accept the gift and adopt a "reasonable" standpoint.

The term "enigmatic" is more than adequate, since precisely "the enunciation is the enigma"¹⁴ and it is the enunciated we will have to deal with. This is the challenge of clinical psychoanalysis as it is "what is said during a psychoanalysis" and consists in "questioning again what Freud"¹⁵ and Lacan have said. We commit ourselves to discover the enigma of the enunciated, and to render an interpretation out of each reading. Within interpretation, writing is rendered as the only possible means of sustaining this supposed place, too.

This is a boundary-process which lays the foundations of the subject's constitution between signifiers, as it sets a limit to supposed knowledge (*savoir*). And this limit appears as pertaining to the function of sustaining the impossible. To sustain this place does not mean to occupy it, as well as

topology does not mean merely displaying topological quotations taken out of Lacan's texts. In any case, this means daring to handle something which "is not that", and clearing up the subject of the enunciation out of the enunciated — without glueing it to the object that causes him (the object *a*). Certainly not like Dr. Simpson in Slapenarski's experience: fold a paper this way and it disappears, then fold a man and it disappears too!

Lacan says of his topology "A practice isn't founded in a substance beyond the real. Practice is not theory."¹⁶ It is not a substance, since it only exists by means of the "saying". And should "substance" indicate here some material substratum, it wouldn't but be because of what the letter borrows from language, remembering the "cutting" property of the word, inasmuch as it is a signifier. What is said during a psychoanalysis finds its reason in the real: and this means "there is no sexual relationship". And again, this in only a statement-stated by those who inhabit language. It remains for us to interrogate the relationship between "to say" and "saying", within the loops "said" in an analysis.

His topology is neither theory nor perhaps structure, as long as it does not "make possible the impossible". Structure is the real, and the reason for its practice; indeed, it is its cause. An object cause of desire: the object *a*, which makes the knot "real-symbolic-imaginary" consistent, the very moment it fades away. The imaginary allows understanding; the symbolic produces transformations as it cuts. And as for the real? The impossible real is only supposed; supposed to be in the place of he who lends himself to become apparent, caused by his desire of not-being, not being anything other than what falls. The analyst's desire is to sustain the impossible. "It is in our practice that I was able to convey better that the real should be measured as what is impossible to say."¹⁷ To say that psychoanalysis is impossible does not prevent it from being practised. The power of impotence finds the impossible again: a contingent, and always unsuccessful encounter. If this paper was possible, it was because something real which is at the basis of my practice, was at play, in order to be able to sustain it — speaking about the impossible.

Clara Kruglak,
Argentina.

Notes

*Throughout this paper, several puns are found, involving especially the words *saying, to say, said,* and the like. See — as the bibliography sufficiently indicates — Lacan's text *L'étourdit*, passim. (Translator's note).

- 1 FREUD,S. *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, St. Ed., Vol. XXIII.
- 2 LACAN,J. *An Interview with J. Lacan* by P.Daix, Paris, November 26, 1966, in *Petits Ecrits et Conférences*. In the Library of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires.
- 3 *The words quotation and appointment* in Spanish are homophonic: *cita*.
- 4 Opening of the Department of Clinical Psychoanalysis, 1977. Statement by M. Czermak on a brief remark by Lacan concerning this Department. *Petits Ecrits...*, p. 170. Library, Freudian School of Buenos Aires.
- 5 LACAN,J. *L'Étourdit*, p.8. *Scilicet*, No. 4, *Seuil*, Paris, 1973.
- 6 Frechet, M, Key Fan. *Topology: An Introduction*, Eudeba, Buenos Aires.
- 7 LACAN,J. Op.Cit. p. 26.
- 8 LACAN,J. Op.Cit. p. 8.
- 9 LACAN,J. Op.Cit. p. 11.
- 10 RUIZ,C.A. *Strips and Torus; an Introduction to the Relationship Between Structure-Theory in Cuadernos Sigmund Freud*, No. 10 (in press).
- 11 LACAN,J. Ou pire, 9.2.72.
- 12 LACAN,J. Ou pire, 11.3.72.
- 13 GARDNER,M. *The Terrible Adventure of the Non-Lateral Man in The Planeta Magazine*, No. 3, *Sudamericana*, Buenos Aires.
- 14 LACAN,J. *L'envers de la psychanalyse*, 17.12.69.¹⁷
- 15 LACAN,J. *Opening of the Clinical Department*, 1977, p. 170.
- 16 LACAN,J. *L'Étourdit*, p.34.
- 17 LACAN,J. *L'Étourdit*, p.52.

**The Desire Of The Analyst A-Nuda (A-Knots)
Between Signifier and Letter**

Ricardo Landeira.

"Flectere si nequeos superos
Acheronta movebo"

Virgil

In a seminar which I called *The Lacanian Unconscious* at the Freudian School of Montevideo last year, I tried to articulate different punctuations made by Lacan in some of his texts with my own questions related to my practice as an analyst. Its development brought new questions and some answers. With some of them I decided to write this paper.

Let us begin with the title I chose for it. I had tried with that name to step ahead of the things I do not know. But when the programmes were printed the title had been changed into another one. The little a of *a-nuda* (*a-knots*) was the little one, the one of the *object a*, and not the capital letter A, which in the algebra of Lacan refers to the Other — I will take it as the Other —, not barred, not castrated.

This change of the title, only with the enlarging of a single letter reminds me of Rabbi Meir's lesson in the Talmud:

"When I studied with Rabbi A'Kiba I used ink with some vitriol in it, and he said nothing. But Rabbi Isema'el asked: "My son, which is your work?" "I am a scribe", I answered. "Be careful — he replied —, your work is God's work. Either if you omit one letter or add one letter, you will destroy the world".

Practicing analysts produce only writing. I will take that mistake and put it to work to see what it produces.

Which is the knot at play when the desire of the analyst allows the production of the *object a*, or when he makes a function of completeness assimilating himself to knowledge?

Let us try to answer this question basing ourselves on some points of Freud's case of Mr.P., which still continues to teach us. Mr.P. had his session one morning during the Fall of 1919. It is not a very well known case and even less worked through after Freud. This text, considered within the Freudian esoterism, is found in lecture XXX of *Dreams and Occultism*.


Freud was going to finish this analysis because "it was not working at all". However in this session — the only one we have —, there was an important and significant production. Freud was surprised and didn't find any other explanation but to consider that between Mr. P. and himself there had been *thought-transference*.

Strachey mentions in his forward to *Psychoanalysis and Telepathy* that when informing this case Freud "forgot" the material and that is why he entitled the manuscript: "*Postscript. Here is the report, omitted owing to resistance, on a case of thought transference during analytical practice*".¹ In this case Freud tells about elements of that session and previous situations of the analysis which he relates to the material. He qualifies his transferential position at the beginning, as "well measured paternal transference"; this paternity of Freud was surely related to his desire.

"On a certain day of the week previous" to the session — in front of Mr.P.'s absence —, Freud came over to Dr. Anton von Freund's house who by chance used to live in the same building that Mr.P. did. Let us remark as well that there was also a *Freund*, a transferential friend, brought out by Freud himself in his acting.

Mr.P. had introduced a signifier. — *Forsyte*, a character of J. Goldsworthy's novels - of which they had been talking for a long time. We find also Freud's surprise for, fifteen minutes after receiving Dr. David Forsyth's visit, Mr.P. had told him that there was a girl who called him *Herr von Vorsicht*.

It is Freud himself who points out those signifiers: *Forsyte* (foresight by homophony) and also *Vorsicht-Forsyth-Voraussich*. During the session about the nightmare, a slip of the tongue of Mr.P. produces a *mare's nest* instead of *nightmare*, thus slipping, losing *night*. I will implement those elements of the analysis in a graph in order to work with the clinical material:



Freud asked questions of Mr.P. in order to find out what he knew, and how he knew it, in so far as Freud had arranged his appointment with Dr.Forsyth, embodying the signifier *Forsyte-foresight* when it hit him. He couldn't take the *sicht-sight-sig* in relation to the scopic pleasure and produce the unveiling of the resemblance of *a*, since that resemblance was also Freud himself. Something remained hidden, the lack of object, the hole made by the discourse when it punctuates the letter.

Freud ended this analysis and in its place he took Dr. Forsyth — as Freud told K.Abraham on 2nd November 1911, one Forsyth substitutes one *Vorsicht*, the "transference of thought" conceals the question because of the desire in this case.

Here lies the difference between producing the *a in the knot* (see the title) and *answering from A*; as Lacan says in *Les non dupes errent*

"... Truth touches the analyst himself ... because, after all, it is there that the true takes its primary importance and that, as I pointed out a long time ago, there is only one transference, that of the analyst, since after all, he is the supposed-subject-of-knowing. The analyst should know how to deal with the relationship with knowledge, and know to what extent he is ruled by the unconscious structure that separates him from that knowledge".²

How to think about the desire of the analyst in this case? How to fill the (x) of the function? I assume that the analyst's desire comes into place in each analysis; it is conditioned by the letter and the knot.

Once the signifiers had been raised in the analysis with Mr.P., there was no passage to the letter. Freud's resistance was an obstacle for the production of the unconscious; in that way there was no knot with the real. When writing, Freud talks about the occult, and I would add, of his position, according to what Lacan states in *Ou pire*:

"It is necessary that there exists a sort of transmutation acted from the signifier to the letter when the signifier is not there, when it is drifting".
"...it is in so far as a letter that it touches me more as an analyst, and it is as letter that it returns, precisely as the repressed signifier."³

Therefore it is the analyst who supports the function of letter, a letter to fall.

The analyst knots, joins, the three, real, symbolic, imaginary, making a letter of the signifier, through what in each analysis is produced as the desire of the analyst. The use of this expression articulates with the impossible in an analysis, with the place of the real that we call *object a*.

The analyst is involved with the real only as a consequence of his analysis, what is at play is the consequence of his desire in relation to the place of the debris of the other.

Lacan states that we shouldn't believe that we sustain the semblant ourselves. We are not even semblant. We can occasionally occupy its place and make something prevail there. What? The *object a*.

The analyst is he who places "the *object a* in the place of the semblant". Let us say that he does so when bordering with the letter the impossibility of *jouissance*. What I mean is that from the production of the unconscious as ex-isting (*ex-istente*) to the symbolic, there is a passage, a transmutation which is a knotting. So, what does this knot mentioned by Lacan in the Seminar *Le Sinthôme* mean? Does it mean to work with the mistakes of the links until the chain of three becomes borromean?⁴ Does it mean to work with the fourth knot which links what was not knotted by mistake? Or, maybe the three of them are loose? Or, is every analysis necessarily finished with the fourth knot?

Lacan considers that for Freud — but not for himself — the three (real, symbolic, imaginary) are not maintained together because they sit one on top of the other and are knotted by a fourth one : the Oedipus Complex.

Therefore : is the triple knot maintained in Lacan? In the Seminar *Le Sinthôme (The Symptom)* he states: "I define as a symptom, *sinthome*, what doesn't allow the triple knot to appear as a triple knot".⁵ Lacan also proposes the names of the father as a fourth knot.

I will repeat a question posed by Vapperau in his seminar *Topology and Time*⁶: What is it that happens in the borromean structure? One finds that the fourth is implied, and for Lacan: The fourth is implied somewhere and the fact is to know what holds up the three". He answers : The borromean structure achieves that, it holds them up, it is a nothingness that matters".

Let us state briefly what are the conclusions of my work : that nothingness is part of the function called desire of the analyst; that hole, that naked *a*, is the act of the analyst who performs it when he splices the unconscious to the *jouissance* of the symptom, when he knots the fantasm as a letter to the real. Lacan says in *The Moment to Conclude* that :

"Analysis does not consist in freeing oneself from one's symptoms (*sinthomes*) but rather to know why one is entangled with them: that is produced because there the symbolic exists".⁷

I understand that "knowledge" as the production of a letter, the articulation of the unconscious with the symptom of what ex-ists (*ex-iste*) and the falling down on the symbolic making a hole to the real of the symptom. In that sense I assume it is also possible to tie a triple knot with the symptom, not as a fourth knot anymore, but inserted between the real

and the symbolic. But this is still a question for me. Our knowledge of the end of analysis, through what the discourse of the analysand teaches us, will help us to continue thinking about it. Here lies the necessity of the *passee*.

The production of the letter suggests the knot, since the letter in these transmutations is the link of one register with another, one littoral that knots making a hole from the position of the analyst.

At the end of his answer to Marcel Ritter on 26th January 1975, Lacan writes:

"Freud began his *Traumdeutung* by the formula that we know:

"If I cannot move the gods of heaven, I will move those of hell."

"There is something that Freud reveals very clearly : the unconscious desire in man is hell, and this is the only means to understand something. Not to desire hell is one of the forms of the *Widerstand*, it is the resistance".⁸


I consider it important to make a change in the letter proposed by Freud :

Si acheronta movebo, Flectere queos superos. If, through the unconscious desire, I move the hell we inhabit, the gods, the superior ones : in so far as they conceal the real —, will bow, will fall, because the Other is also castrated.

Ricardo Landeira,
Uruguay.

Notes

- 1 STRACHEY, J. Editor's note to Freud's *Psychoanalysis and Telepathy*, St. Ed., Vol. XVIII, 175.
- 2 LACAN, J. *Les non dupes errent*. Class of 19.3.74. Unpublished seminar.
- 3 LACAN, J. *Ou pire*. Class of 15.12.71. Unpublished seminar.
- 4 N.T.



Borromean
knot of three rings

Borromean
chain of three strands

- ⁵ LACAN, J. *Le sinthome*. Class of 17.2.76.
- ⁶ VAPPERAU. *Topology and Time*, 15.5.79. Unpublished seminar.
- ⁷ LACAN, J. *Moment de conclure*. Class of 10.1.78.
- ⁸ LACAN, J. *Réponse à Marcel Ritter*, published in *Supplement to the Notes of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires*, p.135.

Pandora

Lía Quijano

Hysteria has travelled a long way since the migratory and problematic uterus of Galen, the burning of witches, convulsive, possessed . . . before arriving to Freud and his theory of the trauma, a theory which was later substituted, although not completely, by the theory of the fantasm. Freud discovered that the hysterics suffered from reminiscences and this fact led him to posit the mechanism of repression and the return of the repressed, expressed in their bodies through the conversive symptoms that evoke cuts.

Lacan considers repression and the return of the repressed as the same thing. Conversive symptoms, as well as delusions or the hysterical hallucination, symbolize the imaginary castration. Coming back to Freud, he discovered that the unconscious fantasms expressed desires emerging from the infantile sexuality at the base of the hysterical symptom.

From his relationship with Charcot, he removed hysteria from the medical field and the neuroses became a new line of scientific research,

leaving the anatomical substratum of symptoms aside. This is the characteristic of hysteria: breaking away with the correspondence with anatomy. The interpretation of dreams opens the royal road of access to the unconscious. Since the early years of this century the field of hysteria has become more and more reduced and it has been replaced, to a great extent, by schizophrenia, borderline states, narcissistic personalities, paranoia, etc.

Freud's hysteria, which Lacan re-situates, includes, apart from the conversive symptoms, the a-symptomatic hysteria, delusions and hallucinations, melancholic states or hypomanic states, mental confusion, etc. In his *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud writes that Ana O. shows a second intermittent state, has a certain consciousness and shows analogies with the oneiric activity and the artificial delusion. And she was able to be treated.

Lacan presents hysteria as the basic structure of the neurosis and makes of obsessional neurosis a dialectic of hysteria. Starting from the rule of free association, which Lacan thinks is not so free, he theorized the supposed-subject-of-knowledge. Later on, he mathematized the discourse of the hysterics as one of the four discourses and suggested the analytical mechanism as producing a "hysterization" of the discourse of the analysand. If from Lacan we suppose that the subject is established as an effect of the signifier in relation to the object of the desire, the *object a*, from which it is structurally separate; if we agree therefore that there is a divided subject; and that this *spaltung* is constitutive of the speaking subject; then we are not to be surprised before those who postulate the existence of a strong I, autonomous, and who don't therefore even want to consider the splitting of the subject since they state the I as the principle of synthesis. It is necessary to recall that for the I, the concept of schizophrenia has a broad meaning as it was used to classify again a great part of the hysterics. It considered Ana O., Emmy, Dora, Elizabeth von R., as psychotic — patients whom Freud never doubted to consider as hysterics forgetting that psychoanalysis was born from Freud's encounter with the hysterics.

We are perfectly aware that hysterics awake great rejection due to their questioning of knowledge and their claim of the impossibility of the sexual relationship. Hysterics also remind us that the knowledge of psychoanalysis has to be recreated with each analysis. In short, hysterics argue the practice of analysis that "obsessionalizes" the subject and tries

to preserve, by means of administrative by-laws, the Freudian discovery. The hysterics look for a master who knows everything about him or her, in order to question that Knowledge immediately. As analysts, we should avoid both falling into the trap laid by the patient, and being in the place of the Ideal with which the analysand identifies at the end of the analysis. Instead, from clinical psychoanalysis, we must make the desire placed as semblant of "a" work, in order for it to fall at the end of the treatment, offering in that way an exit to the hysterics, since the end of the analysis — as Freud described it, means penis neid for the woman, and castration *Angst* for the man — leaves the hysterics stuck to the wailing wall of the bedrock of castration. The solution proposed by Freud for the man isn't any better; it leaves him in an impasse at the mercy of the castration *Angst*.

The end of the analysis — as formulated by Lacan — from the side of the *object a* cause of desire, as function of *jouissance*, leads him further than Freud. In Seminar XI, Lacan says: "No praxis is oriented, as analysis is, towards which, in the heart of the experience, is the nucleus of the real". If we try to understand the hysterics, as Lacan recommends, we have the possibility to learn something from her.

In order to finish, I want to remind you what Lacan says in his Proposition of October 9th.: Psychoanalysis is the opening of Pandora's box; and Alcibiades had no need of it.

Pandora is also the name of an excellent play by Gérard de Nerval whose writing was interrupted by several psychiatric treatments. He describes the Pandora of his play in the following way:

"She could have been attributed the undecipherable enigma carved in the stone of Bologna: neither man nor woman, neither androgyne nor maiden, neither young nor old, neither reckless nor chaste, but everything at once; in one word: the Pandora".

Lia Quijano,
Uruguay.

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- VIII The Case Histories of Freud - Part II - 1986

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**HOMAGE TO FREUD
1979
Contents**

	Page
INTRODUCTION	
A Note on Letter 52 of Freud and on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis: the Dissolution of L'Ecole Freudienne de Paris	1
 PART I HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 40th ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH	
The Word of Freud	Sigmund Freud 8
Presentation of the School	Oscar Zentner 9
A Reference to Freud and Lacan	Maria Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 13
The Entrance of Psychoanalysis in Australia	John Dingle 23
Ideal Objects and Repetition	Rubén Alejandro Cerutti 39
People of the Northeast Brazil Talk About Their Legends: "Joao Galafoice in the Fishing World"	Jacques Laberge 45
Psychoanalysis and Cure	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 53
Psychoanalysis	Oscar Zentner 59
 PART II ON FEMININITY	
The Woman and the Real as a Paradigm of Psychosis	Oscar Zentner 73
 PART III THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
Sexuality and Science	Oscar Zentner and María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 95
Freudian Unconscious, Symbolism and Censorship	Oscar Zentner 113
Elementary Lessons	Oscar Zentner 131

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

**HOMAGE TO FREUD
ON PERVERSION
1980
Contents**

	Page
NACHTRÄGLICHKEIT	1
 PART I HOMAGE TO FREUD	
In the Knot of the Subject	Oscar Zentner 13
Retrospective Unconscious Logic and Perversion, the Moments of Perversion	Gayle Paull 29
Femininity and Perversion	John Dingle 37
The Offended Woman	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 49
A Pseudonym, the Itinerary for a Perversion	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 65
The Brain as Accommodation of Desire	Graeme Crawford Smith 79
Tod/Etcetera/Rat Man	Juan Dávila 85
 PART II THE WORK OF LACAN	
The Seminar, Paris, 10th July, 1980	Jacques Lacan 97
The Seminar, Caracas, 12th July, 1980	Jacques Lacan 103
 PART III THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Comedy of the Bodies	Javier Aramburu and Juan Carlos Cosentino 109
A Case of Perversion?	Luz Freire 119
The Death of Freud	Isidoro Vegh 127
Aphanisis	Oscar Zentner 137

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

**HOMAGE TO FREUD
ON ANGST
1981
Contents**

	Page
LOGOS	
PART I HOMAGE TO FREUD	
The Death of Lacan	Oscar Zentner 9
Non-Libidinization and its Return	Oscar Zentner 15
The Secret Cause	Laurence Bataille 27
Lautréamont and the Uncanny	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 33
Angst, The Null Set Series and the (— φ)	Gayle Paull 45
Beyond the Pleasure of the Text	John Dingle 55
Psychoanalysis or Psychoanalyst	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 67
PART II SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Seminar I On Symbolism	Moustapha Safouan 83
Seminar II On Jokes	Moustapha Safouan 103
PART III THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Rhetoric of <i>Angst</i>	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 119
<i>Angst</i> and the Theatre of the Absurd	Frances M. Moran 123
Interview with Juan David Nasio	Miguel Kohan 129
Conversation in Paris Between Alain Grosrichard, Gloria Autino Gustavo Etkin and Oscar Zentner	139

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

**HOMAGE TO FREUD
THE FREUDIAN CLINIC
1982
Contents**

	Page
PART I LOGOS	
HOMAGE TO FREUD	
The Analytic Construction	Oscar Zentner 9
Metaphor and the Freudian Clinic	Frances M. Moran 31
The Psychosis of the Prime Minister's Son	Rob Gordon 41
A Case for Topology	Gayle Paull 69
Interpretation and the Specimen Dream	John Dingle 85
The Identification and the Ideal	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 103
PART II SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Seminar I Transference and Acting Out	Moustapha Safouan 125
Seminar II On Plato's Symposium	Moustapha Safouan 133
Seminar III The Place of the Analyst in the Transference	Moustapha Safouan 153
Seminar IV Topographic Point of View of the Unconscious	Moustapha Safouan 179
PART III THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
And Thou Shalt Be Like Gods	Ricardo Goldenberg 197

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

**HOMAGE TO FREUD
CLINICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS
1983/84
Contents**

	Page
LOGOS	1
PART I HOMAGE TO FREUD — CLINICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS	
From the <i>Verneinung</i> of Freud to the <i>Verwerfung</i> of Lacan.	Oscar Zentner 9
Castration and Death, Nodal Points in the Latent-Content of Dreams.	Gayle Paull 31
Further Remarks on the Case of Little Hans	Felicity Bagot 57
The Transference and Cure of the Prime Minister's Son.	Rob Gordon 67
The Psychoanalysis of Children	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 85
PART II THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Unconscious, the Transference, and the Psychoanalyst's Interpretation: A Lacanian View.	Juan-David Nasio 103
Psychoanalysis: A Nodal Writing Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts.	Héctor Rúpolo 117 Moustapha Safouan 157

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

**HOMAGE TO FREUD
THE CASE HISTORIES OF FREUD
PART I
1985
Contents**

	Page
LOGOS	1
PART I HOMAGE TO FREUD — THE CASE HISTORIES OF FREUD	
Demand of Analysis and Analysis of The Demand	Oscar Zentner 9
Dora's Refusal To Be a Gift Of Wolves and Wasps	Gayle Paull 29 Felicity Bagot 43
Transference and Resistance In Little Hans	Rob Gordon 53
L'Idée Vient en Parlant	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 73
PART II SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Heidegger Concerning Language	Zawar Hanfi 89
PART III THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Navel of The Dream	Laurence Bataille 123
Death of a Father	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 129
Introduction to Hector Rúpolo's The Non-Simple Borders of a Letter	Oscar Zentner 143
The Non-Simple Borders of a Letter	Hector Rúpolo 145
The Freudian Clinic - A Lost Bet	Isidoro Vegh 157
Critique in The Freudian Field	Isidoro Vegh 175

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

**HOMAGE TO FREUD
THE CASE HISTORIES OF FREUD
PART II
1986
Contents**

LOGOS	Page
The Psychoanalytic Discourse and its Vicissitudes: The Defence is the Destiny	<i>Oscar Zentner</i> 1
 PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD — THE CASE HISTORIES OF FREUD	
PART II	
Estrangement: Depersonalization and Derealization as Negatives of Déjà-vu and Fausse Reconnaissance	<i>Oscar Zentner</i> 11
 Elizabeth Von R - Her Mask Nevertheless Reveals a Hidden Sense	 <i>Gayle Paull</i> 25
Truth and Delusion in Schreber and Freud	<i>Rob Gordon</i> 35
Freud's Discovery of the Negative Therapeutic Reaction	 <i>John Dingle</i> 53
Che Vuoi? or Some Remarks on Anorexia Nervosa	 <i>María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner</i> 63
 PART II	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
Topologie:	
Topology and Psychoanalysis	<i>Juan-David Nasio</i> 81
A Key to an Enigma	<i>Héctor Rúpolo</i> 93
The Decoding of Dreams: Syntax and Abstract Signification	 <i>Moustapha Safouan</i> 109
The Primary Processes in the Dream	 <i>Moustapha Safouan</i> 135
In the Border of the Neurosis	 <i>Isidoro Vegh</i> 153

The Freudian School of Melbourne
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