


**PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN
SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE**



*The Case Histories
of Freud - Part I*

HOMAGE TO FREUD

**PAPERS OF THE
FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE
AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC
WRITINGS**

**THE CASE HISTORIES OF FREUD — PART I
AND
THE DIRECTION OF THE ANALYSIS**

**Editor
Oscar Zentner**

Published by
The Freudian School of Melbourne
1985


The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria, 3122
Australia

ISSN 0811-2533
ISBN 0 9594842 5 6

Copyright © 1985 by the Freudian School of Melbourne.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

Cover designed by Juan Davila

Printed by Monash University Press,
Wellington Rd., Clayton, Victoria, Australia



CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
LOGOS	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD—THE CASE HISTORIES OF FREUD	
Demand for Analysis and Analysis of The Demand	Oscar Zentner 9
Dora's Refusal To Be A Gift	Gayle Paull 29
Of Wolves and Wasps	Felicity Bagot 43
Transference and Resistance In Little Hans	Rob Gordon 53
<i>L'Idée vient en parlant</i>	Mariá Inés Rotmiler de Zentner 73
PART II	
SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Heidegger Concerning Language	Zawar Hanfi 89
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Navel of The Dream	Laurence Bataille 123
Death of a Father	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 129
Introduction to Hector Rúpolo's The Non-Simple Borders of a Letter	Oscar Zentner 143
The Non-Simple Borders of a Letter	Hector Rúpolo 145
The Freudian Clinic—A Lost Bet	Isidoro Vegh 157
Critique in The Freudian Field	Isidoro Vegh 175

LOGOS

“The truth is, there is nothing for which man’s capabilities are less suited than psychoanalysis”

Freud.

“... what is the order of truth that our praxis engenders?”

“... how can we be sure that we are not impostors?”

Lacan.

This seventh volume is a continuation of the psycho-analytic work produced by the School since 1977.

Freud discovered a new field, demarcated by the psycho-analytic discourse. However, this discourse in its turn, produced analysts. The difficulty is, to paraphrase Lacan, that the analyst is not particularly better equipped than others to avoid the effects of mass psychology. To preach on this issue— to return to dogma — is, in itself, the inscription of the effects of the group. On the contrary, to analyse is to remember that as analysts, we are at a vanishing point where the sayer is erased by the saying.

If one of the tasks of the analyst is to produce a pure difference between the desire and the wish of the analysand, then another is to become that pure nothing which is the analyst’s desire.

Oscar Zentner
Director
The Freudian School of Melbourne

THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

OSCAR ZENTNER, DIRECTOR.
P.O. BOX 12, HAWTHORN VICTORIA 3122 AUSTRALIA.



6th HOMAGE TO FREUD

*The Case Histories
of Freud - Part 1.*

AT L'ALLIANCE FRANCAISE DE MELBOURNE,
267 CHURCH STREET, RICHMOND

SATURDAY 22nd SEPTEMBER 1984
FROM 10 a.m. TO 4 p.m.

PART I

HOMAGE TO FREUD

**THE CASE HISTORIES
OF FREUD — PART I**

All papers presented in this book have been written by members of The Freudian School of Melbourne, residing in Melbourne, except where indicated.

"Indeed it is a prominent feature of the unconscious processes that they are indestructible. In the unconscious nothing can be brought to an end, nothing is past or forgotten. This is brought most vividly to one in the neuroses, and especially in hysteria"

S. Freud

"A return to Freud's text shows on the contrary the absolute coherence between his technique and his discovery, and at the same time this coherence allows us to put all his procedures in their proper place. That is why any rectification of psychoanalysis must inevitably involve a return to the truth of that discovery, which, taken in its original moment, is impossible to obscure"

J. Lacan

**DEMAND FOR ANALYSIS AND
ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND**

Oscar Zentner

“... the psycho-analysts are part of the concept of the unconscious, because they constitute that to which it (the unconscious) is addressed. We cannot therefore not include our discourse of the unconscious in the thesis that it itself enunciates; that the presence of the unconscious, because it is situated in the place of the Other has to be sought in every discourse, in its enunciation”

Lacan¹

“Those diseases which medicines do not cure, iron (the knife?) cures; those which iron cannot cure, fire cures; and those which fire cannot cure are to be reckoned wholly incurable”

Hippocrates²

According to our experience, the symptom is at the root of the demand for an analysis.

“In short, it is not a matter of indifference whether someone comes to analysis of his own accord or because he is brought to it — whether it is himself who desires to be changed, or only his relatives . . .”

We propose to analyse those cases where the demand derives from another subject, who is not the subject to be analysed. In such cases, the difference between demand and desire, which in reality never coincide, will be obscured. A psycho-analysis takes place precisely in the fundamental split between the subject of the demand and the subject of desire.

In *The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman*, the demand for analysis came from the father as a consequence of her attempted suicide. The agreement of the analysand to start the analysis clearly showed that the desire was elsewhere. We could argue that according to our point of view, there is nothing special in this. However, Freud highlights this problem when he says that almost no transference was present, although he quickly adds that this would in itself be absurd. In all events, it is due to this situation that the psychoanalysis is doomed to be interrupted, because transference is the condition of the analysis and not its effect.

What is the relation between the demand and desire of the father to Freud on the one hand, and the demand and desire of the girl to her father, on the other? There are some statements in Freud's account which deserve a closer reading.

“ . . . she transferred to me the sweeping repudiation of men which had dominated her ever since the disappointment she had suffered from the father.”

However, it is precisely when the transference is indubitable,

that Freud, to our surprise, decides to interrupt the treatment. But there is more. Against the background of the text, the figure of Freud stands out as not desirable to the subject. It is here that he decides to interrupt. It is not a problem of negative transference, as a fast-reading of the text could make us believe, but of 'lack of resistance'. The transference, as negative in its quality of love transference, is not present. Freud's second decision appears here; to recommend a female analyst for the future. Beyond the imaginary effect that we might find in this recommendation, it is even more important to emphasize the degree to which transference-love, whilst the major resistance of the analysis, is at the same time its only tool. Transference-love will make the analysis reveal the repressed of the subject beyond the boundaries of what psychoanalytic theory offers as an already established knowledge.

The function of the analyst, according to Lacan, is to work towards obtaining a desire, pure, drawn out or extracted from the demands where it is concealed. The fantasm, understood as the primordial fixation of the subject, would then be glimpsed from the side of his desire ($\$ \diamond a$), whilst the symptom would be connected with the demand.

Let us recapitulate some aspects of this case history;

1. The demand for analysis originated in and came from the father.
2. For Freud, the patient was normal and wished to be recognized as homosexual.

In relation to the first, we may ask what was the desire of the parents regarding this daughter? In relation to the second, what was the desire of the analysand regarding her parents?

Freud stresses the importance of this case because he is able to trace the origin and development of the homosexuality with complete certainty and almost without a 'gap'. The girl in question used to worship a lady of doubtful reputation, *la Cocotte* and paraded herself in her company as much as she possibly

could in order to be seen by her father. The day of course arrived when she met her father face to face while walking in the street with the lady of her love. It was after the angry glare of her father and the irritation of her lady at having been used that the girl jumped over a wall onto the railway line.

Six months after the attempted suicide, the girl's father consulted Freud. He commented on the father:

"There was something about his daughter's homosexuality that aroused the deepest bitterness in him . . ."

. . . a remark that contains, perhaps, the connection between the demand of the father and his knowledge of something that he did not communicate to Freud. We think that the 'bitterness' is the link between the homosexuality in the daughter and the 'failure' of the father.

The daughter, as homosexual, questions every man; father and analyst included. The father's glare cannot be a surprise to her since she knew only too well what her father's reaction would be. However, it is by the glare of the father that the girl is dispossessed of her imaginary emblems as a courtesan which so far the mother had allowed her to carry. The girl acted as a bridge between *la Cocotte* and her mother. The glare of the father is equivalent to: "You are not."

The glare of the father acts *nachträglichkeit*, so to say. The glare 'strips her bare' as castrated. This glare coincides in time with *la Cocotte's* request that the girl withdraw from her life. The imaginary position in which she had been encouraged by her mother was lost by the glare of the father. This glare acts as a symbolic castration where the desire is marked. Paradoxically, it is thanks to the mother's rejection of her daughter as woman and the subsequent castrating glare of her father, that the subject finds herself as homosexual and not as psychotic or neurotic.

The attitude of the mother regarding her daughter is some-

what of a dilemma in that she rejects her daughter as such, but approves of her homosexual relationship. She is in complicity with her daughter and, moreover, rejoices through her adventures with *la Cocotte*.

Indeed, Freud clearly says that the girl is not hysteric. He also specifies that it is not sexuality that is repressed in hysteria but perversion. We can from here interpret the mother's position as hysterical. Freud indirectly suggests this when referring to the neurosis suffered by the mother. The mother plays her desire through the desire of another woman — her daughter — enjoying the homosexual love from a typical hysterical position.⁷ We must remember in this context the characteristic description of the hysteric in *Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality*.⁸

It would be incorrect to suggest that in the background of a true homosexuality such as the one that occupies us now, there would always be an hysterical mother. No. What we are saying is that in this case there is ample space for the possibility of our hypothesis:

Freud's analysand, who 'made virtue out of necessity' insisted on the platonic character of her love. That is, she loved in the style of what Lacan describes at the root of courtly love,¹⁰ that impossible love which precisely because it is impossible, awakens even more love and remains free from the erosion proper to any love that is not impeded. The furious glance of the father that the subject searched for indefatigably, adds here another element to the impossibility. When the lady of her love claims her immediate and permanent retreat in answer to the encounter with the father; the young girl finds in this combination not only motives to 'kill' the father and the mother with her suicide, but also a way to extol her love for the sublime. After the attempt, Freud asks, who can now doubt the truth of her love? That truth finds its emblem insofar as it is maintained as sublime. When the young girl confides to Freud that she can have sexual relations both with men and with women, she brings

out love as different from sexuality, love as narcissistic.

The relevance of this case resides in illustrating to what degree the analysis can be divorced from the cure.

Freud's case shows us that the desire is in another place and that it does not coincide with the demand. The father's demand was: 'Cure my daughter' but Freud was very cautious about giving any false hope, acceding only to analyse his daughter for a short period of time to see how far the analysis could go. In other words, Freud opened up the analytic space to his analysand, a space where she could, through her demands, cast some light upon that of which nobody wants to know anything — the desire.¹¹

Freud's prognosis of the case was based on the fact that the analysand had told him that she had not gone beyond a few very limited sexual games¹² and on the fact that:

"She did not try to deceive me by saying that she felt any urgent need to be freed from her homosexuality. On the contrary, she said she could not conceive of any other way of being in love . . ."

Freud goes on immediately in the text to recognize that:

" . . . I could not guess the unconscious affective attitude that lay concealed behind it"

What came to light in this connection,

" . . . determined its premature conclusion." ¹³

The girl brings dreams to the analysis where the desire to be cured appears, and Freud, contrary to what could be expected, interprets them as lies and proceeds to tell her so, too. But Freud warns us that "the dream is not the unconscious". What

is the effect of this interpretation of Freud? The analysand feels free not to dream these dreams any more. It is in that moment that the analysis can, in fact, be an analysis where the analyst analyses and does not demand.¹⁴

Freud speaks of a narcissistic renunciation in the girl and compares it with the masculine way of loving, that is, to love actively and overvaluing the object rather than wanting to be loved. However, in the present case the narcissistic renunciation is in itself a secondary reaction. The girl felt she was not loved, her mother favoured her brothers — therefore, the inversion that took place was that of loving the lady, identifying herself with her mother and identifying in the lover her own being.

Let us try to explain this further, since there are several things to be seen here. If the girl loves, she can be the mother who loves the lady — *la Cocotte*. That is: 'I (the patient)' — the mother — 'love my daughter, *la Cocotte*'. Therefore: 'it is not true that my mother does not love me since I am not the daughter but the mother who loves her daughter'. We think Freud did not touch upon this, but perhaps it is not excluded from the fact that the daughter — as such — wants her mother to accept her love from a masculine position where *la Cocotte* is also her mother.

As Lacan pointed out, if everything unfolds because her father does not give her a child, she might have well got herself pregnant by another man. Rather than her wanting to have a child from the father and to be in a specular relation of rivalry with the mother because she had just been honoured by the father, we think the subject is dispossessed of her 'being' (the phallus).

We base this in the summary that Freud gives us of her infantile sexuality:

"In childhood, the girl had passed through the normal attitude characteristic of the feminine Oedipus complex" ¹⁵.

The father was replaced by an older brother of the girl and she did not remember any sexual trauma. At five years of age she recalled comparing her genitals with her older brother's and a year later, the birth of a younger brother. The comparison of the genitals had a "strong impression" on her and left "far reaching after-effects".¹⁶ When she was thirteen or fourteen she showed great tenderness towards a child of three or four years of age, the consequences of which was that a "... lasting friendship grew between herself and the parents of the child." Very soon, however, a change followed and she became interested only in young and mature women. Was it here that the subject played at being the child loved by the parents? We ignore it, but we know that this takes place very close to the time when her father impregnates her mother again. Does the father with this act not give place to the hypothesis of having impregnated the mother as a complement to the incestuous fantasy already existing between father and daughter? The child that the mother bears is, according to Freud, the child that the daughter awaits from her father. But an incestuous fantasy, if such a fantasy is at play, cannot originate from one side only. As Freud said:

"The mother keeps a strict watch against any close relation between the girl and the father."

It is out of these constellations that the daughter produces the final shift, a change possible, of course, because the latent homosexuality so allows it. It is through the homosexuality that the analysand attached herself to a mother who rejected her.

Due to the birth of her brother, she adopts the "lady-love as a substitute for her mother."¹⁷ This love, this *active love* in the fashion of a man, is the inversion through which it is not the mother who does not love her. She is now the mother who loves her child (herself in the lady-love), while the lady-love who allows her advances only up to a certain point, seems to be saying: 'It is not me who you love, but yourself'. Or, as Freud says:

"The girl we are considering had in any case altogether little cause to feel affection for her mother."¹⁸

We are attempting to connect the mother's hostility towards the girl and the incestuous desire of the daughter towards the father:

"She became keenly conscious of the wish to have a child, and a male one; that what she desired was her *father's* child and an image of *him* . . ."¹⁹

The demand of the father — which certainly does not coincide with the demand of the mother — 'Cure my daughter' could be understood as follows: 'I hope you will fail and in that way I will be exonerated.' The suicide attempt had the meaning of: "She 'fell' through her father's fault . . ."²⁰ The attempt was an attempt to deliver a child.

Freud shows also how the figure of the beloved lady, *la Cocotte*, evoked in the patient the figure of her brother. In that manner, the object choice also received heterosexual libido. It is really impossible to conceal the fact that this case is open to so many hypotheses:

"The synthesis is thus not so satisfactory as the analysis; in other words, from a knowledge of the premises we could not have foretold the nature of the result."²¹

The implicit interrogation in the homosexual constellation of Freud's patient is: Who has the phallus? The mother? The father? Who to demand it from? And finally, is she it, or not? She takes *la Cocotte* as the phallus, in the manner in which she would have liked to be taken by her mother. However:

"We do not, therefore, mean to maintain that every girl who experiences a dis-

appointment such as this of the longing for love that springs from the Oedipus attitude at puberty will necessarily on that account fall a victim of homosexuality." 22

Freud interrupts the analysis because he attempts to move the subject from wanting to be the phallus to not having it. Unfortunately he found himself in the same position as the father which he confirmed indirectly as:

"Only he who does not give *has*,
Only he who gives himself *is*" 23

. . . and this is no other than the position of the analysand. This position is similar to Lacan's formula of love; "to give what one does not have to a being who is not." The analysand only speaks of love, and that is her tragic dimension. We can see quite clearly in this text the distinction between analysis and cure. The question of desire is interrogated in the analysis whilst the demand is queried in the cure.

This is Freud's desire, the desire of the analyst, incomplete, unsatisfied, truncated, irreparable, pure desire. 24

★ ★ ★

I would like now to look at two other cases where the analysis did not proceed beyond the demand. The reason for analysing these demands is that each demand puts into play the essence of the symptom. Paraphrasing Lacan, the articulation of the return of the repressed signifiers is still demand, and what we have to restore is the desire, desire in its form as different from demand.

The following is a striking case due to the dramatic events leading to it. A lady, unknown to me, attempts to commit suicide and is taken to casualty in one of the large hospitals of the city. While in a state of confusion as a consequence of the intoxication, and still in casualty, the lady gives my name to the

doctor who saved her life. So far nothing seems very unusual, except that my name was given by her as if I had been her analyst . . . which I was not. The doctor in question rang me and after several minutes of conversation we both learnt, not without perplexity, that she was neither my analysand nor even a prospective one.

Many questions arise from this bizarre situation, and we are going to put forward some hypotheses to explain, partially and eventually, the case.

A person who attempts to commit suicide is generally someone whose narcissistic structure is in the foreground. Could there be some relation between this and the demand? If the demand is always a demand for love, why should we concern ourselves with this case where the demand was to remain unsatisfied? The structure of love is narcissistic per se, yet, there is a difference between being in love, being loved and committing suicide.

In the case that occupies us, the demand in question was a narcissistic demand. My name could not have been the lady's fabrication. Some knowledge must have been at play. But I never found this out. I want to say that at some point in time this person must have considered an analysis with me. The extraordinary thing about this is that what might have been a day dream appears as an actual fact when the suicidal attempt takes place. One could argue that the transference was established beforehand and the fact that the mentioned transference had taken place outside of the analysis would have given place to the acting out and its issuing passage to the act. Certainly. All the same, in spite of the scanty elements that we depend on, we still think there is space to attempt a clarification of a demand for analysis through a third person — the doctor in casualty — and through an attempt, severe enough to have risked her life.

Here is where we introduce the idea that what was at play might have been a narcissistic demand. What would this mean? Would this abolish, in any case, our general principle that the

demand is a demand for love? Certainly not, except that it proves it to an exacerbated level where the subject wants to be loved as perfect; if it is true that suicide is an act of perfection (Lacan) in that it cannot be repeated.

Another possibility which we do not discard and that does not contradict the former is the following. It refers to the fantasy or ideal of being an analysand without going through the process of analysis. Both situations indicate a transference that does not present itself from within the analysis but from without (outside).

What this demand repeats then, is the statement, 'I want to be loved', and we do not think we are magnifying the case by indicating the possibility of a primordial rejection of the parents that the subject puts into play with a demand for analysis that is not formulated because there is already an Other (the parents) who refused to give recognition. The attempted suicide was a short circuit because it was an answer to the primordial rejection of her demand that we have pre-supposed above. In this, she seemed to put us in the place of the Other who might have rejected her before. From that position she offers herself for me as a non-analysable analysand — an extreme position in order to avoid being rejected by me.

If the primordial function of an analysis is to differentiate between demand and desire, this remains thwarted in this case. It would perhaps be suitable and cautious to show that if there is a desire in the subject of which we can certainly talk, it is the desire to annihilate the demand by death. But the true hysterical melancholy at play exceeds nevertheless the limits of nosology.

If my name is present at the moment of the suicide attempt, it is to me as analyst that the suicide is addressed, with the fantasy perhaps, of both showing 1) the impossibility of being analysed (the dead cannot be analysed) and here resides her melancholy and, 2) her absolute demand for love; to be loved and rescued from the hells of her life.

We have decided to give the name of Euridice to this person, of course.

"To resort to a metaphor, drawn from mythology, we have in Euridice twice lost, the most potent image we can find of the relation between Orpheus the analyst and the unconscious." ²⁵

This hysterical aspect of Euridice, to want to be loved in the manner of her demand, represents two things. On the one hand that the transference is the moment of resistance, and on the other, that an object that in Freud belonged to the anti-investment, will occupy here the place of the repressed desire. It is here that our figure plays at being that object, an object that since Lacan we recognize as the supposed-subject-of-knowing, around which the transference grants its values.

What an analyst cannot ignore is that the transference is addressed beyond the demand which it governs. The analyst occupies the place of resistance inasmuch as the transference is directed to him. The desire of Euridice would be that of annihilating the demand, making the desire prevail with her disappearance. An Euridice who does not demand, offers herself to us in suicide as pure desire.

We realize that perhaps we want to draw out too much from too little. But we must remember that these are hypotheses and their value resides in investigating whether our theory can provisionally explain the problem that we had to face so many years ago. A first attempt would be to show that whilst the demand is directed, desire directs. Euridice tries to direct her desire to death; an object that would finish precisely with the characteristic of desire itself: its indestructibility and metonymy. Her fantasm was expressed in the attempt to terminate her life, leaving after her death a desire, deceitful and transferential, towards me as the end of all metonymy. This would be her only object which could not be changed into another, and to which I would remain forever as witness (of a desire whose metonymy found

its end in a metaphor — as death).

Desire for immortality? There would be nothing particular in it. There are many questions that will remain unanswered, but here we cannot advance further unless we abandon our field. Our action consists in restoring the desire in the discourse if, what is articulated in the repressed signifiers that return continues to be demand, as in Euridice. With these scarce elements we risk the hypothesis that Euridice offers herself to us as a metaphor of her own desire. Where life offers imperfection and boundaries, death with its hand provides the illusion of being complete and without defects. It is this fantasm of phallus that triggers the suicide.

★ ★ ★

We are now going to look at a completely different case. This is the case of a man in his early thirties. His demand for analysis was clear and precise. He wanted me to analyse him and train him to be an analyst. Towards the end of the interview, he commented in passing that he was in analysis with another analyst to whom in fact, I was once introduced. I enquired if his current analyst had knowledge of this interview with me and of his intention. Surprised, he responded negatively. By this point I was unsure as to whether he planned to swap one analysis for another or to have both at once! It became clear that he thought of having two analyses at once . . . When I told him the rather striking qualities of his decision, he seemed not to understand nor to recognize what was being indicated to him. I told him that given the circumstances — his other analysis — I was unable to take him as an analysand. We will soon learn the perverse/obsessional dimension of the case.

We do not discard the possibility that we were dealing with the case of having one analysis in order to control the other. But other aspects seem to us more relevant. The person in question made his demand under the auspices of a disavowal, since truly he knew what he did not want to recognize. From that perspec-

tive, his demand was a demand for complicity, but above all, a demand for an analysis in which everything could occur by stages, without surprises and whose final prize would be to 'become' an analyst after a more or less standardized period of time.

There was only one significant detail in the understanding of that demand. As you remember, he commented about his other analysis towards the end of the interview. We know that nothing can be overvalued in an interview for an analysis.

Freud makes a point of this in the case of the *Rat Man*, referring to the first communications of an analysand. He told me that with his present analyst, it was he himself — the analysand — who decided whether the door of the consulting room was to remain open or shut. In his analysis and while lying on the couch, he had sometimes left the door open and other times shut while his analyst had remained seated in his chair.

This commentary, in appearance trivial and irrelevant, showed, at least in its moment, the structure of the demand for analysis itself. He sometimes made his analysis public, the door of the consulting room opened to the waiting room; while other times he kept his analysis secret, and he closed the door. This acting-out could be read as an equivalence between coming to see me and opening up his analysis. However, this does not exhaust the question beyond a homosexual exhibitionism where what was at play was the reflexive question: 'Do I have or do I not have.'

Now what could have been the trigger for this acting-out? In other words, there must have been something not analysed in his transference without analysis, and he was coming to show it to me, verifying that I shut the door of my consulting room, even in those cases where the castration anxiety is exacerbated.

I said at the beginning that his demand had been clear. He wanted me to analyse him and to train him to be an analyst — at least until the moment I told him I was not going to take him in-

to analysis myself. Lacan reminds us that what the subject wants does not necessarily coincide with what the subject desires. This is why having explained the present factors in the demand, it is convenient to go now to its true analysis.

The subject sought from me the authentication of something that could obviously not enter through the door of his analysis even when the door remained open during the session. We know that when certain fantasies cannot be brought to an analysis (and the fantasy of becoming an analyst was one not indifferent to the ears), that analysis is generally governed under the designs of the super-ego. We might risk the idea that the subject came as a double (representative of his analyst and of himself), the unconscious representative of a desire of his analyst of wanting to have an analysand but not a future analyst. The subject then has to make his demand heard in another analysis. Yet, even without discarding the question of the rivalry between analysand and analyst, I understand that in this case the co-ordinates are other.

Let us continue a bit further with the most unsatisfactory hypothesis, that of the subject coming as an unconscious representative of his analyst or, furthermore, as his unconscious envoy. A subject who is in analysis and asks at the same time for another analysis, must have some ideas, certainly not interpreted, of what it is that his analyst lacks in order to be one — whence arises an identification with his analyst in the form of that which the subject feels he lacks. Therefore he cannot be an analysand. It is for this reason that he demands an analysis from me and not in a naive manner, so that by my not taking him as a patient, I could show him what he lacked to be one. The subject is thus driven to act out because his analyst does not analyse. However, what the subject cannot ignore is that what he lacks to be an analysand, that is, an analyst. Hence his request for an interview. By returning his own words to him, I showed him what he lacked to be an analysand. By the same token, his analyst, who does not analyse, lacks the analysis to be one.

And this is what I risk here as an hypothesis, the last for today. What we find as the conscious request of the subject is none other than the unconscious desire of his analyst; to be an analyst.

NOTES

- ¹ LACAN, J. *Position de l'inconscient, au congrès de Bonneval, reprise de 1960 en 1964*, in *Écrits*, p.834, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1966.
- ² HIPPOCRATES, *Aphorisms*, VII, 87 (trans. 1849), quoted by Freud in *Observations on Transference-Love (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis III)* (1915 [1914]). The paragraph where Freud quotes Hippocrates reads as follows: "It is remarkable that psycho-analysis has to win for itself afresh all the liberties which have long since been accorded to other medical activities. I am certainly not in favour of giving up the harmless methods of treatment. For many cases they are sufficient, and, when all is said, human society has no more use for the *furor sanandi* (passion for curing people) than for any other fanaticism. But to believe that the psychoneuroses are to be conquered by operating with harmless little remedies is grossly to underestimate those disorders both as to their origin and their practical importance. No; in medical practice there will always be room for the '*ferrum*' and the '*ignis*' side by side with the '*medicina*'; and in the same way we shall never be able to do without a strictly regular, undiluted psycho-analysis which is not afraid to handle the most dangerous mental impulses and to obtain mastery over them for the benefit of the patient."
- ³ FREUD, S. *The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman* (1920), St. Ed. Vol. XVIII, p.150.
- ⁴ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.164.
- ⁵ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.147.
- ⁶ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.149.
- ⁷ FREUD, S. "The mother's attitude towards the girl was not so easy to grasp. She was still a youngish woman, who was evidently unwilling to give up her own claims to attractiveness. All that was clear was that she did not take her daughter's infatuation so

tragically as did the father, nor was she so incensed at it. She had even for some time enjoyed her daughter's confidence concerning her passion . . . She had herself suffered for some years from neurotic troubles and enjoyed a great deal of consideration from her husband; she treated her children in quite different ways, being decidedly harsh towards her daughter and over indulgent to her three sons, the youngest of whom had been born after a long interval and was then not yet three years old," in Idem, p.149.

- ⁸ FREUD, S. *Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality* (1908), St. Ed. Vol. IX, p.155.
- ⁹ FREUD, S. *The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman* (1920), St. Ed. Vol. XVIII, p. 153.
- ¹⁰ LACAN, J. *Dieu et la jouissance de la femme*, in *Encore* (1972/73) livre XX p.69, *Editions du Seuil*, Paris, 1975.
- ¹¹ FREUD, S. ". . . and the task to be carried out did not consist in resolving a neurotic conflict but in converting one variety of the genital organization of sexuality into the other. Such an achievement — the removal of genital inversion or homosexuality — is in my experience never an easy matter" in Idem, p.150.
- ¹² FREUD, S. "With none of the objects of her adoration had the patient enjoyed anything beyond a few kisses and embraces; her genital chastity, if one may use such a phrase, had remained intact" in Idem, p.153.
- ¹³ FREUD, S. Idem, p.153.
- ¹⁴ FREUD, S. ". . . such dreams of recovery only have the value of dreams of convenience; they signify a wish to be well at last, in order to avoid another portion of the work of analysis which is felt to lie ahead. In this sense, dreams of recovery very frequently occur, for instance, when the patient is about to enter upon a new and disagreeable phase of the transference", in *Remarks on Dream Interpretation* (1923), St. Ed. Vol. XIX, p.112.
- ¹⁵ FREUD, S. Idem, p.155.
- ¹⁶ FREUD, S. Idem, p.156.
- ¹⁷ FREUD, S. Idem, p.157.

- ¹⁸ FREUD, S. Idem, p.158.
- ¹⁹ FREUD, S. Idem, p.159.
- ²⁰ FREUD, S. Idem, p.160.
- ²¹ FREUD, S. Idem, p.161.
- ²² FREUD, S. Idem, p.162.
- ²³ This is the place where the girl situates Freud from the start in the transference. In this manner she identifies Freud and her father as those who have but do not give.
". . . in analysis transference emerges as the most powerful resistance to the treatment . . ." in *The Dynamics of Transference* (1912), St. Ed. Vol. XII, p.101.
- ²⁴ FREUD, S. "It is not for psycho-analysis to solve the problem of homosexuality. It must rest content with disclosing the psychical mechanisms that resulted in determining the object-choice, and with tracing back the path from them to instinctual dispositions. There its work ends, . . ." in *The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman* (1920), St. Ed. Vol. XVIII, P.171.
- ²⁵ LACAN, J. *The Unconscious and Repetition*, in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (1964), p.25, The Hogarth Press & the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1977.

DORA'S REFUSAL TO BE A GIFT

Gayle Paull

"No one who disdains the key will ever be able to unlock the door."

Freud'

Dora is introduced to Freud in 1898 by her father; a client of Freud's who first visited him in 1894; and is subsequently handed over to Freud by him four years later. The precipitating cause for this gift to Freud by a father of his daughter, was her recent 'loss of consciousness' and a suicide letter found 'accidentally' by her parents. Dora had had a severe cough for years, was in low spirits and was currently very unfriendly towards both her parents. The cause, her father stated, was her wanting him to break off his relationship with Mr. K. and particularly Mrs. K. The request to Freud by him, was that he convince Dora by means of several explanations that this was not possible.

In a footnote Freud tells us that Dora's surname is ambiguous denoting an object and implying something improper; ethical reasons prevent him from writing it. However he had no difficulty or hesitation in choosing Dora as her pen-name, and by association he learnt that he chose it because his sister Rosa's servant had to change her name from Rosa to Dora *to avoid confusion in the household* (by two people having the same name).

Years later at a lecture when attempting to replace the name Dora and so avoid embarrassing two ladies with that name in the audience he again chooses without hesitation, the name Erna. One of the lady's names he later realizes has the surname *Lucerna*. Thus the names are determined in the symptom. The analyst's choice and slip reveal the importance of the surname and the impossibility of a father or a daughter of bearing an improper surname.

Freud wrote of Dora in 1900 as a supplement to his *Interpretation of Dreams* in order to show proof of the efficacy of dream interpretation in one's practice. He states that he now finds hypnoid states superfluous, and he uses the concepts of sublimation, temporal regression and repression for the first time. But Freud has taught us above all in this paper that unconscious thoughts,

“... live very comfortably side by side and even contraries get on together without disputes.”²

The paper revolves around two dreams which are the keys to Dora's symptoms and we are introduced to the concept of nodal-points — ‘wet’ and ‘pictures’.

It was a brief three months analysis and an offended Dora took her leave, giving Freud much to think about. Afterwards he is the first to admit that he,

“... did not succeed in mastering the transference in good time ... Thus she *acted-out* an essential part of her recollection and phantasies instead of reproducing them in the treatment.”³

and he had already written to Fliess⁴ of the dangers of his own resistances as possible cause for clinical resistances in 1897,

“My self-analysis is still interrupted and I have realized the reason. I can only analyse myself with the help of knowledge obtained objectively (like an outsider). Genuine self-analysis is impossible otherwise there would be no (neurotic) illness. Since I still find some puzzles in my patients, they are bound to hold me up in my self-analysis as well.”

and by 1912 he writes,

“... that it remains a puzzle why in analysis transference emerges as *the most powerful resistance* to the treatment,

whereas outside analysis it must be regarded as the vehicle of cure and the conditions of success.”⁵

Freud's resistances were still in operation when seeing Dora. Afterwards the parallelism of the sexes was to be questioned by him, as was indeed, female sexuality. By 1908 he has enough clinical material to write that:

“In psychoanalytic treatment it is very important to be prepared for a symptom's having a bisexual meaning. We need not then be surprised or misled if a symptom seems to persist undiminished although we have already resolved one of its sexual meanings for it is still being maintained by the — perhaps unsuspected — one belonging to the opposite sex.”⁶

Now with such clinical evidence he begins to ask, ‘what does a woman want?’ rather than specifically look at hysteria, but it takes him twenty years of work before writing *The Psycho-genesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman*⁷ and other papers on female sexuality to formulate the question.

Lacan states in *Ecrits*⁸ that Freud failed at the time to see the object of the hysteric's desire and allowed himself to be ‘overwhelmed’, his interpretations arriving like Hamlet, hesitant and too late. The premature breaking off of the treatment was due to Freud's own resistance, of attempting to force Dora into a happy solution, that of recognizing Mr. K. as the object of her desire, all of which resulted in the negative transference.

★ ★ ★

Freud, in the time allotted by Dora, manages to trace her multiple symptoms backwards from the age of eighteen to the age of six, making particular stops at events which occurred when she was 18, 16, 14, 12, 10, 8, and 6 years. At each age the

symptoms grow in number and determination. At six she is masturbating and bed wetting, her father is ill with tuberculosis; at eight she has chronic dyspnoea, an ankle is swollen after a fall; at ten her father has a detached retina; at twelve her father has confusional attacks and paralysis whilst she has headaches and nervous coughing; at fourteen she is in love with Mr. K. and reacts with disgust after he kisses her, her father is in love with Mrs. K.; at sixteen she has tussis nervosa, catarrh, loss of voice and slaps Mr. K.; at seventeen she is limping after an appendicitis attack and by eighteen her character has altered, she is coughing, has temporary loss of consciousness, is depressed and is extremely angry with both parents.

Obviously if Dora had allowed it Freud would have constructed for her the events at 4 and at 2 and thus complete the mathematical series which counts by two. I will return to this later in the paper.

Running intertwined in this series of identificatory illnesses which walks backwards through her history, making retrospective links, are a number of persons with whom Dora identifies:

- 1) her mother, Mrs. K.; as women.
- 2) servant girl; as man's plaything.
- 3) Mr. K.; as lover of women.
- 4) Mrs. K.; as lover of man.
- 5) Governess; as care giver to children, and as mothering as a means of gaining the loved person.
- 6) girl cousin; as hater of mother and lover of father.
- 7) Aunty, father; as models for illness.
- 8) brother; as possessor of an organ.
- 9) mother; as lover of father.
- 10) father; as lover of mother.
- 11) mother; as love object.

I have added Dora's mother, neglected in the case and within the family, to the beginning and to the end of the series and

make it come full circle in the repetition. Dora at eighteen has lived through the series twice, moving from being the gift to her mother by her father, to becoming the hater of all her previous loves, especially her mother.

Dora is continually reflected in this list of others. From their images she narcissistically takes on what is already her own, but now it is expressed in action and symptom. In Wilde's *The Disciple* Dora's unconscious is the pool who answers the Oreads with "But was Narcissus beautiful?" and they reply,

"Us did he ever pass by, but you he sought for, and would lie on your banks and look down at you, and in the mirror of your waters he would mirror his own beauty."

And the pool answered,

"But I loved Narcissus because as he lay on my banks and looked down at me, in the mirror of his eyes I saw ever my own beauty mirrored."

The conscious Dora gazes early in life at her parents' intercourse, (breathlessness is one of her symptoms) she gazes at her brother and notices the difference (and tries to go to the toilet standing up); she gazes at Mr. and Mrs. K. and even at the servants but is never able to gaze at herself.

So Dora meets Freud at a time when she has many hysterical symptoms. She has never chosen an object as Dora but always appears *with someone else's name* and chooses from the list accordingly.

From this string of identificatory people Dora was fighting her position of being, according to Lacan¹⁰, "the mainspring"; her desire being "to sustain the desire of the father by procuring"; and so Dora's symptoms were the emblem of her own father's desire, not the desire for her father. For Etkin¹¹, Dora is the phallus, and for Aramburu and Cosentino¹² Dora is seen as

fighting for her mother's recognition. In this paper I would like to emphasize her position in the exchange of things. Dora is refusing to be the exchangeable 'gift', the phallus, the catalyst floating backwards and forwards between the various combinations of adults on her list. When she gives her one almighty slap, it really ricochets down through her history, slapping all the faces of those upon the list, not as Dora but as the offended party.

Why the slap, when all seemed to be going well, when she could have had her man, and the *household confusion* seemed balanced and harmoniously maintained by her silence about Mr. K.'s actions towards her and the affair between Mrs. K. and her father?

Dora was, as Etkin explained, the Offended Woman, Mr. K. did not renew his entreaties and so she then saw herself in the role of the plaything like the servant girl, but more than this, she saw the role of women, refused to be like them and sought revenge which focused on the betrayal of herself by Mrs. K.. She broke her silence and denounced the proposition of Mr. K.

"... when she was feeling embittered she used to be overcome by the idea that she had been handed over to Herr K. as the price of his tolerating the relations between her father and his wife..."¹³

She no longer wished to be the exchanged gift, the one given by the father as the price for herself having procured Mrs. K. So by her demands to her father she hoped to regain her father, according to Freud. But he failed to see that Dora would also deny Mrs. K.. Dora's anger was now focused on Mrs. K., a woman with a man, a woman with an object. Dora was angry with this woman for contrary reasons, first because Mrs. K. could love a man and she could not; she had feelings of hate towards her because of her betrayal; and lastly she also loved her with the wishes which returned from the repressed love, now displaced from her mother onto Mrs. K.

When Dora did not get what she wanted, when the balance of the exchange proved to be null and void, she saw herself like her mother.

Dora, like Tennyson's Lady of Shalott¹⁴, dared to look and saw for a moment her own castration which forced her to include herself in the list of women, she gave the slap, the mirror cracked and the curse was now upon her. She was, after all, a woman.

"A curse is on her if she stay
To look down to Camelot.
She knows not what the curse may be,
..."

"And moving thro' a mirror clear
That hangs before her all the year,
Shadows of the world appear."

Sir Lancelot then happens by,

"He flash'd into the crystal mirror, . . ."
"She left the web, she left the loom,
She made three paces thro' the room, . . ."
"She saw the helmet and the plume,
she look'd down to Camelot.
The mirror cracked from side to side
'The curse is come upon me', cried
The Lady of Shalott."

Societies are based on the exchange of gifts, the symbols of pacts. In Totem and Taboo¹⁵ we learn that in order to give and receive gifts one must break away from one's narcissism.

"... like King Midas transforming everything he touches into gold."

Moustapha Safouan says,

"... love transforms everything into a gift, it defines itself as the gift of oneself."¹⁶

The law of language is implicated in the exchange of gifts, as words of recognition. The word is already a presence made of an absence and the gifts are signifiers of the act of exchange.

“... the gifts exchanged can be called symbols. But they do not stand for what they ‘represent’ in some fixed relationship to an unconscious ‘meaning’. They are symbols of the act of exchange itself, which is what ties the society together.”¹⁷

The exchange occurs in the symbolic, the object exchanged means nothing in itself. Safouan explains that,

“If the division of labour between the sexes has actually helped in stabilizing their relations — even if its primary causes lie elsewhere — this is not because it established a mutual interdependence between them, but rather because it opened to each of them a field for the exercise of its gifts
...”¹⁸

Dora was objecting to her newly re-learned position, to the exchange of gifts and as one who is recognized symbolically as part of this pact.

Early in her history, being given gifts acquired meaning for her. The nodal points of the dreams implicated the gift. She often received flowers and small gifts from Mr. K. who also sent her *picture postcards* when he went away. Her father refused to give her mother the gift she wanted, she was given a bracelet and not the *pearl drops* she desired. Mr. K. also gave Dora a jewel-case and a kiss, and she became depressed when she did not receive the birthday present she was expecting from him, but limped after the appendix operating — a false step, and an indication of her wished-for pregnancy, Freud interprets.

Dora at sixteen, and now with recurring periods, could not but see she belonged to the group of women. A group from

which her father and Mr. K., “get nothing from” as testified by their and her experience. Dora could see the reflection of herself in Mrs. K., (a woman ill when her husband was around) and her own mother, (cleaning the house symptomatic of the catarrh given to her by her husband). These women, including herself make the complaint ‘I get nothing from love, but illness.’

Dora rather than being the gift literally and so refusing to enter the exchange masked her wish of wanting a gift, a baby, which was independent of her wish for a particular man,

“If the analysis had been continued, Dora’s maternal longing for a child would probably have been revealed as an obscure though powerful motive in her behaviour
...”¹⁹

the foundations of this desire being layed at about 4 years of age when identifying with her mother and desiring a gift from her father. Freud explains,

“... more likely that the wish for a man arises independently of the wish for a baby, and that when it arises . . . the original wish for a penis becomes attached to it as an unconscious libidinal reinforcement . . . part of the eroticism of the pre-genital phase, too, becomes available for use in the phase of genital primacy. The baby is regarded as a ‘lump’ for example in Little Hans . . . It is probable that the first meaning which a child’s interest in faeces develops is that of ‘gift’.²⁰

So the foundation of faeces taking on the meaning of gift would have been already established by the age of 2 in Dora. Faeces, baby, penis, these elements in the unconscious are equivalent and so interchangeable. In *Three Essays on Sexuality* it is faeces with which the infant’s body is represented as the

first gift. "by producing them he can express his active compliance with his environment and by holding them his disobedience".²¹ And in *The History of an Infantile Neurosis*, they are "the child's first *gift*, the first sacrifice on behalf of his affection, a portion of his own body which he is ready to part with, but only for the sake of someone he loves."²²

It will only be later that the wish for a baby is linked to a wish for a man,

"... the infantile wish for a penis is in a woman in whom the determinants of a neurosis in later life are absent: it changes into a wish for a *man*, and thus puts up with the man as an appendage to the penis. This transformation, therefore, turns an impulse which is hostile to the female function into one which is favourable to it. Such women are in this way made capable of an erotic life based on the masculine type of object-love, which can exist along side the feminine one proper, derived from narcissism."²³

Dora at 18 identifies with others on the condition that the identification sustains her desire which is indifferent to an object.²⁴ By 18 Dora is seen as desiring, not an object localized as a man, Mr. K., or as a woman, Mrs. K., nor her father nor her deeply repressed first object, her mother; the hurdle of homosexual choice all women must overcome as,

"... a woman remains always more or less, under the domain of this first tie with the mother, captive to the mirror."²⁵

she emerges as desiring; the elusive *objet a* circulating and impossible to be pinned down to a want. Dora still refuses to enter into the pact of exchange and so remains impotent like her father.

Etkin in his paper *The Offended Woman* states that there will only be acceptance of castration and entry into the exchange,

"... insofar as the phallus can be metonymized or imaginized as a signifier ... the female position is accepted as a token of a pact, as an agreement on the continuity of the presence of the phallus in some other place."²⁶

Dora is captive to her mother's image, of a now ill, unwanted, hated, castrated object, once much loved, to whom she lovingly gave her faeces and sucked her breast. The loved object was forbidden, it was the father's; so the little girl then is forced to play her second strategy and moves to be like her mother, the loved object. With the original love now repressed, she begins to hate her mother as rival, she also notices the difference between the sexes, re-affirmed by her brother and she adds to her growing hate,

"... the little girl makes her mother responsible for her lack of a penis and does not forgive her for such a disadvantage."²⁷

By the time Dora plays out this first round of the Oedipus complex she has lost her mother in her hate. Aramburu and Cosentino in their paper *The Comedy of the Bodies* later show Dora as fighting for her mother's recognition but,

"... the mother is fixed in the rejection of the body — of her daughter — and in her own."²⁸

With the growing body that attracted Mr. K., returns the desire once repressed. The adolescent rejected by her mother, who is hated by the adolescent, substitutes Mr. and Mrs. K. for the drama once played out in infancy between herself and her parents. The unconscious repetition completes its second circuit with the slap, Dora doesn't like either position, male or female, but especially the one that destiny has mapped for her,

“ . . . you wanted to be your *mother* and now you *are* — anyhow as far as your sufferings are concerned . . . ”²⁹

NOTES

- ¹ FREUD, S. (1905 [1091]), Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Stand. Ed. Vol. VII. p.115.
- ² Idem p.61.
- ³ Idem p.118.
- ⁴ FREUD, S. Extracts From the Fliess Papers. Letter 75, Nov. 14th. 1897. Stand. Ed. Vol. I. p.271.
- ⁵ FREUD, S. (1912), The Dynamics of Transference. Stand. Ed. Vol. XII. p.101.
- ⁶ FREUD, S. (1908), Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality, Stand. Ed., Vol. IX, p.116.
- ⁷ FREUD, S. (1920), The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman. Stand. Ed. Vol. XVIII.
- ⁸ LACAN, J. Function and Field of Speech and Language. Ecrits, Tavistock: Lond. 1977, p.91.
- ⁹ WILDE, O. (1894), The Disciple, in The Annotated Oscar Wilde (Ed.) H. Montgomery Hyde, Orbis: Lond. 1982. p.75
- ¹⁰ LACAN, J. The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power, in Ecrits. Tavistock: Lond. 1977. p.236.
- ¹¹ ETKIN, G.E. The Offended Woman. Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne. PIT: Melb. 1980.
- ¹² ARAMBURU, J. and COSENTINO, J.C. The Comedy of the Bodies. Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne. PIT: Melb. 1980.
- ¹³ FREUD, S. (1905 [1901]) Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Stand. Ed. Vol. VII, p.34.
- ¹⁴ TENNYSON, A. The Lady of Shalott. The Works of Alfred Tennyson. Kegan Paul: Lond. 1878. p.28.
- ¹⁵ FREUD, S. (1913) Totem and Taboo. Stand. Ed. Vol. XIII.

- ¹⁶ SAFOUAN, M. Men and Women — Psychoanalytic Point of View. m/f, 1983, p.67.
- ¹⁷ WILDEN, A. Lacan and the Discourse of the Other, in The Language of the Self by Jacques Lacan. Translated with notes and commentary by Anthony Wilden. Delta. 1968. p.230-31.
- ¹⁸ SAFOUAN, M. Men and Women — a Psychoanalytic Point of View. m/f, 1983, p.66.
- ¹⁹ FREUD, S. (1905 [1901]) Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Stand. Ed. Vol. VII, p.104.
- ²⁰ FREUD, S. (1917) On Transformation of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism. Stand. Ed. Vol XVII p.130.
- ²¹ FREUD, S. (1905) Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Stand. Ed. Vol. VII. p.186.
- ²² FREUD, S. (1918 [1914]) From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII. P.81.
- ²³ FREUD, S. (1917) On Transformation of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism. Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII. p.129.
- ²⁴ LACAN, J. The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power. Ecrits. Tavistock: Lond. 1977. p.274.
- ²⁵ ARAMBURU, J. and COSENTINO, J.C. The Comedy of the Bodies. Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne. PIT: Melb. 1980. p.113.
- ²⁶ ETKIN, G.E. The Offended Woman. Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne. PIT: Melb. 1980. p.52.
- ²⁷ FREUD, S. (1931) Female Sexuality. Stand. Ed. Vol. XXI.
- ²⁸ ARAMBURU, J. and COSENTINO, J.C. The Comedy of the Bodies. Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne. PIT: Melb. 1980. p.114.
- ²⁹ FREUD, S. (1921) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Stand. Ed. Vol. XVIII. p.106.

OF WOLVES AND WASPS

Felicity Bagot

“Let us say that in its fundamental use the *fantasm*’ is that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing in so far as the very satisfaction of demand hides his object from him.”

Lacan.²

I intend to proceed backwards in this paper, from a dream to an hallucination then to another dream, in search of a fantasm. The case of the Wolf Man has received an extraordinary amount of attention from both commentators and analysts over the years. Freud himself returned to this case many times, regarding it as pivotal to an array of issues in the theory. Oscar Zentner, in his paper two years ago¹, spoke of the Wolf Man’s “open collaboration with psychoanalysis” and described him as “the analysand of analysis par excellence”.

The subject of the case, whose name we know to be Sergei Pankejeff, consulted many of Europe’s leading psychiatrists (including Ziehen and Kraepelin) before he came to Freud in 1910. He spent four years speaking to Freud and returned to speak for another four months after the First World War. At the time of his death in 1979, he was still speaking⁴. The list of his analysts includes Ruth Mack Brunswick, Muriel Gardiner, Kurt Eissler, Solms and others. It could be said that too much is known about this patient of Freud’s. A book published this year by Patrick Mahony *The Cries of the Wolf Man*⁵ gives testimony to the fact that “knowing too much” can lead even the most eminent of commentators astray.

I will limit myself to words spoken by Sergei Pankejeff to Freud, as presented in the case *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*⁶, specifically, I intend to deal only with one element — the fantasm. The motive force of this paper comes from an

interest in Lacan's statement in 1980 which pointed to his difference with Freud. Where Freud finishes an analysis in "the bedrock of castration",⁷ Lacan continues to the fundamental fantasm⁸.

Let us listen to the words of the patient's *Wespe* dream which emerged towards the end of the analysis:

"I had a dream", he said, "of a man tearing off the wings of an *Espe*". "*Espe?*" Freud asked; "What do you mean by that?" "You know; that insect with yellow stripes on its body, that stings. This must be an allusion to Grusha, the pear with the yellow stripes." "I could now put him right" says Freud "So what you mean is a *Wespe* (wasp). 'Is it called a *Wespe*? I really thought it was called an *Espe* . . . But *Espe*, why that's myself: S.P.'" (which were his initials). The *Espe* was of course a mutilated *Wespe*. The dream said clearly that he was avenging himself on Grusha for her threat of castration.⁹

Lacan comments on this dream that ". . . words themselves can undergo symbolic lesions and accomplish imaginary acts of which the patient is the subject . . . the *Wespe* (Wasp), castrated of its initial W to become the S.P. of the Wolf Man's initials at the moment when he realizes the symbolic punishment whose object he was on the part of Grusha, the wasp."¹⁰

Other considerations of this dream include Leclaire's point that "When inverted, the 'W' becomes 'M' the first letter of Matrona, the woman who transmitted the castrating gonorrhoea to Sergei".¹¹ On another level, this inverted 'W' or 'M' has been seen as a link to the wolves' ears pricked up like a dog. René Major, in the paper on Symbolization¹² quoting Freud, points out that the "W" can be seen as the doubling of the

Roman "V", the number in V o'clock "— that is the hour when, even in analysis, the Wolf Man had attacks of depression, which had taken the place of the attack of malaria at the time when, at the same hour, he had witnessed his parents having intercourse".¹³ René Major also refers to the link made by Freud between the Wolf Man's butterfly phobia and his uncanny feeling at the sight of the opening and closing of its wings. Sergei had said later it had looked to him "like a woman opening her legs, and the legs then made the shape of a Roman V".¹⁴

Let us not lose our way in this proliferating maze, let us return to the *Espe* of the dream, deprived of its initial 'W' revealing the subject as castrated whether he likes it or not. My first hypothesis is that the Wasp dream authenticates the identification of the subject as *eS. Pe*. The symbolic lesion of the word says "you are Sergei Pankejeff — castrated". This by the way is something that he does not want to know anything about.

Another moment can be found as we trace this path to the fantasm where the subject does not want to know — that is, to the hallucination. In Sergei's words,

"When I was five years old, I was playing in the garden near my nurse, and was carving with my pocket-knife in the bark of one of the walnut trees that come into my dream as well. Suddenly, to my *unspeakable* terror, I noticed that I had cut through the little finger of my hand, so that it was only hanging on by its skin. I felt no pain, but great fear. I did not venture to say anything to my nurse, who was only a few paces distant, but I sank down on the nearest seat and sat there incapable of casting another glance at my finger. At last I calmed down, took a look at the finger, and saw that it was entirely uninjured."¹⁵

Freud reports that the patient claimed that his hallucination of the severed finger was instigated,

“by the story that a female relation of his had been born with six toes and that the extra one had immediately afterwards been chopped off with an axe. Women then had no penis because it was taken away from them at birth.”¹⁶

There are various incidents described in the case which reveal Sergei's rejection of castration, for example following his observations of two girls micturating — “he explains to himself that this was the girls front bottom”¹⁷ — thereby rejecting the idea that he saw before him a confirmation of the wound with which his Nanya had threatened him. Freud is very specific when he speaks of the patient as having rejected castration. He says that:

“the first meaning of the phrase is that he would have nothing to do with it . . . This really involved no judgement upon the question of its existence, but it was the same as if it did not exist. Such an attitude, however, could not have been his final one, even at the time of his infantile neurosis.”

Freud continues with a complex state of affairs:

“We find good subsequent evidence of his having reconized castration as a fact . . . First he resisted and then he yielded; but the second reaction did not *do away with* the first. In the end there were to be found in him two contrary currents side by side, of which one abominated the idea of castration, while the other was prepared to accept it and console itself with femininity as a compensation. But beyond any doubt a third current, the oldest and deepest, which did not as yet even raise the question

of the reality of castration, was still capable of coming into activity.”¹⁸

But why the hallucination? In order to grasp this one needs to understand Lacan's concept of foreclosure. Oscar Zentner's recent paper¹⁹ is very helpful in measuring the distance between Freud's concept of rejection and what Lacan describes as foreclosure. He says,

“Foreclosure for Lacan is the mechanism that precipitates psychosis in the reappearance from the real of a primordial signifier in isolation from the existing chain of signifiers . . . it is a question of rejection by which the word-presentation is unlinked from the thing-presentation. Here is where in Lacan's terms the foreclosure produces the rejection of a primordial signifier which as the anamnesis of the Wolf Man showed, resulted in mutism — unspeakable horror. What becomes hallucination and/or delusion is not the return of something in the style of repression, but the imposition from the real of what has been foreclosed.”

Hence my second hypothesis is that what is found in the five-year-old Sergei's hallucination is his refusal to acknowledge castration, that is, his foreclosure of the primordial signifier producing a return from the real.

Now let us trace back even further to the Wolf Dream which occurred when Sergei was aged four.

“I dreamt that it was night and that I was lying in my bed. (My bed stood with its foot towards the window; in front of the window was a row of old walnut trees. I know it was winter when I had the dream, and night time.) Suddenly the window opened of its

own accord and I was terrified to see that some white wolves were sitting on the big walnut tree in front of the window. There were six or seven of them. The wolves were quite white, and looked more like foxes or sheep-dogs, for they had big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked like dogs when they pay attention to something. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves, I screamed and woke up.”²⁰

It is not my purpose here to elaborate the details of Freud's interpretation of the dream. You will find that documented very thoroughly in Volume XVII of the Standard Edition. You will also find every possible “wild analysis” documented in Mahony's recent book. Suffice it to remind you here of Freud's insistence that the dream is the reactivation of the primal scene. The relevant details are that at the age of approximately eighteen months Sergei woke up and observed his parents' copulation.

The Wolf Dream authenticates the castration, of which Sergei Pankejeff (*eS Pe*) does not want to know anything. The Wolf Dream allows the reconstruction of the primal scene — the last outpost that the analysis can reach. My third hypothesis therefore is that the Wolf Dream authenticates the primal scene as the “metaphor of the *fantasm*”²¹ that is — the furthest point to which we can arrive in the analysis of the Wolf Man, and where Freud proposes the libidinal structure of the Wolf Man.

This brings us finally to the algorithm of the *fantasm* as posed by Lacan ($\$ \diamond a$), derived from his graph of desire in the paper *Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire*.²² The elements are explained:

- $\$$ — the barred subject.
- a* — the *objet petit a*, the cause of desire which is located in the real.
- \diamond — the diamond which Lacan calls the

“chisel” (*poinçon*) — (like a hallmark or stamp on silver to guarantee authenticity) it is also a combination of the mathematical symbols for “greater than” and “less than” . . . An impossible combination. Lacan says that “this sign registers the relations envelopment-development-conjunction-disjunction. The links that it signifies in the parentheses enable us to read the barred $\$$ — the ‘S’ fading before the object of desire — *fantasm*.”²³

My final hypothesis is that the Wolf Man's *fantasm* can be interpreted in the following terms formulated by Oscar Zentner²⁴. “I am condemned to witness forever the primal scene.” In other words “I am condemned to witness forever the pleasures of my mother's face in receiving my father's penis.”

The *fantasm* sustains the structure of the subject's desire; a vanishing desire says Lacan and a vanishing object. The evidence of this *fantasm* in the material of the case is seen in that the Wolf Man remained homosexual in his unconscious while his object choices were always heterosexual. I refer you back to Freud's comments in the text regarding Sergei Pankejeff's “liability to compulsive attacks of falling physically in love” and that it was always necessary that the woman assume the posture of his mother in the primal scene and also Grusha's posture while scrubbing the floor. Later still Matrona's posture and occupation and even his choice of wife was not spared the effects of the *fantasm*. These objects signify his desire by metonymy; the *fantasm* ‘V’ is a metaphor substituted for the primal scene now repressed.

Lacan tells us that “the place of the real which stretches from the trauma to the *fantasm* — so far as the *fantasm* is never anything more than the screen that conceals something quite primary, something determinant in the function of repetition . . .” He goes on to say that, “The real has to be sought beyond

the dream — in what the dream has enveloped, hidden from us, behind the lack of representation of which there is only one representative”²⁵. Of course he is speaking here of primal repression which by definition cannot be lifted. This is not a problem of fantasy or of reality. Psychoanalysis deals with the unconscious. The question of fantasy or reality is wrongly posed for psychoanalysis (perhaps it is a question proper to psychology). For psychoanalysis the first datum is that man speaks, and it is with that speech that we work. The backwards movement of this paper can be summarized as follows:

WESPE ← eSPe ← S.P.

NOTES

- ¹ Fantasm; author's translation, Sheridan's translation reads phantasy, which is too readily confused with fantasy a notion far from Lacan's intention.
- ² LACAN, J. The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power; in *Ecrits*, (trans. A. Sheridan) Tavistock: London, 1977. p.272.
- ³ ZENTNER, O. The Analytic Construction; in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*. PIT Press: Melbourne, 1982. p.19.
- ⁴ OBHOLZER, K. The Wolfman, Sixty Years Later, Conversations with Freud's Controversial Patient. Continuum: New York, 1982.
- ⁵ MAHONY, P. The Cries of the Wolfman, International University Press: New York, 1984.
- ⁶ FREUD, S. (1918 [1914]) From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Stand. Ed. Vol XVII. p.90.
- ⁷ FREUD, S. Analysis Terminable and Interminable. Stand. Ed. Vol XXIII. p.252.
- ⁸ LACAN, J. The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power; in *Ecrits* Tavistock: Lond, 1977.

- ⁹ FREUD, S. (1918 [1914]) From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII. p.94.
- ¹⁰ LACAN, J. Function and Field of Speech and Language; in *Ecrits*. Tavistock: Lond, 1977. p.87.
- ¹¹ LECLAIRE, S. *Les elements en jeu dans une psychanalyse (a propos de l'homme aux loups)*. *Les Cahiers pour l'Analyse*, 1966. p.11.
- ¹² MAJOR R. Psychoanalysis in France. Eds. S. Lebovici and D. Widlocher. International Uni. Press: New York, 1980. p.420.
- ¹³ Idem. p.426.
- ¹⁴ FREUD, S. (1918 [1914]) From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII. p.90.
- ¹⁵ Idem, p.85.
- ¹⁶ Idem, p.86.
- ¹⁷ Idem, p.25.
- ¹⁸ Idem, p.84.
- ¹⁹ ZENTNER, O. *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, PIT Press: Melb, 1984. p.14.
- ²⁰ FREUD, S. From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII. p.29.
- ²¹ The metaphor of the fantasm was an idea developed by Gayle Paull during internal Freudian School of Melbourne Seminars, 1984.
- ²² LACAN, J. *Ecrits*, Tavistock: Lond, 1977. p.280. n.26.
- ²³ Refer NOTE 1.
- ²⁴ Internal Seminar of the Freudian School of Melbourne, 1984.
- ²⁵ LACAN, J. Four Fundamental Concepts, Hogarth Press: London, 1977, p.60.
- ²⁶ Refer NOTE 1 for *fantasm*.

TRANSFERENCE AND RESISTANCE IN LITTLE HANS

Rob Gordon

"Even in the analyses in which the physician and the patient are strangers, fear of the father plays one of the most important parts as a resistance against the reproduction of the unconscious pathogenic material."

Freud¹

"There is no other resistance to analysis than that of the analyst himself."

Lacan²

One day, little Hans went out for a walk with his nursemaid and became so frightened she had to bring him back. He was only five so his mother took him out the next day, but he was filled with panic that a horse would bite him. Later he feared the horse would come into his room. Soon he could not bear to leave the house. Naturally enough his parents were "most uneasy" and knew well that their son was suffering from a phobia, since the father was a student of Freud's and the mother had been a patient of the Professor's before her marriage. Together he numbered them among his "closest adherents". They had already cooperated by providing observations of the sexual life of Hans to complement the growing knowledge of infantile sexuality gained from reconstruction of adults in analysis; and they planned to use no more coercion or intimidation than was absolutely necessary in Hans' upbringing.

Of course the father lost no time in paying Freud a visit to discuss the matter. Here was the chance to observe an anxiety hysteria *in statu nascendi*. It was agreed that the father would undertake the treatment under Freud's supervision. In this arrangement, "the authority of a father and a physician were

united in a single person," contrary to the practice of analysis which allowed the analyst to stand in the father's place for the purpose of the analysis. But Freud considered this was necessary otherwise "the technical difficulties of conducting a psycho-analysis on so young a child would have been insuperable." But Mannoni suggests,

"we may believe that he wanted to be involved as little as possible, so that it would result in 'impartial' testimony as to the correctness of the theses from *Three Essays*." ³

Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality had been published in 1905, and had aroused considerable opposition. Here in Hans, was evidence which would support his position. The analysis was performed in the first half of 1908 and published in the following year. Observations on Hans before his illness had been used in *The Sexual Enlightenment of Children* (1907), and the case is mentioned in *On the Sexual Theories of Children* (1908). The analysis must have been a support to Freud since he invoked it in his correspondence with Jung, when the latter said "child hysteria must fall outside the formula applicable to adults, for whom puberty plays such a large role." ⁴ Freud's reply was:

"Only the sentence about child hysteria struck me as incorrect. The conditions here are the same, probably because every thrust of growth creates the same conditions as the great thrust of puberty (every increase in libido, I mean)." ⁵

Hans was to teach Freud much and give him confidence. Jung's daughter at the birth of her younger brother later provided many observations paralleling those of Hans. After being fed on the stork theory, she had begun pestering her mother with questions, replying to such simple statements as "we'll go into the garden" with: "Is that true? You're not lying? You're quite

sure it's true? I don't believe it." When, after becoming fearful and obsessed by volcanoes and earthquakes, she was enlightened as to the true facts, she "showed not the least surprise", and lost her fear. ⁶

Freud must have been delighted, he replied,

"Your Agathli is really charming. But surely you recognize the main features of Little Hans's story. Mightn't everything in it be typical? I am setting high hopes in a neurotic nuclear complex which gives rise to two chief resistances: fear of the father and disbelief towards grownups, both fully transferable to the analyst." ⁷

The similarities between Agathli, as she worked over her brother's birth, and Hans were so striking that Jung confessed, "after Little Hans I no longer have much self-confidence." ⁸ In 1910 Jung published this material, which had been first presented as a lecture at Clark University, U.S.A. during the 1909 visit he made with Freud. The second paragraph of the paper gives some idea of the atmosphere generated by Little Hans:

"These Observations have so much that bears upon, and supplements, Freud's report on 'Little Hans' that I cannot refrain from making this material accessible to a wider public. The widespread incomprehension, not to say indignation, with which 'Little Hans' was greeted, was for me an additional reason for publishing my material, although it is nothing like as extensive as that of Little Hans'. Nevertheless, it contains points which seem to confirm how typical the case of 'Little Hans' is. So-called 'scientific' criticism, so far as it has taken any notice at all of these

important matters, has once more proved overhasty, seeing that people have still not learned first to examine and then judge.”⁹

In 1913, Ferenczi published *A Little Chanticleer*, in which he described Arpad, who developed a preoccupation with fowls which, although more sinister than the straightforward, Teutonic anxiety of Hans, was perhaps even more revealing in regard to the dual pleasures of sadism and masochism in a child.¹⁰ Yet neither of these reports was an analysis.

Besides the guidance of his followers, Little Hans was also used in Freud's confrontations with his critics. One of these, Albert Moll, seems to have had the temerity to visit Freud, who describes the encounter to Jung as follows:

“To put it bluntly, he is a brute; he is not really a physician but has the intellectual and moral constitution of a pettifogging lawyer . . . I let him have it; I attacked the passage in his notorious book where he says that we compose our case histories to support our theories rather than the other way round, and had the pleasure of listening to his oily excuses . . . when I asked him if he had read ‘Little Hans’, he wound himself up into several spirals, became more and more venomous and finally, to my great joy, jumped up and prepared to take flight.”¹¹

Little Hans became important in securing the theory of the sexual aetiology of the neuroses against the scepticism and opposition it evoked, and Freud must have been well aware of the significance of Hans' illness and treatment.

The place it was to occupy in the discourse of the psycho-analysis itself is indicated by Melanie Klein, speaking in 1927:

“This analysis was destined to be the foun-

dation stone of subsequent child analysis. For not only did it show the presence and evolution of the Oedipus complex in children and demonstrate the forms in which it operates in them; it showed also that these unconscious tendencies could safely and most profitably be brought to consciousness.”¹²

In 1938, Edward Glover evaluated it in these words:

“In its time the analysis of Little Hans was a remarkable achievement and the story of the analysis constitutes one of the most valued records in the psycho-analytical archives. Our concepts of phobia-formation, of the positive Oedipus complex, of ambivalence, castration anxiety, and repression, to mention but a few were greatly reinforced and amplified as a result of this analysis.”¹³

The unconscious is revealed by what comes after, not what comes before, as Freud says in his technical commentary on the case, and we may be aware of these influences as we examine it. Perhaps the case itself represents a moment in the history of psychoanalysis — the moment when infantile sexuality is revealed, and its resistance is evoked, for Hans' problem revolved around his lack of knowledge of the facts of sexuality. He had been confronted with the reality of generation by the recent birth of his sister. His parents' enlightenment had permitted him to explore “widdlers” (his term for penis), in conversation and imagination; yet by these “closest adherents” he had been threatened with castration for touching his widdler, and deriving pleasure from it.

For Hans, the problem amounted to this: how could he identify his relation to his father in a world where he rivalled him for his mother, yet could not locate the source of paternity itself.

That mysterious relation which placed father-mother-child in a structure of begetter-bearer-begotten was hidden from him. Hans' anxiety signalled the gap in his world which left him with an uncertainty about what, if anything bound him to his father. In the words of Lacan:

“Little Hans, left in the lurch at the age of five by his symbolic environment [was] suddenly forced to face the enigma of his sex and his existence.”¹⁴

Hans gave vent to his longing for his beautiful mother by inviting her to touch his penis and articulating in a dream derived from the game of forfeits, his wish to draw her to him out of the family circle around the erotic act of making him widdle. The consequences of this movement of libido was a phobic anxiety of horses.

Freud suggested to the father when he visited, that he tell Hans his fear is nonsense, that in reality he is wanting to be taken into his mother's bed; that he was afraid of horses because of the interest he had taken in their large widdlers; and that he should be enlightened, at a suitable moment, that females have no widdlers. The analysis is commenced around the idea of the widdler. Hans responds to the information that his mother lacks a widdler by a phantasy of seeing her in a chemise that exposes her widdler. The father fails to grasp the desire which is emerging in his son and tells him the nonsense will get better if he does not touch his widdler any more. Hans' reply is that his problem is not touching, but wanting to. “But wanting's not doing and doing's not wanting,” he says. As always, Hans is ahead in his formulations. In this statement, all his sexual researches are exposed as the expression of a desire. But the desire lying behind the phobia still remains repressed.

He proceeds, under the impetus of his father's intervention, to articulate his desire in oedipal imagery in his dream/phantasy of having a big giraffe and a crumpled giraffe in his room with him. He takes the crumpled one away from the big one,

which calls out. Then he sits down on the crumpled one. He is portaying in the big giraffe his father's resistance to him coming into his mother's bed, and her resistance to the father in continuing to allow it. Hans, having expressed his own power, then completes the sequence with several phantasies of engaging in delinquent acts with his father. For Hans, his father is unable to carry the authority of the law and is identified as an accomplice of his desire. Instead the mythical policeman of the phantasy carries it.

Up to this point the anxiety has not abated, but Hans has been able to present the full Oedipal structure to which the phobia points. However, the delinquent phantasies indicate the problem of the father's status. The question posed is: Who is it that speaks to Hans, if as father he is questionable but he interprets to the boy, and physician and father are one person. The law is placed beyond the father in the policeman, because he cannot invest his father with it, thus discovering the non-coincidence of the law and the father.

The commencement of the analysis has corresponded to the first of the three moments of the process of the treatment described by Lacan in *The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power* as, “the rectification of the subject's relations with the real.”¹⁵ By his phantasies, Hans has transposed into an imaginary form what had previously eluded him, and what he had consequently enacted. Now the analysis provides the structure in which the phantasies can be articulated.

The direction of the treatment according to Lacan, then proceeds to the development of the transference, then to interpretation. The transference in Little Hans poses a special problem with the father acting as the analyst, which immediately plunges us, along with Hans and his father, into the question Moustapha Safouan asked in regard to Anna O., whether the transference relation “is an actual love or the reproduction, the shadow of some ancient love.”¹⁶ Freud in *The Dynamics of the*

Transference, is clear that the transference develops on "stereotype plates" formed in the early years from the pri-
tions of the libido. The portion of libido which is held b-
from undergoing "the full process of physical development"
reactivated in the transference to seek satisfaction.¹⁷ Yet
Hans, his relation to his analyst is his relation to his fath-
er which leaves us with the problem of what is a reproduction &
what is actual. It is one which in this context does not se-
em wholly solvable.

But this is only so long as transference is considered p-
redominantly as an affect and as a means of accounting for the
facts of the analytic situation, whether they take the form
of love or hate. Another aspect of transference involves access
to meaning in a special way — which rests in a construction of t-
he analyst as the "supposed subject of knowing". In Lacan
words:

"As soon as the supposed subject of know-
ing exists somewhere . . . there is tran-
sference."¹⁸

And this is in fact what occurs when the father takes Hans
to visit the Professor.

Although Hans is no longer so incapacitated by his anxiet-
y he is still unable to go out into the street and has periods of fe-
ar for which he needs his mother. There has been no real improv-
ment as yet. But the first indication of his propensity to
establish a transference has already been shown when he asks
his father why he is writing down their conversation about the
giraffe phantasy. The father replies, "because I shall send it to
the Professor, who can take away your nonsense for you." The use
of the indefinite article indicates that Hans had not yet been
enlightened as to Freud's directing presence backstage, just as
he had not been enlightened with regard to his parents' activities
off-stage. Hans immediately infers a voyeuristic interest
(similar, no doubt, to his own), in the Professor when he
replies,

"Oho! So you've written down as well that
Mummy took off her chemise, and you'll
give that to the Professor too."

Father responds,

"Yes. But he won't understand how you
can think that a giraffe can be crumpled
up."

Hans replies,

"Just tell him I don't know myself, and
then he won't ask. But if he asks what the
crumpled giraffe is, then he can write to us,
and we can write back, or let's write at once
that I don't know myself."¹⁹

Hans is perplexed as to the intentions and capabilities of the
Professor, and shows his ambivalence towards a supposed sub-
ject of knowing.

When the father asks him to free associate immediately after-
wards, Hans translates the ambivalence into the stark language
of desire as he speaks of "raspberry syrup" and "a gun for
shooting people with." He alludes to the kernel of his complex
with these signifiers in a way which escapes the father entirely
until a week after the completion of the analysis, when he sends
a postscript to the Professor:

"As regards 'raspberry syrup' and 'a gun
for shooting people with'. Hans is given
raspberry syrup when he is constipated. He
also frequently confuses the words
'shooting' and 'shitting'. [In German,
schliessen and *scheissen*.]"²⁰

Freud commented on these associations, that "his father in
his perplexity was trying to practice the classical technique of
psycho-analysis. This did not lead to much."²¹ These words are
drawn from Hans by his first confrontation with the existence

of someone who will take his "nonsense" away, and under that sign they condense the references to his anal-sadistic impulses which entail his hostility to his father and, as we shall see, aspects of his erotic feelings for his mother, and the whole complex of questions and fears around the fact of birth, which he will later gain access to via the production of faeces, or "lumf", as the representative of birth. We are told too, that constipation had been a problem for Hans "from the very first". He had received frequent aperients and enemas and it had improved with a reduced diet, only to reappear "recently".

So armed with pleasure and death, in the guise of raspberry syrup and a gun, Hans is taken to meet the Professor the next day. There the father explains that the phobia has not diminished, and Hans is particularly concerned by what horses wear in front of their eyes, and the black around their mouths. Freud becomes the supposed subject of knowing for both father and son as he fills a scotoma for the father by showing these details refer to his glasses, black moustache and beard. Freud announces to Hans that he is afraid of his father because of his affection for his mother, and that he thinks his father is angry with him on account of this. Freud reassures him that this is not so. Then Hans is told by Freud that,

"Long before he was in the world, . . . I had known that a Little Hans would come who would be so fond of his mother that he would be found to feel afraid because of it, and *I had told his father this.*"²²

With these last words, Freud marks the father as his emissary, and himself assumes the role of the symbolic father, and gives to Hans a symbolic structure in which he can begin to elaborate his problem.

Hans' hostility to his father then comes to light as they recall a game in which Hans butted him, and received a blow in return. This enactment of Hans' desire and dread had, till then passed unnoticed by the father, indicating his failure to

recognise that the transference may mean that Hans might reply to his words with actions.

On the way home, Hans indicates that the supposed subject of knowing has been firmly installed when he asks, "Does the Professor talk to God as he can tell all that beforehand?"

The multiple effects of this encounter revolve around the father's new status; he is the Oedipal rival and object of the ambivalence and threat which power the phobia, but he is also now the agent of the supposed subject of knowing. Speaking to father has been constituted as an analytic discourse, particularly when Hans' words are written down for the Professor. There is an immediate improvement in the symptom and Freud concludes that:

"a possibility had now been offered him of bringing forward his unconscious productions and of unfolding his phobia."²³

But the transference does not just embrace Hans in a relation to the supposed subject of knowing. The nature of the father's relationship to Freud is hinted at when we learn that "From the date of this consultation I received *almost daily* reports of alterations in the little patient's condition." Freud's part in the second dialogue which mirrors that between father and child, is indicated in the text only by his commentary on the father's reports. In fact, Freud spends a great deal of time discussing technique, often in relation to the father's interventions, and these comments seem to stand in the place of a report of his advice to the father.

The transference becomes a structure incorporating father and son's dialogue into a discourse for Freud, who then occupies the place of the actual analyst in the structure. This is something he acknowledged in a letter to Jung, when he wrote, "I myself have been toying with the idea of working up *my* analysis of a hysterical phobia in a five-year-old boy."²⁴

The effect of the consultation on the analysis is decisive. The

anxiety decreased immediately, and Hans was able to explore his ambivalence, posing such questions to his father as "Why did you tell me I'm fond of Mummy and that's why I'm frightened, when I'm fond of you?" The father can be questioned now because Freud embodies the law having reassured Hans of his father's love in spite of his hostility. Hans can defy his father when he is told he will not lose his fear as long as he continues to come into the parents' bedroom in the morning. Hans' reply is: "I shall come in all the same, even if I *am* afraid." The anxiety can be differentiated around the terms of horses, carts, and the circumstances in which he finds them. But the Professor is not far from Hans' mind; when the father asks "Why *are* you afraid?" Hans replies, "I don't know. But the Professor'll know. D'you think he'll know?"

The analysis proceeds at this point because Freud has given a triple signification to the father. He is father, analyst, and substitute for the Professor-who-speaks-to-God-and-knows. But these functions are complementary. Insofar as he is father, he is not analyst, because for Hans, his father is not the supposed subject of knowing. Yet he finds himself analyst by his failure to provide the paternal metaphor enabling Hans to locate himself in the family, which gives rise to the phobia. Freud's presence in the situation undermines the father as analyst and in doing so provides him with an opportunity of becoming a father, because the Professor becomes the supposed subject of knowing.

The divine guarantee of the father's love becomes the boundary of a transference relation within which Hans can remember the crucial incident in his history of seeing a horse fall and make a row with its feet. He can now play horses and bite his father. He can defy him in high spirits and say, "Daddy, you *are* lovely! You're so white," when he sees him washing. Whiteness had earlier signified his erotic attraction for his mother, and will later express a conflicted love for his sister.

Then abruptly Hans changes tack and begins to articulate his

anality, speaking of lumpf and widdle, linking them to both defiance and revulsion. It appears the father is not prepared for this, and the tone of the analysis changes. Freud remarks at this point:

"the situation was decidedly obscure. The analysis was making little progress; and I am afraid the reader will soon begin to find this description of it tedious." 25

The fact is, the father has great difficulty abandoning his early formulation of the phobia and following Hans along a necessary diversion. Hans must articulate in lumpf, the representation of his erotic relation with his mother, for he pesters her till she allows him into the toilet with her. This leads on to his anal-erotic relations with other children. But the father is trying to substantiate a phallic construction. Hans' persistence, which seems to be interpreted as resistance, leads the father to lose his analytic stance, and cross-examine Hans on inconsistencies in his phantasies. Hans responds by resisting this breach of the analytic relation, saying, "Oh do let me alone." When he is pressed about his toilet exploits with his little friend, Berta, he answers, "There's nothing shameful in that," or he puts father's suggestions off with "Because I didn't think of it," or blocks as father insists, saying, "I don't know." Here, as elsewhere, when his dialogue with his father fails, he interrupts him to appeal to the Professor saying, "If I write everything to the Professor, my nonsense'll soon be over won't it?" He is saying 'since you can't follow me, let us consult the Professor because he will know what I'm trying to tell you.'

It is clear that although Hans is maintaining his direction, his father has lost his way, hence the dialogue becomes confused. Hans appears to resist the father's interpretations, but in reality he resists being thrown off the scent, and verifies Lacan's formula that:

"There is no other resistance to analysis than that of the analyst himself." 26

Freud interrupts the report to point out that the father is "pressing the inquiry along his own lines" and he then makes a technical comment:

"I can only advise those of my readers who have not as yet themselves conducted an analysis not to try to understand everything at once, but to give a kind of unbiased attention to every point that arises and await developments." ²⁶

It seems most likely that Freud offered some such advice to the father at this point, for there follows a succession of phantasies from Hans, giving clearer expression to the themes of his erotic longing for his mother, the Oedipal threat of his father and his hostile attitude to his younger sister. These the father respects and interprets. As we have seen in Lacan's ordering of the direction of the treatment, interpretation follows the development of the transference relation, but not on a rational, linear sequence, for no sooner has the father succeeded here, than Hans moves on. Around the figure of his sister, Hannah, he next develops a series of phantasies which insist on what the enlightened parents resist. They have not yet given him information concerning conception and birth. Although it is presented as a problem of sibling rivalry, and Hans attempts to deal with it in the particular instance of Hannah, there is a more profound implication to it. Hans' whole relation to his father hangs on his understanding of this process, the paternity it confers, and in turn his assimilation into a symbolic structure.

At the end of the analysis, Hans will articulate the problem: He knows his mother *has* the baby, but he asks, "How does it work?" He means what is the function of the father since he wishes to be father to his mother's child. He confronts his father: "You say Daddies don't have babies; so how does it work, my wanting to be a Daddy?" Later he says "I should so like to have children but I don't ever want it; I shouldn't like to have them." He seems to be struggling with the search for

another function of generation apart from bearing, namely begetting.

But again the resistance emanates from the parents' failure to provide the information he needs and the father makes the same mistake of cross-examining the reality of Hans' statements about Hannah riding to Gmunden in a box, eating meals, drinking coffee and riding a horse. Hans has to reconstitute the transference relation by reminding the father of his proper function as an emissary of the Professor. When his father reminds him Hannah could not walk at that time, Hans replies "Just you write it down. I can remember quite well." Another time he says "I'm not joking, you know Daddy."

But as his father continues to reject Hans' offering, and withhold the knowledge he asks for, there is a point where he gives up the attempt at serious dialogue and resorts to the joke to maintain his discourse.

He teases his father with his phantasies and then gives vent to his own sadistic impulses in the phantasies of teasing and whipping horses. We can understand this turn of events through Lacan's formulations on aggressivity. He says aggressivity,

"may respond to any interventions which by denouncing the imaginary intentions of the discourse, dismantles the object constructed by the subject to satisfy them." ²⁷

This dismantling which often goes by the name of *the analysis of the resistance* is in this case the effect of the *analyst's resistance* which is the father's refusal to enlighten him.

Finally Hans insists by presenting a game in which he

"had been playing with an india-rubber doll which he called Grete. He had pushed a small pen-knife in through the opening to which the little tin squeaker had originally been attached, and had then torn the doll's

legs apart so as to let the knife drop out. He had said to the nursemaid, pointing between the doll's legs 'look there's its widdler!' " 28

At last this evokes from the father an explanation about eggs. Hans can then infer the application of this knowledge to his mother's pregnancy. But he still struggles to comprehend paternity as we see in the following dialogue between father and son, where the father fails to clarify the situation at the crucial moment.

Hans: 'I want to have a little girl for once.'

Father: 'But you can't have a little girl.'

Hans: 'Oh yes, boys have girls and girls have boys.'

Father: 'Boys can't have children. Only women, only Mummies have children.'

Hans: 'But why shouldn't I?'

Father: 'Because God's arranged it like that.'

Hans: 'But why don't *you* have one? Oh yes, you'll have one all right. Just wait.'

Father: 'I shall have to wait some time.'

Hans: 'But I belong to you.'

Father: 'But Mummy brought you into the world. So you belong to Mummy and me.'

Hans: 'Does Hannah belong to me or to Mummy?'

Father: 'To Mummy.'

Hans: 'No, to me. *What not to me and Mummy?*'

Father: 'Hannah belongs to me Mummy and you.'

Hans: 'There you are, you see.' 29

We are left with the question who is resisting? Although there

follows a visible improvement in his state, we shall not be surprised when Hans butts his father in the stomach soon after this conversation.

The analysis then proceeds by way of Hans' desires for Mother and hostility to Father, to the penultimate phantasy: that he has children of his own. When his father says, "you know quite well a boy can't have any children," Hans replies, "I know. I was their Mummy before, now I'm their Daddy."

He goes on to construct an imaginary family with himself and his mother as parents, and father and paternal grandmother as grandparents. As Freud comments, "the little Oedipus had found a happier solution than that prescribed by destiny."

The next day Hans suggests to his father, "Let's write something for the Professor," and dictates a phantasy of taking his children to the toilet, helping them do widdle and lumf and wiping them.

"Do you know why?" asks Hans, "Because I'd so much like to have children; then I'd do everything for them."

Why does he want the Professor to know this unless to indicate he now understands that paternity, no less than maternity provides generation. Having now located his existence and his sex in the triangular relation with both parents, he is able to dispense with the anxiety which signified the existence of a gap in his symbolic world where his father ought to have been.

Then it only remains for the transference to be resolved which father and son do competently. Hans reports a phantasy:

"The plumber came and first took away my behind with a pair of pincers, and then gave me another and then the same with my widdler."

Father interprets,

"He gave you a *bigger* widdler and a *bigger*

behind. Like Daddy's; because you'd like to be Daddy." ³⁰

Which fulfills the condition referred to by Lacan, "that the transference operates in the direction of bringing demand back to identification." ³¹ In his postscript, the father reports to Freud that only a trace of Hans' disorder persists in the form of asking questions about what things are made of and who makes them.

NOTES

- ¹ FREUD, S. Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, 1909, Stand. Ed. Vol. X. p.123n.
- ² LACAN, J., *The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power*; in *Ecrits, A Selection*, Translated by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p.235.
- ³ MANNONI, O., *Freud*; translated by Renaud Bruce, Vintage Books, New York, 1974, p.112.
- ⁴ JUNG, C.G., Letter 83J, in *The Freud/Jung Letters*, Ed. William McGuire, translated by Ralph Mannheim and R.F.C. Hull, Bollingen Series XCIV; Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974, p.139.
- ⁵ FREUD, S. Letter 84/F, *Ibid.*, p.140.
- ⁶ JUNG, C.G. Letter 126J, *Ibid.*, pp.199-200.
- ⁷ FREUD, S., Letter 129F, *Ibid.*, p.203.
- ⁸ JUNG, C.G., Letter 135J, *Ibid.*, p.212.
- ⁹ JUNG, C.G. *Psychic conflicts in a Child*, in *The Development of Personality, Collected Works*, vol 17, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954, p.8.
- ¹⁰ FERENCZI, S., *A Little Chaunticleer*, 1913; in *First Contributions to Psychoanalysis*, translated by Ernest Jones, Brunner/Mazel, New York, 1980, p240.
- ¹¹ FREUD, S., Letter 141F, *op.cit.*, p.223.

- ¹² KLEIN, Melanie, *Symposium on Child-Analysis, 1927*, in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works, 1921-1945*, Delacorte Press, 1975, p.139.
- ¹³ GLOVER, Edward, *Freud's Theory of Inhibition, Symptom-formation and Anxiety*, in *On the Early Development of Mind*, International Universities Press Inc., New York, 1956, p.76.
- ¹⁴ LACAN, J., *The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious*, in *Ecrits, op.cit.*, p.168.
- ¹⁵ *The Direction of the Treatment and the Principals of its Power*; *op.cit.*, p.237.
- ¹⁶ SAFOUAN, Moustapha, *Transference and Acting Out*, in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1982*, p.126.
- ¹⁷ FREUD, S., *The dynamics of the Transference*, 1912, Stand. Ed., vol XII, p.100.
- ¹⁸ LACAN, J., *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, The Hogarth Press; London, 1977, p.232.
- ¹⁹ FREUD, S., *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy*, p.38.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.99.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p.38, n.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p.42.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p.43.
- ²⁴ Letter 82F, 1908, *op.cit.*, p.137.
- ²⁵ *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, op.cit.*, p.55.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.65.
- ²⁷ LACAN, J., *Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis*, 1948, in *Ecrits, op.cit.* p.42.
- ²⁸ FREUD, S., *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy*, p.84.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.87.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.98.
- ³¹ LACAN, J., *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, p.274.

L'IDEE VIENT EN PARLANT¹

María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner

“For who in the World will both mourn and rejoice at once and for the same reason? For either joy will be overborne by mourning, or mourning will be cast out by joy; so it is only in these our Christian mysteries that we can rejoice and mourn at once for the same reasons”²

T.S. Eliot

“L'idée, nous savons bien qu'elle ne vit jamais toute seule. Elle vit avec toutes les autres idées, Platon nous l'a déjà enseigné”³

J. Lacan

The Rat Man, a 29 year old lawyer (Professor Lehrs) from Austria who had just taken part in military manoeuvres as a Reserve officer went to see Freud for analysis in 1907 to get rid of his compulsive symptoms. He had fears that something would happen to two people of whom he was very fond; his father and a lady he admired. Together with these fears he also described commands, prohibitions, compulsive impulses, rituals, doubts and ruminations that had severely restricted his life.

The Original Record of the case survived although Freud had the habit of destroying his notes after a case was written up — which he did in the summer of 1909. The analysis lasted twelve months. He died in the 1914-1918 war. The intricacies of the history make us think that Freud himself could not part with the piece of written memory . . . but history tells otherwise. The death of the Rat Man at the battlefield soon after the analysis ended had surely affected Freud, and the Original Record, forgotten in a drawer, could also have become the token for his

own investment. If the analysis was so successful, we would like to risk the idea that Freud was the means for the Rat Man's *idées vient en parlant*, that is, ideas come as we are speaking⁴, a Heinrich von Kleist quotes in his essay *On the Gradual Fabrication of Thoughts While Speaking*.

★ ★ ★

A Piece of Warning

He first presented the case history of the Rat Man at two consecutive Wednesday night scientific meetings held on October 30th, and November 6th, 1907. Present at the meeting were Abels, Adler, Federn, Graf (little Hans' father), Hautler, Hitschman, Hollerung, Rank, Reitler, Sadger, Schwerdtner, Stekel, Steiner and Wittels.

There is an interesting comment at the very opening of the case. Freud says that he relied on his own recollection of the sessions to jot down a few words each evening. He put forward this method as preferable to a literal but obsessional recording during the sessions. A literal and obsessional version would certainly be precise and exact, a mirror duplication of the discourse of the patient thus leading to aggressivity and precluding Freud — the analyst — from being an Other for the Rat Man.

Moreover, writing⁵ inhibits listening, writing takes over listening. The analyst's memory is not the subjectivity of his recollection but the trace of the discourse that seizes it in the transference. What the analyst jots down is already a reconstruction, the mark of this trace. Precision and accuracy, like chronological time, are not the same as the rigour displayed in this case by the logic of the unconscious.

Freud's account therefore, might have suffered in exactitude but it allowed him instead, to follow the course of the Rat Man's desire in his discourse. It is hardly surprising that Freud would give us this piece of "warning against the practice of

noting down what the patient says during the actual time of the treatment"⁶ in the case of the Rat Man. The analyst's memory⁷ works in the antithesis of that of an obsessional neurotic. It is this direct opposition between a recommendation and the use of processed material that appears clearly in this case history. "In obsessional neurosis the uncertainty of memory is used to the fullest extent as a help in the formation of symptoms"⁸. Freud's listening was at play. He tuned in and accompanied the Rat Man in the doubts and indeterminateness of his narrative. His doubt was in reality a doubt of his own love. His symptoms directed Freud from doubt through to certainty.⁹ The Rat Man depicted in the analysis such states of uncertainty through the questioning of themes like life, death, paternity, memory. These themes, in themselves uncertain and pertinent to all, are chosen in obsessional thinking as the ground for the conflicts of love and hate.

★ ★ ★

My Parents Knew My Thoughts — Efforts of Thought

Freud demanded from the Rat Man to abandon himself to the expression of trains of thought¹⁰, connections and ideas without judgement, in terms of a conscious condemnation, for instance. Hence, what he was requested to do was to talk.

We must note in this connection that the Rat Man had flicked through the pages of Freud's *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* where the explanation of some verbal associations reminded him of his own *efforts of thought*. These efforts of thought had accompanied him since his earliest years and constituted his private denomination for what Freud classed as compulsive ideas.¹¹ We refer here to a narcissistic identification which would read as 'This (the book) is addressed to me' or 'This is me'. This would open the path to questioning the relation between obsessional neurosis and paranoia via thoughts of self-reference. Had Freud written the *Psychopathology of Everyday*

Life knowing of his thoughts? Freud, through his text, became the Other for him and the transference was thus established.

I put forward the hypothesis that the Rat Man treated Freud, from the start of the analysis — that is from the time he first turned the pages of the book as if ‘. . . Freud knew my thoughts’, granting to him attributes which he had once granted his parents as a child. Freud was for him the subject who *knew* of his unconscious. He thus constituted himself as the supposed-subject-of-knowing. *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* was his own everyday life.

Two people had previously exercised a crucial influence on him. A friend he admired and went to see frequently for moral support and reassurance against his hostile and murderous thoughts — or should we say, desires? But before this friend, there had been another young man, a student who eventually became his tutor and who at first praised him to an unparalleled degree, only as a means for gaining his sister’s favours. Soon afterwards however, after being treated as a genius he was treated as an idiot. The Rat Man described this as the very first great blow of his life. So he turned to Freud in the expectation, not clarified in the text, that no deception would occur this time.

The Rat Man dated the beginning of his illness at the age of six when he had the idea that:

*“ . . . my parents knew my thoughts; I explained this to myself by supposing that I had spoken them out loud, without having heard myself do it”*¹²

The thought that parents know of their child’s thinking or that their ideas are transparent for their parents is in itself not a sign of illness. Their thoughts have the value of actions for them, what is thought of, is realized. What Freud questions — as I read it — is the explanation that the Rat Man gives to

from its affective component, and the remaining idea is then almost indifferent to the subject. That is why he can give it away so easily once he decides to start the analysis, that is, once he wants to rid himself of the symptom.

The chronological sequence in time was lost, that is, the historicity of ideas was lost in such a way that the Rat Man dealt with past, present and future simultaneously and as if they were contemporary. The intensity of the affect was certainly not mitigated by time. What was reactivated in the process of thinking nevertheless, was not the recollection through memory of an idea but already a compromise between the repressed idea and the repressing ones. In this way, a pattern or model of unconscious thought was structured and carried out.

“Physical structures make their appearance which deserve to be given a special name . . . They are not purely reasonable considerations arising in opposition to the obsessional thought, but, as it were, hybrids between the two species of thinking; they accept certain of the premises of the obsession they are combating, and thus, while using the weapons of reason, are established upon a basis of pathological thought. I think such structures as these deserve to be given the name of *deliria*’¹⁴.

★ ★ ★

Thou Shalt (Not) Kill

. . . This was going to befall him as a punishment for his lust. The wish to look (at the female body) was opposed by a fear — already compulsive — that something would happen to his father. Defensive acts and protective measures then followed with a similar compulsive character in an attempt at warding off

himself for this:

“... supposing that I have spoken them out loud, without having heard myself do it”

A forbidden thought returned from the repressed in a spoken fashion, audible to the others but silent to him. The thought became autonomous from his consciousness. We encounter here under the form of a first delusion of interpretation the return of the repressed. He was naming his unconscious — what he did not know in himself — through symptoms.

Firstly he feared from the age of four that his parents knew of his sexual desire, his erections, his early curiosity and sexual incursions under the skirts of two governesses, both women of easy virtue, first Fraülein Peter, then Fraülein Lina. Secondly, and in consequence, he feared that if his sexual craving (desire to look at the naked body of women) came true, then his father might die. The desire to look (at the naked body of the governess) related with the idea that if this wish came true ‘... his father would be bound to die’.

He had already the feeling that there was some sort of connection between: “... my ideas and my inquisitiveness” which we may legitimately translate into some sort of connection between: “... my ideas and my desire.” But in order for the representation to be accepted into consciousness, it had to suffer the consequences and demands of the secondary process. This is the work of repression.

“Repression is effected not by means of amnesia but by a severance of causal connections brought about by a withdrawal of affect”¹³

Repression works by elision, by distortion through omission, isolating one representation from the affect corresponding to it so that it becomes innocuous because its causal connections have been severed. The trauma is not forgotten but is divorced

the fear and ideas that had forced their way into consciousness. The Rat Man's *delusion* or *delirium* consisted in thoughts referred clearly to two sets of ideas. On the one hand the idea of which he had knowledge and to which he had conscious access; on the other hand, the idea, repressed, which had erupted with the strength and intensity of a compulsion (*Zwang*).

“Those things happen through compulsion which take place contrary to the desire or reason of the doer, yet through his own agency”¹⁵

But in Aristotle, desire and reason are united as synonymous and interchangeable, implying will and judgement; and the concept of his own agency seems to imply what is not conscious. What is remarkable is how Aristotle in this observation also separates two instances; the *doer* from *his own agency*; in terms of Freud, the *I* from the unconscious. In psychoanalysis, however, reason stands in opposition to desire. The split in the subject here becomes evident, a split between the *subject of knowing* and the *subject of desiring*. And the subject of psychoanalysis is not a subject of knowledge but of desire.

The overestimation of the power of his wishes, thoughts and fears unfolded to such degree that his whole process of thinking became erotized in itself and some pleasure was therefore obtained through the delusion. The system, or, alternatively, the sets of prevailing ideas with their contrary un-doing-ideas or ideas used to safeguard themselves against the power of his own thought, resembles a paranoid delusion. It is the secondary defensive struggle that the Rat Man organizes to fend off the compulsive ideas, that will acquire the quality of delusion or delirium. These ideas, organized in this secondary defensive struggle are those referred to by the Rat Man as his *efforts of thought*.

The pleasure derived from these same *efforts of thought* was related to the fact that the thoughts themselves became sexualized, the process of thinking became libidinized in a way, in-

dependent from the idea or content itself. His imperative need for understanding was proof of his lingering over thought where action was delayed and resolutions were not taken. I seemed caught between the moment of seeing (that instant where we can trace the origin of his fantasm under the skirts Fraülein Peter) and the moment of understanding (the difference between the sexes). Understanding became an end in itself and the conclusion was suspended in a reproach or delusional idea. The scars in thought left by a severe case of obsessional neurosis are, in this manner, the epitome of the impossibility of arriving at the moment of concluding.

His hesitations and doubts were expressed against the background of a sacrilege. The fantasm of the Rat Man is a dead father bound to resurrect¹⁶ in order to witness the masturbation of his son. It is this fantasm that we find in the erotogenic constellation of the Rat Man. There, also, resides his impossibility to confront his desire.

The deliria of the Rat Man appear within the themes of the law, desire and death evoked by what he saw under the skirts of Fraülein Peter and out from under the dress of his mother ('something yellow')¹⁷.

★ ★ ★

A Dowry, A Debt

Product of a marriage of convenience on the side of his father who refused the girl he loved to marry the woman who would give him birth, the girl with a dowry, the Rat Man finds himself to say it in this way, born out of a debt. To this debt of honour there is another debt contracted at the game of cards, that will reinforce the Rat Man's response with a delusional debt (for his lost lenses) that only exists as his creation. His thought is the reality and belief is fixed to it. This debt in thought, symbolic in meaning and real in its presence, is treated as if true in order for him to be able to refuse (negate) paying it. Is this not the way in which the subject repeats the father in this original familiar constellation?¹⁸ He repeats the father creating for himself an in-

existing debt in order to dis-honour him. This is the repetition he carried as destiny in an identificatory function with his father. By acceding to a marriage of convenience, the father deprives the Rat Man from being a wanted son. Thus, through the debt, he is the son of his father.

This symbolic debt, this debt-unpaid, ties the son to a tradition, the tradition of his pre-history where he will find himself as unconscious. Ignoring the automatism that leads him to repeat a history, we find once more that the subject is less of a protagonist and more of an affect of nonsense. A debt of honour like the one contracted by his father, is paid in the tragedy either with death or with dis-honour. The Rat Man's father paid with dis-honour. The appearance in the analysis of a dead father functioning as still alive reveals not only an early desire in childhood for the death of the father, but the father's efficacy as a function.

He reproduced in the analysis his fear that something could happen to his father. But this time something was different which made the quality of his fear peculiar, and it was the fact that his father was long dead — years before. A step further was carried when he extended his fear to the next world, that is, the world of the dead — as if the dead could die once more, or as if anything worse than death itself could happen. He disavowed his death through an ellipsis. The death of the dead appears to us as the negation of a negative clause through which an affirmation is stated. Such is the work of negation. A dead father threatening to die again in the world of the dead is a father whose presence is overpowering and dominates life with unwavering force.

The fear that as a child '... his parents knew his thoughts because he had spoken them out loud' meant he was exposed fully to them in terms of his erotic wishes. And these connections persist at a time when the idea erupts in him while having intercourse, several years after his father's death '... This is glorious! One might murder one's own father for this!' whereby

the relation between his lust and death is firmly secured. The vehemence of earlier times had not languished, on the contrary, and the Rat Man treated past events as contemporary affairs. Freud pointed out to him that his attempt to deny the reality of his father's death was the basis of his whole neurosis.

"It must therefore be admitted that in obsessional neurosis there are two kinds of knowledge, and that it is just as reasonable to hold that the patient *knows* his traumas as that he does *not know* them. For he knows them in that he has not forgotten them, and he does not know them in that he is unaware of their significance".¹

This, let it be noted, is not unrelated to disavowal, where affirmation of a belief is maintained against actual data to prove the contrary. Consequently, and at great cost, at the cost of his severe neurosis he kept the idea that his father was alive. He knew his father was dead, yet he knew his father was alive. He departed from false premises to arrive at a false conclusion, but he believed in the validity of his argument — which he carried out to its last consequences.

The direction of the cure in the Rat Man moves from the dead father to the Name-of-the-Father. The case itself precedes *Totem and Taboo* and continues the Oedipal theme. In this analysis, the difference between the so-called technique on the one hand, the psychoanalytic act on the other, appears in an unequivocal manner. It suffices for it, to read the Original Record. If today they are confused, this is due to the fact that the so-called technique exists only as an obsession in itself.

The place that each one of us occupies as analysts in an analysis is that of the supposed-subject-of-knowing. This place, far from a sterile repetition of a technical prescription, is the moment when the analysis has to be re-invented again with each new case. The psychoanalytic act in the Original Record shows us Freud inventing psychoanalysis again by the mere fact

of exercising it. What other value can we grant to the question he poses to the Rat Man as to why he was giving him so many details of his sexual life. This question-interpretation is the dis-obsessionalization of the mirror situation expressed in "I am telling you this because I know you are interested." From this perspective and contrary to what many affirmed, it is not the case of Freud not dominating the technique, but rather of Freud abandoning the technique as before, when giving up hypnosis and the cathartic method in order to let himself be guided by his patients knowing that he who seeks does not find.

Regarding the theory, Freud affirms here once more his findings about the Oedipal theme and castration. It is not the case of wanting to kill a father — since he is already dead. The Rat Man fears his death. The fact is to find the relation suggested by the idea that while ejaculating, also ejaculates from his thoughts: "This is glorious! One could kill one's own father for this." This shows that desire is established in the limits of the law which implies that the function of the father is the law, and not mere prohibition. If Freud resorted to a myth in order to give account of this correlation, what the Rat Man shows us in the analysis is that the law is exercised by a father when he bears the statute of dead. That is, a father is worth only as dead, as Name-of-the-Father, there where his presence arrives from another place. That it is not necessary to kill the father for it, is also clear in the text. The dead father of the Rat Man appears as manifestly alive which means that he (the Rat Man) also submits himself to the law thus constituting his desire. Perhaps we should also remember that he was a lawyer, that is, a man versed in law.

NOTES

- ¹ "Ideas come as we are speaking" quoted by Heinrich von Kleist in his essay *On the Gradual Fabrication of Thoughts while Speaking*. From *An Abyss Deep Enough: letters of Henrich von Kleist with a Selection of Essays and Anecdotes*, edited, translated and introduced by Philip B. Miller; E.P. Dutton, New York, 1979.

- ² Eliot, T.S. *Murder in the Cathedral*.
- ³ "The idea, we know it, does not live all alone. It lives with all the other ideas. Plato has already taught us this"
LACAN, J. *Les écrits techniques de Freud*, p.157, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1975.
- ⁴ "Man speaks first, and then thinks" LACAN.
- ⁵ We are reminded here of Plato, who made the King of Egypt say in response to Theuth, the Egyptian god of Thoth, the 'scribe of the gods', to whom was attributed the invention of writing; "Theuth, my paragon of inventors' replied the King . . . Those who acquire it (the art of writing) will cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful; they will rely on writing to bring things to their remembrance by external signs instead of on their own internal resources. What you have discovered is a receipt for recollection, not for memory".
PLATO. *Phaedrus*, The Inferiority of the Written to the Spoken Word. Translated with introductions by Walter Hamilton, Penguin Books, England 1973.
- ⁶ FREUD, S. "What follows is based upon notes made on the evening of the day of treatment, and adheres as closely as possible to my recollection of the patient's words. I feel obliged to offer a warning against the practice of noting down what the patient says during the actual time of treatment. The consequent withdrawal of the physician's attention does the patient more harm than can be made up for any increase in accuracy that may be achieved in the reproduction of his case history" in *Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis* (1909), St. Ed. Vol. X, 159.
- ⁷ ~~ARISTOTLE~~ But, [though, as observed above, remembering does not necessarily imply recollecting], recollecting always implies remembering, and actualized memory follows [upon the successful act of recollecting] . . . "For remembering which is the *conditio sine qua non* of recollecting . . ." "It has been already stated that those who have a good memory are not identical with those who are quick at recollecting. But the act of recollecting differs from that of remembering, not only chronologically, but also in this, that many also of the other animals [as well as man] have memory, but, of all that we are acquainted with, none, we

venture to say, except man, shares in the faculty of recollection. The cause for this is that recollection is, as it were, a mode of inference. For he who endeavours to recollect *infers* that he formerly saw, or heard, or had some such experience, and the process [by which he succeeds in recollecting] is, as it were, a sort of investigation. But to investigate in this way belongs naturally to those animals alone which are also endowed with the faculty of deliberation; [which proves what was said above], for deliberation is a form of inference". Memory and Reminiscence, chapters I and II, 451^b, 452^a, 452^b and 453^a in *Parva Naturalia* [the Short Physical Treatises] translated by J.I. Beare, Random House, New York.

- ⁸ FREUD, S. Op. Cit. 233.
- ⁹ See Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, St. Ed. Vol. V, and Chapter VII, Section A and Lacan, On the Subject of Certainty, in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Hogarth Press, London, 1977.
- ¹⁰ FREUD, S. "It is especially difficult for an obsessional neurotic to carry out the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. His I is more watchful and makes sharper isolations, probably because of the high degree of tension due to conflict that exists between his super-ego and his It. While he is engaged in thinking, his I has to keep off too much — the intrusion of unconscious fantasies and the manifestation of ambivalent trends. It must not relax, but is constantly prepared for a struggle. It fortifies this compulsion to concentrate and to isolate by the help of magical acts of isolation which, in the form of symptoms, grow to be so noticeable and to have so much practical importance for the patient, but which are, of course, useless in themselves and are in the nature of ceremonials". In *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Angst* (1925), St. Ed. Vol. XX, 121.
- ¹¹ The German *Zwangsneurose* translated as obsessional neurosis does not account for the voice *Zwang* which indicates compulsion, coercion, constraint, restraint, pressure; an automatism according with Lacan. This *Zwang* not only refers to the compulsion of thought (or obsession) but also to compulsive acts (*Zwangshandlungen*) and compulsive affects (*Zwangsaffecte*). The fear, present but unconscious in the Rat Man, was that not

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

only his thoughts (desires) but the process itself of thinking would become *Zwanglos*, that is, unconstrained, free and easy.

- ¹² FREUD, S. Op. cit., 162.
- ¹³ FREUD, S. Op. cit., 231.
- ¹⁴ FREUD, S. Op. cit., 222.
- ¹⁵ ARISTOTLE. *Rhetoric*, Bk. I: Ch. 10, 1369a, Translated by W. Rhys Roberts, Random House, New York.
- ¹⁶ LACAN, J. *Le Transfert*, Seminar VIII, 1960/1961, Unpublished Seminar.
- ¹⁷ BATAILLE, L. *The Secret Cause*, in Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, On *Angst*, PIT PRESS, 1982.
- ¹⁸ LACAN, J. *The Individual Myth of the Neurotic or Poetry and Truth in the Neurosis*. In *Imago*, No. 10, Buenos Aires, 1981.
- ¹⁹ FREUD, S. Op. cit., 196.

PART II

**SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN
SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE**

HEIDEGGER CONCERNING LANGUAGE

Zawar Hanfi •

-
- An Indian by birth, Dr. Zawar Hanfi received his entire university education in Germany. He studied philosophy, comparative philology, and political science at the University of Freiburg where he came in contact with Heidegger and with one of Heidegger's most distinguished disciples, Eugen Fink. Among his many and varied interests are European literature, comparative religion and mysticism, and art and aesthetic theory. He obtained his Ph.D. from Freiburg in 1963, and his Doctoral Dissertation on Indian Islam was published in 1964. In late sixties, Dr. Hanfi was attracted to study Marx and the philosophical origins of Marxism. This led him to produce *The Fiery Brook* (Anchor Books, New York 1972), a volume containing Feuerbach's essential writings in English translation together with a long introduction devoted to a discussion of the interconnection between Feuerbach's materialism and Marx's humanism. Dr. Hanfi is a senior lecturer at Monash University. Apart from scholarly work, he paints and writes poetry.

Turning to Language

Theorization concerning the nature of language is by no means of recent origin. However, the discovery of language as constituting a paradigm for humanities and social sciences is indeed a recent phenomenon.

The philosophy of language, to all intents and purposes, was founded by Wilhelm von Humboldt. The foundational text inaugurating the modern philosophy of language is none other than Humboldt's, *On the Diversity of the Structure of Human Language*, which was written between 1827 and 1829. It is here that Humboldt speaks of the "inner form" of language, a concept which links together a people and the specificity of its intellectual-cultural articulations. In his attempt to answer the amazing question: Given that man is the same everywhere, what makes it that his languages are so different in their structures and patterns of articulation?, Humboldt is led to believe that *Geist* and language are identical. Language for Humboldt is *Geist* in the sense of an ethnic or a national peculiarity which articulates its understanding of Being into a world. Language for him is not just a means of communication, but a second world constructed by *Geist* as the medium or element in which it lives, that is, understandingly orientates itself.

Language as a paradigm for cultural and social sciences goes back to Claude Levi-Strauss who makes the following observation in his *Structural Anthropology*, a collection of articles written between 1944 and 1947, and published in 1958:

"Among all social phenomena, language alone has thus far been studied in a manner which permits it to serve as the object of truly scientific analysis, allowing us to understand its formative process and to

predict its mode of change. This results from modern researches into the problems of phonemics, which have reached beyond the superficial conscious and historical expression of linguistic phenomena to attain fundamental and objective realities consisting of systems of relations which are the products of unconscious thought processes. The question which now arises is this: Is it possible to effect a similar reduction in the analysis of other forms of social phenomena? If so, would this analysis lead to the same result? And if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, can we conclude that all forms of social life are substantially of the same nature — that is, do they consist of systems of behaviour that represent the projection, on the level of conscious and socialized thought, of universal laws which regulate the unconscious activities of the mind?" (58-59)

The distinction in linguistics between deep and surface structures, between *langue* and *parole*, acquires in Levi-Strauss the fundamentally decisive status of a theoretical distinction between universal laws that are at work from the unconscious, and their projected manifestations in the forms of the conscious behavior. A landscape has acquired its specific character because it is the projection, as it were, of a geological structure which is not available to visibility. The anthropological analyses and explanations of Levi-Strauss derive their characteristic illuminating power and thrust from this distinction which he, moreover, recommends as a scientific principle worthy of emulation by all social scientists.

In order to illustrate the centrality of language in the contemporary theoretical discourse of the social sciences, let me draw your attention to Jürgen Habermas, a neo-Marxist social

philosopher for whom sociology has assumed the form of a theory of communication. Habermas understands his theoretical project as a "reconstruction" of Historical Materialism. Proceeding from an ascertainment of the obsolescence of Marx's theory in its classical form, Habermas nevertheless seeks to retrieve, that is, re-define the actual intention of that theory which is still the liberation of society from the irrational forms of domination. While discarding the Marxian theorem of the determination of the ideological superstructure of society by its economic structure, Habermas separates out the realm of the practical-ethical norms as a linguistic process which follows a logic of its own and takes place in independence from the dialectic of the productive forces. In the history of the self-constitution of the human species, one can, according to Habermas, identify three mutually irreducible processes which originate in the phylogenetically necessitated determinations of work, communicative interaction, and social organization wherein power is distributed in certain ways. What I have called phylogenetically necessitated determinations are, in the language of Habermas, transcendental, or rather, quasi-transcendental interests of the species in its self-constitution and historical development. These interests are technical, practical and critical-emancipatory. The technical interest has to do with production for the satisfaction of needs through a technical mastery of the physical environment; the practical interest has to do with ethical norms and values; and the critical-emancipatory interest has to do with a critique of domination.

Revolutionary transformation, according to Marx, results when the conflict between productive forces and relations of production cannot be resolved within the existing form of social relationships. Marx saw the possibility of transcending capitalist society towards a liberated, that is non-antagonistic, class-less communistic society precisely in this dialectic of productive forces. This idea of revolution, which constitutes the very heart of Marx's theory, is, according to Habermas, in need of being superseded by the idea of a practical discourse which aims at

creating a consensus among the social subjects concerning the problem of emancipation. Now, a practical discourse is a discourse about practical, that is, about ethical and political matters, and that means that by definition it excludes problems which are of a technical nature and hence requires technical solutions. That means further that technical language which is context-free or, to put it in other words, which does not present meaning that needs to be established through reconstructive and interpretative endeavour. Context-free language is the language of natural science and technology; it has to do with work, with strategies involved in the organization of work, and with knowledge which is geared to the task of technically mastering the physical environment. If this is a valid distinction, the conclusion is inevitable that Marx confounds the problem of emancipation by ascribing the emancipatory function to productive forces, for these belong to the context of work, whereas the problem of emancipation is a practical goal and, for that reason, legitimately and meaningfully belongs to the context of the practical discourse. This is the point at which a metacritique of social science opens up a critical-reflective dimension and constitutes it as a theory of communication. A practical discourse represents a communicative situation in which (ideally) all participants are equal; their truth claims to require to be established according to the criteria of discourse which are embedded in the linguistic structure of the discourse itself, and cannot appeal to any authority claims. This is what Habermas calls communication without domination, and it is this "utopian" desideratum which replaces the Marxian utopia of a communist society. The question, however, is: What are the conditions required for the possibility of such a discourse which is free of all domination? This leads Habermas to seek out the factors which, unbeknown to the subject, work towards distorting communication. Distorted communication is the normal condition of social communication and manifests itself par excellence in neurotically and ideologically frozen consciousness. Reflection on language alone can break the spell of such a consciousness.

Habermas' appropriation of language, his differential reflection on possibilities and forms of linguistic articulation in the interest-contexts of work and practical symbolic interaction has its source in the linguistic-analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein and Austin, and in the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer.

As a natural transition, let me therefore make a few observations concerning the shift in philosophy from traditional metaphysical themes to language. It is important to bear in mind that philosophy in the modern era has had to fight a losing battle in the face of the ascendancy of the natural sciences. On the one hand, philosophy had to yield over to science what had traditionally constituted discrete areas of inquiry within its own domain. Copernican and Galilean astronomy and Newtonian physics have nothing in common with the Aristotelian contemplation of the heavenly body and with the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. On the other hand, the actual achievement of exact knowledge through scientific methodology becomes a necessitation for philosophy to equally aspire towards certitude of cognition. Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, is driven by the passion to lay down a *fundamentum inconcussum veritatis*. Without going any further into the matter, let us conclude by saying that by the end of the 19th century philosophy had been thoroughly discredited, especially through Comte, Nietzsche, Feuerbach, and Marx.

At the beginning of our century, it was held by some philosophers that philosophy qua metaphysics was saddled with pseudo-problems which arose from a misuse of ordinary language. Ontology, for example, can be reduced to the mistake of a substantivization of the copula. Or, to take another example, the question concerning nothingness arises when a sentence: There is nothing behind the wall, is first altered into: Nothing is behind the wall, and subsequently, into the phrase Nothing-being (nothingness) behind the wall, but then the specific qualifier "behind the wall" simply disappears; what now emerges is the spurious concept of nothingness. That this

kind of logico-linguistic analysis is myopic and misguided, need not occupy us here.

Finally, I shall now say a few words about a very different kind of concern with language which is known by the name of hermeneutic. Hermeneutic or a theoretical reflection on the problem of the understanding of meaning has a long history but to all intents and purposes, its foundational text, its definitive form from the stand-point of the contemporary problem-consciousness is Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Moreover, as a theory of interpretation, Hermeneutic is of very direct relevance to psychoanalysis. Although Freud had no awareness whatsoever of the hermeneutic tradition, he was de facto a practicing hermeneuticist. After all, and not inappropriately, his method of treating mental disorder did elicit the well-known nomenclature of the "talking cure".

The hermeneutic approach to the understanding of meaning concerns itself with the text and with the text alone; it leaves aside as of no significance the subjective factors, the inner world of the soul, the personality of the author, his passions, pleasures and pains, etc. The text alone counts, and it has to be understood, decoded, brought to eloquence through its immanent structure, by taking it as a whole consisting of parts, as constituting a circular universe of meanings in which each part refers to the whole and the whole inheres in each of its parts. But what if the text remains closed to understanding, doesn't open itself up to attempts at getting its meaning? The text is then perhaps defective, mutilated, contains gaps, lacunae, resembling the text of a dream or the integrated-disintegrated text enigmatically, forebodingly suspended between the analysand and the analyst. The hermeneutic activity consists in detecting the clues within the text and across other texts which are invisibly, inaudibly, cryptically present in it. The text is part of a world of meanings, of a world that exists both in and as language Gadamer says:

"Language is not merely one equipment

among others which belong to man who is (i.e. finds himself) in the world, but the fact is rather that men can have world only to the extent to which it rests on, and presents itself in, language. World qua world exists for man in a manner in which it does not exist for any other living being in the world. The existence of the world in this sense is apprehended by language . . . As for language itself in its relation to the world which comes to articulation in it, in no way does it have an independent existence. Not only is the world world in so far as it comes to linguistic articulation, but language too has its existence proper only to the extent that it constitutes the medium in which world presents itself. The originary humanity of language therefore means at the same time the originary linguisticity of the human Being-in-the-world". (W&M. 419)

"Being-in-the-world" — that is one of the existentials brought to light by Heidegger in his analysis of the being of man whom he terminologically designates as *Da-sein* in his epoch-making *Being and Time*. The point is now reached when we can turn to the question of language in Heidegger.

What follows has been divided into three sections. The first section provides a frame of reference for the sake (hopefully) of comprehensibility. It involves a condensed and by no means a systematic presentation of some relevant aspects of *Being and Time*. The second section gives an exposé of Heidegger's Logos-Essay (VA.207-229) in a way that sticks as closely as possible to the text. The third section attempts to make a few comments on what might be the thrust of Heidegger's probings into the nature of language via an interpretation of the Fragment B 50 of Heraclitus.

I
Being and Time undertakes to inquire into the Being of beings, or into the sense (Sinn) of Being on the whole.

Heidegger ascertains that the question concerning Being, the question concerning the meaning of Being has never been raised throughout the history of ontology. Since Plato and Aristotle, the founders of ontology, the Being of beings has itself been interpreted as a being. Being, however, is not the same thing as a being.

Heidegger approaches the question about Being by interrogating the being which is distinguished by the fact that in being this being relates itself to its Being. It is delivered up to its own Being. This being is none other than man. As a being of such nature, man is terminologically designated by Heidegger as *Dasein*. The being of man cannot adequately be comprehended on the traditional *essentia/existentia* model. Hence the Heideggerian formulation: "The 'essence' of *Dasein* lies in its existence." (SuZ 42).

Dasein is not something that is merely there like a stone. In the parlance of traditional ontology, a stone is the temporary unity of *hupokeimenon* and *sumbebekos*, of substance and accidents. It is the specificum of a genus. *Dasein*, however, can never be properly understood as particularized generality. The traditional ontological 'categories' in terms of which a being such as a stone can be determined have, therefore, no application to the being of the kind of *Dasein*. "The Being which matters to this being (*Dasein*) in its Being is always mine. *Dasein*, therefore, is never to be ontologically grasped as a case or example of a species of being of the order of *Vorhandensein*. Something which is merely existent, which has the character of Merely-occurring-being (*Vorhandensein*), is 'indifferent' to its own Being; strictly speaking, it 'is' neither indifferent nor not-indifferent to its Being because of the way it 'is' " (*ibid.*). The analysis of the structure of *Dasein*, therefore, calls not for categories but for 'existentials'. *Dasein* exists by way of relating

itself to its own Being. 'Existentials' refer to the fundamental ontological structures of *Dasein's* modes of self-relating to its Being ". . . *Dasein* is mine . . . to be in this or that way. It has already somehow decided in which way *Dasein* is ever mine own. The being, which, in being, is concerned with its own Being, relates itself to its Being as to its own-most possibility. *Dasein* is ever its own possibility; it does not possess this possibility as a quality is possessed by something that has the character of a *vorhanden* thing. And since *Dasein* is essentially its own possibility, it can 'choose itself' in its Being, it can gain or lose itself . . . It can have lost, or cannot yet have gained itself only in so far as it is, according to its essence, possibility to be 'authentic' . . . Both modes of being, that of authenticity and of inauthenticity have their ground in the fact that *Dasein* is purely and simply determined by Ever-mine-ownness (*Je-meinigkeit*)." (*ibid.* 42-43).

Heidegger further determines *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world. *Dasein* is 'in' the world — that means that *Dasein* 'knows' itself as factually Being-in . . . This Being-in refers to *Dasein* Thrownness (*Geworfenheit*). As 'thrown', it finds itself in the world. It is not a subject that subsequently discovers the world as the all-encompassing objective world. Rather, the world is already disclosed to it. The concept Being-in-the-world supersedes the subject-object dichotomy. Both Being-in . . . and world constitute the ontological structures of *Dasein*.

An explication of *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world further shows that *Dasein* is always 'attuned' to its world. Heidegger calls this Being-attuned of *Dasein* its *Befindlichkeit*. What is involved in *Befindlichkeit* is that *Dasein* always 'finds itself' in this or that Mood. Nothing psychological is meant by this term. A mood in the context of *Daseinsanalytic* is to be taken in the ontological sense of a certain way in which beings environing *Dasein* disclose themselves. A mood, therefore, has a disclosing significance. Beings disclose themselves to *Dasein* thus and thus depending upon its attunement. "[. . .] in moments of great despair [. . .] things tend to lose all their weight and all meaning

comes obscured [. . .] in moments of rejoicing, [. . .] all the things around us are transfigured and seem to be there for the first time . . . [. . .] in boredom, [. . .] we are equally removed from despair and joy, and everything about us seems so hopelessly common place that we no longer care whether anything is or not." (*Int. Met.* 1-2)

World as a constituent of the ontological structure of *Dasein's* Being-in-the-world is the horizon within which *Dasein* encounters beings. These are, firstly, the things with which *Dasein* is practically involved. Originally and primordially nothing exists for *Dasein* in the mode of Being of *Vorhanden-heit*. Beings present themselves to *Dasein* as belonging together in referential totalities (*Verweisungsganzes*). A thing is first of all disclosed to *Dasein* as 'for the purpose of'. A hammer is always 'known' as hammer, as this particular thing which is used for the purpose of hammering nails in a board. The hammer is not first cognized by *Dasein* qua epistemological subject and only subsequently determined to be used as a hammer. It is the use that *Dasein* makes of it which discloses, which has already disclosed it as a hammer. But the hammer does not exist in isolation. By itself, the hammer refers to nails, wood, iron, workshop, dwelling, landscape, nature, etc. To these environing things, *Dasein* already and always has an understanding comportment. Things as belonging to referential totalities with which *Dasein* is practically involved, Heidegger calls *Zuhanden-heit*, things at hand or handy things. A thing as *vorhanden* or a thing as the object of theoretical reflection has a derivative mode of Being: it has been taken out of its original context of *Zuhandensein*.

Apart from *Zuhandensein*, *Dasein's* world is co-constituted by the kind of being *Dasein* itself is, that is by *co-Dasein* (*mit-Dasein*). Here, again, the alter is not subsequently discovered by an originally isolated, that is, 'world-less' ego. The referential totalities of *Zuhandensein* and *co-Dasein* constitute *Dasein's* world as a constituent of its character as Being-in-the-world. In this sense the world is a horizon of meaning in which *Dasein*

already and always has an understanding comportment towards environing beings. *Dasein* understands itself in its Being, and understands the being of environing beings. Understanding, too, is a fundamental ontological structure of *Dasein*. Where there is understanding, there is also uttering, speaking, listening, communicating. "Speech", says Heidegger, "is the articulation of Understandability" (SuZ 161). What is here called understandability is a whole consisting of interfused meanings. This whole can be dissolved in separate meanings but this does not indicate that meanings exist separately, that speaking consists in putting them together. "The dispositionally determined understandability of Being-in-the-world speaks itself out as speech. The constitutive whole of meanings comes to words. Words accrue to meanings rather than word-things are equipped with meanings" (*ibid.*). *Dasein* exists understandingly, and that means that it is opened up to the disclosedness of environing beings. Understanding and disclosure of Being belong together and thus belonging together constitute *Dasein's* understandability. This understandability is not encapsulated within something like the interior of *Dasein*. Understandability is also essentially communicability. The same thing can also be put in this way that communicability is constitutive of the very structure of understandability. While understanding, *Dasein* communicates both with itself and with *co-Dasein*. Both *Dasein* and *co-Dasein* are united in and through the whole of meanings or through speech which articulates understandability, that is, brings it to words. Speech is nothing if it is not spoken out in sounding words. The sounding wordedness of speech (*Hinausgesprochenheit*) is language. Language as this whole of words, as that within which speech has its own 'worldish' Being, is thus to be found both as an intro-wordly being and as something handy (*Zuhandenes*). Language can be broken up into merely existing word-things. But as an existential of *Dasein*, one should realize that speech is language because the being whose openness (*Erschlossenheit*) speech meaningfully (*bedeutungsmaessig*) articulates, has the kind of Being of Being-in-the-world as thrown and as bound up with 'world'" (*ibid.*). Thus *Dasein's*

Erschlossenheit (Opened-up-ness) finds direct expression in speech because speech is articulated *Erschlossenheit*. The same cannot be said of language because its eventuation is at the same time a distantiation from the disclosedness of Being to *Dasein*. But language can be translated back into speech by being interrogated as sedimented disclosure of Being: Language is, and is not speech.

"Speaking is the 'significantly' (*bedeutende*) ordering of understandability of Being-in-the-world to whom Being-with [necessarily] belongs, and which remains in a definite way of 'procuring' (*besorgend*) Being-together-with. This procuring Being-together-with has the character of communicating in which "the articulation of an understanding Being-together constitutes itself" (162). *Dasein* is also *co-Dasein* which means that *Dasein's* *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* are also *Mitbefindlichkeit* and *Mitverstehen*. Herein lies the ontological structure of communicating. "*Mitteilung* (communication, sharing of meaning) is never something like a transporting of experiences, for example, of opinions and wishes out of the interior of a subject into the interior of another. *Dasein-with* is already and essentially manifest in *Mitbefindlichkeit* and *Mitverstehen*. In speech, Being-with is 'expressedly' shared. That means that it already is but only unshared as not having been seized and appropriated" (*ibid.*). The constitutive moments of speech are: the about-what of speech, that which is actually spoken as such, sharing of meaning (*mitteilung*: communication), and making known (*Bekundung*). "These" says Heidegger, "are no attributes which could empirically be plucked from language, but existential characters which are rooted in the Being-constituted of *Dasein*, and which ontologically make possible such a thing as language." (*ibid.* 162-63).

Heidegger argues that all attempts so far (1927) to grasp the "essence of language" miss the phenomenon of language because they approach it from the point of view of one or the other above-mentioned existentials. Language, thus, has been conceived either from the idea of 'expression', 'symbolical

form', communicating as 'statement' (*Aussage*), making known of experiences, or 'shaping' of life. The key to an adequate grasp of language lies, therefore, in clarifying "the ontologico-existential whole of the structure of speech on the basis of an analytic of *Dasein*." (163)

If speech is a speaking forth directed towards *co-Dasein*, it necessarily presupposes the ability to listen to what speech utters. In speech, meaning comes to word. Hearing or listening to, does not have the character of 'taking in' something purely acoustic which is subsequently translated by the hearer into meaning. No one ever hears pure noise which is later turned into meaning; hearing is from the very outset understanding of meaning. What is heard in hearing is not the word but meaning itself, albeit meaning can be imparted in no other way except as word. Speech as articulated understandability, as speaking forth, is co-constituted by hearing. *Dasein* exists understandingly. That means that understanding involves speaking-with and listening-to. Understanding is, as we have seen, an ontological structure of *Dasein*. Its mode of Being is being-open to . . . In thus being open, *Dasein* is suffused by the disclosedness of 'world' as the horizon within which *Dasein* is already and always engaged in commerce with handy things and with *co-Dasein*. *Dasein* is essentially *co-Dasein*. Its being-together-with-others does not come to pass from an isolated position. *Dasein* is not initially a solitary 'worldless' subject to whom only subsequently and somehow something like 'world' accrues. Ontologically, *Dasein* is Being-in-the-world, that is, 'world' is not something external to it but rather constitutive of its very Being. If 'world' is now taken in the sense of Disclosedness to the Openness of *Dasein*, Disclosedness and Openness point to its ontological constitution as understanding. But what does understanding understand? What is involved in *Dasein*'s understanding comportment towards environing beings? It involves an existential 'knowing' of what to do in different situations, how to seek and offer help, how to respond to propitiousness and adversity, in short, how to procure its existence. *Dasein* ex-

ists not contemplatively but practically. Now constitutive for understanding is that it expresses itself, that it communicates itself to others. We saw earlier that speech is the articulation of understandability. This articulation from the very outset exists as communication. Because *Dasein* is in itself *co-Dasein*, communication is a natural, spontaneously occurring, on-going process of understanding meaning. Disclosedness of Being and understanding as openness of *Dasein* belong together. *Dasein* does not invent or create meaning; rather meaning is given to *Dasein* through disclosure. What speech speaks forth and what listening listens to are what the Disclosure of Being discloses. Speech articulates understanding as disclosure. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger interprets language as speech, that is, as speech of disclosure. Language is primordially speech. If it comes to be taken as 'assertion', it is only due to the fact that the philosophical reflexion of the Greeks (*Aristotle*) interprets *logos* predominantly as 'assertion'.

"Is it an accident that in both their pre-philosophical and their philosophical ways of interpreting *Dasein*, they [the Greeks] defined the essence of man as *zoon logon exon*? . . . Man shows himself as the being who speaks. This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that he is the being that is such as to discover the world and *Dasein* itself. The Greeks had no word for 'language'; they understood this phenomenon 'in the first instance' as speech. But because the *logos* came into their philosophical ken primarily as assertion, this was the kind of *Logos* which they took as their clue for working out the basic structures of the forms of speech and its components . . . In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to ask

what kind of Being goes with language in general. Is it a kind of equipment ready-to-hand within-the-world, or has it *Dasein's* kind of Being, or is it neither of these? What kind of Being does language have, if there can be such a thing as a 'dead' language? What do the 'rise' and 'decline' of a language mean ontologically?" (165-66)

Heidegger's reflexion upon Logos persist throughout his thinking. In *Being and Time*, Logos is grasped as Speech. The context in which Heidegger talks about Logos as speech is the question concerning the method of investigation to be employed in *Being and Time*. That method is phenomenological, and the task of defining what it involves leads Heidegger to an elucidation of 'phenomenon' and 'logos'. The Greek *phainesthai* from which the word phenomenon (*phainomenon*) is derived means 'to show itself'. Phenomenon, therefore, is given by Heidegger the sense of "that which shows itself in itself, the manifest." Since whatever is encountered by *Dasein*, which we in the mean time know to have the character of openness, is something that shows itself to *Dasein* as what it is, phenomena can be taken in general to stand for what the Greeks called *ta onta*, that is, everything that is. Logos, as we just mentioned, signifies speech. But philosophical thinking has taken Logos to signify things such as 'reason', 'judgement', 'concept', 'definition', 'ground', or 'relationship'. The question, therefore, arises as to "how can speech be so susceptible of modification that Logos can signify all the things [. . .] listed . . .?" This question need not detain us for the moment. We turn to Heidegger's further elucidation of Logos as speech. Most importantly and decisively, Logos as speech means the same as the Greek *Deloun*; "to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's speech." To elucidate the matter further: "The Logos lets something be seen (*phainesthai*), namely, what the speech is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking . . . or for persons

who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Speech lets something be seen 'apo . . . : that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the speech is about. In speech (*apophansis*), so far as it is genuine, what is spoken is drawn from what the talk is about, so that speaking communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes it accessible to the other party. This is the structure of the Logos as *apophansis*." Now in so far as Logos lets something be seen as what it is, it can either be true or false. Once again, in determining what is true and what is false, Heidegger takes his cue from the Greek *aletheuein* and *pseudesthai*. As against the prevalent notion of truth as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, Heidegger, proceeding from the etymology of the word *aletheia*, understands truth as 'unhiddenness'. "The 'Being-true' of the Logos as *aletheuein* means that in *legein*, (saying) as *apophainesthai* the beings of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (*alethes*) that is they must be discovered (uncovered). Similarly, 'Being-false' (*pseudesthai*) amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not." (32-33).

We have come across a two-fold characterization of speech. Firstly, speech was determined as the articulation of understandability. *Dasein's* understanding of world comes to word in speech. Secondly, Logos as speech is a letting-be-seen, a making-manifest of what shows itself in itself, or, in other words, Logos is a speaking forth of the truth of the phenomena; Logos is the kind of speech which has a revealing-concealing function. According to the second characterization, Logos is the language of the truth of Being. And it is this characterization which occupies centre-stage in later Heidegger. It is, however, already present in *Being and Time* like the flash of an image which only long years of sustained effort would make available to visibility. But we have to first ask the question: Do the two characterizations of speech refer to different things, or

what they intend is one and the same thing? What does *Dasein* understand in understanding 'world'? It understands the Being of beings, and it does so because Being is the very unhiddenness of beings themselves. The condition of the possibility of understanding lies in the fact that Being has already and always disclosed itself in beings. The facticity of *Dasein* as Thrownness, its *Befindlichkeit* (being thus and thus disposed under the sway of ontological moods), and its ontological structure as Understanding have discovered beings as what they are because *Dasein* thus characterized ek-sists, that is, stands out into Being qua disclosure. If speech is the articulation of understandability, speech articulates the disclosedness, that is, the truth of Being.

II.

The Logos-Essay, which appeared in 1951, is a resumption of Heidegger's reflexion on the 'concept' of Logos as delineated in *Being and Time* in the context of an elucidation of the meaning of phenomenology as a method of investigation. Actually, resumption is not the right word, since Heidegger's thinking has all along been pre-occupied with an attempt to plumb the depths of Logos as a fundamental and primordial word of Occidental philosophizing. Yet, the Logos-Essay belongs to Heidegger's "post-reversal" thinking which is taken to ensue since *On the Essence of Truth*, a seminal lecture delivered in 1930. The term "reversal" indicates a shift in Heidegger's approach to the Being-question from the vantage point of *Dasein* as the distinguished being which alone has an understanding relationship to Being, to Being itself without the 'mediation', so to say, of *Dasein*. The "reversal" occurs out of an internal necessity to overcome metaphysics as both subject-centred and bound up with 'presentational' thought (*vorstellendes Denken*). "... the 'Being' into which *Being and Time* inquired cannot long remain something that the human subject posits. It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its time-character, [that] makes the approach to *Dasein*. As a result, even in the initial steps of the Being-question in *Being and Time* thought is called upon to undergo a change whose movement corresponds with the rever-

sal." (Richardson, xviii).

The Logos-Essay probes the nature of language. It does so by engaging in a prodigious and stupendous meditative exertion which reaches into a dimension where language itself lights up the path of thinking. Heidegger's reflexions reflect the luminous but arcane heart of language; they effulge in 'epiphanies' of words; they provide the space wherein words are freed towards recovering, discovering themselves so that saying may regain the power to startle and to strike dumb, to puzzle and to provoke, to provoke outcry and outrage. Heidegger's uncanny ability to retrieve the locutionary power of words through etymological anamnesis, to make them speak in un-heard-of ways, to weave them into a hyphenated unity which becomes a chiaroscuro of the advent of new meaning — this uncanny ability has often been seen as construed, artificial, even as a vacuous philosophizing which seeks, by etymologizing, to hide the fact that it has nothing to say. Although such judgements express their own emptiness, it is, nevertheless, indisputable that Heidegger's etymological 'adventures' and his predilection for joining words together in most extraordinary combinations, strain the reader's concentration and patience to the utmost.

Heidegger engages in what he calls a "free Laying-over" of an utterance of Heraclitus numbered as Fragment B 50 in *Diels-Kranz*. Laying-over is a literal rendering of the German *überlegen* which normally means to consider, to think over. But Heidegger brings into play, over and above the normal meaning of the word, its literal-etymological sense of laying-over to indicate from the very outset that in order to reach the point where the nature of language can be probed, it is essential to work through that which is 'lying on top' in order to get to the bottom.

The Heraclitean utterance at issue reads as follows:

**Ouk emou alla tou logou akousantas
homologeîn sophon estin hen panta.**

A philologically accurate translation will more or less read as

follows:

*Listening not to me but to the Logos
it is wise to agree that all things are one.*
(Kirk & Raven, 188)

The utterance speaks of *akouein*, listening and having listened; of *Homologeïn*, to say the same; of Logos, utterance or saga; of *ego*, the thinker himself as one who speaks, as *legon*. All this goes to show that Heraclitus in B 50 directs his thinking to a Listening and to a Saying. The meaning of the utterance seems to be simple enough. But why did already the ancients call Heraclitus *Ho Skoleinos*, the obscure? A necessary presupposition for a genuine understanding of the utterance must therefore be to abandon the facile notion of its comprehensibility and to take its obscurity seriously. As a matter of fact, everything about the utterance is worthy of being put into question.

One has to begin by asking the question: What is the meaning of Logos, what of *Legeïn* (saying, speaking) to which it etymologically belongs? It is necessary that we "pay attention to Logos and pursue its INITIAL essencing" (VA, 208).

The clue to what Logos is, is obviously to be gained from what *legeïn* signifies. As anyone knowing Greek would agree, it signifies 'saying' or 'speaking'. Hence, Logos can be taken to mean *legeïn* in the sense of 'stating' and *legomenon* in the sense of 'that which has been stated'. Heidegger does not dispute this, for that would be absurd in view of the fact that from early on the Greeks themselves understand *legeïn* in the mentioned sense. Yet he draws attention to the other fact that from equally early on, indeed even more originally, *legeïn* signifies 'laying', 'laying-down', 'laying-before'. Such 'laying' is swayed from within by a Bringing-together, by a Gathering or Collecting, something that also the Latin *legere* and the German *lesen* indicate through the sense of bringing-in and bringing-together. That *legeïn* which originally means to lay (active) and to lie down (passive) is also corroborated by Liddel and Scott. The

question therefore arises: "How is it that the sense of 'laying' which innately belongs to *legeïn* comes to mean saying and speaking?"

But, first of all, it is necessary to clarify what lies in *Legeïn* understood as Laying. Laying means that something is brought to lie, which, again, involves that in Laying, one thing is laid with another. Thus Laying shows itself as a Laying-together. Now Laying, as we have seen, also has the meaning of *Lesen*. The German word normally means 'to read', but more originally it has the sense of picking or picking up, for example, the picking of grain in *Ahrenlese* or the picking of grapes in *Traubenlese*. When something is picked up or taken off from, it is gathered or collected. *Legeïn*, *legere*, *lesen*, laying, thus involves the laying of something that has been gathered or collected. Collecting, however, is not to be taken as a mere heaping-one-thing-upon-another. Properly understood, collecting is a bringing-in which looks to a 'fetching' because what is brought in is fetched for the sake of being brought in. That is why in such Bringing-in there is at work the sway of a Bringing-under (-the-roof), of providing room, of giving shelter. Thus, "sheltering (*bergen* = protect, shelter, save, conceal, hide) comes first in the way the essence of Gathering-Collecting is made" (210). Now, if Gathering-Collecting is to be understood from Sheltering, that is, if it is done because of, and is directed by, Sheltering, then it is in advance not just Gathering but Gathering that selects that which is to be gathered from that which is to be left out. Selective Gathering will, however, be determined by that which shows itself as the most distinguished or worthy to be selected from out of the selectable. In the way the essence of gathering is made, the very first thing is therefore Selecting (*Erlesen*) towards which is oriented the Gathering which subordinates all Bringing-together, Bringing-in, and Bringing-under (sheltering).

What, then, is the relationship between Laying and Gathering? Heidegger answers:

“Every Gathering is already Laying. All Laying is by itself gathering. For what is it that is called Laying? Laying brings to lie in that it lets lie-together-before . . . The concern of ‘laying’ as the Letting-lie-together-before is to keep that-which-is-laid-down as that-which-lies-before . . . The only concern of Laying qua *legein* is to leave that-which-lies-together-before-by-itself in the keeping (Hut) into which it remains laid down. What is this keeping? That-which-lies-together-before is laid in, away, and into Unconcealedness, deposited in it, put in its safe-keeping (*geborgen*). This Unconcealedness of that-which-lies-before into the Unconcealed is that which is of concern to *legein* with its Letting-lie-together-before.” (211)

Aristotle determines the Being of beings as the temporal unity of *hypokeimenon* and *symbebekos*, or, to use the conventional terms, of substance and accidents. Etymologically, *Hypokeimenon* comes from the medial infinitive *keisthai* which has the meaning of the lying-before of something for itself. To *Aristotle’s* thinking the Being of beings, or that which lies before presences itself as the Underlying, as *Hypokeimenon*. But *Hypokeimenon*, although interpreted in various ways, is “nothing less and nothing higher than the Presenc-ing into Unconcealedness of that-which-lies-before. *Legein* as Gathering remains in-laid in this *Legein* of *Hypokeimenon*.” (211)

The question posed above, “How is it that the sense of ‘laying’ which properly attaches to *legein* comes to mean saying and speaking?”, can now be answered. The purpose of inquiring into the shift in meaning of *legein* was not to pursue the philological question concerning changes in the meaning of words, but to experience an event of appropriation. It is not simply so that in course of time a pivotal word such as *Legein*

changes its meaning. The change in meaning is a decisive event of appropriation. And saying and speaking belong to such appropriation, for they “presence as Letting-lie-together-before of all that, which, lying in Unconcealedness, presences as encounterable.” The letting-lie-together-before as the laying of *legein* has its place within Unconcealedness. But Unconcealedness itself is a mittence (*Schickung*) of Being. Saying and speaking belong into *legein* as laying. Laying is letting-lie-together-before of that which is unconcealed in the Unconcealedness of the mittence of Being. That this is so points to the earliest and richest decision concerning the nature of language. The imprinting of the nature of language by Laying

“reaches into the extreme limits of the possible where-from of the nature of language. For Saying as gathering Letting-lie-before receives its specific nature (*Wesensart*) from the Unconcealedness of that-which-lies-together-before. But the Uncovering (*Entbergung*) of the Covered-up (*des Verborgenen*) into the Unconcealed is the Presenc-ing itself of that which presences itself [of that which presents itself as encounterable]. We name it the Being of beings. Thus, the speaking of language [*Sprechen der Sprache* = the speaking that language does] which presences in the *Legein* of laying, is determined neither from Sounding (phone), nor from Signifying (*semainein*) . . . they neither expressly reach into the region of the initial imprinting of the nature of language, nor are they in any way capable of delineating this region in its main outlines.” (212)

In the light of what has so far been laid bare, *Legein* as Laying has acquired a dimension of meaning which is completely outside the familiar and the vacuous.

It now "names the unfathomable mystery that the speaking of language appropriates itself (*sich ereignet*) out of the Un-concealedness of that-which-presences and determines itself in accordance with, according to the measure of, the Lying-before of that-which-presences as the Letting-lie-together-before." (213)

We have seen what Saying is. But there can be no Saying without Hearing. What, then, is Hearing? One thing is certain; if saying and speaking are not determined by phonetic signifying, hearing, too, cannot consist in the reception by the ear of word-as-sound. The speaking of language is a speaking-to; speaking is addressed to or directed towards . . . What is Spoken-to is itself the gathered Lying-before which has been laid-before. In the ensemble of meanings arising from *Legein* as Laying, Hearing can only mean a Self-gathering which 'pulls itself together' (*zusammennimmt*) for that which is spoken to. Or, to be more precise, Hearing is Harking, for Harking is wherein Hearing has gathered itself into a concentrated listening. Hearing in this sense has little to do with taking in word-as-sound through the ears. Heidegger puts this in a startling manner when he says: "We hear not because we have ears; we have ears and we can be physically equipped with ears because we hear" (215). Only because hearing is not aural hearing can we miss hearing in the very act of taking word-sound in through our ears. That we hear and do not hear has little to do with having ears. "We have heard only when we hearingly belong (*gehören*) to the Spoken-to. The Speaking of that-which-has-been-spoken is *Legein*, that is, Letting-lie-together-before. To hearingly belong to Speaking — that is nothing else but a Letting-lie-together in its ensemble which a Letting-lie-before lays-before together" (215). This brings us close to *homologeïn* in the Fragment B 50 of *Heraclitus*. "Such Letting-lie lays that-which-lies-before as that-which-lies-before. It lays this qua itself. It lays the One and the Same into One. It lays One as the Same. Such *Legein* lays one and the same, the homon. Such *Legein* is *homologeïn*: One as the Same, a gathered letting-lie-

before of something that lies before in the Same of its lying before. (215). The Heraclitean *ouk emou alla tou logou akousantas* can now be translated, that is, interpreted, as follows: "If you have not merely heard the sound of my words (of him who is Speaking), but rather if you abide in a harkful surrender of hearing (*im horchsamen Gehör*), then there is true and proper Hearing." When Hearing is of such a nature, that is, when Hearing is *homologeïn*, it then deserves to be called *sophon*. Once again, Heidegger departs from the familiar meaning of *sophon* as 'wise'. For him, *sophon* is not a wise, that is, a knowing grasping of something, but rather a comportant (*Verhalten*), a comportment which is apt, proper, or becoming. Although normally this would be an adequate rendering of the German *geschickt*, the root-meaning which Heidegger plays upon does not come to light in it. To do justice to the word, we have to bring into play the Latin *mittere*. The verb *schicken* has the same meaning as the English 'send'. But, since the English word does not lend itself to the required variations, one will have to turn to the Latin *mittere* for a way-out. *Sophon* as *geschickliches* is certainly a becoming comportment but it is so because it is com-mitting. "When appropriate Hearing *qua Homologeïn* is, then there is the e-vent of Inter-mittance then the mortal *Legein* com-mits itself into the Logos. The gathering Laying is then a matter of concern to it" (218). *Homologeïn* is appropriate Hearing. With *Homologeïn* there occurs the e-vent of Inter-mittance. But wherein and as what does Inter-mittance presence? *Homologeïn sophon estin hen panta*: "The e-vent of Inter-mittance occurs in so far as One [is] All."

One-All! The *Hen Panta* is not translated by Heidegger as One is All or All is One. He refrains from linking the two together through a copula because according to his way of reading, that is, hearing, *Hen Panta* or One is All is not what the Logos asserts, only in what manner does the Logos presences. For Heidegger, *Hen* is the Only-One; it is, as such, one-ing, that is, bringing into itself as One. This it does by gathering. It gathers up that which lies before and in so doing lets it lie before

as the Lying-before as such and as a whole. The *Hen* unites as a gathering Laying.

In the light of all that has so far been said, what answer can be given to the question, what is Logos? There is only one adequate answer, says Heidegger, and that answer is: *Ho Logos Legei*. This is the simplest way in which the answer can be put. As we have learned, *Legein* means Laying in the sense of Letting-lie-together-before. But what is it that the Logos lets lie before. It is, says Heidegger, *Panta*, All. And what is meant by All? Nothing other than that-which-presences. If we now ask the question, how does all that has been gone through hang together, it would be best to let Heidegger himself speak:

“The gathering Laying-and-laid has, *qua* Logos, laid down All, that is, all that presences into Unconcealedness. Laying is a concealing. It conceals all-that-presences in its presenc-ing out of which it can be brought in and brought forth through the mortal *Legein*. The Logos lays into presenc-ing in advance and lays that-which-presences into presenc-ing down, that is, aside (*zurück*). Presenc-ing, however, involves having emerged into the Unconcealed, to abide in it. In so far as the Logos lets lie before the Lying-before as such, it unconceals that-which-presences in its Presencing. But Un-concealing is precisely what *Aletheia* is. [*Aletheia*] and Logos are the same. *Legein* lets *Aletheia*, that is, the Unconcealed as such lie before (B 112). All unconcealing raises the Presenc-ing out of Concealedness.

Un-concealing requires Concealedness. *Aletheia* rests in *Lethe*; it draws out of *Lethe*; it lays before what remains laid-away through *Lethe*. The Logos is, above

all, Unconcealing as well as Concealing. It is *Aletheia*. Unconcealedness requires Concealedness, *Lethe*, as its reserve which is, as it were, drawn upon by Un-concealing. The Logos, the gathering Laying-Laid has in itself the character of un-concealing-concealing . . . The *Hen Panta* lets lie together in the Presenc-ing what ab-sences away from, and thus against, one another like day and night, winter and summer, peace and war, waking and sleeping, Dionysus and Hades . . . *Hen Panta* says what the Logos is. Logos says how *Hen Panta* essenc-es. Both are the same.” (220-221)

Heidegger's interpretation of Logos reveals it to be the gathering-gathered Laying-Laid (*die lesende Lege*). Having taken the reader through the enormous exertion of probing, elucidating, clarifying the key-words in Heraclitus' Fragment B 50, Heidegger startles him by saying that even Heraclitus did not think the Logos as here interpreted by the author. *Legein*, whence the word Logos is derived means for the Greeks not only that which is originally laid into it, that is, a Laying-before. It means at the same time 'to narrate', 'to say'. And it is this meaning which came to be the pre-dominant one for them. Heidegger says two things: Firstly, the Logos, in so far as it meant the gathering-gathered Laying-Laid, the Greeks lived out of such an understanding of Logos, but, secondly, since the Logos was experienced by them as saying, they did not come to think it from its original essence. Logos is language for the Greeks but they interpret the nature of language from Saying and Sayability, not from Logos as the gathering-gathered Laying-Laid. “Thus the Greeks do experience Saying. But they never think, not even Heraclitus, the nature of language specifically as Logos, the gathering-gathered Laying-Laid” (228). And what would have happened if the Greeks had actually

thought language in the mentioned sense?

“[They] would have thought the nature of language from the essenc-ing of Being, indeed they would have thought it as Being itself. For *Ho Logos* is the name of the Being of beings. Yet all this did not e-ventuate. Nowhere do we find a trace that the Greeks thought the nature of language directly from the essenc-ing of Being. Instead, language, and indeed first by the Greeks themselves, was presented before (*vorgestellt*) from audibility qua Phone; it was presented before phonetically as sound and voice . . . [For them] language is *phone semantike*, that is, sounding-audibility which signifies something.” (228)

It thus happens that from early on language essentially and primarily comes to have the fundamental character of “expression”. And nothing has changed since the Greeks. Even today, language is decisively regarded as expression. Language is expression and expression is language.

“Once, however, at the beginning of the Occidental thought, the nature of language flashed in the light of Being, once, when Heraclitus thought Logos as the leading word in order to think in this word the Being of beings. But the lightning-flash precipitantly extinguished.” (229)

III.

Heidegger’s probings into the nature of language occur at a point that is situated beyond all philosophy and all science of language. He is not primarily concerned with language as a system of meanings, nor with what can or cannot be said, nor

with language as encompassing a diverse plurality of language games each of which is constituted by rules specific to it; nor does he engage in linguistic analysis which, in its self-understanding holds the promise of deliverance from so-called pseudo-problems; nor, finally, does he think of language as a system of signifiers and signifieds. If none of these things holds sway over his thinking, what is it, then, that he seeks to bring to light? The essence of language itself. Since Plato and Aristotle, and ever since in metaphysical philosophy, the essence of something consists in its what-ness, in its quidditas. The essence of something means so much as the presence (*parousia*) in it of a substractum (*kypokeimenon*) which always IS as the permanent, eternal presence that it is. Thus the essence of something tells us what it really is. The essence is thus the possibility of something to be what it is. This, however, is not the sense in which the term essence in the question, What is the essence of language? is to be understood. Heidegger uses this term not as a substantive but as a verb. The essence ‘essenc-es’. The German *Wesen* (essence) provides the possibility of harking to its verbal character, and can be varied or modified in ways which issue from the very centre of Heidegger’s thinking. *Wesen*, taken in its verbal sense is to be thought of as *anwesen*. The prefix ‘an-’ lends a verb the sense of ‘towards’, ‘directed to’, or ‘meant for’. For example, by prefixing an- to *Denken* (thinking, thought), we get *An-Denken* which now means ‘thinking directed to, or thinking meant for’, that is, ‘remembrance, memory, recollection’. Heidegger speaks of Being as *An-Wesen*, of being as *Anwesendes*, of Being of beings as the *Anwesen des Anwesenden*. The essence of language, we said, essenc-es. But it essenc-es towards man qua *Dasein*. Heidegger thinks language as it *anwest*, that is, comes toward, addresses itself to, meant for, opens itself to, etc. Thus, it is not so much the existence of language as a system of meanings that Heidegger thinks, but rather the arrival for man of meaning itself.

One of Heidegger’s ‘shocking’ utterances is that Science does not think (What is called Thinking? In VA, 133). But what he

means is that science does not think in the same way in which Thinking thinks. Heidegger calls his own thought Thinking in order to distinguish it from Philosophizing and Poetizing on the one hand, and from science or scientific thought on the other. There is no affinity between science and Thinking, and there is no transition from the one to the other. The gap between the two is unbridgeable; going from one to the other can, therefore, only be a leap. The leap from science to Thinking consists in abandoning that which constitutes the essence of science, namely, the reduction of what it investigates to an object: Science is the kind of thinking which brings-to-stand-before what has already come to exist for it as an *0(b)p*-positum. It 'waylays' the *oppositum* in order to secure it. "The waylaying (*nachstellende*) bringing-to-stand before (*Vorstellen*) which secures (*sicherstellt*) all reality in its capacity as pursuable Objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*), is the fundamental characteristic of the bringing-to-stand-before through which modern science relates to reality." (VA, 56). Thinking, on the other hand, is a *Cor*-responding to the Address or Addressing of Being. The upshot of this is that with respect to language, a scientific approach would treat language as an object of inquiry. But how can language be treated as an object, as an *oppositum*, if the scientific subject itself dwells within, is encompassed by, language? The essence of language cannot reveal itself to objectivating thought.

We have once again witnessed how etymological exploration lights up the path of Heidegger's thinking. It would therefore be useful at this point to learn from Heidegger-himself about the significance for him of the so-called etymologizing:

"The mere ascertainment of old and often no longer living meaning of words, and recourse to such meaning with the aim of using it in a new sense leads to nothing except arbitrariness. What really matters is to catch sight, by attending to the early meaning of a word and to the change it has undergone, of the area of things

(*Sachbereich*) into which the word speaks." (*Ibid.* 48)

The outcome of the interpretation of the Heraclitus-Fragment is that Logos is the same thing as language. The Logos is that which lays; the laying of the Logos is a laying-together. The Logos is the gathering-together only of that which is gathered together as the gatherable from out of . . . The Logos does not gather all that is gatherable. That which remains *ungathered* remains *concealed*. Only that which the Logos gathers comes into *Unconcealment*. The gathering of the Logos eventuates for the sake of bringing the gathered into sheltered keeping. The bringing-in of the gathered into *Unconcealedness* is at the same time putting it away there. Thus it is hidden within *Unconcealedness*, yet in a way that it can become *un-hidden*. The laying-together of Logos is not a forcing into a laying; the Logos lets lie-together-before that which lies together before from itself. The Logos only brings into a Laying-before that which of itself lies before as the out-standing (*Das erlesene*). The Logos is the *Unconcealment* of that which has been laid-in; but the laid-in is also *concealed* (*geborgen*) within *Unconcealedness*. The Logos is not a saying or a stating, but the *Concealedness-Unconcealedness* of the Lying-in and of the Laid-in. The Logos is not Saying, but the very possibility that anything can be said at all. The speaking of mortals receives its possibility from the Logos. But speaking cannot be without hearing. What is heard in hearing is not an acoustic or phonetic signifying. Hearing is a gathering of oneself (*Dasein*) towards the Logos as the *concealed-unconcealed* essencing of that which presences itself. But what presences itself is the Being (*Anwesen*) of beings (*des Anwesenden*). Logos, language, Being stand for the same thing.

Before we can speak, hear, see, and feel, there has to be the possibility to do these things. The possibility is the *unconcealedness* within which alone there can be meaning which resides in environing things and beings, which enables men to be in and have world. But meaning is how something is disclosed to

understanding. Meaning and understanding, the presencing of that which presences, belong, however, into the mittence of Being. Being itself, beings, *Dasein*, World are woven into the history of Being, a history that is not to be confused with a historian's reconstructive design, a history that is not dialectical, but the epochs of Lighting-Clearing within which the dwelling of human beings occurs.

NOTES

HEIDEGGER, M., *Being and Time* (SuZ), Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. SCM Press, 1962.

HEIDEGGER, M., *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (VA). Neske, 1954.

HEIDEGGER, M., *Vorwort* to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, by William J. Richardson. Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.

GADAMER, H.G., *Wahrheit und Methode*. J.C.B. Mohr, 1965.

PART III

THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE

THE NAVE OF THE DREAM'

Laurence Bataille*

*Laurence Bataille is a former analyst of *l'Ecole de la Cause Freudienne* from which she resigned in November 1982. She is former Directress of the publication, *Ornicar?*, *Bulletin Periodique du Champ Freudien*, Director Jacques Lacan, Paris.

It is well known that in order to become a psychoanalyst, it is necessary to undergo the experience of psychoanalysis oneself.

What becomes of this experience once the "time of the sessions" is completed? This is how I understood the question Conrad Stein asked me.

Attempting to give some sort of answer to it, I will use a dream dreamt a few months after the beginning of my analysis. *A wren (roitelet) was escaping from a weasel (belette) which had already ripped out its tail-feathers, leaving instead a bloody spot. Then the bird turned around and moved its wings in a gesture of impotence.*

As I was lingering over the description of this gesture, my psychoanalyst, hitherto quite silent, asked me: "Like who?" The image of my father appeared immediately in front of me: he was making this same arm movement when he was apologizing for being incapable. This dream, which first had seemed wordless, started to unfold a long chain of associations as a rope drawn by the weight of an anchor, slipping down, glistening in the dark waters. I'll give only the most important of these associations.

It is strange indeed that I represented my father by a wren ". . . the oak said to the reed: . . . a wren is a heavy burden for you". One could not say my father had weighed upon me: he left home when I was four years old. I saw him from time to time, but had no special feelings about him. His death the year before the dream had left me quite indifferent.

The bloody spot called up a painful memory of my earliest childhood. With my mother's tweezers, I pulled out some of my eyelashes instead of eyebrows. Suddenly in the mirror, I saw my eye covered over by a bloody spot. Was I being punished because I wanted to act like my mother? Why was this spot transferred from my eye to the tail of the wren? of my wren-father?

★ ★ ★

My mother was very beautiful. My grandmother often said that she had seen her growing up like a reed — it is the reed for which the wren is a heavy burden — couldn't the wren be myself? Wasn't I a heavy burden for my mother who had to bring me up *without any help*? Who had carried me in her belly? Yes, like a reed, in contrast to the other women of my family who were short and fat "Man is a thinking reed". From this sentence, a thousand reasons appeared which had inclined me to classify my mother on the men's side. And my father? Maybe I had not put him on the women's side, but in any case not on the men's side either.

Man, woman . . . was I like my father or like my mother? was I the bird making this gesture of impotence because I was not a boy? So, by not being a boy, I happened to be "like my father"!

And the weasel? A dim memory of another fable of La Fontaine . . . A weasel had entered into the burrow of a rabbit and couldn't get out because it had eaten too much.² Big belly — pregnancy — from having eaten too much, from having eaten the wren's tail. The symptom which had obliged me to undertake an analysis was in direct relation with that theme.

After the analysis of this dream, the indifference I used to feel for my father changed into an explosive rage. How could he have been such a coward? How could he have let women wear the trousers?

The reed again: my mother is a reed — man is a reed; a thinking reed. Yes! "thinking" makes all the difference. In fact, in my family, thought was exclusively reserved for men. It was their only privilege, it was a virile attribute, whose well-ordered distribution was the only way to avoid chaos. There was no question of a woman appropriating thought for herself. In any case, not me. That is why I always carefully avoided thinking.

From that moment onwards, I began getting free from imaginary storms. The wren weighing on the reed appeared to be a

representation of the sexual act between my father and my mother, a derisory and mute representation of the desire which had perhaps presided over my conception. My most bothersome symptom had no more *raison d'être*.

All along my analysis, I spoke of this dream again and again. It actually was a cross-road of fantasies, constructions, phobias and obsessions of my childhood, which were still very heavily active upon my life.

Today, when I think again about that dream, I no longer see the images of which I gave an account. Only the wren's image remains in profile, maybe an illustration from the fable of "The Oak and the Reed", a kind of tail-piece marking the end of a book. What the story did not tell, no one will ever know; a kind of epitaph, an enigmatic inscription on the tombstone which will forever conceal the final truth.

Wren — *roitelet* — petty king. Thanks to this derisory representation, I laughed at the king my father had embodied during forgotten times, far out from my remembrance; the king from the time before life became absurd, the king whose reign would have occurred and whose will would be done on earth, an earth where words could not lie and could tell everything, an earth where desires would be simple, where the God of the Bible or my father would have known what they were doing and wouldn't have led their creatures to sacrifice (even their own child) in an attempt to salvage their stake from the disorder they had themselves brought into the world.

He is nothing but a *roitelet* (a petty king). He says only that the mouth which could have delivered the meaning of existence, the meaning of life and death, the meaning of sexuation, is closed forever.

However here he stands, an enigmatic figure against whom questions and answers constantly bounce off. He represents this point through which one's being escapes underneath, the part lost for ever, always disappearing, which is more and more lost

as the rope drawn by the anchor slips into the water. It will never stop slipping and disappearing, except on the day when the Fates cut it.

This wren is like a hook holding fast and outstanding the question which made me an analyst.

But why did I confer such a privilege in this dream? I must say that it strikes me by its pettiness; not only does it tell a story about animals, but moreover these animals are rigged out in diminutives, suffixes (*roitelet, belette*) which increase its affectation. Why did I give this dream such a central place? Everything it made me discover could have been discovered by other paths.

First and foremost, why did I relate this dream to my analyst? For you don't tell all your dreams to your analyst. The only thing I remember is that at first sight this dream had nothing to tell. Nowadays, it looks obvious that it spoke quite clearly about castration. Moreover, if it took on such a petty and childish style, one can bet that it had something rather unpleasant to say, something like: "I'll make you loose your Latin. You think you are a psychoanalyst, but this epithet has no more value than the little feathered thing a dancer wears on her bottom."

Now the analyst did speak. Not to say that he was in full possession of his Latin, but to ask a question: "Like who?" Confronted with castration, he didn't flee, he did not make a gesture of impotence, nor did he make a gesture of potency. And he did not reject my affectations. By asking this question, he settled connections so that I was engaged in the path of analysis. That is why this dream held such an exemplary and strategic value. And this I cannot forget nowadays, because I am the one in the psychoanalyst's chair.

Postscriptum — While I was writing this paper, further associations occurred to my mind, which led me far beyond what I was ready to disclose to the reader. All of them seemed more evident than the other: I was amazed at not having thought

about such and such until this day. I cannot resist sharing this one with you: the weasel caught the wren's tail — not actually a tail, only feathers — “to take the feather” means to write (*prendre la plume*). My father was a writer, *un homme de plume*, literally a feather-man, a bird. His phallic attribute was not thought, but more exactly the pen (*la plume*, the feather), just as in the dream. Quick, I have to warn Conrad Stein that writing this paper is out of the question. Because I dreamt twenty years ago that a weasel tore away the tail of a wren? Nice excuse indeed, for evading one's task (*tâche* very close to *tache*, which means spot). It would be more accurate to consider this new interpretation as the expression of an unavowed desire:

NOTES

¹ *L'ombilic du rêve* has first been published in *Études Freudiennes* No. 23 (Review directed by Conrad Stein).

² Some years later I made a verification. I had mixed up two fables: “The Cat, the Weasel and the Little Rabbit” and “The Weasel in the Granary”.

DEATH OF A FATHER

Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin*

“Asking is no longer worthwhile:
nothing of your own self was left for telling”

from,

Al enterarme de la muerte de mi padre

Poem by,

Raul Santana in his book *Lengua Materna*¹.

— The prick!

— Whose?

— Mine!

— Cheers to my father's prick!

It was the last dialogue. Guillermo lived abroad. He knew that those might have been the last words.

A year and four months later — at the age of 85 — his father died. It was an inexorable and gradual arteriosclerotic corrosion. He knew, therefore, that each word would be stamped in his memory forever.

His father laughed happily when Guillermo joined him in his words. They laughed together. But Guillermo was not sure if they were laughing about the same thing.

Was it by chance a burst of complicit laughter that — together with his own — was playing with the absurd? Was it humour or the jubilation of a child who recognizes his powers in a mirror?

*Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin has published several articles in the Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne and in the *Cuadernos Sigmund Freud* of the *Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires*. He is co-author of the book *Lo económico en Freud*, together with Oscar Zentner and others, and is at present working on a book on Female Sexuality. G.E. Etkin is an analyst member of the *Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires*, now living in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil.

His father, as in former years, while talking, stared at the void.

Guillermo read afterwards, in a letter, about the death of his father. It was written. And he then remembered other dialogues, commentaries and words that marked his life.

What were those sounds, those cries, those marks? Those impossible dialogues, fights and occasional insults? What did he say or do to provoke the high and clear laughter of the father?

His mother was a well of silence. Her words were few, only the necessary. For him, her radiant smile. Only in moments of horror had he to ask himself who she was. As to his father, laughter and fury — voice — he should have known. What was his father? Who was this man with whom he wished to talk?

For different reasons — Destiny? — he did not see the death of either parent. His mother, hemiplegia, wheel chair, heart failure. Separated from his father for several years, Guillermo looked after her. Once, blinded by bright lights, he had to clean up her faeces. But he was nevertheless able to see. To see her bent, paralytic, speaking with difficulty, lucid, aware of the sudden arrival of old age.

Of his father, he did not witness neither his death nor the last stages of his deterioration. In this last period — as he was informed through letters, aided by his imagination — his father could not recognize anyone, he soiled himself and cried aloud when his flesh was dissolving or appeared in red and black crusts and cracks; a large cachectic foetus submerged in the residues of the beginnings.

His memory — formerly a prudent tortoise — is now a brilliant bird flying among pictures and photographs, voices and dialogues, sometimes sequentially arranged as in a motion picture in which he acts — as the protagonist? Sometimes an image leads to a phrase. At other times a word reveals an image. As with a member's card.²

"Have you got your member's card?", asked his father from the bottom of the staircase to his mother who was upstairs. They were going to the Gymnastic and Fencing Club on a sunny Sunday in Palermo. He saw his father, tall, with booming voice; the cheek where that mouth spoke, shaved, smooth, tense and congested.

The sight of that questioning face kept returning to his mind. It was probably at this time that his father used to punish him because he refused to eat meat³ (*carne*).

He remembered the carnivals (*carne vale* — farewell to meat); the fine jets of coloured water furiously ejected from tubes, the streamers wrapped around fleeing bodies, flashes of teeth and eyes of fire, sounds of confetti, triumphant gazes amidst the slowly moving cars along the misty *Costanera*⁴.

Afterwards, the hidden and dry flesh (*carne*) of the Oruro⁵ Carnival. Masked shadows turning and vaulting among golden urine, green coca spit and aromas of *pisco* and *chicha*⁶ towards the sound of flutes and guitars.⁷

And the dark and humid flesh, soft and vibrant, broken by the sound of *pandeiros* and *atabaques*⁸ of the frantic carnivals of Bahia.

It was, perhaps, when his father told him about the curse of Tutankhamon and the passion of Lord *Carnavon* for that golden mummy, that the trail to Macchu-Picchu was imprinted on his mind, and later the delusion of a safari through sandy mountains under an indifferent and final sun, at which a sorcerer spat *yonke* — that liquor of northern Peru — in order to make it hide behind the one and only cloud. He dug in the desert, short of breath, opening pits, avid in the search for mummies and treasure troves, golden objects and gold buried with the parched dead.

Maybe these worlds came to his mind while reading that his father was no more than skin and bones. Between both he imagined the corroded and tortured flesh (*carne*), useless and flac-

cid. Nothing was left of that flesh (*carne*) which once marked a booming voice in a tense and congested face, nothing of those muscles which, agile as serpents, contorted themselves as he smashed the ball violently against the wall on a sunny Sunday at the club where entrance was only permitted by presentation of a member's card (*carner*).

Dying alone makes confession impossible. It would have been possible in that dialogue, always sought by the son but seemingly avoided by the father. Why did he avoid a frontal, direct face to face talk? In this way there would have been an answer rendering all other questions unnecessary; and he would have known who that man was.

Nevertheless, the certainty of his death, while setting a mark in his memory, allowed him to find answers for questions that he had not formulated.

Once his father mumbled: "Man is a metaphysical being". He was facing a mirror or void. The truth was that the utterance was not directed at him.

In a posthumous letter his mother left instructions: her body should be cremated and the ashes thrown to the wind in the mountains of Mendoza⁹, Guillermo asked his father to come to Retiro¹⁰, where he gave him jasmine to be set in the small urn. Amidst the continuous murmur of the moving crowd, the steam from locomotives, their sudden strident whistles and while leaving the flowers, he heard him whisper: "How fleeting are all things!" That was his farewell.

One of the last times he went to Buenos Aires, he had a meal with his father. At his side, all bent, his father was labouring to cut a piece of meat (*carne*). "Life is a passing shadow", he mumbled. It was part of a poem that had suddenly been uttered. When asked to repeat it, it turned out useless: he could not remember having said a thing.

Years after graduating in medicine, his father completed another career: Philosophy. After his death, handwritten poems

were found among loose papers or on cover pages of books. One of them, dedicated to Guillermo, thirteen years before, stated in the last stanza:

"And so, always between you two
I shall be enjoying my days
taking pleasure in art, in mind and
philosophy."

He never gave it to him. It was found among the rest. Guillermo recalled. Those tangential, marginal, apparently casual comments — maybe commonplaces — were not directed at him. Just like the poem, dedicated to him, but never delivered. Nevertheless not only was he a witness and listener, but the title of the poem bore his name: Guillermito, as he was called as a child.

There were others. One of them — "Where?", began thus:

"A profound sadness tears me apart
to the last root of my existence
that vacillates bent by the load
of a mortal destiny to its essence".

Who was that man? He learned more about him from his fragmented and unexpected poems and by the seldom heard sideline mumbling than by any direct revelation or friendly confession.

Nevertheless, what had the "enjoying my days" meant to him? Why did he feel "torn apart by a profound sadness"? Was it due to the blinding and deadly glare of an implacable lucidity? The refined subtlety of a hedonist avid for immortality? Or the moments of solitude of a physician who believed in the Spirit and trusted in Progress? Simple sublimation? Mistaken vocation? State of mind?

He came to know more, but now and definitely, became aware that his father would be unknown forever¹¹.

★ ★ ★

From Corinth to Thebes, and from Thebes to Colonus, questions, some answers and the danger of looking. Oedipus, "who is not intimidated by words because he is not afraid of crime" arrives asking the people of Thebes: "What are you afraid of? What do you want?"

The cause of the plague is the crime¹²: Creon brings the answer from the Oracle. But in order to know who the assassin was there is one condition: that he had looked at his victim.

Creon: "We had a king, sir, before you came to lead us. His name was Laius"

Oedipus: "I know. I never saw him"

To see one's father is to see oneself as a parricide. A transgressive father that had also beforehand consulted the Oracle and obtained the anticipated answer in an act: death.

But the presence of the Sphinx — in the metaphor of Laius¹³ — allowed forgetfulness.

Creon: "The Sphinx with her riddles forced us to turn our attention from insoluble mysteries to more immediate matters."

Until his absence, as an effect of an answer given by Oedipus¹⁴ was transformed into a memory of the crime. Why did Oedipus, like the Sphinx and Laius want to know: "Who was the mortal that begot me?" "Today you will know him and you shall kill him", answered Tiresias.

Knowledge then, which when known, makes Oedipus a parricide and puts him in the place of the one that has to die. As Creon who soon after wants to know, and asks Oedipus: "What do you want then?" "Will you banish me from the kingdom?" "By no means. I would have you dead, not banished."

Jocasta, instead, maternal, does not want Oedipus to know: "... It makes no difference now ... Forget what he has told you ..."

And she insists: "... this quest must not go on. ... I im-

plore you, do not do it . . . I know I am right. I am warning you for your own good." "My 'good' has been my bugbear long enough", answers the son. And the mother threatens, "Doomed man! O never live to learn the truth!"

In the name of Goodness, she who knows that "many are the mortals who have united with their mothers in dreams", and tells it to her son, wants to avoid questioning. What does he know and further, what should he be barred from hearing? The parricide act, or the incestuous desire?¹⁵

Tiresias knows and therefore does not want to answer.

Jocasta knows and therefore does not want her son to hear.

Both do not want Oedipus to ask.

Why is Tiresias weary of Oedipus' knowledge? Why does he resist answering?

Tiresias: "What will be will be, though I should never speak again"

Oedipus: "What is to be, it is your trade to tell."

In order that the Oracle's forecast be accomplished, for the tragedy to take place, Oedipus must take the place of Laius and the Sphinx. Tiresias will then take the place of Oedipus: he will answer.

For this, the parricide and the incest are necessary but not sufficient conditions for blindness. For Destiny to be achieved, Oedipus must have an answer, a direct and frontal one, to his demand.

Blindness will thus be a metaphor of his knowledge.

That is why eyes are not necessary in the constitution of the image. What is necessary, on the other hand, is the symbol of the absence of the image in order that the eyes can see. A symbol constituted, in the case, by the place Oedipus occupies in the structure. That is, by the answer he will hear.

With the direct answer — without the detour of the half said — a knowledge of parricide and *jouissance* is transmitted and the climax resulting not merely from a battle to the death for pure prestige, but the enjoyment of the Thing: a fantasm of access to *jouissance* as a condition of recognition.

Afterwards, however, Oedipus in Colonus already blind as Tiresias, does not seek to know the desire of the other; instead he starts by asking where he is: "Can you tell me where we have come to?"

And he enters, as in Thebes, transgressing: stepping on forbidden ground, "sanctified site that shall not be inhabited", where he can be seen by the Eumenides, "those who see everything."

Nevertheless, his transgression is now symbolic. Because if he arrived in Thebes to fulfill his destiny, while fleeing from it, he finds himself in Colonus to pay a debt.

For him, blindness was not enough: he offers his dead body to Theseus¹⁶: "I come to offer you a gift — my tortured body — a sorry sight; but there is value in it more than beauty".

In return, he asks for a place to stay.

But something is repeated. This time Polynices, his son, asks him to talk as he himself had asked Tiresias, as the Sphinx had asked him, and he and Laius had asked the Oracle:

"Speak, father; do not turn away. No answer?
No pity? You send me away without a word?
Not even to tell me why you are angry with me?
O sisters, cannot *you* persuade him to break
This hard unfeeling silence? I am a suppliant
For the god's good favour; he cannot neglect my petition
And let me go away unsatisfied."

Oedipus: "... but you shall fall,
You and your brother, with blood on both your heads.
I cursed you once before; I curse you now —

These are my weapons — . . .
. . . Away! You have no father here, vile brute!
And take this malediction in your ears; . . .
. . . This is my prayer.
In the name of the Father of Darkness, and the bottomless pit
. . ."

The direct answer is always the same: death to the questioner.

But if in Thebes mortal dialogues evoked terrible images and blindness in a vain attempt to mask them, in Colonus the prohibition which substitutes the veil is extended to certain words:

Oedipus to Theseus:
"None guiding me, to the place where I must die;
And no one else must know it. Tell no man.
The region where it lies concealed from sight . . ."
". . . What follows,
A holy mystery that no tongue may name . . ."
". . . There is no one else
Of all this people to whom I can reveal it;
Not my own children, though I love them well.
You are to keep it forever, you alone;
And when your life is drawing to its end,
Disclose it to one alone, your chosen heir,
And he to his, and so for ever and ever."

And after Oedipus' death, a messenger and witness, transmits his last words and describes his last act: "Now, my children, you must be brave and good, and go from this place. You must not ask to see forbidden mysteries; there are things you must not hear (between him and Theseus). And the messenger adds: ". . . our own King (Theseus) was standing alone holding his hand before his eyes as if he had seen some terrible sight that no one could bear to look upon . . ."

Thence, the law is confirmed at the first attempt to its transgression:

Antigone: "I have one desire "
Ismenia: "Which one?"

Antigone: "Only to see the plot of earth."

And afterwards, to Theseus: "Our wish is to see our father's grave".

Theseus: "That cannot be . . ."
 "Daughters, it was your father's charge
 That no man should approach that place,
 Nor any living voice be heard
 About the sacred sepulchre"

The real body of Oedipus — the remainder is at once sacred and impossible. Unnameable and invisible, this lack of body — which in Thebes was the embodiment of a lack — is now a pillar of the law: Theseus — his symbolic son — cannot talk, cannot tell where his no-body rests.

The lack of a body that will become a mark of the site of a secret.

"Am I made man in the hour when I cease to be?" Oedipus asks himself when he becomes aware that he is searched for by the Thebans as a symbol.

Therefore, if in Thebes he was an incestuous son and a parricide, in Colonus he will find himself as a father; a symbolic paternity which will be confirmed by the possibility of transmission: from father to son the secret of where his non-being is.

Oedipus, in Colonus asks again, but does not expect an answer. No one answers and he does not seek any image. He only speaks because he does not know.

In this way, from father to son, there will be no transmission of a supposed knowledge, the insistence of a demand or the repetition of an answer; but only the certainty of the place of the dead. There is transmission in place of transference. Transference turns into transmission when there is something about a body that cannot be known¹⁷.

That is why Oedipus in Colonus to assume the paternal role

of transmitter, must end a cycle that starts in Thebes with his self-imposed blindness as a mark in the real of his abiding in the law.

In Thebes his eyes are lost. In Colonus he loses what his eyes wished to see: the image of a body. It is the starting point from which, as a symbolic father, he can start to transmit.

In other words: from the certainty that no one "has the membership card (*carte*), that the flesh (*carne*) is "ephemeral", that the body, like life "is a passing shadow", that "man is a metaphysical being" by the fact "that he is man when he is nothing", that the words of a father can be heard.

If the body is dissolved and nothing of his *jouissance* or of his death can be known or talked about, however persistent the questioning, it is possible in turn to tell where the impossible can be found.

That is why he who transmits is a dead father: the death of an imaginary father must be a condition for the possibility of exercising the symbolic function.

But what were Guillermo, the Sphinx, Oedipus and Laius asking? For the knowledge of the Other, in the first place, meaning a true knowledge. A knowledge, furthermore, about being a man and being a father. It is true that he only points to the fact of not being able to answer about the dissolution of a body. Neither reincarnation nor Last Judgement, the debt must be paid because the Judgement was given from the start.

It is because the image disappears and the flesh (*carne*) that sustains it decays, that the word can be transmitted.

A man is, therefore, one who knows his non-being. Father, who knows — who knows? — his function. $\forall x: \exists x \overline{x}$.

A transmission must be dis-incarnated (*des-encarnarse*) in order to be effective. And then, it only points out a way: from Thebes to Colonus, the way of "the art, the mind, the philosophy".

As Lacan writes it: $\frac{a}{S_2} \longrightarrow \frac{\S}{S_1}$

March 1983
Salvador, Bahia, Brazil
Translation: Aarne Iivari Munne

NOTES

- ¹ From the poem *When I Learnt of the Death of my Father*, by Raul Santana in his book *Maternal Language*.
- ² Membership card = *Carnet* (in Spanish) is homophonic with *carne* = meat/flesh. This is the key signifier in the history of Guillermo.
- ³ See footnote 2.
- ⁴ *Costanera*; Coast road in Buenos Aires.
- ⁵ Oruro; famous Carnival of the Indians in Bolivia.
- ⁶ *Pisco* and *chicha*; alcoholic drinks from Peru and Bolivia.
- ⁷ *Quenas* and *charangos*; musical instruments from Peru, Bolivia and the North of Argentina.
- ⁸ *Pandeiros* and *atabaques*; musical instruments from Brazil.
- ⁹ City in Argentina near the border with Chile.
- ¹⁰ Second largest railway station in Buenos Aires from where the trains to Mendoza depart.
- ¹¹ One of the mutually exclusive and assymetric differences between P. Ricoeur — a catholic — and S. Freud, a psychoanalyst. For Ricoeur the symbolic father is — after convoluted dialectic which ends with a final synthesis presided over by hope — “image of goodness and mercy” (Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Introducción a la lógica del mal; La paternidad: del fantasma al símbolo*, ed. Megalópolis). For Freud, on the other hand, “the last figure of this series that starts with the progenitors is the obscure power of destiny that only a few of us can conceive impersonally” Cf. *The Economic Problem of Masochism* (1924), St. Ed. Vol. XIX.
- ¹² When the Order is based on an order it is a plague.
- ¹³ For V. Propp, the Sphinx is a woman (Cf. Vladimir Propp *Edipo a la luz del folklore, Ed. Fundamentos*). For A. Green, citing Levy Strauss, it is “*par excellence* a phallic mother” (Cf. André

- Green, *El complejo de Edipo en la tragedia, Ed. Tiempo contemporáneo*) But for S. Freud “the monster symbolizes the father” (Cf. Dostoevsky and Parricide (1927), St. Ed. Vol. XXI).
- ⁴ (Passage to the suicidal act of the Sphinx) in effect, perhaps of the real, direct and clear answer that she, out of curiosity, procured (*que procuraba, la muy curiosa*).
 - ⁵ Does Jocasta feel guilty? What, in truth does she fear? Eventually we will return to the subject.
 - ¹⁶ Symbolic feminization of Oedipus — perhaps as payment of a debt, by which in offering his body to a symbolic son, he inverts and annuls the pederast transgression of Laius with Crysipus.
 - ¹⁷ Or, what amounts to the same, when the image of the body of a father is not a screen.

**Introduction to Hector Rúpolo's:
The Non-Simple Borders of a Letter**

Bolívar and San Martín (one born in Venezuela and the other in Argentina) were the liberators of South America from the Spaniards. The two revolutionary armies met almost at the end of the campaign in the city of *Guayaquil* — now in Ecuador.

The meeting at *Guayaquil* between Bolívar and San Martín was a secret meeting. The words spoken between them were never known but the outcome of the meeting was the renunciation of San Martín in favour of Bolívar in order to end the campaign.

The work of Rúpolo shows:

- a) The ethics of tragedy is not sufficient for psychoanalysis since the latter gives rise to another ethics.
- b) The analyst does not *renounce*, he *perseveres*. When Freud says near the end of his life "but the struggle is not yet over"¹ or when, likewise Lacan says, "I persevere"² they are illustrating this point.
- c) The desire of the analyst is in *perseverance*, renunciation in the field of psychoanalysis belongs to the masochistic fantasy embedded in the training.
- d) Then we should not become confused as the masters always wished. The place of the analyst is tragic but it is not the tragedy of renunciation.
- e) The ethics dwells in not pre-empting the becoming a remainder but in knowing if one wants what *it* desires. The remainder will also be a becoming of the analyst. To pre-empt this path opens not to the *tragic dimension* but to the *opportunistic* one of avoiding the *Angst* of arriving to the effect that the end of the analysis of the analysand produces on the analyst.

Oscar Zentner

NOTES

¹ The Word of Freud, in Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne — Homage to Freud, 1979, p.8.

² Letter of the Dissolution, in Op.cit., p.4.

THE NON-SIMPLE BORDERS OF A LETTER.¹

Hector Rúpolo*

“In the tales of the Mabinogion,
two kings play chess on the summit of a hill,
while below them their warriors fight.
One of the kings wins the game;
a rider comes to him with the news
that the army of the other has been beaten.
The battle of the men
was a reflection of the battle of the chessboard”

Jorge Luis Borges,
*Guayaquil*²

Our subject will be a story of Borges, entitled *Guayaquil* which speaks to us of a moment in our history as Argentinians, according to one of its readings.

This moment is inextricably linked to the question of the father. In this case the father of the country. I refer to General don José de San Martín.

If I have taken up the question of the father, it is because it seems to me a central point for psychoanalysis, both for the development made by Freud as well as for the continuation made by Lacan. And even if this work is not a clinical case, taking the question of the failure of the father may provide — according to my understanding — a view which directly implies the psychoanalytic clinic.

I am interested in emphasizing the developments that have been made by Lacan, which we cannot find in the Freudian version.

*Hector Rúpolo is an analyst-member of the *Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires*.

In Lacan, there is a knowledge of the father which has not been formalized by Freud, a knowledge that refers to the *jouissance* of the woman: $\exists x \Phi x$, which makes her not all (not complete): $\forall x \Phi x$. This *jouissance* which makes the woman not all (not complete) delineates another field different from that of the terrible father of the primal horde, because it puts in question the fundamental concept of the lack in the Other, without possibilities of occlusion.

It is for this reason that the *jouissance* of the woman is supplementary and not complementary.

I have questioned myself on two words which I will use continuously in this work and on which I know — for Argentinians — that they almost have an historical place.

These words are *pity* and *fear*.

In the seminar on Ethics, Lacan underlines these two words in relation to the Greek tragedy.

It is very curious that this word *Pathetikoi* (pathetic in English) appears in the seminar because it is the same word which appears in the story of Borges through the mouth of Dr. Zimmerman.

This character says: “. . . the function of government should be not-visible and pathetic.”

Before continuing with the elaboration of the pathetic and since I have already made a reference to the story of *Guayaquil* by Jorge Luis Borges, I will narrate briefly what happens in it.

★ ★ ★

In this story Borges relates the confrontation between a so-called Dr. Zimmerman, Professor of the University of Cordoba (Argentina) and a Professor of American History from the University of Buenos Aires. The latter is appointed by the Chancellor and the Minister of Education to make a trip to an

imaginary South American country seeking a letter from Bolivar which could cast some light upon the question of *Guayaquil*.

The whole interview between the two Professors appears traversed by the feints of those who are confronted by their search to realize the same objective. This situation appears then as a re-setting of that other scene which occurred in *Guayaquil* (between Bolivar and San Martin).

As he had already been appointed, the Professor of American History seems to hold all the trump cards, but he has also to be diplomatic to avoid a confrontation which could endanger the friendship between the two universities. This is why he enters into a dangerous game and emerges as the loser, conceding his place to Dr. Zimmerman, who will then make the journey.

Returning to the pathetic, it is curious that this word *pathetikoi* names those opposed to the *enthousiaskoi*. The *enthousiaskoi* are those who calm themselves down after having passed the test of exaltation given through the Dionysiac eruption of the music. The *pathetic* are opposed to the *enthousiastic* — let us put it that way — because they are at the mercy of other passions: these passions are *fear* and *pity*. To them, the tragedy is addressed, because as the Dionysiac music calms the *enthousiastics* down, tragedy allows catharsis, purges the *pathetics*, purges them of pity and fear which are their passions.

We cannot avoid making a reference to the hero of Greek tragedy. Lacan characterized him as one who at the end of his career/race is always on the boundary between life and death. The hero is taken to an extreme, which cannot be defined by the solitude in which he finds himself with reference to his fellow man, since the only thing this fellow man can do there is to appear as a screen which occludes his relation given at the end of the race/career³, between the hero and the boundary zone.

The Sophoclean hero, for example Antigone, who is analysed

by Lacan in the seminar on Ethics trespasses beyond a certain limit. This limit is sustained by two pillars: *fear* and *pity*. This is why the pathetics purge themselves of these two passions.

I have made all these references to the hero of Greek tragedy and to *fear* and *pity* because they will be useful for what I am going to tell you.

To begin with, I will call the character of the Borges story *our hero*. I am going to call him this, because of the place that he occupies for Argentinians. The name of *our hero*, is sustained by his campaign and his activity — both planned and carried out — as well as his clarity with respect to the fact that he was not the addressee of his deeds. But also, he is *our hero* because he is confronted with this boundary zone.

I want to emphasize one of his major values, which is somehow his legacy. Perhaps he occupies for us that place of the father because he never confused the place he occupied — because of his quest — with his person. This was a significant task since his objective was the liberation of the people, so that they would give themselves the government of their choice. The glories were not for him; on the contrary he always renounced any kind of exaltation of his person. Which as you can see becomes an ethical legacy. Unlike the Sophoclean heroes who somehow finish by traversing the limit sustained by the pillars of pity and fear, our hero to my understanding — did not traverse this limit.

When confronted with that limit, he played what we will call, his exit from the scene.

His renunciation always was interpreted in Argentina as one of his greatest values: before the possibility of confrontation and fraternal bloodshed, he renounced.

I will try to take a different perspective from this interpretation. His renunciation is what made our hero San Martin say "You will be what you ought to be, or you will be nothing."

One aspect of the question, concerns the place occupied by our hero: that of leadership.

It is known that the leader is such because he functions as the ego-ideal for the masses. The process of idealization is absolutely indispensable for the mass to constitute itself.

Now, the analysis of idealization could carry us in different paths from that of simple idealization implicit in a particular common morality. This common morality for us could be: *to extol the virtues of renunciation*. Which is signified as the grandeur of certain men who at the point of winning a game concede in order not to confront their rival. We will see further that in this renunciation something related to desire is at play.

This is why we may find in our hero an ethic. An ethical legacy, but, *not there where it is extolled*.

Then if I want to speak of a knowledge, that which is transmitted by Borges in this story in which some characters imitate the historical ones and if the author of the story speaks of the truth it is because he was able to give a further step.

Borges can continue walking in this story because he does not remain fascinated before the wall of fear and pity, allowing him not to remain totally trapped in imaginary places: either confrontation or renunciation.

It is true that there was historically as in the Borges story, both a vanquisher and a vanquished. But the problem is posed, can we give a clearer place to what was played in those pages, in that context so important for our history?

Could we reduce it to a vanquisher and a vanquished?

Or on the contrary, will we find another lesson?

Who was vanquished?

What was the meaning of success and over whom?

Why not say that these two battles developed in different

fields — one literary, the other historical — and relate something in regard to this person, so important to the Argentinians, as is the figure of San Martin, in this case the Father of the country?

If the ideals sustained by the father in front of the adversary were more exalted (there was no confusion between his person and his function since he took into account the will of the people) did he do well to renounce?

Doesn't this lead us to say — as is commonly said — that the best are those who cannot carry out their thought; that failure is the only thing we can expect of them?

Shouldn't we think that there was a renunciation at play, but the place was mistaken?

I remember from the story of Borges: "*Mon siège est fait*" (my *siège*/place has been made); that's my last word on the subject.

Of what *sitio* (place or *siège*) are we talking?

What is the *siège* to which Borges referred when he took this famous phrase: if this phrase is already pregnant with equivocation, of the place of that city, the site fabricated by the author of that place?

When historians (principally the supporters of the Father of the country) insist in finding one of the highest values in this renunciation, they make the renunciation function as the corroboration of the height of the great man of the country.

Aren't they maybe trying to mitigate his fault?

Does our hero renounce his personal interests?

Or does he concede to his desire?

This is what I am trying to question, because if there is a point in which we can think of the end of the career of our hero, it is

in the same final point as that of the Borges character: in one it will imply that he will not write any more; in the other, that he will get out of the political scene of Argentina and the continent. He will no longer write the pages of our history.

Is this the best to which a man may aspire?

Will he become a hero when in that last instant which crowns the struggle of his life; he will get a failure instead of a success?

Borges tells us clearly: our character, the Professor of American History was waiting anxiously for that trip, just as the historical hero goes to *Guayaquil* to encounter in that famous interview the support which will allow him to successfully finish his liberating gesture. This is to free the last bastion in America from the power of the Spaniards.

How could it be that the path encountered by the one and the other is that of failure?

We may discuss, as is done by historians that that was the only thing which could have been done; that if he did not renounce, there would have been a fratricidal war. But to accept the implicit conditions of the adversary: (that is to say only one liberator) was that not to sacrifice the cause of freedom at the feet of a little other? a little other who had already acted to usurp *Guayaquil* which already belonged to Peru by the self-determination of the people?

It becomes clear how the Borges character avoids the struggle: there is a moment in which, one as well as the other allowed himself to be overwhelmed. But the problem in his historical view was polarized because some biased historians said of one of the protagonists: what could he do, spill his brother's blood? thus giving to understand that, not to opt for war, he had to opt for renunciation.

This sounds like a false option, already posed by our hero. Precisely: this false option — confrontation or renunciation — is not more than the imaginary outcome of any option, to cover

what is of the order of the lack and together with this, substance is given to the little other.

It is in that point in the different versions of what these two great men said to each other, that historians begin to look for some element to pose the problem.

But with regard to this latter question, Borges also tells us a valuable thing through Dr. Zimmerman:

"Maybe the words that they exchanged were trivial. Two men confronted each other at Guayaquil, if one of them imposed on the other, it was due to his greater will, not dialectical games."

Therefore, rather than asking what was said, — according to my understanding — we have to ask another question: what is the will of our hero when he goes to his adversary to ask for help?

If the rivalry appeared already inevitable, which is gathered from the antecedents in question, which we know from letters and in the act of taking *Guayaquil*, why then does our hero insist that his adversary help him?

Here it is necessary to remember what Lacan tells us of the hero of the tragedy, because what I am telling you today is very much concerned with our ethics.

What I have said implies the possibility of listening in a different way to the one who renounces at the end of his campaign, in a way that is different from the exaltation of renunciation as the highest moral value of our hero.

Then if our hero stood out as such because he never confused his place with his person, his renunciation is heard as another element of his moral value.

But this is where failure remains inscribed for us, as the most valuable thing in a man.

I said: he who renounced at the end of his campaign, like our hero did, had conceded over his desire.

Lacan said:

"Around treason something is at play, when it is tolerated. He who, driven by the idea of the good — I understand the good of he who has betrayed in that moment — concedes to the point of annihilating his own claims, to the point of telling himself: well then, if that is the case, let us renounce our point of view. Neither the one nor the other, but undoubtedly not I, is more worthy. Let us return to the ordinary path. It is there that you can be sure is found the structure of what is called conceding over one's desire."

Lacan adds:

"There is no return from this surpassing, that limit where I have linked in one term the contempt, of the other and of oneself. One can try to repair but not undo. Isn't that a fact of the experience which shows us that analysis is capable of furnishing us with an efficient compass in the field of ethical direction?"

Then what our protagonist asks is the appearance of some Other which will sustain his desire.

But I want to remind you of something. Before I said that there was a renunciation at play, only that it was in a mistaken place, which makes all the difference.

Returning to the question, our hero had to renounce to an Other capable of sustaining his desire, precisely because desire emerges from the lack in the Other.

At the end of his campaign his renunciation was to concede to his desire, in front of the Other with capital letter and not to the small other who was his adversary.

Were the Spaniards the Other?

What could he have left us as his legacy, had he not conceded to his desire and had he not been trapped in the false option of renunciation or confrontation? Maybe, he would have taught us something that Argentinians do not know: that he who is at the service of the good, of personal glory, of narcissism, of that little other who all of us carry within us, of sustaining the desire; has dug his own grave. The essential question is the relation with the big Other and not with the rival, the eventual adversary or the circumstantial enemy.

But this is not all; is it not by chance that we have been called the moral winners, because we always play very well until the last minute in which something betrays us, (a hazard, a coincidence) and there, is where we lose? And isn't it there, that we do not want to see that what we call coincidence or hazard is, in reality our own desire which has been betrayed by ourselves? That is the moment when we detract from our own desire.

Well then: the adversary of our hero, sometime later will recognize his error, which indicates to us that not only does he fall into the error but also that he traps the circumstantial adversary.

Taking again a sentence from the seminar on Ethics, "The hero in the tragedy leaves the adversary to himself."

Of course, to leave the place, to concede to his desire is not to leave the adversary to himself.

But I would not say that the history finishes here, on the contrary, the story *Guayaquil* appears and I would like to quote another paragraph from Lacan.

"I believe that all through this historical period, the desire of man largely mauled,

anaesthetised, numbed by the moralists, domesticated by pedagogues, betrayed by academies, has taken refuge and has been repressed; simply in the subtlest and blindest of all passions — that of knowing — as the history of Oedipus shows: and it is prepared to profer, quickly, that the last word has not been spoken."

It is in knowledge that desire took refuge, in the knowing of this apparently simple story that I recounted to you today.

June, 1984.

NOTES

- ¹ Paper read at the Plenary Session, 3rd Congress organized by *Le Champ Freudien* in Buenos Aires, June 1984.
- ² Borges, Jorge Luis; *Guayaquil* in Doctor Brodie's Report. Penguin Books, 1976.
- ³ Race/career are covered by the one word in Spanish.

**THE FREUDIAN CLINIC: A LOST BET
Through the Freudian Clinic¹**

Isidoro Vegh*

Today you respond to my demand. I start by apologizing for the title, *The Freudian Clinic: A Lost Bet*, because it would be understood as if I were about to offer you what is difficult for me, not to say unattainable. I will change the preposition and instead of *on* the Freudian clinic I will ask you to accompany me *through* the Freudian clinic. This title was proposed because *through* has at least two aspects: as a summing up of one view of the Freudian field — not just any view but a principal one, also *through* the Freudian clinic, since if anything can be said, it is because this clinic acts as a cause. I will start with two quotations: “The clinic is the real inasmuch as it is the impossible to support”², and “it is for this reason that the psychoanalytic clinic is based on re-integrating all that was said by Freud”³. Both statements were made by Lacan during the opening of the Clinical Section, in Vincennes⁴, and they pose two questions. First: Why is the clinic as the real impossible to support? Second: Why *The Freudian clinic* and not *The Lacanian clinic*? It is around these two questions that I will try to develop this disquisition.

If we give credit to the second statement of Lacan, I propose that you accompany me through the interrogation of a text of Freud, in particular, paragraph two of, *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*⁵. I refer to The Forgetting of Foreign Words, known by psychoanalysts as the example of *Aliquis*. I anticipate an affirmation. What Freud tell us is an example of a good analytic session. This affirmation brings its consequences, because it deals with Freud and a young man who are travelling.

*Isidoro Vegh. Psychoanalyst, founding member of *Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires*. Director of publication *Revista Cuadernos Sigmund Freud*. Author of *La Clinica Freudiana* (1984) published by Lugar Editorial, Argentina.

There is nothing of the famous *setting*, of the repeated millieu of a psychoanalytic routine as it is stated from a certain view. It takes place during a vacation of Freud, when he meets a young man with whom there is a small incident. Psychoanalysis deals with that, with small incidents.

Nothing is further from psychoanalysis than generalities. They are small, punctual events, but with all the rigour of determination. Freud said that it happened during his vacation. I asserted that this event reported by Freud is truly a session of psychoanalysis. And, by saying this, I question the empirical definition of an analyst's vacation. I even say there is a question in it: where is the place — impossible place — of the analyst situated? And what is the time when its efficiency is interrupted, a time we could call vacation?

There is no vacation for an analyst whenever the function of the word is possible in the field of language.

On the contrary, there is a vacation for the analyst when he inserts himself in reality. An analyst can be on vacation when he is at his consulting room, and can be not on vacation while he is making a trip.

Freud says it is about a young man — you should keep this in mind — it seems a random comment. However, we will discover that in an analyst's report of a case, as happens with me at this moment, he cannot avoid saying something of himself. This is the first difficulty of the clinic. What is valid for the saying of the analyst is also valid for the saying of the analysand. In principle, all he says, may produce an effect of sense. Freud says, as if it were a description of no importance: "It has to do with a cultured young man", and immediately adds that both of them belong to the same folk — he refers to the Jewish folk. He comments that the young man seemed to know some of his texts — another datum that might also not be anecdotal. They start to talk and the young man begins to lament. Due to his adherence to his folk he found himself condemned to lose opportunities. Opportunities that were available for people who didn't share

that mark. From his point of view, the people of his generation were found to fail, excluded from the possibility of developing their talents and satisfying their needs. Let us listen, too, to the mention of *generation*. In a point of his allegation against the injustice shared by both of the young man and Freud, the first pronounces a latin sentence: "*Exoriare . . .*" He cannot continue, he is missing a word and, as he can, he builds up the phrase by saying: "*Ex nostris ossibus ultor!*" He admits his error after being sanctioned by the laughter of his interlocutor. He asks Freud to say the phrase if he can, and Freud says: "With pleasure: *Exoriar(e) aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor!*" Thus far the origin of the small incident.

This verse belongs to The Aeneid of Virgil⁶ when, in the fourth book, Dido states her strong desire for revenge against the ungrateful lover who performs the command of the Gods. His destiny is to be the founder of the New Empire. In exchange for that he abandons the woman who, for the sake of love, gave shelter to him and his people, risking even her reputation. The young man said to Freud: "You enjoy my mistake. You mock at my mistake, why don't you tell me the whole phrase?" What are these questions? "Do you enjoy my mistake? Are you mocking my mistake?" It is in this way an analysis starts: "What does the Other want of me?" Freud answers: "I will tell you with pleasure" It is a pleasure to Freud to answer and complete the phrase. Second question: why that pleasure, out of a narcissistic boast of his knowledge? I think that, should we continue, we may find perhaps another reason for that pleasure. As soon as Freud finishes the phrase, this young man who seemed to know his works to some degree — this is an important fact — says to him: "It is you — not me — who maintains that these small incidents are not undetermined, that there is a reason for them". And he invites him to verify if it is so. An encounter is produced, under the following subjective positions, which could be defined under the terms of a bet.

A bet

The subject, the young man, challenges Freud to verify what his texts propose with respect to this forgetfulness. And the latter accepts, just like an analyst can accept or not, a demand for analysis. But, how does he accept this demand? Here is one of the reasons why I propose that it is an example of a good session of analysis. By saying good, I don't mean that it has anything to do with well-being, but with the efficiency pertinent to the subject.

There is a famous bet in the history of philosophy, proposed by Pascal in *Pensées*⁷. It is a test that was published after he died. Pascal says of the non-believer in the existence of the Other, called God:

“If God exists, and therefore eternity too, that is to say eternity of his soul, if you accept to situate yourself as a believer or on the path of the believer, you have the possibility to win the infiniteness instead of the finiteness of terrestrial life.”

Thinking of the difference between terrestrial finiteness and eternal infiniteness, the latter that could be gained if God existed and, in the case that God didn't exist, what would be lost, it is convenient — says Pascal —

“that anyone who is not closed to this reason, accepts this bet as I propose it: in favour of God's existence. Even if you don't believe, do what a believer does and initiate yourself in this path”.

Pascal puts into act what he already suggested as a possibility for the subject. In order to approach the demonstration of a truth: it is discovered when it is searched, demonstrated when possessed, or it is discerned when it is examined in relation to the false. In the example of Freud I refer to, the young man pro-

poses that Freud demonstrate the truth sustained by him in some of his texts. It is a question of demonstrating to an-other⁴ a truth that is possessed. Pascal wrote two short works; *The Spirit of Geometry*, and *The Art of Persuading*⁹, where he states what the art of persuading is for him: to persuade somebody else of a truth owned by an-other. It is nothing more than the behaviour of perfect methodical proof which consists of three essential parts. To this end he bases himself in the geometrical method, especially in Euclidian geometry: define the terms to be used, by means of clear definitions. Propose evident principles or axioms in order to prove the subject that is discussed, and in the demonstration to always mentally substitute that which is defined by the definitions. He maintains:

“It is easy to see that by following this method one can be sure of convincing, since if all the terms are understood and perfectly exempt from mis-understanding due to the definitions, and all the principles being well disposed among them; if in the demonstration that which is defined is always mentally replaced by the definitions, the invincible strength of consequences will be effective to the full extent.”¹⁰

Pascal starts from axioms or clear and evident ideas which secure the attainment of truth. It is a thesis that later will be also disproved by the history of geometry. For nowadays in geometry, one of those clear and evident notions, like that of space, is no more than one of the several possible spaces, that which is related to intuition. Pascal's position is questioned because, even by following the order stated by him, the subject can answer by rejecting the truth that reaches him in his belief. And this leads us to state the difficulty of any attempt to convince.

This is not the path followed by Freud. Had Freud accepted

to oppose his reasons to this young man who states his doubt in what he asserted in his texts, he would have entered one of the variables of the bet which I propose to you in relation to game theory. There is an interesting book that I recommend to you; *Theory of Games*¹¹ by Roger Caillois. In this book, the author reminds us of the possibility of classifying different kinds of games: competition games; in which the players, in order to win, must impose themselves on the other, with certain kinds of abilities according to the game, but where also the competitor's skill plays its role; simulacrum games, fancy games, vertiginous games and games of chance. For games of chance, the personal skills of the gamblers are not brought into play.

... lost

Had Freud accepted the challenge by which this small incident begins, he would have started in terms of convincing, a kind of game that implied the skills of one and the other. And, according to the classification, this would be called a competition game. Freud could have argued about what he wrote in his book. He could have developed and stated the theoretical coherence between one term and the other. However, he doesn't do that. What does Freud do? He says to the subject: "Alright, if you wish to get the truth I propose, I only request that you fulfil one condition: Say whatever comes to your mind, with no omissions." This is a fundamental rule of analysis. What does the fact that Freud proposes this rule imply? That he decides to suspend the possibility of winning the bet by means of convincing. He leaves the bet lost, in order to propose another one, in which he will not be the winner. But he invites the subject to a game of chance. Caillois reminds us that these are the only games that are exclusive to humans. The rest, those of simulation — he wrote about it in *Medusa and Company*¹² — have to do with mimicry, vertigo and competition which can be found in the animal world. Games of chance are the only ones, reminds Roger Caillois, that exclusively exist amongst human beings. In a marginal note, Roger Caillois says that we can determine some

f the common features of a community by determining the games they prefer. He uses Argentinians as an example, as he has there several times, and places them in relation to their taste or *truco*¹³.

Freud formulates only one pre-requisite, "You say whatever comes to your mind." What does it imply to say to somebody else, "From now on you stop any criticism and say whatever comes to your mind"? A phrase he says to both the analysand and the analyst. "From now on, everything that is said has, in principle, the same value." This inaugural phrase of any analysis is, as Miller reminds us very well¹⁴, a structural cause of the beginning of transference in its symbolic dimension. After several years of teaching, Lacan proposes a *matheme* for the beginning of the game of analysis. He calls that first move, the *opposed-subject-of-knowing*¹⁵. This implies that a signifier, that of transference, will be started because the fundamental rule was previously stated. Why? Because proposing it to the subject, from the beginning implies a dimension where his saying will place the effect of sense of that which comes out of his mouth, beyond his and the analyst's intention. It states the place of what is said, beyond any intention. The irregularity of what can be produced whilst he says whatever comes to his mind, determines that the regularity that hastens, be the retroactive effect that slips out from the intentionality of the subject; the latter cannot but place it in another place, exactly in the place of the Other, which originates in this way.

The Game of the Other

The fact that an analyst formulates a fundamental rule of analysis, restores the possibility of the place of the Other, whatever the theory to which he adheres.

Let's continue with this short story. The subject says, "Alright, the first thing that comes to my mind, though ridiculous, is to decompose *aliquis* into *a* and *liquis*".

Ridiculous, he says this several times, and Freud tells him not to worry about that, to continue talking, and say what you know, "Reliquien (relics), liquefying, fluidity, fluid" — in German: *Reliquien-Liquidation-Flüssigkeit-Fluid*.

And then comes a question; the subject says, "have you already found something out?" and Freud answers, "No, but go on". To say "No, but go on", is also not unimportant, it is the way in which the analyst situates himself, suspending *all knowledge* from one place, the structural place, in order that the analysis be effective. He suspends the fact of identifying himself with the supposed knowledge. Freud says: "No, go on".

$$\frac{S \longrightarrow Sq}{s(S^1, S^2 \dots S^n)}$$


This is the formula written by Lacan for the inaugural time of transference, in his Proposition of October 9th¹⁶. This capital S is the S of transference. Below the line, the small s in front of the bracket, is the subject who ex-sists¹⁷ to (S¹, S² . . . Sⁿ); the series of signifiers which determines that, if the analyst does not usurp the place of the supposed-subject-of-knowing, then the sub-posed¹⁸ knowledge, an unconscious knowledge, a battery of signifiers which the analysand doesn't know of up to that moment, may be displayed. It is a knowledge that is not known. In front of Freud's answer, that he doesn't know yet, he tells him to go on. The subject continues, "Relics, well, it reminds me of the relics of Simon of Trento, who, as it is told by Christian tradition, was canonized for being assassinated by the Jews when he was virtually a child, according to the belief that for Passover, Jews used to kill Christians, or some Christians, in order to use their blood in their ceremonies."


Freud briefly points out, "As you can see, this already has a relation to the subject we were talking about earlier". The sub-

ject continues and remembers another saint. Saint Augustine and something he wrote on women, also the writing by Kleinpaul that speaks of the victims of the Jews, as becoming reincarnations of the Redeemer. He tells that he saw an old man during his trip — remember that Freud speaks of this man as being a young man — an original old man, with the face of a bird of prey. He talks of an original old man, and Freud listens because before that there were Simon of Trento and St. Augustine, Origins, one of the Fathers of the Church. What makes one suppose that there where the subject says an original old man, the listening of the analyst will propose Origins? That the unconscious is a discourse which, in the midst of its saying produces its script and that this is nothing more than a hieroglyphic writing.

Let us take an example in old Chinese characters; given by Ezra Pound in *The ABC of Reading*¹⁹.

Man was written in this way 

tree, 

rising sun, 

Thus, the sun at dawn as a rising sun amongst the branches of the tree,

all of which writes, the East.



It is in this way that the unconscious speaks. It speaks and in what it speaks it writes. We remember what Safouan said, during his visit, as he made an analogy of the unconscious with the scribe²⁰ who would be in the next room. He is a scribe who can say what he wants, who only says what he wants, except that he cannot say it in the way of the articulated language of every day talk. If the unconscious wants to speak of Origins, Origins is the only word he will not use, but he can present the image of an original old man.

There is an affirmation: "It speaks" says Lacan, also "It reads"²¹. We can find evidence of the previous example in that of Signorelli, the first example given by Freud in *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. Signorelli cannot appear in the manifest narrative, in that forgetting by Freud. Because *Signor* was used as a hieroglyphic in order to substitute *Herr* The fact that it doesn't appear means that It reads, and It reads hieroglyphics.

The subject continues associating. He remembers also St. Paul and St. Benedict. Besides the name of that original old man was Benedict and following the series of saints, he associates St. Januarius. He remembers the miracle of St. Januarius: in a church in Naples, the blood of St. Januarius, which is in a phial, liquefies on a certain date. When this happens, the folk are full of joy because it is a vaticination of bliss. When it does not, there is much agitation. If there is a delay in the miracle, it can be an omen of misfortune. The young man says that once there was a general, who he believes was Garibaldi, who asked for that miracle to be produced, "because if it doesn't produ . . .", and there he stops. Freud tells him that if he doesn't go on, he cannot continue with the stated bet. The condition is to go on, if he wishes. If not, the bet will be suspended. The subject continues; he is expecting news from a lady, which is very important for him, and Freud adds ". . . who missed a period". Freud adds. Does Freud add? Are there two subjects in the session? I say no. There is only one subject. If the analyst suspends his saying and lets the other speak, the Other speaks, even through his mouth.

I remember a film that is being screen nowadays in Buenos Aires. Probably many of you saw it. *The Ship Sails On*, the last film by Fellini. For those who saw it; after the big mess produced during the rehearsal, when does the orchestra function properly? Only at one time, punctually, when the conductor says, "Follow the notes". It is the only moment when conductor and orchestra submit themselves to the law of the signifier,

the notes, and its effect, the work of art, the symphony, is produced.

Freud says to the subject that, if he could get to that conclusion, it was due to the associations he had produced: blood that liquefies, a clear allusion to the calendar, because in German, *Augustine* is *Augustinus* — the relation between *August* and *Augustinus*, in homage to *Augustus*, is more direct — and the same with *Januarius*, from which *January* derives.

Once again we find the dimension of the hieroglyphic. It is not a matter of finding out the qualities, of St. Augustine nor of St. Januarius, nor even of their dimension as saints, although this is at play as far as it is a signifier that insists. Both, *August* and *January*, *Augustinus* and *Januarius*, what do they mean to Freud? *Calendar*. We could add something else, not of the calendar in any of its possibilities, because it may not be the days of a week, but the month. And we could venture that perhaps it had to do with the month of *August*. This is not in the case history. *Vacation in summer*, could probably have something to do with that date. Anyhow, this is what I infer, it is not in the text.

Freud says to the subject, "You have produced a beautiful symbol with the miracle of St. Januarius". It is a problem of the symbol which could be thought of as being produced by analogy. Blood that liquefies, menstruation. Now then, it has nothing to do with that. The analogy appears as an effect of the significant associations. It is not an analogy supported by the resemblance, not even by the resemblance of shapes, that makes the miracle of St. Januarius' representative of the preoccupation of the subject, if the woman he loves did or did not get her period. Rather it is the opposite. That analogy precipitates because it is supported by the significant association that produce and precede it.

Conviction of the Other

Then, the subject says, "I absolutely didn't realize this." In effect, if it has to do with the unconscious, it is radically unconscious. It produces its act, even in the act of saying, without him knowing it. Only in the time of *après-coup* — it can be founded by the time of the interpretation — he will get the knowledge that concerns him.

It is not a matter of convincing but of conviction: the Subject, of the Other, opposite to the belief, as proposed by Pascal. Conviction is possible because the subject receives his own message in an inverted form from the place of the Other. For it to be produced, the analyst must support the fact of a lost bet, that which would be played on a competitive level. It will not be his reasons that will convince, but the letter of the subject which returns from the Other.


The young man ends up by saying two things, "But, are you sure it is really like that? Is it not a coincidence?" And he adds, "But I want to confess to you (confession, something that is directed to the Other) that, in fact, the woman from whom I'm expecting that news is Italian and I visited Naples with her a short time ago." Many years later in *Constructions in Analysis*²² Freud shows how to read something that implies the truth of an act of interpretation; by the discourse that proceeds. As the unconscious opens and closes, he ends by saying, "But isn't it all a coincidence?" Freud answers with something that won't produce any conviction, "Whenever there is association, there will be coincidences like this." This is a letter of Freud's experience, not of the subject's experience.

Freud's comment on the experience is as follows, "In this example, unlike that of the forgetting of Signorelli, there is not a substitute recollection in the place where the word is missing". Then, in small print he adds as a footnote, "Well, there was really a substitute recollection, because later, as I urged him asking whether he remembered another word at the moment he

couldn't remember *aliquis*, he said that he thought of *ab* which is a preposition used in the ablative, and there there was an intensification of the word *exoriare*, but that he believed that it was due to the fact that it was the first word of the phrase. As I insisted, he confessed that then the word exorcism came to his mind." This dialogue with the young man came to an end when Freud, instead of detaining himself at menstruation, insinuated a reference to what he would do if she did not get her period again. "Could there be any relation to what happened to Simon of Trento, the child who was assassinated?" He alluded to the possibility of an abortion. The subject answered: "We had better not talk about it", and the small event was interrupted.

The Analyst's Ex-position²³

Freud wrote that there was no substitutive recollection. I say it is here where we have to read Freud. He says: "All that happened was a change in the order of the words." No more than a change in the order of the words? I say no. A substitutive element appeared in the place of *aliquis*, which, in effect, is an element in Dido's phrase, but appears in the place where *aliquis* was supposed to be. The subject said: "*Exoriar(e) ex nostris ossibusultor*", when he should have said "*exoriar(e) aliquis*", *ex* appears substituting for *aliquis*. I am giving you the formula of the metaphor, in the way Lacan proposes it²⁴.



Aliquis is the signifier that falls under the bar, and *ex* appears as the metaphoric signifier that substitutes it. There is one place left, that of the interrogation, which implies the effect of meaning which reaches the subject. But which subject? The young man? I propose, Freud as well, because Freud says, "There is no substitutive word." What may this particle *ex* be? In Latin, the prefix *ex* is also a preposition of the ablative. There are

several translations for it. One of them, if we follow the line of the exorcism, *exoriare* means to take out of oneself (the phrase says take out of oneself, *aliquis* is somebody, somebody amongst us, somebody of our bones, *ultor* as an avenger. Then, that somebody may rise from our bones as an avenger)²⁵. One of the possibilities of *ex* is *out of*. And it is in this way that the dialogue starts, *out of* the possibilities of Viennese society to which Freud and the young man belonged, remained those who were part of the Jewish community. This *ex* concerned not only the subject, but also Freud. Freud says, "he is a cultured young man, ambitious and Jewish." Couldn't we say the same of Freud, he is a cultured young man, ambitious and Jewish? Didn't Freud always lament that he couldn't get the titles granted to his fellows by the University, because he belonged to the people marked by segregation?

In this case history, the *ex* is the mark that situates not only the subject, but also Freud. And there we can read the desire of the analyst. Besides, the phrase is not said by a nobody. It is said by *Dido against the empire that will be founded by Aeneas*. An empire which, according to Marthe Robert²⁶, is none other than the Roman Empire. Rome, the Church, specifically the Christian, Catholic Church.

There is another question. I will say it in a few words, that *ex* appears as confirming, putting into act, the fact that repression is no different from the return of the repressed, that the unconscious is not placed in the background, but on the surface of the discourse. For that reason Lacan proposes the topology of a one faced and one edged surface, the Moebius strip. That the distinction between the enunciated and the enunciation, placed in Lacanian graphics in two different levels, glides in the same movement of the discourse.

Lacan's interpretation of the famous aporia which so much amused logicians, *I lie* is as follows; *That is the truth*²⁷, which is decomposed in the enunciation that says, *I deceive you* and the enunciated *I lie*. The *I deceive you* situates the position of the

subject in the place of the enunciation, but both of them play their role in that *I lie*. In that *ex* in the place of *aliquis*, of that somebody who must fall according to a desire of death which appears in the subject. In this *ex* is the term that substitutes the one that must fall, but also what returns from that which falls.

The Remaining-to-be-Concluded²⁸

I return to the two questions of the beginning. We asked ourselves: why is the clinic the real insofar as it is impossible to support? It is the real as impossible to support, because there is no sexual relation, "*il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel*". The real of psychoanalysis is not the letter. The fact that the letter is of the order of the real doesn't validate its reciprocity. The real of psychoanalysis is sex and more specifically in the way that "there is no sexual relation", neither between the analyst and the analysand. The clinic is the real is so far as it is impossible to support because the desire of the analyst strikes on the wheel of fortune where the subject plays his cipher. If it is difficult to write case histories it is because telling a case history is to tell about the analyst as much as about the analysand. The difficulty is not to talk of the clinic but to talk through the clinic.

The other question; why Freudian clinic and not Lacanian clinic? Because psychoanalysis insofar as it reintroduces the dimension of the subject in science, makes the analyst a part of the concept of the unconscious. The desire of Freud, founder of psychoanalysis is intrinsic to the efficacy of the bequeathed procedure; without the desire of Freud there is no psychoanalysis. The Freudian clinic is not rational persuasion, nor suggestion in any of its variants although there is suggestion in psychoanalysis, but not as the main resource of its efficiency. Conviction reaches the subject through the letter, which is his inverted message coming from the Other, if a letter of the Other accepts its fall. The analyst makes *semblant* of the *objet petit a* it is *a-lost-ber*²⁹.

Why should somebody wish to be an analyst, when to accept to sustain that impossible place is no more than sustaining the place of a fall? Why doesn't the analyst correspond to the demand for love from his analysand? Out of ascetism? Out of superegoistic imposition? Due to his own difficulty to make that transit? I say no. If the analyst suspends that which is played in that demand for love, it is because there is another desire articulated in its efficiency. A desire that leads him to sustain *a-lost-bet*: desire of death. Desire of death which, if subjectified, supposes a death that leads to *jouissance*. But if the *jouissance* of the analyst is played in the space of the session, we would assist to the space of a perversion. Where then is situated that which allows the analyst to sustain that impossible place? That is the function of the script. No analyst will be able to sustain that impossible place if he does not exercise the function of the script. This function of the script which is the ethics of psychoanalysis, time of the *après-coup*, supposes the ethics of *jouissance* — the place of the analyst's *jouissance*. When I say script, please understand what I said before — if the unconscious produces a script in the saying — the analyst's saying in his analysis, in the supervision and in the relation to other analysts, all these are places where a script is produced. Each of these places have their own times, and the time comes when the script is inevitable, also due to its logical difficulties. The history of psychoanalysis teaches us what was necessary for those who were great analysts. The ethics of *jouissance* supposes a *jouissance* of the writing, intrinsic to the analyst's function. Does Freud write this text as one more example? I don't think so. It is necessary for him, it is a time of conclusion in order to open another time.

Translation; Azucena Rüt Wainer
 Technical revision; Judith Jamschon

NOTES

- ¹ Disquisition given at the Freudian School of Buenos Aires, 16th. October 1980. In the original, the word *por* was used. In Spanish, it

means both *through* and *because of*. We will translate it throughout the text as *through the clinic* or *because of the clinic*, according to the meaning of the phrase.

- ² "La clinique est le réel en tant qu'il est l'impossible a supporter" (The clinic is the real insofar as it is the impossible to support).
- ³ "C'est bien pourquoi la clinique psychoanalytique consiste a re-interroger tout ce que Freud a dit" (This is why the psychoanalytic clinic consists in re-interrogating everything that Freud said).
- ⁴ LACAN, J. *Ouverture de la section clinique, Ornicar? No. 9, Paris, Lyse, 1977*.
- ⁵ FREUD, S. *Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), St. Ed., Vol. VI*.
- ⁶ VIRGIL. *The Aeneid, Song IV*.
- ⁷ PASCAL, B. *Pensees, Paris, Garnier Frères, 1964*.
- ⁸ Literally translated in order to emphasize the word *other*.
- ⁹ PASCAL, B. *L'Esprit de la géométrie et De l'art de persuader, Paris, Pédagogie Moderne, 1979*.
- ¹⁰ PASCAL, B. *Op. cit.*
- ¹¹ CAILLOIS, R. *Teoría de los juegos, Barcelona, Seix Barral, 1958*.
- ¹² CAILLOIS, R. *Medusa y Cía., Barcelona, Seix Barral, 1962*.
- ¹³ Popular Argentinian card game in which partners communicate by grimaces.
- ¹⁴ MILLER, J. *Algorithme, Ornicar? No. 16, Paris, Seuil, 1978*.
- ¹⁵ LACAN, J. *Proposition du 9 octobre 1967, Silicet No. 1, Paris, Seuil, 1968, p.19*.
- ¹⁶ LACAN, J. *Op. cit.*
- ¹⁷ In the original, *ek-sist* instead of *exist*.
- ¹⁸ In the original, *sub-puesto* instead of *supuesto*.
- ¹⁹ POUND, E. *A.B.C. de la lecture, Paris, Gallimard, 1966*.
- ²⁰ SAFOUAN, M. *El trabajo del sueño, Cuadernos Sigmund Freud*

No. 8, Buenos Aires, 1981.

SAFOUAN, M. *L'Inconscient et son scribe*, Paris; Seuil, 1982.

²¹ LACAN, J. *Encore*, Paris, Seuil, 1975.

²² FREUD, S. *Constructions in Analysis* (1937), St. Ed. Vol. XXIII.

²³ In the original, *ex-posición* instead of *exposición*.

²⁴ LACAN, J. *On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis*; *Ecrits*, a Selection, Tavistock Publications, Great Britain, 1977, p.200.

²⁵ VIRGIL, *The Aeneid*, Song IV, 625. Literally; "Let someone (*aliquis*) arise from my bones as an avenger."

²⁶ ROBERT, M. *Freud y la conciencia judía*, Barcelona, *Península*, 1976.

²⁷ LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977, p.139.

²⁸ In the original, *lo que resta -a- concluir*. The author plays with the word *a* making a reference to the *objet petit a*.

²⁹ In the original, *una a-puesta perdida*. The Spanish word for bet is *apuesta*. Here again, in order to play with the word *a* with reference to the *objet petit a*, the author decomposes it into *a-puesta*.

CRITIQUE IN THE FREUDIAN FIELD

Isidoro Vegh

1. In The Freudian Field

Only a few months ago the third Psychoanalytic encounter between Argentinian and French analysts and those from other countries was concluded. Amongst those, I include myself as a debtor to the teachings of Jacques Lacan. In that opportunity together with other members of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires we gave a text which answered the demand of the title of the congress, "How does one analyse today?" The title of the answer was, "Interpretation".

This text was offered in a style which for many was thought to be hermetic and thus the answer proposed was thought to remain closed.

Instead, the answer was heard to announce a critique. I will not contradict this. We wanted it to be a critical interpretation and the style implied the place towards which that critique was directed.

It was intended to show that some disciples of Lacan, authors of texts which appeared to be rigorous readings of his works, had for some time been producing other views in front of which we couldn't fail to show our differences — differences which furthermore imply another question in as much as those texts were said to be the valid consequences of the teaching of Lacan. That I know was heard. This was not sufficient. It is necessary to show this in another way. Maybe today I will have the opportunity to clarify what on that occasion seemed to be hermetic.

Buy why the obscurity?

At least in what touches me, what was at play was the inscription of a testimony: beyond my name or my person, what was at play were the teachings of Jacques Lacan. That is why we preferred quoting in abundance from his works which I believe accounts for the somewhat closed style of the text presented.

It was also around an intervention of mine in the Congress in which I openly assumed a critical position linked to other critiques which emerged in that congress. That led some members of this School to question essentially my word; not only within the School but also in a paper which took some of my affirmations out of context concluding that they implied an unacceptable consequence. A critical statement about Michel Silvestre and another where I affirm that some positions risk a deviation with ethical consequences were taken in order to infer, (I have to recognise that those who wrote the paper were kind enough to not attribute this conclusion to me) that that led the Freudian School of Buenos Aires to a split with the *Fondation Champ Freudien*.

Wasn't there in the reading of my critique a truth which could have been returned to those who formulated it, by way of their receiving their own message in an inverted form?

To threaten with a split to those who were listening to this critique that I gave and today take up again, wasn't that a way of trying to stifle it?

There is a place which I choose in psychoanalysis in Buenos Aires and in psychoanalysis in general. It is not a recent choice and I plan to continue in this manner. It is my way of mapping my debt to the teachings of Lacan who said in the Letter of the Dissolution, how he wants the continuation of psychoanalysis.

"So be it for a labour, I have said, which in the field opened by Freud, restores the cutting edge of its truth — which brings back the original praxis which he instituted in the name of psychoanalysis in the duty which belongs to him in this world — which by an assiduous critique denounces its deviations and compromises which impede its progress by degrading its use."

If I used the word deviation it is because our paper started

from this text. I can tell you the reason for this seminar in another way, with a brief text extracted from a mystic Islamic Sufi tradition from a compilation made by Shah.²

It is valid for those who want to receive it, but I cannot fail to recognise that I am specially speaking to those who are members of the Freudian School. It is called, The Foundation of a Tradition.

"Once upon a time there was a town composed of two parallel streets. A dervish passed through one street into the other, and as he reached the second one, the people there noticed that his eyes were streaming with tears. 'Someone has died in the other street,' one cried, and soon all the children in the neighbourhood had taken up the cry.

What had really happened was that the dervish had been peeling onions.

Within a short space of time the cry had reached the first street; and the adults of both streets were so distressed and fearful (for each community was related to the other) that they dared not make complete inquiries as to the cause of the furore.

A wise man tried to reason with the people of both streets, asking why they did not question each other. Too confused to know what they meant, some said: 'For all we know there is a deadly plague in the other street.'

This rumour, too, spread like wildfire, until each street's populace thought that the other was doomed.

When some measure of order was restored, it was only enough for the two communities to decide to emigrate to save themselves. Thus it was that, from different sides of the town, both streets entirely evacuated their people.

Now, centuries later, the town is still deserted; and not so far away are two villages. Each village has its tradition of how it began as a settlement from a doomed town, through a fortunate flight, in a remote time, from a nameless evil."

I come then to question. And I will question some texts and I offer myself as well to be questioned, I do not understand in any other way, the relation between psychoanalysts. I offer my thought — and I am not eclectic — and my reflections up to this time in order to be questioned. If it is done in the terms of the ethics proposed by Lacan, "to make praxis of theory", for me it will be stimulating.

2. Critique

What is critique? There are many ways to answer this.

Following some developments which can be traced even in Hegelian theory, I differentiate an external critique from an internal critique.

An external critique is a dogmatic opposition: to one text, another is opposed; I do not want to say that this is useless, but if it remains like that, it seems to me insufficient and risks leading to a wrong track.

The internal critique instead, questions those statements to which it is addressed and tries to find out the reason for which they were produced, even the way in which they are offered. To grasp their reason makes manifest the places where these

statements find their limit, and discovers their insufficiency within the system that they propose.

Lastly and to clarify even more from where I speak, I propose my reading of Lacan. Who can say "This is Lacan"? It would have to be Lacan himself. Does that mean that any reading of Lacan has the same value? I don't think so. Each reading has to give its reasons.

As Octavio Paz said:

"Up to this point the activity of the translator is similar to that of the reader and that of the critic: each reading is a translation and each critique is, or begins to be an interpretation."³

What I will expound is my reading, my interpretation.

There is something today which facilitates my task, which is not the same as saying that it will be easy. A couple of years ago at the *Reencuentro* of psychoanalysis in Buenos Aires, at the end of my work I included the critiques that later I took up in the July congress and which today I follow.

They were inferences outlined by me after reading certain texts. Today I hope to expand on with the aid of other works which say things in a much more explicit way than the theses that were expounded at that time.

3. From the Texts

I will use two texts and a third which is the basis of those, *Reveil* by Jacques Alain Miller.⁴ Of the other two texts, one has recently been published in Spanish and the other in French in *Ornicar?* No 30. I will take Serge Cottet's *Freud and the Desire of the Psychoanalyst*,⁵ and the other from Michel Silvestre's *Transference in the Direction of the Cure*,⁶ where both make their affirmations to the one to whom they consider themselves debtors, collaborators and disciples: J.A. Miller.

I will start from *Reveil*. I found there the manifesto, at least, of what arrives to me. In that text Miller said that he never was an analysand of Lacan but from what he heard of it, of the way in which Lacan worked in the last years, he goes on to propose some conclusions. Basically he poses that it is about a Lacan dedicated to the re-encounter with the real, an accentuation which sustains and justifies that practise which is reduced in many cases to a scansion: the analysand arrives, Lacan receives him, takes his money and goes. It is not by chance that the magazine published in Spanish by the *Fondation du Champ Freudien* is called *Escansion*.

Scansion is opposed to *interpretation*.

Neither is it by chance, as you may deduce, that our work was not called scansion but precisely *Interpretation*.

Well, I will start with a reference to the texts which I mention and at the same time I will comment upon them.

4. Transference and Interpretation.

In, *The Transference in the Direction of the Cure*, Michel Silvestre writes:

“Let us explain. Through the means of the transference, the repetition can very well attribute to the analyst some emblems of the subject. The analyst is invited to denounce these false links. This is what analysts called interpreting the transference. The effect of these interpretations, when they exist, is no more than the consequence of posing these emblems in a prevalent position of the discourse. That the false link is denounced and the analyst is separated from this attribute is a first effect but secondary; the analysand knows well that his analyst does no more than re-

mind him of his father or his mother. On the contrary, thus separated from the analyst the symbolic weight of the signifier will be reinforced and the effect of this jump outside the imaginary could be, on the contrary, to purify and affirm the submission of the subject to the signifier, without breaking it.

The identification with the analyst, is thus avoided but the price is of a consolidation of the subjugation of the analysand to the major signifiers of his history. What in Lacan is called, the *Master Signifier*.”

From the same writing, page 29:

“Repetition is the privileged way of the return of the repressed, it is the support by which the subject produces the unconscious signifiers to which he is subjected. The field of the transference is also that in which repetition accedes to the analysis. But there, where the transference finds its specificity, it is not in the relation of the subject to the signifier, to the Other that he will find himself liberated, purified, but in the relation of the subject to the signifier, to the Other that he will find himself liberated, purified, but in the relation of the subject to the object.”

From Serge Cottet's *Freud and the Desire of the Psychoanalysis*, page 149:

“If the Other in fact knows the forbidden thoughts, what better definition of superego than that which Lacan gave of the analyst as the *sujet-supposé-savoir*. The

subject who is supposed to know the repressed thoughts has a name in Freud, the superego."

Let us see where these conclusions originate: *Reveal* the text of Miller, in *Ornicar?* 20/21, says on page 51:

"The renunciation of the analyst, his renewed departure from the philosophical rut can very well dress itself up with the marks of that effort which is called 'analysis of the resistances' or the 'interpretation of the unconscious'. The supposed subject of knowing is no more than the effect of sense than the possibility interpretation implies."

Again from Michel Silvestre's, *The Transference in the Direction of the Cure*, page 32:

"Again, the subtle distinction between 'interpreting the transference' or 'interpreting within the transference' does not lift in any way this ambiguity; however little the analyst is an intervening part of the transference, these two expressions are in fact equivalent."

We have just seen a first series of texts, now I will read others and at the same time comment upon them.

In the Proposition of the 9th October 1967,⁹ a proposition where Lacan writes the matheme of the beginning of the analysis and also speaks of its end, it says textually:

"The *sujet-supposé-savoir* is for us the pivot where all that belongs to the transference is articulated."

Lacan continues,

"A subject does not suppose anything, he

is supposed. Supposed, we teach by the signifier which represents him for another signifier."

Lacan says in his seminar on Transference in 1960-61:

"No matter how much the transference is interpreted, it keeps in itself a kind of irreducible limit."

You may remind me: this is exactly what Silvestre said. However let us hear how Lacan resolves that limit of the transference.

"That is, what in the fundamental conditions usual in analysis of the neuroses, will be interpreted on the basis and with the instrument of the transference itself. This could only be done at a given moment. It is from the position given by the transference that the analyst analyses, interprets and intervenes in the transference itself."

From the same seminar of Lacan:

"... this transference is at once admitted as possible to be dealt with by interpretation: thus if you wish, permeable to the action of the word. This immediately introduces the question that remains and which will remain open for us: this phenomenon of the transference is itself placed in the position of sustaining this action of the word. When transference is discovered, we discover also that if the word has such power before it is perceived, it is because there, there is transference."

What does Lacan teach us about the appropriate position for the analyst? No doubt: the support of the semblance of the *ob-*

jet a. But I emphasize that Lacan does not exclude the interpretation, he is not opposed to the signifier, he does not make mutually exclusive disjunctions (as I said in that critical intervention) — he articulates, he says that the analyst interprets — the dimension of the signifier — from a place, from a position which is his in the transference, as support of the word which interprets.

The fantasm was talked about. Some believed that the question was symptom or fantasm: no, there is symptom, fantasm, interpretation, transference, *objet a*, signifier, end of analysis, beginning of the analyses. All the theory and practice of the analysis is at play, otherwise I wouldn't have made the effort in which I was implicated.

I am going to resort then to the seminar, the Logic of the Fantasm. I know that some said "Isidoro Vegh remains in the symbolic." I remember that in 1977 in this School I gave a seminar called *Desexo*¹⁰ where I criticized another text of Miller, where the *objet a* was not taken up.¹¹ I moved towards this seminar, The Logic of the Fantasm.

In these seminars of 1966/67, what does Lacan say? Let us look at the lecture of 14th December 1966.

"Is it by an effect of the signified, as the metaphor appears to indicate, that interpretation operates? Surely the formula by which this effect of signification is to be located at the level of its logical structure, in the technical meaning of the term (I want to say that the series of this discourse which I offer will give you the reasons by which this effect of signification is located) specified and will locate the interpretation as an effect of truth."

That is to say, in the same seminar where Lacan demonstrated the logic of the fantasm, he also speaks of the interpretation as an effect of truth.

Another thing which is said is that I read the early Lacan. As if that would be wrong: I read the early one, the one in the middle and the last one!

In *The Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary*, the seminar of 1974, Lacan says:

"What is this story of sense? Moreover if you introduce there what I worked hard to make you feel: that this which belongs to the analytic practice, this practice with which you operate, but on the other hand, in regard to this sense, you do not operate more than by reducing it; that is in so far as the unconscious supports itself from this something. It is for me necessary to say the most difficult part of it, that I needed to introduce — this something that is defined by me as structured like the Symbolic.

It is from the fundamental equivocal that this something is classed under the term Symbolic from where you always operate. I speak to those who are worthy of being called analyst."¹²

In the year 1974 Lacan speaks of the importance of the symbolic and he speaks of the equivocal and he says to conclude,

"the equivocal is not the sense, the sense is the imaginary, the equivocal is of the order of the symbolic."

Let us advance and we are already in the teachings of Lacan of 1977;

"If I said that there is no metalanguage, it is to say that it does not exist; there are no more than multiple supports for the language which is called *lalangue* and what would be right is that analysis would be

able to arrive by a supposition, to undo by the word what is made by the word."¹³

From the same seminar:

"The analyst cuts (*tranche*) what he says is a cut, that is to say he participates in the writing . . ."¹⁴

Some people believe that that about the letter was a personal invention, unfortunately it was not the case, it was Lacan who anticipated this.

"That is why I said that, neither in what the analysand says, nor in what the analyst says is there anything but writing."¹⁴

Let us make a parenthesis in the quotations so as not to fatigue you. Up until now we have been punctuating some questions which are subtly shown, in which we will harvest at the end. I do not ignore that so far someone could tell me, "You are in a dogmatic critique." I assume so, but just for the time being. In Lacan, at least in the quotations proposed from many diverse moments of his teaching, there is no trace of that opposition between *interpretation* and *transference*: between reaching the real of the object, a valid objective of course — there I recognize the merit of the punctuation of Miller, to remind the analysts that that dimension of the object is what one tries to reach, that the analysis is not a mystique of the signifier — and the word for which that road would be barred.

5. Of the Fantasm

Now in this series we are going to work some questions of the fantasm. I return to the texts of the French colleagues. I read from the text of Michel Silvestre on page 30:

"To say it in another way, these times where transference interrupts associations — moments of stagnation — far from be-

ing always dead, lost for the subject, are on the contrary intervals, where there appears a specific material, that of the relationship to the object, that is to say that of the fantasm . . ."

So far, I agree.

"It remains to be seen how this material . . ."

And here is where the disagreement arises:

" . . . by definition silent can be introduced in the analyst and interpreted by the analyst."

I will continue with Silvestre, he will be more explicit:

"We approach here head on, a question which has been implied from the beginning of this article. It rests on this paradox that the Freudian procedure through free association, privileges a certain type of material, in the first place that which is linked with repetition — this which leaves aside another kind of material, more resistant to free association but to which are linked, however the biggest difficulties that psychoanalytic practice encounters."

Free association, I emphasize leaves aside, "another kind of material" which is more important because of the difficulties it implies in psychoanalytic practice.

"This other kind of material Lacan indicates to place under the register of the object and particularly in the picture where the subject himself is linked, that is to say, that of the fantasm."

If the fantasm is silent, it cannot be linked into the free associations; free association remits to the signifier, the silent fantasm is set apart: its logical consequence — for reaching it, interpretation is of no value.

“The single possible emergence of the fantasm beyond this imaginary expression is that of the construction.”

In the same line:

“The fantasm is not to be interpreted but to be constructed. This is why, as such, the fantasm is radically separated from repetition. This is why it remains silent. The fantasm is a silent fixity as J.A. Miller showed in his seminar of 1982/83 from which we took our inspiration for the essential points of this development.”

This is why I said that the manifesto of the whole of this position is found in Miller, these authors themselves recognize it.

I quote in order to prove some conclusions to which these texts invited me.

Let us advance then to the question of the fantasm.

In his seminar, On Transference, Lacan speaks of the *fundamental fantasm* — if anyone believed that the question of the fundamental fantasm belongs to the last years of Lacan's teaching he is mistaken.

Lacan said in his seminar of 1960:

“It is in so far as something is presented as revaluing the way of infinite sliding, the soluble element, which brings by itself the signifying fragmentation in the subject, that something takes the value of a privileged object and stops this infinite sliding. It is

in this way that an object which takes in relation to the subject this essential value which constitutes the fundamental fantasm, where the subject recognizes himself in analysis as detained (what we call, in order to remind ourselves of more familiar notions, fixated) in relation to the object, and this privileged function is called by us *a*. It is then, in so far as the subject is identified with the fundamental fantasm, that the desire, as such, takes consistency and can be designated.”

For Lacan, the dimension of the fantasm and the desire are articulated. Moreover, only there in the fantasm, the desire takes consistency. You will see in the quotations which follow, how in the proposition that I criticize, are opposed in disjunction, the *phallic dimension* and the *Name of the Father*, which implies the subject in his desire with the existence of the object and a *jouissance* that he sustains beyond the desire.

In the *Logic of the Fantasm*¹⁵, Lacan says — this is a very important quote because in it he says how he himself thinks and poses the question of the fantasm in the cure:

“Truly, the function of the fantasm, I said in your interpretation and particularly still in the general interpretation that you will give of the structure of a given neurosis, should always, in the last instance be inscribed in the registers which are those I have given. Thus in phobias, desire as prevented; in hysteria desire as unfulfilled and for obsessional neurosis, desire as impossible.”

— And now comes a very long paragraph that I consider essential:

"... such is the role of the fantasm, in this order of the neurotic desire. Signification of truth, I said, that means the same thing as when you are affected by a capital T."

— the T with which truth is marked in logic.

"Pure convention in the theory, given for example in such a set, when you apply the connotation of T to anything that will be called an axiom."

— In the Logic of the Fantasm Lacan spoke of the Fundamental Fantasm as an axiom —

"In your interpretation the fantasm has no other role. You should take it as literally as possible *and what you are going to do is to find in each structure to be defined, the laws of transformation which will ensure this fantasm in the deduction of the statements from the unconscious discourse the place of an axiom.*" (my italics)

From the same seminar:

"I remember here to question what belongs to the function of the fantasm. I say on the model of, A Child is Being Beaten¹⁶, the fantasm is no more than a signifying composition . . ."

Do you remember the other text for which the silent fantasm was opposed to the field of free association, to the field of the signifying repetition? Well, Lacan says:

"The fantasm is no more than a signifying composition of which I gave the formula linking the *a* to the $\$$ (subject). What does this mean? that it has two characteristics; the presence of an *objet a*, and on the other

hand nothing more than this which engenders the subject as $\$$, thus a phrase. This is why 'A Child is Being Beaten' is typical. 'A Child is Being Beaten' is no more than the signifying articulation. 'A Child is Being Beaten', with the condition (read the text), that over this hovers nothing more than that impossible to eliminate, which is called the gaze."

This text is sufficiently explicit; in Lacan the fantasm is a signifying articulation linked to something which is not signifying. In the Lacanian theory everything is not signifying; the *objet a* is not signifying but it is only produced in the articulation of a phrase.

In, Science and Truth, a text of December 1965:

"The object of psychoanalysis (I declare my colours and you will see it come with it) is nothing other than what I have already advanced of the function that the *objet a*. Would the knowledge (*savoir*) of the *objet a* then be the science of psychoanalysis?

It is precisely the formula that we are trying to avoid since this *objet a* is to be inserted, we know that already, in the division of the subject from where the psychoanalytic field is specially structured. It is from here that today we started again."¹⁷

If Lacan wrote this, it is because already in those times he started to find the first indications of what I am criticizing today.

6. Direction of the Cure and End of the Analysis

Now for the third and last series, which I titled Questions of

the Direction of the Cure and End of the Analysis.

From the text of Michel Silvestre on page 41. He says:

"It has been seen, however that this legalisation of desire by castration, could be an insuperable limit of the cure. To accede to castration, a beyond is necessary, that is to say to distinguish there a *jouissance* — out of the phallus — which should not fall by this fact under the paternal jurisdiction."

As I anticipated, there is postulated in the dimension of the *objet a* a radically separated from the signifying articulation, a *jouissance* which leaves aside the *Name of the Father*. But does not the production of the fantasm have as a condition the primary repression, primary efficacy of the paternal metaphor?

Serge Cottet in, *Freud and the Desire of the Psychoanalyst* is still more explicit, he says on page 143 commenting on a case:

"The accent has been displaced from the oedipal conflict to the conflict with the superego. Our impotent is not described in the same way as in *Contributions to the Psychology of Love* (1912)¹⁸.

In that text the woman in so far as she represents the mother in the unconscious, produces a short circuit of the desire. Instead of being her object, the barrier of incest made the desire impotent. Here is, on the contrary, the impotence of the subject to find in the woman something other than the *Name of the Father* which blocks the route to desire. It is no more a fixation on the mother but an intense fixation to the father by which the inhibition is motivated."

Trying to read, giving the benefit of doubt to the author, I thought: "was he referring to the idealized father?" he does not clarify this, moreover, he insists like M. Silvestre on something which should go beyond this question of the father. Something which leaves aside the father, absolutely aside, not only the idealized father, with which everybody would agree but as the previous paragraph quoted says, in a dimension which excludes the castration, which implies the *Name of the Father*. We understand instead that the proposition of Lacan to go beyond Freud, does not disavow castration but rather maps the bedrock of castration, thus leading us to pass through.

A last quote also from Serge Cottet:

"It is about repression that Freud qualifies in an improper manner. What would be the proper manner of acting with the drive? Are there renunciations which would not fall under the blind law of the superego? Which are those the analyst wishes to favour? These different questions permit us to consider better the relation of Freud to the instance of the law.

For this it is necessary to refer once more to, *Civilization and its Discontents*.¹⁹ It is known that the analyst does not introduce the analysand into the path of sublimation or sanctity. In both cases, the demand of the drive keeps pressing, which obliges the subject to adopt measures of defense."

For Serge Cottet, sanctity and sublimation are the same. It is in the text on *Narcissism* that Freud precisely differentiates, I recall, when he says that a "preacher", example of an idealist, does not sublimate. There the presence of an ideal is in opposition to sublimation. In the *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan proposes as a definition of sublimation, "to elevate the object to the dignity of the thing". In *The Logic of the Fantasm*, he

speaks of sublimation, clarifying it as something opposed to repression, as one of the destinies of the drives, as "the time of the fall of the work, in so far as *objet a*".

Two quotes which were in our paper for the congress in July, from *L'Envers de la psychanalyse* (1970)²⁰ Lacan says:

"S₁, the Master Signifier, directed towards the means of *jouissance* (S₂) . . ."

— for Lacan S₂ is not pure *blah, blah, blah*, he called it the means of *jouissance* —

" . . . not only induces but also determines the castration"

In *Du Semblant* the seminar of 1971:

"The function of the father is so essential to the psychoanalytic discourse, that it can be said that it is its product. The Master Signifier of the psychoanalytic discourse is until now the *Name of the Father*. The father is the term of the analytic interpretation."²¹

I think that there is a good distance between this and the preceding authors. I heard, I imagine that you did too, in the July Congress one of the statements which took me by surprise: "The unconscious is opposed to the psychoanalytic act." Is it coherent? If the unconscious implies that dimension of signifying repetition and the psychoanalytic act has to do with the fall of the object, they are opposed: "it would be about the act and not to lose time listening to dreams, lapses, ritornellos of the repetition of what is said." "The analyst wastes his time there. Lacan brings the analysis up to the end, that is what it is all about."

Does Lacan really say this?

Speaking of the psychoanalytic act in *The Logic of the Fan-*

tasm, Lacan says the following in the seminar of 22nd February 1967.

"The psychoanalytic act is signifying. The act is a signifier which is repeated, even in a single gesture, for topological reasons that make possible the existence of the double loop created by a single cut. It is installation of the subject as such, that is to say that from a true act, the subject emerges differently according to the cut; his structure is modified, the subject does not recognize this ever in its truly inaugural reach . . ."

I will finish with the quotations and I will pass to something different from what I called "a dogmatic critique." These are quotes from *The Moment to Conclude*, the seminar of the year 1977/78. Specifically the one of the 10th January 1978 — Lacan died in 1981 — therefore close to the end of his life and work.

"The end of the analysis, is when one has revolved twice around, that is to say re-encountered that of which one is a prisoner . . . In order for this to be seen, this of which one is captive and the unconscious is that; it is the face of the real, it is the face of the real . . . that to which one is chained."

Also:

"The analysis does not consist in liberating one from his symptoms, since it is this *Synthome*, as I write it. The analysis consists in that one has to know why it is there en-chained; that it is produced by the fact that there is the Symbolic."

That Lacan accentuated the teaching of the real in his last

years did not take the primacy from the symbolic.

“The Symbolic is the language: one learns to speak and that leaves traces and for this fact leaves consequences which are no more than the symptom and the analysis consists in realizing why one has symptoms, as such the analysis is linked to knowledge (*savoir*).

Mathematics makes reference to writing, writing as such and mathematical thought is the fact that one can represent a writing.

The real . . . we have the suggestion that the real does not cease to be written.”

— strange because he always said that the real was that which did not cease not to be written and he adds:

“ . . . it is thanks to writing that forcing is produced; one writes regardless of the real, because there is need to say it, how could the real appear if it were not written? It is the reason why and the reason for which the real is here. It is here in my way of writing it; the writing is an artifice. The real does not appear then if not by artifice, an artifice linked to the fact that there are words and even sayings and the saying concerns that which is called the truth.”

“There is certainly writing in the unconscious even if no more than in the dream, by principle of the unconscious, it is what Freud says, the lapsus and even the joke are definable by being readable. A dream is made, it is not known why and then *a posteriori* it is read; likewise with the lapsus; and all that Freud says of the joke is well known, as being linked to this

economy of the writing, economy in relation to the word.

The readable; it is in this that knowledge (*savoir*) consists, altogether it is very little, this is what I say of the transference because I have timidly advanced it as being the subject, a subject which is always supposed. There is no subject, well understood, there is no more than the supposed, the supposed knowledge. What could be the meaning of this? Supposed knowledge read in another way.”

Finishing the quotes:

“Language is a necessary evil . . . a necessary evil and this is why we do not have any idea of the real and that which is the most real is.

7. Supposed, *à la lettre*

In order that this critique not remain an opposition of text to text it is necessary to risk something further.


What could have led a group of analysts without doubt both studious and rigorous, who had produced texts that we value and more than once commented upon in this very place, to develop what to my reading is divergent in so many different places, although in a coherent way, from so many other punctuations that Lacan himself wrote or said?

I think that they have their reason and that reason is what I infer.

The opposition that they make of the *objet a* to the signifier, therefore from the fantasm to the symptom and in consequence from the scansion or construction to the interpretation (and we could keep going) is sustained from this displacement; if the *ob-*

jet a is not signifying, if the *objet a* is from the real then it does not belong to the word and consequently the word could not reach it. I would say that everything was going well until the final consequence, precisely for what Lacan thought with, the Borromean Knot. I write it:

Figure 1



I drew the real, covering the imaginary and making it know the symbolic. Also the *objet a* the phallic *jouissance* and the *jouissance* of the Other.

The Borromean Knot, says Lacan,

... is defined in its minimal formula constituted by three rings. None of them traverses the interior of the other. They are only knotted when three. There can be more than three but not less and its essential property is that if I cut any one of them, the other two become un-knotted."

Doesn't he say that if it is cut through the symbolic, there also is an encounter with the real and the *objet a* falls? Isn't it the simplest way of indicating the opposite of what is presupposed in the series of formulations of Miller and his collaborators?

What other question does that series make me consider? That there, there is also at play a supposition of the real: constituted *a priori*, only because it is thought in this way, does it become absolutely excluded from an efficacy in which the word could operate.

Do you remember when Lacan said "... it is by the word which undoes itself and which should undo what has been done by the word."? Lacan did not say "the analyst is *a*, but that he is semblance of *a*". What is semblance? It is what represents the thing without being it. Why: if the analyst is the semblance of *a* it is because he himself is an effect of discourse; the *objet a* which by the logical times of the unconscious we may situate retroactively as being the "cause of desire", it is a product.

Lacan in the last years, I will simply say it, remarked "we have to overcome the symbolic — *il faut surmonter le symbolique*," but he added, "that does not mean that the symbolic does not remain primordial"; "I have a primordial hole, that hole is that of the symbolic". He told as well, of paying a visit to an Atomic Centre in France to see how people worked the matter: "there I found with the *psarticles*". What did he mean to say with this? He clarifies it: "the real is not reality". If the scientist, the nuclear physicist is confronted with the real of the par-

ticles — Lacan says, “the atom, that real, radical, the legacy of Democritus” — if the dimension of the radical real can be reached by the intermediary of instruments, then they themselves pose in act of an equation “the letter in the real”.

This is why Lacan insists in this question of the writing. Which leads me then to a third question which is a mistake in this group which I criticize, as I said also in the Congress: they have not developed the concept of the letter.

The signifier that they devalue, I devalue as well, it is the one of the linguists, it is not the signifier of psychoanalysis. Lacan told this very clearly and I read it, “what is produced between analysand and analyst is nothing if not writing.”

In order to be understood, to speak of the letter implies the dimension of *jouissance* thus two questions: where I wrote *jouissance* of the Other (see Fig. 1) is the same place where Lacan puts *science*, that one which works by means of letters. The letter reaches what the saying cannot; also Lacan said with this I conclude: “I will metaphorize with incest the relation that truth keeps with the real.”²²

I know that what I wanted to tell you today is polemical. It seems to me that if between analysts, and moreover between those of us who are called Lacanians, there cannot be questioning without thinking about *a child is being killed*, then our effort is not worth the trouble.

NOTES

The theme of the *Tercer Encuentro* in Buenos Aires in July 1984 was: “Analytical practise or how does one analyse today?” The text of a preparatory seminar held in 1983 by Jacques-Alain Miller and Diana Rabinovich under the title “*Symptôme et Fantasme: le moi dans la théorie de Jacques Lacan*”, was available. Serge Cottet’s thesis on “Freud and the desire of the analyst” and the first issue of the revue *Escánsion* were published in Spanish.

¹ LACAN, J. Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne —

Homage to Freud, 1979, p.3.

- ² SHAH, Idries, Tales of the Dervishes — the Founding of a Tradition. Quoted from *Asrar-i-Khilwatia* by Sheikh Qualandar Shah. Octagon Press: Lond, 1967, p.70-71.
- ³ PAZ, Octavio, *El Signo y el garabato*. (The Sign and the Scribble) Ed. Joaquin Mertz. Mexico, 1973.
- ⁴ MILLER, Jacques-Alain. Reveil, *Ornicar?* 20/21 Editions du Seuil, 1980, p.49-53.
- ⁵ COTTET, Serge, Freud and the Desire of the Psychoanalyst. In the text, page references are to the Spanish edition. Navarin/Seuil, Paris, 1982.
- ⁶ SILVESTRE, Michel, *Le Transfert dans la direction de la cure*. *Ornicar?* 30, Edition Navarin, Paris, 1984, p.13-45.
- ⁷ Op. cit. p.19.
- ⁸ LACAN, J. Proposition, 9th October 1967 — on the psychoanalyst of the school. *Scilicet* 1. Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1968, p.18.
- ⁹ LACAN, J. *Sur le Transfert*. Seminar, 1960-61.
- ¹⁰ VEGH, Isídoro. *Desexo* in *Notas de la Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires*, 3, 1979, p.330-437.
- ¹¹ MILLER, Jacques-Alain. Sutures of the Signifier. *Cahiers pour l'analyse*: 1/2 Edition Le Graphe, Paris, 1966.
- ¹² LACAN, J. The Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. Seminar, 10th December, 1974.
- ¹³ LACAN, J. *Moment de conclure*. Seminar, 15th November, 1977.
- ¹⁴ LACAN, J. op. cit. Seminar, 20th December, 1977.
- ¹⁵ LACAN, J. *Logique du Phantasm*, 1966/67. Seminar, 21st June 67.
- ¹⁶ FREUD, S. A Child is Being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions (1919). St. Ed. Vol XVII.
- ¹⁷ LACAN, J. *La Science et la verité*. *Ecrits*. Edition du Seuil. 1966. p.863.

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

- ¹⁸ FREUD, S. Contributions to the Psychology of Love, (1912). Stand. Ed. Vol. XI.
- ¹⁹ FREUD, S. Civilization and its Discontents (1929). Stand. Ed. Vol. XXI.
- ²⁰ LACAN, J. *L'Envers de la psychoanalyse*. Seminar, 18th February, 1970.
- ²¹ LACAN, J. *Du Semblant*. Seminar 16th June 1971.
- ²² LACAN, J. *L'Etourdit. Scilicet, 4. Edition du Seuil*, Paris, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE
FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

* * *

Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

• * •

- I - Homage to Freud - 1979
- II - On Perversion - 1980
- III - On *Angst* - 1981
- IV - The Freudian Clinic - 1982
- V/VI - Clinical Psychoanalysis and The Training of Analysts - 1983/84

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria, 3122
Australia

HOMAGE TO FREUD – 1979

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
INTRODUCTION	
A Note on Letter 52 of Freud and on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis; the Dissolution of L'Ecole Freudienne de Paris	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH	
The Word of Freud	Sigmund Freud 8
Presentation of the School	Oscar Zentner 9
A Reference to Freud and Lacan	
	Maria Inés Rotmiler de Zentner 13
The Entrance of Psychoanalysis in Australia	John Dingle 23
Ideal Objects and Repetition	Ruben Alejandro Cerutti 39
People of the Northeast Brazil Talk About Their Legends:	
"Joao Galafoice, in the Fishing World"	Jacques Laberge 45
Psychoanalysis and Cure	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 53
Psychoanalysis	Oscar Zentner 59
PART II	
ON FEMININITY	
The Woman and the Real as a Paradigm of Psychosis	Oscar Zentner 73
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
Sexuality and Science	
	Oscar Zentner and Maria Inés Rotmiler de Zentner 95
The Freudian Unconscious, Symbolism and Censorship	
	Oscar Zentner 113
Elementary Lessons	Oscar Zentner 131

Order from
The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

HOMAGE TO FREUD/ON PERVERSION – 1980

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
NACHTRÄGLICHKEIT	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 41ST ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH	
In the Knot of the Subject	Oscar Zentner 13
Retrospective Unconscious Logic and Perversion, the Moments of Perversion	Gayle Paull 29
Femininity and Perversion	John Dingle 37
The Offended Woman	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 49
A Pseudonym, the Itinerary for a Perversion	
	Maria Inés Rotmiler de Zentner 65
The Brain as Accommodation of Desire	Graeme Crawford-Smith 79
Tod/Etcetera/Rat Man	Juan Davila 85
PART II	
THE WORD OF LACAN	
The Seminar, Paris, 10th July 1980	Jacques Lacan 97
The Seminar, Caracas, 12th July 1980	Jacques Lacan 103
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Comedy of the Bodies	
	Javier Aramburu and Juan Carlos Cosentino 109
A Case of Perversion?	Luz Freire 119
The Death of Freud	Isidoro Vegh 127
Aphanisis	Oscar Zentner 137

Order from
The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

HOMAGE TO FREUD/ON ANGST – 1981

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
LOGOS	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 42ND ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH	
The Death of Lacan	Oscar Zentner 9
Non-Libidinization and its Return	Oscar Zentner 15
The Secret Cause	Laurence Bataille 27
Lautréamont and the Uncanny	Maria Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 33
<i>Angst</i> ; The Null Set Series and the ($-\varphi$)	Gayle Paull 45
Beyond the Pleasure of the Text	John Dingle 55
Psychoanalysis or Psychoanalyst	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 67
PART II	
SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Seminar I – On Symbolism	Moustapha Safouan 83
Seminar II – On Jokes	Moustapha Safouan 103
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Rhetoric of <i>Angst</i>	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 119
<i>Angst</i> and the Theatre of the Absurd	Frances M. Moran 123
Interview with Juan David Nasio	Miguel Kohan 129
Conversation in Paris Between Alain Grosrichard, Gloria Autino, Gustavo Etkin and Oscar Zentner	139

Order from
The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

HOMAGE TO FREUD/THE FREUDIAN CLINIC – 1982

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
PART I	
LOGOS	1
HOMAGE TO FREUD	
The Analytic Construction	Oscar Zentner 9
Metaphor and the Freudian Clinic	Frances M. Moran 31
The Psychosis of the Prime Minister's Son	Rob Gordon 41
A Case for Topology	Gayle Paull 69
Interpretation and the Specimen Dream	John Dingle 85
The Identification and the Ideal	Maria Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 103
PART II	
SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Seminar I – Transference and Acting-Out	Moustapha Safouan 125
Seminar II – On Plato's Symposium	Moustapha Safouan 133
Seminar III – The Place of the Analyst in the Transference	Moustapha Safouan 153
Seminar IV – Topographic Point of View of the Unconscious	Moustapha Safouan 179
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
And Thou Shalt Be like Gods	Ricardo Goldenberg 197

Order from
The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
LOGOS	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD – CLINICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS	
<i>From the Verneinung of Freud to the Verwerfung of Lacan.</i>	Oscar Zentner 9
<i>Castration and Death, Nodal Points in the Latent-Content of Dreams.</i>	Gayle Paull 31
<i>Further Remarks on the Case of Little Hans.</i>	Felicity Bagot 57
<i>The Transference and Cure of the Prime Minister's Son.</i>	Rob Gordon 67
<i>The Psychoanalysis of Children.</i>	Maria Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 85
PART II	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
<i>The Unconscious, the Transference, and the Psychoanalyst's Interpretation: A Lacanian View.</i>	Juan-David Nasio 103
<i>Psychoanalysis: a Nodal Writing.</i>	Héctor Rúpolo 117
<i>Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts.</i>	Moustapha Safouan 157

*The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria, 3122
Australia*

