

**PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN
SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE**



*Clinical Psychoanalysis
and the Training
of Analysts*

HOMAGE TO FREUD

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THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL
OF MELBOURNE**

**CLINICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS
and
THE TRAINING OF ANALYSTS**

Editor
Oscar Zentner

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LOGOS

“I am under no delusion about the difficulty of my task. Psychoanalysis has little prospect of becoming liked or popular”

S. Freud

“Paradoxically, the difference which will most surely guarantee the survival of Freud’s field, is that the Freudian field is a field which, of its nature, is lost. It is here that the presence of the psycho-analyst as witness of this loss, is irreducible”

J. Lacan

Clinical psychoanalysis, the training of analysts, transference and a writing for a psychoanalytic topology are the main topics that compose the present volume – fifth and sixth in the series. The enumeration of these themes is sufficient to indicate the weight, complexity and work imposed by psychoanalysis upon us. These increasingly important subjects are today, still, the source of different directions.

Almost one hundred years after the inaugural moment of the Freudian discourse and the demarcation of its field, the lack of a single monolithic direction is a situation that cannot be neglected. We explain this lack by the fact that the psychoanalytic group has not prevailed over the psychoanalytic discourse. This has enabled psychoanalysis to continue.

Our project is to give the reader access to psychoanalytic essays. The book, transference of work done by the School, is the furrow of our task.

Oscar Zentner
Director
The Freudian School of Melbourne

THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

OSCAR ZENTNER, DIRECTOR.
P.O. BOX 12, HAWTHORN VICTORIA 3122 AUSTRALIA.



5th HOMAGE TO FREUD

Clinical Psychoanalysis

AT L'ALLIANCE FRANCAISE DE MELBOURNE,
267 CHURCH STREET, RICHMOND

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FROM 10 a.m. TO 4 p.m.

PART I

HOMAGE TO FREUD

CLINICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

All papers presented in this book have been written by members of
The Freudian School of Melbourne, residing in Melbourne, except where indicated.

"Anyone who hopes to learn the noble game of chess from books will soon discover that only the openings and end-games admit of an exhaustive systematic presentation and that infinite variety of moves which develop after the opening defy any such description. This gap in instruction can only be filled by a diligent study of games fought out by masters. The rules which can be laid down for the practice of psycho-analytic treatment are subject to similar limitations"

Sigmund Freud

"This is Freud's contribution. If it is still necessary to confirm it, we only have to notice how the technique of the transference is prepared. Everything is done to avoid the relation of ego to ego, the imaginary mirage which could be established with the analyst. The subject isn't face to face with the analyst. Everything is done to efface a dual relation of fellow men. On the other side, it is from the necessity of an ear, of an other, a listener, that the analytic technique is derived. The analysis of the subject can only be carried out with an analyst. This reminds us that the unconscious is essentially word, word of the other, and can only be recognized when it returns to you from the other"

Jaques Lacan

**FROM THE VERNEINUNG OF FREUD TO
THE VERWERFUNG OF LACAN**

Oscar Zentner

"In this way death brings us the question of what discourse denies, but also the question of knowing whether it is the former which introduces negation in the latter. Because the negativity of discourse, insofar as it makes being in what is not, refers us to the question of knowing what the not-being, manifested in the symbolic order, owes to the reality of death . . . whence arises, with the not-being, the definition of reality."

Jacques Lacan¹

"Die Bejahung – als Ersatz der Vereinigung – gehört dem Eros an, die Verneinung – Nachfolge der Ausstossung – dem Destruktionstrieb."

Sigmund Freud²

"There is no such thing at all as unconscious 'no'".

Sigmund Freud³

In the work on *Negation*, Freud shows the pleasure – which is not the pleasure principle – exercised by some psychotics by way of negativism, which is probably none other than the clinical demonstration of the defusion of drives which has taken place due to the disinvesting of the libidinal components.

We propose to develop a differentiation between the mechanisms of negation (*Verneinung*) and negativism (*Negativismus*) which were mentioned by Freud but not developed further.

Whereas the first already indicates a moment of repression, its partial lifting, and as such a certain recovery (affirming precisely what is being denied), the second is the symptom (*Anzeichen*) of a foreclosure (*Verwerfung*) which has already taken place.

Let us consider for a moment the passage which Freud carries out from pleasure in negativism – as an effect of the psychotic restitution consequently established on the moment of foreclosure – to the symbol of negation, with which the function of judgement becomes possible. Thoughts will thus acquire the possibility of a certain independence from repression as well as a distancing away from the repetition compulsion. The automatism of repetition is a logical consequence of Freud's mapping in the text of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. If in the words of Lacan, the discovery of psychoanalysis is also showing that it is language which constitutes thought, then the latter is constituted as such beyond the pleasure principle. Language is at the service of the death-drive because it breaks the hedonism that repression regulates.⁴

When Freud, in formulating his hypothesis on negation, tells us that in the unconscious there is no "No" and that the *I* only recognizes the unconscious in a negative way, he allows us to advance our hypothesis on the structural difference between the "No" of negation – a negative recognition of an unconscious element on the part of the *I* – and negativism – a product of a permanent encounter with the real.

The "No" of negation provides the key to understand the mythical phenomenon of the entry of the symbolic in relation to the fundamental affirmation (*Bejahung*).⁵ The symbolic, Lacan tells us, awaits the subject. However, as is well understood, that does not guarantee how the subject will affirm himself. For that we must go somewhat further into an essential disjunction that opens up in the process which occurs between the being and the subject, in the relation between the fundamental affirmation and negation.

The affirmation of the inscription⁶ of perceptions occurs at the level of perceptual symbols (*Wahrnehmungszeichen*) which by themselves alone are incapable of being conscious and are organized through associations by simultaneity. When these inscriptions (*Niederschrift* or *Fixierung* in the *Traumdeutung*)⁷ are organized by causality in a second register (Ucs), they become representations (*Vorstellungsrepräsentanzs*) which will sink all objectivity by the weight that the dead thing (*das Ding*)⁸ leaves in the trace of the incarnation of the signifier. The entry of the symbolic into the real also sustains the opposite; the irruption of a hallucination as a product of what opposed the symbolization allowed by negation.

Foreclosure (*Verwerfung*) comes forth to meet the fundamental affirmation thus avoiding "... that something from the real comes to offer itself to the revelation of the being ..."⁹

If in negation, as Freud demonstrates, we find the precondition of judgement, we should then be able to find in foreclosure the lack of judgement. The foreclosure of a fundamental signifier produces hallucinations as a return from the real of a severed symbolic element which cannot be repressed, suppressed or rejected.

The hallucination is a perception of course and of an object which even when always the same, will not exonerate us from interpreting it in accordance with the particular history of the subject. The history in psychosis, however, is different from the history in neurosis. In the first there is encounter, whilst in the

second there is return.

We should recall here the rhetorical and hysterical question which Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates in the *Theaetetus*:

"I'm not only annoyed; I'm afraid about what I'll answer if someone puts this question to me. 'So you've discovered false judgement, Socrates? You've found that it's located, not in our perceptions in relation to one another, and not in our thoughts in relation to one another, but in the connection of a perception with a thought?' I suppose I'll say 'Yes', and I'll give myself airs, as if we've discovered something admirable."¹⁰

Lacan distinguishes the appearance of the feeling of *déjà-vu* in the meeting of erratic hallucination where the imaginary tries to mend the hole of the foreclosure of the symbolic. Plato remarks on a similar point in the *Theaetetus* to show that neither reality nor unreality hold up well, whether one is awake, insane, or dreaming.

This extreme point shows, in our opinion, that a conventional criterion is not appropriate to psychoanalysis. So-called reality and its status must be dealt with within the context of psychoanalysis. As Freud pointed out in the *Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, reality will always remain 'unknowable'.

* * *

The field of psychosis is still a somewhat troublesome area for the analyst. When Lacan, instead of treating psychosis "as a qualitative de-structuring where all the unconscious becomes conscious", tries rather to establish a difference of mechanism between psychosis and neurosis, he accompanies the experience that Freud described as follows:

"*Eine Verdrängung is etwas anderes als eine Verwerfung*".¹¹ (A repression is something other than a foreclosure).

What is involved here is a radically different type of defence. Repression is a mechanism which exists on the supposition of primary repression (*Urverdrängung*). This supposition, which is not clinically observable, is nonetheless a theoretical necessity on which Freud bases the division of the psychic structure. It is thanks to this primary repression that repression (proper) is possible. This is the frame work for the basic mechanism at play in neurosis.

In psychosis, instead, things take on another aspect. Foreclosure makes psychosis possible with the rejection of a primordial signifier.

Freud posits negation as the normal mechanism of judgement where the *I* recognizes the unconscious with a negative formula. Negation, opposed to the fundamental affirmation, gives rise to the symbol of negation. It is in the moment of the *Bejahung* that foreclosure bars the way and thus prevents the so-called normal judgement, giving place to psychosis.

"It is surely this which explains, apparently, the insistence of the schizophrenic in reiterating this step. In vain, since for him all the symbolic is real. This is quite different for the paranoid where, as shown in our thesis, imaginary structures prevail, that is, the reverse action in a cyclic time which makes so difficult the anamnesis of his disturbances, of elemental phenomena which are only pre-significant and which do not succeed, except after a long and painful discursive organization, in establishing, constituting, that ever partial universe which is called delusion."¹²

The radical separation between unconscious and preconscious-

conscious is affirmed, in our view in two different principles which rule both topographies: a primary principle on the one hand and a secondary principle on the other. These principles, developed by Freud in his *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning* are reinforced in his paper *Negation*.

* * *

It is owing to the creation of the symbol of negation that judgement is possible. The function of judgement does not take place in the unconscious, which is not the same as saying that the unconscious is irrational, or, worse still, that it is the source of the biological instincts. The lack of the "No" of negation in the unconscious is correlative to the formula with which Freud describes the unconscious as what "It is"¹³, indestructible.

Freud says in *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*:

"I must state emphatically that this fact has not up to now met with any recognition. But it seems to point to an important characteristic of unconscious thinking, in which in all probability no process that resembles 'judging' occurs. In the place of rejection by a judgement, what we find in the unconscious is 'repression'. Repression may, without doubt, be correctly described as the intermediate stage between a defensive reflex and a condemning judgement."¹⁴

When we compare this with the fact that the definition given later by Freud regarding negation is precisely to establish it between repression and flight, we understand that negation is a partial lifting of the repression which gives rise to judgement. The place of judgement in dreams is taken over by their apparent absurdity or non-sense. He added in a footnote in the same article (that):

"... the highly remarkable and still insufficiently appreciated behaviour of the relation between contraries in the Ucs is no doubt likely to help our understanding of *negativism* in neurotic and insane patients."

Freud endeavours to give an account of the origin of judgement basing it upon the metapsychology of the opposition – mythical – between Eros and the death drive. But origin, even the origin of judgement, is the myth of the origins. However, before arriving at the problem of the drives, we shall recall in our process the precedents which structured its final theory. It is in the *Project for a Scientific Psychology* that we find the topology of a structure between two exteriors, the exterior of the stimuli which arise from within and the exterior of the stimuli which arise from without. Hence, we have a structure whose primary function is that of discharge and nonetheless, already much more sophisticated than the outline of the simple reflex arc. Moreover, a structure created for the purpose of maintaining energy outside of itself. This is the moment in which there reigns only one principle, the principle of constancy, a precedent no doubt, of what was to follow. It is worth noting that the failure of this project coincides with the success of the opening of dreams as the royal road towards the Ucs.

The energy in this structure leaves minimal traces at the beginning, but this situation finally becomes unsustainable, since it is imperative that the structure keeps a minimum of energy to depend on a certain mobility to command the stimuli from wherever they come. This structure will turn out to be insufficient in theory, too. The demands of life will create, as a secondary effect, a *détour* of energy, from its arrival (perceptual pole) to its departure (motor pole). Now, this *détour* will create a lateral effect where a complex called *I*, a product of collateral investments, will be formed. This product, this project of a psychology for neurologists, is a first allegory of the mythical forces of *Ananké*, against which *Logos* will be in opposition, giving rise to *Moirá*.¹⁵

But it will be a bit later, in hysteria, or more precisely in the psychoneuroses, where the precursor of the drive to which we plan to refer is established. It is in the realm of psychoneuroses where the conflict between sexuality (or unconscious erotogenicity) and the drives of the *I* (or self-preservation) is established. Our intention is more to connect points for a later development than to present a conceptual review of the history of the terms proposed by Freud. These points will therefore be incomplete. In any case, we can establish the crucial moment for the determination of the drives of the *I* in the *Psycho-Analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision*, where the conflict occurs between sexuality or the unconscious and the drives of the *I* or of self-preservation. Freud maintains without apparent difficulty this pair of opposites until the conceptual connection between *Schreber* and *On Narcissism: An Introduction*, is attained, when the libido enters into a prohibited area, the *I*.

The opposition between investments of the *I* and object investments is a step further that runs from the known (sexuality versus *D*), to the unknown. In this connection, it is only necessary to recall that the death drive (*Todestrieb*) is formulated when Freud without ambiguity writes *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Here, the theory produces *jouissance* losing the hedonist illusion of the all-powerful principle of pleasure. The conflict of the drives is then re-established in the following way. The former pair of opposites namely sexuality and *I*, come to fall under the general denomination of Eros or life against which death sets its face.

All this is not only far from being simple but marks important dissensions among generations of analysts. Not all were able to accept this premise, and some of those who accepted it proved unable to understand it. One would only have to carefully turn over the pages of the works of Melanie Klein — to name the most important analyst of those generations — to discover the difference between her conception of death and that of Freud. What I am about to describe does not exempt anyone from

giving an account of his own experience which one must obtain for the counter-experience¹⁶ still required by psychoanalysis. What in Melanie Klein is an instinct (not a *Trieb*) of death, is in Freud destruction drive (which is death but invested with libido or in the process of disinvestment characteristic of sublimation).

Lacan, who read Freud with more attention than some people believe, clarifies in *Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis*, the libidinal presence which invests the image for its constitution (its own or another's) or its annihilation, as in suicide or crime. We underline this theoretical disagreement because, perhaps, this was what Melanie Klein did not know.

* * *

Returning to a somewhat forgotten story which only merited a footnote in Jones' biography of Freud we will find the name of Sabina Spielrein, who anticipated the concept of a death drive notwithstanding the fact that she assimilated it with a destruction drive. To partly understand the forgetting of her work, let us go first to the question which Freud used as the basis of this opposition of drives.

"It is not my wish, however, to put before you the origin of this novelty in the theory of the drives; it too is based essentially on biological considerations . . . Our hypothesis is that there are two essentially different classes of drives: the sexual drive, understood in the widest sense — Eros, if you prefer that name — and the aggressive drive, whose aim is destruction . . . But it is a remarkable thing that this hypothesis is nevertheless felt by many people as an innovation and, indeed, as a most undesirable one which should be got rid of as quickly as possible. I presume that a strong affective factor is coming into effect in this

rejection. Why have we ourselves needed such a long time before we decided to recognize an aggressive *Trieb*?"¹⁷

If we support the idea that whoever formulates a rhetorical question knows the answer, what better way than to confront Freud with Freud? This question of 1932 was answered by Freud himself; he wrote to Jung the following:

"One should honour an old woman, but not marry her; really, love is for the young. Fraulein Spielrein read a chapter from her paper yesterday (in the Society of Vienna), (I almost wrote the *ihrer* with a capital 'i')¹⁸ and was followed by an illuminating discussion. I have hit on a few objections to your (*Ihrer*) (this time I mean it)¹⁹ method of dealing with mythology, and I brought them up in the discussion with the little girl. I must say she is rather nice and that I am beginning to understand.²⁰ What troubles me most is that Fraulein Spielrein wants to subordinate the psychological material to *biological* considerations; this dependency is no more acceptable than a dependency on philosophy, physiology, or brain anatomy. Psychoanalysis *fara da se*".²¹

Freud shows in the contradictory content of these two statements (of 1919 and 1932), the crisis in which psychoanalysis was enveloped around the theory of the drives until the clarification given in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, which remains current. It was, however, the 19th of November, 1911, at the meeting of the Viennese Society of Psychoanalysis where, for the first time, the opposition of the drives of life and death (or destruction, in this case)²² was presented. Sabina Spielrein²³ presented the work called *On Transformation*, a part of her article *Destruction As Cause of Coming Into Being (Destruktion als Ursache des Werdens)*.²⁴

The letter from Freud to Jung indicates clearly what his position was regarding this work. But neither the letter nor the minutes of the meeting of the Psychoanalytic Society of Vienna are sufficient to explain why what was unacceptable in 1911 became accepted in 1919 and why in 1932 it was accepted in almost the same terms which in 1911 produced the condemnation of this work by Freud nearly to oblivion. In effect, it is in reading the work of Spielrein and the position she takes in regard to dementia praecox in favour of Jung and against Freud, where this forgetfulness of Freud and of the psychoanalytic community is perhaps made intelligible.

In a book of debatable purpose, *Sabina Spielrein entre Freud et Jung*, we find on page 223 the following:

"The only consequence of the restricted activity of the *I* which characterizes this illness (Dementia Praecox), is that the mind only works in its archaic, analogical modes. Freud holds that Dementia Praecox covers a phenomenon of withdrawal of libido, then of its return and finally, of a conflict between investment and withdrawal of libido. I believe on the contrary that we are dealing with a conflict between the two opposite currents of the psyche of the *I* and of the psyche of the species."

Spielrein marks here the difference between herself and Freud. When Freud writes to Jung on 30th November, 1911 – a letter written the day following that meeting differentiating libido as erotogenicity and libido as a psychic force (in the Jungian sense) – he establishes that:

"I should be very much interested in knowing what you mean by an extension of the concept of the libido to make it applicable to dementia praecox²⁵ . . . I hold very simply that there are two basic *drives* and that only the power behind the sexual

drive can be termed libido."²⁶

Freud, contrary to Jung, postulates the hypothesis that behind the drives of the *I* (not sexual) there reside the drives of self-preservation which are irreducible in themselves.

Thus he maintains the libido outside the *I* and confines it to the unconscious. That is, there is a certain equation between libido, sexuality and unconscious on the one hand and *I*, self-preservation and repression on the other. The lapse of time from 1911 to 1919 allows Freud from both the clinical and theoretical points of view to arrive at his final classification of the drives.

The mythical forces at work — *our witch metapsychology* — are life in opposition to death. But in Freud this death drive is mute and henceforth one cannot trace it as one can trace the libido, in its so-called phases of development. It is only by the investment of libido that death becomes destruction, and from there it appears as sadism or masochism. While the passage from the general principle of life to the libido is carried out by substitution, (*Ersatz*), the passage from the side of death to destruction is carried out by succession, (*Nachfolge*). Substitution implies a degree of transformation, similar to the work imposed on the psychic by the somatic. Succession, instead, does not carry with it the notion of work or of transformation.

The reason for the flat rejection of the position of Spielrein indicates that, however hesitantly, Freud had to choose between the biologism of the hermeneutic *Weltanschauung* of an *a priori* knowledge of Jung, and psychoanalysis. The position of Spielrein, strongly influenced by Jung, breaks down the meaning which sexuality and the Ucs have in Freud. From destruction or the death drive (for Spielrein there is no differentiation, nor for Melanie Klein) the being will come forth. As is known, this ghost of *Avis Fenix* is at the bottom of the confusion of Jung between myth and fantasm.²⁷

In Freud, still with a certain ambiguity as shown in the text of 1932 mentioned above, the death drive is beyond the prin-

ciple of reality, not to impose the principle of pleasure — a hedonist principle of a certain regularity and balance — but rather to impose *jouissance* which is good for nothing, but impels life until that final moment called death. In Spielrein anxiety is the proof of death (whilst in Freud it is the proof of castration) because it is the resistance to sexuality. How can we not recognize in these steps the genius which nonetheless directed the errors, since it was she, without doubt, who compelled Freud to reassess his theory of the drives after eight years. Seven months after the reading of *Destruction as Cause of Coming Into Being*, Freud wrote *The Theme of the Three Caskets*. There, Freud classes the woman as death, and this does not seem to be independent of this other woman called Spielrein. We find support for this, among other things, in a small comment in *Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, where Jones tells us that it would be interesting to know the motive which led Freud to write that work.

Quite possibly it is again no other woman about whom Lacan comments in his seminar of 16th March, 1976, referring to a Japanese film where the woman as death is shown:

“... since I told you that *The Woman* did not exist — and I have more and more reasons to believe it, especially after seeing the film *The Realm of the Senses*...”²⁸

... and Sabina Spielrein was also a particular part of the dark continent which the woman represented for the Freudian theory.

The function of judgement, as developed in *Negation*, shows the interplay of the drives. The destruction drive — and not the death drive — will play its part here, since judgement implies the libido and as such, investment of the death drive with its *successor*, destruction. Following the division between Eros and destruction, we find in judgement on the side of Eros the fundamental affirmation (*Bejahung*), which the subject expresses as “I want to eat this,” “I want this inside” or “This is mine”. All these examples belong to what Freud distinguishes as *having*, different from *being*.²⁹

Within this fundamental affirmation, Freud describes two kinds of judgement, one of existence and the other of attribute. Negation dialectically opposes the affirmative judgement (or fundamental affirmation). I indicated above that it is Eros that really permits affirmation and it is in this way that the *Bejahung* becomes the substitute (*Ersatz*) for Eros, whereas negation is the successor of the destruction drive. This is the general form in which judgement occurs, but it only takes place when the symbol of negation has been created. This process, different from that described by Spitz,³⁰ is logical, not chronological.

Affirmation is the condition of what will become internal (in principle equal to what is pleasurable or belonging to the subject). What is expelled (*Ausstossung*) will become external (in principle equal to unpleasure, alien). Negation then, since it is essential to the function of judgement, has to be placed at the root of the erasing of the thing by the signifier, becoming that by which something that has been expelled or repressed is symbolically recovered. When the subject says, "I don't think that", the statement is already the partial lifting of the repression which permits the entry into consciousness of the repressed material on condition that its form is negative. Thus, this is precisely how Freud conceives the *I* in its relation to the unconscious; in a relation of negative recognition. Therefore, negation requires the symbolic order to be intact.

Repression remains halfway between "a reflex and a condemnation (conscious)" whilst negation would be halfway between "repression and flight". It is for this reason that in the first place, negation frees the thought from repression (partially) and in the second place, it permits the derivative representation of the repressed to enter into associative links even when they may be unpleasurable for the *I*. All this, which characterizes the so-called normal process, is constituted on the one hand by incorporation or introjection, and on the other by expulsion or rejection. This process, in a so-called normal judgement, finds a pathological correlation when foreclosure curtails the primordial affirmation.

* * *

Freud takes up the problem of defences again in a way which seems pertinent to us in the *Outline of Psychoanalysis* in 1938 "... Whatever the *I* does in its efforts of defence, whether it seeks to disavow (the word used is *Verleugnung*) a portion of the real external world (*Wirklichen Aussenwelt*) or whether it seeks to reject a demand of the drive (*Triebanspruch der Innerwelt*) ..." where we see without ambiguity that there are two mechanisms, one which deals with the relations with the external world (*Wirklichen Aussenwelt*) – disavowal – while another deals with the relations with the demands of the drive (*Triebanspruch der Innerwelt*) – rejection (*Abweisung*) –.

Rejection, the means of defence over the demands of the drives, might give us a key to the intention of Freud to understand psychosis, because in psychosis there is less of a failure in relation to the outside world than a lack with respect to a primordial signifier. This being the case, we find here the relation of foreclosure (*Verwerfung*) with rejection (*Abweisung*).

This statement, however, is not quite so simple, inasmuch as the repression characteristic of neurosis would also be involved with the so-called demands of the drives. In this case we should understand foreclosure as specific within rejection – a general means of defence in psychosis.

Although Freud did not specify the difference between disavowal and foreclosure as mechanisms of defence, Lacan showed that there is such a difference. In disavowal, the mechanism typical of perversion, there is a conflict between the demand of the drive and the prohibition by reality. This is referred particularly to the subject's refusal and acknowledgement of the anatomical difference between the sexes. In this way he accepts and disavows castration at once. Consequently, a split in the *I* is caused. In foreclosure:

"... what is at play when I speak of foreclosure? It is about the rejection of a primordial signifier in the outer darkness, a signifier that will lack in that level from

time onwards. This is the fundamental mechanism that I suppose at the base of paranoia. It is about a primordial process of exclusion of a primitive inside, which is not the inside of the body but that of a *first body of the signifier*. It is in the interior of that primordial body that Freud supposes the constitution of the world of reality . . ."³¹

The rejection under consideration approaches what Lacan describes as foreclosure. There exists, however, a distance between the position of Freud and that of Lacan. Foreclosure, for Lacan, is the mechanism that precipitates psychosis in the re-appearance from the real of a primordial signifier in isolation from the existing chain of signifiers. This is what Freud calls psychotic restitution, accompanied by loss of reality. Freud explains the psychotic as someone who treats words like things. Only an ingenuous realism could have confused the true extent of this statement, taking it as a synonym of everything unconscious becoming conscious. Neither repression nor negation are the mechanisms in operation. It is a question of rejection by which the word-presentation is unlinked from the thing-presentation. Here is where in Lacan's terms the foreclosure produces the rejection of a primordial signifier which, as the anamnesis of the *Wolf Man* showed, resulted in mutism.³² What becomes hallucination and/or delusion is not the return of something on the style of repression, but the imposition from the real of what has been foreclosed.

"*Verwerfung* thus has stepped in the way of all manifestations of the symbolic order, that is, the *Bejahung* which Freud posits as the primary process in which attributive judgement takes its roots and which is none other than the primordial condition for something to come from the real to be offered to the revelation of the being . . . Such is the inaugural affirmation, which

can be renewed only by way of the veiled forms of the unconscious word. . ."³³

Whilst negation recovers what was repressed, foreclosure is on the other hand, the imposition of a rejection upon a primordial signifier that was to remain in the real from where it will appear in a symbolic form.

The concepts at play in the analysis of Lacan's articles *Introduction* and *Reply to the Commentary of Jean Hyppolite on the Verneinung of Freud* (in *Ecrits*), are *Bejahung*, *Verneinung* and *Verwerfung*. These two texts of Lacan and the explanation of Hyppolite caused me to return several times to Freud, where I found a brief line which in my view has not received the attention it deserves. He comments in particular on the displayed pleasure in negativism present in some psychotics.³⁴ My hypothesis is that just as the fundamental affirmation and negation exist in the so-called normal judgement (negation, being the one which really puts that primordial affirmation into action), what is in question in psychotic judgement is foreclosure. Negativism appears as the special and particular effect which foreclosure has created. In this way, negativism is the psychotic restitution through which what has been foreclosed remains under the form of hallucination or delusion which comes from the real.

* * *

If we admit this, what remains to be explained is the relation of negativism with negation. Negation is the recovery of a signifier which has been repressed by means of another signifier. In contrast with this, negativism marks the attachment to a signifier isolated in the real, an attachment which questions the status of being against the background of not being. Negativism is the symptom of foreclosure, a mark of the real, "which expects nothing from the subject" and which is always "identical" to itself. It is a signifier against the background of not being which does not take place when *Verwerfung* instead of *Verneinung* cuts across *Bejahung*.

If foreclosure is the most radical form which prevents a judgement of existence and of attribute taking place, negativism is its clinical manifestation, just as negation is the clinical manifestation of repression. If this is correct, just as negation implies a partial lifting of repression, negativism shows the restitution of the subject in relation to its signifiers. Both bear the label "Made in Germany",³⁵ hence differentiating what is a symptom as an already secondary product from the defence.

When judgement is prevented by the dialectic of foreclosure and negativism, we must understand that a signifier has remained isolated in that there is no other signifier which can put it into circulation. This signifier – which Lacan called the Name-of-the-Father – necessarily appears on the background of the not-being left by the erasing of the thing (*das Ding*).³⁶

I follow here, obviously, a reflection suggested by Lacan, when referring to the Project, he wondered if all the misunderstanding surrounding the Freudian discovery did not reside in a failure to recognize that it was an experience of discourse. It is by following this indication that we can think of pleasure in negativism as also being an effort to limit *jouissance*. In psychosis pleasure in negativism is also a limit to *jouissance*, a restitutive limit of which the negativity cannot but show the permanent eclipse of the only signifier which illuminates all by its shadow.

This is why to think of psychosis as a structure where the unconscious is conscious cannot be sustained. If foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father produces as an effect (in the terms of Freud) a withdrawal of the word-representation from the thing-representation, then the transference from the system unconscious to the pre-conscious is prevented. Neurosis, by contrast, promotes the transference in the return of the repressed. In psychosis there is no return, there is encounter. What the psychotic has lost when he speaks is common sense, or, to be more precise, what has been lost is the level of redundancy proper to communication. But more importantly is the fact that the

psychotic cannot do something which the neurotic does all the time and that is to imagine that the signifier is at his service.

I still hold valid the commentary of Octave Mannoni regarding the psychotic who dealt with words as a linguist.³⁷ If the psychotic lacks something, it is the lack of lack which prevents him from losing the thing (*das Ding*), a hole through which the Name-of-the-Father becomes possible. The law is repressed desire for which the Name-of-the-Father is its precondition, but foreclosure hinders it. The delusions and hallucinations of the psychotic are, in this regard, an attempt to give a status to his desire.

When Lacan was asked if the formula regarding the signifier as being that which represents a subject for another signifier was still valid in psychosis, his answer was categorically positive. Why? . . . precisely to indicate that a subject – psychotic or not – cannot but help being represented, and in the case of psychosis, exactly by that foreclosed signifier³⁸ of which his negativism would be a symptom.

* * *

NOTES

- ¹ LACAN, J. *Introduction au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite*, in *Ecrits*, p.379, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1966.
- ² FREUD, S. "Affirmation – as a *substitute* for uniting – belongs to Eros; negation – the *successor* to expulsion – belongs to the destruction drive", in *Negation*, St. Ed. Vol. XIX, p.239. The italics are mine.
- ³ FREUD, S. *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, St. Ed. Vol. VII, p.57.
- ⁴ LACAN, J. *The Seminar*, Caracas, 12th July, 1980, p.103, in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne/ On Perversion*, Vol. II, Pit Press.
- ⁵ LACAN, J. *Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite*, in *Ecrits*, p.382, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1966.
- ⁶ FREUD, S. Letter 52 written to Fliess, in *Extracts from the Fliess Papers*, St. Ed. Vol. I, p.234.
- ⁷ FREUD, S. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, St. Ed. Vol. V, p.539.
- ⁸ FREUD, S. *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, St. Ed. Vol. I, p.383.
- ⁹ LACAN, J. *Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite*, in *Ecrits*, p.388, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1966.
- ¹⁰ PLATO. *Theaetetus*, p.84, translated by John McDowell, Oxford University Press, 1978.
- ¹¹ FREUD, S. *Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose*, p.111, *Gesammelte Werke*, XII. In Strachey's translation of *An Infantile Neurosis*, St. Ed. Vol. XVII, p.80, this sentence is diluted into "A repression is something very different from a condemning judgement."
- ¹² LACAN, J. *Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite*, in *Ecrits*, p.392, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1966.
- ¹³ The literal translation of "Das Es" from German to English is "The It".
- ¹⁴ FREUD, S. *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, St. Ed. Vol. VIII, p.175.
- ¹⁵ FREUD, S. *The Economic Problem of Masochism*, St. Ed. Vol. XIX, p.168.
- ¹⁶ LACAN, J. Letter of the dis-solution of *l'Ecole Freudienne de Paris*, 5th January, 1980, in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne/*

Homage to Freud, Vol. I, Pit Press.

- ¹⁷ FREUD, S. *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, St. Ed. Vol. XXII, p.103.
- ¹⁸ *The Freud/Jung Letters*, Letter of Freud to Jung of 30th November 1911, p.469, Princeton University Press, 1979. Freud's lapsus shows that he listened to the work of Spielrein as if it were Jung's – that is – not with good predisposition.
- ¹⁹ Although Freud realizes his lapsus and explains that he now means to say *Ihrer*, this only confirms our previous point, that wrongly or not, Freud listened to Jung when Spielrein spoke. Spielrein was an ex-analysand of Jung.
- ²⁰ We have to remember here the guilty request of supervision that Jung demanded from Freud regarding this patient. The correspondence clearly shows Sabina Spielrein's seduction who wanted to have a child from Jung. It is over the background of Jung's demand that Freud will write many of his papers on technique. The phrase "I am beginning to understand . . ." cannot but be a reference to Jung's seduction by his analysand.
- ²¹ "Psychoanalysis will get along by itself", attributed to Carlo Alberto (1798-1849), King of Sardinia, was a motto of the Italian struggle for independence, p.501/452 in *The Freud/Jung Letters*, p.469, Princeton University Press, 1979.
- ²² We have already mentioned the difference between destruction and death. This difference was ignored by Kleinians and some Freudians.
- ²³ See the multiple meanings given to the surname Spielrein in the book, *Sabina Spielrein entre Freud et Jung*, Aubier, Paris, 1981.
- ²⁴ There are two echoes which we cannot ignore in the title of her paper; Heidegger's being-for-death (Dasein) and Freud's *wo Es war soll Ich werden*.
- ²⁵ The diagnosis that Jung did of Spielrein at the start of the treatment was that of psychosis.
- ²⁶ *The Freud/Jung Letters*, p.469, Princeton University Press, 1979.
- ²⁷ "I (Freud) hold that the surface versions of myths cannot be used uncritically for comparison with our psycho-analytical findings", in *Freud/Jung Letters*, p.473, Princeton University Press, 1979.

- ²⁸ Lacan et sa moitié de poulet, p.122 *Littoral, revue de psychanalyse*, No. 10, *La Sensure*, October 1983, Paris.
- ²⁹ The outcome of the Oedipus complex can be articulated in the separation between being and having: "I want *to be* in order *to have* . . ."
- ³⁰ SPITZ, R. *No and Yes. On the Genesis of Human Communication*. International Universities Press, New York, 1957.
- ³¹ LACAN, J. *Les Psychoses, Le Séminaire, 1955/1956 livre III*, p.171, *Le champ freudien, Seuil*, Paris, 1981. The italics are mine.
- ³² Negation and foreclosure are mutually exclusive. Whilst the former makes verbalization possible affirming through what is negated, the latter annihilates this specific quality.
- ³³ LACAN, J. *Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite in Ecrits*, p.387, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1966.
- ³⁴ FREUD, S. *Negation*, St. Ed. Vol. XIX, p.239.
- ³⁵ FREUD, S. *Negation*, St. Ed. Vol. XIX, p.236.
- ³⁶ FREUD, S. *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, St. Ed. Vol. I, p.383.
- ³⁷ SHAKESPEARE, W. Polonius: "Though this be madness, yet there is method in it" in Hamlet, Act II, Scene II.
- ³⁸ LACAN, J. "Freud brings about an essential revision to the distinction he made between neurosis and psychosis by saying that in psychosis, reality is reformulated, that a part of reality is suppressed and that reality is never truly scotomised. In the end, you will see it from the context, it is a deficiency, a hole of the symbolic that he refers to, even if in the German text, he uses the term reality" *Les Psychoses, Le Séminaire, 1955/1956, Livre III*, p.171, *Le Champ Freudien, Seuil*, Paris, 1981.

CASTRATION AND DEATH, NODAL POINTS IN THE LATENT-CONTENT OF DREAMS

Gayle Paull

Freud's scientific consideration of dreams begins with the assumption that dreams are the product of psychic activity but that the finished dream is not recognized by the dreamer as such, and here most agree. There is therefore, a place unknown to the *subject*, in the subject, but now, already the Freudian thought could be lost.

Dreams are one of the proofs of the existence of this unknown place, the other scene, the *unconscious*, and Freud states that dreams are the "royal road" to it. It is from here that an unconscious wish emerges during sleep and necessitates the construction of a dream. With the aid of preconscious work, its function is to disguise the wish thus making it unintelligible to the dreamer. It is the preconscious system which functions as the dream's screen between the unconscious and consciousness.

And so it is this place, the unconscious, that defines the subject for psychoanalysis, as a *barred subject*, Lacan's §.

All dreams then have a purpose, not as disturbers of sleep but in fact prolong sleep. Freud explains that they are the guardians of sleep:

"... it is more expedient and economical to allow the *Uncs* wish to take its course, to leave the path to regression open to it so that it can construct a dream, and then to bind the dream and dispose of it with a small expenditure of preconscious work — rather than to continue keeping a tight rein on the unconscious throughout sleep."¹

However, as Moustafa Safouan points out in, *The Dream and its Interpretation in the Direction of the Psychoanalytic Treatment*,

"If psychoanalysts are unanimous in considering the dream as the "royal road to the unconscious," this unanimity does not extend to the question of the use of dreams in directing the treatment... In truth, if analysts do not have the same experience, we must conclude that they do not have a conception of this object that can found a common experience."²

Safouan affirms that this common experience can only be found if the analytic experience is considered as an experience of discourse. Taking the Freudian/Lacanian thought he poses the discourse as one in "which the subject can only signify himself on the condition of being hidden from view... *There is no other subject than the subject who speaks.*"³

Our analytic subject, the barred subject, $\$$, is then regulated by his usage of the signifiers in his discourse. But the meaning of, from where in analysis does our subject speak and from where do we listen and to what, is often lost in the psychoanalytic discourse. This is what motivated a now dead Lacan to write on behalf of a dead Freud, and re-state Freudian concepts

in terms of signifiers and signifieds, $\frac{S}{s}$, to the 'modern' audience. The importance of the signifier is that it is the localization, the nodal point of analytic truth. The Freudian unconscious, the barred subject, therefore awaits further discovery in the 'clinic'.

In *The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power*, Lacan states that,

"Indeed, no index suffices to show where it is that interpretation is operative, unless one accepts in all its radical implications a concept of the function of the signifier, which enables one to grasp where the subject is subordinated even suborned, by the signifier... the signifier effects the advent of the signified, which is the only conceivable way that interpretation can produce anything new. For interpretation is based on... the fact that the unconscious is structured in the most radical way like a language."⁴

The dream signifies and awaits interpretation as:

"The transportation of ideas into hallucinations is not the only respect in which dreams differ from corresponding thoughts in waking life. Dreams construct a *situation* out of these images... they 'dramatize' an idea."⁵

A dream then is a frozen moment taken in the life of a continuous discourse of the subject and is given a 'flashy' visual effect. The dream becomes the film footage, the unconscious the director.

The desires revealed in the dream are never interpreted, only constructed, nor is the dream ever fully interpreted due to the overdetermined dream elements, which is not the same as saying

that the unconscious is open to all meanings.⁶

Dreams themselves are constructed from the signifying chain of the discourse using substitution/displacement, called metonymy or combination/condensation called metaphor. In Lacan's words,

"... what is metaphor if not an effect of positive meaning, that is, a certain passage from the subject to the meaning of desire?"⁷

Thus the dream is a royal road, it links a listener to the unconscious. As a passage way it is disguised, only partially ever known, and on either side, exist and branch the numerous possibilities of the meaning. The importance is that the dream reveals this passage as particular to the visual representation and the words spoken by the dreamer. But whatever the particularity Lacan tells us that, "the dream is made for the recognition of desire."⁸ The demand for recognition of desire is from the unconscious and if the demand for this recognition becomes too great then the sleeper will awake.

So it is here, that Freud teaches, that it is with the latent-content of the dream and not with the manifest-content that we will glimpse our analytic subject, \$.

Today then I would like to present some clinical fragments, via the dreams of two boys, and this is no surprise, for Freud's experience has shown that distorted dreams requiring interpretation are found in children of four or even younger. And so taking Freud's words to set the task before us,

"We have to transform the manifest dream into the latent one, and to explain how, in the dreamer's mind, the latter has become the former."⁹

This first task requires the technique of dream interpretation, the second, a theoretical explanation.

* * * *



Fig. 1.— Tied to a bridge by a Dracula bat.



Fig. 2 – Monsters, biting me with their gums.



Fig. 3 – The Rape by Magritte.

The first boy, aged 6, has an interesting set of dreams that he presents over time. During one of the sessions he asks if he can draw me a dream. And without instruction from me he produced these drawings.

The first dream drawn was a small balloon floating over a bed, with himself in it, he crossed it out and redrew the details larger. The dream depicts in his words, "A bridge with myself tied up and lying on the bridge, a Dracula bat has me tied up and is going to throw me over the bridge." (Fig. 1).

Later he drew other dreams of monsters. In this one, he drew the monster's face and body in a most indefinite manner. "This dream is a dream of monsters killing me, I forget why, they are biting me with their gums." (Fig. 2).

I was reminded of Magritte's, *The Rape*, (Fig 3) a painting which substitutes the face details by female genitals — a common dream substitution Freud remarks. The opposite is also remarked upon by him in *A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession*,¹⁰ where the face details are imposed onto the



Fig. 4 — Baubo. Reproduced from St. Ed. Vol. XIV, p.338

lower abdomen of a woman. A small sketch appears in the text where the lifted skirt frames the 'face' as hair, again the pubic area forms the face. And a similar displacement, from the lower part of the body to the upper, unlocks Dora's symptoms for Freud. (Fig. 4).

By way of association to these dreams he said "I saw the Bloody Tower of London on television. It is where the Queen is and she kills people."

Later still, he drew a pirate ship, in which "I am tied up to here, (the mast) and I have to join the pirates or walk the plank." In the drawing, his mother has already jumped, his sister is on the plank ready to jump and join her mother. He told me that he had decided to join the pirates. (Fig. 5)

In dreams censorship is evidenced by the distortion of transposition of the dream and it does so "In order to prevent the generation of *Angst* or other forms of distressing affect."¹¹ It is not probable that the choice of such memories is due to the objective stimulus alone, even though Draculas and pirates are depicted often enough in the media,

"... dreams make use of any symbolizations which are already present in the unconscious thinking, because they fit in better with the requirements of dream-construction on account of their representability and also as a rule they escape censorship."¹²

Nevertheless *Angst* can

"... be the fulfillment of a wish. We know that it can be explained by the fact that the wish belongs to one system, the *Uncs*, while it has been repudiated and suppressed by the other system the *Pcs*."¹³

When I interviewed this boy's mother she reassured me without being asked, that he had no sexual knowledge, that he was innocent in this regard and that it was "*private*". On the ques-




Fig. 5—Joining the pirates

tion of tying up, she told me that once she had a male friend when her son was about four years old, and because her son was being so naughty at the time, this man jokingly *threatened* that he would tie him up and throw him over the balcony if he continued his actions. The boy 'egged' the man on, in such a manner that the man finally carried the threat out, and lowered him over the balcony.

According to the mother, her son turned white with fear and she became angry with the man. The boy remembers none of this early incident but his unconscious makes use of it.

The first dream is of a punishing bat, who ties him threatening to throw him; the second of a killing monster, drawn with face and genitals as being the same; and thirdly the pirate dream where the boy must decide to join the pirates. All of these dreams he has had repeatedly.

Bridges, in several places of the *Traumdeutung* can refer to parental intercourse, bridges link the banks, bridges cross to death, and bridges can fall short. There is no book of dream meanings however. But what is important for us is the associations of his mother and his apparent lack of memory.

Tying up, is a punishment and the phantasy of *A Child is Being Beaten* is explained by Freud:

"The situation of being beaten, which was originally simple and monotonous, may go through the most complicated alterations and elaborations; and punishments and humiliations of another kind may be substituted for the beating itself . . . the phantasy now has strong and unambiguous sexual excitement attached to it, and so provides a means for masturbatory satisfaction."¹⁴

Dracula as we know sucks blood and this boy as we shall see, has his own hypothesis from where.

The *monster* is a disguised drawing of the female genitals, it is

vague, he is not sure.

The *Queen* is in the Bloody Tower though. He must of course have guessed or seen at one time the surprising female genitals and probably with menstrual blood.

In the third dream he is asked to make a decision of either joining the *pirates*, (the men) or jumping to death (with the women). This is related in a disguised manner to the incident on the balcony. Here we can't help hearing the similarity between the words *pirate* and the two meanings of *private*, the word used by his mother. The first, meaning is *genitals*, he tells me that he has decided to be with the pirates (the men) and so he decided to go into *private*, here the second meaning is secrecy, and masturbation is the consequence.

The idea that I want to put before you was that he perhaps wanted to be tied up again because he thought he was being naughty. What was his crime at the present time? Probably that he was frequently masturbating in bed. His mother of course denied all knowledge of his masturbation. I saw him however on many occasions in her presence holding his penis.

The punishment phantasy was being used so that he could then indulge in masturbation as he was already being punished in the dream. The *Angst* following the masturbation was that the Queen would kill him, the monster would bite him, the bat would throw him or he would have to join the women in the water — he may lose his organ. In other words, in front of the fear of castration he runs towards castration, the symptom of being equal to a woman results as a counter phobia.

What did he now fear from his mother's knowledge of his private actions? His mother often said, "I will kill you for that". What would she do for this? Therefore the question he could not articulate was, what are the consequences of his sexuality if his mother finds out?

But why was he so naughty that day when he was about four years old? We are reminded here that a child's impulse towards incest persists in the unconscious:

"It is the fate of all of us, perhaps to direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father."¹⁵

He wanted, not to fall short, but to be a man and so satisfy his mother. He wasn't sure at this age how to satisfy a Queen, but now (when sexuality/masturbation has emerged he adds in the knowledge of female genitals) he thinks the consequences to be 'bloody'. He nevertheless risks all and touches his penis in front of his mother and her not seeing traps him in masturbation and punishment. Anger becomes the symptom, his desired Queen is indifferent to him, he is forced to be naughty, risk the dream punishment and to have punishment as the only recognition of his desire. His old wish is so strong that he now uses consequent punishment to perform masturbation, knowing that it is a risky business. His desire is left unsatisfied always, and forever, so the dream is in repetition.

However Moustafa Safouan tells us that:

"... no rehandling of the first relationship of being subjected to the mother's desire is possible without an integration of paternal meaning"¹⁶

So let us now turn to the dreams of a second boy, aged 10 years.

He is reported to have unruly behaviour and apparent constant over concern with sexual matters, particularly at school. For instance at the most inappropriate times he would call out and change spelling-words, shortening and lengthening them to give new meaning, such as bump into bum; repetitively say 'plop' 'plop' and would always ask to sing 'Charlotte the Harlot'.

After seeing him for the first time, I asked him what he thought about the present situation. To my surprise he answered, "I could swear on the holy bible," and that was the way he introduced me to his history. Indeed Freud says:

"... it usually happens that the very re-

collection to which the patient gives precedence, which he relates first, with which he introduces the story of his life, proves to be the most important the very one that holds the key to the secret pages of his mind."¹⁷

Over time he produced a dream that led me towards his first statement, his defensive formula. This dream he dreamt in two parts on the same night. The first part is:

"Aaron is walking down some stairs and says, 'my brother is dead.' He (Aaron) is very scared."

This dream is followed by the appearance of a second dream:

"Dracula is biting me in bed. Then I am awoken in the dream by my dad going to the toilet and I ask him 'where is Dracula?'"

He says that at the moment he has these two dreams almost every night.

In one session he drew a picture of Dracula, it appeared with a boy inside it. The colours of the clothing of both characters was commented upon, and the boy's were obsessively labelled. (Fig. 6).

In further associations, he remembered that one morning he saw two marks on the neck of one of his brothers, one on either side of the neck, and he convinced himself that they were the marks of Dracula.

To begin our interpretation:

"In the case of two consecutive dreams it can often be observed that one takes as its central point something that is only on the periphery of the other and *vice versa*, so that their interpretations too are mutually complementary. . . dreams dreamt on the same night are, as a quite general rule, to be treated in their interpretation as a single whole."¹⁸

This is because a single dream is never complete, it is only an attempt at a wish fulfillment, there are no whole things in analysis, only fragments and partial things.

When asked about the dream, he told me that the boy in the dream is Aaron a friend of his, and then he related the following story. Aaron's brother had died about three years ago at the age of five. This younger brother had died by "hailstones, lightning, or fainting or something like that. He just went outside and fell down." He didn't see the incident but Aaron told him of it.

He told me that preceding this death, Aaron had promised to give him a football and like many children, Aaron had made an oath, "I swear on the holy bible that I will give you a football." According to the story, the promise was broken and so the brother died. After the death, the football was given by Aaron.

He said he got a shock at the time. But it was in fact revealed that this shock really had not occurred to him until last year, when he had put death and breaking promises together. It was a clear case of an after affect. I point this out because,

"When in analysis two things are brought out one immediately after the other, as though in one breath, we have to interpret this proximity as a connection of thought."¹⁹

So let us pursue this thought with the incident that triggered the return of the past story and the emergence of its affect. It was when an older brother forced him "to swear on the holy bible that he would give him fifteen football stickers." He immediately got the stickers after making the oath. He told me that he was scared of not giving the stickers. But this can only be one of the moments in the discourse as a,

"... dream might be described as a *substitute for an infantile scene modified by being transferred on to a recent experience.*"²⁰




Fig. 6 - Dracula

Let us then map out the interplay of displacement, condensation, and overdetermination of the signifiers of these dreams and see what are the nodal points which signify the localization of an analytic truth.

“... by means of overdetermination, elements of low psychological value form new values, which afterwards find their way into the dream-content. If that is so, a transference and displacement of psychological intensities occurs in the process of dream-formation, and it is as a result of these that the difference between the text of the dream-content and that of the dream-thoughts comes about... the consequence of the displacement is that the dream-content no longer resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and that the dream gives no more than a distortion of the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious.”²¹

The way this boy was solving his current difficulties was to take up the obsessive idea that he cannot say anything that sounds like a promise. Remember the formula “I could swear on the holy bible”, and the unstated, but I cannot. If he did make a promise he cannot risk breaking it as he thinks something terrible will happen, maybe to himself or to his brother.

His dreams lead us to the meaning of this symptom. Words, since they are the nodal points of numerous ideas, are our first focus in the dream, and also because the work of condensation is clearly seen when it works with names and words spoken in dreams.

So how are the words of history, the formula, linked with the words in the dream? Freud helps here by telling us that,

“... it is an invariable rule that the words spoken in the dream are derived from spoken words remembered in the dream material.”²²

We already know that the same words were spoken by two brothers. Aaron as a brother, and the boy's older brother, but this is not enough. Who is this brother in the dream that is dead?

The boy that we have been describing has the name Darren. We know that it is not the spelling of the name that is important in a dream but the sound of a word. Aaron is a Darren with the D 'cut-off'. There is an identification with Aaron. Darren's older brother has further determined the link with the use of the *switchwords* and also the promise of a gift, the football and the stickers. The brother is then a brother of Darren, but which one?

Brothers, death and the holy bible, bring him by association to the bible story of Cain and Abel. Darren's religious background had acquainted him (and his unconscious) with such biblical stories.

"And it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother and slew him."²³

This story as a day residue captures the unconscious wish. In the bible Aaron, a high priest, is a symbol of the spiritual mind, the inner mind and represents Abel on a higher mental plane, whilst Cain is the lower mind, the 'I' a "tiller of the ground."²⁴

"And thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgement the Urim (Wisdom) and the Thummin (Love); and they shall be upon Aaron's heart, when he goeth in before the Lord: and Aaron shall bear the judgement of the children of Israel upon his heart before the Lord continually."²⁵

and again

"And he shall take the two goats, and set them before the Lord, at the door of the tent meeting. And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for the Lord and the other lot for Azazel."²⁶

Here the Lord represents truth and Azazel, ignorance and error. Diagrammatically the switch can be seen as follows from Aaron (A) to Darren (D):




Fig. 7 - Identification of Darren with Aaron

We will go further. Darren comes from a family where his grandfather has remarried and has had children. So in fact Darren's father has brothers, half-brothers, the same age as his own children. It is therefore not Darren's younger brother that is now in question, Darren has placed himself in his Grandfather's family, making Darren his own father's brother. Darren is still in the position of being the younger brother. Diagrammatically:




Fig. 8 - Darren as younger brother

Is it Darren who is then fearful of his life as younger brother? Yes, but not so quickly, the dream is determined in other ways. We can only say at this stage that he is worrying about his father also identified as a brother.

But why did this problem in the dream only emerge a little more than a year ago? A further fragment of history can help us here. Darren must have learnt of the arrival of a new rival, a new brother, now only a few months old. Could it be that he wished the death of this brother? Darren an older brother causing death by thought. The football, a gift, is equal to the baby, a gift from the father/brother. Diagrammatically:




Fig. 9 – Darren as older brother

Approaching our question from the flight down the stairs we can recognize the revival of Darren's Oedipal wish, to go up the stairs. The dream act of going down, would be after the act with his mother – his brother/father in this case would have to be dead. He only got the football gift after the brother's death. We know that,

“... dreams of death of parents apply with preponderant frequency to the parent who is of the same sex as the dreamer.”²⁷

But if this was attempted, and this is where Darren has to swear on the holy bible, that he won't do this – he cannot however, as the thought always returns, the consequence is the return of

Dracula, who appears in the next part of the dream. The father will bite, cause marks and swallow him. The dead boy is seen drawn in Dracula's stomach. The father appears in the dream's dream as Dracula disappears, and so the dream is confirmed.

The evidence of the once wished for father's death is seen by the converted over concern for his life. By the obsessive “I simply won't ever again even think of swearing on the holy bible” and that is that! My father will live.

The arrival of a new brother takes Darren to the position of older brother, his wish for the younger brother's death reactivates the old wish, the wish of the father/brother's death. Darren is an older and younger brother, in either place death occurs. Dracula will 'draw blood' and castrate him if he wishes to give his mother a gift. He cannot swear on the *holy* bible as he wants to stay *whole*. The typical obsessive recurrence of death is always a reference to castration.

The dream is overdetermined by the metaphor 'brother', and by metonymy Darren signifies his history through identification with Aaron and the promised gift. Behind the Desire-of-the-Mother lies the threat of castration and the paternal death wish.

The nodal points can now be mapped as follows:




Fig. 10 – Brother as metaphor

Darren is barred (\$) from knowing his dream's demand for recognition of desire. In terms of Lacan's graphs the metaphors are hooked retrospectively. The stated dream and castration are connected by metaphor but always unknown to the conscious Darren. (Fig. 11).




Fig. 11 -- Metaphor hooked

Freud in his paper on *Screen Memories* states:

"It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as

they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, *emerge*, they were *formed* at the time."²⁸

The history told is then the after effect of the unconscious and works *Nachträglichkeit*.

* * *

NOTES

- ¹ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). Stand. Ed. Vol. V, p.578.
- ² SAFOUAN, M. The Dream and Its Interpretation in the Direction of the Psychoanalytic Treatment, p.139, in *Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of Lacan* (Ed.) Schneiderman, Yale Uni. Press, 1980.
- ³ Ibid, p.141.
- ⁴ LACAN, J. The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power, p.233-34, in *Ecrits*. Tavistock, London, 1977.
- ⁵ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Stand. Ed. Vol. IV, p.50.
- ⁶ LACAN, J. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Hogarth Press, London, 1977.
- ⁷ LACAN, J. The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power, p.258, in *Ecrits*. Tavistock, London, 1977.
- ⁸ Ibid, p.260.
- ⁹ FREUD, S. Revision on Dream-Theory, Lect XXIX, (1932). *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Stand. Ed. Vol. XXII, p.9.
- ¹⁰ FREUD, S. A Mythological Parallell to a Visual Obsession, (1916). Stand. Ed. Vol. XIV, p.337.
- ¹¹ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams. Stand. Ed. Vol. IV, p.267.
- ¹² Ibid, p.349.
- ¹³ Ibid, p.580.
- ¹⁴ FREUD, S. A Child is Being Beaten (1919). Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII, p.186.
- ¹⁵ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams. Stand. Ed. Vol. IV, p.262.
- ¹⁶ SAFOUAN, M. The Dream and its Interpretation in the Direction of the Psychoanalytic Treatment; p.158, in *Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of Lacan* (Ed.) Schneiderman, Yale Uni Press, 1980.
- ¹⁷ FREUD, S. Childhood Recollection from *Dichtung and Wahrheit* (1917). Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII, p.149.

- ¹⁸ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams. Stand. Ed. Vol. V, p.525.
- ¹⁹ FREUD, S. Childhood Recollection from *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (1917). Stand. Ed. Vol. XVII, p.153.
- ²⁰ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams. Stand. Ed. Vol. V, p.546.
- ²¹ Ibid, p.307-308.
- ²² Ibid, p.304.
- ²³ *Genesis*, Vol. IV, p.8.
- ²⁴ GASKELL, G. A. *Dictionary of all Scriptures and Myths*. New York: Julian Press 1960.
- ²⁵ *Exodus*, xxiii, p.30.
- ²⁶ *Leviticus*, xvi, p.3-8.
- ²⁷ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams. Stand. Ed. Vol. IV, p.256.
- ²⁸ FREUD, S. *Screen Memories* (1899). Stand. Ed. Vol., p.322.

FURTHER REMARKS ON THE CASE OF LITTLE HANS

Felicity Bagot

In Freudian doctrine, the phallus is not a fantasm, if by that we mean an imaginary effect. Nor is it as such an object (part, internal, good, bad, etc.) in the sense that this term tends to accentuate the reality pertaining in a relation. It is even less the organ, penis or clitoris, that it symbolizes. And it is not without reason that Freud used the simulacrum that it represented for the Ancients. For the phallus is a signifier. . .

Jacques Lacan¹

In the Preface to *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* Lacan sounds a warning to the unwary regarding the idea of 'object' in psychoanalysis by telling us that "the only conceivable idea of the object, (is) that of the object as cause of desire, of that which is lacking".² What then can a phobic

object be, or maybe the question is more properly put – what can it not be?

In approaching Freud's case of Little Hans³ in order to come a step closer to the elusive notion of a phobic object one finds an array of obstacles along the path to understanding. There is the problem of the Oedipus complex to be grappled with, which Lacan tells us is the nodal point or nodal conflict in psychoanalysis; there is the problem of *Angst* or anxiety, the problem of repression and most of all this problem of castration. Little Hans also has a problem, from the very beginning of his father's reports: "Mummy have you got a widdler too?" His mother's reply doesn't help him much – "Of course, why?"

Fortunately Freud has a reply for us but it comes with his "Last Will and Testament" in, *The Outline of Psychoanalysis*, 1938. The most important phrase there is: "... both (boys and girls) start off from the premise of the universal presence of the penis".⁴ What kind of legacy is that? A further problem no doubt, but worth keeping in mind until Lacan can pay the interest due.

Freud bequeathes us another problem in detail in 1938, that of the splitting of the ego as being a universal characteristic of neurosis and not solely a feature particular to psychosis or fetishism. Most of the heirs have failed to perceive this clause in the "Will" and have subsequently become trapped in the fantasm of the "I" as infallible and all of its consequences. Freud clearly tells us in 1938 that there is "... a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on".⁵

To return to Freud's young patient and his ponderings as to whether his mother did or did not have. Some short time later the threat of castration is pronounced in response to his masturbation: "If you do that, I shall send for Dr. A. to cut off you widdler." This seems to have no particular effect on him at the time but lies dormant waiting to be caught up in the signifying chain at another moment. He continues his researches into who and what, has and has not, in particular staring at his

mother undressing. When asked by his mother "What are you staring like that for?" he says "I was only looking to see if you'd got a widdler too." His mother replies: "Of course, didn't you know that?" "No" says Hans, "I thought you were so big you'd have a widdler like a horse". His observations and protestations continue following the birth of his sister "But she hasn't got any teeth yet", "But her widdler's still quite small", "When she grows up it will get bigger, right".

Over a year later at the age of four and three quarters his *Angst* breaks out in the form of an anxiety dream: "When I was asleep I thought you were gone and I had no Mummy to cuddle with". Freud comments that this dream:

"... pointed to the presence of a repressive process of ominous intensity... we must regard it as a genuine punishment and repression dream... the child dreamt of exchanging endearments with his mother and of sleeping with her; but all the pleasure was transformed into *Angst*, and all the ideational content into its opposite. Repression had defeated the purpose of the mechanism of dreaming".⁶

Freud goes on to outline the precursors of the child's psychological situation:

"During the preceding summer Hans had similar moods of mingled longing and apprehension, in which he had said similar things, and at that time they had secured him the advantage of being taken by his mother into her bed. We may assume that since then Hans had been in a state of intensified sexual excitement, the object of which was his mother".⁷

Shortly after this the phobia proper is announced when out walking with his nurse maid:

"... he began to cry and asked to be taken home, saying that he wanted to cuddle with his mother... in the evening he grew visibly frightened (again);... he cried and could not be separated from his mother, and wanted to cuddle with her again..."⁸

The following day on being taken for a walk by his mother his fear was repeated and he assigned the first content to it with the words: "I was afraid a horse would bite me". Freud relates in his discussion that it was at this point that the first intervention was made:

"His parents represented to him that his *Angst* was the result of masturbation and encouraged him to break himself of the habit. I took care that when they spoke to him great stress was laid upon his affection for his mother, for that was what he was trying to replace by his fear of horses..."⁹

Subsequently his phobia of horses found various expressions and two months later we find expressed the link that hooks his castration *Angst*. He reports having heard during his summer holidays at Gmunden the father of a little girl telling her: "Don't put your finger to the white horse or it will bite you". It is not irrelevant that this was associated with a departure. This had been preceded by Hans telling his father: "... white horses bite, ... there is a white horse at Gmunden that bites. If you hold your finger to it, it bites". His father then gives him the interpretation: "... it strikes me that it isn't a horse you mean, but a widdler, that one mustn't put one's finger to".

It seems that the later threat of castration picked up a link here in his unconscious. Subsequently his father, at Freud's instigation, gives Hans the information that women have no widdlers. Hans promptly returns the following day with a phantasy of his mother having shown him her widdler: "I saw Mummy quite naked in her chemise, she let me see her widdler..." A bit later comes the first of several direct expressions of

concern by Hans regarding whether his own widdler is "fixed in". As Freud notes in his discussion: "The fact was that the threat of castration made some fifteen months earlier was now having a deferred effect upon him"¹⁰ Hans was facing the terror of the possibility that his widdler was detachable. Freud delineates this threat clearly by saying:

"... it would have been too shattering a blow... if he had had to make up his mind to forego the presence of this organ in a being similar to him; it would have been as though it were being torn away from himself..."¹¹

Hence his father's information that women have no widdlers only served to increase his concern for the preservation of his own.

In *Inhibitions Symptoms and Angst*,¹² Freud formulates three questions in relation to the mechanism of phobia to guide us in our thinking.

1. What is the repressed impulse?
2. What substitutive symptom has it found?
3. Where does the motive for repression lie?

Before attempting answers to these questions he tells us that it is necessary to review Little Hans' psychical situation. In this he firmly asserts Little Hans' place within:

"... the jealous and hostile Oedipus attitude towards his father, whom nevertheless — except in so far as his mother was the cause of estrangement — he dearly loved. Here then we have a conflict due to ambivalence. A well-grounded love and a no less justifiable hatred directed towards one and the same person. Little Hans' phobia must have been an attempt to solve this conflict."¹³

Freud resolves the first question telling us that the representation of the drive which underwent repression in Little Hans was

a hostile one against his father. There are many and varied expressions of this within the text of the case as the analysis emerges, for example the references to the fear of the horses falling down. Of course the reason for these wishes towards his father was that he interfered with his intimacy with his mother. He prohibited Hans from being in bed with his mother. He prohibited both the child's and the mother's desire. As Freud says "This father of his came between him and his mother,"^{14,15} or as Lacan would say, he inserted the *Law of the Father*, that is he was an agent of the *law* but not the cause of the *law*. Hence the child is constituted in the symbolic order and therefore is subject to the *Law of the Father* and confronts the impossibility of being and/or having the phallus.

Freud goes on in his discussion of the case to search for the connecting links between the repressed representation of the drive and the substitute for it. His answer to the second question is that "what made it a neurosis for Little Hans is one thing alone: the replacement of his father by a horse. It is this displacement, then, which has a claim to be called a symptom."¹⁶

Freud continues in his exposition by outlining the processes of repression and regression in phobia and comes to the conclusion that:

"The formation of his phobia had the effect of abolishing his affectionate object-investment of his mother . . . though the actual content of his phobia betrayed no sign of this. The process of repression had attacked almost all of the components of his Oedipus complex . . . there were a collection of repressions and regression . . . his phobia disposed of the two main impulses of the Oedipus complex — the aggressive impulses towards his father and his over fondness for his mother"¹⁷

Now Freud turns to the critical third question — what was

the motive force of repression? He tells us that it was the fear of impending castration. The fear that a horse would bite him can without any forcing, be given the full meaning of a fear that a horse would bite off his genitals, would castrate him. As we have seen earlier his many observations had confirmed that there was a possibility that his penis was detachable. Freud says that "the idea contained in his *Angst* — being bitten by a horse was a substitute by distortion for the idea of being castrated by his father"¹⁸ This was the idea which had undergone repression. The *Angst* belonging to the animal phobia was a displaced fear of castration.

Lacan describes the state of affairs in phobia by telling us that the phobic object appears in order ". . . to take the place of or make up for (*suppléer*) the lack in the Other"¹⁹ He also refers to the phobic object as the all-purpose signifier. Clearly to grasp this notion one must work with desire and "the signifier par excellence of desire" — the phallus. In a passage from *Ecrits* Lacan maps out for us the child's situation:

" . . . the child, in his relation to the mother, a relation constituted in analysis not by his vital dependence on her, but by his dependence on her love, that is to say, by the desire for her desire, he identifies himself with the imaginary object of this desire in so far as the mother herself symbolizes it in the phallus"²⁰

Oscar Zentner's seminar on Freud's three moments of the Oedipus complex²¹ will be of some assistance here. He says that the Oedipus complex is the myth of not having and not being; a myth of incompleteness par excellence. In the first moment the child is the phallus, he occupies the place of the desire of the mother and the completeness her desire. The second moment is the moment of breaking or separation produced by the father. It is the symbolic father, not the father of flesh and blood who inserts the *law* — you cannot have your mother and you cannot re-integrate your product. In the third moment — the father is

permissive – he allows identification – you can be like me, but not entirely like me. In this moment an ideal ego is constituted.

You will recall the opening of this paper with “The object as cause of desire”. Lacan also says “man’s desire is the desire of the Other”. The key to Lacan’s understanding of desire is the lack – or *manque-à-être* or *want-of-being*. In *The Four Fundamental Concepts* he indicates that it is “the lack that constitutes castration *Angst*”.²² The child will find himself in the impossible task of fulfilling the mother’s lack. In *Ecrits*, Lacan speaks of “the child’s desire . . . identifying itself with the mother’s want-to-be (or lack of being), to which of course she was herself introduced by the symbolic law in which this lack is constituted”.²³

So for Little Hans we have the elements of the interplay between his desire and the desire of the Other, the threat of castration, the lack in the mother, and the *law*. The phallus is what in the oedipal situation is in circulation among all five of these elements.²⁴ Then for Little Hans the phobic object appears in order to take the place of, or make up for (*suppléer*) the lack in the Other, insofar as this lack means the Other cannot fill the lack in oneself. Little Hans’ displacements in a chain of phobic objects limits this metonymy with a metaphoric substitution of a specific phobic object which stands for the lack. The phallus, unconscious as it is, stands as the major signifier of the lack. The phobic object, always mobile, is the symptom.

* * *

NOTES

- ¹ LACAN, J. The Signification of the Phallus (1958) in *Ecrits*, A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p.285.
- ² LACAN, J. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, The Hogarth Press, London, 1977, p.ix.
- ³ FREUD, S. Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, (1909). Stand. Ed., Volume X. All quotations from this case will be from the Standard Edition.
- ⁴ FREUD, S. An Outline of Psychoanalysis, (1938). Stand. Ed., Vol. XXIII, 154. This statement can only be understood if we realize that Freud does not confuse at any stage, the phallus with the penis; this universal premise refers to the antithesis of phallus and castration as the only possibilities.
- ⁵ FREUD, S. The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence, (1938). Stand. Ed., Vol. XXIII, p.276. See also Freud’s discussion of the splitting of the Ego in the same volume ps.202-204 of The Outline of Psychoanalysis.
- ⁶ FREUD, S. Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year-Old Boy, (1909). Stand. Ed., Volume X, p.23.
- ⁷ IDEM, p.118.
- ⁸ IDEM, p.23-24.
- ⁹ IDEM, p.119.
- ¹⁰ IDEM, p.120. This is the particular way the unconscious always operates, in analysis, *nachträglichkeit* – giving meaning afterwards. The translation of *nachträglichkeit* by *deferred effect* can mislead.
- ¹¹ IDEM, p.106.
- ¹² FREUD, S. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, (1926). Stand. Ed., Vol. XX. The word *anxiety* does not cover the full concept of the original German word *Angst*. For an explanation of the insufficiency of this translation and The Freudian School of Melbourne’s preference for retaining the word *Angst* for the concept see: Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne—On *Angst*, PIT Press, Melbourne, 1982.
- ¹³ FREUD, S. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, (1926). Stand. Ed., Vol. XX, p.101-102.

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

- ¹⁴ FREUD, S. Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, (1909). Stand. Ed., Vol. X, p.134.
- ¹⁵ As I shall develop later in the paper, this corresponds to the second moment of the Oedipus complex, the moment in which the father can only be present in so far as he interdicts both the union of the child with the mother, and the uniting of the mother with the child.
- ¹⁶ FREUD, S. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, (1926). Stand. Ed., Vol. XX, p.103.
- ¹⁷ IDEM, p.106-107.
- ¹⁸ IDEM, p.108.
- ¹⁹ LACAN, J. The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power (1958) in *Ecrits, A Selection*, translated by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p.248. The french verb *suppléer* is not easily translated. The range of meanings include: to supply, to fill up, to make up, to take the place of, to do duty for.
- ²⁰ IDEM, p.198.
- ²¹ Internal Seminar of the Freudian School of Melbourne August 1982.
- ²² LACAN, J. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Hogarth Press, London, 1977, p.73.
- ²³ LACAN, J. On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis. (1958) in *Ecrits, A Selection* translated by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p.207.
- ²⁴ See for instance the development of this point in Lacan's Seminar on the Purloined Letter translated in the Yale French Studies Vol. 48 p.38-72, see also Oscar Zentner's further explorations of the idea in his paper *The Woman and the Real as a Paradigm of Psychosis* in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne* Vol. 1. 1980 PIT Press.

THE TRANSFERENCE AND CURE OF
THE PRIME MINISTER'S SON

Rob Gordon

"O my youth! for man lost
in limitless love
without return of conscience, the point
between memory and desire shifts,
adrift in a whirlpool.
Time past and future reverse direction
and capsizes; dolphin
and tuna in the net of perception.
It's I who am on the wrong side, amen.
Except for the gift of speech. Less
the Pentecost of grief
that smelts everyone in the same mold."

Mario Luzi¹

"The breaking out of a negative transference
is actually quite a common event in institu-
tions."

Freud²

In 1812, the Prime Minister of England, Spencer Perceval, was assassinated in the foyer of the House of Commons. He had been regarded as the epitome of a Christian gentleman and actively espoused the doctrines of the Evangelical movement. One of his sons, John, then aged nine years, discovered the body by accident as it was laid out in a nearby room before the family had been told. A newspaper report of the time says the boy's distress was "beyond description"³ What further effects it had on him at the time we do not know. A handsome pension was settled on the family by the parliament, and his mother later remarried.

John grew to manhood, served in the army, then became disenchanted and resigned his commission to study at Oxford. His religious interests grew and he went to Row in Scotland to investigate some miracles of healing and speaking in tongues. There he began to experience "promptings of the spirit" and a short time later, in 1830 developed an acute psychotic illness while staying in Dublin. He was placed in the asylum of Dr. Fox outside Bath, then about eighteen months later in that of Mr. Newington at Ticehurst. After two years, John recovered his reason and wrote a two volume account of his experiences.⁴ He allows us to trace the course of the illness through the early decompensation, the florid period and then the gradual recovery.

His hallucinations took the form of voices which he took to be spirits commanding him to do all manner of things. He developed delusions in which he was being made to suffer tortures for the sins of others, or that by his sinfulness he jeopardized the whole of creation. His family members were felt to be sacrificing themselves for him. The illness progressed to a delusion that he had lived a second simultaneous life as a boy in Portugal. There he had been befriended and cared for by an old priest whom he had murdered and robbed. He thought he had found refuge with a band of degenerate monks and assisted in the killing of a pig by immersing it in boiling water.

His father was a recurrent element in his hallucinations, delusions and his rational thoughts as well, together with the themes of death and sin. It appears the boy's discovery led him to conclude his father's death was due to his failure to be what his father wanted — a Christian gentleman's dutiful son, instead of an ambivalent, Oedipal rival. The delusion of murdering the old priest indicated his Oedipal signification of his father's death as an event for which he was responsible. He thought he had a second self which was an ungrateful, sacriligious robber.

John did his best to master his guilt and hostility by repression and reaction formation. He seems to have been a rather sanctimonious young man, wholly disapproving of his military comrades' profligate way of life. He worked assiduously for the religious betterment of the men under his command. But when the ambivalence reached a certain pitch, he left the army. It seemed to have served as a symbolic system sustaining the meaning of his existence in terms of the faithful service to God and Country of a martyred Prime Minister's son. In another paper,⁵ I have traced the development of the psychosis and demonstrated how it was structured around the figure of his father.

The essence of psychosis is the dissolution of the symbolic order. The subject is unable to order his experiences any longer by their relation to a network of signifiers that confer meaning and lawful relations on them, and the unconscious emerges as an imaginary reality with all the plasticity and terror of the primary process. Lacan⁶ identifies the failure of the function of the Father as the condition leading to the loss of the symbolic; that is to say, the subject loses the function that confers on him a position within a network defining his relation to what he desires. In short, he loses his relation to the Law, which is transmitted by the Name-of-the-Father.

John's symptoms demonstrate the ubiquitous presence of the Father as Spencer and the Almighty, most clearly represented in a vision of his father transfigured with a long, white beard weep-

ing tears of crystal over him. But they also demonstrate the son's sinfulness and unworthiness because of his failure to perform the incessant tasks imposed by his delusions to save himself, his family and mankind from damnation. What began as the Holy Spirit and companion spirits inspiring him, turned into a legion of persecutors when he doubted them.

The elements of his history were woven into an endless play of displacements revealing themselves new each moment as they presented in the garment of his thoughts, memories and perceptions. Instead of acting as signifiers anchoring his past and present experiences, they were cut loose from the structure of the symbolic and abandoned to the play of the imaginary.

The second volume of John's memoir was published ten years after the onset of the illness. Not only are there long, impassioned diatribes against lunatic doctors, his caretakers and his family, but he admits that he still hears the voices; the difference is that he no longer takes them as external perceptions. He locates them securely in an imaginary order by identifying them as the voices of spirits who play with him by God's will though he does not feel bound to obey them.

His cure consists not in the eradication of his symptoms, but in learning to live with his father's death as the wound in his history, a cure consistent with the psychoanalytic idea of cure outlined by Etkin:

"The idea, yes, is to be able to live with that wound in such a way that the inevitable pain which is produced – will not develop into a black hole which attracts and absorbs the 'jouissance' (pleasure) and the tension of life. Nothing more but nothing less"⁷.

In his text, John shows the two elements which are the agents of the cure: transference and signification. But the movement of the cure does not imply a sequential development of one stage after another. Rather, it consists in a disordered

structure which gradually becomes ordered with lawful relations between its elements.

The fabric of this structure is evident in two places – firstly in John's relations with those around him and the successive positions he occupies in those relations; and secondly in the meaning given to his hallucinations and delusions.

Freud describes transference as developing on the "stereotype plates" of the conditions under which drive satisfaction occurs. They are "constantly repeated – constantly reprinted afresh – in the course of the person's life."⁸ Lacan identifies the transference as situated in its impact on the subject's world. He states that it,

"structures all the particular relations with that other who is the analyst . . . Hence the expression . . . *he is in full transference*. This presupposes that his entire mode of perception has been restructured around the dominant centre of the transference. . ."⁹

In the restructuring process, the subject finds himself in a world of his own where he encounters his unconscious with the distortions proper to it. The transference is the field of the repetition which meets the subject out of what Freud described as his "state of expectation" deriving from the lack in his relations with the first objects. Every further encounter is "apprehended as a promise"¹⁰ of that satisfaction by the new object. The original lack is exposed for the subject in the transference and he finds himself in a dialectic with the others who constitute it. He becomes subject to the laws of that dialectic. Freud saw transference as an expression of the compulsion to repeat what cannot be remembered, or according to Lacan, what is "opaque" or "resists signification" for the subject. Lacan expresses the function of the transference as:

"this indeterminant of pure being that has no point of access to determination, this primary position of the unconscious that is

articulated as constituted by the indetermination of the subject – it is to this that the transference gives us access in an enigmatic way. It is a Gordian knot that leads us to the following conclusion – the subject is looking for his certainty.”¹¹

The relation between transference and signification can be defined from this.

To paraphrase Lacan: The concept of transference appears in the moment when what is opaque for the subject is transferred to the Other which is “the locus of speech and potentially the locus of truth” or signification.¹² If, as Lacan says, “the unconscious is the discourse of the Other,”¹³ then in the transference, the discourse is located in the Other and thereby becomes accessible, which is expressed by Lacan as “the transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious.”¹⁴ The unconscious is understood as,

“that which is inside the subject, but which can be realised only outside, that is to say, in that locus of the Other in which alone it may assume its status.”¹⁵

For John Perceval, the Other revealed itself in the onset of his psychosis as the Almighty and the spirits shouting, threatening and rebuking him. At this time he was strapped to his bed or to a niche in the wall of the asylum. His world became imaginary, where the drama of his history was re-enacted in the costumes and props provided by his recent miraculous encounters at Row.

The psychosis was structured around four propositions which became subject to constant displacements and distortions, and were enacted as hallucinatory realities. They can be expressed as:

I am the assassin of the Father/Almighty

I am the cause of the suffering of my loved ones.

I deserve punishment/persecution by the servants of the Father/Almighty.

I am deprived, and rejected by those I love.

The voices express both the lewd and sublimated desires, the merciless judgement of his sins, and the supplications for mercy.

These propositions remind us of the distortions occurring in Schreber’s delusions around the central theme of “I (a man) love him”, which passed through a number of positions before arriving at the final delusion which rebuilds a world shattered by catastrophe. But as Freud shows, “the delusion formation which we take to be a pathological product is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction.”¹⁶ For Perceval, the transference gradually facilitates a further series of displacements from the spirits as persecutory agents to the people around him.

The transference begins as soon as he arrives at Dr. Fox’s. He is told by his voices that it is the house of a friend of his father’s. Then he sees a patient and later Dr. Fox himself as his father. To what extent this is assisted by the name Fox is worthy of consideration. John’s father’s maiden parliamentary speech was an attack on the leader of the Whig opposition – Charles James Fox. Whereas Spencer Perceval was an upright Christian, Fox was the degenerate profligate, indulged son of an eccentric, self-made public servant turned aristocrat.¹⁷ He was everything Spencer was not.

To begin with, the voices persisted as spirits. The identities of his family emerged in the place of the caretakers. The grating of a chain against the wall spoke to him with his father’s voice. He identified a servant as his father, the housekeeper as his mother and fellow patients as his siblings. In the transference the family circle is recreated.

There were also constructed identities. He was told his servant’s name was “Herminet Herbert”. On his recovery he made a philological analysis of the name which mystified him. It could be interpreted to mean “the servant of the Lord of

Hell." This excess of interpretation shows both the psychosis hinging on the word, and at the same time its interpretation establishing the symbolic relations of the word, as illustrated by the very need to give the word a meaning.

Gradually, however, he became outraged at his living conditions and treatment. Instead of experiencing them as a persecution with the gratification that he was suffering for the redemption of others, he became incensed that "the son of my father" was not better provided for. This hostility and the reality of his treatment strengthened his real experience of those around him and enabled them to emerge from the delusion. He realized that the voices were not always right, and that the acts of his keepers were sometimes petty, mean and ignorant. In these moments, he no longer saw them as representatives of the will of the Almighty.

But then the keepers received the investment of his hostility. He wrote to his mother complaining about his treatment and then discovered that Dr. Fox had not forwarded the letter. This was a decisive point in his recovery. He was outraged, complained to his mother and demanded to be released. She refused and attempted to placate him, and he then identified her and the other members of his family as accomplices of the doctor and his colleagues. He described the intensity of the transference:

"I cannot describe the hatred with which the recollection of this conduct still inspires in me: then I hated, I despised, I was enraged, I became hardened. I loathed myself for keeping any terms with my relations and those around me. In the end I scoffed at religion; I blasphemed the name and nature of God."¹⁸

His hatred and realization of what he interprets as the cynical indifference of the doctor restructured the psychosis. It marks a displacement from persecuting spirits to persecuting doctors,

and from punishment by the Almighty to mistreatment by ignorant doctors. In this phase, he is able to preserve God (the Father) from his anger and it is only on his recovery that he returns to condemn God as the author of his troubles. But the good name of his father remains inviolate throughout.

At first, his sadistic impulses were directed towards himself by imaginary agencies and were irresistible. Through the transference, they became directed at him by the doctors, but were able to be resisted. He dissembled, fought and made plans to resist them in the domain of his father by taking them to the law courts. The transference initiated a struggle with the doctors and his family which established a structure to differentiate the conscious from the unconscious.

The conscious portion consisted of:

- (1) The anger and hatred due to the family's indifference, expressed as a wish to instigate legal proceedings against them.
- (2) The experience of being maliciously and ignorantly persecuted by the doctors and caretakers.

The unconscious portion consisted of:

- (1) The anger and hatred due to the father's indifference expressed as murderous wishes.
- (2) The experience of being persecuted by the Almighty and His spirits which also signify the Father.

But they in turn were based on a number of unconscious propositions which embodied the retrospective signification of his father's death. They can be expressed as:

- (a) The Father is all powerful and represents the moral, spiritual and temporal Law, combining as he does Father, Lawyer, Prime Minister and "Christian Gentleman."
- (b) The Father is dead, therefore omnipresent.
- (c) John is guilty of his death and has broken the Law.
- (d) Therefore: To be loved by the Father and accepted in the Law, he must be punished.

They constitute the agency of conscience which was identified with the Father and the Almighty and took on an hallucinatory representation in the psychosis. But his recognition of these figures as imaginary began when he was told he could do things and he found he could not, or that damnation would follow some of his actions and it did not. He began to doubt the voices. At the same time, he began to doubt that his keepers were angelic servants of the Almighty. He formed the thought that they acted from spite or ignorance in abusing him. His voices purporting to be the Saviour encouraged him to dispute with them. After a fight, when told to resist being shaved, in which his thumb was wilfully dislocated and he was suffocated into submission, he wrote:

"My spirits were completely roused by this affair, and I gained a self-confidence, and a liberty of thought for a long time lost to me; the absurdity of my Saviour having desired me in such circumstances to expose myself to such disgraceful treatment was self-evident, and my resolution became the stronger to exercise a great control over myself, and cautiously and steadily resist being led away again into any situation."¹⁹

The development of the transference allowed him to relegate the hallucinations to a different order from that of flesh and blood objects. As he acted out more, wrestling with and opposing his keepers he felt,

"that every dispute and struggle I had with those controlling me, served to strengthen my mind and to dissipate my errors."²⁰

He experienced intense feelings of guilt and badness, which only abated when he was able to direct them towards his keepers. His family's complicity in the treatment aligned them with his persecutors, and he vented his hostility on them too. But he was no longer impotent.

After continued efforts he was transferred to Mr. Newington's

asylum where he obtained a private sitting room and a manservant — the least a gentleman should expect. He came to accept himself more, and began to understand what had been happening to him. He indulged in other forms of acting out such as attempting to abscond and fighting with his servant. He had, however, given warning of his attempt and he accepted his containment as fair play. He was now more concerned with freedom and respect. His hostility was not so intense and he says some complimentary things about Newington and is even sympathetic when he sees him ill. Even if we take this as a reaction formation to his hatred, it is indicative of a developing structure of defence. He wrote a letter of complaint to a London surgeon and addressed visiting magistrates, and gave expression to his increasing capacity to take his destiny into his own hands.

The dialectic of the transference involved his world being structured at first by his hallucinations and delusions. It was a private world. But reality intruded in the form of discrepancies imposed by the actual events, which replied to his constructions. He responded with a second structure, which identified the objects as persecutors. Their behaviour now coincided with his expectations and enabled him to make affective expression of his situation.

His relation with his keepers and family was able to be subjected to law, that is the law of the land. For Perceval, the law of the Father and the temporal law were fused and his attempt to litigate represents his entry into a symbolic system which, however is only partial, since it also embodies his transference, and enacts his attack on his persecutors. But it is enough to enable him to locate his hallucinations as imaginary. The law confers on him the status of subject as he pleads his case in letters and to anyone who will listen. His transference relations replace those with the spirits and the direction of the current of aggression is reversed. Instead of suffering, he is now the aggressor.

But his transference could not move beyond this point. At the time of writing, he is still in "full transference". He bitterly denounces his family's betrayal of him and spends many pages ranting against the doctors, and the social situation of lunatics. Justified as many of his observations may have been, it is clear that his writing on these subjects is erratic, emotional and at times incoherent. It breathes a sense of barely controlled fury. The contrast with the passages analysing the meaning of his symptoms is marked; he is lucid, restrained and articulate, and touchingly offers his observations of himself for the enlightenment of the medical profession.

In these passages the other function of the cure — signification — is apparent. He constantly examined the phenomenology of his hallucinations and delusions, and related them to what he saw in his fellow patients. Although unable to achieve a psychoanalytic understanding of the displacements and condensations which disguised his history in his symptoms, he was able to insert them into a system of ideas which located them between the sense organs on the one hand and the "spirit" by which he indicated what we would call fantasy, desire and the unconscious on the other. It may even be that his use of the word "spirit" to denote the subject of desire and the imaginary domain led to the concretization of his fantasies as actual spirits which spoke audibly to him, hence the linguistic structure of his psychosis is evident.

Instead of recognizing desire as the basis of the parapraxis he puts it concretely:

"this power of a spirit to control the utterance is daily experienced though not remarked, in what we call a 'slip of the tongue'... it almost invariably happens that the word made use of by mistake is the contrary to that intended... the organs of speech are made use of without the volition or rather intention of the person speaking. This is remarkable, because it

would prove the residence in the temple of the body, of two distinct powers, or agents or wills."²¹

He was able to signify his hallucinations as derived from normal experiences. In fact he developed an obsessional concern to interpret them. Even though his voices directed him at one stage to declare he was of sound mind, he says:

"But now I no longer obeyed their word, and I was so scrupulous that I could not seriously claim to be considered of sound mind so long as there was one phenomenon remaining, the faithfulness of which I had not tested, and the source of which I had not discovered."²²

He recognized the formation of his hallucinations out of the play of the Almighty (Unconscious) upon the various effects in the sense organs:

"neither when I had seen persons or ghosts about me, neither when I saw visions of things, neither when I dreamt, were the objects really and truly outside of my body; but that ghosts, visions, and dreams are formed by the power of the Almighty, in reproducing figures as they have before been seen, on the retina of the eye, or otherwise to the mind... or by combining the arrangement of internal particles and shades, with that of external lines and shades, etc., so as to produce such a resemblance, and then to make the soul to conceive, by practicing upon the visual organs, that what is perceived really within the body exists without side, throwing it in a manner out, as the spectre is thrown out of a magic lantern."²³

Thus he is able to see his symptoms within a symbolic order.

He must, however, consign much of the meaning to the signifier of "the Almighty" which plays upon his apparatus. This does not stop his hallucinations but it does allow him to say of them:

"That which I have beheld, however, I can faintly and indistinctly recall, and I can refuse these ideas by turning to other occupations, though at times in spite of all my efforts, they still haunt me. I think it probable that they are common to all men, but that the world generally reject them, being taught so to do and fearing God or the accuser."²⁴

The symbolic predominates, allowing him to retain a subjectivity in relation to them, but even here, the hostility which became invested in the transference to the doctors and family appears when he realizes his delusions were a deception just as he accused Dr. Fox of deception. In this case, however, his wrath is directed towards the Almighty and in this utterance we sense his recognition of his relation to the unconscious, and the primary process:

"I was enraged and disgusted at having been deceived. I spoke to myself thus: 'I am cast out of heaven, I have been disgraced by the Almighty, no temporal king has dishonoured me and turned me to ridicule; the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords, the ruler of the Universe has despised me, from whose presence I cannot flee, to whose omnipresent court of Holy Spirits I have been exposed.'²⁵

He is able to develop a structure of sense around his religious ideas to achieve a mastery in his confrontation with the Almighty. He understands what has been happening to him, at least in terms of the whims of the Almighty. No longer are his voices and visions a reality which engulfs him, they have become phenomena in which both real and imaginary components can

be identified within an articulated structure which includes self as subject, the body, the unconscious (in the form of the Almighty, the Other), death (of himself in his play with the idea of suicide as well as his murderous feelings towards his keepers), the other (lunatic doctors and his indifferent family), and the Name-of-the-Father (in his signification of himself as "my father's son", a gentleman and an Englishman worthy of respect on these counts), and preserves symbolic relations between them.

But lest we feel too confident that we have understood John Perceval and his psychosis, let us end with the awe which contact with the real inspires in those who have encountered it;

"I have seen very beautiful visions both in my sleep and when awake... in which figures endowed with great majesty and decorum, and of exquisite grace and beauty, were combined in postures, easy elegant and delightful, and in actions of refined voluptuousness; were I to call it sensuality or debauchery, I should not convey the idea of holiness, of innocence, and of honest merriment, of which these forms were the expression. Neither do the works of any artist that I have yet seen, excepting a few of the ancient statues of Venus, Apollo, and busts of Jupiter, manifest their character...

I am not sure it is lawful to mention these things; and whilst I unveil them with reverence, I call to mind the verse of Orpheus;

"To whom it is right I will speak.

Close the doors against the profane!"²⁶

* * *

NOTES

- ¹ From: *In the Dark Body of Metamorphosis*, in *In the Dark Body of Metamorphosis and Other Poems* by Mario Luzi, translated by I. L. Salomon; W.W. Norton and Co. Inc. New York 1972, p.19.
- ² FREUD, S. *The Dynamics of the Transference*, (1912) *Stand. Ed.*, Vo. XXII, p.106.
- ³ The incident is reported in *The Day for 14th May 1812*, Quoted in *Spencer Perceval, the Evangelical Prime Minister, 1762-1812*; by Dennis Gray, Manchester University Press. Manchester 1963, p.459.
- ⁴ BATESON, Gregory (Ed); *Perceval's Narrative, A Patient's Account of his Psychosis, 1830-1832*; William Morrow and Co. Inc.; New York 1974.
- ⁵ GORDON, Rob; *The psychosis of the Prime Minister's Son*; in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, Melbourne, 1982.
- ⁶ LACAN, Jaques; *On a Question Preliminary to any possible treatment of Psychosis*; in *Ecrits, A Selection*; translated by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, London, 1977.
- ⁷ ETKIN, Gustavo Ezequiel; *Psychoanalysis and Cure*, in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, Melbourne, 1980, p.57.
- ⁸ FREUD, S; *Op. cit.* p.100.
- ⁹ LACAN, Jaques; *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. The Hogarth Press, London, 1977, p.124.
- ¹⁰ SAFOUAN, Moustapha; *Transference and Acting-Out*; in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, Melbourne, 1982, p.128.
- ¹¹ LACAN, Jaques; *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, p.129.
- ¹² *Ibid*; p.129.
- ¹³ *Ibid*; p.131.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*; p.146.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid*; p.147.
- ¹⁶ FREUD, S; *Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of A Case of Paranoia*; (1911), *Stand. Ed.*, Vol. XII, p.71.

- ¹⁷ For an account of Charles James Fox, see Christopher Hobhouse, *Fox*; John Murray, London, 1964.
- ¹⁸ BATESON, *Op. cit.*, p.124.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*; p.268.
- ²⁰ *Ibid*; p.267.
- ²¹ *Ibid*; p.289-290.
- ²² *Ibid*; p.304.
- ²³ *Ibid*; p.305-306.
- ²⁴ *Ibid*; p.507.
- ²⁵ *Ibid*; p.307.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*; p.306.

THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CHILDREN

Maria Inés Rotmiller de Zentner

'I am all ears'¹

*'Most eyes have perfect sight,
tho' some be blind'*

Psychoanalysis and Language

To analyse is to punctuate, as in syntax, the words — phonemes or unities of signification — articulated in the discourse. Discourse of words or play, paint, rubber bands, drums . . . that unfolds within the transference. This practice or art of punctuating, emphasizes its antithesis with the process of synthesis, since it is the examination of the elements and parts rather than any statement voiced as a totality, which will be revealed in an analysis. In the analytic session the unconscious is particular because it addresses the analyst through the vicissitudes of language.

Impediment, failure, split. In a spoken or written sentence something stumbles. Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the unconscious. There, something other demands to

be realized — which appears as intentional, of course, but of a strange temporality. What occurs, what is *produced*, in this gap, is presented as the *discovery*. It is in this way that the Freudian exploration first encounters what occurs in the unconscious.”²

We have heard of these failures before: the dream, parapraxes, the joke, the symptom. They are conveyed as errors, spontaneous miscarriages of language. Although the word is the instrument, it is no less the barrier. It is through language organized as discourse within the transference that the analytic work takes place because there, the unconscious speaks.

In the end — and in the beginning — there is only the word. The fecundity reiterated in language provides — as in play — the elements that the analyst will punctuate in the interpretation. The clumsiness of the subject’s errors in language are a signal of the unwavering grammar of the unconscious. There is a semantic disharmony between the unconscious and the ‘I’ which explains why the latter is legitimately called the symptom inasmuch as it is the organizer of defences.

* * *

The Psychoanalysis of Children

If we now refer to the principles that govern the psychoanalysis of children it would be fair to say that by and large they do not differ from those that direct the psychoanalysis of adults. Paraphrasing Charcot, the task of the analyst is to witness the same thing over and over again until it begins to talk. Only then, the interpretation is formulated. And the same thing will talk over and over again according to the principle of the unconscious; to repeat.

Language is organized in discourse in the analysis, even in those cases where the spoken word is lacking and silence spreads as in mutism, catatonia or as in an acute psychotic breakdown.

How far the analysis can go with these cases remains to be seen and it will be dictated by each particular case. The direction taken by the analysis is to normalize the subject to its signifiers, attempting to lift the embargo laid down by foreclosure, repression, negation or disavowal.

There is a minimum of conditions required for an analysis; the possibility that the discourse of the child returns to him in a setting, artificial enough to allow us to say that it bears no relation with what common sense indicates as dialogue. In theory, an analysis will always be basically the same. It will have to recognize the prevalence of the signifier over the subject, the structure of the unconscious as a language, free association and suspended attention; and all of this within the transference which, without being encouraged, will be present.

The extinction of common sense has been, amongst others, the scandal introduced by Freud. Psychoanalytic signification arises from the debris of common sense. Consequently, what is important is to be able to hear, to hear with suspended attention. This brings about a first difficulty because the word, we know it, is not easy to be heard when we speak of the psychoanalysis of children. Which ought not to make us believe that the word is any easier to listen to — or less deceitful — when it is pronounced by an adult. The word, and silence as well, should be listened to against the temptation of its content. Play in a session offers the same chance of interpretation as the spoken word because play is language, play is organized as discourse in the session. The unconscious treats it in a frolicsome way, like a joke.

To understand is not exactly what is required from the analytic hearing. One could say in this regard that suspended attention is contrary to understanding, because understanding is what sustains the common sense of the interlocution or dialogue. The analyst instead, when analysing, breaks the sense of what has been said. Both the parents and the child organize the symptom through sense. This being at once, both the en-

trance and the impediment to the carrying out of our task.

* * *

The Ear and the Eye

In the psychoanalysis of children the word is not replaced by play. What we say is that play is language. But this is known, indeed. The analyst should, instead, be a bit more guarded in the use of sight. Sight may become an alibi, an equivocal tool in the domain of the imaginary, simply because play attracts the eye, because play is to be seen, not heard, and because play fascinates the eye in a dual relation where the mirage of completion is desired — and sometimes, even achieved.

The object infatuates the eye and it equally opens the eye to disenchantment. As Shakespeare said:

“Beauty is but a vain and doubtful good;
A shining gloss that vadeth suddenly;
A flower that dies when first it ‘gins to bud;
A brittle glass that’s broken presently:
A doubtful good, a gloss, a glass, a flower,
Lost, vaded, broken, dead within an hour”³

Sight — unlike hearing — is the instrument par excellence that fills in the gaps and turns a broken line into a continuum.

This gaze is only a nostalgic reference to the eye that looks, since the gaze is present there where the other looks at it. And then, it is not only the look that sees it seeing, but seeing that it is being looked at by it.⁴ The position that the analyst assumes in front of a child follows from this. We refer to that controversial figure described by Lacan as the supposed-subject-of-knowing (*sujet-supposé-savoir*) who becomes even more evident in this domain as the child believes in the transparency of his thoughts, granting therefore omniscient powers to the analyst.

Sight conceals what hearing uncovers and reveals. It is not by chance that where Freud and Lacan posed a lack, the Kleinian school placed an object that obstructed and occluded that lack,

promising as a possible aim of the analysis the assumption of a total object. This would be a total object that originates from partial objects from where the position of normality or sanity would be acquired. Melanie Klein’s contribution is not the discovery of a total object corresponding to a depressive position. Instead, her contribution is the emphasis of the partial object, to which the gaze and the voice are added as parts that do not make totalities.

“This is how one should understand those words, so strongly stressed in the Gospel, *‘They have eyes that they might not see’*. That they might not see what? Precisely, that things are looking at them”⁵

The gaze in its immediacy is the place where erotogenicity becomes evident for perceiving unequivocally what is desired, and what is desired will resist what is offered. Hearing, nonetheless, offers the same danger except that it is mediated by the voice. The basis of the argument is to keep the register of the symbolic open while renouncing the lures of the imaginary where narcissistic confrontations take place.

Desire is united to an imaginary desire — that is, given as a model by one’s own perception of oneself — and the perception of one’s own image is sufficient, Lacan says, for an ideal to take place there.

The gaze resists the necessary fragmentation that analysis demands to produce the analytic interpretation. It resists fragmentation because it is at the bottom of the unification of one’s own body. We refer to a rupture or fragmentation at the level of the image, that is, by virtue of the gaze, equal to a sensation of the end of the world, namely *Angst*. This is the analyst’s own *Angst* that finds refuge in the gaze, because it is precisely in the gaze that the subject patches up the *gap*, the *interval*, as remarked by Lacan.

The fear of the fragmentation of one’s own image — the analyst’s — often hinders the perception of the fragmented

image in the child. Here the analyst is not an exception, his castration *Angst* is a good alibi for the *Angst* that every analyst feels about his desire. The rationalization for the use of the term countertransference⁶ is, for the last thirty years, the obsessional mark that isolates the analyst from his *Angst*.

This is a problem – only too pertinent – inherent to psychoanalysis, but not only to the analysis of children. If charity begins in one's own home, then the analysis begins in the analyst. Analysis begins by the analyst not situating himself as the guardian of knowledge, particularly if we recall that this position in analysis is equivalent to resistance. As mentioned before, young children believe for a long time that their parents know their thoughts; that is, that they are transparent and that their thoughts can, in this way, be made public. This belief is often reinforced in an analysis of the imaginary where not only obsessional traits are established in the analysand, but also guilt and persecution.

* * *

What do we do when we Analyse

What do we do when we analyse?⁷ asks Lacan. Alice's perplexity comes here, to our aid, once more:

"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"

"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.

"I don't much care where—" said Alice.

"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.

"—so long as I get *somewhere*," Alice added as an explanation.

"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough."⁸

Does it really matter which way we go? Perhaps it is impor-

tant that we, as analysts, don't wish to go anywhere except where the analysand goes in his discourse. There is nothing better for finding one's own road than to get lost, says an Argentinian proverb. And since we do not direct the child at all, we might start by thinking over what it is that we do.

If the Socratic method taught us the value of a humbling dialogue where a question is asked not so much for an answer to meet its truth but rather for the intellect to exercise the power of its thought; psychoanalysis and the analyst – when not divorced – accept the unconscious as the place of the truth.

And what do we do?

"My aim is not to normalize the relation between the child and myself, but, as it were, his relation to language . . ."

"The aim is for the child to be able to put into words the signification of his illness that the symptom had, as a task, to mask"⁹

We listen in a privileged situation of reciprocal transference, a transference that is love and hate but transference that is also resistance. It does not matter what way we go, so long as an ear is lent to the child in the session where the specular situation with the ego(I) of the child will be avoided. Lacan referred to this in the following way:

"This is Freud's contribution.

If it is still necessary to confirm it, we only have to notice how the technique of the transference is prepared. Everything is done to avoid the relation of ego to ego, the imaginary mirage which could be established with the analyst. Everything is done to efface a dual relation of fellow men.

On the other side, it is from the necessity of an ear, of another, a listener, that the analytic technique is derived. The analysis of the subject can only be carried out with

an analyst. This reminds us that the unconscious is essentially word, word of the other, and can only be recognized when it returns to you from the other"¹⁰

Because, he adds, the ego (I) of man is structured as a symptom, it is a privileged symptom, it is the human symptom par excellence, it is the mental illness of man.¹¹

* * *

A Note on the Beginnings

Freud started the psychoanalysis of children with the case known as Little Hans, published in 1909 for the first time in the *Jarbuch fur Psychoanalytische Forschungen*. The question as to whether this was or was not a psychoanalysis remains open to discussion. We are inclined to think that it was an analysis however hesitant and equivocal and perhaps even naive, according to the parameters that we hold today. This analysis — although controversial — showed empirically the impossibility of holding the coincidence of the father and the law, analyst and educator, analyst and father, analyst and the law, in one and the same person.

The particularity of that analysis, nevertheless, was that it did not develop around a *box of toys* but around a father, a real father who made the words of his son echo for Freud and those of Freud echo for his son.

"'Little Hans', the five year old patient, may now be identified as Herbert Graf (1903-1973), who had a distinguished career as an opera stage director in New York, Philadelphia and Zurich. His father was the musicologist Max Graf (1875-1958), a founding member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society"¹²

This intermediary was not an accident of history. The early

introduction in the analysis of children of a third element, of a number *three*, was a requirement proper of the Freudian discovery. The theory demanded the introduction of what we should call the symbolic dimension between Little Hans and the father. The mediator was perceived by Freud. The mediator was not a *mélange a trois*, but rather someone to whom the deadly transference could be addressed symbolically.

If this *box of toys* has signification, it is precisely because the box, as a *box of resonance*, evokes the word — a word that calls for reply and is full of signification.

Play in the psychoanalysis of children has to be taken into account where transference appears as repetition, as resistance and also as working through. Play is not only imaginary but also symbolic and real. It is as symbolic as the word can be. We can recall in this regard how Freud was able to find the entry of the infantile subject into the symbolic with his grandson Heinz Rudolf's¹³ game of the reel. That entry was given by the repetition — and not so much the re-encounter — of the lost object, of its loss, that is, its subjection to the signifier. The symbol, indeed, is the death of the thing as we can easily verify in our clinical work, both with children and with adults. Heinz Rudolf's game was accompanied with the vocalization *Fort-Da*. It was the happiness for the annihilation of the reel, its absence, that allowed the symbol to come into play.

This is exactly the use that the symbol allows, the possibility to symbolize the absence, that which must lack in order for the subject to be constituted around it. Freud's example of the *Fort-Da* is a stereotyped game where the simple opposition of sounds allows the *Fort* (absence) to be evoked in the *Da* (presence). And it is precisely because there is absence — *Fort* — that the presence — *Da* — can be evoked. The symbol allows this substitution when it annuls the existing thing. It was not the fascination of the game but the listening to the opposite phonemes *Fort-Da*; that clarified Freud's hypothesis of repetition compulsion in that text. Freud gave priority to listening to

the phonemes over the seeing of the game.

The *Fort* and the *Da* are in this example at the root of the definition of a signifier as that which represents a subject for another signifier, but which in itself does not mean anything. Lacan severs in this way the already dissimilar traces between the symbol (as representing something and as having meaning), and the signifier (as representing a subject and as lacking meaning).

The child finds himself at birth in, or rather, is born into a symbolic world where language pre-exists him. Indeed, he finds himself in the confrontation between the symbolic and the real. It is not the imaginary that prevails in childhood as we are sometimes led to think. It is illuminating in this respect to hear children say:

“The dog goes miaow,
the cat goes woof-woof”¹⁴

Also:

“We remember in this connection how fond children are of playing at reversing the sound of words and how frequently the dream-work makes use of a reversal of the representational material for various purposes”¹⁵

This is the realm of the symbolic. However, if all this were not sufficiently convincing, we can always recall ‘Humpty Dumpty’s practice of giving private meanings to commonly used words’. “May we . . . make our words mean whatever we choose them to mean?” asks Roger W. Holmes in his article, *The Philosopher’s Alice in Wonderland*.¹⁶

* * *

The Child and his Parents

Many years before observing his grandson, Freud already had written to Fliess¹⁷ of how his son Martin enjoyed the composition

of verses that annoyed his audience – his parents principally. Then, to calm them down he used to say, “When I compose verses like these it is only like making faces.” Therefore, early enough, Freud had realized that if grimaces had any value, it was because they were commanded by language.

Since we have just seen one of the ways in which a child, Martin, rebelled against his parents, Freud and Martha, we might as well think about the position of the parents in the psychoanalysis of children in regard to both their child and the analyst.

The child does not ask for an analysis. He is brought by his parents – or surrogates. This is not indifferent to the fact that the transference that ensues will encompass all three variables: the child, the parents and the analyst. It is not uncommon that when the child’s symptom unravels, untangles, changes or disappears, one or other of the parents decompensates. If a Kleinian analysis shows the fantasy of the child in respect to the maternal and paternal world (particularly on the former), a Freudian analysis will discover the fantasy of the parents in relation to their child.

It is the historicity of that particular child in relation to his own ‘romance’¹⁸ and family together with the severity of the symptom – neurosis/perversion/psychosis – what will structure the approach always around the transference.

Transference, like love, is ambivalent. This brings problems for the children who deal in their day to day affairs with their parents and siblings, with their fantasies and ideals. The analyst will add yet another and perhaps more relevant figure of transference while the analysis lasts. Treachery and infidelity will burden them when the transferences, that is, the translocations or shifts of affect are clearly expressed in the transparent qualities of love and hate.

“Those lips that Love’s own hand did make
Breathed forth the sound that said ‘I hate’,
To me that languish’d for her sake:

But when she saw my woeful state,
 Straight in her heart did mercy come,
 Chiding that tongue that ever sweet
 Was used in giving gentle doom;
 And taught it thus anew to greet;
 'I hate' she alter'd it as gentle day
 Doth follow night, who, like a fiend,
 From heaven to hell is flown away;
 'I hate' from hate away she threw,
 And saved my life, saying 'Not you'.¹⁹

... where negation is beautifully utilized and its results, even believed. Lovers, accordingly, round up their vision and complete their illusion in order to maintain love — transference — alive. Transference, in this regard, has something to do with repetition and the death drive.

We would like to finish by commenting on a passage from the case history of the Wolf Man where Freud examines the advantages and disadvantages of an analysis carried out in childhood²⁰ and an analysis carried out fifteen years after the infantile neurosis had terminated.

"An analysis which is conducted upon a neurotic child itself must, as a matter of course, appear to be more trustworthy, but it cannot be very rich in material; too many words have to be lent to the child and even so, the deepest strata may turn out to be impenetrable to the conscious. An analysis of a childhood disorder through the medium of recollection in an intellectually mature adult is free from these limitations; but it necessitates our taking into account the distortion and refurbishing to which a person's own past is subjected when it is looked back upon from a later period. *The first alternative perhaps gives the more convincing results; the second is by far the*

more instructive."

The analytic experience interrogates the theory because it is in the former where the latter can be understood. The direction of an analysis is not to know where one goes. Wanting to know is already part of the resistance to the long way that an analysis inevitably proposes, not because it wants to arrive to an *adaptation*, neither in order to *mature* anyone as if the analysis were a *hot house*.

The meaning of the direction of the analysis is that it moves. It does not matter to know where, as this would simply destroy its way. Only when an analysis finishes can we know where we have arrived. And only if it is interrupted shall we know in what point we have stopped.

• * *

NOTES

- ¹ Figure of Speech quoted by Freud in *A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession* (1916), St. Ed. Vol. XIV, p.338: The reiteration of the word *Vaterarsch* (father-arse) in Freud's twenty one year old patient connecting an obsessive word and an obsessive image, reminds me of a twelve year old girl I treated who speaking of her father's times at work stumbled over *shit work* and *ship work* in order to finally pronounce *shift work*.
- ² LACAN, J. (1964) *The Unconscious and Repetition*, p.25, in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1977.
- ³ SHAKESPEARE. *The Passionate Pilgrim*, XIII.
- ⁴ ZENTNER, M.I.R. de. *A Pseudonym, the Itinerary of a Perversion*, p.65, in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, Homage to Freud/On Perversion*, 1980.
- ⁵ LACAN, J. (1964) *Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a*, p.109, in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1977.
- ⁶ LACAN, J. (1953) *The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*, p.35, in *Ecrits, a Selection*, Tavistock Publications, 1977.
- ⁷ LACAN, J. *Introduction aux commentaires sur les écrits techniques de Freud*, in *Les écrits techniques de Freud, le Séminaire 1953/1954, livre 1*, p.16, *Editions du Seuil*, Paris, 1967.
- ⁸ CARROLL, L. *Alice in Wonderland*, in *The Annotated Alice*, with introduction and notes by Martin Gardner, Bramhall House, U.S.A.
- ⁹ MANNONI, M. *The Child, his 'Illness' and the Others*, Penguin University Books, London, 1973.
- ¹⁰ LACAN, J. *Les Psychoses, Le Séminaire 1955/1956, Livre III*, *Editions du Seuil*, Paris, 1981 (My translation).
- ¹¹ LACAN, J. *Introduction aux commentaires sur les écrits techniques de Freud*, in *Les écrits techniques de Freud, le Séminaire 1953/1954, livre 1*, p.22, *Editions du Seuil*, Paris, 1967.
- ¹² FREUD/JUNG LETTERS, p.588, Edited by William McGuire, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1979.

- ¹³ MANNONI, O. *Ça n'empêche pas d'exister*, p.161, *Editions du Seuil*, Paris, 1982.
- ¹⁴ LACAN, J. "*Le chien fait miaou, le chat fait oua-oua.*" A nursery song in which various animals are attributed with the wrong sound. In *Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic of Desire* (1960), *Ecrits, a Selection*, p.325, Tavistock Publications, 1977.
- ¹⁵ FREUD, S. (1910) *The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words*, St. Ed. Vol. XI, p.161.
- ¹⁶ *Antioch Review*, Summer 1959, from *The Annotated Alice*, with commentaries by Martin Gardner.
- ¹⁷ FREUD'S Letter to Fliess of 14th. March, 1898.
- ¹⁸ Reference to Freud's paper *Family Romances* (1908) that explains a typical infantile phantasy.
- ¹⁹ SHAKESPEARE. *Sonnets*, CXLV.
- ²⁰ FREUD, S. (1905) *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, St. Ed. Vol. VII, p.201 "The direct observation of children has the disadvantage of working upon data which are easily misunderstandable; psychoanalysis is made difficult by the fact that it can only reach its data, as well as its conclusions, after long detours." As early as 1905 Freud realized the danger involved in the 'direct observation of children' with which he attempted to differentiate a phenomenological and psychological approach from a psychoanalytic one.

PART II

THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE

**THE UNCONSCIOUS, THE TRANSFERENCE,
AND THE PSYCHOANALYST'S INTERPRETATION:
A LACANIAN VIEW¹**

Juan-David Nasio*

In spite of Franco-American exchanges over the last few years, psychoanalytic research in either language remains relatively little known to the other. This is not merely due to a lack of information, but also to a disparity at times in how analysis is practised and views its objectives. It seems to me that where this disparity exists, it stems from a conceptual difference in the fundamental questions. The way therapy is practised and the particular questions the analyst poses, or asks himself, depend essentially on how he conceives such notions as the unconscious or the drives. Obviously, in the course of analytic practice, these fundamental notions are not present or explicit all the time, but

* Member of the *Ecole freudienne de Paris*, founded by Jacques Lacan, and dissolved in 1980. Psychoanalyst, Lecturer since 1971 at the University of Paris VII, author of *L'Inconscient à venir* (1980), edited by *Christian Bourgois*, Paris.

they act as underlying pre-suppositions or prejudices which imperceptibly determine the way the analyst intervenes with a patient, or what theoretical problems he chooses to investigate.

Reading Gill and Hoffman's work, I realized that it would not be adequate to write the usual book review or compare the theses of *Analysis of Transference* and those of the Lacanian school, nor even to confront the two views on the same problem, for what emerged was that each view engendered the problems it set out to resolve.

I would like to clarify to the English-speaking reader that Lacan's conception of transference and psychoanalytic interpretation and the problems deriving from it, stem directly from a certain idea of the unconscious. For Jacques Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language. If all the consequences of this source-definition — familiar to the whole French psychoanalytic community — are rigorously drawn, we find ourselves asking questions and theorizing about transference with our patients in a very different way from that proposed by Gill. Our problems are not the same because our idea of the unconscious is not the same, in spite of our common reference to Freud.

For example, let us take one of Gill's major conclusions, when he proposes (Vol. I, p.125-126) giving preference to the interpretation or analysis of transference (in two accepted senses, p.6) at the expense of the extra-transference or genetic interpretation. Before making any comment on the question we have to reconsider and redefine the two important terms of the conclusion: transference and interpretation. Now, what happens is this: in our developing of the two concepts we arrive at a problem that is totally different from the one envisaged by Gill.

To begin with, what is the meaning of the word *interpretation*? Among all the possible interventions made by the analyst in the course of analysis, interpretation is the one that occurs most rarely and always in an unexpected fashion. It does not result

from any reflection on the part of the analyst, nor is it dictated by any technical rule designed to bring the unconscious into consciousness. Interpretation as we understand it, does not seek to reveal the sense hidden in the analysand's words and dreams. The psychoanalyst may indeed employ this type of rational and explanatory intervention — examples of which are given in Vol. II — but it would not be considered by us as an interpretation. We prefer to reserve the term interpretation for that special case when the analyst makes a rare, pertinent and unpremeditated statement by which he is surprised himself. If we wanted to sum up the analyst's usual comportment, we might say: silence is the norm, explanatory interventions (those Gill calls interpretations or analysis) are frequent, and interpretation is rare.

To put it briefly, an interpretation is important not because of what it says or elucidates, but according to two criteria. First, by the fact that it is a word enunciated at a given moment within a given sequence of other words that precede and follow it — a criterion that defines the signifying value of the interpretation. But above all, what allows us to judge whether or not such an intervention is an interpretation is the way it is put forward by the analyst. By this I mean in what disposition of unconscious subject the analyst enunciates his interpretative intervention.

We operate a reversal of perspective: instead of focusing on the content of the interpretation and its effects on the patient, we are more concerned with how the interpretation takes the analyst by surprise and the signifying context of its emergence. Obviously, one view does not exclude the other, and we are equally attentive to the analysand's immediate and mediate reactions to the interpretation. But once interest is concentrated on the relation between the interpretation with other words, and on the relation between the interpretation and the analyst as unconscious subject, certain ideas formerly taken for granted are brought into question. For example, the idea of efficient interpretation, or the role of technical rules in conducting an analysis. Interrogation not only of ideas: the attitude of the

analyst toward the patient, the way he sees his function, and above all the objectives he assigns to the analysis are just a few of the ethical aspects of our practice which come under revision.

As we have said, each view engenders the problems it sets out to resolve. We might add that each chooses its own "father". For instance, the same Freud of *The Dynamics of Transference* which Gill examines at length in the first chapters of his book, opens with a sentence written in the same years 1912-13, that is very close to the concept of interpretation we hold:

"But I have had good reason for asserting that everyone possesses in his own unconscious an instrument with which he can interpret the utterance of the unconscious in other people."

(*The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis*, S.E. 12:320)

Once we adopt the view that focuses on the unconscious origin of the interpretation, the terms of the problem and the problem itself as stated by Gill, change. He uses the classic expression of "transference interpretation" (or analysis) as if transference was the object of interpretation, whereas, without giving undue importance to what interpretation says, we consider it proof in itself of transference. In our view, interpretation is an effect produced by transference rather than an element acting upon the transference. The formula we propose would be: *interpretation is the actualization of transference.*

With this formula we find ourselves confronted by another obstacle than the one negotiated by Gill in his conclusion. While his concern is to give priority to transference as the object of interpretation, we have a different problem to resolve: how to sustain our thesis that the effective value of interpretation in analysis depends on its status of unconscious formation; without giving rise to the idea of a so-called non-directive therapy, against which we are making false allegations, nor yet evoking

the picture of a silent analyst waiting for "unconscious inspiration" before intervening.

* * *

Let us leave the question in suspense and come to the concept of *transference*, taking up again the distinction between the transferential and extra-transferential-genetic planes established by Gill all through his work, and particularly in the paragraph mentioned above. One would hardly expect to come across such a distinction in a work of Lacanian orientation. Once again our preoccupation is not the same as Gill's. His concept of transference implies that he listens to the patient's words whether they refer or not, explicitly or implicitly, to the analytic relationship. If they do refer to it, we are on the transferential plane, if not, on the extra-transferential or genetic. The incidence of the interpretation is therefore measured relatively with one plane or the other. Certainly, in our daily practice we take into account the analysand's allusions to the relationship with his analyst, and a certain number of our interventions depend on it, but this doesn't mean we draw the conclusion that we are on the transferential plane or outside it. If we had to define the transferential plane, we would say it was limitless, including the whole life of both the patient *and* the analyst during the segment of history that is an analysis. Such, however, are not our categories.

From the concept of the unconscious structured like a language evolves the idea of two kinds of transference links: one made up of love and hate, the other by the punctual and unpremeditated emergence of unconscious formations in one or other of the partners in the analysis (a dream, a lapsus, even a new symptom, appearing in either the analyst or the patient; or, as we have already pointed out, the suddenness of an interpretation). The first link belongs to the imaginary dimension, the second — to which we referred when speaking of interpretation and its actualization — to the symbolic.² One is inter-dependant

on the other: without transference love and hate, there could be no unconscious symbolic realization that seals in one brief instant, whether in the analyst's office or outside it, the analytic relationship. Nothing binds us so strongly to the partner as an unpremeditated remark that takes us by surprise. The psychoanalyst listens to the patient's words, forgets them, knowing how to wait for their return. But it is only when they become dream for him, or parapraxis, or unexpected gesture, that there is true transference. More transference takes place in a lapsus made by the analyst when speaking of his patient during supervision than in a manifestation (explicit or not) of transferential love on the part of the patient himself. Only on the symbolic plane of transference — and there only — the psychoanalyst is his patient's equal.

Now let us consider the imaginary dimension of transference. The term *Imaginary* often used in French psychoanalytic writing, is misleading. It suggests an exclusive priority given to the images (specular, fantasmatic, etc.) that the subject is likely to produce in regard to the other. The imaginary order does indeed consist of an organization of libidinally invested ego-images which take the form of primary affects or passions: love and hate (to which Lacan adds a third, following a certain Hindu influence: ignorance). But what characterizes this order, particularly in reference to transference, are the beliefs, judgments and suppositions implicit in the analysand's words: in short, the fiction created by the simple fact of speaking. The patient speaks, and his speech creates the place of fictitious power which the analyst will have or not to occupy. It is one thing to confer authority by the patient's confidence (justified or not) in the personal or professional capacities of his analyst; quite another is the fictitious power conferred by the patient suffering from a symptom, who tries, by appealing to the analyst, to find out the reasons for his suffering. Without realizing it, the patient assigns a unique position to his interlocutor: that of being sole recipient of his plea, the end of his search for a response to the why and wherefore of his symptom. Love and

hate, attitudes, the roles and images mutually reflected by the analyst and the analysand are built on this foundation of fictitious suppositions inherent to the fact of suffering, of talking about it, and seeking some response.

When Merton Gill (p.112, Vol. I) advises the analyst to be attentive not only to the patient's attitude in this regard, but also to the image of the analyst's attitude toward him which the patient projects — or when, with Hoffman (p.4, Vol. II), he points out the importance of localizing the role (I translate, images and attitudes) the patient assigns to the analyst — we recognize these as manifestations of imaginary transference. In our opinion all such imaginary manifestations are only the effects of a discourse which, by the fact that it seeks an answer believes an answer is possible. In the act of speaking, the word creates the god who listens to it.

Although we cannot develop the idea here, the belief that such answers exist corresponds with a prejudice very common among our patients, which is that the unconscious is a second ego, a sort of evil genius working inside us. The basis of fictitious suppositions can be reduced to one principal fiction: that of supposing the unconscious to be a subject or a separate being.

J. Lacan proposed a concept-formula for this supposition that the subject is the unconscious, or alternatively that the unconscious is a subject: the supposed-subject-of-knowledge (*sujet-supposé-savoir*), (*savoir* — knowledge in Lacanian theory meaning the unconscious). In our view, the imaginary transference is organized around this fiction of the unconscious as a being, while, on the contrary, the symbolic transference is based on the principle that the unconscious is a language type structure.

* * *

On several occasions we have referred to the Lacanian definition of the unconscious without having the opportunity to develop it. And we have also emphasized the fact that the

theory of transference and the psychoanalyst's interpretation evolve from it. I would like to deal with these two questions, but within the limits of this article, I will have to restrict myself to a few schematic statements without providing clinical examples to support them.

The Unconscious Structured Like a Language

The elementary unit of the concept of the unconscious is the signifier, a formal but not a descriptive category. A signifier may be a lapsus, a dream, the account of a dream, a hesitation in the telling, a symptom, a gesture, a phoneme, etc., even an interpretation by the psychoanalyst, on condition that two criteria are respected, two non-linguistic criteria in spite of the term signifier which is of linguistic origin.

a) In the first place, the signifier always appears without the analysand being aware of it. Whatever the gesture, it can only be a signifier if it is awkward and unforeseen, produced without any conscious intention. Secondly, a signifier is always void of sense, signifying nothing, so that it does not enter into the alternative of being either explicable or inexplicable. In so far as it is a signifier, this unforeseen gesture calls for no intervention from the psychoanalyst. In a word, the signifier *is*, and nothing more.

b) The signifier *is* — yes, on condition that it remains attached to other signifiers; it is *one* among others with which it is in relationship. Although the signifier One, (S_1), can be localized by the analyst, the others, (S_2), with which it is linked, cannot. These are virtual signifiers previously actualized or not yet actualized. The relationship between S_1 and S_2 is so close that in using the signifier it must never be imagined alone. A Lacanian aphorism summarizes this relationship very well: a signifier is only a signifier for other signifiers. The implications of this formal summary are practical: a signifier is not a signifier for the psychoanalyst, nor for anyone else, it is for other signifiers. As soon as the psychoanalyst, or even the patient, gives it a sense, it will no longer act as a signifier, but as a sign. So, to the

question of how a signifier can be interpreted, we reply: by bringing into play another signifier as equally devoid of sense as the first. Once again, I recall that we characterized psychoanalytic interpretation as a signifier which happens only on rare occasions for the analyst.³

To summarize, the unconscious is structured like a language which means that the unconscious consists of this formal relationship between a present and localized signifier and other non-localized and virtual signifiers.

The Symbolic Transference

If all the consequences of this concept are rigorously respected, we arrive at three propositions and one final thesis on transference. As all the propositions were not explicitly put forward by J. Lacan, I take the responsibility for their formulation.

a) Since it is a question of signifiers, it is not a question of persons. Hence, signifier One, (S_1), can actualize the chain of other signifiers through either one or other of the two partners of the analysis. Once the signifier is actualized another will follow, later, elsewhere perhaps, with someone other than the person with whom it first appeared. The lapsus made by the analysand will return later in the form of a memory blank, a parapraxis, or as another lapsus made by the other person, this time the analyst, with whom an imaginary transference exists (subject-supposed-of-knowledge). Each time the signifier occurs it will be different, even if the situation is similar: a dream that follows will never be the same as the first dream. Each time the victim of the lapse will be different: a dream made by the analysand may be followed by a word invented by the analyst. But each time, irrespective of whoever is present, irrespective of whoever is speaking or suffering in the transference relationship, invariably we have the same matrix of relationships that constitute the unconscious: one signifier and all the others.

b) If the unconscious is structured like a language, that is to say, if it exists as the actualization of all potential signifiers, (S_2),

in a localized psychic formation, (S_1), this means it cannot be looked for either before or after the psychic event. *There is no unconscious outside the event itself.* It would be a mistake then, to think that before the lapsus, for example that the unconscious was awaiting the chance to manifest its presence, or, on the contrary, that after the lapsus it left behind a trace which becomes unconscious.

c) If, on the one hand, the lapsus heard by the psychoanalyst is made by nobody, the analysand at that moment serving as mouthpiece for a discourse for which he is not responsible, and if, on the other hand, the complex and infinite network of signifiers which culminate punctually in this lapsus remains distinct from the finite and imaginary dimension of the self, then the unconscious is not prisoner of the entity we call an individual. This is why the unconscious can be neither individual nor subjective. Hence, our third proposition : there is no such thing as an unconscious for the analysand and another for the analyst, *there is only one unconscious involved in the analytic relationship*, which is the one revealed through the psychic event. At that moment, practitioner and patient with all their differences are effaced in favour of a discourse that simultaneously seals their union.

If we accept this view of the unconscious as product of the event and consequently of an unconscious that embraces the whole analytic relationship, then the ethical and practical consequences cannot be ignored. Why? Because the analyst who takes these propositions to heart and lives them as his own must recognize that any interpretation is a formation of the unconscious in the same way that a lapsus is, or a symptom in the patient, and that once having come to light via the mouth of the analyst, it is subject to the same laws of signifying logic.

Interpretation appears as an enunciation by the analyst and disappears in the same breath, replaced by another signifier that takes its place. Thus, one interpretation is soon replaced by another equivalent formation (lapsus, dream or symptom), this

time coming from the patient. Practically, when the interpretation occurs, it doesn't go to the ear, but is immediately forgotten. How is it forgotten? By repression, an active form of forgetting that never ceases to make return appearances. Repressed, interpretation returns in the dream, and it is in dreaming that the analysand responds to the words of his analyst; one does not explain the dream, it is a response incited. Now, if we speak of a return of the repressed interpretation for the analysand, the opposite is also true : interpretation for the analyst is the return of a dream recounted by his analysand and immediately repressed, or else, what happens more often is that the analysand's unconscious returns in an interpretation by the analyst.

Let us not fall into the error that the last sentences might infer : the idea that each of us possesses an unconscious of his own. Rather let us adopt the idea of alternation. One unconscious sets in motion the other's unconscious; or, to put it better, one sets in motion the unconscious of the analytic relationship, as if the signifying pair $S_1 - S_2$ circulated in a coming and going between analyst and analysand. But the signifiers do more than circulate, they bind and link the two partners of the analysis together without them being aware of it.

This brings us to our final thesis on transference. For what else is this alternation and unconscious circulation except transference itself? Here is the proposition I want to make : *the analytic transference is equivalent to the unconscious*, they are homomorphic in the same way that two systems correspond with each other in every point. Which is a way of saying that *the unconscious and the transference relationship are one and the same thing at the moment of the event.* There is transference between analyst and analysand only when the unconscious arises, unique, as a conjunction of the two partners, inside the analyst's office and in another time. The unconscious and transference exist only in the rareness of an hour when one of them speaks without knowing.

* * *

It seemed to me that the most valuable contribution I could make to our Franco-American exchange, and at the same time set up a joint resonance to the work of Merton Gill, was to state our view on the book's two main themes : transference and interpretation. Unfortunately, this has meant neglecting a number of important questions dealt with by Gill (the problem of resistance, the difference between the awareness and the resolution of transference, the identicalness between analysis of transference and analysis of neurosis, etc.), and in his comments on certain analytic sessions in Vol. II.

I have no idea how *Analysis of Transference* will effect my daily practice, but reading it has already taught me that simply to explore another point of view, even if it is to criticize, represents a serious challenge to one's own theoretical and practical habits. One of the merits of Gill and Hoffman's book is the clarity and discernment of its statements, which encourage the analyst-reader to bring himself into question.

Translation : Catherine Duncan

NOTES

- ¹ On the book of Merton M. Gill and I. Hoffman, *Analysis of Transference* (1983) New York, International University Press, Inc.
- ² The terms *Imaginary* and *Symbolic*, together with the *Real*, form the triad proposed by Jacques Lacan in 1953 (and further developed in 1973 according to the topology of the Borromean knot) to categorize various analytic entities.
- ³ The aphorism quoted would be incomplete if we omitted a third term : the subject. A signifier (S_1) represents the subject for other signifiers (S_2). We should simply add that this subject is not to be confused with the individual, but rather identified with the abstract idea of the subject of the analytic experience.

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PSYCHOANALYSIS : A NODAL WRITING

Héctor Rúpolo*

By way of introduction.

I want to state in a few words the reason for our work and the relation of what we say here, to the analytic practice.

If, as Lacan says, the analyst forms part of the concept of the unconscious, the transmission of psychoanalysis is essential in order for that praxis to be sustained.

And further, there have to be analysts in order that an analysis be demanded.

Now then, the transmission of psychoanalysis, which is an essential component in the formation of an analyst, implies the transmission of a knowledge.

The problem is where to place this knowledge and what is its relationship with the praxis. Because to say that there is a rela-

* Héctor Rúpolo: A.M.E.F. Analyst — Member, *Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires.*

tionship between the knowledge that is transmitted and the analytic practice is no more than to situate the problem in some way.

For me the problem is to be able to explain – more than to situate – this relationship.

In our day, knowledge holds the baton; and it is transmitted. There is no problem in this.

This problem arises from the following : how to transmit a knowledge which makes no sign but signifier?

It is known that the difference between sign and signifier is fundamental for psychoanalysis due to the fact that the signifier implicates the subject, and the sign does not.

Again I state the same question, but in other terms : how to transmit the knowledge, not the knowledge of science which forecloses the subject, but the knowledge of psychoanalysis, without transposing it?

If psychoanalysis is a theory which implies the lack, and if the matheme of lack is S (A), which means that something is missing in the Other, and therefore it doesn't make a whole; how to transmit, considering this real which implies the lack?

The analytic practice is sustained by establishing a place Other where it is possible to speak. What is spoken has not at least, the restriction of the common sense.

It is in the rupture of this sense psychoanalysis operates.

Now then, how can this be transmitted?

This question that turns up insistently brings us to talk about something we will develop in this paper:

It is about the *script as real*.

The real is not the script, but a script is of the order of the real.

If the analytic practice is the real of what the analyst can say of a psychoanalysis, that real can be conveyed in the script.

As you can see, from my point of view, the script is in the point of articulation between the analytic practice as a lost real and the saying which has to do with the transmission, because the letter as such, puts a limit to the saying and at the same time, invites it.

Science and script.

To begin with, I will try to state the difference between what is science and what is not; as well, I will try to find the relation between the script and the scientific discourse.

For the purpose of locating both points, I found it helpful to resort to the beginnings of the history of cosmology, to a discussion likely to have been among historians of science referred to by Koyré.¹

a) The cosmological writing.

Where to place the beginnings of this history of cosmology? With the Babylonians or the Greeks?

Of course it was the Babylonians who chronologically preceded the Greeks. The discussion is not of this order. What was in discussion was whether the Babylonians were doing science.

As a matter of fact, they made copious notes. They made notes on everything they observed, and by this means they had whole catalogues of the different celestial events. It is clear though that this discussion centred around the point of where to place the beginnings is not at all puerile, because it is an endeavour to give those notes a status : the scientific status.

On the other hand, the Greeks did not produce the writing of such exhaustive catalogues in the way the Babylonians did, but they had some idea, some theory which guided their observations.

Koyré points out this difference : Babylonians simply searched for the possibility of anticipating the behaviour of meteorological phenomena in regard to their harvests. This necessity of

predicting the events starting from the repetition of the observed facts, can be nothing other than astrology.

The Greeks instead, put into action a particular theory which organized the observables and then by organizing the data, produced explanations. The Babylonians were not interested in producing explanations.

This is the first difference between what was done by one and the other.

If the Greeks explained and the Babylonians did not, what did they explain and to what was it related?

In the light of science nowadays, it can be considered that the explanations of the Greeks were highly erroneous.

What they explained was, in fact, what they had produced as a script, and this script was what made it possible for them to order in a certain way the celestial phenomena.²

The circle was the script that the Greeks produced, and it was relevant until the moment in the history of cosmology when a rupture is produced by the introduction of another script: the ellipse.

Ptolemy, for example, by his theory of the epicycles (which is reduced to combinatorial circles) tries to outline an explanation of the movement of the heavenly bodies.

Plato had already stated the circular movements. And Copernicus — who makes no revolution in this history — worked also with circles. The difference between the latter and Ptolemy was that instead of placing the Earth in the centre of the universe, he placed the sun. However, for the Greeks, the movements were circular by nature.

Following on from all of this Koyré asserts that it was Kepler who, in effect, produced a revolution in astronomy by introducing the ellipse and putting the circular movements aside.

But this script, this attempt to mathematize the real is based in a discourse, and this discourse, which we would call "scien-

tific" in the case of the Greeks, is the one that gave place to this circle as script in cosmology.

As science is generally read from the point of view of our times, the point in which every scientific script is in history linked and imbued by religious ideas, ideals, or philosophical concepts which apparently have nothing to do with science, remains concealed.

Hence in the case of the Greeks we can situate the discourse that produced and gave way to the circle as a script.

We will quote Plato for that purpose, in what is called his encyclopaedia, *The Timaeus*:

"Regarding the shape He (God) gave, it was suitable to its nature. A suitable shape for a living being would be a figure that contains all possible figures within itself. Therefore he turned it into a rounded spherical shape, with the extremes equidistant in all directions from the centre, a figure that has the greatest degree of completeness and uniformity, as he judged uniformity to be incalculably superior to its opposite. And he gave it a perfectly smooth external finish all round, for many reasons."³

The discourse then, which gives rise to the circle as script, is the discourse of the perfection of the sphere. A sphere which, due to its perfection, will reign for a long time. Later we will see in what other ways it can be related with the scientific discourse. Summarizing what we have developed so far:

- The scientific discourse is characterized by the attempt to explain something of the real. For that purpose it produces a script, in this case *the circle*. This script organizes, shapes and gives a certain intelligibility to the real.
- The script is not simply writing. The Babylonians wrote without obtaining any cosmological theory.
- The script depends on some kind of discourse, in this case that of the perfection of the sphere.

b) Script, logic and discourse⁴

I will now approach another subject which is essential to the script that is signified within the discourse of sciences.⁵ We enunciate it as follows:

"The script participates in an emptying of sense."

The script does not contain any sense, therefore it is not to be understood, but to be explained.

Let us take as an example the circle of which we spoke previously. We could assign to it the characteristics of perfection; its proportions participate of certain formulae, its centre is at the same distance from all the points of its contour line and this shows us its perfection. In spite of this, we will not succeed in finding in this drawing, in this closed line, any other sense apart from that assigned in the discourse. As I said previously, the script in itself is emptied of sense, and it cannot be understood, but it is to be explained.

Now then, it is my purpose to demonstrate how this script comes to be emptied of sense, and what relationships are established with the discourse.

We will illustrate this with the syllogisms of Aristotle. We will not only situate in this text the birth of logic, but also its status as a science. If Aristotle had only created the syllogisms, we could not affirm its scientific status.

Then, on what do we base our assertion that logic starting from the Organon, is a science?

In addition to creating the syllogisms, Aristotle produces one more operation which consists of substituting the words by letters. The reading made these days from this is that Aristotle worked with variables.⁶

We say that Aristotle produces the first script in the grounds of logic, accordingly it can be asserted that there, logic is already a science.

Not only do we pretend to show how starting from the substitution of words by letters the sense of the former is emptied producing a script, but we also intend to show the relation of this script with a discourse, all of which seems to us illustrated with the syllogisms.

Let us start from a syllogism, such as we know it today:

All plants with wide leaves are caducous.
All grapevines are plants with wide leaves.
All grapevines are caducous.⁷

Nevertheless, we find syllogisms formulated in this way in very few texts of Aristotle because he used letters instead of words such as *caducous*, *plants*, or *grapevines*.

Replacing the words by letters it could be read:

Every B is A
Every C is B
Every C is A

Even so, this statement does not correspond exactly to an Aristotelian syllogism, because actually they have the following form:

A is the predicate of every B
B is the predicate of every C
A is the predicate of every C

We are not giving this form to the Aristotelian syllogism out of preciousness or fidelity to the text, but because we are led by the fact that in this form, in this spatial distribution, something sufficiently important is in play that must not be overlooked.

For this purpose we need to add another element: the word used by Aristotle to designate the major, minor and medium

terms, *ορος* in Greek, which is generally translated as "term".

It is known that syllogisms have three terms as already mentioned above, and that the major and minor terms each determine the major and minor premise respectively, in the following form:

Major premise	Major term	medium term
Minor premise	Minor term	medium term
Conclusion	Minor term	major term ⁸

The rules specify that in the conclusion the medium term does not appear; that the major term is the predicate of the conclusion, and that the minor term is the subject of the conclusion. The problem is *what* was understood by term, by this translation of the Greek *ορος*. It is in the displacement of the word *ορος* towards sense, towards the concept, where an incorrect interpretation of Aristotle occurred. When Aristotle puts letters in the place of words and calls them *ορος*, I understand it as *one and the same thing happening*.

The Greek term ορος means term in the sense of limit, but not in the sense of concept.

Now then, in each of the premises and the conclusion there are two terms, but it is absolutely clear that the function of the term as limit, is completely different in the following form:

Every B is A

Than in this other:

A is the predicate of every B

In the first case, the letters do not have a spatial location as a limit, while in the second they do. Now we can ask ourselves: what do the terms limit?

The terms put a limit to the premise as a conclusion, but this function of a limit shows properly when Aristotle uses letters.

It is this that makes me come to the conclusion that the letters emptied of sense act as a limit, and place the beginning and the end of each one of the premises:

Although, there are some words which are kept within these limits, for example: "... is the predicate of every ..."

But, these words will disappear in quantificational logic.

That is to say, in modern logic, everything will be substituted by letters. In this development of the Aristotelian logic the symbolic logic continues and we see a certain movement produced by the script on the discourse.

This movement can be represented as a pressure made by the letters lacking sense, a pressure which limits the discourse until what is left of the discourse in the premise disappears.

It is when logic is at its maximum development — with the symbolic logic — that a very singular relation between the script and discourse is generated.

In this way the discourse has no place within logic, because the enunciation has been expelled.

We find here an illustration of what Lacan teaches in *The Science and the Truth*. He states that science is based on a psychotic mechanism — *Verwerfung* (repudiation, rejection, foreclosure). Because if the logical discourse has no possible enunciation, it is exactly by way of this, that all the marks of the enunciation in the statement have been expelled.

Now then, since all that is foreclosed returns, the discourse in logic will come back in another way: *the metalanguage*.

This remainder, which fails in eliminating the letters and is still kept in the discourse will disappear later; it is the verb *to be*.

I interpret that because of the relation that the discourse of

Aristotle holds with the discourse of the master, the verb *to be* cannot be rejected from its interior. That is why it will be necessary to await the advent of another discourse, the discourse of the university – the modern master – in order to definitively reject the verb *to be* from the logical discourse.

For us this means that the signifier signifies itself; this is the claim of the script in logic.

This claim is, in the last instance, reduced to the fact that a signifier supports itself; it does not need the Other.

There is clearly no possibility for any other sense. In the logical script, for example, there is no possibility for the joke.

No one can ask someone else about a letter in a certain formula, and be answered: "It is x". Nor can the one asked say: "But you are a liar! You say it is x to make me believe it is z, but I know it is really x; then why do you lie?" Psychoanalysis, instead, (based in the discourse which originates in the analysand, in the analytic practice, a discourse which determines a subject) cannot follow the logic in this claim since for psychoanalysis, *a signifier always needs another to represent the subject.*

The objection psychoanalysis makes to logic is not eclectic. It is not that logic persists in its way and psychoanalysis defines the signifier in another way, but that psychoanalysis *questions* the logical discourse. *As a result of the claim that the signifier signifies itself, logicians found themselves with the paradoxes.*

"Indeed, you may find that these things are all rather silly. But logic is always rather silly. If one does not go to the root of the childish, one is inevitably precipitated into stupidity, as can be shown by innumerable examples, such as the supposed antinomies of reason, for example, the catalogue of all the catalogues that do not include themselves, and one arrives at an impasse, which, I can't think why, gives logicians vertigo.

Yet the solution is very simple, it is that the signifier with which one designates the same signifier is evidently not the same signifier as the one with which one designates the other – this is obvious enough. The word *obsolete*, insofar as it may signify that the word *obsolete* is itself an *obsolete* word, it is not the same word *obsolete* in each case."⁹

If we take *B* as identical with *B*, we can say that one is not the same as the other because one is in a different place to the other.

c) The signifier that signifies itself and the principle of identity.

I started from the characterization of the scientific discourse by its product: the script.

I also said, that this script has certain elements which make it different from the discourse, even if it is a discourse in itself.

Now we will analyse another function of the script in logic which has to do with one of its main *foundations*, product of paradoxes but absolutely necessary for its constitution.

Later, by analysing the function of topology in the discourse of Lacan we will accede to a close relation between space and writing and finally, according to the above mentioned we will also account for the difference between the script in logic and in psychoanalysis.

We pointed out above, how in the Aristotelian discourse – more precisely in its logic – one finds an incipient movement of foreclosure of the discourse in the constitution of the logical script.

This reaches its height in modern logic, where the script has no relation at all with the discourse. That is to say that logic comes to cut all relation between script and discourse. The constitution of this discourse, the logical script, needs a foundation.

I will address this now.

It is in a principle of logic that we find this foundation: *the principle of identity*.

It is the principle which makes logical writing possible.

This principle says that *B* is identical to *B*.

It would be really impossible to write any logical formulation if everything that is written were not clasped to this principle.

More simply : no calculation could be done in logic if *B* shifted from one place to another. It is because of its fixity, of its being always the same, of being identical to itself, that it is possible to write the same letter in the different positions in order to signify the same thing, even if what is written in that letter is a void.

The condition is that *the void implied by the letter always be the same*.

If a letter can always be reduced to another one — which is identical to itself — it is because it does not need another one to define itself. Owing to the principle of identity, *B* will always be defined as *B*.¹⁰

The first *B* is on the left side of the second *B*, and at the same time, the second *B* is on the right side of the first *B*.¹¹

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SCRIPT

a) The space that sustains that the signifier signifies itself.

I start from the following question : Can any relation be established between this claim that has to do with a branch of the signifier, a pretense of the logic that makes a 'whole' and the space? Let us quote a paragraph from Seminar IX of Lacan:

"In other words, you can make a small circle, on a *torus* or any other surface, and then as it is said, by progressive shortenings,

reduce it to nothing, to a point. And, if what Kant says is true, that there is a transcendental aesthetics which I believe, I simply believe that his is not the correct one. Because, in the first place, it is precisely a transcendental aesthetics of a space that is not a space and second, everything there lies on the possibility of reducing anything that is drawn onto a surface that is characteristic of this aesthetics, in such a way as to be able to be reduced to a point, in a way such that the totality of the inclusion which defines the circle can be reduced to the evanescent unit of any point around which it contracts itself. In a world whose aesthetics are such, being able to contract everything on everything, one always has the feeling of having the whole in one's hand. In other words, whatever is drawn there, it is possible to produce this kind of collapse, which, when it has to do with the significancy, it will be called tautology."¹²

I think that in this paragraph lies the possibility of answering the question we posed.

Lacan says that the space of Kant is the one that renders it possible to reduce everything, that anything that is drawn onto that surface, can be reduced to a point. That everything can fold over onto everything and that this is what gives the illusion of having the whole in the hand.

Now then, what else other than the signifier which signifies itself, the signifier which apparently sustains itself, that needs not of the Other to define itself, gives us the possibility of having the illusion of the whole in the hand?

For, if we base ourselves in what is identical to itself, and we discard the identical as representing the non-identical, we have

the possibility of duplication and not of repetition.¹³

It is from this that we can understand a circle as the duplication of any point around which the former contracts itself. This is rendered possible by the "place", the "topos" where the inscription is made.

In the case we are working on, this place is the place of Kant, a space that is founded in the apriori. According to Kant, the apriori of the space is reduced to that which gives conditions of possibility of knowledge, as this develops in a space and a time. Now then, this space and time are not cognizable, they are what the-subject-who-knows brings, they are the cloth onto which the representation of the object can be printed.

But more than a cloth — that would imply a knotted weave, and in consequence, the difference — it is from the identical, in the plane and in the sphere, that this starts. That is why Lacan says : I believe there is a transcendental aesthetics, but Kant's is not the correct one.

This space, of the identical to itself, is the space of homogeneity of which I already spoke in another paper.¹⁴

My thesis is that a space like the space of Kant, makes possible the inscription of identity in an easier way than other spaces.

The scientific discourse is built in such a way, that it *must* render possible a discourse without contradictions. This is why the contradiction is displaced to its limit, as in the case of logic.

The example of the paradoxes gives an account of this.

But it is precisely in this that I base myself in order to think about Lacan's need to search for another space on which to write about the analytic discourse. It is in this way that I understand the paragraph from the seminar on *Identification*. If the analytic discourse states that the signifier is what represents the subject for another signifier, it is not possible to write this in a space like the space of Kant, which renders possible the inscription of the signifier that signifies itself.

If we write on the homogeneous surface of a plane as well as a sphere, when tracing a circle we will have no possibility of stating differences, for it will *always* be possible to reduce it to the nothing of a point. It is exactly with this that I want to pose the differences between the script of the order of logic for example,¹⁵ and the one that arises from the analytic discourse : the space on which one writes is also implied in the writing itself. From all of this I deduce the following formula : "*The script is not without space.*"

b) On a possible solution of writing in another space other than the spherical one : the topology of Lacan.

In order to explain and make Lacanian topology intelligible, it seems essential to quote a reference.

"What is remarkable regarding this succession when starting from the torus is that the non-sphere, (thereby presents itself first hand) . . ."¹⁶

Lacan uses another space, which is characterized by not being spherical, it is a question of the topology of surfaces, as the surface of a sphere is not the same as the surface of a torus.

I will explain what the difference is between a torus and a sphere and how it is possible to place a succession starting from the torus.


Let us take the geometric definition of a torus : it is a revolving surface that is generated from a circumference which turns in the space around an axis in a plane, without cutting it.

It is unclear from this definition in what consists non-sphericity, because it implies that a sphere is not such.


It is in this sense that I find it better to think of the torus not from the point of view of geometry but from that of topology, and so for this purpose we will take some explanations made by Seifert¹⁷ which will give us a starting point to turn the sphere into a non-sphere.

For Seifert, all closed surfaces are divided into orientable and non-orientable; therefore both are generated by *starting from the piercing of the sphere*, what will be for us to *non-sphere* it.

The torus is obtained from making two holes on a sphere and joining them by means of a tube. The result will be a "Sphere with Hafts".




Torus




Sphere with one haft or torus

Topology, by means of necessary transformations, enables us to go from one figure to the other. We can also continue adding h hafts and will have a sphere with h hafts, and in the case of two hafts, for example, a double torus.



Double torus




Sphere with two hafts or double torus


This generating of closed surfaces starting from the piercing of the sphere, renders possible half of the closed surfaces, because up to that point, they are all orientable.

In order to develop the non-orientable, it is necessary to turn to the Möebius strip. But before this, it is necessary to think about the haft from another perspective.

The haft is equivalent to a torus with a hole, and the sphere with a haft is equivalent to the haft plus a disc.




Haft or pierced torus




Disc + one haft = Sphere with one haft

The other closed surfaces, the non-orientable, appear from the piercing of the sphere, and from putting a Möebius strip on the holes. But, as a haft is equivalent to a pierced torus, if we put a disc onto it, it will be a sphere with a haft. It is also possible to imagine the Möebius strip as a projective plane or a pierced cross cap, and if we put a disc onto the border, the result will be a cross cap or projective plane, or, as Seifert calls it, a closed Möebius strip.




Disc put on the Möebius strip



Equivalent to a Cross cap

As we already said, by piercing a sphere and putting a Möbius strip onto it, all the closed non-orientable surfaces are generated such as the Klein bottle which is equivalent to a sphere with two Möbius strips. Seifert also calls it a ring-shaped non-orientable surface.



Klein Bottle

All this allows a classification of both the orientable and the non-orientable surfaces since for each haft or for each Möbius strip a number will be given which is named genus. For example the torus will be genus 1 and the sphere, genus 0.¹⁸

From what was said previously, *the sphere is turned into a non-sphere by piercing it or putting hafts or Möbius strips onto it.*

These are the surfaces Lacan worked with in his seminar where, according to what we have said, space is opened where we can write the stroke of the identical representing the non-identical.

c) On the writing of the demand in the torus.


In the seminar on *Identification*, Lacan shows how the demand is inscribed in the torus.

This inscription enables the writing of a signifier in reference to another. In the closure of the demand the constitution of

third element will represent the subject determined by that relation between signifiers where one is represented by another and the object "a".¹⁹


It is possible to draw a circle that can be reduced to a point, onto the surfaces of both a torus and a sphere. However, unlike the sphere, we can make two kinds of circle, on a toric surface which are irreducible to a point.

These are the ones which surround both holes.



Lacan calls full circles those which turn around the web of the torus, and empty circles those which go around the axis or central hole of the torus.

But to these two kinds of circles irreducible to a point, a third one can be added, which arises as the product of both, but has the peculiarity of being counted only when at least two full circles are made.



The third circle turns around the axis and the web of the torus.

Now then, if I say that a succession of full circles would be repetitive turns of the demand, those which we make starting from a point and closing to the same point, I can count those turns and see that in effect the number that coincides with the number of full circles is one less than the turns made. This is because in addition to this number, one more turn was made around the axis of the torus and this was the turn which was not counted for the one who made the course.

This turn, not counted by he who traverses the course of the demands, is the subject (\$) who will always be apprehended by means of the Other, because for him who makes the turn of the demands it will only be a succession of full circles.


The important fact is that with only one full circle we don't obtain this third uncounted circle. It is only from two that this will arise. This is what immediately refers us back to the structure of the signifier. A signifier cannot signify itself, it always needs another signifier, and a third element will arise, which is the subject produced by the signifier.

“... give rise to this plus unit, not counted as such, essential to any series of structures and on which I found all my theory of identification since 1960 and in which you will find the structure of the torus. A bag onto the torus a certain number of turns, to carry out a series of complete turns, a cut, to get the number you wish and more, is all satisfying but obscure; it is enough to make two turns in order to see this third turn, necessary for the line to bite its tail, it will be this third turn secured by the looping of the central hole, through which it is impossible not to pass because it is cut out. I said it like this in order for you to understand, and too short to show you that there are two chains at least at the

origin, with which it can be done but the result is not the same for the generating of this plus one.”²⁰

But it is not only from the writing of the turns of the demand that this third circle, uncounted by the one who is the subject of the demands is written, but it is constituted in so far as the demand closes over itself; a place irreducible to the demand, which speaks about the metonymic desire, represented by the inside circle of the torus.


It is here that the relation arises with the imaginary other of frustration, of inversion, of demand and desire, which can be sketched as two tori embraced. What is the web for one will be the axis for the other, and vice versa.



Two linked tori

If we think of a torus interlocked with the Other of frustration, we can see how a certain inversion can be established at an imaginary level between what is a full circle in one and an empty circle in the Other and vice versa. Now, if we are signifying the successive full circles as the repetitive demand, we can draw the empty circle as the displacement of desire, irreducible to the demand.

Empty circle, irreducible
to the full circles, metonymy
of desire.



Succession of demands (full circles)

I said that in the superimposition of two tori there can be a certain inversion, which would express how the subject wants to reduce his desire to the demand of the Other from which the superego results.

Then, from this point of view of frustration, we define desire as that which in the intersection of the demands cannot be said.

I think that with this I showed graphically enough the relevance this *non-spheric* topology has (in this case of the torus) and how from the operation with these surfaces something different from what logic writes can be written.

Not only can something be written differently from the sciences, but also from other readings, for example the readings of frustration, which are generally approached from the level of the demand, and are not related to its support : the subject and the object "a". In other words, a reading of frustration at an imaginary level is done, and cannot be articulated with the desire, an indispensable element for operating in analysis.

d) A different writing : the nodal writing.

What I have shown up to this point is that the script in psychoanalysis is of a different weave than that of some

sciences. This difference lies as much in *what* is written as in where it is written. Another difference is : the relation between script and discourse:

With respect to what is written I showed how in the field of logic, there is a pretense of writing supported by the principle of identity : that the signifier signifies itself. We said that this logical script is connected to a space which is the spheric space, "*the one which lacks topology*".²¹ Besides, this space makes possible the *wholization* to which Science is always so attached.

I also showed how the relation between discourse and script is excluded in logic, and how the pretense of logic was to base all its science in the pure script. In this way logic was not able to avoid the paradoxes to which it arrived due to this purpose.

I also said that what psychoanalysis writes is of a different order to the scientific discourse : *The psychoanalytic*. It supports itself in the singularity of the subject, questioning any kind of *wholization* which implies that the signifier signifies itself.

"For psychoanalysis a signifier always represents a subject for another signifier." The space to write this had to be modified : this is how I understood what Lacan says in his seminars and his efforts to write in a *non-spheric* space, implying something of the failure of the perfection of the sphere which fascinated the Greeks so much.

Finally, we mentioned how this implied, precisely, that the script in psychoanalysis has an intimate and dependent relation on discourse, on the analytic discourse.

However, what I have analysed so far are the surfaces where circles are inscribed.²² In this section I will approach knots and chains, which are a different kind of writing.

To analyze knots and chains presupposes different possible perspectives. The perspective I have chosen starts from what has already been shown : to question through knots and chains the separation between *what* is written and *where* it is written, and,

in the case where this is maintained, how it is done.²³

Following from the separation mentioned above, *what* is written – in the case of knots – refers to them as objects; and *where* indicates the flattening of the knot or its placing onto a plane.

If we consider the knot as an object, there arises some possibility of defining the space as well as carrying out certain operations in it. We will try to clear up these possibilities.

The difficulty lies in how we handle the space. In general this appears related to the use we make of our bodies. Thus the space appears in some way imaginized by two dimensions²⁴ or at most in three dimensions; where we make a translation of our body as a solid in a three dimensional space.²⁵


In summary: *the knot as an object* would imply certain operations which can be carried out with the orientation of the space. What is kept from these operations is the knot as writing; flattened by writing it on a plane.

What is a knot?


Knots are a very special kind of object. Not even mathematicians know very well what to do with them. In effect, the knots pose a kind of difficulty which they cannot easily solve.

There are different invariants to distinguish one knot from another (which is a problem that knots state, for one knot can have different presentations) or to know if in effect it is knotted or not.

Now then, Lacan seldom operates with knots, he generally works with chains.



Trefoil knot



Borromean chain of three

I said that mathematicians are worried about distinguishing one knot from another and also whether if in fact they are knotted at all, but what interests mathematicians is not the same as what interests analysts.

Lacan doesn't make a mathematical use of these, although he bases his theory on what mathematicians write.

So it is that we find a relation with what I said previously. *What is stated as a difficulty to mathematicians for the study of knots, is what makes knots interesting for the psychoanalyst.*

Mathematicians face the difficulty of a peculiar relation established between the knot and the space of immersion.²⁶ It happens that the knot is of dimension one, one line; and the space where the knot is immersed is the Euclidean space of three dimensions. The knot in a two dimensional space (a plane), is cut, and therefore annuls its nodality. In space four, it is unknotted²⁷, therefore the space to which the knot belongs is $E3$ ²⁸. From our point of view this is the fundamental property of knots: *to render it possible to study the space $E3$ by means of a mathematic object which is absolutely pertinent to it, and which makes objection to the translation of our bodies as solid volumes.*

But this is precisely where its mathematical difficulty lies.

Because *the jump* of two dimensions which is produced is what makes the knot a difficult object to study.

Doesn't mathematics face problems which are difficult to solve in order to study mathematical objects which present a difference of one dimension with their immersion? For example, to study a line on a plane or to study a surface in the three dimensional space does not offer any difficulties but, as we already said, the knot jumps not one but two dimensions, from the line to the immersion in E3.

In relation to what was said above, knots present two fundamental questions which we will underline in order to emphasize what interests us.

I. The possibility of determining a point in a different way to that which is usually done, this is what is called a triple point.^{29, 30, 31}


II. Knots render it possible to orient ourselves in space in another way other than with our bodies. I will show a possible operation with this kind of nodal orientation: the inversion, distinguished from the specular inversion.

e) The three dimensional point or triple point.

This point that is determined by the borromean rings is defined by Lacan with the word *coinçage*, which has been translated into Spanish in *Encore* by *trabazón* (interlocking) and in *Les nom dupes errent* by *calce* (wedge).

The word in French means to lock, to seclude, to wedge. But the most exact translation would be from the point of view of what Lacan defines as the *coinçage* in *Encore*: the interlocking: "it is the crossing of two continuities which stops a third one."³²

The *coinçage* is then the point where the rings of the borromean knot are interlocked, the point where the movement is halted by the action of two of them. In the borromean knot there are three possible points of interlocking:



But these three points don't imply the triple point, because *there is no place apart from the interlocking itself for this triple point.*

Now then, this triple point only determinable by its own interlocking, or wedlock of the knot, has a share in the borromean property, that is to say that *if one of the rings unknots, this point slips away, disappears*, in the same way that the borromean chain disappears.

If we say that each one of the rings is the writing of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, we can assert that this point has the property of being supported *only* on the three registers. But this point, constituted in this way, by sharing the borromean property, makes it a very special point because: *just as it is not a nothing* (as in the case of the geometric point which is said to have no extension), it is a borromean point in the sense that *it carries implicitly its own possibility of breaking*. The borromean knot constitutes a very peculiar form of *One* and at the same time it is a "One" that can be untied and brake the chain loosening all the links.

"The knot is another thing. In fact the function of the plus-one is specified as such. If

we can cancel the plus-one there is no more series, by the fact of this one-between-others section, the others are freed, each one as one. This could be a very material way to make you feel that One is not a number, although the series of numbers is made of ones."³³

Here arises what Lacan will assert throughout his later seminars, that the breaking of one of the rings of the borromean knot is psychosis because it is the One that is withdrawn from the series:

"One can perceive there the demand of a phrase, whatever it be, such that if one of its links is missing, it frees all the others, that is to say it withdraws the One from them"³⁴ (with regard to Schreber's phrases)

f) A possible operation with the borromean knot: The inversion.³⁵

By this operation we try to question something that is usual for us (but not necessarily more clear because of this); the orientation we give to space.

We generally give this orientation by translating the space in relation to our bodies, so as to distinguish left from right. We understand the inversion as specular, what happens is that our right becomes the left on a mirror plane.³⁶

I already anticipated the problem that was stated with regard to this question of distinguishing between both "B" of the identity. If we observed them on a plane and from the front, we could say that one was on the right and the other on the left. But, what could we say of them if we placed ourselves inside them? The fact that we pass from the reflected object to the image in the mirror doesn't withdraw us from the specular.

Now we could insert one more dimension and say: if these letters were hanging in space, which would be left and which

right? It is evident that the position of our bodies will be essential for this determination. But again our bodies would be the element of reference that would allow us to situate the orientation of these letters.

Lacan pretends to rid himself of a spatial orientation based in the body because dimensions are for Lacan the "dit-mensions", which means the space inhabited by the *parlêtre*.


We have to orient the dimension, not in the imaginary that has to do with the specularity of our body, because the imaginary space is only one of the dimensions of the *parlêtre*.³⁷

It is the knot that offers this possibility because in principle the borromean property speaks of a minimum of three; these three are, the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real.

In order to go further into this subject we find it better to stay with one example which will allow us to distinguish a specular inversion from another kind of inversion; which we propose as if it were borromean to make it graphical.

We can make two operations on a word in order to think about the orientation.

Let's take the word DRAWER and operate a possible specular inversion on it, that is to say that we place a mirror next to it and simply write what the flat mirror reflects:



Now, let's take the same word and perform a different inversion so that although it is not the same as that produced by the borromean rings, it has the peculiarity of transforming the order and, creating besides, a different meaning.

What we obtained in the previous specular inversion had no sense because the letters were also inverted and it was not possible to read.

DRAWER | REWARD

Non-specular inversion

We see how this kind of inversion keeps the letters in the possibility of being read although in another orientation, because the only thing that was inverted was the order in a palindromic sense. The first turns to be the last and vice-versa. This lends the possibility of other meanings for this word.

Now, in the case of the borromean knot of three, Lacan maintains that in principle what matters is the equivalence produced between the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real, in the sense that: if any of them is missing, the knot is undone. Equivalence is also in the sense that any of the rings can be the Symbolic, the Imaginary, or the Real. And this is essential, because with this equivalence Lacan intends to maintain a criticism of the possible sense that can be given to each of the three registers.³⁸

Now, this operation which Lacan calls inversion, implies beyond total equivalence, the *differentiation* which is implied in the orientation of the knot.

Before showing the difference between one and the other inversion in the borromean knot itself, we will explain the question of its placing onto the plane, or, its flattening.


g) The borromean script : a spatial writing.

Up to here we have treated the knot in a way which has catalogued it as an object, and this allowed us to think of *what* is written.

We will now approach the knot from the aspect of *where* it is written.

Knots are written onto the plane, making them flat; in other words, we flatten them when we write them onto the plane.

If we take a borromean knot and flatten it, we could write in an erroneous way as follows.




This writing is erroneous because it doesn't maintain its nodality: because if we cut the interlacing lines, not writing which lines go over and which below, *the crossing places of the knot get lost*.

And the writing of the knot, to be such, *has to maintain those crossing places, in order to maintain the specificity of the writing itself*.

Then, when we flatten and write a knot, everything depends on how we represent the crossings of the knots, due to the fact that this way of writing maintains *the three dimensional property of the knot*.

So it is that we can show now how the knot is written, as well as — as we said above — the difference produced in the writing of a borromean knot of three, between its specular image and the inversion which, apart from changing the orientation of the knot, *changes the crossing points*.



Borromean knot

Specular image

Inversion

Once we showed nodal writing in its erroneous way (which, in the case of the borromean knot is simply a Venn diagram) and its writing maintaining three dimensions, we have to state a question that was left pending. Can we keep the separation we made before between *what is written, and where it is written* also in the case of the knot?

Does the knot not come to question this separation we made for the other kinds of writing, showing us that *the knot is a writing in itself*?

The artifice of interrupting the lines in order to see what goes below or what goes over is simply a convention to be able to transfer the essence of the knot onto the plane: *which is one or many closed lines immersed in three-dimensional space*.

But as we already said regarding the particularity of the triple point, and in the case of the inversion, the knot *constitutes a space*, it is a space in itself, it is the *space of a writing*.

It is for all this that the knot is so exemplary for Lacan, it is for this reason that during his last seminars Lacan kept manipulating and writing them, because of all that Lacan produced, the knot makes possible the transmission of a Real which directly implicates the analytic practice, the practice from where Lacan took his knots, for this practice implies this kind of writing.

Since the unconscious is nothing but a matter of links, bindings and knottings, that is the practice which was bequeathed to us by Freud as well as by Lacan. The future of psychoanalysis will depend not only on what can be said, but also on what can be written.*

Translation: Azucena Wainer

* This article was originally published in *Notas de la Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires* No. 4, Oct., 1983.

NOTES

- ¹ It was Koyré who put us on the track of this subject, although he does not state the difference between script and discourse which we are going to do here, and which is essential.
- ² Not only writing constitutes science, but also an efficient technique. For the purpose of my paper I will refer only to what has to do with writing.
- ³ PLATO, *Timaeus and Critias*, p.45, translated by Desmond Lee, Penguin Books, England, 1979.
- ⁴ What we write here was an introduction to the lectures of Gregoric Klimovsky on paradoxes of logic, at the Freudian School of Buenos Aires, 1982.
- ⁵ Although the script has its place in each science, logic is exemplary of this because it is "The science of the written", quoting Lacan "The science of the real".
- ⁶ LUKASIEWICZ, Jan. *La silogística de Aristóteles. Edit. Tecnos.* p.18.
- ⁷ Ibid. p.14.
- ⁸ We have placed the medium term in this way in order to make it correspond with the syllogisms studied in this paper.
- ⁹ LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts*; The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis 1977 p.209-210.
- ¹⁰ In fact, a letter does not need another one to signify itself, but it does need a signifier. Now then, as in logic the relation between discourse and letter is cut, the letters then function as discourse. This makes possible for us to read the script of logic as if it were a discourse pretending to be a whole that signifies itself.
- ¹¹ In this statement we try to use the same elements used by Dedekind when he speaks of cuts. The support comes, as is seen, from a spatial notion. More specifically, I am talking of orientation. One could say it is like this for those of us who are facing both B's. But for those who place themselves in either one of them, the left and the right change. I will come back to this subject further on.
- ¹² LACAN, J., *Séminaire IX, L'identification*, (7/3/62).
- ¹³ MILLER, J. A. *La sutura. Elementos de la Lógica del significante*. P.14. Universidad de los Andes. Colombia.
- ¹⁴ RUPOLO, Héctor. *Espacio-Tiempo en Freud, Notas de la Escuela Freudiana de Buenos Aires* No. 3. p.257.
- ¹⁵ Perhaps this could be thought for The Science in general. But we are far from making a general epistemology, because to do so brings the difficulty of constituting, in a way, The Science as a whole. I prefer to think from psychoanalysis, The Science, or, what would be its equivalent: The Sciences which will allow us to maintain $\forall x \Phi x$ (the not-all).
- ¹⁶ LACAN, J., *L'Etourdit*, joint publication of The Freudian School of Buenos Aires and the School of Psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud of Rosario. p.29.
- ¹⁷ SEIFERT, H. Threlfall, W. *Lecciones de Topología*, Madrid. Instituto Jorge Juan, 1951.
- ¹⁸ This is what allows us the series of which Lacan speaks in *L'Etourdit*.
- ¹⁹ Due to the fact that we will only operate on the torus, we will not include the essential relationships between the object "a" and the symbolic phallus, since we would have to work on the cross cap.
- ²⁰ LACAN, J. *Séminaire XIV, La Logique du fantasme* (23/11/66).
- ²¹ This is valid provided we relate it to what was said up to here, because the inversion of the sphere states a topological problem which has been solved only recently. Furthermore, Stevens Male who discovered the possibility of this inversion, encountered resistances which appear framed within the imaginary of the sphere.
- ²² What I have shown so far, is restricted to the order of the inscription of circles onto a torus. This was enough to make the difference between the inscription onto the unifying sphere and the inscription onto the non-sphere clear, which always implicates the piercing of the sphere.
- ²³ Although it is relevant to maintain the difference between knots and chains (the knot is a closed line immersed in a three dimensional space and the chain the joining of many closed lines) to make it easier I will use the word knot in one case or the other without distinction.
- ²⁴ On this matter, in addition to references in Lacan's seminars, it is pos-

sible to read Poincaré, *La ciencia y la hipótesis* and *El valor de ciencia, Editorial Austral*.

- ²⁵ LACAN, J. *Séminaire XX, Encore* (1972/1973), p.120-121, *Seuil*, Paris 1975.
- ²⁶ Referring to this difficulty, we thank Carlos Ruiz for putting us on the right track with this question, which mathematicians generally overlook because they take it for granted.
- ²⁷ In space four, figures like a torus can be knotted; lines are always susceptible to being unknotted.
- ²⁸ Whenever we speak of Euclidean space of three dimensions we will use E^3 .
- ²⁹ "Because there may be another way of making a point other than by cutting the space, then tearing a page, and then, with that line that we don't know where it is floating between the two, break it and then say: that is the point that is to say nowhere; that is to say nothing: maybe the way should be, to take those circles of thread I already explained to you, in such a way that if you cut one, the others would not be linked. They can, just by being only three, interlock in such a way as to remain inseparable." *Les noms dupes errer* Lacan, J. *Séminaire XXI*, p.4, 1963/1964.
- ³⁰ These two matters that I mentioned are obtained with the borromean knot of three. This knot has the peculiarity of being the union of three closed lines with the following property: if any one of them is cut, the other two are unknotted. The fact that there are three lines producing the knotting is essential for what we will develop in the next paragraphs. Whenever we want to refer to this property we will name it: borromean property.
- ³¹ With regard to the matter of the triple point also obtainable with the surface of Boy, which is nothing other than a projected plane, it seems to me that it has not the same property of the triple point determined by the borromean knot. *I leave the question open*.
- ³² LACAN, J. *Séminaire XX, Encore* (1972/1973), *Seuil*, 1975.
- ³³ LACAN, J. *Séminaire XXII*, (14/1/75), *Réel, Symbolique, Imaginaire*
- ³⁴ LACAN, J. *Séminaire XX, Encore* (1972/1973), p.154, *Seuil*, 1975.
- ³⁵ There are other kinds of topological inversions as for example that

the tricot, of the torus or of the sphere. Due to the limits of this paper only that of the borromean knot is commented upon.

- ³⁶ It is in this that are based the insufficiencies that Lacan brings out from the optical scheme in Observations on the report of Lagache. Lacan says it does not make clearer the position of the object "a" in relation with the Symbolic.
- ³⁷ We prefer to use the French word due to difficulties of translation.
- ³⁸ This kind of deformity is contemporary with Lacan. There was a time when the symbolic was eminent to the detriment of the imaginary, and nearly nothing was said about the real. Nowadays, some disciples of Lacan criticized him because of his nodal writing, saying that he intended to suffocate the world. Others of the early days, like Mannoni, say that the last productions of Lacan belong to the university Lacan.

**FOREWORD TO M. SAFOUAN'S,
JACQUES LACAN ET LA QUESTION DE LA
FORMATION DES ANALYSTES**

M. Safouan deals in the work that follows with the seriousness and responsibility of someone who not only knows of most of the intrinsic reasons for the failure of *l'Ecole Freudienne de Paris* but who also knows of the fact that a psychoanalytic institution is not alien to the analysis of an analyst.

The *passe* and the *cartel*, although far from perfection, are somehow the challenge for times to come. Lacan created with them instruments, in an attempt to deal with the problem of the aim and the end of an analysis as well as of the training of analysts.

Oscar Zentner

JACQUES LACAN AND THE QUESTION OF
THE TRAINING OF ANALYSTS

Moustapha Safouan*

*Lorsque son père, ou sa mère, est mort on le
dit au Bouddha, mais lorsque le Bouddha est
mort, à qui le dit-on?*

*MOUSTAPHA SAFOUAN: A.E., Analyst *Ecole Freudienne de Paris* founded by Jacques Lacan (dissolved in 1980). Has published the following books:

- *Le structuralisme en psychanalyse*, in *Qu'est-ce que le Structuralisme*, *Le Seuil*, 1968.
- *Études sur l'Oedipe*, *Le Seuil*, 1974.
- *La sexualité féminine dans la doctrine freudienne*, *Le Seuil*, 1979.
- *L'échec du principe du plaisir* (1979) translated as *Pleasure and Being: Hedonism from a Psychoanalytic Point of View*, St. Martins Press, 1983.
- *L'inconscient et son scribe*, *Le Seuil*, 1982.
- *Jacques Lacan et la question de la formation des analystes*, *Le Seuil*, 1983.

Introduction

Jacques Lacan's death, shortly after the dissolution of his school, leaves to those imbued with the conclusiveness of his teaching, no other choice but psychoanalysis itself, I mean in the first place the given question of the "training" of the analyst.

Lacan, on the one hand, has brought to light what is at stake in this training: the analyst's desire; on the other hand, he has offered institutional structures able to ensure it. His contribution remains unappreciated; many people even consider that the failure of the E.F.P. (Freudian School of Paris) is a fait accompli.

This conclusion, however, is hardly justified. For, after all, the same structure which the most prominent people within the official societies hold responsible for the failure of the latter to reach their objectives, is also because of its bureaucratic nature which no one can grasp, the one which supports them; so that we can say that the E.F.P., for its part, was at least given a structure which allowed it to draw out the inferences of failure, instead of sinking into it.

We must therefore re-examine the question of the training of the analyst in his relations with the institutional structures that this training motivates: as it appears before Lacan and with him. It is then possible that the failure of the E.F.P. appears due to reasons which do not minimise Jacques Lacan's contribution to receive the attention of the psychoanalytic community. Since, in what follows, we will examine the appreciation of the different modes of institutionalization, what are the criteria of this appreciation? This question arises all the more forcibly since we do not have at our disposal a paradigm, which in this case could guide the effort of the legislator, such as, for Plato, the soul, recalling the laws of the Republic or else for, Hobbes, the right of nature or the necessary order of universal mechanism.

Analysts would readily agree to three points:

a) that the training of the analyst has nothing to do with the reproduction of a model; there are families of doctors, lawyers, interior-decorators, while it is unthinkable that becoming an analyst "runs in the family";

b) that neither has it anything to do with the transmission of a *savoir-faire*; an institution which aims to train teachers, researchers, scientists, technicians or skilled workers demands enrolment pre-requisites, but no one wonders whether this enrolment corresponds to what the subject really desires, a question, which on the contrary, is at the heart of any analysis;

c) that no one could practise analysis without having undergone a so-called "didactic" analysis.

It is important to note, that as justifiable as it may be, this necessity of a didactic analysis could not be considered proven. Some analysts, such as Abraham and Bernfeld, started practising analysis without having previously undergone a didactic analysis; and we think that an analyst using the Freudian notion of repression, because of his very status as listener, would be able to drive out the repressions which mark someone else's words, but that by definition, his own repressions would escape him.

That is not all. We seldom question the actual results of the didactic analysis: an ability to analyse or, more simply, a desire to continue a translation of the unconscious with another. But, for lack of this questioning, despite the first two points previously agreed upon everything falls into place, as if it were a matter of professional training, in the common meaning of the word.

The different institutional structures are therefore finally judged according to the positive meaning they give, implicitly or explicitly, to the training of the analyst and particularly to didactic analysis, and according to whether they do or do not allow an evaluation of work meant to test their adequacy to their goal.

* * *

Before Lacan

The history of the psychoanalytic movement does not need to be retold¹. Those who have discussed the topic agree on this: the methods of analytic training still in use have been defined at the founding of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. But, we have at our disposal extremely significant evidence of this event, that of Bernfeld.

On January 10, 1950, Siegfried Bernfeld, who we know mainly through his work on Freud's scientific training, delivered to his colleagues, members of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute Education Committee, a memorandum where he defined in fourteen points his conception of the *free* psychoanalytic institute. This conception was considered as *utopian*. Shortly after, he resigned from the committee due to the sterility of the discussion with his peers and to free himself from the bond of silence required by his position: to be able to say publicly what he had to say. And he said it; in a lecture given to the Society and the San Francisco Institute on November 10, 1952, a few months before he died, on April 3, 1953. This lecture was at last published ten years later (*Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1962, p.453-482): we are tempted to believe that death succeeds in achieving results where man has failed during his life. It was even felt necessary to precede the text of the lecture with an editorial introduction signed by Rudolph Erksstein. He states that, had Bernfeld had more time, he would certainly not have had his lecture published without completely reshaping it, in order to confer on it his usual *objective* form. As such, Erksstein goes on, this lecture is a document which shows Bernfeld's *troubled reactions*² in facing the problems of analytic training, "problems more intensely felt by a man whose primary identification would be made in relation to the process of teaching rather than to that of the organization of training (sic)". No comments on these assertions. I would only like to emphasize the relationship between the distinction in question here (between those who identify with the process of teaching

and those who identify with the organization of training) and the common distinction in the theory of *management*³, between *functionals* and *operators*.

In fact, Bernfeld's lecture is a priceless document which, indeed, reflects *his troubled reactions* (and with reason!), but also the most decisive turn in the history of the psychoanalytic movement.

Bernfeld notes that the idea of personal analysis is not very much younger than psychoanalysis itself. From the late 1890's students attending Freud's classes at University, told him from time to time their dreams. Psychologists and doctors sometimes asked him for his help in the treatment of neurotic symptoms. According to Bernfeld, these early analyses were truly didactic.

Around 1905, Freud started with some analysts to conduct analyses which were much longer and had greater therapeutic ambitions⁴. He varied the length of the analysis and the amount of theoretical teaching it included, according to the desires and circumstances of each student-analysand and according to the nature of the neurotic symptoms. In any case, he always kept his didactic analyses totally free from being subject to interference from administrative rules and political considerations. He continued in that manner long after the Institutes foundation, despite the fact that the *authorities* as he sometimes called them with a touch of irony, were appalled and embarrassed.

Bernfeld quotes his own experience as an example. In 1922, he discussed his project to start a practice in Vienna as an analyst, with Freud. The Berlin group encouraged analysts, especially beginners, to undergo a didactic analysis before starting to practise. Bernfeld asked Freud if he thought that this preparation would be desirable for him. Freud answered straight away: "It is absurd. Go ahead. You will certainly encounter difficulties. But we shall see what we can do to help you."

According to Bernfeld, the history of didactic psychoanalysis is divided into two perfectly distinctive periods. The *first one*, goes from the beginning of psychoanalysis until the winter of

1923-24. During this period, Freud conducted the analyses of practising analysts and of other people professionally interested in psychoanalysis, in the manner we have just described. He was soon joined by Abraham, Ferenczi and Federn. As a matter of fact, anyone who knew a little bit more than the newcomer and had the desire and the ability to start working, did so, each in his own way. The lessons learnt from this first period are that anyone interested in psychoanalysis, either as a science or as a therapy, is very likely to realize in the end that self-analysis could neither satisfy one's curiosity nor help one's personal difficulties and therefore, one is led, of one's own accord, to ask somebody who seems both to know a little bit more and who can be trusted, for a personal analysis.

Towards the end of this period, the Berlin group took an important decision. Many members of this group felt the need for a personal analysis. But as they all knew each other, they invited Hans Sachs to come from Vienna to Berlin and to specialize in analysing analysts, those who were already well established as well as those who were starting out. Thereby, Sachs became the first didactic analyst. Sachs was not a medical doctor and at that time, only had very limited therapeutic experience. Very early, he felt that it was very difficult for him to conduct the analyses he had to, while also supervising the therapeutic work of his analysands and while discussing theoretical and technical questions with them. Very wisely, he omitted any teaching from his analyses and restricted it to his seminars held at the clinic. This is the origin of the procedure which all didactic analysts have followed till now.

The *second* period starts at the end of 1923-beginning of 1924, when the Berlin Society Education Committee decided to regulate its activities. The committee offered a complete education programme to psychiatrists who, among other things, agreed to the following conditions: the committee irrevocably accepted or rejected the candidate according to the impression received during three successive interviews. To begin with, the candidate had to undergo a first personal analysis for at least six

months; it was the same committee which appointed the didactic analyst. On the didactic analyst's advice, the committee decided when the analysis could be considered sufficiently advanced to allow the candidate to participate in further stages of training; it was also the committee's function to decide when the analysis could be considered finished; moreover, the candidate had to agree, in writing, not to call himself an analyst before his formal admission to the Society.

Everyone knows today, that all this became a habit. But then, says Bernfeld, the proclamation of this policy sounded like something unprecedented in the analytic world. A few analysts saw in it the solution to the fundamental problem. Others, on the contrary, were sceptical. Some others, like Bernfeld, felt that, far from resolving problems, the decision taken in Berlin would rather complicate their task.

From the description of these different reactions, it emerges that the proclamation of the Berlin group had not been seriously *opposed*. But this proclamation comprised a claim to legitimacy. The question then arises: why did this claim gain the support of analysts as well as those who wanted to become analysts? Bernfeld does not ask that question. He merely states, that after thirty years, one can better understand the factors which determined the policy of the Berlin group. What he says about it however, answers my question, in so far as he leads us to verify that it is not only in the common work that the cohesion of the groups rests, but also in libidinal energies.⁵

This is indeed how Bernfeld explained the Berlin group's decision. Just after World War I – he says in 1920 – Freud and psychoanalysis suddenly and quite unexpectedly became world famous. In Austria and Germany, psychoanalysis was everywhere (in the press, cafe's, theatres, youth movements, unions etc. . .). This success, says Bernfeld, really frightened the old generation of analysts, who had to realize that the new situation required resources other than the simple *heroism* of early times. Analysis was everywhere . . . except within the medical profes-

sion, which looked down on it, despite the sympathy of young psychiatrists. Bernfeld also notes that, curiously, psychoanalysts themselves wished to gain respectability. They wanted to become part of the medical profession and, to reach this goal, they felt that they should have *their* clinics, *their* professional schools and *their* corporative societies.⁶

Actually, there were two tendencies regarding the question of how to adjust to the new situation.

“In Vienna, close to Freud — Bernfeld writes — we preferred the idea of offering the new movement opportunities for serious study of psychoanalysis and for the application of analysis to all the fields of therapy and education. In Berlin, the tendency was rather to isolate the psychoanalytic societies clearly from the general analytic movement, and gradually to establish psychoanalysis as a specialty within the medical profession. As a compromise, the clinics in Vienna and Berlin decided to include in their training programme some provisions for the training of non-physicians. But with greater and greater intensity their purpose came to be the issuing of diplomas in psychoanalysis. In the long run, the Berlin tendency won out.”

Why did that tendency win? Bernfeld does not ask the question and goes on:

“Most important, however, for the development of those features of our training that I am discussing tonight was Freud’s illness. As you may remember, in the summer of 1923, Freud’s cancer was discovered, and

everyone, including himself and his doctors, expected him to die within a few months. By the summer of the following year it was fairly well established that the cancer was under control, and that Freud could hope to live many years longer”

“I need not explain in detail — Bernfeld goes on — what Freud’s ‘death and resurrection’ within this one year meant to the older psychoanalysts in Vienna and Berlin”

After alluding to Rank whose case he describes as an illustration of what he calls an “outburst of the id”, Bernfeld carries on:

“Some of the others grew intensely anxious because of the threatened loss, and became very eager to establish a solid dam against heterodoxy, as they now felt themselves responsible for the future of psychoanalysis. They determined to limit by rigid selection among the newcomers, and by the institution of a coercive, long drawn-out trial period of authoritarian training, any final admission to their societies. In fact, *they punished their students for their own ambivalence*. At the same time, they consolidated the one trend that Freud always had wanted to avoid: the shrinkage of psychoanalysis into an annex of psychiatry.”⁷

There is no doubt about the meaning of this statement: we could not have said better that the institutionalization of psychoanalysis was, on the part of those who promoted it, an *acting out*⁸ which displayed what, from their desire, was not

signified otherwise: i.e. the essential link (not to say the effective identity) to that desire of a defence which forbids all and everyone a certain idea of *jouissance*, that which the position of the master "would promise". The institutionalization of psychoanalysis was like a "repetition" where staged, behind the back of the "actants", was the myth promoted by Freud in *Totem and Taboo*, a "fraternal" arrangement dictated by the murder not so much accomplished as un-admitted, or else, admissible though un-accomplished; it was the outcome of a convergence in repression. In the same way, the socialization of analysis, synonymous with its integration in "the medical order", was a set back of the complicity on which the social link is based.⁹

In a word, by institutionalizing psychoanalysis, it was precisely as if psychoanalysis never existed. Why so many fears, which turned the accomplishment of a duty into a police operation, if it were not because "to take Freud's place" was not only to take the place which would allow everyone to serve psychoanalysis at best? Why this conformity, this need for respectability or social recognition, if it were not to find in it the alibi of a deep, lonely and yet evident delinquency?

In those conditions, it is not surprising to learn, as Bernfeld points out, that the most zealous people to protect psychoanalysis from heterodoxy, were called, among others, Alexander, Rado, Reich, K. Horney, Fromm, Reichman — Fromm. It is not surprising either, that a total lack of invention was displayed . . . since the void left by Freud had become a "place" falsely and neurotically prohibitive.

For after all we cannot say, and Bernfeld emphasizes it, that as far as a training method is concerned, the Berliners had found something that people seriously interested in psychoanalysis had not found by themselves. Their "work" only consisted in turning into an obligation what was a matter of choice. A move heavy with consequences. Because, from that time on, the didactic analysis became, in Bernfeld's words, an analysis "to

take", in the way one takes a course in preliminary anatomy to become a doctor.

A state of things which is judged from its results, and which Bernfeld does emphasize: despite thirty years of experience (to which another thirty can be added today), we still do not know anything about the progress of the didactic, nor what it consists of.

And if it is true, as Bernfeld points out once more, that once an institution is set up it can survive for motives other than those which lead to its foundation, where should we look for those motives of survival but in the benefits of its hierarchical functioning?

However, the ignorance emphasized by Bernfeld, whom we are going to leave here, is a fact and it is attested to by the divergence of opinions between didacticians.

They all agree to say that a didactic analysis is different from a therapeutic analysis: it is an analysis which is "deeper" or which "goes further". What does it mean?

For Jeanne Lampl-De-Groot, a didactic analysis is an analysis which goes as far as a perfect knowledge of the self (sic) requires.

For Max Gitelson, who thinks in particular of the problem of "normal" candidates, who were finally called "the normopaths"; a didactic analysis must be an analysis of character.

For Crete L. Bibring, a didactic analysis is aiming, beyond the lifting of symptoms, at realizing a balance and an inner elasticity which allow the future analyst to grasp without inhibition the unconscious conflicts in others and not to be disturbed by his patients' acute neurotic fantasms.

The list could go on and on quite easily.¹⁰ What is serious is the collusion attested to by Balint in a 1947 article,¹¹ between institutional hierarchy and ignorance.

In this essential article, Michael Balint intends to examine

two symptoms. One is the reluctance of the experts to put their knowledge in writing (which is all the more extraordinary since those same experts, that is the didacticians, are otherwise rather prolific writers). The other one is, on the part of the same experts, a dogmatic attitude unknown to any other sphere of psychoanalysis.

Those are objective facts, he says, easily verifiable by anyone who would take the trouble to look through our periodicals. Indeed, in twenty-five years of existence, that is since the founding of the *International Training Committee* by Eitington in 1925 to 1947, the question of training has never been adequately examined *in print*.¹² Addresses given within that committee, by authors like Rado, Sachs, H. Deutsch, I. Hermann, never came into existence. Here there is, considers Balint, a "severe inhibition", which constitutes for him the first suspicious symptom. As for the second symptom, dogmatism, Balint just gives two examples. (1) How it has been decided that the supervising analyst must be different from the analyst with whom one undergoes the didactic analysis. This decision was arbitrarily taken by the British Society in 1949, even though the debate never came to any conclusion and where the pros deserved at least as much consideration as the cons. (2) How the Institutes decided that the didactic analysis must last so many hours or years (four for the London Institute, for example), even though it has been established that nobody can foretell how long an analysis will take and that, to yield to that kind of prevision, would be an elementary analytical mistake.

Balint writes :

"I think that no analyst will have much difficulty in diagnosing the condition which caused those symptoms. The whole atmosphere strongly reminds one of the primitive initiation ceremonies. On the initiators' side — the training committee and the didactic analysts — we notice the secrecy

which surrounds our esoteric knowledge, as well as the dogmatic enunciation of our rules and the use of authoritarian techniques. On the candidates' side, that is those who have to be initiated, we notice the quick acceptance of esoteric fables, the submission to a dogmatic and authoritarian treatment without much protestation and the reverential behaviour."

We shall easily admit with Balint that an ignorance which, for want of self-recognition, presents itself as esoteric knowledge, finds compensation in dogmatism. But it is interesting to note that dogmatism calls for an authoritarian institutional structure, whose benefit gives an incentive to protect ignorance.

A dogma is indeed not a simple belief. He who says "I believe" (for example : "I believe she loves me" or else : "I believe in God") admits an incertitude in the very certitude he wants to express. A belief is a subjective act, which, as such, betrays the dependence of the object on the assertion which poses it, as it betrays, at least when the belief is derived from a desire, the dependence of the subject himself on the object thus posed. Dogma is something else. With it, we are dealing with an object which indeed requires a subject who poses it as an assertion, but who denies any dependence in relation to this assertion. A dogma takes itself for a truth which claims its recognition as such. This truth corresponds to what is called the "Text" and the object asserting itself in it, includes a paradox with only one solution : that the subject disappears as subject of the enunciation to appear as mere interpreter of the Text. So that, if we admit that "repression" is the operation by which the subject disappears as a subject knowing what it is all about, we are entitled to say that an institution based on a dogma is repression *in persona*. And we see that the setting up of such an institution goes together with the establishment of a cast whose members will differ from their privileged relation to the truth of the

Text and whose function will be to organize "primitive ceremonies". In fact, this cast of "initiators" or of "supposed subjects of knowing" is the biggest possible screen which could stand between the subject and the truth, in the sense of the repressed.¹³

So, it is not surprising to note with Balint in a 1949 article on "the termination of analysis"¹⁴, the fierce resistance of the didacticians to any attempt to enlighten the didactic analysis. After recalling Freud's pessimism about the end of analysis on the one hand, and Ferenczi's ambitions towards a didactic analysis which would be a "super-therapy" on the other hand, he notes that Ferenczi did not imagine, however, that there were going to be as many "super-therapies" as Institutes, leading to a repetition of the confusion of tongues. Since the thirties, the length of analysis started to be extended. Official training programmes generally mentioned four years. But everyone knows, insists Balint, that this period of time only refers to the end of the official stage of training and that, in most cases, the actual analysis continues without interruption and no one, except the two people concerned, knows for how long.

"What is surprising, he writes, is that any inquiry on the part of a third person about what is actually taking place in those post-didactic analysis is immediately set aside, with proud indignation. Post-didactic analysis is a strictly private matter; any interference is unacceptable and intolerable. We obviously have here a case where part of the truth is used to disguise the whole truth. Either, post-didactic analysis is a continuation of didactic analysis that is a public matter or, the recently admitted analyst still needs analytical help, in which case both the procedure of original selection and the recent admission are suspected of

inadequacy. Although a complete knowledge of the facts would be of great importance in controlling some faults of our training system, a veil of secrecy and intimacy is carefully kept on all those facts."

So, it is not an accident if the *International Psychoanalytic Association* (I.P.A.), heir of the "Prussian and somewhat melancholic [institutionalization] of psychoanalysis", in Bernfeld's words, showed the characteristics of an authoritarian and hierarchical structure which allowed the didactic analysts' resistance to become organized. However, we find the hierarchical structure in various types of social organizations. To which type of organization does the I.P.A. belong then?

According to the statutes written in English (official language of the International Psychoanalytic Association) and adopted in a work meeting, *Business Meeting*,¹⁵ at the International Conference held in London on July 23, 1979, the I.P.A. appears as a supranational institution which has the power to recognize the following organizations:

1. Regional associations,
2. Component societies and federations of component societies,
3. Provisional societies,
4. Study groups,
5. Affiliated organizations.

The differences between those categories lie in the extent of the responsibilities they carry out in relation to the criteria about the selection, qualification and promotion of analysts, as well as in the promulgation of training programmes.

1. The Regional Association is not only ultimately responsible in those domains, but also, it is its responsibility to recognize new societies within its "geographical area". Those societies are regarded as affiliated to the regional association, even though

the I.P.A. can only recognize them indirectly. Hence it appears that "the geographical area" constitutes in fact a "private hunting ground" for the regional association.

What are, according to the I.P.A. statutes, these geographical areas? There are three of them: North America up to the U.S.A.—Mexico border, all of South America and the rest of the world.

The denomination "regional association" covers in fact a declaration of independence, if not a secession, on the part of the A.P.A. (American Psychoanalytic Association). This association has been founded by Jones in 1911; the very year A.A. Brill founded the New York Psychoanalytic Society.¹⁶ In 1930, the first International Mental Health Conference was held in Washington. The American Psychiatric Society and the American Psychoanalytic Society, which up to then, only had 56 members, agreed to hold their annual meeting at the same place and date as the Conference, where several prominent European analysts had been invited, most of them from Berlin, such as F. Alexander, H. Deutsch, S. Rado and Spitz. From then on, the American Psychoanalytic Association started to become, from a small group that was meeting every year, a federation including Societies in most big cities, each of them with its training methods and its education committees. But, until 1933, these programmes were approved by the I.P.A. Undoubtedly it was under the pressure of the first emigrants whose internal struggles amazed him so much that he confessed his amazement to his friend Jones, that A.A. Brill (who only remained president of the American Psychoanalytic Association because he was said to be the only *pater familias* able to save the building from collapsing), demanded the renewal of the structure of the Association. A meeting was held in Boston on December 27, 1935 and a new constitution was adopted. A *Council on Professional Training* was established which was to become responsible for the coordination or the standardization of psychoanalytic training in the United States. In less than five years, a profession was defined, with its corporations, its train-

ing standards and its authorized voices. When the emigrants started to pour into the country towards the end of the thirties this rigid structure had already been set up. The founding of the Professional Training Council certainly created friction with the I.P.A. Jones, who was dependent on American subsidies to support his I.J.P. (*International Journal of Psychoanalysis*) and who regarded the A.P.A. as his beloved child, wanted to go to America in 1939. The encounter took place only after the war.

William Gillespie, who succeeded Hartman as the I.P.A. president in 1957, gave a colourful account of the encounter:

"Shortly after the war I was attending a meeting (at Mansfield Gardens) between some of the most important members of our Society, led by Jones and a few prominent American analysts, not to say "heavy-weights". This epithet refers particularly to Karl Menninger and Leo Bartemeier, as much for their aggressivity as for their stature. The subject of the meeting was: on the one hand the injustice prevailing in the International Association dominated by the Europeans (mainly by Jones) and on the other hand, the request made by the Americans to be able to protect their own rights, a request hardly obscured by the threat of secession. To my mind, as a young observer, it was obviously a repetition of the Boston Tea Party, with Jones as King George III. The discussion went on till 3 a.m. Jones' tact, his sense of humour, his patience were wonderful and we all parted good friends. Later, in 1948, there was a return match and we came to an agreement by which, in the future, the International Association presidency would be equally

taken in turn by Europe and America, the American Association would be autonomous as for the questions of training – and there would no longer be an International Training Committee, as before the war.”

This negotiation did not revolve – as far as we know – around a theoretical stake nor around different conceptions of *training*.¹⁷ Which leads us to believe that, under the cover of a share of “responsibilities”, it was a share of power. The agreement they reached gave all the advantages to the Americans, since the A.P.A. kept and even reinforced its influence within the I.P.A., whilst the latter gave up all authority (the term is not exaggerated after the reference to George III) in the North-American “geographical area”.

Let us now proceed to:

2. The Component Societies and Federations of Component Societies.

A Component Society is a society directly linked to the I.P.A. and not indirectly, that is through the Regional Association – in which case we talk about “affiliated society”. The I.P.A. can also recognize, if a request has been lodged, a federation of component societies. This recognition does not prevent the societies from being ultimately responsible in regard to the training and qualification of analysts. The function of the federation – as is the case for the European Society whose head office is in Geneva – is limited to the organization of conferences or meetings between federated societies. They sometimes go further, of their own accord, for example when they unify their selection criteria and their training methods, as did the Federation of Brazilian Societies. The important fact is that no society can modify the composition of its members that is their hierarchy, nor its methods of training and qualification, without advising the I.P.A. beforehand: this is done to encourage the discussion with the other full I.P.A. members, in order

to ask for their advice in case those modifications should diverge from the standard methods.

Then we have:

3. **The Provisional Societies.** This appellation means that a Society is admitted as an I.P.A. member only after a period of provisional recognition. During that time, the provisional society (which must be at least composed of 10 members, including six full members including four didactic analysts) is bound to submit to the I.P.A. Council regular reports on its training activities. On the basis of those reports the Council submits its conclusions to the *Business Meeting*, which meets at every I.P.A. conference, every two years.

As for:

4. **The Study Groups;** a decision of the I.P.A. Council granted them a status. This local group must include at least four full and associate members; when this condition is not fulfilled, the I.P.A. Council is able to give the title of full and associate member to those it chooses. The group is then authorized to train qualified students, either under a Component Society or under the I.P.A., or more precisely, under a committee appointed by its council to this end.

And finally:

5. **The Associate Organization;** this status is granted by the I.P.A. to a group, which even though it is not authorized to train or qualify analysts, wishes to keep in touch with the I.P.A.

Any associate or full member of a society belonging to the I.P.A., automatically becomes an I.P.A. member – but, however, a society is not bound to recognize as full member, a full member recognized by another sister-society. This clause is probably due to the fact that many emigrant analysts were recognized as didactic analysts by their European Societies and were

expecting to hold the same position in the American societies, which they were very reluctant to do.

The difference between full and associate members lies on the fact that the latter can only attend the *Business Meeting*, whereas the former can vote and run for the key positions of command. As for the scientific meetings of the I.P.A. Congress, everyone can attend and make a speech, provided though that the membership fees are paid. There is also another difference worth mentioning and common among the societies : the didactic analysts, at the top of the pyramid, are always chosen from among the full members.

Let us now proceed to the *administrative* structure of the Association.

First the full members meeting, which meets at every congress : it is the *Business Meeting*, already mentioned many times. This meeting elects for two years, the president of the Association as well as the vice-president and the treasurer. They are nominated to those positions, either by ten full members or, as is more often the case, by a "Nomination Committee" appointed by the president, with the other members of the Council.

This *Council* in question includes, besides those elected to the positions I have just mentioned, the past presidents during the four years following the end of their mandate plus a secretary nominated by the president and associate secretaries acting as regional secretaries.

The president and the Council have the power to act on behalf of the Association, to manage it and promote its objectives. They have a considerable power : they can deprive a member of his title — which does not prevent the expelled member from appearing in front of the Business Meeting and retaining his title if he obtains two thirds of the votes.

We have just seen that the promotion of the Association's objectives is one of the tasks assigned to this "statutory" council. According to Article 3 of the I.P.A. statutes, these objectives

are:

a) to facilitate the communication between psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic organizations, by means of suitable publications, scientific Congresses and other meetings.

b) to promote the training and education criteria which ensure the continuous development of psychoanalysis.

c) to help with the training and development of analytical organizations.

An association that calls itself a *Psychoanalytic Association* (article 1) must define what is *psychoanalysis*. Here is this definition (article 3):

"The term psychoanalysis refers to a theory and function of the personality and of the application of this theory to other areas of knowledge and finally to therapeutic techniques. This body of knowledge is based on an is derived from Sigmund Freud's psychological discoveries."

The aseptized and academic nature of this definition, where there is no reference at all to the unconscious or desire, that is to the fundamental terms of Freudian experience, is obvious. What is no less obvious, is the connection between a definition of psychoanalysis which refers it to the notion of personality and a mode of institutionalization which, finally, is based on *statutory* authority.

In actual fact, the I.P.A. administrative structure as I have just explained it briefly, is not without reminding us of the *bureaucratic* model described by Max Weber, and of which the main characteristic features are : the organization of jobs into a hierarchy with each stratum representing a clearly defined sphere of legal competence; a recruitment made through a free contractual relation and based on the candidates' qualifications; a system of promotion — which implies a "race"; a maximal

centralization of decisions, and above all, "the government of men through the only abstract game of impersonal rules which no one at all can grasp".¹⁸

Let me remind you that it is with Jeremy Bentham (*Constitutional Code*), that the theory of bureaucracy found, in an almost completed form, its first expression. This theory includes at random apparently democratic or liberal elements (appointment to positions by election or competitive entrance examinations) and authoritarian elements (absolute obligation to obey).

All these contradictory elements find their common roots, as L.J. Hume judiciously showed it "in the only theoretical structure of individualism and in the acceptance of individualism as an exact interpretation of the world".¹⁹ Which means that if we want to understand Bentham as well, we must go back to Hobbes.

It is indeed in the latter that we find the most perfect expression of modern political theory, in so far as this theory claims the individual as the only initial element; the individual defined by his will; a highly selfish will. Consequently, in the absence of a sovereign who imposes his orders, men could not in any case issue a law or produce a social order. It is apparently a diametrically opposite doctrine to the Freudian myth of the primitive horde, according to which the order of the law would on the contrary become rooted in the murder of the sovereign. However, since the two conceptions are based on the idea of a natural man or state of nature, we might perhaps be tempted to find their common origin in the disintegration of the medieval conception, which did not question the existence, for each people, of a pre-established law and which, from there, considered the prince as the judge of his people, that is, someone who is empowered with the law and not the legislator who dictates it.

Bentham subscribes to Hobbes' individualism and his corollary, nominalism. But as precisely a doctrine which only sees reality in the concrete individual and his selfishness would not

account for an order which rests on notions as *abstract* as those of right and duty, good and evil and many others, it led to the call for the theory of the "fictitious entities", which exist through language and through it alone — a theory which is itself a fiction, because one cannot see how the notions of *horse* or *fire* would owe their existence to language less than those of *just* and *unjust*. This theory however, gave Bentham the means to fully exercise his legal rationalism. He only had to define the aim for which the law had to be put in order. Utilitarianism provided him with the answer; and it is therefore on utilitarianism in the meaning of the acceptance of "maximal happiness for the greatest" as supreme value of social morality, that Bentham's endless efforts are based "in the view of linking back the means with the ends, of treating institutions and arrangements as means dependent on this supreme aim, of condemning and of rejecting inferior means, and of remodeling everything else, in order to serve it more efficiently". (*op. cit* p.9-11). This "rationality" might have allowed the same author to state (p.257) that the key to the understanding of Bentham's cogitations on government is in Max Weber's famous remark, by which "the purest model in exercising legal authority is the one which uses an administrative bureaucratic staff".

But if there is an experience where we come very close to the limits of individualistic logic and utilitarianism as social morality, and to the limits of the legal rationalist devices based on that, it is indeed the psychoanalytic experience. An experience, where happiness, far from being the supreme aim, has in fact no other value but that of a fragile reference to the aim which the subject pursues without knowing and which he questions. This aim, the unconscious desire, appears to have the closest relation with a law as universal as language, the law of the prohibition of incest, but a relation whose paradox compared with legal order as well as morality is such that it sometimes throws the subject, in search of an impossible absolution, into crime. Since Aichorn, we know that the need for self-punishment motivates many delinquent acts; as we know that guilt is often a ploy

readily used by the subject to escape anxiety. At the most, we can subscribe, concerning this relation of the desire to the law, to Lacan's formula; "where the subject yields to his desire, we are sure that there, there is guilt". But we should also note that this formula does not assure us at all that where he does not give in, there is no guilt: There are many cases where the subject does not yield to a desire which takes him straight to his downfall. Therefore, in wanting a guarantee against the lack of landmarks in this field of the relation of the unconscious desire with the law, we can only appeal to arrangements whose only function is to do with appearances. It is precisely on such arrangements that the I.P.A. is based, regarding training.

This conclusion is verified at the level of the only two points on which, according to a report by Robert S. Wallerstein,²⁰ the psychoanalytic societies agree:

a) The "triple side" of the training of analysts (didactic analysis, supervised analysis and theoretical teaching), b) the selection of candidates. As for didactic analysis, we have been that the obscurantism which prevails in that area and which makes the list of questions of the Studies Committee as well as the efforts to make psychoanalytic training "more attractive",²¹ look ridiculous, is precisely what allows the I.P.A. current structure to remain.

As for supervised analyses, the weight of the administrative mentality is such that the reader who skims through the voluminous book by Robert Langs (*The Supervisory Experience*, Jason Aronson, New York — London 1979) ends up in front of a conception of "contrôle" (supervision) which is not very different from Fayol's: The *contrôle* consists in making sure that everything is done according to the adopted programme, given orders and accepted principles".²² We are dealing here with, really, an extreme caricatural point of view, but it only shows the logical consequence of a common attitude which sees in the supervisory analysis "a helping and enabling process"²³ and which

implicitly aims at standardizing the criteria according to which we have to evaluate the candidate.²⁴

On this matter, the embarrassment of the experts is shown through the results of a report which Albert J. Solnit wrote from the answers given to six questions asked to the presidents of the Studies Committees — out of the 49 institutes contacted, 28 answered.²⁵ We find no agreement on selection criteria for supervisory analysts, nor on the methods used to qualify them for that task. We admit, with a few exceptions, that supervision in one of the functions of the didactic analysts and that, everywhere, the selection of supervisors is the same as the nomination of didactic analysts; but as we are not told according to which criteria they are nominated . . . we do not even know if supervision is a pedagogical or therapeutic activity; these answers *seem to say*²⁶ that a supervisory analysis is something more than an education and less than a therapy (sic!). As for when to authorize a candidate to exercise supervision in his relations with the development of his didactic analysis, we have a whole range of possible answers.

It never occurred to anyone that a supervised analysis is not a supervision of the analyst (let alone of the analyst's analyst) but of analysis itself: which means that it is a place which allows the analyst in supervision to record what, from his interventions, constitutes a psychoanalytic act, which goes towards the unmaking of a repression and, from there, towards making the analyst return over a certain blindness — as it can also be, as is often the case, the place where the analyst can record the insufficiency of his analysis. Then, is it not surprising that instead of an answer, we find rules?

As for the theoretical teaching, the third "side" of the training of the analyst, I will just mention for now Brian Bird's remark". Nothing stamps the mark of a profession on a group more indelibly than adoption of a school system. Standards, procedure, criteria, classes, curricula, these are not for education of scientists but for the education of members of a profession".²⁷

It is on the second point of agreement, selection, that our conclusion about the transformation of the question of the training of analysts into a matter of arrangements intended for appearances is verified to the highest degree.

In his introductory speech at the symposium organized by the XXIInd I.P.A. International Congress (Edinburgh) on the theme *Selection criteria for the training of psychoanalytic students*, Pieter J. van der Leeuw says: "It is certainly easier to determine what makes a candidate totally inept or "improper" to psychoanalysis than to determine the criteria which, essentially, prove or make his attitude possible"²⁸ This statement — to which we could readily subscribe, if by that, it meant that it is easier to give an opinion on the reason to refuse a demand for a didactic analysis rather than on the reasons to accept it — does not prevent van der Leeuw from insisting on the required qualities of the analyst. He mentions about ten of them, which undoubtedly, he, himself, would be hesitant to pretend to have: the capacity of identification, integrity, affective warmth, the capacity of self-discipline, etc. . . . It is clear that this type of speech has no other purpose but to consolidate what, in the terminology of the theory of bureaucracy, is called *esprit de corps*.

We are beyond hope if we think we can moderate such "perfectionist zeal" by reducing the required qualities to one only: "the love for the truth" as Franz Kohut did, in following Anna Freud. Besides, it is odd that analysts do not notice that it is precisely "the love for the truth" which urges a subject to invent all sorts of "truths", in order to satisfy this very love.

During the same symposium, Maria Langer tried to approach the subject from a different angle: not from the angle of the required qualities to become an analyst but from that of the desire which would determine the analytic "vocation". For her, this vocation, (from Latin *vocare* = to call) would proceed not from a *wish to help*²⁹ but from a *need to do so*.³⁰ A need which, in her opinion, would lie finally, in the need to "repair

some parts of the infantile ego as well as the damaged internal objects". We can only wonder, once more, at the fact that the author does not notice that, if it is a matter of unconscious "need", the whole question would be to know what happens to the "vocation" in question once this need has become conscious, that is, recognized as fantasmatic: this is why there is analysis.

This remark is important: in order to find one's bearing, it is not enough to shift the emphasis from the being of the analyst to his desire. We must also consider that desire as an addition and not as a first motive which could be determined in advance and which would be the source of some "vocation" or other — a term whose mystifying nature is so obvious, when one knows that anybody and everybody comes to analysis driven, among other things, by the most prosaic personal reasons: to earn money, to pose in society as a *Kennermenschen*³¹, not to be left behind compared with friends etc. Actually, not the least virtue of analysis is to lead the analysand into recognizing openly those motives, instead of enclosing him in his somehow denegatory, idealizing delusions.

American societies, more "realistic", especially the Chicago Institute, initiated a "job analysis"³² of the analytic profession, which recalls in every way Taylor's analyses of the baseball player and the construction worker's jobs. Far from assuring a one hundred per cent reliable "predictability", which is the ideal admitted by all those who deal with the question of the selection, this method, on the contrary, led to "unexpected" complications. Because the selectors' markings rarely agree: hence the problem of "how to select good selectors?" Hence in order to compare the different selectors' marks given to the same candidate, the methods "group interviews"³³ with their protocols whose description I spare the reader: it is enough to point out that to dissipate the traumatic effect these *group interviews* have on candidates, they are followed by an individual interview and we did not notice that such an effect is not surprising when we do not hesitate to use "tricks" to detect the

reactions of the *interviewed*.³⁴

Paula Heiman sees in the very expression of "*job analysis*" obvious allusions to anality.³⁵ A remark, which because of the sallied nature of psychoanalytic terms, asks for a commentary.

To this end, I will recall an episode taken from Peter Goodchild's book, *J. Robert Oppenheimer, Shatterer of Worlds*.³⁶ During World War II, the English received a reliable and very alarming piece of news about the advance of Hitler's Germany in atomic research. So they sent one of their qualified scientists to the United States, to warn Ernest Lawrence who, in the field of experimental physics was, at Barclay University, Oppenheimer's rival in the field of theoretical physics. Alarmed by this news, Lawrence hastened to Washington with his English colleague, to meet the man in charge of the Pentagon Scientific Research, named Conant:

"Conant found himself convinced . . . He turned to Lawrence:" Ernest, you say you are convinced of the importance of the fission bombs. Are you ready to commit the next few years of your life to have them made?" Conant had put his finger on the point. The question took Lawrence by surprise. I still remember the expression in his eyes as he was sitting there, his mouth half open. He had to make a serious personal decision . . . His hesitation only lasted a moment: "If you say it is my *job*, I will do it."

The use of the word "*job*"³⁷ in this context shows that the "anality", mentioned by Paula Heiman, denotes a precipitation of the subject bound to answer by "yes" or "no" in an identification with the Other as the Other of the power as a machine shouting orders; a position which induces in the "subordinate" (or in the student who, because of his very identification, sees

no objection in regarding himself as a student in principle, and not because he chose the master on his own accord)³⁸ a subjective demission inscribed in the institutional reality.

It is not surprising then, to find ourselves confronted with the problem of *the analysis of the "normal" candidate*³⁹ that is precisely the one who does not know what to do with his position as a subject . . . except bargain it.

But the methods of *job analysis* do no more than show with particular evidence that the main vices lie in the current situation of psychoanalysis: in the fact that to become an analyst has become a matter where the major decisions, about preliminary selection or later "stages" (that is how we consider the three sides of analytic training), are the Institute's responsibility.

We can here repeat what Max Weber tells the subject of the university system:

"It would be unfair to impute to the petty characters in the faculties or the government departments, the responsibility of a situation through which so many mediocre people indubitably play a very important role in the universities. We should rather look for the answer in the very laws of the concerted action of men, especially in that of several organizations, in the collaboration between the faculties who propose candidates and the government department which appoints them."⁴⁰

* * *

WITH LACAN

Apparently, the preceding pages put us in front of an insoluble dilemma : on the one hand, psychoanalysis seems rebellious to institutionalization, on the other hand, as the future of analysis is a matter which requires the co-operation of many, without institutionalization, there is no analyst, therefore no psychoanalysis either.

A dilemma which compels us to choose between a revolt which speaks to the point (but without realizing it speaks the truth):

“to talk about a psychoanalytic *society* is a contradiction in terms”, and a compromise described by J.B. Pontalis as follows: “There is no psychoanalytic institute in the world which has not been led to question its selection and training⁴¹ procedures, the modalities of the teaching it offers and what qualifies a ‘candidate’ to practise analysis. There is not one of them who, quite hypocritically, is not complaining about the fact that a Ferenczi, a Tausk would not have the slightest chance of reaching the end of the labourious obstacle course that the training of an analyst has become today. We deplore, here and there, the surrounding conformism; we look for creativity. We wonder : why do the curious-minded people, why do the young researchers who want to ‘learn something new’ (as Freud said of himself) not come to us? And we blame an excess of bureaucracy or an excess of laxity. After all, we cope”⁴²

But, it is precisely because this dilemma imposes such a choice – as if the desire of the analyst were powerless to find an

outlet between the refusal of the *belle ame* and the complicity with the disorder of the world – that it is suspicious, as much as the mistake which consists in changing the relation of the two words between which it is true that the choice is sometimes necessary (analysis and analysts)⁴³ into an opposition which makes them mutually exclusive – in return for which the first available idiot will only have to spit on the analysts to be convinced that it is analysis, itself, that he loves.

In actual fact, he who finds himself locked in this dilemma, forgets to ask a question : is it not possible to invent “a new mode of becoming grouped in an institution” a mode which would escape what Jacques Chevalier calls:

“the process of institutionalization” bound to a repetition he assimilates to the return of the repressed and which implies that the forces of the institution are under pressure to reproduce the same model of institutional power they fight?⁴⁴

This question is precisely Lacan’s, who put it as follows at a meeting held in the days following the “excommunication”⁴⁵ :

“If the society of masters is possible, it must be on the side of the analysts, which implies of course that the desire of the analyst is not as silly as that of the ancient master.”

Although in other respects they correspond to the traditional usage, the statute of the S.P.P. (*Société psychanalytique de Paris*), already written by Jacques Lacan in 1949, comprise a major innovation, which surprisingly enough, nobody noticed, while we remember the public protest raised by a technical innovation (short sessions) of which the least we can say is that it was relying on a theoretical conception far more valid than Ralph Greenson’s very “classical” technique, based on the idea of “therapeutic alliance with the healthy part of the self.”⁴⁶

I refer to the following paragraph : "From now on, the student is put entirely under the wing of his psychoanalyst, who invites him at the appropriate time to attend the theoretical courses and seminars recommended by the Committee, and who is the only one to judge, by authorizing him to undertake an analysis under supervision, when to make him return in comparison with it."

It is possible that the extent of "powers" thus granted to the analyst, creates even today, some sort of fear of abuse. However it is only what F.A. Hayek,⁴⁷ quoting Montesquien, calls a "descriptive rule" (as opposed to a "normative rule"); it only reflects the actual responsibility of the analyst, as Lacan understood it as early as that period. There is here a point which deserves more attention; for as long as the responsibility of the analyst is not clearly defined, it runs the risk of being assimilated to a power, a confusion which leads to the most disastrous consequences in so far as it implies the assimilation of the analytic relation with a social relation, an outstanding area where men exercise their power (whether on the market-place or in social gatherings, in sporting competitions or in scientific discussions and conference rooms, not to mention in charitable or erotic relations).

The responsibility of the analyst rests on a distinction introduced by Lacan in his work on *Les variantes de la cure-type* (1954), between two truths : that of the spoken word and that of the discourse. The spoken word is articulated in a discourse which *means (veut dire)* something and this *means (veut dire)* says enough that it does not say it. More precisely, this *means (veut dire)* has a double meaning and

"it depends on the listener that it is one or the other : either what the speaker wants to tell him through his discourse, or what

this discourse teaches him about the condition of the speaker".

That is how it is permissible for the listener to consider as a liar the one who, however, holds a true discourse : "Why are you telling me that you are going to Cracow . . . , etc?" (*Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*). In other words, the answer to the question : who is speaking? depends on the listener. And that is where the responsibility of the analyst resides : it is him, really, who as listener or hearer finds the subject who talks to him.

Until now, we have only dealt with a rather simple distinction which tends to make us aware of the subject who speaks as the one to whom we impute good or bad faith. (It is quite interesting to note that we find in a language like Arabic a rather close distinction between the truth of the spoken word and that of the thing or the being in general : to say that God is true, one does not use the word which is used when one wants to attribute the truth to one's spoken word). This very simple distinction was necessary to avoid the damages of objectivation into which psychoanalytic practice has slipped and to establish a healthy practice such as shown in Theodor Reik's book *Ecouter avec la troisième oreille*, especially in the chapter called "Who am I?"

But Lacan, as we know, went further. In *La Chose freudienne*,⁴⁸ he turns the truth not into an attribute of the spoken word, in opposition to the truth of the discourse, but into the very thing which speaks or more precisely, signifies itself in the spoken word : the Thing appears, in the discourse where it is articulated as an incongruity, a lie, a sophism, a pretence, a grotesque pun, etc. . . . At the same time, we discover that not only the truth falls on the subject's side — that was already clear with the first distinction — but also that the spoken word is itself liable to trial — and that is where the responsibility of the analysand is found, not from the adequacy to the Thing traditionally used to define the truth, but from an adequacy to the truth itself, to the *Freudian Thing* or to the *symbolic debt*.

Compared with this Freudian Thing, the responsibility of the analyst could not be found anywhere else, according to Lacan, but in his ability to ignore, to ignore what he knows or what he managed to know. Lacan has already emphasized this point in *Les Variantes de la cure* type. But, as the required adequacy to the horizon of the spoken word has appeared, in this work, as an adequacy to the being for death, correlative of the disintegration of the ideal of mastership induced by the specular image, the duty not to ignore – ignorance has no need to be erected in a duty – but to be able to ignore, was simply based on the denunciation of the intimate link between knowledge and power.

Lacan's next work, *Situation de la psychanalyse en 1956*, shows mainly that the *méconnaissance*⁴⁹ of the dimension of the truth which "speaks" or, of the *Dritte Person* (third person), resulted in that the relation between analysts could not be organized otherwise than in the form of a social relation, based on power, or which only acknowledges one grade: between the strongest and the weakest, superiors and inferiors, masters and apprentices, etc.

If it took about ten years (proposal of 1967) to put forward the idea of substituting hierarchy by grades – which is supposed to realize itself in the course of a didactic analysis – leading from the subjective position of the analysand to the position of analyst, it is probably because of the necessity of restructuring the concept of transference which pulls it away from the centring where it was bogged around the *person* of the analyst with the ontological perspective which the idea of the person drained behind it. Another reason, no less important, is that, in between, another institutional experience, that of the S.F.P. (*Société française de psychanalyse*) was created and we were awaiting its promises.

In fact, the S.F.P. did not make many changes. Aspiring to reintegrate the International Association, it "was still living" as I. Roubleff noted in a conference held at the Freudian School

of Paris, "on the model of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, with its board of directors, its study committee, its didactic analysts, its full, associate, corresponding, trainee and guest members". The only positive point to its credit was the suppression of the scholastic and academic patterns which the Paris Institute, like the other Institutes affiliated to the International Association wanted to impose upon the theoretical teaching of psychoanalysis.

Those methods produced the most sterilizing effects ever. It was proved, at the same time as two different conceptions of teaching were opposed regarding the foundation of the Paris Institute, when a report called "Current conditions of the organization of Psychoanalysis in the United States" was published, and gave the statements made in December 1952, by Dr. F.P. Knight in his presidential address to the American Psychoanalytic Association.⁵⁰ Knight points out, among the factors tending "to alter the role of analytic training", besides the increasing number of candidates in training, "the more structured form of teaching" in the institutes which offer it, opposing it to "the earlier preceptorship type of training". A diagnosis which Lacan, who takes this report into account in *Variantes de la cure* type, comments as follows:

"We see well enough, in this rather public speech, how serious the disease is and how little perhaps not at all, it is understood. The remedy is not that the institutes should be less structured, but that a predigested knowledge should not be taught there, even if it summarizes the data of analytic experience."⁵¹

In fact, Knight is not entirely wrong: he is sure that a teaching linked to the *curriculum* is mainly used, as it has been said over and over again since, to leave one's professional mark. It remains that Lacan is also right when he declares, with the metaphor of "predigested knowledge", that a teaching which

meets the demands to learn, in the meaning of acquiring a common knowledge is a teaching which deceives ignorance instead of using it (according to Lacan's previous words) as a frame around which knowledge (*le savoir*) is arranged: this is what we are doing when we try for example, to reduce the data of a problem to an equation which will enable us to find the unknown. Teaching without questioning allows the progress of accumulation. However, the efficiency of teaching according to Lacan's conception is only measured by the efforts of the re-starting that this teaching creates elsewhere. We are looking here at an idea which will later be the main idea of the *Foundation Act* of the Freudian School of Paris⁵²: that of the *transference of work*, an idea itself inseparable from the idea of the *cartel*, as the latter represents not only the proper place for this transference or this restart, but also the standard unit for an original mode of social organization.

About this original plan of the *cartel*, we have at our disposal, fortunately, a priceless document; I refer here to the discussion in Issue 18 of *Lettres de l'Ecole freudienne*, was continued for the *Journées de cartels*, in April 1975. This discussion published in Issue 18 of *Lettres de l'Ecole freudienne*, was continued for three half-days; on Saturday afternoon April 12, 1978, on Sunday April 13, in the morning and the afternoon.

On Sunday morning April 13, Lacan, bringing out an introductory remark by David Nasio, said:

"We have nevertheless suggested that this person (the Plus One), who is in a way the echo of the group, exists in any functioning of a group except that nobody is aware of it and it would be advisable for the analysts not to disregard it, because it appears clearly that all this starts very early. *Tres fasciunt ecclesiam*, says the wisdom of nations, and that goes far; why is there this arising of three?"

That is the question.

Let us suppose two subjects. Either they kill each other and for that, do not need the spoken word; or they reach an agreement, which could not do without a spoken word in which their action expresses *itself* and decides *itself*, as well as the rule of this action. But it is clear that in order to carry out this spoken word, a true third word, neither of them has at his disposal only his own voice; as it is clear that this voice could not be sufficient to grant him the necessary power so that it is accepted with one accord. That is why he who enunciates this word, even if he does no more than enunciate a "universal" law, that is to which he submits himself (for example: Honour thy Father and Mother), could establish it as the object of an agreement, only on condition of presenting it, and I shall say *presenting* it for lack of *recognizing* it, as a spoken word received from elsewhere. So the figure of the Other of the Other takes shape and the powers of enunciation are in a way handed over to it: he is The One who speaks. The demands, addressed to him are different from the common demands, those we address to others who are real, in the fact that we call them *prayers*.

The Other of the Other or The One who speaks, constitutes the root or the manifested or more precisely, *revealed* source of Authority.

Revealed by whom? By someone who isolates himself from the group and "who is in a way the echo of the group", that is, the *leader*, whose force lies, we know it, in that he serves for those who follow him that is the rest of the group, their own pre-judgments; he is in a way the incarnation of the latter. That is how the social order is a fundamentally paranoid order: it is, all things considered, based on this law of the spoken word, where we can indeed drive out the hidden source of authority, namely the law by which it is from the receiver that the sender receives his own message in an inverted form. The leader or the "mis-leader" (*le "me-chef"*) as Lacan liked to call him, represents the manifest, incarnate form of the *plus one*.

Does it mean that it is possible, as the quoted passage from Lacan suggests it, that this "plus one person" takes another more discreet shape, if not absent, than the one we have just denounced? It is the very question of how to find out whether the analysts are in a position to produce a new mode of establishing themselves; except that this time the question is asked in such a way that it includes its own answer.

Indeed, if we remember that the law by which the sender receives from the receiver his own message in an inverted form, applies not only to the spoken word in its empty face but also to the authentic spoken word which includes in itself its answer or which proceeds from "a transference of work", we will easily admit with Lacan that its place cannot be a crowd. In a group which meets rather precise numerical conditions, I mean which consists of four persons at least and six at the most, there is always a person who isolates himself as echo of the group, but this time, to the effect that this person assumes the function of the spoken word in so far as this spoken word finds in the listener, the answer it includes; and, contrary to the leader whose presence is obvious, the "plus one person" isolates himself in a way which, most of the time, passes unnoticed.

There is no need to look very far for an example. Lacan's remark which we have quoted starts as follows: "We have nevertheless suggested . . ." In fact, it is he, himself, who made this suggestion during the previous discussion on the Saturday afternoon. However the use of "we" is perfectly justified: because he only made it when it was, so to speak, "in the air". So we can say that during this very discussion, Lacan played the *plus one*, without anyone noticing it then. He was turning what he was saying into an act and at the very moment that he was saying it. Lacan was indeed our man for that type of "artifice"⁵³ when Lacan says that the *duty* of the analysts is to pay attention to this *plus one*, whose presence usually passes unnoticed, he means that the *cartel* represents for him the fighting unit against the psychology of the group, eager for *leadership*.⁵⁴

This battle was lost; I shall mention it later. At the moment, I would like to focus on two consequences drawn from what precedes: *the first one* is that the idea of a department of *cartels* whose *plus ones* are appointed in advance, is strictly speaking a misinterpretation, since precisely, one has to be able to spot the *plus one* in an act. *The second one* is that the idea of a *cartel* is the consequence, at an organizational level, of a conception of the teaching of psychoanalysis based, for the same reason as the conception of analysis itself, on the principle of the founding function of the spoken word.

Another important innovation of the *Foundation Act (Acte de Fondation)* is that the School is not limited to the training of analysts. This training is the task of the first section, called *Pure Psychoanalysis, (Psychanalyse pure)* the only one which requires a didactic qualification.

It implies that the School will not be constituted by analysts alone. That is how within the *Section of Applied Psychoanalysis (Section de Psychanalyse appliquée)* "which means of therapeutic and clinical/medical", will be admitted:

"medical groups composed or not of psychoanalysed subjects, as long as they are able to contribute to the psychoanalytic experience; by the criticism of his indications [the psychoanalyst's] in his results — by the testing of the categorical terms and structures I have introduced there, as supporting the straight line of Freudian experience — all this in clinical examination, in nosographic definitions, in the very position of the therapeutic projects."

Likewise, in the *Section for the Census of the Freudian Field, (Section de recensement du champ freudien)* all those will be admitted who can contribute to the realization of its objective, which is "to bring up to date the principles of which analytic praxis must receive its status in science".

All this is summarized in this sentence from the *Adjoining Note*, regarding the *Candidature to the School*: "The candidature to a school is one thing, another is the qualification of a didactic analysis." In fact, many psychoanalytic institutes, especially in the United States, realize today the necessity for such an opening, in order to achieve what they call "the double objective, professional and scientific, of the psychoanalytic institute".

But, it is particularly in the domain of the didactic analysis that the *Foundation Act* "holds simple habits for nought" — That is, some rules simply based on what is done and what is not done.

So, a psychoanalyst will be regarded as a didactic analyst "for having done one or more psychoanalyses which were actually didactic". Lacan adds: "It is an actual habilitation, which in fact has always happened like that and which depends on nothing more than a directory ratifying facts, without even having to be exhaustive".

I omit the procedure of selection.

"The only certain principle to put down, unites Lacan, in the *Adjoining Note*,⁵⁵ and especially since it has been misunderstood,⁵⁶ is that psychoanalysis appears as didactic through the will of the subject and that he must be warned by the analyst to whom he directs his demand for a didactic analysis that the analysis will dispute this will, in proportion to the approach of the desire it conceals."

On the contrary, I find it very important to emphasize title 4 of the *Adjoining Note*: *On Didactic Psychoanalysis in the Participation of the School (De la psychoanalyse didactique dans la participation à l'Ecole)*. Indeed, under this title, Jacques Lacan,

while articulating, although in different terms, the principle by which the analyst authorizes himself, draws the inferences which this act of authorizing oneself implies for the School.

"Because the School, he writes, at whatever time that the subject starts an analysis, has to weigh this fact against the responsibility of its consequence which it cannot refuse."

"It is invariably that psychoanalysis has effects on all practice of the subject who undergoes it. When this practice proceeds, however little it may be, from psychoanalytic effects, he happens to generate them in the place where he has to recognize them."

"It is impossible not to see that supervision is imperative as soon as these effects appear and first of all, in order to protect the person who comes there as a patient from them."

In other words, Jacques Lacan, not only subscribes to the practice of supervision accepted by every institute, but also, by refining his reason in a proper way, he draws the necessary inferences refused by the analytic institutes.

I refer here to a question formulated at the first conference held in Shasbourg in 1969, as follows: Is the practice of the so-called psychotherapy of psychoanalytic inspiration a part of the training of the analyst or not? A question which arises because the institutes of the International Association ask their candidates to agree not to practise analysis before the Institute authorizes them. So, the aforesaid candidates, who otherwise often have therapeutic responsibilities which nobody denies, are entrenched in what they call "psychotherapy of psychoanalytic

inspiration" — as if they were not dealing with a therapy which proceeds from psychoanalytic effects. Consequently, the subject is led to fail in his function.

"The School, concludes Lacan, could not withdraw from this disastrous state of things, because of the very work it is made to guarantee.

That is why it will provide the supervision suitable for each situation, by facing a reality, which the agreement of the analyst is part of.

On the contrary, an insufficient solution could motivate a breach of contract."

You may have noticed that, among all this innovative effort Lacan constantly applies two closely interdependent principles

- 1) not to deviate from the "descriptive" rules in favour of the "normative" rules
- 2) not to give anything for a law, except what can be proven.

Those two principles are summarized in this sentence which appears in the *Proposition of October 9, 1967*: "we establish only in the functioning".

In actual fact, as Jean Clavreul reminded me, it was to solve a particular institutional problem, which cropped up during the functioning of the E.F.P.: how to deal with the question of the access to the title of "*Analyste de l'Ecole*" (AE) (Analyst of the School)?, which Lacan introduced in the *Proposition of October 9, 1967*.⁵⁷

The *Proposition of October 9, 1967* is a unique work in psychoanalytic literature. Much has been written about, either the termination of analyses, didactic analysis or the psychic

analytic institution. There are even many publications which deal at the same time with the last two topics, but regard them as two independent questions: on the one hand, we have the institutions with their current structure and on the other hand, the didactic analyses which take place within the limits of those institutions; we recall in that case the warpings to which the didactic analyses are submitted, because they are taking place within those limits; sometimes we suggest a few reforms. But, what gives the *Proposition* its originality is that it does not only ask the question of the end of the didactic analysis but also proclaims an institutional structure: the experience of the *passee*,⁵⁸ centred around this question. It is not exaggerated to say that his question of the end of analysis as resumption of the experience of the analyst at the level of the experience of the other, must, according to the *Proposition*, regulate the whole activity of the institution.

In order to avoid any confusion, it is useful to recall that the *termination* of analysis to which I have just referred as to one of the questions often discussed in psychoanalytic literature is one thing and that the question of the aim of analysis is another thing.

By *termination of analysis*, we mean the conditions under which analyses really come to an end or under which we can regard an analysis as over, as well as the arrangements for this termination. It is in short a question of "analytic technique", which is effectively found in the many text-books that we know on the topic. But no more than Freud who, on this matter, just made a few negative statements about what should be avoided, and no more than Ferenczi who, in order to express something more positive, could not do better than blame the *tact* of the analyst, we could not say that Lacan has written a text-book about analytic technique. If he has devoted a whole seminar to his question, it is in order to set up the basic concepts which ensure a correct work with the unconscious. It would not even be exaggerated to say that, from Lacan's point of view, to write about technique, in the meaning of a codification of rules,

would only be a way to avoid the question of the psychoanalytic act by taking refuge in "the making" ("*le faire*").

In actual fact, *the* psychoanalytic technique does not exist; and the contradictions between different authors are the best proof: so and so estimates that it is better to have less frequent sessions in order to prepare for the final "weaning"; so and so estimates on the contrary that it is better to maintain the same frequency, if not to increase it to follow very closely the depressive reactions which might appear in view of this cessation. The best advice on that matter is that of Ella Sharpe, who says that psychoanalytic technique is never *learnt*.⁵⁹ The best "technician", shall we say, is the one who remains available in the face of what he is dealing with, always the particular, without adopting any analyst's ideal and who learns something new every day. Nobody will pretend that didactic analyses are so called because, through them, the analysand learns to carry out analyses. The fact is that during his analysis, the analysand learns nothing of that kind. At the most, from what we have heard, he learns to listen. There is no school for the analytic technique as there is none for eroticism. If supervised analyses are necessary, it is not because they teach the analyst how to carry out an analysis (a fairly widespread conception which only confirms the illusion that quite often, really motivates the requests for supervision), but because he learns to learn. Besides, those who had the opportunity to supervise analyses readily admit that, from what the analyst in supervision tells them, they learn more than him — so that we can say they are more "experienced". The "experienced" analyst is the one, who according to a Lacanian formula "is not without his not-science (*ne-science*)".

The *termination* of analysis has therefore nothing to do with the question of *the aim of the didactic analysis*, as Ferenczi questions it and says: the end of analysis is the analysis of character beyond the pregnancy of symptoms. Freud also raises the question of the end of analysis in the improperly translated article "Analysis Terminable and Interminable". We

now his answer: the analysis moves towards a point, a rock, namely the castration complex a point where the efficiency of his efforts of Freud/analyst aim and from where the analysis runs the risk of extending to a kind of indeterminable analysis, and for all that without crossing that point.

In the *Proposition*, Lacan asks the same question of the aim, except that he closely relates it — as Freud could have done but did not, probably on purpose — to the question of the psychoanalytic institution. Because the question of the didactic analysis is posed in these terms: how can the experience of this analysis create the desire to repeat it with someone else, or to make again the translation of the unconscious at the level of the unconscious of other subjects? A question which can be asked in different ways, but the consequence is the same, regarding the psychoanalytic institution.

Psychoanalytic institutes, as we have seen were born to train analysts. Once granted that a personal experience of analysis was required for anyone intending to practise analysis, it was indeed necessary that there were didactic analysts at the start, without wondering or even having to wonder where the didactic analyst came from: in what does the analysis he undergoes for his own sake prepare him to become an analyst in his turn? This question came up after some time. If it has not been asked, despite the consequent darkness regarding the matter (the becoming of an analyst), it was of course because of the prestige attached straight away to the status of the didactic analyst.

By asking this question himself, Lacan reverses the relations: an institution is not an analytic institution because it includes among its members didactic analysts who carry out didactic analyses, but because didactic analyses are *in actual fact* taking place there; and it is precisely the essential task of the institution to clarify the question of the *aim* of these analyses.

An *essential task*, first because without it, we would not know where psychoanalysis stands compared with the order of science; secondly because, by realizing that the institutional

structures in use were misleading the *training*,⁶⁰ there was no other remedy but to replace those hierarchical structures by another one, which would allow a functioning, centred precisely around the elucidation of what is supposed to happen during a didactic analysis as a passage from the analysand to the analyst.

We admit that such a project could not fail to have some repercussions, which go as far as upsetting the meaning given to the demand for a didactic analysis. It is in this way that the required agreement not to call himself an analyst nor to practise analysis without the authorization of the institution is substituted by the principle by which "the analyst only authorizes himself".

It would be superfluous to dwell on the virulent criticisms and real cries of alarm which greeted this principle. Let us only say that they were based on a misunderstanding; they were summarized in this objection: "and so, why, then the institution?" as if it were a matter of a formula saying everything about the becoming of an analyst, whereas it was a matter, as I have just said, of the meaning given to the project of the one who wants to become an analyst. In other words, it is a matter of *institutionalizing the autonomy* into an initiative, a principle which is already for the one who takes this initiative, if he wants to take part in the common work, an appeal to have the institution, the School in that case, attest that "the psychoanalyst (himself) brings into this initiative a sufficient guarantee of training". To such an extent that Lacan goes as far as saying that the title of A.M.E. (*Analyste Membre de l'Ecole*) (Analyst Member of the School) does not have to be requested in order to be granted. And besides, we note that the granting of this title represents only for the School a *testimony*; the *guarantee* is brought by the person concerned. Let us also note that the School can give this testimony without knowing anything about the didactic analysis or "personal" analysis from which the subject authorizes himself to practise analysis.

Does it mean that the School is not interested in the question,

asked by Bernfeld, in a way to which death conferred in retrospect pathetic accents: What is the didactic analysis? Of course not. The only question is to know from whom to obtain the required explanation. From the didactic analysts? Without insisting on the actual outcome of "the consultation of auguries", such an answer disregards the fact admitted by many expert analysts, that the value and effects of an analysis are judged only by what happens afterwards. One is therefore compelled to turn to anyone, who, judging that he has conducted or has let his didactic analysis be conducted to its end, would like to give testimony about it.

The answer to which question, are we looking for, through his testimony?

It is generally accepted that, in order to practise analysis, one must go through the experience of the didactic analysis. But this affirmation, to which Lacan subscribes, implies that the didactic analysis includes a passage such that the one who at the start was the analysand, becomes the analyst; a passage defined by the fact that a desire appears there: the desire to retake at the level of someone else's unconscious, the experience carried out on one's own unconscious. It is the answer to the question: "What is this desire?" that we are looking for.

Here, we could not lay enough stress on the fact that we do not expect the answer to be *said*; and the one who becomes an analyst is the first one to know it: since his analysis is supposed to have led him not only to come in close contact with the reality of the unconscious, but also to assume his division as a subject to the highest degree. We could not consider the desire of the analyst than otherwise, as *a new formation of the unconscious*; it is even the most authentic meaning of "the formation" of the analyst, a meaning whose *méconnaissance*⁶¹ has totally misled the common conceptions of the relation between psychoanalysis "in intention" and psychoanalysis "in extension". It remains that what cannot be *said* can indeed, if it exists, *signify itself*. This is how we can learn that the desire of such

and such an analyst is, deep down, a desire to make sure that the ambiguities of an alliance imposed upon him by the constellation which presided over his birth, with any religious or social values (maternity, mother-country, love of neighbour, or even the earth), are lifted. This does not mean that any identification should be challenged, which opens the door to all treacheries; but that it should not obnubilate critical judgment.

It is obvious that to stress the desire of the analyst, implies a well defined conception of analysis or, more precisely, of those two moments when the organs of an analytic institution are bound to intervene : its beginning and its end.

Everyone says that transference is the start of analysis. However, transference, the "real of analysis" which maintains in their current success or failure the societies and institutes affiliated to the I.P.A., leads to its own *méconnaissance*⁶², even its systematic negation. It is therefore transference that we must first question.

This is where the tireless criticism which Jacques Lacan has always uttered against the notion of *counter-transference* stands: a way, in his mind, to ask, without asking, the question of the desire of the analyst. This criticism, today more than ever, keeps its value. Because the abundant literature written on counter-transference towards the end of the 40's and all through the 50's (Paula Heiman, Money-Kyrle, Marguerite Little, Lucy Tower, Greenacre etc. . . .) has emerged, during the 60's, on the theory of Racker — who is not afraid to state, with the courage, of someone who believes he is doing his honest duty, that the analyst is submitted to the same difficulties as his patients: he is also immature, neurotic, bogged in his Oedipus, etc.⁶³ As this objection does not escape him: "how then would he be the analyst?", in order to give the latter a "*raison d'être*", he looks again for differences and this time in the register of the being. But as the being could not accept any differences unless it is surreptitiously brought back to an order of perfection, the analyst becomes an adult again, helpful, passionate about truth and *last but not least*⁶⁴, a knowledgeable man. A conception, needless to

say, diametrically opposite to Jacques Lacan's when he attributes the start of transference to the fiction of the *supposed-subject-of-knowledge*, with all that this start already implies of "constituent downfall" about the position of the analyst: since the latter could not pretend "without being dishonest" to be this *supposed-subject-of-knowledge* let us add: without blocking transference precisely.

For after all, this fiction of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge could not suit another (be it the analyst, the doctor or anyone of those characters whose function and ascendant lie, last of all, on what is called in Church vocabulary "the charisma of the word") but for as much as in the other, the Other *desires*. Let us consider here the panic which sometimes strikes a pregnant woman in the face of the oracle in which her own mother does nothing really but signify her own desire: "it will be a boy". The subject is left in this interrogation: *che vuoi?*⁶⁵ If the Other deviates from the silence where the only possible answer to the question is signified: "let yourself be"⁶⁶ to act as if he knew, by being prodigal with advice, assurance, suggestions and counter-suggestions, not to speak about edifying explanations, at the same time he frustrates the subject of this desire which has to appear as an "x": since the subject could not otherwise elaborate his interrogation on the question of his desire; the Other refuses him the *discretion*, indeed distressing (since the subject is about to be lost), but essential, however, so that his already formulated desire could be recognized there. So it is not surprising that some subjects who come to us once they have interrupted their analysis (negative transference) with an analyst too "interventionist", put all their efforts in deceiving us and sometimes in going as far as pretending to be psychotic — "a way to make sure that the costume (of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge) does not fit the analyst", writes Lacan. This is also why, except when the credit of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge is granted to the analyst beforehand, transference effectively starts only in the wake of an interpretation which simply restitutes to the subject what he represses in the very

signifier where this repressed surfaces through his mouth, stimulating then what Lacan calls in *Acte psychanalytique* (1967-1968 seminar): the *poiesis* of the subject, the production by him of a new signifier.

Such is, in brief, Lacan's conception of the extent of transference. Now what of his conception of the *end* of analysis?

I will recall it quickly by saying that, out of the existing conceptions (those of Ferenczi, Balint, Melanie Klein, Hoffer, Strachey and many others), it is the only one which reaches the same *conclusion* as Freud's, with that exception, not negligible, that far from emerging as the "rock" the analysis breaks on, the complex of castration (symbolized by $-\varphi$ is resolved, according to Lacan, at the very moment of its interpretation.⁶⁷

An understandable difference, because Freud thought of this complex in the register of the having (*l'avoir*) (which is the appropriate register of the imaginary) and not in the register of the being (*l'être*) in so far as it is defined in the signifier, as Lacan teaches it. It is with castration as with the fiction of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge where the imaginary character is discovered only once its symbolic root as effect of the signifying relation has been spotted.

Another difference, no less important, between Freud and Lacan, in regarding the conclusion of analysis, results from the progress that the Lacanian conception represents regarding the extent of transference, as we have just seen it. According to Freud, transference comes from the need to be loved, a need the subject tries to satisfy . . . by loving, by becoming himself the lover — in return for which it appears that to love and to be loved is the same thing. Lacan admits all this and even develops it in many well-known formulae. It concerns the narcissistic nature of love, hence of transference love, but it does not concern its extent. Once this extent has been clarified by Lacan, we can conceive that the analysis comes to an end with "the elimination of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge". This elimination has absolutely nothing to do with what is commonly described as "liquidation of transference" — an expression which has no

other function, according to Lacan, but to conceal the desire of the analyst. And in actual fact, we cannot see how the end of analysis should put an end to any feeling towards the *person* of the analyst. Who is this person who could be grasped otherwise than through feelings, when "to have no feeling" towards someone still expresses one of the most virulent feelings? Do we ask the analysts to depart from their "human condition"? The end of analysis concerns the relation of the analysand not to the person of his analyst, but to analysis. It is, if I may say so, the time when the algorithm of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge, gives away his secret of also being the algorithm of what Lacan calls "the ternary constituent of analytic function" or even of the object which blocks the gap of $-\varphi$: that is the object (a) of which it now appears that the analyst was only the rubbish dump. This is how the analyst is being struck, through the grace of the analysand, with an "un-being" (*dés-être*), while the analysand, himself, receives from it a "subjective destitution" already implicit in the "first fundamental rule".

Let us now come back to the question of the *passe*, in the meaning of a testimony regarding didactic analysis and of what we can learn from it.

Lacan sometimes uses such formulae as: "What is this madness which drives someone who knows what the situation of the analyst is like at the end of analysis, to practise analysis?" In my opinion, these formulae are excessive, I mean deliberately exaggerated, probably to make one understand the situation. For after all, Lacan himself maintains that what the subject realizes during his analysis as a "peaceful" conquest over his unconscious, is of "an unequalled price", should the result of this conquest be something other than the happiness undoubtedly dreamt of at the start, or should it result indeed in "an aggravation of the natural difficulties between sexes", as Lacan said during one of the last meetings of the jury of assent (*Jury d'agrément*), to the astonishment of some of its members. As for me, I would not advise anyone to hold Lacan's opinion on

this matter, for an immediate truth nor for something certain. I only want to say this: what has an unequalled price for the analysand, has exactly the same price for the analyst — which is understandable if it is true that the translation of one's own unconscious can always be taken up again with that of the unconscious of an other. It is therefore possible that a desire to practise analysis could arise *from a didactic analysis* and not, as some of Lacan's formulae suggest, despite it. For when the desire to practise analysis has appeared, the analysand is surely not without a presentiment of this identity of price.

We have seen under which condition the desire of the analyst works: on condition that it only appears as an "x". The question then becomes: what is the desire which drives the one who has become an analyst to act like this with his desire — a desire without which he could not realize the famous "apathy" of the analyst, that is, to overcome other desires, as the desire to come to the point with the analysand, to throw him out of the window, for example, or to hold him in his arms?⁶⁸

We shall never stress enough, along with J. Clavreul, that the didactic analysis does not have a "first *passe*" which could again put the answer to this question at the disposal of the analysand, who then would only have to take it into account (why? to test its validity!) during the "second *passe*" in the sense of a testimony about the first. Let us say again that the analyst could no more than anyone else articulate his desire, but what has not been articulated is no less signified. I have already given an example. Here is another one: why the desire to practise analysis could not be, deep down, in such and such an analyst, an anxiety (legitimate enough to object otherwise to the truth out of hatred for the mouth which utters it.⁶⁹

We see, in the light of those examples, how much interest for the structuring or the restructuring of analytic doctrine, is linked to the collecting of testimonies from the *passants*,⁷⁰ to their accumulation and their comparison.

Let us go further. Diane Chauvelot⁷¹ showed that Freud and

Ferenczi's trip to Sicily was, strictly speaking, a *passe*: the first one, Freud's, with a companion badly prepared for the function of *passeur* where he was put without knowing what was being done. She saw in that episode the indication of a "necessity for the *passe*." I will readily agree with her, if it implies the fact, which can be observed even outside of the ex-E.F.P., that some analysts do feel, at the end of their analysis, the desire "to talk about it to someone else other than their analyst". There is hardly any doubt that the psychoanalytic institutes which provide nothing to follow up such a desire, operate in the direction of repression, as is shown by the following fact. Some analysands go on with their analysis in an extremely "brilliant" manner as if they were constantly going from one discovery to another, from one surprise to another; but, one sentence comes back from time to time as a *leit-motiv*: "I could never talk about my analysis!" Which simply means, and it does not take long to realize it, that, despite appearances, we are dealing with analyses where repression works continually and recovers every conquest.

But can we go so far as to agree that this "necessity for the *passe*" is such, that any one who finishes a didactic analysis, feels the desire to give testimony on what it was like? I would be all the more cautious of the answer, as the experience of the *passe*, as it took place in the E.F.P., did not keep its promises. It is to the question which crops up from this failure, as from the failure of the School as a whole, that we now have to answer.

Lacan has always paid attention to institutions. His first major known work deals precisely with that institution known from time immemorial: the family. In this piece of work, the distinction between the different registers of fatherhood (symbolic, imaginary and real) without being explicitly articulated, is however as present as could be, be it only in the distinction, explicitly introduced itself, between the normative function of the father and his natural function, or else in the criticism aimed at Bachofen's theories on matriarchy. Again in the last

pages of the *Proposition*, Lacan shows that the inner circle he draws "as a gap of psychoanalysis in intention "is tied", according to the topology of the projective plan . . . to the horizon of psychoanalysis in extension. "An horizon he designs with three points of perspective in flight", remarkable for each belonging to one of the registers whose collusion in heteropy constitutes our experience". Those pages, not only testify to an extraordinary interest in sociological matters, but they are also in themselves a model of sociological study for which they give a method.

This method consists in breaking the reality represented by the I.P.A. into three dimensions, corresponding to the three registers.

In the symbolic, we have the myth of Oedipus, whose "ectopic" application to an experience whose Oedipus is however the core, amounts to reducing it to the position of an ideology. An ideology which indeed contributed a great deal in a way to exempt sociology from taking sides for a century as it had to do before, on the value of the family, the existing family, the *petite-bourgeoise* family in civilization — "namely in the society conveyed by science". Lacan's remark is not invalidated by the fact that, in a relatively recent collective work about the family and its future,⁷² there is not a single psychoanalytic study nor even a reference to psychoanalysis. "Do we benefit or not, questions Lacan, from what, we cover there without knowing?"

The second "facticity", that of the imaginary is obvious in the structure which the psychoanalytic societies share with the Church and the Army. The favour that the imaginary identifications receive from it, explains at the same time "the reason which binds psychoanalysis in extension to limit (to the imaginary identifications) its consideration, even its range." "This tendency, as we say, is responsible for the relegation to the previously defined point of horizon of what can be qualified as Oedipal in the experience." As for the out coming benefit, it is

the same one which the subject finds in the function of the Ideal Father.⁷³

The third "facticity" is to be spotted, according to "the Lacanian verdict", in what, cut off from the symbolic, surfaces in the real: the real of concentration camps, where Lacan sees the first manifestation of "what will go on developing as a consequence of the alteration of human groupings by science and namely of the universalization it introduces there."⁷⁴

Shall we impute to Freud, Lacan questions again, to have wanted, in his introduction to the creation of the secular model of this process to ensure for his group the privilege of universal buoyancy from which the two above-named institutions benefited? It is not unthinkable.⁷⁵

"In any case, this recourse does not make it easier for the desire of the analyst to locate itself in this conjuncture". Unless we reduce this desire to the simple desire to last or to "adjust" to the test of time: "let us recall, Lacan goes on, that if the I.P.A. of Mitteleuropa has proved its preadjustment to this test without losing one of its members among the aforesaid camps, it owed it to this feat of strength to see the occurrence, after the war, of a rush, which had its understudy candidates heading off (one hundred mediocre psychoanalysts, remember!) in whose minds the motive to take shelter against the red tide, fantasy of that time, was not absent."

In short, Lacan knew what he was talking about when talking about psychoanalytic societies and its therefore in our interests to bring out the concepts underlying what he submits as a solution to their problems. What do we find?

We find first the declaration of a principle to which is submitted the institutional or instituting act itself a principle expressed as follows: "we establish ourselves in the functioning". In actual fact, it is from the faults found in the functioning of psychoanalytic societies that, in order to counteract it, the new act, the *Foundation Act*, is produced.

The application of this general principle to domains which interest psychoanalytic societies, leads to the principle by which "the analyst authorizes himself", a principle which upsets from top to bottom the meaning of the relation between the School and those of its members intending to become analysts. It is no longer a relation between candidates and didactic analysts (an ill-founded relation, since the didactic analysis and at the same time, the status of the didactic analyst are not defined yet), but a relation of testimony, which works two ways: either from the School to the analyst, the former attesting that the latter brings into his training enough guarantees, or from the analyst to the School, in case the former, of his own accord, wishes to tell the latter about what his analysis has been for him.

All this seems to be simple common sense and if a question crops up, it is rather to know why it has not been asked before. The question is really this: why were we not determined to recognize in the desire of the analyst the axis around which the analysis revolves? But, the end of any analysis is precisely to answer the question of the desire. Shall we come to the conclusion that the structure of the present societies is meant to protect right through analysts from analysis? We shall be all the less surprised since we have seen with Bernfeld which *acting-out*⁷⁶ constituted the institutionalization of psychoanalysis, in Berlin in 1920. The multifarious resistances — I shall come back to them later — to Lacan's *Proposition* will not surprise us either.

The same conclusion is drawn from the examination of Lacan's innovations regarding the other side of the training of the analyst: the theoretical teaching.

We know the opinion he expressed on the matter in 1953: the important thing is that no predigested knowledge is taught there, that is (this metaphor has no other meaning) a teaching which gives those who receive it what they themselves know or believe to know, in other words a common knowledge. But a teaching which serves a predigested knowledge in that sense, is in perfect harmony with hierarchical structures, since "the

authority of the office" (*L'autorité de l'office*) that these structures put forward lies, last of all, we have seen it, on the function of the word in so far as the subject receives from the Other his own message in an inverted form and this, much as this formula applies to the word at its most worn-out level or in a word, to the empty word. In so far as the same formula applies also to the full word, the one which includes its own answer, another function appears, that of the *plus one person*, at which level authority practically becomes synonymous with the efficiency of the psychoanalytic act. Hence the organization of work on the basis of *cartels* whose members have to recognize his *plus one*.

Lacan's innovations, considered as a whole, were not intending to satisfy some vain curiosity, as it has been hinted, but to allow us to find if not a definition, at least a few explanations about the desire of the analyst, in the essential function which is his in any analysis. There is hardly any doubt that, if this result had been achieved, it would have allowed consideration of other institutional structures based on what we could have learnt according to the principle "to establish ourselves in the functioning". It would have been, if I may say so, the "happy" case of the application of this principle. This case, alas! did not eventuate, but failure did. Why?

I shall start from this remark: if the failure of the School is the failure of the *Passe*, it does not mean that this last failure is the *cause* of the first. For the *passe* itself took place within the limits of the functioning of the School and it would have been strange if it had not suffered from this functioning. Here is an example, if not a proof.

In a letter to the newspaper *Le Monde*, Lacan wonders whom, among the members of his jury of assent (*Jury d'agrément*), he would have advised to take upon themselves the *Passe*. So there had been a mistake in their choice. We cannot be surprised when the rules of the School entrusted this choice to elections, to *vox populi*?

Let us go further would the recourse to another mode of choice, for example, the drawing of lots or else a direct appointment by Lacan, have prevented this failure? It is certain that if such a modification had been an infallible remedy, Lacan would have adopted it without hesitation. Although he certainly had his own reasons, which I shall examine later, the failure of the *passé* cannot be dissociated from the functioning of the school in general and first, we must question why the functioning failed.

There we have the opinion of Lacan himself. The last time he spoke to the members of his School and it was already at this stage of life when his appearance evoked irresistibly Rembrandt's last self-portraits, he said this literally: "Group psychology, you know it, it is in Freud". But we cannot talk about group psychology according to Freud, without talking about the function of the *Leader*.⁷⁷ How did it happen that Lacan was invested with this function he otherwise hated?

Lacan appeared on the scene of psychoanalysis at a time of need and crisis. I mean that he started his functions as a didactic analyst, at a time when those intending to become analysts or at least a great number of them, could not be contented with what was said about the connection between the end of analysis and the Oedipus: that at the end of analysis one kills the father; nor about transference: Ziegarnick effect; nor about the analyst: that the important thing is not what he says or what he does, but what he is — his *manne* in fact. As for the theoretical notions forged by Freud, their reduction to common knowledge was such that the "young" analyst, that is the one who had not yet lost the sense of the questioning, felt "lost", for example, in the face of an observation attesting to the devastations of the super-ego ("heir of Oedipus complex", it was said) in a subject who had never known his father.

The first distinctions between the different registers of fatherhood introduced by Lacan at the seminar he inaugurated at his home — 3, rue de Lille — sounded among the members of his audience, very limited at that time, as a promise which

everyone grasped with all their heart and soul — even those (or perhaps should I say: especially those) who knew that it was the promise of nothing other than a proper work with the unconscious. That is how the transference with Lacan started "fatally", because what I called his appearance on the scene was not a vain appearance.

But transference, as we know, carries the best and the worst; and when it is strengthened on the scale of a group, without talking of a large group, it becomes insoluble. Even a dissolution act could not do it. But let us proceed slowly.

Lacan had something to say. Not anything, but he had answers to the questions asked by those called "the young". And those answers did not come out of the blue: he learnt them (he said so in America and elsewhere) from the lips of his analysands. For all that, he had, in order to find them, to "submit" himself to their discourse, as he says: In a way, this "submission to the discourse" was all that Lacan knew; that was his strength.

The result was a message, his, which once more "fatally" had to take the following shape: "They wrote . . . but as for me, I tell you". On that account, Lacan became, whether he liked it or not, a charismatic leader. The very shape of his message proved to have some effects that the content of his discourse, of the discourse of the analyst, could not dissolve. Let us disregard what happened between the time of the beginning and the second period, which starts with "*Je fonde*" ("I found"). The same effects, despite the apparent enthusiasm, were still to become stronger.

Lacan has been blamed for this beginning: "I found, as alone as I have always been in my relation to the analytic cause . . ." Did we ever wonder what would have happened if he had said: "I found with you, my chosen"? In a word, Lacan, analyst, had to advance constantly between Charybdis who deceives the expectation of love and Scylla who arouses what he was unable to control.

For not only was he the founder, but also, as no one had a clear idea of what could replace the disgraced structures of the I.P.A., he had to be the legislator. Here is a position whose imaginary resonances we will appreciate, if we remember that even Roman Emperors were considered and considered themselves, as judges and jurists, whose advice could be asked, as today we ask lawyers, but not as an authority which enacts or makes up the laws.⁷⁸ Even better: contrary to what is generally admitted, the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope was installed not to grant the Pope an absolute power, but to jugulate this power; for if the Pope is infallible, each successor is at the same time tied up by the laws issued by his predecessors.⁷⁹ I need say no more about the imaginary place taken by Lacan in the transference of the group.

The consequences were all the more serious as Lacan was in charge of the School, from the beginning to the end. Pierre Benoit drew attention to the dangers of Lacan's double position: as a master and as a "schoolmaster". But the odds are that if Lacan had let someone else be in charge of the School, the result would have been the same as when Freud gave Adler the presidency of the Viennese Society: the students did not waste any time in re-establishing Freud in his position of leadership. And probably Lacan, who was very familiar with the history of psychoanalysis, knew it.

So that he only had one hope left and a very slight one: to try to modify the relation of a group to its leader. "The one who dares undertake to establish a people, writes Rousseau, must be in a position to change, so to speak, the human nature." Let us disregard human nature. The experience of the School, proves in any case, that group psychology does not change. At the most, we can slow down its development, by avoiding everything which can give the institution a fictitious unity, which assimilates it to what is called a "moral person".

It is really what Lacan could not avoid — and I wonder how we can blame him for it, unless we suppose that "no one is

supposed to ignore the future" which would be an even crazier thing to say than the *dictum* we know. When he was about to grant the School its institutions, what did this School mean to him? Of course, what it should have been so long as the effective experience of its functioning had not been settled, namely: an organism (the metaphor comes under the pen) meant to accomplish certain tasks and which, for that purpose, had to have several administrative organs. Here is the problem. He believed that organization = administration.⁸⁰

But the fact is that not only "any administration is a domination", as Weber would say, but also should I add, precisely through what Lacan taught us, that the position of the administrators is exactly that of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge. To such an extent that, asking one day a member of the ex-School why he chose his analyst, I heard him say without the slightest hesitation: "But because I was flabbergasted by his impudence!" Understand: by his ability to impose on you because of the position of administrator he had been granted.

Moreover, the people in charge of different tasks had been appointed and maintained in the same position without any exchange of posts for almost twenty years by Lacan himself; general meetings practically, were merely approving the lists submitted by Lacan. But, whatever the reasons of confidence which motivated Lacan, the fact is that this mode of appointment and distribution of jobs is really characteristic of that of organizations based on charismatic authority.

Plus there is the number factor which, as we know, tends to reinforce group effects, to the extent of making them — after a certain point — practically irremediable. The School which hardly had one hundred members at the beginning, had more than six hundred at the time of its dissolution, not counting its corresponding members. An increase almost equal to that of the American psychiatric analysts, encouraged and supported by the Federal government, and who from 3,000 in 1945 reached 25,000 in 1978.⁸¹ Indeed, the development of the School was

due to the loud echoes created by Lacan's teaching; nevertheless we cannot hold as negligible this general fact stressed by sociologists: the loosening, today, of the identity received by the individual from his belonging to the family and the search for this identity more and more in the profession.⁸² This explains what Jean Clavreul drew attention to, during the *Journées de Deawille*: namely that in 1968, we hardly found in the School a non-analyst who did not become an analysand or an analyst. We wonder: where do all these people, indeed driven by a desire which trusted Lacan, but who nonetheless had to be tested, could find a sufficient number of analysts for their training? The result was that the Freudian School tended to become little by little a type of cultural movement, which some other people did not fail, since, to set up as a model. As for the association between analysts and non-analysts, which at the start met the need to take psychoanalysis out of its "exterritoriality", it became a body which was neither fish nor fowl. The same person played at the School the part of linguist, mathematician, sociologist, etc. . . while playing the psychoanalyst among the people of his own specialty.

The School did not become an "operating centre against the malaise of civilization", but rather a place where under the apparent unity based on the devotion to the master, everyone was in fact everybody's enemy.⁸³ A formless place from where came out such and such works which we read over and over again, not without recalling the Oedipus, the denunciation of the master's tyranny and the students' servitude. All that without noticing that, for lack of any reference to the symbolic, such a discourse was itself included in the Oedipus, such works where, in the name of a practice, which did not change anything as if there was an analytic practice which does not rely on a theory and as if every theory did not establish a method of allowing it to consider it true or false; not to mention the publications whose ideological inspiration when displayed deceived nobody.

How could the experience of the *passé* not suffer from this

tate of things? Of course the first reason (I almost say it in the sense of the first date) of its failure is that at the time when Lacan submitted his *Proposition*, his students, among whom were after all the members of the jury of assent (*Jury d'agrément*), were far from adequately understanding what was suggested to them. Those who approved did it because they trusted Lacan. There is indeed, in the life of an institution, as in the life of an individual, an age, a limit beyond which one must be in a position to explain this trust, which otherwise runs the risk of becoming the most comfortable form of resistance. But the conditions which were arranged for the application of the experience of the *passé* turned out to be very impracticable, which contributed a lot to the prevention of any progress in that direction.

Firstly, the *passant* was supposed to be an analyst who had just finished his analysis, at a relatively recent date. But we dealt with candidatures of some analysts who had been practising for several years. These candidatures, which could not be rejected purely and simply, could not be of a great benefit. The jury of assent (*Jury d'agrément*) came to a negative conclusion only in two cases:

- a) the case where the desire to give testimony was apparently missing; the rather pragmatic reasons, of the candidature itself, only showed through;
- b) the case of candidates whose testimony did not leave any doubt that those "seniors" had become analysts by means of an identification to the analyst, which was sometimes well established even before the start of the analysis, which was then, a resistance right through. So that we can say that, what represents for some the culminating point of a successful analysis, is in fact, the unquestionable sign of its failure. This is at least a lesson we have learnt from the *passé*, even if it is a negative one.

Secondly, the *passant* was supposed to carry out his proceeding — this has been written by Lacan — with the agreement of his analyst. But this condition also turned out to be impractic-

able—and I would readily add: not always desirable. So among the candidates who applied then, some were practising analysis while their own analysis was not yet finished. Besides we know that not all analytic societies ask their students to wait until the end of their analysis in order to start practising. Some societies even require that the analysis continues for two years after they start practising analysis. Anyhow, the examination of candidatures which came under those conditions shows — at least in my opinion — that the passage to the practice of analysis before the end of the didactic analysis is always an *acting-out*,⁸⁴ where indeed a desire is signified, but a desire which refers to a given moment of the analysis, without explaining what can happen at the end of the analysis. The jury came to a positive conclusion in the case where the *acting-out* in question, was going in the direction of an authentic analytic work.

I shall add in conclusion that it is not exaggerated to say that almost half of the candidatures were presented by analysands or analysts who would never have thought of carrying out this procedure without the extraordinary swelling of the title A.E. (*Analyste de l'Ecole*, Analyst of the School) whose bearer had become the only analyst who counted, the true one, the didactic analyst, the theoretician etc. All this has not only been said and repeated again and again, but also, driven by a kind of collective frenzy. Those who said it did not hesitate to project this mirific vision on Lacan and his jury of assent (*Jury d'agrément*) who, in fact, were often put in an embarrassing situation by candidatures which required rather “a clinical listening”. In short, we can count on the fingers of one hand the candidatures abiding by the conditions initially planned. But when we recall the number of observations of obsessional neuroses or hysterias needed by the analyst before he can start to understand a new observation (which the minds who like to work with nothingness cannot figure at all, like those who use any type of teaching as a weapon), we cannot see why the light should have to come out from those few testimonies.

This disproportion conveyed the disproportion which existed within the School between group effects on the one hand and that which was carried on as authentic work, on the other.

Lacan certainly introduced the basic concepts, on which an institution, was to rely of a new kind, even unknown before. But for the reasons I have explained, his School became an institution relying on charismatic authority and granted with a centralist administration. Such an institution has its own logic that no dissolution could stop. Max Weber showed that this logic requires that the question of succession comes up sooner or later and that its solution is found (whatever maybe the dramatic episodes which punctuate its development and the idea which each protagonist has of his role) in the “routinization of charisma”.

However, Lacan has left a conception of the training of the analyst, the seriousness of which will always mobilize new desires.

Learning from the lessons of this failure of the E.F.P., those driven by these desires will have no problem in finding the principles allowing that, instead of the administrative apparatus where the institution is fixed as a “moral person”, a support or souls in need of an identification, could be substituted, according to Claude Conté's remark, a *place* where everyone is aware of the consequences for the institution that one's position implies.

* * *

Translation: Claude Schneider

NOTES

- ¹ Cf. in French, among others, Nathalie Perrier, *Histoire critique des institutions psychanalytiques*, in *Topiques 2*; Micheline Enriquez, *On forme un analyste*, in *La Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse*, 20, and an unsigned article, *Sur L'histoire de la formation des analystes*, in *Silicet 6/7*.
- ² English in the original.
- ³ English in the original.
- ⁴ Federn and Stekel started practising in 1903.
- ⁵ We can say here with Robert Bock (Freud and Modern Society, Ed. Nelson, Great Britain, 1980; p.130) that Freud, with his group theory, complements Marx more than he opposes him.
- ⁶ Further evidence, that of Bertram Lewin, confirms Bernfeld's point of view; cf. *The Organization of Psychoanalytic Education*, in *Selected writings of Bertram Lewin*, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly Inc., New York, 1973.
- ⁷ I underline.
- ⁸ English in the original.
- ⁹ On the incompatibility of the analytical discourse with the medical discourse regarded as a form of discourse of the master, cf. Jean Clavreul, *L'Ordre médical*, Paris, Seuil, 1978.
- ¹⁰ As a sample, cf. *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. XXXV, part II.
- ¹¹ *On the Psychoanalytic Training System*, in *Primary Love and Psychoanalytic Technique*, London, Tavistock Publications, 1952.
- ¹² English in the original.
- ¹³ As Pilhes' novel points out (*L'Imprécatrice*, Seuil), the function of those supposed subjects of knowing is far from missing from the "giant, multinational and American" companies. Cf. also, Pierre Legendre's last book, *Paroles poétiques échappées du texte*, Seuil, Paris.
- ¹⁴ Op. cit.
- ¹⁵ English in the original.
- ¹⁶ For what follows, cf. Arcangela R.T. d'Amore, *Psychoanalysis in America*, 1930-1939, in *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, L.1981, p.570. Let us also mention, for the understanding of what follows, that in the opinion of John Chynoweth Burnham (*Psychoanalysis and American Medicine*, 1894-1918, International Universities Press, New York, 1967), American psychiatrists, contrary to their European Colleagues, gave Freud's work a favourable reception, because they greatly needed a psychological therapy method in order to compete with Mary Baker Eddy and *Christian Science*.
- ⁷ English in the original.
- ⁸ Gérard Defois, in *Pouvoirs*, No. 17, 1981.
- ⁹ L. J. Hume, *Bentham and Bureaucracy*, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- ⁰ *Perspectives on the Training of Analysts in the World*. This report, published by the International Journal of Psychoanalysis (1979, 1) gives the conclusions of a survey resulting from the inquiries of the I.P.A. Studies Committee about the training of analysts. Micheline Henriquez gave a very good summary of it in an article that we have already mentioned.
- ¹ Cf. *Psychoanalytic Education and Research, the Current Situation and Future Possibilities*, written by Stanley Goodman from the minutes of the Congress held from September 30th to October 4th under the auspices of the American Psychoanalytic Association, International Universities Press, New York, 1977, p.260.
- ² Henri Fayol, *Administration industrielle et générale*, Dunod, Paris, 1981, p.133.
- ³ Cf. *Becoming a Psychoanalyst, a Study of Psychoanalytic Supervision*, collective work under Robert S. Wallerstein, International Universities Press, New York, 1981, p.XI.
- ⁴ Op. cit. p.17.
- ⁵ Cf. *Learning from Psychoanalytic Supervision* in I.J.P., 1970, p.359.
- ⁶ English in the original.
- ⁷ English and italics in the original. *On Candidate Selection and its Relation to Analysis*, in I.J.P., 1968, p.513.
- ⁸ I.J.P., 43, p.227. The lists of "qualities" required of the analyst are many. We find them among the most different authors, most of

them didactic analysts.

- ²⁹ English in the original.
- ³⁰ English in the original.
- ³¹ German in the original. *Connoseur*.
- ³² English in the original.
- ³³ English in the original.
- ³⁴ English in the original.
- ³⁵ *The Evaluation of Applicants for Psychoanalytic Training*, in I.J.P., 49, p.528.
- ³⁶ B.B.C., London, 1980.
- ³⁷ English in the original.
- ³⁸ "Tu sé lo meo maestro" cf. first canto in Dante's *Inferno*.
- ³⁹ It is the title of a famous article by Maxwell Gitelson *The Analysis of the "normal" candidate*, in I.J.P., Vol. XXXV, part II, 1954, p.174.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. *Le Savant et la politique*, Paris, Plon, Coll. 10/18, 1956, p.58.
- ⁴¹ English in the original.
- ⁴² *Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse*, No. 20.
- ⁴³ Cf. J. LACAN, *Situation de la psychanalyse en 1956*, in *Ecrits, Seuil*, 1966.
- ⁴⁴ Cf. *L'analyse institutionnelle*, in *L'Institution*, P.U.F., 1981.
- ⁴⁵ June 1964, after disintegration of the S.F.P. (*Société française de psychanalyse*).
- ⁴⁶ Cf. *The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis*, The Hogarth Press, London, 1967. We will not recall here Lacan's disastrous objections to the idea of 'therapeutic alliance' and those expressed by the sociologists of the Frankfurt School against Hartman's conception of 'health'. Let us recall however, that the condemnation of the technique of Lacan's short sessions took place in 1953, when the *Committee on Evaluation of Psychoanalytic Therapy of the American Psychoanalytic Association* had to be dissolved after six and a half years of unsuccessful debates to find an acceptable definition of psychoanalytic therapy. Three years later, Helen Tartakoff, in her excellent review of books about psychoanalytic technique, had to admit that the word "psychoanalysis" which appeared in the titles

of those books, was loosely applied to very different therapeutic methods, based on personal postulates, particular to each author.

In actual fact, the technique of short sessions that Lacan was led to adopt, as he mentions it in his letter to Balint published in *Analytica*, in the face of specific forms of resistance characteristic of didactic analyses, was based on the one hand, on a refusal to define "the force of the ego", with its capacity to support the frustration without regression (the self being a frustration in its essence) — a view largely confirmed by Wallon's observations on the envying sympathy or the sympathizing envy. On the other hand, it was based on a conception of the psychoanalytic experience as an experience of the discourse, a conception authorizing the use of the interruption of sessions for the purpose of "punctuation". Indeed, we are dealing here with a metaphor: what will the analyst say to the analysand when asked if the interruption of the session is a full stop, a comma, an exclamation or interrogation mark, etc...? But, at least, this metaphor is better adapted to the nature of psychoanalytic experience than the military metaphors which pullulate in writings about technique. Anyway, to believe that there could be, at the level of the conduction of analysis, a technique which guarantees the practitioner against mistakes, not to mention abuse, is a lure behind which we hide for fear of facing the only serious question: that of the desire of the analyst.

- ⁴⁷ Cf. *Droit, Législation et Liberté*, Vol. I, *Règles et Ordre*, P.U.F., 1981, p.95.
- ⁴⁸ LACAN, J. *The Freudian Thing*, in *Ecrits*, a Selection, p.114. Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, London, 1977.
- ⁴⁹ *Méconnaissance*: word composed by *mé* (in English equivalent to the prefix *dis*) and *connaissance* (in English *knowledge*). There does not seem to be an accurate translation for the connotations of the word.
- ⁵⁰ *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 1953, I, No. 2, p.197-221.
- ⁵¹ LACAN, J. *Variantes de la cure-type*, in *Ecrits*, p.356-357, *Editions du Seuil*, Paris, 1966.
- ⁵² The text of this Act is published, along with a note, in the directory of the Freudian School of Paris, where the reader will also find the *Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole*.

⁵³ To my knowledge, no one better than Catherine the Great has been able to explain the reasons of her authority. This passage from a letter sent, a few years after her death, to young Emperor Alexander by someone close to her, shows it:

"Nothing left a greater impression on my mind than this conversation (with Catherine): its topic was the unlimited power with which Catherine the Great not only ruled her own empire, but also arranged matters in other countries. I spoke of my surprise in the face of the blind obedience with which her will was carried out everywhere, in the face of the haste and zeal that everyone showed to please her".

"It is not easy as you think, she condescended to reply. First of all, my orders could not be carried out if they were not of that type of orders which could be carried out. You know how cautiously and warily I work to promulgate my laws. I examine the circumstances, I seek advice, I consult the enlightened part of the people and in that way, I discover which type of effects my law is likely to produce. And only when I am convinced in advance to have everyone's assent, do I give my orders and have the pleasure to observe what you call blind obedience. *And that is the foundation of unlimited power.* But believe me, they would not obey blindly if the orders were not adapted to the customs, to the people's opinion and if I only followed my own desires without dreaming of the consequences."

Cf. Isabel de Madariaga, *Russia in the age of Catherine the Great*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1982, p.580. Italics from the original.

Cf. also, on the same topic, the origin of authority, Serge Moscovici's last book, *L'Age des foules*, Paris, Fayard, 1980, which, unfortunately I found only after I had finished writing this essay.

⁵⁴ English in the original.

⁵⁵ Cf. the Directory of *l'Ecole Freudienne de Paris*, 1977, p.82.

⁵⁶ Cf. note 49.

⁵⁷ Published in *Silicet* 2, Paris, Seuil.

⁵⁸ *Passe, passant, passeur*. These words are left in their original French form throughout the text. For further reference see *Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole*, in *Silicet*, I, p.14-30, Editions du Seuil, Paris.

⁹ Cf. *The Technique of Psychoanalysis in Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1968, p.9.

⁰ English in the original.

¹ Cf. note 49.

² Idem.

³ Cf. Heinrich Racker, *Transference and Counter-Transference*, International University Press, New York, 1968.

⁴ English in the original.

⁵ What do you want? As asked by Beelzebub in *Le Diable amoureux* (The Devil in Love), by Cazotte, Gallimard, Paris.

⁶ Cf. Lacan's seminar on *Le Transfert* (1960/1961).

⁷ Cf. Safouan, *Du Sujet dans ses rapports à la castration ou du cheminement de la vérité dans l'inconscient*, in *Etudes sur l'Oedipe*, Seuil, 1974, p.52.

⁸ Cf. Lacan, Seminar on *Le Transfert* (1960/1961).

⁹ I say 'anxiety' and not 'fear'. The nature of anxiety is not that it is without object but that we don't know what this object is at the time when we feel the anxiety.

⁰ *Passant*: Subject who takes the *passé* upon himself.

¹ Cf. *Lettres de l'Ecole Freudienne de Paris*, No. 25.

² Cf. *The Family and its Future*, Collective work under Katherine Elliott and J.A. Churchill, London, 1970.

³ Cf. Safouan, *La figure du Père idéal*, in *Etudes sur l'Oedipe*, Seuil, 1974, p.44.

⁴ During the first E.F.P. Congress, Lacan put forward that this return does not, as in medieval times, take the shape of the neurosis of possession by the devil, but truly that of racial segregation. Those words are so truthful that today they seem prophetic.

⁵ All the less unthinkable, I should say, as have every reason to see in the rising of bureaucratic structures today another consequence in "the alteration of human groupings by Science".

⁶ English in the original.

⁷ English in the original.

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- ⁷⁸ Cf. Tony Honoré, *Emperors and Lawyers*, London, Duckworth, 1981.
- ⁷⁹ Cf. Brian Tierney, *Origins of Papal Infallibility*, Brill, 1972.
- ⁸⁰ Pierre Legendre (cf. *Pouvoirs*, 11) agrees: for him, the failure of the School is the failure of a centralist administration – which does not imply so much that the remedy is found in a decentralized administration.
- ⁸¹ Cf. *Law and the Mental Health Professions*, Walter E. Barton and Charlotte J. Sanborn, Editors, New York, International University Press, 1978, p.185.
- ⁸² Cf. Bryan S. Turner, *For Weber, Essays on the Sociology of Fate*, London, R.K.A., 1981, p.314.
- ⁸³ This explains the common relief when the dissolution was announced, except those who already thought of “the future” and whose reactions depended on what each one of them was expecting from it.
- ⁸⁴ English in the original.

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