


PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN
SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE



Homage to Freud

The Freudian Clinic

**PAPERS OF THE
FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE**

THE FREUDIAN CLINIC

**Editor
Oscar Zentner**

Published by
The Freudian School of Melbourne
1983

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria, 3122
Australia


ISSN 0811—2533
ISBN 0 9594842 3 x

Copyright © 1983 by The Freudian School of Melbourne.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

Cover designed by Juan Davila

Printed by PIT Press, Plenty Road, Bundoora 3083, Victoria



CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
PART I	
LOGOS.....	1
 HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 44TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH — THE FREUDIAN CLINIC	
The Analytic Construction	Oscar Zentner 9
Metaphor and the Freudian Clinic	Frances M. Moran 31
The Psychosis of the Prime Minister's Son	Rob Gordon 41
A Case for Topology	Gayle Paull 69
Interpretation and the Specimen Dream	John Dingle 85
The Identification and the Ideal	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 103
 PART II	
SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Seminar I — Transference and Acting-Out	
	Moustapha Safouan 125
Seminar II — On Plato's Symposium	Moustapha Safouan 133
Seminar III — The Place of the Analyst in the Transference	Moustapha Safouan 153
Seminar IV — Topographic Point of View of the Unconscious	Moustapha Safouan 179
 PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
And Thou Shalt Be Like Gods	Ricardo Goldenberg 197

LOGOS

"He who interrogates me knows how to read me."

Lacan

The present fourth volume of The Freudian School of Melbourne has been mainly dedicated to the subject of *The Freudian Clinic*.

This book, like the previous ones, is the continuation of the first Australian psychoanalytic annual publication. The intention of this work is to transmit the psychoanalytic experience from a particular frame. This is why although different styles are to be found, the bulk of the book remains within a precise context.

The field of psychoanalysis leads to different lines of thought. The works follow the discovery of the Freudian unconscious from the point where the path was taken up by the Lacanian teaching. Nobody can expect the text of this reading to be simple and conclusive. We consider it the transference of an unfinished work.

Nothing in regard to the psychoanalytic symptom is self evident. Sufficient proof of this is the wide spectrum of resistances that such a discovery has produced in the psychoanalytic group. The difficulties that the text presents are intrinsic to the subject of psychoanalysis itself.

There is yet another difficulty that the reader ought to remember. Until the appearance of The Freudian School of Melbourne and its publication, the audience, that is *you*, were scarcely given the opportunity to question and work psychoanalytic writings from this particular view.

We founded the School in 1977, when we assumed the right of taking up the responsibility that the transference gave us. In that act of foundation, the field of a discourse took its demarcation. The space thus created was organized around seminars on Freud and Lacan, and the annual homage to Freud.

The fact that this specific psychoanalytic activity gave place to discontent was due to the effect that experience shows when the cause is Freudian.

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

"... I had learnt that psychoanalysis brings out the worst in everyone. But I made up my mind not to answer my opponents and, so far as my influence went, to restrain others from polemics... Perhaps this attitude on my part has been misunderstood: perhaps I have been thought so good-natured or so easily intimidated that no further notice need be taken of me. This was a mistake; I can be as abusive and enraged as anyone; but I have not the art of expressing the underlying emotions in a form suitable for publication and I therefore prefer to abstain completely."

Freud

When there is transference—even negative—the enactment of the listening becomes crucial. To listen is to take responsibilities for those who, by addressing their demand to us, establish a transference. As analysts our foundation had the function of an interpretation which, as such, produced *associations*. However, it is well known since Freud, that *associations* are no guarantee of the lifting of repression.

In our foundation we propose to work the texts of Freud from the place in which a psychoanalytic thought was produced, namely the texts and seminars of Lacan. Our work in this regard follows Lacan's teachings on the ethics of psychoanalysis, "*If I can, I ought.*"


Our proposition is a proposition to work—to make possible the advancement of psychoanalytic theory.

Oscar Zentner
Director

The Freudian School of Melbourne

THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

Oscar Zentner Director P. O. Box 12, Hawthorn Victoria 3122 Australia



4 th Homage to Freud

The Freudian Clinic

AT L'ALLIANCE FRANCAISE DE MELBOURNE 267 CHURCH STREET RICHMOND

SATURDAY 11 TH SEPTEMBER 1982 FROM 10 AM TO 4 PM

PART I

HOMAGE TO FREUD

THE FREUDIAN CLINIC

All papers presented in this book have been written by members of The Freudian School of Melbourne, residing in Melbourne, except where indicated.

“Both of the parties to the dispute obtain their share: the *Trieb* is allowed to retain its appeasement and proper respect is shown to reality. But as is well known, the only free thing in this life is death: this success is achieved at the price of a rift in the I which never heals but which increases as time goes on. The two contrary reactions to the conflict persist as the nucleus of a splitting in the I. The whole process seems so strange to us because we take as self-evident the synthetic nature of the processes of the I. But we have been manifestly wrong in this.”

Sigmund Freud

“The analyst should not misunderstand what I shall call the power of accession to the being from the dimension of ignorance since he has to answer to that which throughout his discourse, questions him from this dimension. He has not to guide the subject to a *Wissen*, a knowledge, but in the ways of access to this knowledge. He must engage him in a dialectic operation, not in order to say to him that he is mistaken, because he is perforce in error, but to show him that he speaks badly, this is to say that he speaks without knowing, as an ignorant, for it is the way in which he is in error which counts.”

Jacques Lacan

THE ANALYTIC CONSTRUCTION*

Oscar Zentner

"After all, being declared dead
was an advance on being buried
in silence."

Freud

"What is a father? It is the dead
father, Freud replies, but no
one listens. . ."

Lacan

"Give thy thoughts no tongue,
Give every man thine ear,
but few thy voice. . ."

Shakespeare

Some years ago Mr. E., a man in his late twenties, came to see me complaining of unhappiness and desolation. He was a loner, without

* A shorter version of this paper was read at the *Rencontre à Paris* 13--16 February 1982. *Fondation du Champ Freudien*.

friends or interests and detached from everyday life.

This young man had been forced to separate from his family in order to go abroad on his own, to work in his uncle's business. In this way, he was told, he would obtain work experience. He had been travelling and living with his family in different countries all his life, since his step-father, a diplomat in the foreign office, was posted around the world.

* * *

E. started his analysis in order to receive the death certificate of his father, which would ensure his inscription into a genealogy. Of his father's death he said: "I never knew my father. . . he died in a car accident when I was very small." He introduced himself as not knowing the father's history.

A couple of screen memories gave us some important hints. He remembered hiding behind some rocks on the beach when he was very small, frightened that his father would throw him, yet again, into the sea. Another memory, pertaining to the same time, referred to seeing one of his sisters naked. The themes of *fear* —as in the first memory— and of *seeing* —as in the second memory— became two constant variables throughout the analysis. To *see*, referred to having perceived the difference between the sexes and the screen memory of having been thrown into the *sea*,¹ referred to the fear of castration attached to that knowledge.

There were two ideas that preoccupied E. One, that he was impotent, the other, that his step-father was impotent too. I inferred that this was a reference to a certain impotence in his father, since he needed to protect him a lot; so much so, that he did not know or did not want to know anything about his life.

E. said that he had a photograph of his father. To this he associated that his father was a sportsman and a lover of racing cars. Indeed this was what had killed his father. One summer night, his father and a friend went on a dangerous trip in his racing car. His father was driving. There was an accident and both died. E. added that this was everything he knew of his father and of his death. He said he was too small at the time and that anyway, in his home, the subject of his father's death was never touched upon.

E. accepted his mother's silence. In this way he could maintain his dead father as non-existent. His depression was caused by an identification with the foreclosure of the knowledge of a father who, rather than dead, was kept as non-existent. As a result of this identification with an unknown dead father, E. introduced himself as having no desire, since this was preferable to coming into contact with his desire for a dead father. In relation to his father, E. equated: "I never had you" and "I have never wished your death" with: "I have never lost you." It was precisely this that permitted his mother to master his desire, turning him into an impotent.

It was after the recollection of his mother saying: "Let the past belong to the past" in reference to his father's death, that E. brought other memories. His father was drunk the day he died in the car accident. He then associated another of his mother's statements directed at him and his siblings: "Do not idealize your father, do not think that he did not have any problems." The maternal command prohibited E., in this way from having an *idea* (representation) of his father.

In regard to the screen memory of being hidden for hours at the beach to avoid his father's threat to throw him once more into the sea, I proposed the hypothesis that it was a reference to the summer of the death of his father. For E., the accident slowly began to take the shape of a provoked accident, of suicide, since he remembered again the words of his mother: "Do not think that your father did not have any problems."

I introduced the following construction. The father, a sportsman, tyrannical and arrogant, facing E. when he was between three and three and a half years old, could not tolerate that E., small, shy and inhibited, was afraid of the sea.² If E. was afraid, this would expose a lack in his father. E., therefore, challenged his father in the field of fear.

E. commented on the following family anecdote in response to the construction. One day his father, while driving the same racing car and realizing that the brakes were not working, pressed the accelerator in a defiant attempt, challenging the car and his fate. He did not kill himself on that occasion by mere chance. According to E.'s mother, his father used to say with pride: "I am *never* afraid." This reminded us of E.'s introduction in the analysis: "I *never* knew my father".

As a result of recovering what he already knew, E. started to move from indifference to rage and from anonymity to history. The condition for being implied in a history is precisely not to know it, —that is to say —it has to be unconscious.

At examination time at the university, E. was unable to sit and study, he became panic-stricken. He used to awake and see an image in his bedroom which he would try, in vain, to grapple with and seize. He then had to leave the light on all night and was only able to go to sleep at dawn. This hallucination which disappeared after some months, was the return of a dead father whose life had been foreclosed and who was now handing over the castration to the son.

The panic did not allow E. to have fear. E. confirmed this with different associations —the current one being, "I lose my head." The inheritance of his dead father was to run towards panic in order to avoid fear, since it is in fear that castration comes into play. The scene on the beach would be linked to a father who, driven always by panic, could not allow his son to have what he never did —namely— fear. In this way, he left to his son as a figure of identification, a father in panic. If fear was the result of castration, panic erased all differences, abolishing castration.

The father actually died during the summer in which E. remembered being hidden behind the rocks on the beach. I interpreted to E. that perhaps, because he felt so much at the mercy of his father, who had thrown him into the sea on several occasions, he might have desired his death. In this way, the factual death of his father arrived for him as a confirmation of what his thought was able to produce.

He then remembered how unhappy he used to be at school when someone could see his school report as he was enrolled with his step-father's name, while he currently kept using the surname of his father. That non-coincidence made him uncomfortable but he accommodated himself —yet again— to the ambiguity. He was never able to say that his mother had re-married. It was around this theme that I showed him that nobody had to know —including myself— that his father was for him neither dead nor buried. E. said that he had never visited the grave of his father.

It was this dead father —alive in him— who demanded from him not to have fear, not to ask, not to know, because to ask was to know that his father was dead —as E. desired. This situation carried him to panic, so he kept himself 'detached from everyday life'.

E. paid the price for the death of his father as the expression of his desire, by carrying him *alive inside*, without burial, and identified with him. A typical and frequent expression of E. during his analysis was, "I feel rotten". It was in this frame of mind that he began to think about going to the graveyard where his father was buried, but described an inner force which did not permit him to do so. (He related this to the fact that he could never be close to his step-father, because to adopt a step-father was to give the death certificate to the dead father; the consequence of which would be that castration would return to him.) E. requested my company, to go to the cemetery, because he did not in fact want to see the grave. He had to go to bury his father and to constitute the grave which, truly, did not yet exist for him. E.'s thought of asking me to accompany him was connected to his wanting a witness to attest to the fact that his father was dead and buried or to convince the father to allow himself to be buried.

One day in a pub of ill-repute and involved in an absolutely banal incident, he received a black eye. "I was embroiled in a fight. I was really looking for it." In this passage to the act E. was telling me that about twenty-four or twenty-five years ago, his father, who he always wanted to believe had never existed and of whom he thought he knew nothing, was killed in an accident. An accident he was already seriously thinking was closer to a deliberate act than to chance.

The day of his father's death, E. was in his playmate's house. He said he thought that he had not been able to say good-bye to his father on that day, and that this became related to his difficulty in separating from people and departing; to the point of refraining from seeing people altogether in order to avoid the moment of the farewell. So, he became shy, inhibited and solitary.

E. spoke of his hatred, of all those years lost, of the silence in the family, of his life that was worth so little, of himself ageing. He wondered what on earth the analysis was going to be useful for if, when finished,

nobody would want to look at him anyway because he would be ugly and old. He was afraid he was transparent in such a way that everybody could find out what he had discovered in his analysis and that, on the whole, nobody liked murderers.

E.'s opening statement in the analysis dealt with his *knowing* ("I never knew") and his *being* ("I was very small"). The emphasis in the use of *never* touched upon the distance between what his 'I' knew and what he did not know in regard to the death of his father. The negation attached to the father encompassed also the repression of knowledge itself. But, who or what was the agent of this repression? This, we think, can be explained as follows: On the one hand the repression is reproduced by the maternal mandate in the active silence (no mention of E.'s father), and on the other hand, it is E.'s father however, who produced in E. an absolute and repressed knowledge; expressed as *never*. It is the return of the *never* (between flight and repression) that in conjunction with the 'I' of E. produces knowledge under the sign of negation: "I *never* knew my father. . ."

E. identifies with the paternal mandate 'You *never*' becoming 'I *never*'. In this way the superego mandate takes advantage of what the 'I *never*' knows, that the unconscious knows.

Freud states in the New Lectures of Psychoanalysis, Lecture XXXI, right at the end, the task of analysis as not unlike a task of civilization *Wo Es war soll Ich werden*. The superego mandate seems to tell E. *Wo Es war Ich soll (nicht) werden*, that we can translate as *Where It was I never ought to be*. E. is inscribed in the paternal genealogy by the command 'You *never*'. Thus, "where It (the father) was, I (the son) will never become." It is around this point that E.'s analysis started. He came to receive the death certificate of his father in order to be inscribed in a genealogy in a way other than as a rejected son. E. showed this in his difficulty in relating to his step-father and his fear of being rejected by him. However, the ambivalence of E. with his step-father was the displacement of a conflict between him and his mother which, according to E.'s words ran as follows, "nobody ever talked at home about anything in relation to the past nor in relation to my father".

The early introduction of the two screen memories were the kind of emblems (*blasons*) with which E. filled up the apparent gaps in his history. Though the connection between *seeing* (the naked sister) and being punished for it are self evident, we think it justifiable to connect the screen memories with E.'s account of his father's death, "I never knew my father, he died when I was very small."

If now we allow ourselves to equate 'to know' with 'to see' we will advance a few things. It is not uncommon that a child's way of knowing is through seeing. If this is so, then E. said, "I do not know that which I have not seen." But E.'s position is more complicated. He will then, say, "I never saw my father, he died when I was very small". The first part refers to the negation (*Verneinung*) 'I never saw', the second, 'I was very small', is an incomplete statement. It was a task for the analysis to complete the sentence by adding, "I was too small to be responsible for my father's death". Hence we arrive at the following equation:

I never knew my father = I never saw him = conscious.

I knew my father = I saw him = unconscious.

Indeed, this is the constitution of the subject where the 'I' as not *knowing* (= *seeing*) is split from the unconscious.

We are facing the splitting of the subject in its constitution and the essential part played by negation (*Verneinung*) between flight and repression. The unconscious knowledge (of his father) is fixed through negation in that which makes of the unconscious a *not said*. As Lacan showed, the moment of the death of the father, his factual death, is also the moment in which the wish for his death will return upon the son under the form of his castration.³ Then the statement, "I never knew my father, he died when I was very small. . ." has also the function of appeasement, in order to deflect the castration from him. And this not without a price, as we hope we have been able to convey.

The choice of this fragmented history has, for us, the aim of discussing some aspects of the construction. If the transference is an inevitable event from which it can be justly said, that without it, there is no analysis, the construction instead, seems not to be so essential to an analysis, at least in psychoanalytic literature.

"The transference is unthinkable unless one sets out from the supposed subject of knowing. You will now have a better idea of what he is supposed to know. He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as he formulates it—quite simply, signification. Signification implies, of course—and this is why I first brought out the dimension of his desire—that he cannot refuse it. This privileged point is the only one by which we can recognize the character of an absolute point with no knowledge. It is absolute precisely by virtue of being in no way knowledge, but the point of attachment that links his very desire to the resolution of that which is to be revealed. The subject comes into play on the basis of this fundamental support—the supposed subject of knowing, simply by virtue of being a subject to desire."⁴

Even if the construction is so complete as to give place to the termination of the analysis,⁵ there still remain certain questions. How does the subject resolve that which Freud differentiated between what had been heard and what had been experienced, that is to say, the double inscription? How does the analysand reach the point where the repressed past becomes history? How does he resolve his desire of being an analysand?

And in reference to the desire of the analyst⁶ is it not in him—in order to continue being an analyst, in his un-being—where the desire can be preserved as cause? The termination of an analysis produces definite effects in the analyst. He has to become a remainder. We think that such an effect was pointed out by Freud in his admonition to Ferenczi. Theoretically he has to arrive at an end 'arbitrary but not unmotivated'. The only point where the termination of the analysis can be formalized is through the subject's questioning whether he wants what he desires.

In regards to the theme of construction, Freud said in his paper *Constructions in Analysis* that,

"The analyst has neither experienced nor repressed any of the material under consideration: his

task cannot be to remember anything. What is his task? His task is to make out what has been forgotten from the traces which it has left behind or, more correctly, to *construct* it . . . for analysis the construction is only a preliminary labour. . . If, in accounts of analytic technique, so little is said about 'constructions', that is because 'interpretations' and their effects are spoken of instead. But I think that 'construction' is by far the more appropriate description. 'Interpretation' applies to something. . . such as an association or a parapraxis. But it is a 'construction' when one lays before the subject of the analysis a piece of his early history that he has forgotten. . . We do not pretend that an individual construction is anything more than a conjecture which awaits examination, confirmation or rejection. . . The path that starts from the analyst's construction ought to end in the patient's recollection; but does not always lead so far. Quite often we do not succeed in bringing the patient to recollect what has been repressed. Instead of that, if the analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him an assured conviction of the truth of the construction which achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory?"⁷

Although laying down sufficient theoretical precautions, we think Freud was far less cautious in his hopes for the future of the construction in an analysis. Freud was not interested in finding a better analytic tool, as he himself stated,

"I believe that we should gain a great deal of valuable knowledge from work of this kind upon psychotics (as well as neurotics) even if it leads to no therapeutic success."⁸

Freud draws a parallel between the delusions of the patient and the constructions:

"The delusions of patients appear to me to be the equivalents of the constructions which we build up in the course of an analytic treatment—attempts at explanation and cure, though it is true that these, under the conditions of a psychosis, can do no more than replace the fragment of reality that is being disavowed in the present by another fragment that has already been disavowed in the remote past. It will be the task of each individual investigation to reveal the intimate connections between the material of the present disavowal and that of the original repression."⁹

Freud is here stressing an old subject of his own:

"The essence of it is that there is not only *method* in madness, as the poet has already perceived, but also a fragment of *historical truth*; and it is plausible to suppose that the compulsive belief attaching to delusions derives its strength precisely from infantile sources of this kind. All that I can produce today in support of this theory are reminiscences, not fresh impressions. It would probably be worth while to make an attempt to study cases of the disorder in question on the basis of the hypotheses that have been here put forward and also to carry out their treatment on those same lines."¹⁰

There are two things that are striking for us in Freud's paper *Constructions in Analysis*. One is the distinction between knowledge of the historical truth regardless of the therapeutic success: the other is the apparent disregard in mentioning the transference. Lacan judges severely whether the psychosis, in the case of the Wolf Man, was not triggered by the determination of Freud to mark and date, almost until the birth of the subject, his relation to the primordial scene, his fantasm (S ◇ a).

Many things ought to be said here. At the level of the theory, Freud was with the Wolf Man answering Jung's position regarding infantile sexuality. Oddly enough, it was with the Rat Man that Freud was

trying—hard indeed—to use some of Jung's ideas. However, in both cases the transference is used and taken into account, but the therapeutic success in both still leaves open a fruitful field for discussion. The Rat Man died during the war and his case will remain as an interrogation. The so-called therapeutic success of the Wolf Man, Sergei Constantinovitch Pankejeff, is no less of an enigma from the psychoanalytic viewpoint. He had a long life. He died in 1979 and had an open collaboration with psychoanalysis, Freud, Brunswick, Gardiner, Eissler, Solms, and it would be safe to add the big Etc. It is really debatable whether one could support Freud's comment in relation to the cure of the Wolf Man. What is clear is that the patient never overcame the transference with Freud. The price was to live Freud's construction and to remain in that point where someone either becomes an analyst or remains living the findings of the analysis until the end. This is not a simple matter.

We think that the construction is only able to produce a structural change when it can elicit a topographical regression, only way in which the relations between unconscious signifiers can be altered. The other point is the focalization of the fantasm of the subject. These two aspects were worked through in the infantile neurosis of the Wolf Man, yet the transference to Freud continued—or was it that none of the analysts who treated him after Freud, were able to point out anything different other than that the transference to Freud was inexorable? Perhaps one of the consequences of the construction is the intransitive character of the transference it awakens.

If Freud—following here expressly what has been said by Lacan—in the case history of Dora situated himself in the transference in the place of Mr. K., in what eminent place for the Wolf Man would Freud be situated if the Wolf Man had chosen, in his way, not to be another analyst but to be the analysand of Freud and, by real heritage, the analysand of analysis par excellence? If being an analyst is the secondary benefit of a true neurosis, to be the Analysand with capital letters is to be the privileged interlocutor of psychoanalysis.¹¹

But Freud was warned by his previous cases and so too, was Ruth Mack Brunswick. Freud thought that an antiquity given as a gift could settle and finalize the debt of the patient to him. The misunderstanding

was that the patient had always thought that psychoanalysis had a debt to him. This debt, of course, he wanted unpaid, placing himself as a guarantor of the analysis. This secondary benefit is, we think, symptomatically expressed in the collection of money that Freud organized for several years for him.

We want to show that just as the psychosis was not foreign to the construction (as Lacan explained), the subjection of the subject to the analysis was given not as a debtor but as a guarantor. In other words, the fact that the construction clarified the infantile neurosis, added to the fact that there was memory or conviction in the analysand, seems not to be sufficient for the neurosis to terminate.

Let us return to the apparent disregard for therapeutic success in construction. The analyst performs a task somewhat similar to the task of the archaeologist; that is, the reconstruction of the debris into a significant order. However, Freud recognizes the limitation of the comparison by underlying the quality of the material used by both investigators, since...

"Indeed, it may as we know, be doubted whether any psychical structure can really *be the victim of total destruction.*"¹²

We add the doubt as to whether something that is analysed is able to be destroyed. Freud's statement was far from being a rhetorical one. It is his affirmation of the overdetermination that reigns in the unconscious where everything *is* and, moreover, everything *is* forever. It was this conviction which led him to use free association and to the recognition of the lack of time in the unconscious. This confidence permitted him to think that somehow, the analyst's task is easier than that of the archaeologist.

It is, insofar as Freud's work with construction continued, that he allowed himself to treat the material in a pseudoarchaeological manner, thus offering the patient a piece of his life. This is of utmost importance, whether it can be remembered, as in the best cases, or not.

"If the analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him an assured conviction of the truth of the construction which achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory."¹³

Freud's *Constructions in Analysis* is a rigorous paper, however, many implied contradictions can be detected. Freud was settling the account of his long debate about trauma and fantasy and his answer is somewhat surprising. Everything is in this historical truth not factual history but rather a *nachträglichkeit* re-ordering of the past where trauma, fantasy, interpretation and construction, acquire meaning — psychoanalytic meaning— so long as there is someone to listen to the unconscious according to the advice of Polonius, "Give thy thought no tongue, give every man thine ear, but few thy voice."¹⁴

The fact that Freud takes the path not giving precedence to trauma or to fantasy is clear in the following:

"This second phase *is the most important and the most momentous of all.* But we may say of it in a certain sense that it has *never had a real existence.* It is never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a construction of the analysis but is no less a necessity on that account."¹⁵

The second part of this quotation is to be read more than twice by those who make of the awareness of an ego the new eschatological mosaic tablet to be followed in a so-called analysis. We add that this construction is neither of the analyst nor of the analysand, but intrinsic to analysis itself. In this regard, we understand why for Freud the construction, not withstanding it being used in the clinical situation, was a *necessity* of the theory.

Constructions in Analysis was written in 1937 and we have good grounds to think that by then, the therapeutic success with the Wolf Man was in doubt. In 1919, instead, while the therapeutic success was sure for Freud, he wrote *A Child is Being Beaten*, where the problem of construction is dealt with by taking the clinical material very much in the way he described in 1937, as the only way in which the archaeologist could re-create what had been destroyed. We refer to a phase that has never existed.

These correlations are of interest for us. Success or failure, the advance of the theory was the main purpose in Freud. Or, as Lacan puts it, cure is a surplus in an analysis, a surplus of the analysis itself. To say it without euphemisms, the cure is not the aim.

It was in *Erinneren, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten* (translated as Remembering, Repeating and Working —Through) that Freud, having the Wolf Man and his famous dream in mind wrote the following:

"There is one special class of experience of the utmost importance for which no memory can, as a rule, be recovered. These are experiences which occurred in very early childhood and were not understood at the time, but which were *nachträglich* (translated by Strachey as *subsequently*) understood and interpreted."¹⁶

However, in *Die Wege der Symptombildung*¹⁷ Freud called these fantasies *Urphantasien* and referred them to some kind of universal fantasies which occur in subjects regardless of any factual experience. We mean in this regard what Freud understood to clarify for instance in the Wolf Man case with reference to the primordial scene —*Urszene* or *Urphantasien*.

In our subject, his amnesia was the repetition on the one hand of the fulfillment of the maternal order which belonged to the past and had to be forgotten, and on the other hand, his amnesia was his particular way of remembering for me.

"Above all, the patient will begin his treatment with a repetition. . . When one has announced the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis to a patient with an eventful life history and long story of illness and has then asked him to say what occurs to his mind, one expects him to pour out a flood of information; but often the first thing that happens is that he has nothing to say. . . As long as the patient is in treatment he cannot escape from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering."¹⁸

It is time for us to see whether or not there is any modification to the direction of an analysis according to the use of construction or to the use of interpretation, but there is no need for a choice since we think that analysis moves with both. This is the way that Freud, hesitantly at

times, showed us.

It was in *The Two Principles of Mental Functioning* that Freud pointed to:

"The strangest characteristic of unconscious (repressed) . . . processes is due to the entire disregard of reality testing. . . But one must never allow oneself to be misled into applying the standards of reality to repressed psychical structures. . . undervaluing the importance of fantasies. . ."¹⁹

It is in this text that we learned of the dream of a man after his father's death:

" . . . his father was alive once more and that he was talking to him in his usual way. But he felt it exceedingly painful that his father had really died only without knowing it."²⁰

Freud proposed to add to the narrative of the dream,

" . . . as the dreamer wished, in consequence of his wish".

"The dream-thought then runs: It was a painful memory for him. . . to wish for his father's death. . . and how terrible it would have been if his father had had any suspicion of it! What we have here is thus the familiar case of self-reproaches felt after the loss of someone loved, and in this instance the self-reproaches went back to the infantile significance of death wishes against the father."²¹

This same dream is discussed in *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

Lacan showed in this dream the constitution of the subject as fundamentally not knowing. In Freud's example the patient was suffering from a self reproach which sprang from the fact that he wished the death of his father. The dream showed someone dead without knowing it, while the dreamer knows his father died.

In the case of E. he did not know anything about his dead father. The point of contact between being awake and saying, "I do not know

anything about my father" (negation) and having a dream where it is the father who does not know he is dead is striking. In both cases it implies a dead father in a different position in regards to a live son. On the one hand the lack of knowledge is in the father (dead), on the other, the lack of knowledge is in the son.

For E. the function of the interpretation was the restitution of an elision. The elision that E. put into play was not the death of his father but something of him still alive, something that could be read as: formally dead, almost unknown, but very much alive somewhere.

His not wanting to know anything of the life of his father was, as the construction revealed, the result of the maternal mandate, "I do not want you to know that your father was ever alive" — which was not in different to the symptomatic condition of the subject.

We have, accordingly, the identification of the analysand with a dead father who did not know he was ever alive, since for the subject, if his father had been alive, E. would have been thought by another (his father). We put in this bizarre way the fact that the analysand knew almost nothing about the life of his father. The father bequeathes an inheritance to the son; in this case, to erase the foot prints of his existence, becoming symbolic.

This knowledge of E. about his dead father has for us all the characteristics of the *Verdrängung* where something is in the place of something else. The death of his father as the statement, "my father died" is an avoidance because if we ask, Who knows that he died? E. would not find it easy to say "I" because "I" (E.) ought to have known something before. He ought to have known that he who is dead was alive before dying, and this is what in E. is repressed; the symptom.

E. knows but he presents himself in the analysis as not knowing. This opens many different paths. Maybe this is so because in E. there was a knowledge constituted as not knowing; as not wanting to know anything of a desire of which it would be insufficient to say — only — that he wished the death of that dead father.

We hold that the problem that E. poses for us is the fact that it is not sufficient that a father is alive in order to wish his death. Neither is it sufficient that he is dead in order not to wish it. But the contrary does not

suffice either. What E. avoids is to live the existence of the one who carries the death of the other; that which since Freud is called mourning. But, is E. then a melancholic? This is not so sure if by that is understood that the subject does not know what he has lost.

Moreover, we think that what E. presents is a different thing altogether. He has lost and he knows it, but what he has lost does not seem to constitute the knot of his neurosis. The loss is not sufficient to embark on the search for the lost. What E. lacks is at the level of the *fantasm*. We think E. is telling us that he has been unable to constitute the annihilation of his father in order to feel that he is missing for him. This is what we can describe as E.'s symptom. Too much 'object' and stuck 'to the sole of the shoe', a description of the real with which Lacan makes nothing of motor development if this is not preceded by the order of the symbolic which awaits the child with the lack.

What E. does not know is what he has not lost. E. does not want to know anything about the fact that his father was alive and, on the other hand, the conservation of the father's surname speaks to us of this symbolic presence which explains in E.'s history that while everybody had taken up the new surname, he retained the same. It is there that E. does not know what he has not lost. This is neither the product of an immense love nor of an immense hate. To say that it is from there that E. waits for his mother is just to explain the lure that E. believes he represents for her.

Ingenuous no doubt, but also ingenious, without knowing that he does no more than play the game of his mother. Here dwells no doubt, the pact by which two people feign that they do not know that they have the same knowledge of the same thing.

If in the analysis of the dead father Lacan shows that the subject who attributes the non-knowledge to the Other presents himself as knowing, what can we say of the subject of our analysis who poses himself as not knowing?

"I do not say that; this is the statement that Freud puts at the root of the *Verneinung*, when the subject constitutes himself as unconscious."²²

When E. receives his own words in the analysis, he negates them

either with silence or with the word, because the *Verneinung* secures his desire. The function of the *not* in the "I do not say" shows the most radical property of the signifier which presents itself as the possibility of being erased.

If we have recognized in the repressed the particularity of the indestructibility of the desire, we recognize as well in the *Verneinung* the fixation by which the subject does not want to know that he knows in a place where, if he were able to think it, his judgement would fail. He will then coincide with the Other, a fear to which E. succumbs. If E. were to know, the Other would know as well immediately. And here it is not only a question of his death wish but of his desire, in which case it would pertain to the Other and not to E.

The resistance—one of the five that Freud named—is also a way of avoiding the fantasm touched by Jones' pen with the name aphanisis. In brief, the resistance is the resistance to disappear as a subject. There is no other way to be constituted as a subject than not knowing.²³ The negation of E. —that he knew that his father was alive before dying— is only possible for him in the analysis. Retracing the path beyond the apparently painful indifference with which he retouches his existence; death will appear. This death, neither abstract nor far away nor virgin, is the death that the father bequeathed to him with his 'sins' as an accident of life, inverting in this way Freud's formula about life being an accident of death.

Although it is true that E. asked his mother for advice in despair and, as a result of consultations, the indication for an analysis emerged; it would not be simple to conclude that in his coming to analysis he was following the wish of his mother or on the contrary, he was using the analysis as the possibility of including me between him and his mother.

We have to be prudent. Freud used to repeat that when in doubt, abstinence was best, not in order to finish with nothing but in order to gain time to draw conclusions.

The retracing of this paper—the history of which contains the necessary deformations to impede the recognition of the analysand makes me arrive at the following conclusion. Neither too much nor too little, E. was asking from me, against his own resistances, the return of

his words in the course of the analysis—what he did not know that he knew, transferring his voice in the interpretation.

The path constituted as a symptom had to be un-knotted. The paternal demand unappealable forever left him in the shadows of the maternal seduction. Here the transference neurosis could not fail to appear under the form of imaginary alliances in the analysis in order to change one dependency for the other, while the direction of the analysis implied to work the transference in the particular dimension of E.'s own history.²⁴

If E. had inherited the mother, and if everybody in his family was sufficiently well informed to name the Oedipus complex, were they not expecting maybe that the analysis would play a kind of infantile fable where the analysts' armour with the gynaecological scissors would cut the mental umbilical cord?

The analysis implies risk, and the major risk which an analysis implies is exactly the construction not so much in its closeness or its distance from the historical truth (this was Freud's preoccupation) but because beyond being close or far from it, it can mark the subject in the mandate of following the construction forever. The Wolf Man is an example.²⁵

The analyst is not to give faith, of any last truth, to the analysand. The change produced in an analysis does not guarantee any advance. The only advance that can be guaranteed is the direction followed by psychoanalysis itself, even at pure loss.

A clinical paper—since this is the occasion to say it—has no other aim than the discussion, not in order to say that we know, not in order to repeat what has been said millions of times, but to show what is important in a history: the particular.²⁶ It is not closed to other interpretations or to other constructions, which is not the same as to say that the unconscious is open to all meaning.

Paraphrasing Borges, we can say that for Freud, memory²⁷ was so large that it included what had not taken place, forgetfulness and the not-known.

NOTES

- ¹ *Sea* and *see* are homonyms.
- ² Or of seeing. As above.
- ³ LACAN, J. *El deseo y su interpretación*, [1958], (Desire and its Interpretation) Ediciones Nueva Vision, Buenos Aires, 1970. My translation. There is no English translation.
- ⁴ LACAN, J. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis —From Interpretation to the Transference— p.253, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Alan Sheridan, The Hogarth Press, London, 1977.
- ⁵ As in Freud's Wolf Man.
- ⁶ LACAN, J. "The analyst's desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it. There only may be the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone it may live." From The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p.276.
- ⁷ FREUD, S. *Constructions in Analysis*, Stand. Ed., Vol.XXIII, 259-261, 265.
- ⁸ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.268.
- ⁹ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.268.
- ¹⁰ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.267.
- ¹¹ The Wolf Man remained a step back from Lacan's questioning in *L'éthique de la psychanalyse*, "If I can I ought". It is after this statement that an analysand demands *the pass* if he wants to be an analyst of the School.
- ¹² FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.260.
- ¹³ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.266.
- ¹⁴ SHAKESPEARE. Hamlet, Act I, Scene I.
- ¹⁵ FREUD, S. A Child is Being Beaten, Stand.Ed., Vol.XVIII, 185.
- ¹⁶ FREUD, S. *Erinnern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten, Gesammelte Werke*, X, p.129.
- ¹⁷ FREUD, S. *Die Wege der Symptombildung, Gesammelte Werke*, XI, 386.
- ¹⁸ FREUD, S. Remembering and Repeating, Stand.Ed., Vol.XII, 150.
- ¹⁹ FREUD, S. The Two Principles of Mental Functioning, Stand.Ed., Vol.XII, 225.

- ²⁰ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.225.
- ²¹ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.226.
- ²² LACAN, J. *El deseo y su interpretación* (Desire and its Interpretation).
- ²³ LACAN, J. *Idem*.
- ²⁴ LACAN, J. "History isn't the past. History is the past insofar as it is historized in the present, historized in the present because it was lived in the past. The path of the restitution of the history of the subject takes the shape of a search of the restitution of the past. This restitution should be considered the aim at which the roads of the technique attempt to arrive." My translation, from *Le Seminaire, livre I, Les écrits techniques de Freud*, [1953—1954], (The Technical Writings of Freud), Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1975. There is no English translation.
- ²⁵ OBHOLZER, K. *Entretiens avec l'Homme aux loups*, Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1981.
- ²⁶ LACAN, J. "The discovery, the progress of Freud, is the way in which he takes a case in its singularity. What does it mean to take it in its singularity? It means, essentially, that for him, the interest, the groundwork, the essence, the dimension proper to the analysis is the subject's reintegration of his history until its last limits, that is to say, until a dimension that surpasses amply the individual limits." My translation, from *Les écrits techniques de Freud*.
- ²⁷ PLATO. Socrates: "And let's say it's the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses. . ." From *Theaetetus* p.78, Oxford University Press, Great Britain, 1973.

METAPHOR AND THE FREUDIAN CLINIC

Frances M. Moran

The meaning of this paper will emerge only in the *telling*. It must not be *read*.

To have said the latter necessitates a pre-script to the paper, *Metaphor and the Freudian Clinic*, that I am about to deliver — for it alludes to the very context which situates that which I am to present.

As will become clear, this paper is one which is based upon a journey undertaken by virtue of an attempted clinical paper with reference to the *Wolf Man*. This journey is of a particular type, one which is distinctive in terms of its being without destination. It is a journey whose nature is reflected in the words spoken by Dorothy in response to Mr. Wainwright's interrogation about her wanderings in Orwell's novel, *A Clergyman's Daughter*.

SPD: "Those things don't really matter. I mean, things like having no money and not having

enough to eat. Even when you're practically starving —it doesn't change anything inside you."

Mr. W. "Doesn't it? I'll take your word for it, I should be sorry to try."

D. "Oh well, it's beastly while it's happening, of course, but it doesn't make any real difference: it's the things that happen inside you that matter."

Mr. W. "Meaning?"

D. "Oh things change in your mind. And then the whole world changes, because you look at it differently."¹

This paper, then, concerns a telling of my journey in reading a case history in Freud and your listening to my telling which is itself a reading. Hence we have here the Borromean Knot with the interlinking of reading, telling and listening.

To unlink the knot for the sake of clarification there is:

(i) *the reading* which points in the direction of those aspects of literature, and the other arts where the gaze is involved. This, of course is not to be confused with the clinic where it is not by chance, nor only because he tired of looking at his patients all day, that Freud placed himself beyond the risk of the lure —"the relationship between the gaze and what one wishes to see involves a lure."²

(ii) *the telling* which points in the direction of the free association of the patient without which there can be no interpretation of the patient's desire, the latter being the nucleus of clinical practice.

"For desire, if what Freud says of the unconscious is right and if analysis is necessary, can be grasped only in interpretation."³

(iii) *the listening* which points in the direction of the presence of the analyst which is "itself a manifestation of the unconscious".⁴ It points in the direction of he who with suspended attention has the nonsense-ears to hear the primary language in which beyond what the patient tells us of himself, he is already talking to us unknown to himself.⁵

The Borromean Knot, the reading, the telling and the listening in then, the structure which underlies the following presentation, a stru-

ture which must be kept in mind as he who has ears to hear is invited to listen to the metaphor of clinical practice in the speaking, *après coup*, of an attempt to write a clinical paper.

* * *

"There is no such thing as a metaphor of a metaphor."

Wallace Stevens

"But what is metaphor if not an effect of positive meaning, that is, a certain passage from the subject to the meaning of the desire?"

Lacan⁷

Several months ago I was asked to make a report to a group on the topic of Freud's reconstructions as found in the case of the Wolf Man. Full of good intentions I set about my task in a reasonable and methodical way. I read the text as if it were a novel and, as is the case with all proficient speed readers, my initial survey provided me with nothing more than a general overview. I returned to the text once more with the intention of culling from it a series of reconstructions. My aim was that of highlighting the clarity and precision of Freud's work. I, like numerous others, had been thrown into a state of utter adulation at Freud's incredible ability to reconstruct the patient's history to the point of finest detail. It was my continued fascination with Freud's production that for some time prevented me from actually setting about the work which lay virtually unattended in the palm of my own hands.⁸ The part played by resistance in transference is indeed very considerable. Nevertheless, I was later to find that the same text was to evoke a wide spectrum of feelings including anger, hopelessness, excitement and curiosity to mention but a few. It was not until I had well and truly embarked upon an attempt to write my own paper that I could appreciate Freud's warning, namely, that the difficulties in store when the beginner comes to deal with associations and with reproduction of the repressed are insignificant compared with the much more serious difficulty that has to be met in the management of the transference.⁹

In spite of clinging to my original intention I somehow found myself in a maze as I tried to plot out the reconstructions of the meaningful

events whose repression had structured the obsessional symptoms.

It was in attempting to find a way through this maze that I grasped the nonsense that the sum of the past can never equal a (w)hole that is always a hole. In other words, the cause of the symptoms cannot be understood in a linear fashion, for overdetermination presides. Furthermore, psychoanalysis doesn't cure, because it doesn't repair what is irreparable, it doesn't give back the lost. As Gustavo Etkin tells us:

"The idea, yes, is to be able to live with that wound in such a way that the inevitable pain which is produced — will not develop into a black hole which attracts and absorbs the possibility of *jouissance* (pleasure) and the tension of life. Nothing more, but nothing less."¹⁰

There seemed to be no way in which I could do justice to the intricacies and complexities of the processes recognized by Freud within the formulation of his presented reconstructions. As a means of assuaging my frustration I drew consolation from the words with which Freud himself opens Chapter Two:

"I am unable to give either a purely historical or a purely thematic account of my patient's story; I can write a history neither of the treatment nor of the illness, but I shall find myself obliged to combine the two methods of presentation. It is well known that no means has been found of in any way introducing into the reproduction of an analysis the sense of conviction which results from the analysis itself. Exhaustive verbatim reports of the proceedings during the hours of analysis would certainly be of no help at all; and in any case the technique of the treatment makes it impossible to draw them up. *So analyses such as this are not published* in order to produce conviction in the minds of those whose attitude has hitherto been recusant and sceptical. The intention is only to bring forward some new facts for investigators who have already been convinced by their own clinical experience."¹¹

Judging myself to be one of those who have already been convinced I felt heartened, and, being blinded to the fact that I was "concerned with what is perhaps the most difficult material that can be the subject of human research",¹² thereupon decided to focus on what I considered to be a less ambitious project.

Two years ago a paper was delivered at the Homage to Freud entitled *A Pseudonym, the Itinerary for a Perversion*,¹³ in which Lewis Carroll was cited as explaining the origin of *The Hunting of the Snark*.

"I was walking on a hillside, alone, one bright summer day, when suddenly there came into my head one line of verse —one solitary line— "For the Snark was a Boojum, you see."

I was able to recall this with interest, no doubt, because for some unknown reason the title of a paper, *The Godfather and the Wolf Man*, had occurred to me at some most unexpected moment. Surely, I thought to myself, this would be a good idea to pursue in view of the company I would be keeping in following up an idea that suddenly came into my head.

Hence, I turned to the Chapter headed, *The Obsessional Neurosis*, with regenerated enthusiasm but found "that things are not so simple"¹⁴ and that the project could not be carried out quickly. I knew that to be trapped by that poisonous utilitarian attitude would inevitably prove itself to be fatal. A telling consequence of my interest in this exploration was that I shed the need to get onto other things and allowed myself to work at it slowly, carefully and thoroughly. It seems to me, it is that attitude that finds what is to be found, nothing else; for as we are told, we must be prepared to work over many tons of ore which may contain but little of the valuable material we are in search of.¹⁵ Again and again I had to return to the earlier chapters with reference to the seduction and the dream. The return of the repressed led me to return to the repressed repeatedly. The project had become one which was beyond the pursuit of intellectual pleasure —it had become a work of excavation:

"...it must be born in mind that the excavation is dealing with destroyed objects of which large and important portions have quite certainly been lost, by mechanical violence, by fire and by

plundering. No amount of effort can result in their discovery and lead to their being united with the surviving remains. The one and only course open is that of reconstruction, which for this reason can often reach only a certain degree of probability. But it is difficult with the psychical object whose early history the analyst is seeking to recover. Here we are regularly met by a situation which with the archaeological object occurs only in such rare circumstances as those of Pompeii or the tomb of Tutankhamun. All of the essentials are preserved, even things that seem completely forgotten are present somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the subject. Indeed, it may, as we know, be doubted whether any psychical structure can really be the victim of total destruction."¹⁶

With each re-reading I saw some new shade of meaning, some more clearly defined aspect of the history.

But this return led me even further afield than I could ever have imagined at the outset. Like a dream, where in regression the fabric of the dream thoughts is resolved into its raw material, the fabric of this particular case history seemed to be resolving into the raw material of the Works of Freud before my very eyes.¹⁷

I found myself working through the pages of Totem and Taboo, The Ego and the Id; The Oedipus Complex; The Resolution of the Oedipus Complex; Obsessions and Phobias; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety; The Future of an Illusion; A Child is Being Beaten. . . . It was then that I knew that I had been taken beyond the realm of my good intentions — I had no neat paper which presented a process schema clarifying the *I*-identifications and the *It*-identifications associated with the father, son and Godfather as I had previously hoped and planned. The former were to refer to the Wolf Man's ideas of himself as a child of God and son of his father where those identifications were to endeavour to mould his ego after the fashion of the one that has been unconsciously taken as a

model. The latter, the *It*-identifications were to refer to the indistinguishable object investment and identification which occurs at the very beginning in the primitive oral phase and to the super-ego, the heir of the Oedipus complex, which is derived from a transformation of the child's earliest object investment into identifications. Not only did I have no paper to present for the date appointed for my report but my paper still remains unwritten. I may well have had good intentions and, furthermore the burden of the name proved too great for me — I have yet to make its inheritance my own.¹⁸

And myself at this point? No doubt, an ex-centric, lost in Borges' library¹⁹ that "sphere whose exact centre is any one of its hexagons and whose circumference is inaccessible". Search as I might, there is no catalogue of catalogues to this other 'scene';²⁰ a scene where there are no things, only *Sachvorstellungen*. There was/is no end possible to my search for there remains that shelf which is yet to be done.^{21 22} The telling of my attempted clinical paper has not a happy end if one imagines that "to understand is an end in itself" but it bears the mark of a realization that "the greatest successes do not require that one knows where one is going".²⁴

While there is no post-script to this paper — for we are duped if we have been led to believe that we will find symmetry in the experience of the Freudian clinic, I bring this paper to a termination. It is true, as the able listener will have heard that I have mixed my metaphors. There is no doubt, therefore, that this paper is a derivative of clinical practice wherein the inmixing is best described by drawing upon the analogy of the enfolding of the moebius strip where the inside is the outside and the outside the inside. All this is to say, that the analyst is the analysand and the analysand, the analyst in that enfolding wherein the analyst remains always an analysand insofar as he continues to desire the Truth.

I remain, therefore, an ex-centric, one lost in Borges' library or dare I say that I am where *It* speaks and I cannot. If this be so then at most I can refer you to the same library, there where there will be no final answer, no catalogue of catalogues, only the question that is to be asked at that moment when the journey reaches the end which is the beginning — *Do you want what you desire?*

NOTES

- ¹ ORWELL, G. *A Clergymen's Daughter*, Secker & Warbury, 1965, p.294.
- ² LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, Penguin, 1977, p.103.
- ³ LACAN, J. *Ecrits, A Selection*, Tavistock, London, 1977, p.169.
- ⁴ LACAN, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, p.125.
- ⁵ LACAN, J. *Ecrits*, p.81.
- ⁶ STEVENS, W. Cited in T. Hawke, *Metaphor*, Methuen & Co., 1972, p.91.
- ⁷ LACAN, J. *Ecrits*, p.258.
- ⁸ FREUD, S. *Observations on Transference-Love*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XII, 159.
"The part played by resistance in transference-love is unquestionable and very considerable."
- ⁹ FREUD, S. *Observations on Transference-Love*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XII, 159.
- ¹⁰ ETKIN, G. *Psychoanalysis and Cure*, in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, Homage to Freud — 1979*, PIT Press, Melbourne, 1980, p.57.
- ¹¹ FREUD, S. *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XVII, 13.
- ¹² FREUD, S. *The Question of Lay Analysis*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XX, 191.
- ¹³ ZENTNER, M.I. *A Pseudonym, the Itinerary for a Perversion*, in *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, Homage to Freud, On Perversion*, 1980, PIT Press, Melbourne, 1981.
- ¹⁴ FREUD, S. *The Question of Lay Analysis*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XX, 198.
- ¹⁵ FREUD, S. *Idem*, p.219.
- ¹⁶ FREUD, S. *Constructions in Psychoanalysis*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XXIII, 259-260.
- ¹⁷ FREUD, S. "In regression the fabric of the dream-thoughts is resolved into its raw material." From *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Stand.Ed., Vol.V, 543.
- ¹⁸ GOETHE, J.W. "What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, acquire it to make it thine." *Faust, Part 1 Scene 1* cited in Freud, S. *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XXIII, 207.
- ¹⁹ BORGES, J.L. *The Library of Babel*, In *Labyrinths*, Penguin, 1970, p.79.

- ²⁰ FREUD, S. *The Interpretations of Dreams*, Stand.Ed., Vol.V, 536.
- ²¹ FREUD, S. "It almost looks as if analysis were the third of those 'impossible' professions in which one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results. The other two, which have been known much longer, are education and government." From *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, Stand.Ed., Vol.XXIII, 248.

THE PSYCHOSIS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SON

Rob Gordon

"The gods belong to the field of the real."

Lacan¹

"Timeless as water into language flowing,
Molten as snow on new burns,
The limbo of half-knowing
Where the gagged conscience twists and
turns,
Will plant the flag of their knowing.
It is not peace we seek but meaning."

Lawrence Durrell²

"In the year 1830, I was unfortunately deprived of the use of reason. . . . The Almighty allowed my mind to become a ruin under sickness — delusions of a religious nature. My soul survived that ruin."³

John Perceval begins the account of his psychosis with these words. For two years he was acutely ill and confined in two separate lunatic

asylums. The fact that his father, *Spencer Perceval*, was Prime Minister of England from 1809 to 1812 makes the story all the more significant, especially if we follow Lacan:

"It is in . . . the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in the place of the Other, and in the failure of the paternal metaphor, that I designate the defect that gives psychosis its essential condition."⁴

Although the Name-of-the-Father has a relation to the actual father which must be determined in each case, we can suspect that John's psychosis will find its signification in relation to Spencer. Not only did he embody the Law of the family, but he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, Attorney General and Prime Minister.⁵ Although regarded as "an industrious mediocrity of the narrowest type,"⁶ Spencer's life is not without interest, particularly as a framework for John's delusions. Its signification is taken *nächtraglichkeit* from its last event — for Spencer Perceval was the only English Prime Minister to have been assassinated. It happened around 5 p.m. on May 11th, 1812. He had just stepped into the lobby of the House of Commons when a certain *John Bellingham* held a pistol to his chest and shot him through the heart. He is said to have uttered a cry, taken several steps forward and said, "Murder!" as he fell.⁷

Now Bellingham also had a relation to psychosis. His father "had been in confinement as a lunatic and had died mad,"⁸ and this tragedy must have had its effect on the son. While acting as an agent in Archangel, Russia, he was imprisoned for five years *because of unpaid debts*. On his return to England, he developed a "delusional resentment"⁹ at the Government's refusal to pay him compensation for his trouble.¹⁰ In fact the accounts in *The Times* give the impression that the assassination of Perceval was in effect, an elaborate method of committing suicide. Bellingham said: "It is a private injury. I know what I have done. It was a denial of justice on the part of the Government."¹¹

From prison, he wrote to his landlady, "For eight years I have never found my mind so tranquil as since this melancholy, but necessary catastrophe."¹² He is said to have died without fear or remorse, cheered by many of the crowd, who then auctioned his clothes button by button

as souvenirs.¹³ He had been tried and executed within seven days of the crime.

Spencer's body was initially placed in the Speaker's picture room of the House. When his wife, Jane, was told, "at first she refused to believe it 'and even fancied she heard him coming upstairs'. For hours she was too shocked to cry, but finally she broke down and afterwards grew 'very moderate and resigned'.¹⁴ A newspaper of the time — *The Day* — reported that while the body lay in the Speaker's room, "one of the sons of Mr. Perceval, a fine boy of about thirteen years of age happened accidentally to come down a few moments after the assassination took place. . . the unhappy child's distress is beyond description". Gray, who reports this in a footnote of his biography of Spencer, concludes the son referred to was probably John, then nine years old, since his elder brothers were away at Harrow school.¹⁵

Spencer was an arch-conservative and belonged to the Tory Party; he supported the war against Napoleon in Spain, but opposed almost all reforms except the abolition of slavery. The latter offended his Christian conscience, since he had been an early follower of the evangelical movement.

Because of the importance of religious themes in John's psychosis, it is worth examining this aspect of Spencer's life. He went to Trinity College, Cambridge in 1780, and studied law. There he joined a small evangelical group in what was predominantly an unreligious environment. The evangelical movement emphasised the need for an active spiritual life. Its followers "believed that the immediate action of the Holy Spirit leads men through conversion to a holy life. . . . They accepted the total depravity of man: of his own will, he cannot turn to God, and restoration of divine favour can be affected by Christ alone. . . . They developed an almost morbid preoccupation with death. In their reaction against rationalism, they allowed unfettered scope to the emotions. . . they depreciated intellectual pursuits and relied on uncritical Biblical literalism". They manifested "an intense preoccupation with the salvation of the individual".¹⁶

Spencer made religion central to both family and public life, to the extent that when his first son (also called Spencer) was only a few days old and seemed on the point of death from a painful bowel disorder, he

wrote a special prayer which was credited with curing him. He wrote another prayer for himself on becoming Prime Minister. He studied the prophetic books of the Bible.

Spencer in fact seemed not entirely free of the gift himself. After his death, a letter was found to his son, Spencer, in which he wrote of his life, "with a sense of the improbability of its long continuance".¹⁷ A marginal note to a poem was found in his hand, which recalls the account of Jane's reception of the news of the assassination:

"I do not weep, the springs of tears are dry,
And of a sudden I am calm as if
All things were well, and yet my husband's
murdered."¹⁸

He was also said to have had a strong presentiment of his death and gave his will to his wife with instructions some days before it. In addition John Williams, of Cornwall dreamed the exact details of the assassination three times on the night of the 2nd or 3rd of May.¹⁹ Spencer was staunchly opposed to allowing Roman Catholics rights to vote or hold public office. This was later a matter of some concern for John. In particular, two acts of Spencer's were also of significance in John's illness. First, as Prime Minister, Spencer had suitable *religious books distributed to sick and wounded soldiers*. Second, he repaired Whitehall Chapel so it could *seat the King's Guard* during services. A contemporary wrote of him that he was "the model of a Christian gentleman. . . illustrating the Gospel by his public adoption of its verities, and his practical submission to its precepts. . . . He might be said to have been Christianity personified".²⁰

Although not much appears to be known of his family life, it was generally held up as one of his virtues. It seems, however, that he eloped with his wife, Jane Wilson, through the drawing-room window. His older brother had married her older sister, but the girls' father had not agreed to Spencer and Jane's union. They went on to have twelve children, of which John seems to have been 5th. He said the happiness of children, "is as great as anything the world can produce".²¹ He "was beloved without a sensation of fear, and was never so happy as when playing in the midst of them".²² The night before his death, when told no guests were expected for dinner, he said, "I am happy, for I shall have a

pleasure I very seldom enjoy, of dining with all my family alone". After dinner, the customary passage from the Bible was read and he asked Jane to allow the children to stay up later than usual. Then he kissed and blessed each one as they went to bed.²³

He was an unusually pale man. He dressed in black, and was called 'sepulchral Spencer Perceval'. An associate described him as "a short, spare, pale-faced, hard, keen, sour-looking man with a voice well suited to the rest".²⁴ Needless to say, this was the view of a political opponent. In addition to his rigidity and bigotry, there are hints of an obsessional disposition. He prepared all speeches in great detail, and read them from the drafts. When pressed to extemporise, he would become *confused and ineffectual*. He lacked confidence which, in his early years mounted to timidity, and had an "excess of modesty". He was said to *tutter*, particularly at the beginning of his sentences. This defect seems to have interfered with his spontaneous public speaking.²⁵

Politically, he was one of the most repressive 19th Century prime ministers. He published pamphlets such as, *The Duties and Powers of Public Officers with respect to Violations of the Public Peace*. The Ludite riots occurred during his period of office and he ordered the army against them. There was strong public feeling against him in the lower classes.

But it is significant that his assassin was regarded as insane, although the plea was rejected by the jury because of his composure. However, a contemporary wrote, "No person can have heard what the conduct and demeanour of the man has been since he committed the crime, or can have read his defence without being satisfied that he is mad."²⁶

John Perceval was not the only eccentric family member. Frederica, the youngest child, kept the blood-stained rug on which her father died, and other relics until her own death in 1900.²⁷ *Spencer junior*, on the other hand, seems to have espoused evangelical doctrines of a more enthusiastic nature than his father. When cholera reached England from France in October 1831, he saw it as Divine retribution for the nation's evil ways. He had already moved for a nation-wide fast in December 1830 — the time when John was at the height of the acute phase of his illness. However, in consequence of the poor acoustics of the House of Commons, his colleagues misheard him and thought he referred to a

military matter and cried, "General what?" When he finally made himself heard, a member asked if he was aware that one-third of the people fasted every day of the week already? In January 1831, he moved it again and was quite beside himself. With Bible in hand, he haranged the Parliament for an hour and three-quarters denouncing and prophesying desolation and pestilence.²⁸ Le Marchent, a witness, described the scene: "Perceval looked as if he had just escaped from Bedlam — his face pale as death— his eyes flaring."²⁹ Another diarist of the time wrote, "Poor Perceval made a dreadful exhibition of fanaticism in the House. He was clearly labouring under temporary derangement. . . . Afterwards the unfortunate gentleman sat down exhausted by his own phrenzy."³⁰ We may well wonder what part his brother John's distressing illness played in young Spencer's views. Soon after this Spencer left Parliament and joined the Irvingite church. Edward Irving was a charismatic evangelical figure who also features on the periphery of John's narrative.

* * *

John Perceval was born in 1803. He was nine years old when his father was killed. He left school at the age of seventeen, studied one year with a private tutor and then followed the inclination "formed in childhood for a military life". He found army life difficult. He resisted tendencies in his companions to make light of religion and morality or to drive him to intemperance by ridicule. One can suspect that some of these tendencies may have been shared with his companions when he says,

"In private I had severe conflict of mind upon the truth and nature of the Christian religion, accompanied with acute agony at my own inconsistency of conduct and sentiment with the principles of duty and feeling taught by Jesus and His apostles;"³¹

But then he "found at last a time of peace, and joy and triumph, as I imagined in the doctrines usually styled 'evangelical' ". He implies they were a new discovery, and nowhere does he refer to the religion of his childhood. Could it be that the faith of Sir Henry Carr, K.C.E., his mother's second husband had not been that of the Prime Minister? Had he lost contact with evangelism as practised in the family by Spencer,

only to rediscover it later? John makes no reference to Spencer's religion, nor does he speak of it as other than a dramatic new force in his life. *It would seem that the religion of his father had been repressed only to return when he was beset by difficulties.*

"Till then the message of Jesus Christ, instead of being a message of gladness had always been to me one of increasing woe and shame; as a sinner, to whom it made the law more binding, the offences against the law more ungrateful — the heinousness of the crime deeper, in proportion to my conception of the boundless love of the Almighty God. Then I understood that the law was done away in Christ, and liberty given to the mind." (p.6)

But as with all compromise solutions to psychical conflicts, the "peace and joy and triumph" were attained at a price. It was after this, in 1829 that his "conduct first became decided and extreme, through the active principle instilled by the doctrines". He felt he had become one of the elect of God the Father, "for the sake of the obedience and sacrifice of Jesus Christ" and that he "a vile and weak creature" had been changed into the "likeness of Divine holiness". Now his conflict was restructured in another form — he felt "gratitude for the gift given", but "fear of the wrath of God if I disobeyed the end for which it was given". It now concerns his very existence in the face of an Other who will judge harshly.

The relocation of the conflict rests on his relation to the Law. He feels himself clearly within it, and consequently now he can fall outside it. But the Law which founds man's existence as a subject is not just a system of commandments, but as Lacan points out,

"the law of man has been the law of language since the first words of recognition presided over the first gifts."³²

Perceval is precariously situating himself within the symbolic register, which will locate him in relation to the function which constitutes the Law — namely, the function of the father — Almighty God. In the words of Lacan,

"It is in the name of the father that we must

recognise the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history has identified his person with the figure of the law."³³

Hence it is no less than the field of the symbolic, the field of language, which is at stake for Perceval, in its capacity to constitute his relations to the imaginary and to the real — and in turn constitute him as a subject. John says the law was "done away in Christ" and the "liberty" he speaks of, refers to the beginnings of a process of a loss of the symbolic function and hence a loss of the separation of it from the imaginary and the real.

We may assume from what he has said, that Almighty God had received a signification as a being whose declared love did nothing to abate its authoritarian power. Do we sense something here about the conduct of Spencer toward his son? The Almighty who has been instituted as the representation of John's superego is displaced by a tolerant Christ, who holds before him the representation of an ego ideal that will permit, as he says, "that the soul might choose gratefully what it could not be driven to by fear". The effect of this restructuring of his superego was to open the way for an augmentation of his ego which, as we have seen, was accustomed to a harsh jurisdiction.

During this period, John was stationed with his regiment in Dublin and busied himself with the religious welfare of his men. He read the service to them, and *procured books for them and for the sick*. Then he *"procured seats for the men in a large chapel"*. These actions bear a remarkable resemblance to those of the Prime Minister. But his conduct began to cause problems for him in the face of the prevailing army life. He says,

"I judged it prudent to withdraw from a scene of constant conflict with my own conscience. . . My last attachment to the Tory party and to the pride of being an Englishman, were then severed. I had thought my country upright, noble and generous and that party honest and honourable. I now despised the one, and began to hate and fear the other." (p.10)

As we know, his father had been a Tory Prime Minister. Does England here constitute a displacement for the father?

He now repudiates the paternal function as it is represented in his reer and his political allegiance. But he gives us another detail. He tells us he feared that the Duke of Wellington, then Prime Minister, might lead the army for "putting down the will of the people by the bayonet". The figure of "The Prime Minister" emerges as a harsh, wrathful judge, prepared to use John as his instrument. Remember Spencer's use of troops to quell the Luddite riots.

John structured political events as representations of his relation to the paternal metaphor. Repression had sustained an identification with "kings and constitution" and the army. But this was set aside. He wished to escape the dominion of the father but replaced the symbolic structure of career, family, and political adherence with an elevation of the father into an imaginary position so that he became "Almighty". Liberty brought in its train persecution, and thrust him out of the symbolic register. John shows this when he says,

"I was also strongly persuaded that the time of the end was at hand, and that God was about to visit the nations with his plagues." (p.11)

Remember Spencer junior's parliamentary activities along the same line (thought.) John demonstrates the experience of the loss of the symbolic — that sense of universal disintegration or collapse, which is so often the prodrome of a schizophrenic illness. He well knows this when he says in the next paragraph, "So seeking liberty, I fell into confinement; seeking to serve the Almighty, I disgraced His worship and my own name."

He left the army imbued with his freedom. He felt at first "joy unutterable and full of glory", and "endued with a new nature, and with power to overcome all those habits which had most vexed me during my life". He found that his "mind and conduct were for the first time consistent with each other". He had received the support of the evangelical community in Dublin, where he would have stayed, but he felt it was "my duty to my mother. . . and my attachment to England" which made him leave. In Oxford, where he then went, he found himself alone. Others would not share his religious views. He faltered, feeling puzzled, then decided, then mistrustful; he began to fluctuate between fear and illness. Spencer must have felt a similar isolation at Cambridge, where his evangelism was out of sympathy with his environment.

But then—and it is curious how fully John gives the detail—he was at an old man's sick bed in Oxford, and there met a friend of one of his brothers. This man was a Calvinist and introduced him to a circle of like-minded friends. He looked on this event as a signal of encouragement from the Almighty. But its meaning is perhaps also built on the fact that the old man, (named Bradley) had "put on mourning at my father's death, though he knew him not," and it gave John happiness that a few days before his death, Bradley "understood that one of my father's sons had attended upon him".

An imaginary father appeared in the form of the dying Bradley and presented him with a companion, also a friend of his brother; or should this young man be understood as a brother of his brothers, as a son of his father? Should he be understood as a Double for John Perceval who brought to him that certainty that he lacked?

In Oxford, he mentions attending the preaching of Henry Bulteel (1800—1866). Bulteel was a "high Calvinist with a reforming spirit".³¹ But his teaching of predestination, justification and salvation brought him into conflict with church authorities, and as a result of a sermon indicting the university and the church in February 1831, (several months after John became ill), he had his licence to preach withdrawn and left the Anglican church to found his own group who became known as the Bulteelers.³² The effects of such a radical can only have intensified John's repudiation of the structure in which he had been situated.

* * *

In June 1830, John heard of certain miraculous events reported to have taken place at Row, a town near Glasgow in Scotland. A friend urged him to go there and see if they were true. He left Oxford in July and must have arrived some weeks later.

These events at Row are not explicitly mentioned by John, but will be found to occupy a significant place in Presbyterian church history. John reports meeting all the main characters involved. John McLeod Campbell was the local minister, and John stayed in his house with him. He was said to be one of the saintliest and most learned ministers of his day. He had drawn the attentions of the church elders by maintaining doctrines contrary to the Calvinist principle that only a few chosen ones

would receive eternal life. Exception was taken to such statements as "God loves every child of Adam with a love the measure of which is to be seen in the agonies of Christ".³⁶ He inspired strong religious feeling in his congregation, but was called before the Presbytery in September 1830, to answer charges of heresy. John accompanied him to this hearing and assisted in the preparation of his defence. In May the following year, he was dismissed from the ministry — the same year as Bulteel in Oxford.

Campbell's position had been aggravated by a spate of miracles in his parish. A certain consumptive, Isabella Campbell, (no relative of John McLeod's), "had lived and died a life of such unusual sanctity as to draw pilgrims to her couch and to her home from many quarters".³⁷ When her sister Mary was in a decline with the same disease, she began speaking "with superhuman strength in an unknown tongue". Nearby, in Port Glasgow, two brothers named Macdonald had a similarly stricken sister. One day, she declared to James, the elder of the two, that he might be endowed with the Holy Ghost. He turned away towards the window for a moment, then said, "I have got it". He went to his sister and spoke from the 20th Psalm saying, "Arise, and stand upright!" After several repetitions, she rose and was healed. They wrote to Mary Campbell with the news and when she read the letter she also rose from what had seemed her death-bed and pronounced herself healed. Whereas for some time she had been bed ridden, she now resumed a very active life speaking in tongues to assemblies of people.³⁸

These events occurred in the context of declarations that the Second Coming was at hand. Edward Irving declared the Row miracles a second revelation, and showed that the church need no longer rely on a single revelation for its establishment. The principle of continued divine inspiration was propounded to form a new religious current. Speaking in tongues happened more and more to others in the vicinity. It is said that Mary Campbell "is responsible for the modern Pentecostal movements".³⁹

John Perceval must have spent some weeks in this atmosphere. He says he spoke often to and received advice from Mary Campbell; he spent time with the Macdonald brothers and other prominent figures. While he revelled in the milieu of divine contact, he found the direct

confrontation with its manifestation disturbing and confusing. During a luncheon at the manse, a young woman asked him to come outside for a moment where she addressed him in tongues and quoted scripture to him. He attended meetings and soon began to feel promptings within him to make biblical quotations to passers-by. But he "shrank from doing so, conceiving it to be a delusion". Although mistrusting himself when he left Row he felt "in my own imagination, a living instance of the Holy Ghost operating in man".

He then went back to Dublin, where his doubts became greater. At the same time, he noticed pains in his "palate, throat and hearing" by which he felt able to discern evil in himself. In describing these pains, he repeatedly makes reference to the phrase "hold my tongue". He often felt the urge to speak. When he did not speak and actually held his tongue, he went against God's will, which was for him also against the laws of nature. It was then that he felt the pains.

What began as an imaginary injunction: "hold your tongue" was transposed into the real. It lost its linguistic status and became an immediate effect on the body, in consequence of him being outside the law of language. John's pains marked him rather, as the object of another's injunction. Thus he became trapped in the real. If he did not speak as he was guided, but followed his own thoughts, he would "*stumble upon broken sentences, stammer and prove ridiculous*". Recall how Spencer stuttered and stumbled when he neglected his carefully prepared draft and tried to extemporise. It appears the father too, mistrusted his own spontaneous thought and required the formality of preconceived language to protect him. Thus he found himself in an impossible position. If he spoke he feared that he was mad and hence outside the law, if he did not speak, he felt he was evil and ungrateful and hence also outside the law.

Doubt, which remained one of his major symptoms, shows itself to be a state where the subject finds himself at a loss. He is outside the structure which locates him as a subject and is unable to establish a relation to the claims laid on him. Doubt, in fact, seems to indicate the loss of status as subject. In John's case, being outside the law of the father meant he gained a freedom to doubt, but it was an illusion, giving him the status of object of the imaginary agencies he had set up through his

scape — that is, the Almighty and those in close communion with him.

Much later, when he began to recover from the illness, it was because resolved the doubt. Paradoxically, however, he did this by beginning doubt his guidance itself. Doubt enabled him to form the idea that his perience was a delusion — cast by wicked spirits perhaps, but nevertheless, he located it as an imaginary phenomenon. He then ceased to see.

Doubt, which undermined his relation to the symbolic order undermined the snare which restricted him to the real, and opened the way for him to restructure himself as a subject again. But at this stage, it still undermines his relation to the symbolic.

On his return to Dublin, he met two "individuals" who had been at Row. It is to be wondered if they were women since he goes on to say, "I was tempted to protract my stay until they returned to Scotland". He described meeting many women while at Row. But by now his doubt and uncertainty had made him "incapable of speaking... without interlarded rebuke and misgiving, accompanied with real nervous pain". He felt inclined often to give up all care in religion, exhausted, weary and broken-hearted". In this confusion and despair can be detected the breakdown of his investment of religion as the central theme of his life. It had been basic to the formation of his superego, and the means for eliminating other desires in his life. These now became freed.

He then succumbed to the invitation of "a woman of the town". He describes a

"sense of shame, of ingratitude, of remorse, continual accusation of myself, that I did not feel the extent of my crime, of my guilt in bringing disrepute on doctrines I was persuaded came from the Holy Spirit". (p.26)

does not feel guilt for his sexual activity, but for his lack of remorse. He allows himself the pleasure, but it seems also to constitute an attack on the doctrines. It is via the path of sexuality that his hatred of the father comes to expression at the same moment that he has most fully aligned himself with Him. Perhaps the foundations for this act were laid by Spencer's views on adultery. He had strongly supported a number of attempts to make it a punishable offence.⁴⁰

As a result of the indulgence, John contracts, or thinks he contracts a venereal disease and takes what appear to be obsessional cleaning measures, as well as mercury. The venereal disease becomes the signifier of his hatred of the Creator of the Law, and allows it to escape repression. *The sexual encounter leads directly to the acute phase of the psychosis.*

While staying with friends, he spoke to them in foreign tongues, endeavoured to place his hand in the fire to show it would be unhurt, and when given a red handkerchief, saw it as a token of ill exclaiming, "what have you given me? You have given me blood." He "forboded a calamity which, though inevitable, I could not distinctly see". That night, he woke and a voice told him he had offended the Lord by taking the medicine and "could only be saved by being changed into a spiritual body, and that a great fight would take place in my mortal body between Satan and Jesus. The result of which would either be my perfection in a spiritual body or my awakening in hell".

The struggle demands that he take a position —

"resting on my feet, my knees drawn up and on my head and [be] made to swing my body from side to side without ceasing. In the meantime I heard voices without and within me, and sounds as of the clanking of iron, and the breathing of great forge bellows, and the force of the flames" (p.29)

After passing the night like this he felt his body had been perfected and clothed upon with the Holy Ghost. He felt two different guidings and one half of his body "appeared in a state of scarlet inflammation".

During the morning he had at first felt like an angel, then became confused, unable to move and overwhelmed with the conviction of utter worthlessness. A spirit cried out "in me, and for me, Lord! take me as I am!" This utterance seems to mark his capitulation to the psychosis; he abandons the attempt to remain within the Law.

Let us review the sequence of events. First, he travels from Row to Dublin. On the way he lost his Hebrew Bible — a parapraxis for

dowing the loss of the symbolic and his repudiation of the 'true' *gion*. He declines an offer to become a curate in Somersetshire. This would have placed him under the jurisdiction of a Bishop and a structure of law. Instead he goes to Limerick and preaches with the assistance of his spirit. After meeting the two "individuals" from Row, he stays in Dublin and gives expression to his sexual desire and aggressive wishes towards the father. He has in fact repeated the repudiation of the normal-symbolic career structure which occurred when he left the area. Only this time, we may assume a strong libidinal element in the experience at Row.

The split between sexual desire and guilt as to its aggressive significance, becomes focused on the venereal disease. He does not know whether to attribute his cure to the mercury he is taking or to a "magical blessing", being unable to decide, he says, "I split the difference by taking half the dose that my physician had ordered me. The result is, that I doubted my delusions and I doubted my physician."

At the moment of his capitulation, his friend enters the room and he is taken back to his hotel, a servant is put to guard him and a doctor called. This begins the period when confined to his room, and later to his bed, he is fully at the mercy of his voices, (while his elder brother, Spencer, is absent from England). During this time the spirits demand that he speak, and rebuke him for using his own voice, not that given to him. He is troubled in a series of doubts. When he loses patience and speaks pell-mell, he again feels the pain in palate and throat which stops him as effectively as a "hold your tongue!" He is required to resume the position demanded on head and feet.

He speculated on theological questions, and saw himself at their centre. "I perished," he says, "from an habitual error of mind. . . of fearing doubt". Later a "lunatic doctor" attended him, and he continued confined to his room. Much as he longed to exercise, he communicated with no one but his voices, with whom he expostulated. Again he foresaw "a dreadful doom which I could not define, and from which, like one in a dream, I attempted to run away". He had delusions that his whole family was waiting outside to hail him as a martyr; he believed he was to be crucified and burned; that his father and a deceased sister had been raised from the dead; that they had defended him from a violent mob

(remember the mob which gathered when Bellingham was escorted to prison) by sacrificing their lives.

In this experience we have a hint of what is to come — the violent mob represents his own hostility, responsible for the deaths of both father and sister. He becomes steadily more embroiled in delusions, which leave him not only powerless but unable to achieve any status other than that of object of his voices, and impossible object at that. Whatever he does he fails:

“My usual delusion came on me, that I was gifted with the power of an elephant to break my bonds; and when I tried and found how futile were my efforts, I was told I did not choose to use the strength I had, from cowardice, or ingratitude or laziness.” (p.41)

His delusion expressed the loss of a symbolic dimension. Instead of a psychical conflict, he experienced himself as the object of a battle in the real which concerned his body.

Many other delusions developed which centred on the spirits praying the Lord to allow him one more chance before eternal damnation. In this way, he moves steadily deeper into the centre of a structure which is not the less potent in its annihilating and omnipotizing of him for its being imaginary. There is a crescendo approaching. He struggles to be a subject, trying to satisfy and reconcile the voices. He is adjured to suffocate himself on his pillow, and is reminded: “it was my only chance of salvation, that, through my cowardice and want of fortitude whole creations were suffering as yet the wrath of the Almighty, waiting for my obedience”. He goes on:

“At last, one hour, under an access of chilling horror at my imagined loss of honour, I was unable to prevent the surrender of my judgement. The act of mind I describe was accompanied with the sound of a slight crack and the sensation of a fibre breaking over the right temple; it reminded me of the mainstay of a mast giving way. . . until now I had retained a kind of restraining power over my thoughts and belief; I

now had none. I became like one awake, yet dreaming.” (p.44)

He had now truly ‘cracked up’ as we still say. Something similar happened twice more; he felt himself in heaven, hell and on earth simultaneously; then he imagined the Almighty judges him for disobedience and cast a thunderbolt at him. The lightning pierced the air on his right and “the reason for disobedience on earth, and the mystery of my sinfulness was revealed to me”.

Here is another crucial experience. It opens the way to the fulcrum of his psychosis, which can now emerge in the real, as an experience lived through simultaneously with, but distinct from his mundane reality. It is an experience which presents him with the task imposed on him by his psychosis, which he will spend the rest of the term of his illness trying to signify. When he succeeds, and in the measure to which he does, he will have recovered.

* * *

The kernel of the psychosis emerges in the form of an experience, which is described in the following words:

“I heard what resembled the notes of a hurdy-gurdy, which appeared to go round me, playing a tune that effected me with extreme anguish. It seemed to remind me of all that I had forgotten of my heavenly Father’s care and love towards me. My mind, amidst other scenes, was transported back to Portugal — to a day when I passed through Alhandra on horseback on my way to visit the lines of Torres Vedras, in company with three brother officers. It appeared to me, as if that day a little Portuguese beggar boy had been playing on a hurdy-gurdy in the street. But to my imagination, now, it was connected also with a time of life, when I had in person lived at Alhandra, a beggar orphan boy. When I had been taken charge of by the vicar or priest of the parish, who had loved me, clothed me,

educated me, and provided for me as an assistant in the church. My protector had introduced me to the abbot of a monastery, and he also, a venerable old man, had been my patron. I rewarded them, by aiding in the robbery of the monastery chapel, with certain bad companions, and carrying off a golden relique, for the loss of which the old abbot had been sentenced to the flames by the Inquisition, being accused and condemned on presumption; and I had been too grossly sensual to come forward and save him. I had returned home, and in a few days I entered the sacristie, where was the vicar, and having *assassinated him*, stole his money and garments, which I disposed of and fled to Cintra. The monks of Alcobaca had there met me, and I became for a time repentant; but I was taken into their convent, and became at last, with another lad, the servant and enjoyer of their unnatural lusts.

During my residence there, I used to visit Cintra, and in one farm house, being asked to assist in killing a pig, I had, to gratify my cruelty, plunged it alive into boiling water, after fastening up its mouth with sackcloth, to prevent its cries being heard." (p.47)

What are the significations of these place-names? As we know, John served with the army in Portugal, and must have become well acquainted with the history of the Penninsular War, which his father supported. John must have learned that Alcobaca was a town housing an ancient monastery, "the pride of Portugal" and it was burnt to the ground by the French Marshall, Massena, when he was forced to retreat from the impregnable fortification line Wellington had established at Torres Vedras. The war had become a fight for an ideal against a barbarian in Spencer's view, and occurred in that period of John's childhood when we are told he formed his inclination for a military career. The campaigns were reported by The Times with patriotic

fervour and must have greatly excited a young boy's mind.

Cintra too, must have been a familiar name, for it was there that the French sued for peace after their first major defeat on the Continent by Wellington. In the Battle of Vimiero, in 1808, he gave Junot's troops "an unmerciful beating". Wellington was then encumbered with the arrival of two senior officers, who overruled his intention to drive the French out of Portugal by force, and negotiated the Convention of Cintra, which not only permitted Juno to evacuate his army from Portugal intact, but to do so at British expense, in British transports, with no restrictions on the further employment of the troops elsewhere, and unbelievably, allowing them to take all the goods acquired while in Portugal — that is, their plunder. This led to a major political crisis in London resulting in an inquiry before the House of Commons, in which Spencer played a prominent part. This was the year before he became Prime Minister. There was a strong popular feeling against the Government and the Generals. Wordsworth, for example, wrote, "Britannia sickens, Cintra, at thy name!" It represented a tragically wasted military opportunity.⁴¹ But perhaps it had a major impact on the Perceval household, since it almost led to the immediate collapse of Lord Portland's Government, and consequently much manouevering and consideration as to who might become the next Prime Minister. In the event, the Cintra Inquiry did not bring down the Government, but it did result in Spencer emerging for both Lord Portland and the King as heir to the post.

These names emerge from the past as signifiers of betrayal, which are inserted into John's delusions as the Lacanian "anchoring points",⁴² which pin the fabric of the delusions to the underlying framework.

John has created for himself "another scene" in which he can recreate the father's love and care, and relocate himself as a child. Repeatedly, he presents the death and betrayal of the father. First he represents the boy as an orphan, then he steals the relic and the abbot is killed, and he "assassinates" the vicar. He situates himself as the assassin of his father and in doing so, confirms how in the Prime Minister's death, the real coincided with an imaginary Oedipal event for the nine-year-old, who we may suspect, had later employed his faithful service to his country and church as an alibi, until they were rejected.

In the death of the pig, do we perhaps detect a representation of himself and his own suffering, in the boiling water of the real; and is the fastened mouth as akin to his experience of "hold your tongue!" on palate and throat, depicting his alienation from the use of language as a subject? As if to anticipate our response, in the paragraph following the quotation above, John relates how the Portuguese memory was assisted by an hallucinated song.

"I do not remember the hour and the day
But I do remember the day and the hour,
When I was a little boy;"

This surely is a reference to the traumatic discovery of Spencer's body, newly assassinated in the Speaker's Room. The psychotic split—avowel and disavowel together—is referred to; and he adds a footnote to the last line of the song, emphasising the link:

"I fear the death of my poor father was at the root of all my misfortunes; for I can trace the notes of this air, to the time we were living happily at Hampstead. I was then a little boy. But not now. *I do not yet understand his loss.*" (p.48)

How can he understand the event when the crucial memory was almost certainly unconscious? He thinks he should remember Portugal but we could suspect it is the discovery and the thoughts and desires linked to it that are really to be remembered. He is told by spirits his difficulty in remembering is due to his willfulness, and he understands the song to mean;

"that I *would* not, not that I *could* not remember, and this partly from compunction at the crimes I had committed on my patrons, partly from a sense of shame and guilt at the revelation of my acts of the monks." (p.48)

When he argues that he is alive in England and unaware of a concurrent life in Portugal, he "was made to understand that an act of ingratitude in childhood had effaced from my mind the consciousness of this mystery." Thus he describes the function of foreclosure, only he fails to make the substitution of his own past for Portugal.

Next, he imagines he will share the pig's fate, "my mouth covered

th sackcloth, bubbling and boiling and drowning and suffocating for ever and ever and ever!" He continues with the familiar representation of castration: "my eyes were to be taken out of my head, and I yet ritually see them hanging over me". He believed he heard the water being prepared in the next room.

The psychosis represents castration for the assassination of his father. Spencer himself has no place in the experience to this point. He is throughout the displacements, but the structure is lost, which in its symbolic function offers the possibility of a relation that will enable him to establish himself as a subject. It is the loss of the paternal function which Lacan designates as crucial in psychosis. Lacan's description of Schreber's delusions applies also to John's:

"For the psychosis to be triggered off, the Name-of-the-Father, *verworfen*, foreclosed, that is to say, never having attained the place of the Other, must be called into symbolic opposition to the subject.

It is the lack of the Name-of-the-Father in that place which, by the hole that it opens up in the signified, sets off the cascade of reshaping of the signifier from which the increasing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, to the point at which the level is reached at which signifier and signified are stabilised in the delusional metaphor."⁴³

his process of the foreclosure, the actual father's relation to the law is crucial:

"For one will find in it the reason for that paradox, by which the ravaging effects of the paternal figure are to be observed with particular frequency in cases where the father really has the function of a legislator or, at least has the upper hand, whether in fact he is one of those fathers who make laws or whether he poses as a pillar of the faith, as a paradigm of integrity and devotion. . . all ideals that provide him with all too many opportunities of being in a posture of undeserving, inadequacy even of fraud, and in

short, of excluding the Name-of-the-Father from its position in the signifier."⁴⁴

John uttered "one of the few sentences . . . addressed to any living being" during this time to the brother who bore the same name as his father. He said, "Spencer, I am desired to tell you, you are a hypocrite." On the curtains of his bed, he saw three faces, "one of my Saviour, the other my father and of my Almighty Father; both with long white beards". He was deeply impressed by this: "I saw the venerable countenance of my father bending over me weeping, and the crystal tears falling, which I felt trickling down my shoulders". The father appears at this point together with the displacements that have served for him, and perhaps the father's tears stand for those that the boy might have shed on the shoulders of his father as he bent over him, by the same kind of logic as Freud traces the transformations of Schreber's desires.⁴⁷

At this point we might pause to note that as if to etch more deeply the facts of history into young John's experience, we find that the next two Prime Ministers after Spencer also died in office. We can suppose their deaths must have evoked the traumatic discovery of his father's body and the office itself may well have become associated with death.

But the hallucinatory appearance to John of his father's face leads him to question the experience, "it was not altogether the countenance of my father as on earth. . . could my father's beard have been so white and long? . . . so my doubts took slight hold on my reason". The moment his illness reaches its full expression, he begins the process of recovery, or the attainment of a symbolic order. "A kind of confidence of mind came in me the evening after I had been threatened and saw the thunderbolt fall harmless by my side, and when two days passed, and found me safe in my bed." Other experiences of dire threat were passed too.

That is not to say, however, that he was any the less beset by the "disaster of the imaginary". He says, "my delusions or the meshes in which my reasoning faculties were entangled, became perfected; and it was next to impossible thoroughly to remove them, perhaps for man's word alone, impossible". But nevertheless he became well enough to travel, and was taken back to England and placed in the asylum of Dr.

Fox near Bristol, and later another. In these places, over the next two years, he recovered. This process is described in great detail, and seems to have involved the development of a strong hostile transference to his caretakers, the principal one of which was Dr. Fox. It is relevant that Spencer's principal parliamentary antagonist in the early part of his career was also named Fox, and that his maiden speech to the House "began with a panegyric on the constitution and a violent tirade against Fox."⁴⁵

Dr. Fox, his sons and the attendants became the castrators and the confinement the castration. He then devoted all his energies to becoming free of them, and so worked his way to a symbolic relation. In this way, John fulfills the condition required by Lacan when he asks,

"How can the Name-of-the-Father be called by the subject to the only place in which it could have reached him and in which it has never been? Simply by a real father, not necessarily by the subject's own father but by A-father."⁴⁶

Like Schreber with Flechsig,⁴⁷ John gradually constitutes himself as a subject in the face of Dr. Fox's apparently implacable indifference to him, and provides a justification for the anger and hate that the memory of his "odious evangelical" father did not allow. How can one, after all, hate a father of whom a Queen has written, "one of the best men, one of the truest friends. . . and one of the most upright characters that ever existed". That this was no mere compliment is evident in the medal that was cast in his memory after the assassination.

John's symptomatology continued to be florid for long periods, but as Freud stated, the symptoms themselves are the attempt at restitution for what was evident in the first weeks as the task imposed on him by his history, and which he received when he came of age. When he wrote of his experiences, years later, he could say,

"Now all or nearly all the phenomena which I have narrated, strange as they may appear, are to some degree or other familiar to all men. . . . For instance this power of the spirit to control the utterance is daily experienced, though not remarked, in what we call a slip of the tongue; where

one word is put for another and one letter transposed with another, and as the mind by a positive law always thinks in contraries at the same time, it almost invariably happens that the word made use of by mistake is the contrary to that intended. The universal for the particular, the affirmative for the negative, and the like (p.289-90)

And perhaps this last discovery made by John when observing a fellow patient points to the discrimination between real, imaginary and symbolic, and more importantly to the linguistic structure of lunacy — and it is this insight which, we can be sure, enabled him to recover “the use of reason”:

“Keeping my mind continually intent on unravelling and understanding the mysterious influence I was under, I one day saw an old gentleman who had been in China pluck a privet leaf, and declare it was tea; the same used to smear his face with red clay, calling it paint. I thought immediately thus — the spirit speaks poetically, but man understands it literally. Thus you will hear one lunatic declare that he is made of iron, and that nothing can break him; another that he is a china vessel, and that he runs the danger of being destroyed every minute. The meaning of the spirit is, that this man is as strong as iron, the other frail as an earthen vessel; but the lunatic takes the literal sense and his imagination not being under his own control, he in a manner feels it.” (p.271)

OTES.

LACAN, Jaques. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, The Hogarth Press, London, 1977, p.45.

From “The Reckoning” in *Selected Poems of LAWRENCE DURRELL*, Faber and Faber, London, 1977, p.68.

BATESON, Gregory (Ed.) *Perceval's Narrative, A Patient's Account of his Psychosis 1830—1832*, William Morrow and Company Inc., New York, 1974, p.1.

LACAN, Jaques. *On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis (1955)* in *Ecrits, A Selection*, translated by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p.215.

Dictionary of National Biography; Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, Vol.XV, 222.

GREEN, J.R. *A Short History of the English People*, Macmillan and Co., London, 1902, p.826.

Reported in *The Times*, 12th May, 1812.

VALPOLE, Spencer. *The Life of the Rt. Hon. Spencer Perceval including his Correspondence with Numerous Distinguished Persons by his Grandson*, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1874, Vol.II, 297.

MACALPINE, Ida and HUNTER, Richard. *George III and the Mad-Business*, Allen Lane, London, 1969, p.318.

The Times, 13th May, 1812.

MACALPINE and HUNTER. *op.cit.*, p.313.

Letter published in *The Times*, 13th May, 1812.

GRAY, Dennis. *Spencer Perceval, the Evangelical Prime Minister, 1762—1812*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1963, p.462. Further details are given in ASPINALL, A. (Ed.), *The Letters of George IV, 1812—1830*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1938.

GRAY. *op.cit.*, p.458.

ibid., p.459.

RAGG, G.R. *The Church and the Age of Reason (1648—1789)*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1960, 152-154.

GRAY. *op.cit.*, p.464.

Quoted in GRAY, *op.cit.*, p.465.

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

- ¹⁹ WALPOLE. *op.cit.*, Vol.II, 229. He gives the text of Williams' account of the experience.
- ²⁰ GRAY. *op.cit.*, p.16, quoted from *The Portrait of a Christian Gentleman*, by William Roberts, 1829.
- ²¹ GRAY: *op.cit.*, p.12.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p.27.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p.456.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.11, quoted from *The History of the Regency and Reign of George IV* by Cobbett.
- ²⁵ MARLOW, Joyce. Spencer Perceval, (1809—1812), in VAN THAL, Herbert (Ed.), *The Prime Ministers*, Vol.I, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1974, p.274.
- ²⁶ WALPOLE, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, 298, quoted from *Autobiography of Samuel Romilly*.
- ²⁷ GRAY. *op.cit.*, p.465.
- ²⁸ CHADWICK, Owen. *The Victorian Church, Part 1, Adam and Charles Black*, London, 1966, p.36-7.
- ²⁹ ASPINALL, A. (Ed.) *Three Early Nineteenth Century Diaries*, Williams and Norgate, London, 1952, p.211-2.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.213.
- ³¹ This and all further quotations of John Perceval are from BATESON, *op.cit.*
- ³² LACAN, Jaques. *The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis (1953)*, in *Ecrits, A Selection*, p.61.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p.67.
- ³⁴ REYNOLDS, J.S. *The Evangelicals at Oxford 1735—1871*, Marcham Manor Press, Oxford, 1975, p.97.
- ³⁵ *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol.III, 213.
- ³⁶ HENDERSON, Henry F. *The Religious Controversies of Scotland*, T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1905, p.152.
- ³⁷ OLIPHANT, Mrs. *The Life of Edward Irving*, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1862, Vol.II, 128.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol.II, 128-134. See also DRUMMOND, Andrew L., and BULLOCH James, *The Scottish Church 1688—1843, The Age of Moderates*, St. Andrew's Press, Edinburgh, 1973, p.198-9.

HOMAGE

- DRUMMOND and BULLOCH. *op.cit.*, p.206.
- GRAY. *op.cit.*, p.43.
- BRYANT, Arthur. *The Great Duke or The Invincible General*, Collins, London, 1971, p.130f, GRAY, *op.cit.*, pp.180-187.
- LACAN, Jacques. *The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason since Freud*, (1957), in *Ecrits, A Selection*, p.154.
- LACAN, Jacques. *On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis*, p.217.
- Ibid.*, p.218-9.
- GRAY. *op.cit.*, p.35.
- LACAN, Jacques. *On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis*, p.217.
- FREUD, S. *Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (1911)*, *The Standard Edition*, Vol.XII, The Hogarth Press, London, 1958.
- GRAY. *op.cit.*, p.465.

A CASE FOR TOPOLOGY

Gayle Paull

The main question I am posing for myself today is, how can a psychoanalyst use topology in the clinic when the technique requires 'suspended-attention'? I don't suggest that I can answer it completely, but let us see how psychoanalysis can benefit from an understanding of topology in its practice.

The first interesting effect of this question upon me was that it forced me not to relate the Lacanian topology to you from its outcome, but to return to the beginning discoveries of Freud. Already in doing this I have discovered that the end and the beginning are one and the same.

Psychoanalysis is the study of the unconscious and everyone agrees, this is no simple matter for the clinic. The ego suffers the effects of the unconscious, so broadly speaking we can then attempt a cure by taking two divergent paths from here on. One would be to help the suffering ego, build in it more 'strength' by summoning up reinforcements in consciousness, giving it a 'pat on the back' as it were against the constantly invading unconscious thoughts. We could try and make the ego unaware of its 'other scene' and restore its 'total personality' in the

here and now, and out it would walk on two healthy legs and a substitutive cure in its pocket. Thus we could try and make the repression work, not an easy task by any means, but one which the ego would gladly accept. The other course open to us and by no means easier, is to attempt to lift the repression from the unconscious through interpretation, perhaps helping the ego to understand a little, its own words. The ego however demands to stay as it is, struggling against the words and thoughts, often refusing to listen, but something is moved regardless when the interpretation is correct. This cure offers no pats on the back but rather demands hard and painful work from the ego. Through transference, the ego although always unwilling, reveals its story.

Well, given the choice between a pat on the back and hard and painful work what would you choose? Obviously the patient only wants to be cured, or does he? He has probably already found out a great deal about his analyst and chooses accordingly. Obviously the 'therapist' would prefer a life work of patting than the hard work against resistances — or so this would seem by the misunderstanding of Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis.

Freud presented us with two topological schemes for the psychic apparatus; the first being Unconscious, Preconscious and Conscious the second being It, Super-ego and Ego; to aid us in our psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious and so direct us in the cure of its effects.

Freud saw the subject as a reservoir of libido or psychic energy which unknown to the subjects consciousness, the ego, and against all self understanding was being overdetermined in a different place than that thought to be — 'the other scene'. Thus Freud's essential sentence 'where it is I ought to become' fashions all Freudian analyses. It will structure the 'suspended-attention'. The analyst will listen, not to the I of the subject but to what is said in this 'other scene' whilst the analysand talks towards his cure.

Lacan saw the clear indication and extended Freud's topological schemes without altering the conception of the Freudian unconscious. He took Freud's critical sentence as a formula and mapped his schemes around it.

Lacan presented the unconscious as structured as language and so he proposed to us, the subject, as a body of signifiers in the form of, signifier over signified ($\frac{S}{s}$), developing this later through his Schema, R, I and his graphs.

The basic method of psychoanalysis has evolved over the lifetimes of these two men and the practise is intimately connected with their theory and it is essential to understand it in this way.

We will first look at the method and theory developed by Freud and then the Lacanian extensions.

Freud and Lacan ask their analysands to lie down, the analyst sits behind. The 'fundamental rule' is applied; that the analysand say whatever comes to the lips without making a selection. The analyst listens with the rule of 'suspended-attention' as a counter part to the 'free association' of the patient. In *Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psychoanalysis* Freud says,

"The technique, however, is a very simple one. As we shall see, it rejects the use of any special expedient (even that of taking notes). It consists simply in not directing one's notice to anything in particular and in maintaining the same 'evenly — suspended attention'... To put it in a formula: he must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient."

In *Further Recommendations*, Freud adds,

"But in any case the patient must be left to do the talking and must be free to choose at what point he shall begin."

But what a curious method of attempted curing? A couch, a chair and two bodies, there is no note taking during the session, discussion, pills or equipment. It seems very simple, but it becomes curious and intriguing. We add to this array, the dimensions of space and time shared between two bodies, but how? through the surprising answer of

Lacan, by language, and it is signified by the paying of money because a debt is owed in many ways.

Freud did not start out with such a radical conception, his technique evolved through his understanding of repression and its clinical form of resistance. Lacan linked this inherited knowledge with linguistic and topological ideas to give them psychoanalytic meaning. The theory of repression is the cornerstone of the structure of psychoanalysis, which Lacan shows in §.

In the Preliminary Communication to Studies on Hysteria, Freud and Breuer have already outlined, without knowing at the time, the future direction of psychoanalysis, after they learnt this from five women patients *in the clinic*.

We read Freud's first use of the words *cathartic* and *abreacted* linking with the function of language in the passage,

"The injured person's reaction to the trauma only exercises a completely 'cathartic' effect if it is an *adequate* reaction — as, for instance revenge. But language serves as a substitute for action; by its help the effect can be 'abreacted' almost as effectively."³

and his first use of *repressed* to mean defence is found in the following,

"...cases in which the patients have not reacted to a psychical trauma because the nature of the trauma excluded a reaction. . . which the patient wished to forget, and therefore *intentionally* repressed from his conscious thought and inhibited and suppressed."⁴

The first case presented is the pioneering work of Breuer, who asked Anna O. questions under hypnosis and attempted to remove difficulties that arose by removing the memories of them. It was Anna's unconscious who gave the titles in English to the treatment by calling it a 'talking-cure' or 'chimney-sweeping'. However, Breuer did not understand her meaning as hypnosis was his method:

"Everyone of her hypnoses in the evening afforded evidence that the patient was entirely clear

and well-ordered in her mind and normal as regards her feeling and volition so long as none of the products of her secondary state was acting as a stimulus 'in the unconscious'.⁵

As we read for the first time the psychoanalytic use of the word *unconscious*. The editor points out that Breuer was possibly attributing to it 'in the unconscious' by using the quotation marks. Freud certainly takes for granted his meaning of the unconscious at his first use of the word in his text on *Frau Emmy Von N.*, when using the Breuer method:

"Her astonishment the evening before at it being so long since she had had a neck cramp was thus a premonition of an approaching condition which was already in preparation at the time and was perceived in the unconscious."⁶

Already in this case we share in Freud's own astonishment at his therapeutic discoveries when we read about his first hints of the importance of talking in a *free associative* way:

"...even without questioning under hypnosis I can discover the cause of her ill-humour on that day. Nor is her conversation during the massage so aimless as would appear. On the contrary it contains a fairly complete representation of the memories. . . it often leads on, in quite an unexpected way, to pathogenic reminiscences of which she unburdens herself. . . It is as though she had adopted my procedure and was making use of our conversation. . . as a supplement to her hypnosis."⁷

Breuer teaches Freud the usefulness of her motor symptoms, such as *stammering* and her use of defensive formulae such as 'Emm, Don't touch me' and we learn a fundamental truth, that these symptoms all have one thing in common,

"They can be shown to have an original or long-standing connection with traumas, and stand as symbols for them in the activities of the memory."⁸

and that if the patient fails to confess some part of the story relating to the symptom then it will persist.

A critical moment is reached during the analysis of Emmy when Freud in a footnote tells us about the lack of success he had had in treating an hysterical girl for 5 months, who had previously been diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. Her condition had not improved by assurances, commands or treatment under hypnosis,

"I turned to psychical analysis and requested her to tell me what emotion had preceded the onset of her illness."

According to Freud she gave no answer but no change in her condition was seen and so he said to her, that he was sure that what she had said had nothing to do with it, thereupon,

"...she gave way to the extent of letting fall a single significant phrase; but she had hardly said a word before she stopped, and her old father, who was sitting behind her, began to sob bitterly. Naturally I pressed my investigation no further, but I never saw the patient again."¹⁰

So already we learn of the effects of approaching a truth through 'psychical analysis' and the 'cover up' by the symptom.

With Emmy, Freud tells us frankly that he still could not say how much of the therapeutic success was due to suggesting the symptom away or by resolving the affect by abreaction and so he could not use it as evidence for the cathartic method. He states however that only those symptoms which had psychical analysis were permanently removed.

Freud's learning continues with Lucy R, who was referred to Freud with difficulties arising from olfactory sensations, particularly a 'lingering smell of burnt pudding'. Fortunately for us Lucy could not be hypnotized and so Freud was forced to make an historic decision and to investigate further,

"I therefore conducted her whole analysis while she was in a state which may in fact have differed very little from a normal one. . . I ostensibly dropped hypnosis and only asked her to 'concentrate' and I ordered the patient to lie down and deliberately shut her eyes."¹¹

Freud hypothesized that the patient knew everything and that all he needed was to oblige the patient to communicate it and so he arrived at his technique of 'applying pressure' to the head to overcome some reluctance in speaking. It is in this case that we obtain a clear idea of the way in which Freud is working — for behind the smell of the burnt pudding was the smell of the cigar smoke, and behind this was disillusion in love:

"The key to the patient's whole situation lay only in the last symptom to be reached by the analysis."¹²

Freud's work with Katharina develops this idea further and he selects for the case history more evidence of the layering effects from past histories. Of fundamental importance in this case is the effect of past scenes of which no effect occurred at the time but which were later linked with a second scene resulting in a trauma. Lacan develops this in his topology of symptoms in which at least two loci are required.

With the removal of Elisabeth Von R.'s pains in her legs, Freud has adopted his pressure technique permanently (at the time) and has abandoned hypnosis with the learning that there is an,

"...intimate connection between the story of a patient's sufferings and the symptoms of the illness. . . With regard to these feelings she was in a peculiar situation of knowing and at the same time of not knowing — a situation, that is, in which a psychical group was cut off. . . in that they were cut off from any free associative connection of thought with the rest of the ideational content of her mind."¹³

Can this be Freud's first teaching about the *other scene*? Especially Elisabeth's secret command to herself concerning her brother-in-law, which she wished to hold back from Freud, "Now he is free and you can be his wife".

Freud often must use pressure on Elisabeth's head several times in order for her to confess some information, only to find out once it was confessed that it was there all the time and that Elisabeth thought she could avoid it. And so Freud discovers the work of the *resistance* in the *linic*:

“... I began to attach a deeper significance to the resistance offered by the patient in the reproduction of her memories and to make a careful collection of the occasions on which it was particularly marked.”¹⁴

In his article *Psychotherapy of Hysteria* he introduces us to his first use of the word *censorship*, by the ego, and links this with clinical resistance. Thus he poses the task of those using his method, as one which “lies in overcoming by his psychical work this resistance to association”. His work with an obsessional reported in this same article produced only single words and then a string, “concierge, night-gown, bed, town, farm-cart,” around which a story unfolds.

“When memories return in the form of pictures our task is in general easier than when they return as thoughts. Hysterical patients, who are as a rule of a ‘visual’ type, do not make such difficulties for the analyst as those with obsessions. . . *The patient is as it were, getting rid of it by turning it into words.* . . I have described such groupings of similar memories into collections arranged in linear sequences. . . These exhibit a second kind of arrangement. Each of them is . . . stratified concentrically round the pathogenic nucleus. . . To put this in other words, it is very remarkable how often a symptom is determined in several ways, is ‘overdetermined’.”¹⁵

Finally in this same article the observations concerning *transference* are first made when patients transfer onto the physician, ideas arising from the analysis:


“Transference on to the physician takes place through a *false connection*. . . The patients too, gradually learnt to realize that in these transferences on to the figure of the physician it was a question of a compulsion and an illusion which melted away with the conclusion of the analysis.”¹⁶

Of course the theory is not born as yet but the seeds are certainly planted and Freud himself admits that he is still far from having mastered it, his analysis, psychical analysis, psychological analysis, hypnotic analysis and finally *psychoanalysis* in 1896.

In *Constructions* it is clear that psychoanalysis and its method are born:

“What we are in search of is a picture of the patient’s forgotten years that shall be alike trustworthy and in all essential respects complete. . . What then *is* his task? His task is to make out what has been forgotten from the traces which it has left behind or, more correctly to *construct* it.”¹⁷

Lacan’s Schemes aid in this reconstruction. Schema L situates the site of the Other from which the question of existence may be presented to the subject. It is also the legislator of what can and cannot be said. Beyond this Other is the recognition of desire and desire for recognition.



“The time and manner in which he conveys his constructions to the person who is being analysed, as well as the explanations with which he accompanies them, constitute the link between the two portions of the work of analysis, between his own part and that of the patient.”¹⁸

Thus the two parts of the work are *suspended attention* and *construction*.


So the scene is set for the psychoanalytic topological schemes of Lacan both for understanding particular patients and the psychoanalytic theory and its method.

Topologically speaking then we start a case and see the symptoms as part of the knot-of-the-subject. It is a knot within a discourse, without end points so that it cannot be easily unravelled by taking one end and 'working through' all the tangles in a linear fashion. The knot-of-the-subject is rather to be seen as a messy discourse that ties and binds the subject in it in a never ending fashion. The subject relates part of his discourse starting here and then there, skipping a few years back, occasionally jumping with hope to the future, then in the here and now, but always only telling half the story. In this way the analyst will listen never trying to reduce his own *Angst* by a futile grab at a slippery end.

The discourse is linked in a circular looping fashion and as Lacan teaches us by taking the Möbius strip as its model, it is an infinite chain that has no definable, discrete measurements. The discourse does have nodal points, points of entry, rings of ideas, it stutters into words occasionally and reveals its true colours in the deception of dreams, monuments set up in the body, archives in the form of childhood memories, semantic evolution as in personal style, traditions such as history and distortions in the linking of the chapters of the story.¹⁹ But for all the evident uncertainties, and attempts at curing, the truths are gradually revealed by the symptom, in relief from this tangling background of idle chatter.

All these are moments in the discourse. Lacan captures such moments of the discourse in his Schema R. In this Schema the discourse is taken as a Möbius strip which is captured in a frozen moment at its torsion and becomes the Real.

Schema R



Freud tells us that in dreams the 'if only' is replaced by 'It is'. This is then given hallucinatory representation by *regression* — a path which leads from thoughts to perceptual images.²⁰ He writes a clear message and Lacan makes his transference with the text:

"If the ideas of a 'topography of the mental apparatus' and of regression are consistently followed up (and only in that way could these working hypotheses come to have any value) we must attempt to determine the stages of regression at which the various transformations of the dream thoughts occur."²¹

and in Lecture XX, Development and Regression we hear that,

"The fact is that repression is a topographico-dynamic concept, while regression is a purely descriptive one."²²

and in Paths to Symptom-Formation,

"... Later conflicts and the emphasis we find in the analysis laid on the impression of childhood appears entirely as the work of regression."

This leads us to an understanding of the analytic session itself, 'it is' and it is to be understood as a dream. In Jokes Freud adds,

"On the other hand, there is another part of the dream-work which we cannot attribute to regression . . . condensation."²³


Lacan therefore formulates metaphor to account for condensation in

the unconscious and metonymy to provide the motive for displacement. "The symptom resolves itself entirely in an analysis of language, because the symptom is itself structured like a language, because it is from language that speech must be delivered."²⁴ and so it is that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, where the dreams are to be read like a rebus and the symptoms like metaphors symbolizing at the level of an organ or at the level of a function, an unconscious signifier:

"The symptom is here the signifier of a signified repressed. . . The unconscious is the sum of the effects of speech on a subject at the level at which the subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier."²⁵

The repressed then has in the unconscious the status of signifier a discourse moulded by metaphoric repression where the metaphor substitutes another signifier S' for the repressed s.

Lacan teaches us that the function of the signifier on the signified is to either cause an elision or block it, its function can be seen like this,



and its derivation from the formula $f(S) \frac{I}{s}$ into its two forms²⁶

i) Metonymy

$$f(S \dots S') S \equiv S(-) s$$


in this form the elision is blocked, repetition resulting, and so the bar represents the blocking of the emergence of signification.

ii) Metaphor

$$f \left(\frac{S'}{S} \right) S \equiv S(+) s$$

here there has been a successful elision of a signifier, the bar is crossed indicating a substitution of a signifier for another signifier. The s is the subject constituted as secondary in relation to the signifier, and *this is the psychoanalytic subject.*

We see in Schema R the effect of the metaphor which substitutes the Name-of-the-Father in the place first symbolized by the operation of the absence of the mother and introduces us to the lack and the phallus:²⁷




The resulting signifiers make an autonomous chain which diverts desire to demand through displacements and condensations of investments to other signifiers through metonymy and metaphor. The patients demand will always be supported by this unfillable unconscious desire. The demand will be eternal and never will have the destiny of being linked with an object.

"The interval which is repeated, the most radical structure of the signifying chain is the site haunted by metonymy, the vehicle of desire. . . *objet a* is the pivot around which every turn of phrase unfolds in its metonymy."²⁸

This elusive *objet a* is suspended in the torsion of the Real and shown in Lacan's graphs of retrograde vectors which hook the void of *objet a*. The elision of metonymy in Graph I is built upon until the final Completed Graph.²⁹ In this Graph we see again the non coincidence between the $\frac{S}{s}$

Graph I — Metaphor hooked by retrograde vector



Lacan tells us that,

"... the hysteric, obsessional or phobic is he who identifies the lack of the Other with his demand and assumes the function of an object in his phantasy. . . It is the structure of all the formations of the unconscious and it also explains the primal division of the subject being produced in the place of the Other (the symbolic), the signifier causes the subject to arise there, but at the cost of becoming fixed. What was ready to speak there disappears being no longer anything more than a signifier. . . Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual trauma and its substitute term in the actual signifying chain there passes the spark that fixes in a symptom the signification inaccessible to the conscious subjects — a symptom being a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element."³⁰

The psychoanalytic body becomes then a set of possible erotogenic zones, the subject, a body of signifiers and desire as a set of lacks. The direction of the Lacanian analysis is indicated. Seeing desire as metonymy and symptoms as metaphor we are given the direction of the associative links in the topology of a construction.

We are now in a position to attempt to understand the outcome of the following part of a case history, of a boy referred because of his unruly actions and the path of his concerned and intelligent mother when she decided that her 7 year old son's masturbation in her presence had been going on for too long. She told him the following,

"I think you are too big to do that anymore. It is not a bad thing to do but you cannot do that in front of people. I want you to stop it from now on. I have decided to help you to stop doing it, and I will take a coin from your money box every time you do it."

She told me with pride "I have taken several coins from him already". The boy appears to me to be delighted with this.

How can we understand this interesting couple? The boy's symptom or the boy as a symptom of the mother? Let us go to Lacan's models in order to understand the failure of the punishment and the boy's delight.

Firstly, we must consider the attempted seduction of the mother by the boy — the boy's, Desire-of-the-Mother. The usual solution of such scenes is to threaten castration or something similar. The mother however has allowed the scene to occur on many occasions and in doing so by her muteness she has tried to bar her son from the Name-of-the-Father, the Law and the consequent mark of castration. Eventually after much thought the mother is happy with her solution. She takes a coin from the money box, in doing so, contrary to her belief, it is her desire that is revealed — it is an attempt to escape her own castration — she wishes to have a complete son (her phallus), a son however who is constituted outside the effects of the Law. The boy does not obtain his wish, but he is delighted that his sexuality is acknowledged every time a coin is taken. The boy's organ is intact, it is true, but his sexuality literally costs him.

The map for the boy is drawn by his parents. The absent Name-of-the-Father shows the failure of the metaphor to substitute it for the absence of the mother. The boy remains the Φ in the map of his mother.

NOTES

- FREUD, S. Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psychoanalysis, (1912), Stand.Ed., Vol.XII, 111, 115.
- FREUD, S. Further Recommendations (1913), Stand.Ed., Vol.XII, 134.
- BREUER, J. and FREUD, S. Studies on Hysteria (1893—1895), Stand.Ed., Vol.VII, 8.
- Idem, p.10.
- Idem, p.45.
- Idem, p.76.

- 7 Idem, p.56.
- 8 Idem, p.95.
- 9 Idem, p.100.
- 10 Idem, p.100.
- 11 Idem, p.107,109.
- 12 Idem, p.124.
- 13 Idem, p.160,165.
- 14 Idem, p.154.
- 15 FREUD, S. The Psychotherapy of Hysteria (1893—1895), Stand.Ed., Vol. VII, 280,288.
- 16 Idem, p.302,304.
- 17 FREUD, S. Constructions (1937), Stand.Ed., Vol.XXIII, 258.
- 18 Idem, p.259.
- 19 LACAN, J. The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis in The Language of the Self (1953). Translated, A. Wilden, Delta, p.21.
- 20 FREUD, S. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), Stand.Ed., Vol.VIII, 162.
- 21 Idem, p.164.
- 22 FREUD, S. Lecture XX, Development and Regression (1916—1917), Stand. Ed., Vol.XVI, 342.
- 23 FREUD, S. Paths to Symptom-Formation (1916—1917), Stand.Ed., Vol. XVI, 364. Jokes. . .p.219.
- 24 LACAN, J. Ecrits, Tavistock, London, 1977.
- 25 Idem, p.69.
- 26 Idem, p.164.
- 27 Idem, p.200.
- 28 Idem.
- 29 Idem, p.303.
- 30 Idem, p.321.

INTERPRETATION AND THE SPECIMEN DREAM

John Dingle

"Do you think that sometime on this house there will be a marble plaque reading. . .

In this house on July 24th 1895, the secret of dreams unveiled itself to Doctor Sigmund Freud.

Sigmund Freud, Letter to Wilhelm Fliess, June 12th 1900.¹

"..... the transference is not the enactment of the illusion that seems to drive us to this alienating identification that any conformity constitutes, even when it is with an ideal model, of which the analyst, in any case, cannot be the support — the transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious."

Lacan, J. Analyse et vérité, le séminaire, 22nd Avril 1964.

Well, here we are in the post-Lacanian era. Lacan's thought has been summarized by the journalists,³ his relevance interpreted for the psychiatrists⁴ and his key concepts distilled for the encyclopaedists,⁵ the *retour à Lacan*⁶ has been launched, the unconscious has been exported to the Georgian Socialist Republic where its reinstatement in the U.S.S.R. has begun⁷ and the so called *néo-Lacanisme* has made its debut in feminist circles even in far flung Melbourne.⁸

For some, this is the time to break the spell woven by the word of Lacan.⁹ I refer notably to one Serge Leclaire, longtime collaborator of Dr. Lacan whose latest book *Rompre les Charms* subtitled *Recueil pour des enchantés de la psychanalyse* has just reached my hands. The subtitle requires perhaps an explanation — a *recueil* has the double meaning of a medical aid post— such as one provided for foot soldiers who cannot withstand a long march, falling by the wayside and also the meaning of a miscellany or collection of essays or stories. So this is a *recueil* for these bewitched by psychoanalysis. Figuring prominently among the recent exploits of the author are his involvement with the feminist group "*politique et psychanalyse*" lead by Antoinette Fouque and his successful exportation of the unconscious to the Soviet Union at the Congress of 1st October 1979 at Tbilisi in the Georgian Socialist Republic.

Those of you who attended last year's Homage will remember well Gustavo Etkin's caricature of the Marxist analyst's 'engaged' stance and attempts to maintain his praxis rooted in a 'concrete' reality.¹⁰

For those who are interested in the ongoing attempts to relate psychoanalysis to the Marxist tradition I would recommend a recently published work by Joel Kovel, called *The Age of Desire* in which the author, at least candidly, exposes the profound paradoxes and contradictions in his own practise by a recounting of clinical cases.¹¹ The magnitude of the unbridgable gap is there patently delineated. The two issues of Marxism and Feminism seem to be related, in so far as Leclaire presents his involvement with the women's (class) struggle, as a credential of Marxist respectability.

One Michelle Bouraux-Hartemann is promptly alert to what he is up to. Her satirical critique of Leclaire in *Le mouvement de Serge Antoinette Lacan* she subtitled *Où le héros Lacanien se fait recoudre un*

*orceau d'altérité par un Mouvement de Femmes.*¹² This subtitle contains a pun which is difficult to translate — roughly, *Where the Lacanian hero develops (in the sense that a young girl develops) to resuture a piece of otherness via a feminist movement.*

To give you some idea of Leclaire's thesis, I would like to quote the first two paragraphs of his speech at Tbilisi. He bids us remember,

"that at the origins of psychoanalysis, there are women who consenting (to accommodate) themselves to the good care of "doctors", have permitted the discovery of psychoanalysis, leaving once more to men the handsome profits of exploiting what they have had to say."

"There is absolutely no *future of the psychoanalytic movement which does not pass through the raising of a mortgage still secretly inscribed: that of the status of the hysteric (man or woman) as hostage, in his or her relation to the work of the Master.*"

One is familiar with Lacan's decades of railing against the deformations of psychoanalysis at the hands of the American Ego-psychologists and the medical establishments. I venture to predict that what the Russians will now do with their recently imported "unconscious" in the form of "another logic" and an "unredeemed mortgage of women" will render us all speechless.

Now what on earth has all this rambling about the relation of theory and praxis to do with the Freudian clinic and with the title of my paper "Interpretation and the Dream Specimen of Irma's Injection?" Well in the midst of Leclaire's miscellany, under the title *A propos d'un fantasme de Freud: Note sur la transgression*, he includes a commentary on the dream of Irma's injection — the so-called specimen dream — which seemed to me to contain precisely a refutation of the ideas expressed by Leclaire which I have just been quoting.

I mean if this is the post-Lacanian era and women are about to reveal us what psychoanalysis is really about, what is the point of going back to comment on one of Freud's early dreams? This sort of reactionary

backsliding would in the Cultural Revolution have called for rehabilitation. Does this man know what he is doing?

This then was what stimulated me to re-read the Irma dream and the commentaries written on it and it is these researches which form the basis of my paper.

Of course this dream, which will be known to all of you, is the one to which Freud returns repeatedly in the *Traumdeutung*¹³ using it first as an example to demonstrate the technique of exploring the dream's latent content by fragmenting the text of the dream and free associating to each of its fragments.

Secondly, he uses it repeatedly to exemplify the various mechanisms of what he calls the "dream work"; condensation, displacement, substitution, symbolization and so forth.

The classic writings on dream interpretations and the nature of the dream work after Freud himself are those of Ernest Jones; Freud's *Theory of Dreams* and *The Theory of Symbolism*¹⁴ and Ella Sharpe's book *Dream Analysis*.¹⁵

It is not my intention to discuss here in any detail the mechanisms of the dream work but I would recommend the two seminars of Dr. Safouan published in last year's Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne as a guide to the caution with which the previous two authors need to be approached.¹⁶

I wish to confine myself for the remainder of this paper to the third major discovery of the Specimen Dream. Here I quote Freud;

"When the work of interpretation has been completed, we perceive that a dream is the fulfilment of a wish."


In other words, the reason that Freud attributed such a singular importance to this dream, was not the knowledge that wishes could be fulfilled in dreams — a fact of which he had long been aware and concerning which he had written to Fliess on the 4th March 1895, recounting the case of his friend Rudi Kaufman, who in order not to awake and get up, dreamt that he was already in the hospital where he worked.

More important and in fact quite revolutionary was the idea, that by

allowing the free associations to the various dream elements, it is possible to deduce the existence of wishes which are not immediately apparent in the manifest content.

I took the time to investigate the derivation of the term *Traumdeutung*. The German word *Traum* seems exactly equivalent to the English word dream — derived from an old Anglo-saxon noun which had the primary meaning in the Old English *Dream* of melody, joy or gladness.

The mutual derivation of the German *Traum* is from the old Saxon *trōm*. The nearest relative of the English dream in the West Germanic group of languages I have drawn is, as you can see, the Old-Frisian word *drām* which means "a shout of joy". So you can see that the idea of the dream being an expression of desire is inherent in the derivation of the word itself.



The word *Deutung* is more problematical, as the Langenscheidt gives two alternative meanings; interpretation and construction, which have come to have different technical meanings in common psychoanalytic use.

Gabriel, in a recent paper I think, delineates clearly the relation between interpretation and construction in this way:

"Now psychoanalysis can neither interpret every dream and every symptom, nor can it be absolutely certain that a single interpretation is correct. It is perfectly possible to misinterpret a dream and it is also possible for an experienced analyst to impose an erroneous interpretation on a dreamer. So, just as with a single observation in the natural sciences, we can hardly expect a single interpretation to lead us to the unconscious idea behind it. Interpretations of dreams, symptoms and other mental events of an individual must be set against each other until a coherent pattern of unconscious desires and defenses begins to emerge; in this way, we move from individual interpretations to constructions."¹⁷

I think Dr. Safouan was stating this in another way when he said, "... I would say that the progress in an analysis or in the psychoanalytic process consists in the movement which leads the subject to recognise the metaphors which underlie or are hidden behind the symbols of his dreams and his symptoms."¹⁸

Oscar Zentner in a recent seminar has suggested that perhaps the best translation of *Deutung* into English is the word allusion. So in collaboration we suggest that the best rendering of *Traumdeutung* into English would be "allusion to desire".

Now let us go to the text of the dream of Irma's injection and see if we are able to make a construction which alludes to Freud's desire. I shall read the entire text of the dream in English. Now don't be alarmed, I am

t going to presume to reinterpret Freud's own dream, which in any event cannot be done in a language other than the one in which it is stated; my intention is purely to remind you of the elements of the text in order to point to some of Freud's own interpretations.

Freud himself prefaces the dream with a concise preamble which sets the essential context of the dream. In the summer of 1895 he is treating a young woman who is an established family friend — with all attendant complications that that connotes. The treatment had been partially successful, in that her hysterical anxiety was resolved but a number of somatic symptoms remained. He had proposed a solution that Irma had been unwilling to accept. While Freud and his patient were at variance over this particular interpretation, the analysis was taken off for the summer vacation.

The day prior to the dream, Freud had a visit from a junior colleague whom he calls Otto who had been staying with Irma's family and whose usual remark to the effect that Irma was better, but not quite well, Freud took as such a reproof that he sat down that same evening to write out the case history to submit to the judgement of a senior colleague, Dr. M. in the hope of justifying what had occurred in the treatment.

Here is the text of Freud's dream of that same night — July 24th 1895:

"A large hall — numerous guests whom we were receiving — among them was Irma. I at once took her on one side, as though to answer her letter and to reproach her for not having accepted my solution yet. I said to her, 'If you still get pains, it is really only your fault'. She replied, 'If you only knew what pains I've got now in my throat, stomach and abdomen — it's choking me'. I was alarmed and looked at her. She looked pale and puffy. I thought to myself that after all I must be missing some organic trouble. I took her to the window and looked down her throat and she showed signs of recalcitrance, like women with artificial dentures. I thought to myself that

there was really no need for her to do that. She then opened her mouth properly and on the right I found a big white patch; at another place I saw extensive whitish grey scabs upon some remarkable curly structures which were evidently modelled on the turbinal bones of the nose. I at once called Dr. M., and he repeated the examination and confirmed it. . . . Dr. M. looked quite different from usual, he was very pale, he walked with a limp and his chin was clean shaven. my friend Otto was now standing beside her as well and my friend Leopold was percussing her through her bodice and saying: 'she has a dull area now down on the left'. He also indicated that a portion of the skin on the left shoulder was infiltrated, (I noticed this, just as he did, in spite of her dress). M. said 'There's no doubt it's an infection, but no matter; dysentery will supervene and the toxin will be eliminated'. We were directly aware too, of the origin of the infection. Not long before, when she was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection of a preparation of propyl, propyls, . . . propionic acid. . . . trimethylamin (and I saw before me the formula for this printed in heavy type). . . . Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly. . . . And probably the syringe had not been clean."

You have probably all read for yourselves the way in which Freud deduces that the wishes expressed in the dream are those of exonerating himself of any guilt or responsibility for the persistence of Irma's illness. He appears even to be prepared to go to the extent of laying the blame on the patient herself for not accepting his solution. There are two important clarifications to be made here; firstly that at that stage in the history of the development of Freud's theory, he believed that having discovered the unconscious meaning of a conflict, one simply presented it to the patient — who then either accepted it or not. If he accepted it,

well and good but if he didn't it was his responsibility; secondly that the German word *Lösung* or solution has the same double meaning of solution to a conflict and solution for injection which gives the whole dream its symbolic sense.

Now of course the place for the psychoanalytic interpretation of a dream is within the context of a relationship of transference. Naturally this version of the dream text is heavily censored for the purposes of publication. Freud says at the conclusion of his analysis of the dream:

"I will not pretend that I have completely uncovered the meaning of this dream, or that its interpretation is without a gap. I could spend much more time over it, derive further information from it and discuss fresh problems raised by it. I myself know the points from which further trains of thought could be followed. But considerations which arise in the case of every dream of my own restrain me from pursuing my interpretative work. If anyone should feel tempted to express a hasty condemnation of my reticence, I would advise him to make the experiment of being franker than I am."

But for an extraordinary series of actions perpetrated by the Princess Marie Bonaparte, of which a succinct account is given by Oscar Zentner in his paper, *The Woman and the Real as a Paradigm of Psychosis*,¹⁹ things would probably have been left there.

However, during the nineteen fifties, a whole secondary literature on the Irma dream, much of a somewhat speculative nature appeared in the wake of the publication of a highly censored selection of Freud's letters to Wilhelm Fliess,²⁰ which permitted a re-reading of the *Traumdeutung* in the light of its author's correspondence. This, together with the publication in 1953 of the first volume of Ernest Jones' biography focussed attention on the vicissitudes of Freud's relations with Breuer, the importance of the death of Freud's father and the progress of his so-called self-analysis as revealed in the context of his relationship with Fliess — the one who was supposed to know the biological secrets of human sexuality.

The major speculative efforts at this time relating to the 'specimen dream' were those of Edith Buxbaum (1951),²¹ Erik H. Erikson (1954)²² and Harry C. Leavitt (1956).²³

I will not dwell at any length on these papers which mainly concern themselves with social and cultural elaborations of day residues in the manifest content of the dream.

Edith Buxbaum highlighted the central role Wilhelm Fliess played in the *Traumdeutung*, as the recipient of many dream interpretations in the form of letters and as the first recipient of the completed manuscript which he read and corrected for Freud.

Erikson makes the interesting remark that in that modern era (1954) full dream analysis was only performed usually for the edification of student analysts and was seldom a part of contemporary ego-psychology. Needless to say in his long paper he confines himself almost entirely to the manifest content of the dream and its socio-cultural associations.

To give Erikson his due he does make two singularly pertinent observations albeit without betraying more than a vague inkling of their import. The first concerns the nature of the dream as the fulfilment of a wish,

"We note that the wish demonstrated here is not more than pre-conscious. . . . Nor is the theme of sexuality carried through beyond a point which is clearly intended to be understood by the trained reader and to remain vague to the untrained one."

Secondly, that the autobiographical emphasis entailed in Freud's fantasy of the tablet commemorating the unveiling of the mystery of the dream,

"supports our contention that this dream may reveal more than the fact of a disguised wish fulfilment derived from infantile sources; that this dream may, in fact carry the historical burden of being dreamed in order to be analysed and analysed in order to fulfill a very special fate."

I shall return to elaborate on these two points further on in my paper.

In 1966, Max Schur,²⁴ who had been Freud's personal physician, released the contents of a number of previously withheld letters from Freud to Fliess, including the vivid description in the letter of the 8th March 1895 of the events which underlay the Irma dream and account for the persistence of his wish to be acquitted of guilt, along with Fliess in this case.

Accounts of the so-called "scandal" of Irma's post-operative haemorrhage on the 7th March 1895 which was caused by a piece of iodoform gauze left *in situ* by Fliess after surgery on her turbinates, can now be read in all the contemporary biographies of Freud. Schur for the most part confines himself to relating these newly revealed day residues to the manifest content of the dream.

For those with a particular interest in the 'gossip' of psychoanalysis I will note only for the sake of completeness Grinstein's book *On Sigmund Freud's Dreams*²⁵ and the two volumes of Didier Anzieu, *L'auto-analyse de Freud*,²⁶ which I believe has just been translated into English, which gives what must surely be the ultimate catalogue of who is who in both the dream and the associations.

Now I wish to return to the two observations of Erikson which Lacan takes as the entry to the reconstruction of Freud's desire as expressed in the dream.

As part of his seminar for 1954—55, Lacan devoted two sessions to an examination of the dream of Irma's injection.²⁷ If you recall this is the seminar called, *The ego in the theory of Freud and in the technique of psychoanalysis*. In other words his examination of the dream is in the context of the study of the evolution of Freud's various conceptual models of the psychic apparatus as one can see them for oneself by reading the various drafts, the project and his published works. He makes a critique of Erikson on the grounds that like Hartmann²⁸ he makes the latest, or worse still a composite model of the psychic apparatus and applies it to the "understanding" of a text from the early formative stages of Freud's thought, thereby avoiding the awkward problem that Freud's various models cannot be precisely synchronized or reconciled.

For Lacan, it is precisely the effects of these attempts at synchronization of Freud's thought which makes a return to the original texts necessary. He says,

"It is not a matter for us of synchronizing the different stages in Freud's thought, or even of making them accord with each other. It is a matter of seeing what unique and constant difficulty in the progress of this thought corresponds with the creation of the contradictions between these different stages. It is through the succession of paradoxes (antinomies) that this thought always presents to us within each of these staging posts and between them, that we are confronted with that which is properly the object of our experience."

He refers of course to the *decentring* of the subject of desire in relation to the ego of the dreamer.

Now let us return to the two arresting observations of Erikson. There is no doubt that Freud considered the major discovery of the Irma dream lay in the confirmation of his belief that a dream is the expression of a wish. But how could he be satisfied with a demonstration entirely based on a wish that could at best be called pre-conscious — but probably in fact was conscious? True the allusions to sexuality are there especially in the associations to the injection of trimethylamin, which Lacan tells us he has on good authority is the substance responsible for the aroma of stale human semen.

Freud gives as his answer, that he is not prepared to pursue his associations any further for the purposes of publication; or as Lacan puts it, he has no wish to recount stories of the bed and the chamber pot.

How then, are we to approach the problem of attempting to make a construction which alludes to Freud's desire as it is revealed in the dream text and associations as they are published in the *Traumdeutung*? Certainly not by making a wild analysis using the elements of additional day residues from purloined letters.

On first examination of the text, Freud seems only to have expressed

the most general notion about the nature of the desire expressed in dreams, without considering specifically from whence it arises.

That Freud did ask the questions: What is this unconscious desire? and Why does it exist?, is evident in many other places in the project and the *Traumdeutung*. Although Freud only reveals to us the discovery of a pre-conscious or conscious wish, surely his enthusiasm about this dream of dreams and the subsequent evolution of his theory signify after the event that he was in fact, beyond the point to which he was prepared to expose himself, aware of the magnitude of the step he had taken. As Moustapha Safouan put it, he had trespassed on the territory which had previously been reserved for gods.

In Lacan's seminar, he reminds us that dreaming and interpreting are two separate operations. In analysis it is easy to see the way the analyst intervenes in the second operation, of interpreting but easy to overlook the analyst's intervention in the first operation — in the dreaming; but he is always there in the life of the subject and already in his dream.

Lacan here refers to the articulation of the imaginary with the symbolic: the two operations consist in putting the symbolic discourse in a figurative form (i.e. to imagine the symbol) for example in a dream and in symbolizing the image (i.e. to make an interpretation of the dream).

This brings me to Erikson's second observation and let us take him at his word,

"...that this dream may in fact carry the historical burden of being dreamed in order to be analysed and analysed in order to fulfill a very special fate."

This then is the essential point, Freud's dream text and his associations and interpretations are not only addressed to Wilhelm Fliess, as Edith Buxbaum pointed out, but they are also addressed to us, the readers of his *Traumdeutung* — we are already there in his dream. This dream is chosen to put us on the track of his objective which is to understand with him the purpose of the dream, the expression of unconscious desire. It is Freud's unconscious which speaks to us through the intermediary of the dream and Freud has discovered what it says — something which at the same time is him and is not him and is the source

of his *Angst*. On the basis of this realization Lacan proceeds to make the following construction:

"I am the one who wishes to be pardoned for having dared to attempt to cure these invalids that up to the present no-one wished to understand and that one was forbidden to cure. I am the one who wishes to be pardoned for that. I am the one who wishes not to be held culpable, for to transgress a limit previously imposed on human activity is always to be culpable. I don't want to be that. In my place there are all the others. I am only there as the representative of that vast vague movement which is the search for the truth in which I fade away. I am no longer anything. My ambition has been greater than I. The syringe was dirty without doubt. And even in the measure to which I have desired it too much, where I have participated in this action, where I have wished to be, I, the creator, I am not the creator. The creator is something greater than I. It is my unconscious, it is this word which speaks in me, beyond me. *Voilà le sens de ce rêve.*"

And it is in endorsing this construction of Lacan's that Leclaire provides the refutation to his statements that I quoted at the beginning of the paper and which stimulated me to read as much as I was able of the literature on the specimen dream. He concludes;

"The discovery of psychoanalysis, the works of Freud, are rooted in the singularity of his desire, a desire of desire. And one can rightly say, I think, that there there is the accomplishment of a fantasm, a realisation of desire, not at all in the sense of a perpetual lure, but some transgression accomplished with his whole cortège of malediction and unsupportable light, quite the contrary to an appeasing satisfaction or an illusory response. The truth in action in this desire has no

end; scarcely had Freud realised this way of writing the book than he questions himself anew on his indestructible desire, will this supreme transgression succeed in attaining immortality, will it have its "marble plaque"? There are today in the world many plaques commemorating the exploits of Freud; these stones speak; they say that *there is no longer any beyond.*"

Or as Lacan says in another place "*L'homme après Freud c'est ça.*"

Where does Leclaire think that these women are going to take psychoanalysis? There is nowhere to go except the perpetual fall into the ill.

Two years ago I concluded my paper at the Homage to Freud, for 80 by reiterating the point, that the fact that all which is analysable is real, does not imply that all that which is sexual should be accessible analysis.

There is no unpaid mortgage, Freud recognized his transgression even if he repeatedly managed to repress this recognition as Mehlman²⁹ would have us believe. He paid the price in the burden of culpability that all who follow him must share.

What does this tell us of the Freudian Clinic — I think the comparison between Lacan's construction and the papers of Erikson and our clearly delineate a specific line of approach to the patient's unconscious desire.

NOTES

- ¹ Letter to Wilhelm Fliess. June 12th 1900.
Such a plaque was in fact unveiled on 6th May 1977 by Anna Freud. Her address is given in, Freud, A., *Psychoanalytic Psychology of Normal Development*, Hogarth Press, 1982.
- ² LACAN, J. *Le Séminaire — Analyse et Vérité 22 Avril 1964. Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse. Le Seuil.*
- ³ CLÉMENT, C. *Vies et légendes de Jacques Lacan*, Paris, Grasset 1981.
- ⁴ LEARY, S.A. The significance of Jacques Lacan. *J. Am. PsAnal. Assn.* 201—219, 1979.
- ⁵ MILLER, J.A. *Encyclopédie Ornicar?* 24, 35—44, *Automne, 1981.*
Article Lacan (Jacques) redigé pour l'*Encyclopédia Universalis en Sept 1979.*
- ⁶ SEDAT, J. *Retour à Lacan?* Paris, 1981. *Librairie Arthème Fayard.*
- ⁷ CHERTOK, L. Reinstatement of the Concept of the Unconscious in the Soviet Union, *Am. J. Psychiatry.* 138, 575—583, 1981.
- ⁸ MITCHELL, J. Psychoanalyst. Born in New Zealand, Member of the British Institute of Psychoanalysis, visiting Scholar, Deakin University (1982). Author of *Women's Estate* (1972), *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1974) and *Female Sexuality in the School of Jacques Lacan* — to appear in (1982).
- ⁹ Notably for Serge Leclaire in *Rompre les Charmes* Inter Editions, 1981. Especially the text of Leclaire's presented at Tbilisi, *L'inconscient: une autre logique* — a discussion paper prepared in 1975, and *Le mouvement psychanalytique animé par Jacques Lacan.*
- ¹⁰ ETKIN, G.E. *Psychoanalysis or Psychoanalyst*, (1981). Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne — *On Angst*, PIT Press, 1982.
- ¹¹ KOVEL, J. *The age of Desire*, Pantheon Books, 1981.
- ¹² BOURAUX-HARTEMANN, M. *Le mouvement de Serge Antoinette Lacan: où le héros Lacanien se fait recoudre un morceau d'altérité par un mouvement de femmes*, in Sédât, J. (Ed.) op.cit.
- ¹³ FREUD, S. *Die Traumdeutung* (1900) G.W. 11/111 p.p.s. 111 et. seq. S. Fischer Verlag. Stand.Ed., Vol.IV, 107, Hogarth Press.
- ¹⁴ JONES, E. *Papers on Psychoanalysis.*

- ¹⁵ SHARPE, E.F. *Dream analysis: a practical handbook for psycho-analysts* (1937), Hogarth Press.
- ¹⁶ SAFOUAN, M. *Seminars of the Freudian School of Melbourne*, (28th December 1981) *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne — On Angst*, PIT Press, 1982.
- ¹⁷ GABRIEL, Y. *The Unconscious in the Human Sciences*, *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 11, 246—283, 1982.
- ¹⁸ SAFOUAN, M. *On Symbolism*, (1981). *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne — On Angst*, PIT Press, 1982, p.93.
- ¹⁹ ZENTNER, O. *The Woman and the Real as a Paradigm of Psychosis*, (1979) *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne — 1979*, PIT Press, 1980, p.73.
- ²⁰ BONAPARTE, M., FREUD, A. and KRIS, E. (Eds). *The Origins of Psychoanalysis, Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes 1887—1902*, by Sigmund Freud, Imago (1950).
- ²¹ BUXBAUM, E. *Freud's dream interpretation in the light of his letters to Fliess*, *Bull, Menninger Clinic*, 15, 197—212, 1951.
- ²² ERIKSON, E. *The Dream Specimen of Psychoanalysis*, *J. Amer. Psy. anal Assn.* 2, 5—56, 1954.
- LEAVITT, H.C. *A Biographical and Teleological study of 'Irma's Injection' dream*, *Psychoanal Rev.* 43, 440—447, 1956.
- SCHUR, M. *Some Additional 'Day Residues' of 'The Specimen Dream of Psychoanalysis'* in Lowenstein, R.M. et al. *Psychoanalysis: a General Psychology*, International Universities Press, 1966.
- GRINSTEIN, A. *On Sigmund Freud's Dreams*, Wayne State University Press, 1968.
- ANZIEU, D. *L'auto-analyse de Freud et la découverte de la psychanalyse* 2nd Edition, *Presses Universitaires de France*, 1975.
- LACAN, J. *Le Séminaire, Livre II 1954—55, Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse*. *Seminars of 9th March and 16th March 1955. Le rêve de l'injection d'Irma*, 1978, *Le Seuil.*
- HARTMANN, H. *The Development of the Ego Concept in Freud's Work* (1956) in *Essays on Ego Psychology*, Int. Univ. Press, 1964.
- MEHLMAN, J. *Trimethylamin: Notes on Freud's Specimen Dream*. In Young, R. *Untying the Text*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

THE IDENTIFICATION AND THE IDEAL

María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner

"One half of me is yours, the other half yours, — mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours, and so all yours"

Shakespeare

"I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you —the object small a— I mutilate you."

Lacan

In *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Freud quotes an account from Rank,

"A slip of the tongue occurs in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* (Act III, Scene 2), which is

from the dramatic point of view extremely subtly motivated and which is put to brilliant technical use . . . it shows that dramatists have a clear understanding of the mechanism and meaning of this kind of parapraxis and assume that the same is true of their audience. Portia, who by her father's will has been bound to the choice of a husband by lot, has so far escaped all her unwelcome suitors by a fortunate chance. Having at last found in Bassanio the suitor who is to her liking, she has cause to hear that he too will choose the wrong casket. She would very much like to tell him that even so he could rest assured of her love; but she is prevented by her vow. In this internal conflict the poet makes her say to the suitor she favours:

'I pray you tarry; pause a day or two,
Before you hazard; for in choosing wrong,
I lose your company; therefore, forbear awhile:
There's something tells me (but it is not love)
I would not lose you. . .

. . . I could teach you
How to choose right, but then I am forsworn;
So I will never be; so may you miss me;
But if you do you'll make me wish a sin,
That I have been forsworn. Beshrew your eyes,
They have o'erlooked me, and divided me;
One half of me is yours, the other half yours
Mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours,
And so all yours.

The thing of which she wanted to give him only a very subtle hint, because she should really have concealed it from him altogether, namely that even before he made his choice she was wholly

his and loved him — it is precisely this that the poet, with a wonderful psychological sensitivity, causes to break through openly in her slip of the tongue; and by this artistic device he succeeds in relieving both the lover's unbearable uncertainty and the suspense of the sympathetic audience over the outcome of his choice."

This slip of the tongue in fact shows the identification between both characters — Portia and Bassanio. "Linguistic usage takes this into account, for two lovers are being spoken as being one!" said Freud in the *Traumdeutung*.

The beginning is mythical. Pondering on the beginnings closes the advance of science. This is relevant to the concept of identification in psychoanalysis. One can speak indefinitely of an origin or beginning in this way as it will never be exhausted. Instead, a myth is produced. This artificial beginning then, will irrevocably mark the speaking-being (*parlêtre*). Myths try to explain the links of prevailing social systems (like the myth of the Primal Horde and the murder of the Father) and of individual existence (like the Oedipus myth). In psychoanalysis, the former refer to the Law while the latter refers to the castration complex. But neither the Law nor the castration complex are myths. Psychoanalysis treats myths as the prevalent conscious side of the symptom and moves towards its object of analysis; the unconscious.

Freud pursued several lines of thought in respect to the concept of identification although he had not arrived, as he wrote in 1932 in his Lectures, at a clear delimitation of it. Identification poses the problem of the confrontation with a process that is relevant to more than one aspect of the theory.

Lalande draws a distinction in the domain of philosophy, between:

- a) Identification as the act of identifying, that is to say, of recognizing as identical, and
- b) Identification as the act by which a being becomes identical to another or by which two beings become identical (in thought or as a matter of fact, totally or *secundum quid*).

This means that there is a distinction to be made between the *transitive* and *reflexive* usage of the verb, hence:

- a) to identify, and
- b) to identify oneself with.

It is in this second usage of the verb, as reflexive, that we shall find the most intricate problems since it indicates that the *subject is the same as the object*. By object we mean the *other*, the likeness, since the psychoanalytic object is a different thing, namely the *objet a*, as Lacan denotes it in his algebra, the cause of desire.

The ego ('I') is the place for unconscious identifications. We must remember that the 'I' is no more than a portion differentiated or modified from the Id ('It') and is subject to the influence of perception just as the 'It' is subject to the drives (*Triebe*). This, in its turn, speaks of the influence that the *Triebe* have on the 'I' via the 'It'.

Already in 1897, in Letter 58 written to Fliess, Freud mentioned identification. He referred to the tonic spasm in hysteria as the imitation of *death with rigor mortis*, that is to say, the identification with a dead person. In manuscript L of the same year, there is a mention of the function of phantasy and a reference to identification as a literal explanation for 'multiplicity of psychic persons'. This will be, of course, the place of the 'I'.

This 'I' had been recognized by Freud after his stay at Nancy, where he was able to observe experimentally how the 'I' carried the post-hypnotic order ahead as previously imposed (onto the 'I'). Freud recalled with indignation the words commanded to the patient '*Vous vous contre suggestionnez*' because, what could the patient do, in front of suggestion, but resist?

When Freud renounced influencing the subject through hypnosis, psycho-analysis gained its place beyond dispute. The 'I' of the subject did *not* have to identify with the 'I' of the analyst. The 'I' of the analyst had to maintain the distance from the analyst. A different thing took place in hypnosis where the ego-ideal of the subject identified with the hypnotist. It is the distance between them, instead, that allowed analysis to take place.

I shall now quote a later paragraph from Freud in reference to identification from his New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, and I will return afterwards to the beginnings of his theory;

"Identification is the assimilation of one I (*Ich*) to another one, as a result of which the first behaves like the second in certain respects".

In 1900 Freud spoke of identification in dreams and referred it to the process of identifying the person or persons appearing in the dream, that is to say, the dreamer himself who is always present often in the form of an extraneous person as well. In this way the dreamer uses identification in the first of the two distinctions explained by Lalande. Literature provides examples of this sort of identification.⁴ Isidore Ducasse, Comte de Lautréamont, in his book *Maldoror* says,

"Old ocean, you are the symbol of identity: always equal to yourself".

While Lewis Carroll, his contemporary, makes the Duchess say to Alice:

"Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise."

While identifications show the movement of intersubjectivity, identity is an illusion of psychology; namely, the old dream of wholeness and totality that Lacan clarified by saying that paranoia is personality, the delusion of totality when anything is bound to anything.

Hysterical identifications were described in the volume on *Dreams*. Freud disentangled the relationship between the desire in the dream and a symptom in real life, that is, between identification in the dream and hysterical identification. The hysterical identification expresses, in most cases, a common sexual element and it allows the subject to identify on the basis of unconscious elements at the level of desire. That is to say, with the *desire of the desire of the Other*.

This desire is understood as desire that is impossible to be fulfilled. Desire remains unfulfilled while the subject is alive since its fulfilment means the disappearing of the subject. Desire has the status of a metonymic chain where the object is a means and not an end. Desire is preserved in its structure because the encounter with the object is the end; an end which Freud called the death drive.

In 1912-13 in Totem and Taboo Freud writes of the myth of a totem meal where the primal father —the object of the most profound envy and fear— was slain and devoured by his sons. By means of this, the primal horde, the sons, became at once the murderers and the heirs. The father, eaten, was identified with. Each one of the sons had in that way, eaten, incorporated and introjected the father.

Introjection is symbolic and gives place to the ego-ideal, one of the functions of the super-ego.

The particularity of identification is that it produces changes at the level of the psychic apparatus; since identification is —as different from imitation, psychic contagion— unconscious, although occurring in the 'I'.

This myth of the origins was later clarified by Lacan when saying that the Law is the repressed desire. In this way Law and desire are linked since it is upon the imposition of the former that the latter exists as such. In psychoses the interaction between Law and desire is blocked and foreclosure does not allow the Name-of-the-Father to become.

In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud returns to the subject of identification. This time he puts forward the hypothesis of identification occurring prior to object-choice, a hypothesis to which he will return later. The loss of a beloved object can occur in reality or exist in phantasy, since it is unknown to the 'I' because consciousness knows nothing of the extent of its love or what it loses with that loss. In other words, the 'I' becomes a symptom of the unconscious loss.

In melancholia, the 'I' has withdrawn its investment from the object (the likeness) but, through narcissistic identification the object has remained in the 'I' and turns out to be the target of the recriminations, reproaches and ill treatment that were originally directed towards the lost object.

This object is not the *objet small a*, since it is this *a*, as lost, that becomes the cause for the subject. In melancholia the *a* is confused with the ideal-ego (imaginary projection).⁵

In the specific case of melancholia, the 'I' will retain the lost object by identification and since some of the characteristics of that loss are unconscious (for example the ambivalence) due to repression, the conflict

instead of arising between the 'I' and the lost object, will arise between the ideal-ego (as if it were the 'I') and the 'I' (as if it were the lost object).

This identification fulfills the basic requirements of a transformation in the 'I' in order to keep an investment in an object which no longer exists. In other words, in melancholia the suicidal act is the imaginary capture of the illusion of the *objet a* situated at the level of the ideal-ego.

In melancholia then, the 'I' identified with the ideal-ego will become an end in itself. We will understand why melancholia is a narcissistic illness if we remember the formula that Freud gave us in Narcissism, An Introduction, where he said that we come out of our narcissism in order not to die.

In melancholia, consequently, the 'I' is the end of the chain in the libidinal equilibrium of the metonymic wandering. The ideal-ego becomes the object in desire. That object in desire is confused with the *objet a*, a short cut that culminates in suicide.

Although it is true that something similar occurs at the end of the Oedipus complex where an identification takes place between the 'I' and the lost object, the difference is that the identification occurring at the end of the Oedipus complex will differentiate in it a portion, the super-ego.

The super-ego then, the real inheritance of the Oedipus complex, will be the nucleus of these lost objects (parents principally). In melancholia, instead, the identifications do not create a new instance. Melancholia occurs in so far as the super-ego (ego-ideal) is already structured.

We see then that identification can be either an element of structuring force (as in the consequence of the Oedipus complex) or an element of destruction (as the identification leading to suicide in melancholia). The identification that leads towards the establishment of the super-ego as the inheritance of the Oedipus complex is correlative to the structuring of the psychic apparatus.

The value of the Oedipus complex dwells in its relation to castration. Desire obtains its status through the mark of castration, that is to say, through the Law by the enactment of desire.

The transitory identification in mourning turns into a process of

lasting duration in melancholia. *Having* (the loved person for example) is transformed into *being* (the loved person). Part of the 'I' by representing the absent-lost object, becomes the object by identification. Hence, the super-ego (ego-ideal) will envisage the homicide of the object. Since the object is now, by identification, a part of the 'I', homicide turns into suicide. The only way of eliminating the object is by killing it through suicide.

The super-ego is the agency of impossible demands. The ego-ideal gives the order "*Jouis*" (Enjoy yourself!) to which the subject can only reply "*Jouis*" (I hear).⁶ The command cannot be carried out because the 'I' can only hear the demand at the level of the ideal-ego. Between the ego-ideal and the ideal-ego the 'I' can only hear.

The super-ego is the identification with the super-ego of the parents rather than an identification with them and this is why in this constitution the parental fantasm will play a decisive role.

It is in Chapter VII (On Identification), of *Group Psychology* (1921) that Freud describes three sources of identification.

Firstly,

"Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. It plays a part in the early history of the Oedipus complex."

An early part that we ought not to confuse with pre-Oedipal stages. Clinical experience shows us, with Lacan, that if the pre-Oedipal stages exist phenomenologically, they are unthinkable from the psychoanalytic point of view; a point in which Melanie Klein was quite Freudian, although in order to sustain the Freudian ambiguity of the overall supremacy of the Oedipus complex. She could not express this supremacy if not by chronological means, by the introduction of a much earlier Oedipus complex.

This identification, ambivalent from the start is, in many ways, the discourse of the Other that places the subject in lineages and generations.

Simultaneously as this identification takes place, a 'true' object choice is developed, which leads us to point out the difference between one and

the other. Identification and object-choice pose for the subject the problem of *being* and *having* which at the beginning are marked out by Freud as being the same. *Being* is at play in identification while *having* is at play in object-choice. *Being* then logically precedes *having*. *To have* is preceded by *to be* and only after (if we understand the *after* as a logical moment) having experienced the abandonment (or loss) of the object.

To be and *to have* are intertwined insofar as we assume that the child does not distinguish between 'I' and not 'I'. *To be* is the condition for *to have*. *To have* implies, among other things, the difference between sexes. Something in the order of the *being* has to be lost in order to speak about *having*.

'It' (the unconscious) speaks⁷ first, therefore 'I' think after — this is the Freudian discovery which according to my clinical experience shows that in the subject, inasmuch as he is a speaking being, his unconscious will always be ahead of his thought since the latter is a consequence of the former.

Secondly,

"Identification appears instead of object-choice, and object-choice has regressed to identification."

This is seen in the process of formation of neurotic symptoms. The 'I' identifies itself by introjection. This is to say that something is transferred in the 'I'. The movement followed then would be identification — object-choice — identification by regression. This identification, also ambivalent, can fall on either a loved or a hated object and takes from its object a single and idiosyncratic trait. The neurotic symptom, now borrowed by identification, is a representative in the 'I' of the object. It implies the abandonment of the object resulting in a return of the libido to the 'I', where the 'I' then offers itself to the 'It' as an object of love or hate.

Thirdly, it is the identification with the desire of the other. This is the case that we so commonly see in our clinical work. Here, identification has little to do with object-choice at first. Rather we can say that object-choice sometimes appears as a consequence of this identification. It is not the other who as such is relevant here but the other's desire. That is to say that there is an unconscious longing for the desire of the other,

which is achieved by identifying with the object's (the other's) desire. An example often seen in the psychiatric ward is the adolescent who develops a symptom proper to another adolescent who is neither his friend, favourite companion nor a particular object for hatred. But through the new symptom obtained by identification, a gain is made, a desire proposed through this indirect way; for example to enjoy a similar sexual transference with his/her analyst.

Freud describes as well the identification as it takes place in a case of male homosexuality and he reviews the case of *melancholia*. In the former where by a particularly intense fixation upon his mother the subject cannot, after puberty, make the change onto another sexual object but identifies himself with her. The subject identifies,

“...with an object that is renounced or lost as a substitute for that object — introjection of it into the ‘I.’”

In the latter case, in *melancholia*, the subject has lost the object of his love, and the dimension of that loss is repressed. A portion of the ‘I’ takes the other as the target for self-reproaches and criticism. “The shadow of the object has fallen upon the ‘I’ (*Ich*)”, as Freud said in *Mourning and Melancholia*.

Two years later, in 1923, Freud will say in *Das Ich und das Es* (The ‘I’ and the ‘It’) that,

“...the effects of the first identifications made in earliest childhood will be general and everlasting”

and he resorts to the ego-ideal when saying that,

“...behind the ego-ideal — there lies hidden an individual's first and most important identification, his identification with the father in his own personal prehistory.”

Freud will correct himself in a footnote to the text saying that it would be safer to say identification with the parents. The fact that Freud has kept both the text and the footnote allows us to point out at his own indecision at giving up his former affirmation.

It would be appropriate here to remember that, in referring to the

death of his own father, Freud said it was the most painful experience in the life of a subject.

We shall keep Freud's first statement, untouched by his own censorship, as truth. Thus, there is a first and automatic identification with the father.⁸ This implies that the child takes direct possession of his father by identification. It seems to be that the child does not have to lose his father in order to arrive at an identification with him. With the mother, instead, the child has to lose her first in order to then choose her and identify with her.

This primary identification with the father has in the theory of Freud, the value of a myth. It refers to what Lacan pointed out as the Name-of-the-Father, that is, the Law by which a child will shape its identifications. It is after these identifications that his destiny will show him as neurotic, perverse or psychotic.

The child (either boy or girl) takes possession of the father by identification, that is to say without needing to carry out an object-choice, therefore, without needing to come out of his narcissism.

The Name-of-the-Father will arrive to the child insofar as his word will separate the child from his mother in the second logical moment of the Oedipus complex. To invest an object (object-choice) implies the rupture of narcissism. Identification, in the terms above described, is the preservation of narcissism via the early establishment of the germ of what will become the ego-ideal.

The uncertainty of fatherhood comes here to add upon the model of identification that which lacks at the level of knowledge. *Pater semper incertus est* while the mother is *certissima*, an old legal tag that reminds us that ‘paternity is always uncertain, maternity is most certain’ quoted by Freud in *Family Romances*.

The son will confer his father the desired certainty in the uncertainty of fatherhood. But it will be from the function he carries that an identificatory relation with his son will be provided.

It is this primary identification with the father, automatic and narcissistic, that belongs to the domain of the myth. Using Freud's metaphor, it pertains to the domain of the *witch metapsychology*.

Primary identification is a hypothetical construction, a logical need for the theory. In all identification that will follow, this primordial primary identification will serve as a pole of attraction. In a similar manner the secondary repression performed in the apparatus will be attracted by the beacon of primary repression. Primary repression is the structuring, in the psychic apparatus, of the division between what will remain forever repressed and that which can become preconscious by the lifting of the repression.

The Freudian subject, we have said it many times, is a subject divided between what his 'I' assumes as the knowledge and what his unconscious poses regardless of this 'I'. There is no possibility of erasing repression. Primary repression is the bar between understanding and being.

Primary identification—I insist—with the father, is a necessity of the theory, therefore, its formulation is dogmatic. It has to do with the father as Law, as a function and, as such, only explicable as the other side of desire. If the Law is the repressed desire, then the work of castration is necessary for desire.

X., age 16, was hospitalized in an acute state. He had had a psychotic breakdown after a gang in the nearby park had verbally abused him and physically provoked him, breaking his nose. On arrival in the psychiatric ward I heard X. addressing the following commands to himself: "You must brush your teeth after every meal", "Your fingernails have to be clean and short", "Don't pick your nose", "Breathe through your nose, don't breathe through your mouth", . . . and so on.

X's father is a policeman and X. was being teased and tormented incessantly because of this. In one of his sessions he made the following slip of the tongue, "My policeman is a father. . ." then he smiled and corrected himself, "I wanted to say that my father is a policeman. . ."

We cannot ignore the disastrous effects brought about when, in everyday life, a father occupies the position of a vigilant custodian of the legal law. As Lacan says in *The Purloined Letter*, we should not confuse the prefect of police with the Law. Moreover, one excludes the other. The father will be identified with the Law insofar as he will come into

play as 'dead'. It is in this symbolic moment that the child's desire of the father, as dead, will make the appearance of the Law possible.

* * *

The following quotations from Kafka's Letter to My Father, stand as documents where every statement is enlightened by Freud's works on the subject of identification and the formation of the super-ego.

"At the time, and at that time everywhere, I would have needed encouragement. I was, after all, depressed even by your mere physical presence. I remember for instance how often we undressed together in the same bathing-hut. There was I, skinny, weakly, slight, you strong, tall, broad. Even inside the hut I felt myself a miserable specimen, and what's more not only in your eyes, but in the eyes of the whole world, for you were for me the measure of all things. . ."

"Please, Father, understand me rightly, these would in themselves have been utterly insignificant details, they only became depressing for me because you, the man who was so tremendously the measure of all things for me, yourself did not keep the commandments you imposed on me. Hence the world was for me divided into three parts: one in which I, the slave, lived under laws that had been invented only for me and which I could, I did not know why, never completely comply with; then a second world, which was infinitely remote from mine in which you lived, concerned with government, with the issuing of orders and with annoyance about their not being obeyed; and finally a third world where everybody else lived happily and free from others and from having to obey. I was continually in disgrace, either I obeyed your orders, and that was a disgrace, for they applied, after all, only to

me, or I was defiant and that was a disgrace too, for how could I presume to defy you, or I could not obey because for instance I had not your strength, your appetite, your skill, in spite of which you expected it of me as a matter of course; this was the greatest disgrace of all. . .!"

"The impossibility of getting on calmly together had one more result, actually a very natural one: I lost the capacity to talk. I daresay I should never have been a very eloquent person in any case, but I should after all have had the usual fluency of human language at my command. But at a very early stage you forbade me to talk. Your threat: 'Not a word of contradiction!' and the raised hand that accompanied it have gone with me ever since. What I got from you—and you are, as soon as it is a matter of your own affairs, an excellent talker— was a hesitant, stammering mode of speech, and even that was still too much for you, and finally I kept silence, at first perhaps from defiance, and then because I couldn't either think or speak in your presence. . ."

NOTES

- 1 PLATO in the Symposium makes Aristophanes say "Is the object of your desire to be always together as much as possible, and never to be separated from one another day or night? If that is what you want, I am ready to melt and weld you together, so that, instead of two, you shall be one flesh; as long as you live you shall live a common life, and when you die, you shall suffer a common death, and be still one, not two, even in the next world. Would such a fate as this content you, and satisfy your longings? We know what their answer would be; no one would refuse the

offer; it would be plain that this is what everybody wants, and everybody would regard it as the precise expression of the desire which he had long felt but had been unable to formulate, that he should melt into his beloved, and that henceforth they should be one being instead of two. The reason is that this was our primitive condition when we were wholes, and love is simply the name for the desire and pursuit of the whole." Lacan takes the satirical words of Aristophanes psychoanalytically showing that love is when one gives what one does not have to someone who is not. In Lacan's own terms "Love as such, I have always told you, and we shall find it in every corner, is to give what one has not. And one cannot love more than doing as not having. Even if one has it. That love as an answer, implies the dominion of the not having. It was not me, it was Plato who invented it, who invented that only Poverty can conceive love and the idea of becoming pregnant in a night's party. And, as a matter of fact, to give what one does not have, is the feast, it is not love". From Seminar VIII, 1960—1961. *Le Transfert*, Unpublished seminar of Lacan. My translation.

In all the places where in this text the term *I* appears it is due to my literal translation from the German *Ich*. Since the Latin *ego* corresponds more to a philosophy of the subject of knowledge than to the subject of psychoanalysis where, if there is any knowledge this dwells in the unconscious from which the *I (Ich)* is only an effect.

In all places where in this text the term *It* appears it is due to my literal translation from the German *Es* which I prefer to the Latin *Id* since it is coherent with the Freudian formula *Wo Es war soll Ich werden* (Where It was I ought to become).

CARROLL, L. " . . . Let me think: was I the same when I got up this morning? I almost think I can remember feeling a little different. But if I'm not the same, the next question is, 'Who in the world am I? Ah, *that's* the great puzzle!' And she began thinking over all the children she knew that were of the same age as herself, to see if she could have been changed for any of them. "I'm sure I'm not Ada," she said, "for her hair goes in such long ringlets, and mine doesn't go in ringlets at all; and I'm sure I can't be Mabel, for I know all sorts of things, and she, oh, she knows such a very little! Besides, *she's* she, and *I'm* I, and — oh dear, how puzzling it all is! From Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, published by Bramhall House, U.S.A.

LACAN, J. "There is an essential difference between the object defined as narcissistic, the *i(a)* and the function of the *a*. From The Four Fundamen-

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

tal Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, p.272, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1977.

- 6 LACAN, J. Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic of Desire, p.319, in *Ecrits; a Selection*, Tavistock Publications, London, 1975.
- 7 FREUD, S. "...the courage to let his own unconscious speak". From A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men, p.165, St.Ed., Vol.XI.
- 8 LACAN, J. "The single stroke (*Einzigiger Zug*) is not in the first field of narcissistic identification, to which Freud relates the first form of identification —which, very curiously indeed, he embodies in a sort of function, a sort of primordial model which the father assumes, anterior even to the libidinous investment on the mother— a mythical stage, certainly. The single stroke, in so far as the subject clings to it, is in the field of desire, which cannot in any sense be constituted other than in the reign of the signifier, other than at the level in which there is a relation of the subject to the Other. It is the field of the Other that determines the function of the single stroke, in so far as it is from it that a major stage of identification is established in the topography then developed by Freud — namely, idealization, the ego ideal". From *Interpretation to the Transference*, p.256 in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1977.

PART II

SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

Four seminars, *On Transference*
given by Dr. Moustapha Safouan
at The Freudian School of Melbourne
in January 1982 for guests,
members and analysts of the School.

FOREWORD TO DR. SAFOUAN'S SEMINARS ON TRANSFERENCE

In the beginning of 1982, The Freudian School of Melbourne invited Dr. Moustapha Safouan, Analyst of *L'Ecole Freudienne de Paris*, to give a series of seminars on Transference for guests, members and analysts of the School. Dr. Safouan was an active contributor to Lacan's seminars which were the nucleus of the formation of the French psychoanalytic school. Those seminars covered a period of 30 years until the dis-solution of *L'Ecole Freudienne de Paris* in 1980. In the dis-solution Safouan remained with Lacan and his principles.

The dream of an international movement above all differences, ended long before Lacan's death. Since the death of Lacan we are witnessing the dispersion of the psychoanalytic discourse. Psychoanalytic discourse is not isomorphic with the psychoanalytic group; this was the truth that the dis-solution as a psychoanalytic act showed.

The group as revealed by Freud and Lacan, always runs the danger of becoming a horde. And if psychoanalysis is one of the impossible professions, it is precisely because it is the profession which causes resistance to the advancement of the psychoanalytic theory.

The psychoanalytic group and the psychoanalytic discourse are not one and the same thing. The constitution of a group, even if a group of analysts, cannot avoid the struggle for pure prestige. It is not that power is bad or good, as the moralist pretends under cover of being anarchic or revolutionary. The position of power is an imaginary position in this regard — as seen with the ex-communication of Lacan.

The reason why power is intrinsically contradictory (without *'aufhebung'*) to psychoanalysis is the fact that, whether you like it or not, it remains in the pre-Freudian field as an Adlerian position.

Philosophers in this respect saw power as infinite and knowledge as finite. They failed to take a further step, namely that power as infinite is a fantasm promoted by belief.

This is not our path. The only absolute master is death, in front of which the group becomes a horde, believing that a ruler or a master is the Law.

If psychoanalytic discourse, which is not necessarily the discourse of science — refers to any power, it refers to the power of the unconscious. Notwithstanding the efforts to fend off desire, it will produce the thing on which psychoanalysis operates, the symptom and the fantasm.

Our proposition is a proposition to work. The School is the place where those who are prepared to investigate and assume the transference of psychoanalysis are welcome. For them the best path is still the Socratic one: to look at their desire — and forget about themselves.

In six years of existence the School has been working steadily and exclusively in psychoanalysis.

Today, whoever wants to become an analyst, who addresses his demand to the school, in order to be listened to, must be prepared to receive back his own words, to avoid feeding with common-sense the formations of his unconscious.

To be a member, an analyst member, or an analyst of the Freudian School; the method proposed by Lacan as the 'pass' has to be taken up. That is to say, it has to be applied. The School is not a place of graduation. This is why the 'pass' is the way by which the work circulates in the School. To finish or to graduate as an analyst is exactly opposite to a Freudian School which accepts and assumes the following consequence: the Freudian desire is unattainable because it can only be articulated, and revealed. It circulates but it cannot be fulfilled.

This is none other than the transference as Socrates 'interprets' it to Alcibiades. Love, which although in the apparent takes the form of Socrates, refers to someone else. Agathon in the text perhaps, but the *objet a* no doubt in the realm of psychoanalysis.

This Socrates, *supposed - subject-of-knowing*, refuses to know anything but love. And the interesting thing is that while affirming to only know matters of love, he refused to give it while it was in demand. To reduce this to that easy word 'frustration', implies the perverse position of thinking of oneself in the capacity of having it. No doubt our reader will find here that echo of the Lacanian teaching: love is to give what one does not have to one who is not.

So long as the clinical experience will keep interrogating the theory, the psychoanalytic discourse has the chance to continue.

To conclude is to produce the psychoanalytic act. If Freud considers that obsessional neurosis leaves scars in thought, because action through judgement does not put an end to thinking, this was his way of urging his followers to take up work and not ceremonials or rituals.

Oscar Zentner
1983

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

Dr. Safouan has published the following works:

*Le structuralisme en psychanalyse in
Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme, Le Seuil*
(1968)

Etudes sur l'Oedipe, Le Seuil (1974)

*La sexualité féminine dans la doctrine
Freudienne, Le Seuil* (1976)

L'échec du principe du plaisir (1979)
Translated as,
Pleasure and Being: Hedonism from a
Psychoanalytic Point of View.
St. Martin's Press (1983)

L'inconscient et son scribe, Le Seuil
(1982)

*Jacques Lacan et la question de la for-
mation des analystes, Le Seuil* (1983)

SEMINAR I — TRANSFERENCE AND ACTING-OUT

Moustapha Safouan

Concerning Freud's ideas on transference, one always has in mind the case of Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim). If you recall, Anna O. related to Breuer stories modelled on Hans Anderson's Picture Book without Pictures. This book had been the first gift Breuer got from his father. He learned to read from this book. The stories are variations on the theme of a little girl who has no-one to love — until in the end she finds a sick old man whose wife is in despair. The little girl cares for him and he recovers; that is, she finds someone to love. In these stories death is quite evanescent, and disappears before the all-powerful love — there is no realization of death as a limit, or subjectivization of death. Love conquers death; even at seventy. Bertha Pappenheim considered her fatal illness as the "interior enemy". But then she was too old to fabricate new symptoms.

So Anna O. told these stories to Breuer and her symptoms were ameliorated. Lucy Freeman has no doubt that this cure is due to transference, as the cure was illusory — as was shown by the fact that she became worse after the expected shock of the death of her father. So, a transference cure is equivalent to a cure by love.

But it is not so sure that Breuer was the *object* of this love.

I remind you of Lacan's *schema de la vase renversée*. You will recall the description of Anna O.'s symptoms before the cure; she had fallen to pieces, astasia-abasia, paralysis, anaesthesia, etc. etc. The organization of the body image occurs through the recognition of the image in the mirror as one's own — ie. it goes through the mediation of the other. Breuer was rather such a mediator.

Indeed, Anna O. called her treatment the *talking cure*, which stresses the symbolic aspect of what is going on. She talked of bringing Breuer into her private theatre. He was not the object of love, but the other who conditions the love of one's own image as the first object. That is, she loved Breuer as a condition for loving herself.

Then at one point Breuer invites her to a promenade in the *Prater*. He hires a car and brings his second daughter, Bertha, in the car. (His mother is also called Bertha.) When they returned, she was so depressed that she talked of suicide for the first time.

A desire of Breuer's had been realized and she took it as a demand. She was not prepared to occupy this place of motherhood. (A desire is not necessarily meant to be realized, only to be sustained.) Remember this observation finishes with Anna O.'s fantasm of *accouchement*.

This raises a number of questions concerning transference. The first question is whether it is an actual love or the reproduction, the shadow of some ancient love. Freud's answer is paradoxical — every love is a repetition, that is, every love reproduces its infantile prototype — ie. the incestuous desire for the first object. If so, what is peculiar about transference love?

Jones claimed that every analysis aims to expose this buried desire and that this defined the end of the analysis, (an opinion held also by Freud at one time). Others think this too reductive and like to stress that there are always some elements that are actual and productive in love and some elements that are regressive. But what are the criteria?

Others, like L. Chertok and R. Saussure in their *History of the Discovery of the Unconscious*, claim that Freud simply could not face the reality of his patients' love. But if transference is simply actual and authentic, how can it be analysable?

Thomas Szasz claims that, whether there is transference or not, it cannot be asserted by one of the parties; the truth becomes a matter of disputation.

All these opinions betray a misconception either of desire or truth. The main mistake is to see love as a transitive relation (ie. the love goes to the object). Another way of seeing it is to regard love as a way of authorizing oneself as being lovable. This discovery of the narcissistic structure of love is not peculiar to psychoanalysis. Plato, circa 255 B.C. in the *Phaedrus* gives a description of the state of love which includes a reference to the mirror.

In the songs of the troubadours derived from Persian sources, it is common to find the idea that no-one would love if they had not already been visited by love.

Bergler and Jekels in a paper in the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* of 1949, state that 'to love is to ask for love'. To ask for love implies that you consider yourself in principle lovable.

Lacan underlines the function of the third person who mediates the love between the subject and his first object, the ego — he calls this the other of dependence and love, (*l'autre de la dépendance et de l'amour*) — a place or a function usually occupied in the first place by the mother. Can we say that Breuer assumed this place in the cure of Anna O., or whether he was put in this place by her? Her aim was to recollect her unity and reunite the parts of her body. But her telling these stories wasn't only to re-establish her mirror-relation to herself, it was also her only means to regularize her relation with death — a relation which was almost completely deficient. It was this deficiency which was repeatedly revealed in these stories. Breuer was supposed to intervene at this point, between her and what Heidegger calls the being for death, (*l'être pour la mort*).

Even if Breuer had only asked if she believed that the girl never lost her man, and even if she had said it, he would then have appeared to her as someone for whom loss or mourning means something. This would situate him in another position with relation to the symbolic. Breuer, of course, was miles away from this: he was regarded in Vienna, as "the doctor's doctor". (I draw your attention to Kennedy's recent book, *Unmasking Medicine*, on the question of death being regarded as if it were an illness.)

For analysis the situation is different. As Lacan says, in analysis, *un- being (le des-être)* is on the side of the analyst. Not so with Breuer, whose reaction was to love her stories, i.e. to love 'her'; but what does the 'her' denote? In telling her stories, she became identified with the book — a book which tells its own stories. Anna O. even counted; if she forgot to tell a story in one visit, next session she would tell him two stories.

Breuer's wife became impatient with his persistent talk of Anna O.'s case; Breuer got embarrassed, and became anxious to finish. Anna O. began to feel that he wanted to get rid of her. She activated many reminiscences under hypnosis — notably the hallucination of her father with the death's head.

After the *visite d'adieu*, a servant came while Breuer was dining with his family to announce that Anna O. was having an hysterical attack, with cramps — a new symptom which culminated in the fantasm of giving birth. "Dr. Breuer's baby is coming", she cried. Breuer fled (and did not return) in front of what was an acting out destined to show the burden of his desire upon her.

This brings us back to the question, is transference an actual love or a repetition?

If it is a repetition, then what is repeated? Freud in *The Dynamics of Transference*, asks what are the reasons and genesis of transference. His answer is that every individual whose needs of love are not satisfied will remain in a state of frustration, (*Versagung* = denial or refusal of a promise) that is, his libido will be maintained in a state of expectation, such that at every encounter it will be apprehended as a promise of love.

Lacan quotes in this connection from the prophet Jeremiah,

"... the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge."

(Attempts have been made, mostly in the fifties and sixties notably by Daniel Lagache in his psychoanalysis of behaviour, to see a verification of this from Gestalt psychology in the so-called *Zeigarnik* effect, which Lacan rejects as an explanation, along with the frustration-aggression hypothesis).

Freud's point is that you love as a way to get love, though he does not make this explicit. To that extent, transference is the outcome of an

actual encounter and it is an actual love, but all the libido is not invested in the object of love — some part of it remains tied to objects which are unconscious. That is, all love is only partial. Remember, Abraham did not talk about partial objects, he talked about partial love.

What is this unconscious object? For Freud, the unconscious object invested is a stereotype or cliché. In this sense every object love is a repetition of some cliché and an object is a love object in as far as one is directed to this object in search of the cliché. How then is this stereotype defined? — as a first love from the past reproduced in the hope that satisfaction not obtained with the old object will be obtained.

But why wasn't it satisfied in the first place? We could say that this is because it was a demand for absolute, unconditional love; a subjective requirement impossible to satisfy — i.e. there are limits to the satisfaction that love can give and no limits to the demand of love. A purely genetic approach to this question gives rise to a psychological mystery which requires another approach — the structural approach. Structuralism thinks outside time, in the sense that it glimpses the internal necessity working every time.

According to Freud, there is part of the libido which remains in the unconscious. That part invested in an unconscious object cannot be called narcissistic libido. But there is also a narcissistic libido invested in the object. [Lacan symbolizes the specular image as $i(a)$, (*i* of *a*) (and the object of love as $i'(a)$, (*i'* of (*a*)).]

That is, the object is the reflection of the subject as he wants to be seen, rather than the reflection of some old object. This object always appears in an idealized form. With this idealization, we approach the concept of lack; this object is given all the attributes which I don't find in myself. The libido invested in the stereotype is not narcissistic libido in so far as the narcissistic libido is invested in the object which is in front. The unconscious object is not such as to appear specularly — that is, it is not within the domain of consciousness. What appears in the field of the specular is the lack of this object, i.e. the lack appears as the absence which defines me in so far as I am not only an image.

It is precisely this lack which determines the transportation of the libido that invests the image of one's own to the image of the object —

what I lack the object has, giving the illusion of totality— all I want (which is all I am) is there.

This idea of a stereotype has a history in psychoanalysis deriving from the phenomenological observation that everyone has his own conditions for love, ie. in these details reside all the reality of the object — for example a certain woman can never resist a man in some way associated with danger. In analysis, the point at which the subject recognizes the determinants of his object choice is one of the crucial moments.

Bergler tries to assimilate this to the notion of an internal image (cf. a gestalt trigger in the animal world described by ethologists) which means that the person carries a predisposition to repeat the action when confronted with the object, ie. he postulates a one to one correspondence between the internal image and the object which results in falling in love. He takes Goethe's Werther as an example. When he sees Charlotte giving bread to the little children, he encounters his own image from the external world — experienced as a *coup de foudre*.

We can envisage Lacan's *objet a* as another step towards the definition of this stereotype of the unconscious object. There was a time when this object was considered as an imago of a person, eg. the mother. Lacan's position is to state that there is an object such that it does not appear in the narcissistically invested image, which is unconscious, and without which transduction (*transversement*) of libido between narcissistic libido and object libido does not occur. There is repetition, yes, but what is repeated is not the first love, but the cause of all love.

There is an important paradox concerning transference. In the psychoanalytic doctrine, we speak of transference resistance despite the fact that transference is the condition of the efficacy of interpretation.

If we have love, why the need for knowledge — love is blind. But one must go through love as a condition so that the lack-object that determines this love can be treated.

The analysand may fall in love with the analyst in the treatment, but mostly he is in love with a third person. This lateral transference is precisely *the transference*. The question of whether he is worth loving is nevertheless addressed to the analyst. In the next seminar we will elaborate this question of the bifurcation of the transference through an examination of the Symposium of Plato.

Let's turn now to the relation between transference and acting-out. Lacan refers here to a case described by Ernst Kris, of a scholar who had published widely and who accused himself of plagiarism. Kris started by examining his works to see if there was plagiarism or not. He tells the patient in the session that he finds none. After the session, the patient goes to a restaurant to eat fresh brains — an acting-out, no doubt.

Kris behaved as if the self reproaches concerned acts. But for a psychoanalyst, self reproach relates to desire, not to acts. Acting-out is a means of showing what one cannot say to the analyst.

The study of ritual also has a bearing on this question. Acting-out is not necessarily the result of a false interpretation. Often it comes spontaneously as a result of the fact that what one cannot say one can at least show. The hysterical attack of Anna O. was an acting-out in this sense. Her labour is an acting-out of an interpretation not made of Breuer's desire.

Acting-out occurs in relation to, but outside the analysis. An example is Freud's patient, the homosexual woman who loved a *démi-mondaine* in a chivalrous way to point out something to her father. If we relate transference to acting-out, the latter is the more transparent term, in that it helps to define the obscure.

Transference outside analysis is acting-out; acting-out in analysis is transference. For example, when the topic of castration makes itself felt in the analysis, the patient then falls in love. This love is an acting-out which, in so far as it takes place during the analysis, is transference or, more precisely, transference resistance.

* • *

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS

... Analysis is the analysis of transference, the analyst doesn't necessarily have to do anything to bring it out.

... the *sujet-supposé-savoir* is the motor power of the transference. When this credit is not given to the analyst, there is no transference.

... the aim of analysis is to restructure the relation to the source of repetition, what Freud calls *l'objet foncièrement perdu*. The question of

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

the efficacy of the analysis is that of its ability to stop repetition.

... You cannot believe and analyse at the same time. It is one or the other.

... *les pièges de narcissism du désir sont innumérables.*

Seminar reconstructed from notes.

SEMINAR II — ON PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM

Moustapha Safouan

Hegel, in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* was not claiming to advance or add a new theory of knowledge, or a new critique of knowledge as it already existed. Knowledge for him was a fact which existed in a variety of discourses; for example the discourse of the stoics or the discourse of the sceptics and so forth and even the critique of knowledge is one of these discourses. So he didn't need to add a new theory; all he needed was to consider these different discourses in order to see how knowledge is effectively structured and how the deficiencies or the contradictions which exist within a certain discourse, say that of the stoics, work as the motive power for going to another kind of discourse. This is the movement which he called dialectic, in which contradiction works as the motor.

I recall this because the *Symposium* of Plato can be considered as a study of love, but as love effectively existed in a certain discourse. Of course there is no question in Plato of a self-movement or of a dialectic movement, but as far as the study of the phenomenon is the study of a certain discourse, the idea is there. He does not say what love is or what

love is not; he just lets people talk about love and you will see for yourself — which is a very brilliant idea.

Love is not only a passion we submit to or which we suffer, and that is all, but we live it in a discourse. And not only do we live it in a discourse but we can go further and say that, if union with the beloved is the end of this passion, as a matter of fact, this union is not realized or even realizable except in a discourse.

This is clear then, that the object of love as in mystic love or in the ideas of a philosopher like Spinoza and all philosophy is built on the idea of union with the beloved. This simply means that the union is with the significant. In other words the union is of a symbolic order and not of the real order. As a matter of fact, we don't need to go to these heights of mysticism and so on. Even on the common level we can notice that love is really at the very end, as Lacan put it, the love of a name. It is a matter of recurrent psychoanalytic observation that the moment when the analysand gives the name, even outside of analysis, when the lover gives the name of the beloved, it always means that he has crossed some fantasm.

So the method of Plato seems to me completely adequate to its object. This was the method around which he arranged the Symposium. As you will remember, the banquet took place because Agathon, which precisely means 'the good', in the sense that we talk about the 'supreme good', this Agathon was a tragic poet who was well known. He had won first prize in a competition as a tragic poet and that was the occasion of the big celebration. Because no-one was in a hurry, on the second day, some intimate friends were invited to a more intimate celebration. But because they were too tired to resume drinking, one of them proposed the idea of spending the night talking instead of drinking, and each at his turn to make a praise to love and that is how it started.

The one whose turn it was to talk first was a young man Phaedrus who was supposed to be the very example of an Athenian youth of the fifth century. So Phaedrus started by presenting the argument that love was the most ancient of the Athenian gods and was the god most worthy of praise because he was the most beneficial. Beneficial in what respect? — because in love lies the motive power, the drive behind the highest and most noble deeds. For example, if a beloved commits a

shameful deed and is seen by somebody else, he would feel shame. But even if he was seen by his parents, his shame would be nothing compared with the shame he would feel if he was seen by his lover. So lovers are incapable of shameful things, to such an extent that an army made of true lovers would be able to resist and gain victory against even the universality of man. Given that great deeds lead to immortality, so that you obtain everlasting memory, it was only love that drove Alceste, because Alceste was the lover but Achilles was the beloved. You can see in this scenario, this dialogue, a kind of indication that the place of the lover who sacrifices himself can easily be taken by the beloved. I mean an indication of an operation of substitution, according to which the beloved becomes the lover and as a matter of fact you can say that the very essence of love is some kind of substitution according to which the one who loves is by the same token put by this very movement of loving, in the place of the eventual beloved. The point is that this gives rise to the idea of love that makes one abstain from doing shameful things.

Let us look at this discourse more closely. It amounts to pointing to the importance of what we may call 'the gaze', '*le regard*', 'the look' and it points to the fact that the beloved and the lover are each suspended in the gaze of the other and the finality is to see in this gaze the very image of him that he would like most. One of the commentators of this discourse here points to a dangerous situation; it's like drowning into the disappearance of the efficacy of any law. Because under these conditions the most shameful things can be done because they please the lover. When he takes the example of defending one's own city, clearly you can say that it is a law. But the question is, is this law your desire or not? It may be my very wish. This would leave me free not to participate in a dirty war. But according to this logic of Phaedrus in his discourse the law, the Athenian custom or duty of defending the city, is taken as just an object to which you accommodate yourself in order to get admiration. Duty and desire are completely apart.

Another idea which may be worth noticing in this discourse is that since all is directed in order to get narcissistic satisfaction in the gaze of the other, you can say that love is effectively a means of enjoying one's own being. Enjoying one's own being is simply to love.

From this point we can proceed to the following discourse which was,

the place, held by Pausanias. Pausanias is a Greek name which comes from a verb which means to stop, to pause. This Pausanias was a well known homosexual and as you know Greek homosexuality was a tradition organized socially and was a phenomenon subject to no social repudiation, only social regimentation. For example it was the idea that you should love boys but with the social regimentation that you don't pursue them younger than a certain age etc., etc. So there was no social condemnation, only regimentation.

So there are a number of subtleties of this kind that we should be aware of when each speaker talks from his own position. In the dialogue, there are clear indications that Pausanias was in love with Agathon and that Agathon had started to feel a bit tired of him. So this situation draws him in his speech to make the distinction between the bad and the good love: good investment and love which is not a good investment in the language of libido and banks. So he starts by talking about two kinds of love, as love belongs to Aphrodite and there are two kinds of Aphrodite, the celestial and Aphrodite the earthly. The celestial Aphrodite was formed when the testicles of Uranus were cut and fell into the sea. At that moment the water boiled and out of the foam came Aphrodite. So she owes her coming into being at birth to no intervention of the female element. That is what makes her really greater and that is why love goes to boys and not to women.

His discourse is very instructive in as much as it puts into relief another facet of love which is not the narcissistic gratification but the kind of idealization which it brings. Another point is that this idealization is clearly given as a kind of negation, because all this praise of the heavenly Aphrodite, barely hides an attraction in the other direction towards Agathon. At that moment we are told that Aristophanes, a friend, got the hiccups to such an extent that he could not speak at his turn. And there are many commentators who have spent ink trying to explain why. The only credible or fitting explanation, I think, was that he was simply laughing while he was listening to this hypocrite paederast Pausanias. And this is given credit by what he says; "I can't speak, I am arrested. . . etc.", in this speech you can find at least five puns on the name Pausanias.

So, as he could not speak, the one who was beside him took up the

toast. He was called Eryximachus, a medical man. He speaks from the view of the prevailing Sicilian medical tradition which was based upon the philosophies of Empedocles according to which there are two forces those of strife and concord, in other words the forces of hate and love. To put it into a nutshell, he made those cosmic forces.

Then comes the turn of Aristophanes who should have spoken before. With him things become more serious. Aristophanes starts to enter into something different, what we call the order of desire. He starts by saying that men have no idea about the power of love. I will teach you and you will be my *porte parole* and you in your turn will teach others. Here you have an indication that Plato is going to say something serious and we have the indication of some revelation and the word revelation is actually used in the text. So what is the revelation? There is also the indication that we ignore revelation. He says we ignore our true nature and what is our true nature? It is what we were. Our ancestors were a race of spheric beings; everyone was a sphere. And then comes a long description of how strong and muscular these beings were and other descriptions of the olympic ideal of man, strong and quick. So they strove hard and wanted to attain the heights of Olympus and dismiss the Gods and occupy their place. So Zeus was displeased with this excess and as a punishment he cut them into halves. So if a woman was part of a sphere which joined with another half containing a woman we have what is called a lesbian. If a man was part of a sphere which contained another man (and here is the vicious remark) we have Pausanias, if he is what I think he is. If there are halves which join to make a sphere containing a man and a woman then these are the race who make havoc. But we are all of us pieces of man or pieces of woman. There is the custom that we take a stone, cut it in half and give it to our children to symbolize and to announce to generations a friendship and so it is that we are symbols of men and women.

All this jovial way of presenting things has its serious indications. It is said clearly that one loves some object in as far as he finds in this object his own completion. In this insistence of unity as the finality of the love drive we have all the indications given in a sarcastic way which underlie the illusionary character of this search for love. But illusionary in what sense? Because it is *irrealisable*. Although they are all intelligent enough,

they believe in it and in order to believe in it they create obstacles because this unity they are supposed to seek is the very thing they are supposed to dread, as unity is the very pole of desire and anxiety in this speech of Aristophanes because in one moment of his discourse he makes an explicit hypothesis. Suppose a blacksmith comes, he says, with his tools and surprises two lovers in bed and he asks them "what do you want?" They will have no answer. So he says, "don't you want me to unite you in a common death and a common life?", and here they say, "that is exactly what we want". But the point is that there is some sarcasm here. He tells us by the very fact of not telling us that the blacksmith did not combine action with words. Suppose that the blacksmith started to unite them really in a common death and common life, you can imagine the result! So you can say that this illusory character is the very illusion which underlies the notion in some psychoanalytic circles of genital love. There can be genital desire but genital love is this illusion. Also it can be deduced from the discourse that if love is finding the object as much as it appears to complete you and if love is to place oneself in the place of the beloved, then you can say that love amounts to annihilating the object, to become some part of yourself instead of that which you present yourself. This you can deduce from the current metaphors such as, you are my eyes, my heart, etc.

Well after these revelations, if we call them so, comes the turn of Agathon himself. This is a most difficult discourse. Some say it was stupid, some brilliant but merely on the level of style, some say it was the most glorious page of Greek ever written etc., but most commentators do not find any substance in it. Now in order to understand it or give it its full import, one needs to recall that at the end of the banquet everybody was completely drunk and everybody slept except three people, Socrates and the two poets — the comic poet, Aristophanes and Agathon. Socrates in his passion for the tragic poet was trying to convince them that the comic poet was the tragic poet and that the tragic poet was the comic poet and so he was trying to convince them of their identities. At that moment some other group of people came suddenly and that was how it ended. Now, one wonders why at this stage did Plato mention the two and introduce the identity of the comic and tragic when he did not develop it? Well I think he did not develop it because he had already developed it in the way he made them talk. He developed it

in action. As a matter of fact this speech of Aristophanes was undoubtedly a comic speech, because of the effect and especially because it was a speech about a lost paradise. There is a Spanish scholar whose book, *The Origin of Tragic*, really shows in a convincing way that the theme of a lost paradise is the theme of all comedy. So by its very theme as well as by its effect, it is comic.

Now, Agathon is a tragic poet, but does this mean he must give himself to a tragic speech? This would be out of place. It poses the question, is it possible to pronounce a tragic speech about love? I mean isn't any speech about love bound to be a comic speech? Well I would say in this case that, if the goal of this passion is unity and if the passion is rigorous — I mean if it goes to the very end of this goal without hesitation, then in this case it becomes tragic.

Well this is a suggestion, but anyway to give it some weight I will recall a book written by Michelet who is the famous nineteenth century French historian. Michelet is even more appreciated among the French than say Jevons among the English, not only for his quality as an historian but also for his literary qualities. This Michelet has written some other books outside his domain as an historian. He has a book titled *'la Femme'* and another titled *'l'amour'*. If you read this book you can't stop laughing. Everybody laughs! What was the purpose of this book? He says that he was afflicted to see his French compatriots abandon themselves to alcohol and narcotics and become miserable when they have happiness near at hand. Happiness for a French woman is a French man and for a French man is a French woman. And the book is describing how man can find happiness in his mate. It describes how you should treat each other at the beginning of life. You come to the chapter titled, *Is Union Possible?* And he says that union is not possible as far as there is life, union is possible only in death. Then he starts a long tirade to the effect that in this case, if union is not realizable except at the price of death, then death is my friend and then he starts some two or three pages which really make you tremble and its quality completely changes.

To return to Agathon then, he may have the possibility of giving a tragic discourse or speech on passion but to do so would have been out of place.

The solution found by Plato was very astute, in the sense that, as a

tragic poet he was supposed to understand fully the language of passion. The language of passion is rhetorics, so it was a discourse in which the rhetorics flowed and sophism, which is part of rhetorics, to such an extent that the commentators were struck by what we call the *legèreté* or futility of this speech. When you look closely, it was not as futile as it seemed and after all Plato makes him conclude his speech by saying, here is my speech with its measure of *badinage* and also its good measure of seriousness. So this is an indication not to dismiss the whole thing and in order to give you a single material example he says, that he does not subscribe to Phaedrus' idea that love is the most ancient of gods. On the contrary, love is the youngest of gods. The proof is that love flees old age, it loves youth. But here is the most verbal area in the worst sense of the word. This argument is no argument at all, love is young because it loves the young, but he says it flies old years. It flies to youth, youth which is too rapid to our taste, because it arrives to reach us earlier than we want — so here is a touch to the fragility even of life and of love by the same token, which is given without being said at all, like a light touch. As a matter of fact, it is almost sure that Plato in his youth, like every self-respecting young Athenian used to abandon himself to writing poetry and one genre of poetry was to write epitaphs for the dead. One of the epitaphs which was written by him was dedicated to a courtesan who died in old age. I can't recall it now, but it is one of the most moving things you can read.

So the theme of old age was not out of the author's sphere of reflection and you have many many indications in Agathon's speech which confirm this is so and in the form of *badinage*, there are many indications that this is so and many many truths concerning the fragility of love, its cruelty, its inconsistency, etc. So that I would say that if Aristophanes' discourse which was comic, it was also tragic, which are the bones of the discourse. It pertains to the abhorrence of men for the original sin, punishment of the world, to ignorance of this punishment and the keeping of the trace of this punishment apart. So I would say that his speech was proof of the identity of the comic and the tragic, as far as their elegance and style was concerned and in their content and thought. So I think the thesis was doubly proved.

Once all these author's speak it is then the turn of Socrates. He starts

by saying what is there left for him to say? But because he agreed to this social situation, he starts in his own way, which is the way of posing questions. As Agathon was insistent on the idea that love is beautiful he starts by putting the question, whether love is a sign of lack or a sign of possession? His answers are given, that you love what you lack. Then he asks if love is beauty, and he answers, 'yes'. Well, then he says love lacks beauty? and the other says 'yes'. And so why did you say that love is beautiful? At this the situation gets tense. Agathon is not pleased. Socrates tells him that 'after all I don't blame you because I have the same ideas like yourself, but I was instructed in these matters by an oracle, a woman named Diotima and from now on I will report what she said to me'. From this moment, Socrates stops talking directly and just reports Diotima. Some commentators say this was said just not to antagonize Agathon but there is certainly more to it than that.

Socrates then asks the question of whether love is a god of richness and plenitude or rather a god of lack? According to Agathon, a man loves what he lacks. Socrates was taught by Diotima and the formula used by her was 'Love is always the love of something and that something is what he lacks'. Now here is a point about love; when we talk about love, we talk about it as a gift, 'I gave her my love. . . .' So if you persist in talking about love as a gift and about love as something lacking then you should say that the gift in love is a lack, love is a gift of a lack, this formula of Plato's is the very formula of Lacan.

Diotima proceeds to make another point, that love is not only lack, it is also a philosopher and there is the myth of Eros' birth as a demon. The function of demons in Greek mythology is to be messengers. They carry the messages of gods to the mortals in the shape of dreams, so by their very nature they are compromised, either by function or in essence and I would compare them to our symptoms which relate us to our unconscious. As a philosopher love's congenital element is interrogation. But what is the object of this interrogation? Well, it is not a question of what do I love, because, to what I love I can always answer, such a person or roast beef, it comes to the same. I know the beloved. The question is here, to make the point that there are two different kinds of lack. There is the lack which is the lack of a possession, I can love Madam X to get some *jouissance* or I can get some *jouissance* from roast beef. This

second lack can more or less be appeased. This is lack for which its antithesis is possession. The point here is that there is a lack which cannot be appeased by possession, the lack which makes us love a person or object. It is because we put the object in the place of that which we lack, that there is love. As a matter of fact, there is a kind of fallacy in the discourse. You do not love a person/object because it comes from the place of a missing part, but because you love him you put the person in the place of the missing part. That is why Diotima made scornful dismissal of Aristophanes' theory that people love part of themselves. She, herself however, was going to make a similar fallacy because in the first place she says we do not love parts of ourselves but we love things which are good. This is why at the end Aristophanes says, 'Oh, I don't accept this' and you can imagine how he answers because the same reasoning applies to her thesis — we do not love the object because it is good but it is because we love that we make it good— we find in it a promise of goodness. The main thesis of her speech is the moment when she talks about the object of love as beauty. Here she asked Socrates if he accepted this, like to a little boy. 'Yes, keep going' he answers. Now suppose Socrates, she says, a third person comes and puts to you and me the question, by asking, 'when man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?' Here is the distinction between what you know and what you don't know — here you find what we call the two components of the libido, distinguished even before Freud. We have the lack which is a conscious lack which is the narcissistic investment of the object by which we know love, with the possibility of satisfying this lack. And there is the other kind of lack of which you know nothing and which is precisely what we spoke about yesterday.

I said that there is that about which no knowledge can be obtained but the question is, is there somebody who has this knowledge? The least we can say is that Socrates did not pretend to have this knowledge. He said, 'I will not speak, I will live and let her speak', and that is my reason why he left the speech to someone else. He didn't pretend to know. To leave this speech to a woman is better because after all they know better! The indications in the text are very subtle and it's a dialogue to which one must be very attentive. Plato shows that Diotima is an oracle, that here there is no matter of science because science in the Socratic way is simply limited by the requirement and coherence of the

significance. You can say that love is lack, beauty, etc., and so you follow the coherence of what is imposed upon you by the significant but beyond that you can not pretend it to be science, it is a matter of opinion about inspiration, enthusiasm, and so on.

After this comes the idea in philosophy of the ascending dialectics of Plato. The accession to the beautiful itself. Why there is a need for this is precisely because having what you love and not having what you desire, there is still need of some satisfaction and that is why there must be the need of going further and for Diotima's idea. In this idea of dialectic ascension which is described as Plato's true theory of love (I would think a true theory is the most you can say), I think that Plato would have thought about it in the same way that Freud himself viewed *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. As Freud put it, it is speculation and I think this is how Plato viewed his theory of dialectic. By the same token he probably added faith to it with his reasoning.

You can follow the ascending dialectic steps easily; you start by loving one boy but then you don't have all you want in this love. Then there is love of beauty of form which is the second step. But in this you don't find all you want in the beauty of bodily form. So then there is the love of the noble soul and then you find that the soul is beautiful in as much as it realizes some qualities. But to say what qualities, requires you to make moral studies, so you go to one of these. So you go from love of boys, to love of beauty, love of form, to the love of souls, to the love of science and then you are still not satisfied. So then what remains is beauty itself, so you, in reality, go to a non-specular object. That same object that was refused in the beginning as insufficient, appears again but as non-specular. It is exactly the same object which appeared in the demand which appears again in another chain, which is the unconscious chain. It's the same movement and by non-specular he really says it by saying beauty not infected or contaminated by colours or human flesh. This thing, the lack of which appears in the image and which I can't pretend to contain, conditions the whole transduct of the libido. One being accessible to knowledge and the other of which there is no knowledge.

So this is in the end the object from which we are really cut, he says and this is the cause of the whole movement. This is the cause of our

desire. This is the real object of which we are incomplete and this becomes the motive force all along and the cause of desire. Socrates surely was supposed to know that and so he could not pretend to contain this knowledge, or beauty itself and this is what makes his power in front of the seduction of Alcibiades. As you remember when he finishes reporting about Diotima, comes the episode of Alcibiades who gives every indication in the text that he is in love with Agathon. When drunk he only sees Agathon and he goes like a somnambulist, places a crown of olives on his head — all the indications of being madly in love are there. At that moment he perceives Socrates next to Agathon and says, 'Ah! Socrates you are here' and that starts the manoeuvre. He refused to praise beauty but wished to praise Socrates. . . and so the discourse of attempting to seduce Socrates begins and then of how Socrates dismissed him. But the main thing here is the comparison with what was underlined by Lacan in his seminar on The Transference, where this was the most revealing thing he gave us. The comparison of Socrates to these kind of boxes which you find at the base of Athenian statues. Boxes in which you make a lovely creature. You open the box and you find in it the agalma which is usually translated by statuettes of gods. The agalma, in some of its uses, for example, in Phaedrus, in Plato himself and in poetry, the tragedies of Euripedes for example, the agalma is a statuette of a god, yes, but you try to make it as beautiful as possible, which doesn't mean that it has to be beautiful. For example in the popular art, people try to put everything you can put in an object.

Anyway the intention is to make it as beautiful as possible. It is supposed to captivate or incline favourably towards you, the god's desire. It is a trap for the god's desire. This use can be translated as *ex voto*, in some churches especially in France and Italy you can frequently find, say, St. Francis of Assisi and because I recover from some illness or was miraculously saved, I give some object which is as beautiful as I can give. These are objects which are called *ex voto*. There is another use which is also linked to the ritual of the sacrifice. You try to make the sacrifice as beautiful as possible, for example, if it is an ox, you gild the horns. So it is an object which has also the power of charm and this is important because Alcibiades himself, according to many historians was supposed to be a political and military genius. He played a very big role in the Athenian politics and military history about 430 but his genius

has severely been put into question by modern scholars, especially in a recent book, *Alcibiades Re-examined*. The intention is clear, it is to demolish the person but the modern historian has also to account for the opinions of the ancient historians. Historians like Plutarch and even Thucydides in the Peloponnesian war, considered him a genius. This modern author claims that all this can be explained by the charm of the person. He was absolutely charming. His charm was even admitted by his worst enemies.

So after Socrates talks of that from which he was cut and after he talks of that of which he disclaims all pretension to be the container, he will be in a position to tell us that Alcibiades is doubly mistaken.

So Socrates makes Alcibiades realize that he is mistaken and that he is not the container of this ultimate beauty, this wonder of wonders. Socrates also knows Alcibiades was mistaken about the object, himself, because if he gives the object all this credit, he does not know enough about himself in order to be it. I would say all this exhibition was destined to get from Socrates a sign of his unconscious desire. This is precisely what Socrates refused. He told him, my boy you are really destitute because if you are saying that I have all these glorious things in me and you want to make an exchange, giving to me something in order to have some of this, you are like a man who wants to exchange copper for gold. But if you have eyes to see, you will see and you will know that I am nothing, but you are very far from knowing that. The text says; "Suppose you are making a mistake and I am not worth anything at all".

So of what value is all of this in our psychoanalytic work? Well to start with, all this was addressed to Socrates but the one he loved was Agathon, the one called 'the good'. Agathon has suffered many sarcasms from Lacan but he was not as stupid as Lacan wanted to present him. The point is that there is an object of love and the acme of passion where he was on the point of trembling. Does the other love me or not and am I worthy of this love? Well this question is addressed to someone else who is the object of transference — Socrates. So this is what I meant by lateral transference being the transference itself.

The other point is the very question, am I worthy? It supposes that there is someone who knows the answer, a transference, where the question is put to the one, who is supposed to know. So you can say that the

transference starts as a desire to know and the agalma is the form that this desire takes in its first appearance.

The third point is that there is evidently, what I call, a difference in libidinal equilibrium, as Socrates answers from a different point so far as love is concerned. From Alcibiades, what Socrates knew that made him different in this discourse, was that he knew he was not what the other imagines. Which means the famous unbeing. As a matter of fact, once Lacan was dead he was attacked by many analysts. Andre Green for example says that Lacan's doctrine was wicked because of his refusal of love etc. This is true but the point is that there is an annihilation of worth. But this renunciation or realization of the lack of worth is first made by the analyst. The unbeing is first on the side of the analyst. If there is wickedness in analysing one's worth it is the analyst who suffers first. The rebuke is stupid because if there is wickedness, it is not against the analysand. It is the analyst who suffers first. It is up to the analysand to accept or not to accept the same knowledge, that he was mistaken and that is that! The unbeing — *le des-être*.

What happens afterwards is that Socrates says all this business of my agalma or not agalma was a show for Agathon. And here comes the difference between the Socratic method and the psychoanalytic method was because in psychoanalysis we are not supposed to tell the analysand 'there is what you love', because if you tell him that, you will give him the illusion that there is something adequate to his lack. While the aim of the process is to bring a better knowledge of his lack to light. So if you give him an interpretation like Socrates, of 'that is what you want' you will undermine the process. So for us there is no Agathon.

* • •

Oscar Zentner: There is no object. Dr. Safouan, I would like you to distinguish a bit more between love and desire.

Moustapha Safouan: Well let us read the translation again, 'He who says that he loves the beautiful what does he desire?'

In the ascending dialectic, you go to speculations like those of Diotima. She puts speculation to stuff the hole of ignorance and beauty is the final answer. But here there is an obscure point which gives rise to

the question well then what do I desire? So even beauty does not contain the answer. I would say, *la structure trouée de l'objet*. The pierced structure of the object to be filled.

Oscar Zentner: In this point, Socrates, when he comes to make his own speech almost fades by giving place to Diotima and I remember we laughed by saying she is a woman, she should know. I wonder if beyond the laugh 'she knows' because what is in play is not a matter of being, I mean being the phallus.

Moustapha Safouan: Well that could be, yes.

Oscar Zentner: It seems that in the moment when Socrates has to open his mouth he reveals that there is some gap between love and desire. My speculation is that Diotima does not put in Socrates' head, because she is a woman, the phallogocentric dimension of the question of what is love and desire. Then there cannot be a coincidence between love and desire because the phallus will escape. No-one will either possess it or be it. Diotima maybe, presents herself as being but that is a speculation. The other question is, if we can connect this with Lacan's seminar on Hamlet where he says that when we love, the object is in desire. Meaning that the object is in the place of desire, like a substitution. There is no object of desire, it is in desire.

Moustapha Safouan: The thing is given in Aristophanes' myth, except that this myth puts things in the real, as posed by its very structure as myth. It organizes the real. He says that once there was a human race, as if it happened. So that is why as far as Freud forged the myth of the primitive horde... once there was a father etc. etc., he put it as something that really happened. In this case, as a matter of fact, you can say the *real* is the impossible. I don't want to go into that but you can say as far as the myth itself is concerned, that it transposes things into the dimension of the *real*. But there is a gist of truth in the whole thing. It is because an obscure cut is transposed into the libido theory, which boils down to saying there is a certain cut and the object gets its value in as far as it comes in the place of the lack. This cut comes in the place of a fundamental lack. This cut is presented in the myth as a real event, but is given in the psychoanalytic theory by Freud as castration in as far as it is phylogenetically transmitted. This is the most convincing explanation

of the effects of the Name-of-the-Father, by reference not to a real event but by reference to the symbolic order. The object who is loved is the object who is put in the place of the phallus so that you get some appeasement of castration.

Gayle Paull: Sometimes at Thursday Seminars Oscar says that analysis is barbaric, I think I understand that now. The whole idea of transference and then what? To realize that, that's to be annihilated.

Moustapha Safouan: Lacan's formula is *l'objet tient lieu de la cause du desire*. The object stands for the cause of desire. The cause, the object can never be, but it is the delegate, it can stand for it. The object stands for the cause of desire.

Oscar Zentner: Taking this formula, you are going further than what Freud described as castration. The object which stands instead of being the cause is an object which is not specular, which means it is an object which is in the *real*.

Moustapha Safouan: The object which I meet in reality, which is narcissistically invested takes its value from the fact that it stands for the lack, for the cause of the desire. But still it is not the same, there is also a non-coincidence here.

Oscar Zentner: Which means that for Freud as well as for Lacan, the fundamental thing remains that the subject is split. I think that is important to underline.

Moustapha Safouan: Socrates' notion is of being cut from an object which is an object not of this world, not from the same place. So this cut is the equivalent of the division of the subject. This corresponds to the sub-lunar and supra-lunar worlds of Plato, but for us the notion of soul has no practical value.

Oscar Zentner: After Freud, with some exceptions, can we say that the Freudian discovery, the re-discovery rather, was a pretension to fulfill the gap which occurs in the subject. Because tonight you were speaking of the difference between genital love and genital desire and I think that is the point where we can see the deviation from the Freudian discovery. It is clear that there can be a genital desire but there cannot be a genital love.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, love is usually given as oblativity. If love is a gift then it must be a gift of this very lack, because if you give something you give shit. We know that the idea of giving starts at the dawn of life. The first thing we ask of a human being is to give shit. So, oblativity is not genital it is anal.

Oscar Zentner: That is an important point for us, because, for instance, if we watch carefully the Freudian text we find the appearance of the object in reality is in the anal phase. . . And that will be an object in so far as it will create an imbalance in the libidinal equilibrium in the individual. He can answer to the demand of love of the other, the mother for instance, even if the demand is not pronounced. For instance Freud says it is very well known that the child will shit in our lap only as a proof of love. I think there the symbolic equivalence can start. Proof of love equals shit. If it is true, that in the Symposium when Socrates refuses to be placed where Alcibiades wants to put him, I wonder if this is a further step. It is not only a problem of shit, it is a problem of what Alcibiades puts on to Socrates. Socrates interpretation is that it is nothing. 'I am not that.' My question is the relationship between un-being (*le des-etre*) and shit, if there is one? At the end of an analysis the analyst will be that remainder, that residue.

Moustapha Safouan: I don't know a great deal about the end of analysis, except that as far as the process goes in the direction of this idealization of the agalma, maybe at some moment, say the moment of regression, the analysand may signify that which is the object of fixation, which remains after all idealization is dismissed. Maybe it is oral but these are very vague questions. I am not sure that the analyst contains the agalma. It is enough that the analysand signifies his point of fixation in relation to somebody else. It is with the analyst, of course, that his better knowledge about the motor force of idealization, about this object which functions as a motor for idealization, can be obtained. Is it necessary to end an analysis with the analyst being the container of this point of fixation? Not necessarily, Lacan's proposition must be considered under the experience of those who pretend to have completed an analysis. As far as I can say from my experience I may have completed two or three analyses but at the end the analyst is signified as mathemes. But as far as common language must be used, I am not sure that it is the

analyst who necessarily appears as the container of the point of fixation. It is enough that the container, or point be signified. It may be signified in relation to some other, like the father or mother but once this is signified things go as if the analyst is no longer necessary.

Oscar Zentner: Do you mean at the end, that the analyst may reflect or refer that object, *objet a* to someone else?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, yes.

Oscar Zentner: Well, I understood really the residue in that way, because if the analyst continues to be the container of *objet a* then there is no end to analysis. The analysand will always return.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes. In this proposition of Lacan, the analyst is realized as worth nothing. The analysand was mistaken, that is the question. This *agalma* is to be found in its true figure in the analyst in that which served the function of making him forget castration. The task in the analysis is to discover this figure in relation to the dominant figures in life, like the mother and the father.

Oscar Zentner: This is close to Cazotte's — *che vuoi?* The problem is if *che vuoi?* is the beginning or the end of the analysis. I think it is the beginning.

Frances Moran: I think it could be the end in the sense that that is the question.

Moustapha Safouan: Well let's take again 'he who loves the beautiful what does he desire?' In the exposure of the lack in the other, in the analysis, he may build the fantasm that this other will fill the gap. But he may also learn that what is lacking in him is also lacking in the other. So of course this experience has two edges, and here comes the function of narcissism. I mean you cannot love someone who does not need you in any way. This is impossible. As Lacan said nobody would love God if he didn't know that God depended upon him for his very existence. You can't love the perfect being.

Frances Moran: Browning says 'if man's reach does not exceed his grasp then what is heaven for?'

Oscar Zentner: If castration is the moment of interpretation of the complex we can say that the lack in himself is signified in the subject in

so far as he can signify a lack in the other. The lack in the other will give him his own lack.

Moustapha Safouan: The experience of the lack in the other may make you forget your own lack. There is nothing in language which answers the question of what you are. You think you can satisfy the object as such by your own being. Now in the psychology of the boy where he takes the penis as the signal of his masculinity, the castration complex means that some libidinal change will take place, according to which that subject when he is a man will no longer make of his penis the site of virility. But if the subject is a woman, she may renounce the search for the master, the superman, the Don Juan. The hysteric looks for a master, but you can have hysterics who satisfy a very profound aggression against man by choosing him weak. He is weak by comparison with the master, but this does not mean she doesn't want a master. She may choose him as a Don Juan tormenting her. He is above all castration. In other words she may make the mistake in man of confusing the phallus with the penis and this may take the shape of detaching her libido from the ideal of a master, which can lead her to make very bad choices, like a Don Juan.

Frances Moran: Does every woman want a master? There is a point in your book, *Pleasure and Being*, where you make a point about your friend being an intelligent being. I took it to refer to all women.

Moustapha Safouan: No, in my mind I didn't think of that at all. You mean my friend Haydée? No I was talking of the subject. The point is that there is no being which is superior to you. She was really frightened, not as a woman, but as a subject. In this case at least it was not a matter of her relation to the phallus. It was not an analysis. But there must be something to run after, that is the point.

Next time I will continue the theme of the transference and maybe illustrate some topographic conceptions, perhaps by taking a dream and considering the place of the analyst and his formation in relation to the institution.

SEMINAR III — THE PLACE OF THE ANALYST IN THE TRANSFERENCE

Moustapha Safouan

I chose tonight's topic to allow some further development of the distinction between the object of love and the object of desire. It seemed to me that theoretical developments would be abstruse and arduous to follow; anyway things will become much more alive after I have presented some material.

I will start by drawing your attention to something in French. If you say *tu m'aimes* that means that you love me, and you can write it phonetically *mem*. If you change the *m* to *n*, *mens* it means you lie (tu mens). It is also an Arabic name *Atem* — A loves you, to a French ear.

So with these preparatory remarks I will start by telling you about an analysand, she practised in some paramedical field. In that capacity she had many contacts with children and their parents.

"I dreamt" she said "that the mother of an Algerian boy called Atem called me. In the dream she was supposed to be Atem's mother, in fact she was not Atem's mother but it was somebody else. The reason she

phoned was to complain of her son. I tried to reassure her, but the more I tried the more anxious she became. At last I had to put an end to the call because I had to go elsewhere. I was relieved by the interruption because first I noticed that all my efforts to reassure her were to no avail and secondly because I had something else to do. So I went down to the first floor. The place was in indescribable disorder and there were some young men standing on the other side of the street waiting. But before going out I wanted to put some order, particularly as in the centre of the room was a table with all kinds of packets of medicaments upon it. At that moment I noticed an older man, whom I hadn't seen before, sitting on a *fauteuil* in the corner. He got up and walked over to the table, took a packet of tablets as if to read the name of the medicament. Then, rather astonished, he said *tiens, tu m'aimes?* (you love me?) Does the presence of this medicament on the table bear any relation to our feelings? That phrase was enough to terrify me completely. I felt a wave of pleasure go through my body and I said as if to correct him *tu mens*, (you lie). It was only when I awoke that I realized the tonal meaning of these phrases and I made the remark to myself that there was a mistake in one single letter which can only be realized as far as the phonetic transcription is concerned."

Well, that is the dream, now what can we get out of it? Let us now imagine what we will call a *classic analyst*, meaning an analyst who is familiar with Freud's theories on the matter of feminine sexuality and uses what he knows in interpreting the material offered. I imagine in this case he will see in the woman in the dream some kind of mother substitute and I think it would be justified; by what she said, that there was some substitution which had taken place. He will make some interpretation to this effect "she was supposed to be but she was not", and he may think that this first part of the dream, this conversation was an illustration of a deadlock which the mother-daughter relationship usually meets. That is, the girl never gives her mother entire satisfaction. There is some lack, she never received her phallic baptism from her mother. She turns then to her father, the older man downstairs. Such an analyst may also see some reference to himself if he meets the description and in his capacity as analyst he may start telling her of her feelings of incestuous desire towards her father. But the answer was the negation — "you lie". Now, from all this, her analyst may conclude that it is a

matter of a daughter-father incest and that his main task is to bring these discovered feelings of incestuous desires to the fore and once the patient realizes this and once she can put some order into her desire, some order in that place, she will be able to join one of the male objects who are waiting outside.

Well, all this is plausible, we will go further and put the question, is this the true interpretation of the dream? By true I mean, the unconscious text of the dream. We have no way of knowing for certain what is in this place. We have no means other than the use of the text. I have doubts about the legitimate character of this interpretation because you have to treat the dream as a text and you cannot pretend to detect, apprehend or seize the meaning of some text if you omit to take into consideration half of it. So there are many, many details in this dream which are left completely untouched by this interpretation. To start with why suppose it is a question of the mother and daughter relation? Why is the mother-daughter relation represented through a telephone call, and that is one point. Another point is, suppose it is a question of feelings towards her father and their negation, why then do the avowal and the negation both take this form of curious transformation of common phrases into proper-names? This is a point which is completely left out, and what is the meaning of this libidinous wave which seized her upon hearing this word before she even had time to realize its meaning? In the end we must take into consideration Freud's remark to the effect that reflections that the dreamer has once he is awake, which take the form of comments, of judgements on the dream are part of the dream's text itself. Well what does it mean, her remark that there was a mistake in one letter?

So the interpretation has to be reconsidered. I will start with the second question, this curious object called "you love me". As a matter of fact upon second thoughts, one realizes that the existence of such objects is much more common than one imagines. There are many objects which we offer which are gifts and we offer not to answer any need, but just to signify our love and I would say that any object like this can be called the object "you love me".

In point of fact the medicament can be considered as the first object which symbolizes both mother's love and mother's power and in French

you say "you take this and the pain will go". This object is one of the most archaic or early objects symbolizing this double dimension of the mother figure and what we notice is that the object in the dream became part of the belongings of the dreamer and it was in the house, on the table and I mean, this is an operation which may translate into the language of Melanie Klein by saying that it was the "good object" that was introjected. Then I can say that this is the object which left its stamp upon the subject and with which some identification has been made, a symbolic identification with the significant, with the signifier. So here we have the basis of what is called ego-ideal and of course she conceives herself as containing this object. After all it was not by chance that she had chosen this paramedical profession. So you can place the effects of the object even in the choice of her profession.


Now, let us suppose that the analysand meets a psychoanalyst who is himself caught up in this very identification; I mean who has exactly the same relation with the same object and in this case she herself will be meeting with her double. I will explain the state of things by saying that she was the container. You can call it even her specular image, you can consider it as the image of this object, she contains the image of this object which is the medicament, and she will find herself in front of her double, of another image of the same object, and in this case that means she will be facing another *tu m'aimes*. That means she will be liable to hear the phrase from the other's mouth, which happened; and moreover the other in this case, that is the analyst, will be liable to give the word its apparent meaning, which happened in the dream and I think that this will be a source of anxiety.

Here I can make a digression about the anxiety, the fear, when you read what some analysts describe from the clinic. Rado for example interprets everything concerning the transference situation with respect to his own person etc., things get worse and worse and you feel in the descriptions such analysts give that it is the anxiety on the patient's side which obliges them to continue. Well I would say that this kind of encounter with her double will be a source of anxiety and that this wave of libido is what you call a reaction formation to the anxiety. Of course if she had to wait until she "woke up" in order to make the remark, in order first to realize the meaning of these phrases as such, it is because

had she grasped the meaning of this phrase in the dream itself, she would have woken up, it would have been a nightmare. As to her remark that there was an error in one letter, for an interpretation I think you can repeat the remark "there was a mistake in one letter" because after all, she had received the stamp of this identification: she had mistaken herself for this power of medicament. Still, she surely was not without some knowledge of some mistake in this identification, that she was not what she loved to be in the dream, and it is just this very knowledge which I call castration. That's all. In fact this interpretation was not given, that was not the moment. This whole dream is a bit curious. You have dreams which you can call transference dreams, but you don't have dreams about the topic of transference as such, this happens very rarely. But the explanation is that the analysand had gone through two years of analysis with a former analyst. The former analyst had interpreted all her signifiers, all her acts, as if they only related to herself and herself only. (She had a woman analyst.) I would say that she had conducted this analysis as if she were the patient's only *objet*, the absolute object. She had simply forgotten that the analysand was an object to herself and that she had come into analysis to get some cognizance about that obscure object which she was, without knowing it.

So I would see this dream which she delivered to me in the second session as a warning to me not to repeat the error of the first analyst. I mean not to put myself in the very same position.

The whole situation can be represented by this schema of Lacan:



There are two lines which cross each other. One of which is supposed to represent the imaginary relation, that is the line which joins two egos. . . i(a) the image of the object . . . two images of the same object.

The other line is the one that relates the subject which is symbolized

in the schema, by S, to his unconscious; to what Freud called the other scene — this relation of which the being itself was the outcome. So I would say that the place of the analyst as far as the analyst is capable to put himself in the right place, is in the place of the Other. And this interpretation goes in the direction of making explicit the subject's relation to what he says, in as far as what he says means more than what is in the letter of what he says. I would say this line S → A is precisely the line of the telephone that was there in the beginning of the dream. That relation was presented in its symbolic dimension as a relation which goes through discourse.

So I would say that the analysand comes into analysis with the question, "who am I?" But it is the very same question as "who are you?" So I would say the question of the analysis, and that is what the analyst represents in the unconscious; "are you the same object or not?" This object appears in the dream as precisely the medicament. This is the form of the *objet a* in the material. I think we can stop now and try to reflect together.

* * *

Sabar Rustomjee: I don't understand where the castration came in?

Moustapha Safouan: The very fact that she was capable of making the dream with the distinctions it employed and the invitation addressed to the analyst not to put himself in the dream means that she was not simply an image of 'a'; she was not completely swallowed in the identification. This very fact implied that all her being was not to be reduced to this object. And this very knowledge, which was not her knowledge but which is the knowledge signified by the *other scene*, from which dreams come. This very knowledge is what I would call the castration complex. This knowledge is what I call castration, I mean that she knows that she has not this absolute power. If she had in herself this knowledge to signify, you would have a case unamenable to analysis.

Rob Gordon: I didn't quite get the meaning of the question, "Are you the same object or not?" or did you say that the object in the dream was the tablets, which is big A?

Moustapha Safouan: No, little (a), that's right. I mean the castration

complex can be observed simply in the fact that the subject plays. She is an educator, who presents herself with a certain power, of curing the children, she satisfies her needs of love, even with the child who is called A-tem, "he loves you", and well, she is playing the healer which is a very archaic image, but she is only playing that, and there is some point in her psyche at which she is not taking the thing completely seriously.

Oscar Zentner: Can you please expand your commentary a bit more about the former analysis? It reminds me of a sentence from Ferenczi which says something like "you always dream for me *a l'aurore*" (at dawn), it refers to the mythical image called Aurora, from which you can draw almost automatically the conclusion that the dream is to Ferenczi — aurore. . . .

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, but the question was absolutely for me, in fact it was a warning, it was a message addressed to me, the dream was for me, there was no doubt about that. But the whole point is that this doesn't mean that it was a dream for me, that is a dream for my person, for my person is quite a separate thing. My person is precisely. . . something which has some opacity for her. I'm not simply an image of her *semblable*. The question in the dream is for me, but it is not precisely of me, in the sense of my person. The dream I would say is addressed to what in me remains obscure for her and which makes her wish. . . I am what I am, she is not involved.

Oscar Zentner: From the theoretical view I am wondering if what you are saying can be divided between what is called interpreting the transference and interpreting within the transference. Your example is within the transference. . . .

Moustapha Safouan: I didn't give any interpretation at all.

Oscar Zentner: I know, but in relation to what you are saying. . . .

Moustapha Safouan: In French we say "*au bon entendu salût*" (a word to the wise is sufficient).

Oscar Zentner: You are saying here that there is no doubt that the dream is addressed to you.

Moustapha Safouan: It is even about me, but as something which escapes her apprehension. I cannot be anything but the object which

she is. When the subject says "I", you can say that what underlies this "I" on the level of the enunciation is the *objet a*. That is the whole story. As far as she says "you", you are supposedly this object, but her status, her relation with this object and your relation with this object are brought within. The very fact that they are here to be analysed means that they are put in question. As a matter of fact what has to be revised in an analysis is not only the relation of the subject to his history, but this object which becomes expressed because of course, there is not a history that a mother would behave in such a way. So the relation really is the relation with this object. So I would say that the analyst in the transference is the *objet a*. The analysand is there to clarify her history. If I told her for example that this "older man" was me, and as a matter of fact I am exactly the age of her father, I am sure that this would have finished her first experience and brought up a negative transference and an interruption, she would have left. Because I am not her father, and that is out of the question.

Oscar Zentner: This is why I am trying to distinguish from your example, besides the point that you didn't interpret the dream, if you are interpreting *the* transference or *within* the transference.

Moustapha Safouan: I will give you an example from this patient, of what I mean by interpreting *in* the transference. I never interpret the transference in the sense "I am so and so". At most what I say when a patient says "I have no right to know anything about your private life" and this theme comes as a covering of something that he really doesn't want, I may say "what the hell about my private life, I don't know about the private life, what's there?" So I may happen at some crucial moment to make such a remark and then it will not be in the sense of I'm representing here "so and so". It will be really real at that moment. But to interpret *in* the transference, what is to be interpreted is the relation of the analysand with the signifiers. For example, this very woman when she came, she was really in a state, in a disquieting state, and she had a way of walking like this. I mean she was effacing herself in every step, she had some tendency to disappear to make herself inconspicuous and at the same time in the preliminary discussions she expressed some ideas. One of her ideas for example was the belief that she could conquer any man. So at some moment here I envisaged the hypothesis of

erotomania and after all we know that the erotomaniac's job is to castrate the man she follows, and this kind of demeanor, so timid, could not be taken at face value and there was some aggressiveness, and the hypothesis could be envisaged in these talks. And of course you have to be attentive since it is a demand for a second analysis, you have to be more attentive, it could be an acting out from her first. In some cases somebody comes for a second analysis and after some sessions you must give him the advice to go back to his first analyst.

Well the only interpretation that I gave her, I did so only in order to see her possibilities of perceiving. So she told me that her first and last marriage was a catastrophe in the sense that, during her honeymoon the idea was to go to the mountains and to take long walks. But what happened was that her husband fell into a crisis of semi-epilepsy on every walk in the wilderness which put her in a state of complete terror, as they were away from any inhabited centre, village or town, not to mention doctors and so on. And as she had given me some idea, describing this disquiet, that one of her symptoms was the fact that she cannot live with a man without feeling the dread that a second woman would come and take this man from her, so also this was an idea that was not reassuring at all; projected jealousy, homosexuality, and so on. So when she told me that her husband had this reaction when they were in the forest in the mountains, and I remembered that she had told me about her fear that another woman would take him, I commented on this souvenir of her marriage to her husband "Well, it is better to be taken by a woman than be taken by death" and she just looked at me and smiled. I was reassured because I felt that the symptom had a metaphoric structure. To be taken away by death or to be taken away by a woman, it was a metaphor for "*enlevé par l'amour*", (to be carried away by love). So this was a kind of interpretation. True that it was only during the preliminary interviews. Yet she came with her transference already constituted. She left her first analyst and came to me for a second analysis of her own choice. So she came with her transference already constituted. So my interpretation was an interpretation *within* the transference. But it concerned always the same thing; her relation to what she was saying.

Gayle Paull: What is the difference between *within* the transference

and *in* the transference?

Oscar Zentner: I thought that Dr. Safouan's interpretation was *within* or *in* the transference not an interpretation of *the* transference, because to interpret *the* transference is to liquidate the transference. Also if I can make an observation, this dream in a way looks similar to the dream of Anna Freud, because she is a paramedical person and the patient dreams of medicine, which by extension in latin language, medicine is for the medical person (*medecin*) to handle. It looks like the dream of Anna Freud of how the subject presents *itself in the dream*. Well Anna Freud by repeating the syllables of her surname,¹ strawberries, wild strawberries. . . .

Moustapha Safouan: And she says "Anna Freud, strawbewwies, wild strawbewwies, omblet, pudden!" and so on and at the end she gave her signature, so to say. So you see really here, that the coincidence with the object of which she was dispossessed is very clear in this dream. Yes you can say that this was another dream in which the *objet a* appeared explicitly, and the oral character of the object is very clear to the analyst.

Gayle Paull: Can you relate the 'Internal 8' to this; the diagram of Lacan, to this dream and yourself?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, well I found that the dream was almost a theory in itself. I was astonished myself. I mean I had to spend some time thinking about this object. The question is that I would say what is specific about Lacan's theory is that you won't find them unless you forget all knowledge and approach it from this point. In reality to follow the material without glossing over important details and then you can finally come out of the material. I started off not by thinking too much of this business *tu m'aimes* and so forth.

It is this very object which is beyond my knowledge concerning you and it is beyond my knowledge concerning myself, which is expressed in the form of the medicaments. Its first form is what we said last time we met, it is what we called in the Alcibiades' episode as the "*Agalma*", this is its first appearance.

Gayle Paull: Can I show you this diagram concerning the function of the transference and ask you where you place the analyst in terms of the 'Internal 8' of Lacan in relation to what you have said?

Moustapha Safouan: That's from the Four Fundamental Concepts?

Gayle Paull: Yes.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, at its face value, because I don't remember the text itself, I would say that it is because there is a point of transference that the demand doesn't make a full circuit, it conveys more. And what is conveyed is precisely something that you can consider as a point of identification, which is implied in the image. This is implied in what I said, she was the medicament and you can consider it as a point of desire. To be identified with the medicament, means exactly that she wants to be the healer. So, the point of identification is always a point of desire. Now if we go back to the idea that identification does not give the being identity, it organizes lack. Even conscious identification. Even Napoleon wants to be more Napoleon. So I would say that because there is a point of transference, that demand is not simply demand, it implies an underlying movement, which can be expressed or considered according to two facets as a point of identification and a point of desire.

Gayle Paull: And that is the overlap that he talks about?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes.

Gayle Paull: So that's the function of the transference.

Moustapha Safouan: The function of the transference is that it makes the interior circuit, because without transference the demand is simple. "Give me this" means "Give me this" and that is that.

Oscar Zentner: I have an old question. I think it is more than ten years old, and with your example I can see a bridge. It is between what Freud describes in the *Interpretation of Dreams* in Chapter VII as transference, and transference in the psychoanalytic praxis. If we accept that the dream is a process in which the subject will use the system Perception-Consciousness as a screen, like in the movies, in order to hallucinate or to project there the dream, this dream, and probably all dreams, but this dream maybe more, will be the way in which the subject puts himself in consciousness, in perception, in a disguised way. In the dream the subject will express his unconscious, in the way of not knowing. He does not know that he is the one who appears in the screen. That is the condition, this is why he can appear. That then is

really not too far away from the definition of Freud, that transference is the passage from the unconscious system to the preconscious system. Even beyond the dream, in the analytic session, the patient is *passing* if we can use that word from the unconscious system to the preconscious system; with the condition of not knowing, because of course if he says, "yes I know this means this", it is almost as if he is serving us, with what is supposed that we have to interpret in his discourse. I don't know, it is a kind of reflection between the metapsychological transference from the unconscious to the preconscious and the so-called clinical transference. They are not after all so far the one from the other. If we do what you were doing by referring to the diagram we can find again, how that transference is going to appear in the scheme of Lacan. I think it is important for us because theory is not so far from the clinical work, but it has to be in the background while we are working with the patient. Of course after, in the moment of reflection the theory comes and we are obliged to find, to try to work out a kind of explanation. As Gayle was trying to do with the topology of the transference.

Moustapha Safouan: As far as the work is concerned the analyst of course, should be prepared by the study of the primary processes to get into the Lacanian perspective which is to understand them as very akin to, if not the same as linguistic processes.

I was going to say as the processes recognised in rhetorics but then I would have been under the obligation to add without any theory, which you have, I mean, you don't have a theory of Aristotle or Plato. . . but anyway once you work with the unconscious on this basis you can go further and forget all knowledge and you don't just make hypotheses simply on the basis of some dynamic science which doesn't exist because you want to consider the unconscious as some reservoir of forces. Hence you work with the unconscious as if it were structured as a language which implies forgetting all your previous knowledge and just following the movement of the signifiers which are brought into the discourse. Then you obtain results which in a second time can be worked in the form of schemas of topography and so on. But surely you don't work with the unconscious with this topography in your head. As far as the

appearance of the subject in the dream is concerned, Freud had made two remarks, the first of which is excellent. He said that the appearance of the dreamer in his own dream under many guises is not very strange from the fact of the appearance of the subject in many places of his phrases, for example "if I remember how beautiful a boy I was when I was young"; so "I", "I", etc. This remark, I think is an excellent one. He made another remark which is less happy, to the effect that dreams are absolutely realistic. He says that every appearance of any person in the dream, all the persons that appear in the dream represent the dreamer. This of course is untenable you could say. And he himself corrected this assertion in an article written in 1923. He gives a very nice example of a dream. As far as I remember the dreamer, a young woman, dreamt that she was sitting with her friend and her friend was dressed in a negligent way. The father came in and made a remark about how nicely she dressed and Freud says that this dream can be simply interpreted if you put "nicely undressed" instead of "dressed", because the fact was that this girl had spent a moment of her life with her father, I think she even shared her bed with him. But anyway there was a seduction play between them. So the friend in the dream was another representation of herself. In this case the appearance of the dreamer two times in the dream is completely analagous to the phrase, "how nice I looked in his eyes". But you cannot generalise this concept at all. This dream which I gave is not an example. Surely the "older man" in the dream is not herself. I would even say the whole point was that he was not. . . I would say this is a less frequent case, the dreams in which all the persons represent the dreamer this is by far the less frequent case.

Oscar Zentner: I don't remember the example but I wonder if when Freud says egoistic he really means maybe objects which belong to the ego as distinct from unconscious objects. I think egoistic, at least in the Spanish translation from the German, refers to the ego. When he speaks of the drives, he refers to some drives as being egoistical. I wonder then if that would be the case. If they refer to the ego, then it is obvious that there can be another object no doubt, but if they refer to the unconscious then it is only its own object. It is only when there is no distinction that all objects in the dream could represent the dreamer.

Moustapha Safouan: You can say dreams are absolutely realistic in the sense that they are all telling about what you are that you ignore, what you are in the unconscious, in this sense, yes. You can say in all dreams there is an umbilical point which leads to the heart of being. In this case, yes. *But that was not his meaning when he said that there were absolute meanings. This interpretation is absurd. But still they are not egoistic because the object, which the subject is in the unconscious, is precisely what is the furthest object from his conscious thought. The subject is the root of identity, and at the same time the root of foreignness. As far as you come near to realizing that you are there in that object, and before the realization comes the feeling of strangeness, of depersonalization.*

Oscar Zentner: We return with that to the formulae of Descartes and Lacan, which I will modify a little. "I am precisely there where I do not know anything about myself."

Moustapha Safouan: Of course! It is from the very beginning a whole question of this. The mirror gives you access to yourself, it gives you transparency, you are transparent. This whole story of beyond the mirror. . . there is the absence where you lie and the specular image gives you transparency which is at the same time the indicator of our absence from ourselves. And it is this point of absence which philosophy has tried to tame. That is the whole question. And the rupture with humanism is that instead of this concept of man came the concept of the *split subject*. Because what we discover through analysis is that this absence is not pure absence. I mean the fact is, we have in this example, that the distance from the mother had its effects on the boy. Here again is a case of identification in which some object symbolized the mother's love and the mother's power. All this operation happened without the subject being aware. . . I mean, it took place completely closed from the subject's eyes.

Frances Moran: In some ways is this connected with the *Fort—Da* —the presence or absence— all of this that you are talking about?

Moustapha Safouan: Really, how? Explain this to me.

Frances Moran: I don't know either —I can't put it into words— but where the presence is, I mean the absence leads to the presence.

Gayle Paull: Yes, it is the formula

Name of the Father	•	Desire of the Mother
Desire of the Mother		Signified to the Subject

I think it is exactly this, if you read in the *Ecrits* concerning the *Fort—Da*.

Frances Moran: It brings to mind something about repetition. . .

Inés Zentner: It is beyond the pleasure principle.

Frances Moran: Yes, it is the same point.

Oscar Zentner: I think what I understood Frances to be saying, is that what is important to conceptualize is that the subject is trying to build a lack. That is the whole relation of the subject — how can he build his relation with a lack? How can he put a lack where in reality is the discourse of the mother for instance. I don't know if that was it?

Frances Moran: Yes.

Gayle Paull: Can we pursue that Frances?

Frances Moran: I suppose it is, that if you don't know that is what the subject is trying to do, that is when you fall into the trap of giving an answer and being that object.

Moustapha Safouan: I mean this is the fault of many analysts, for example to take this analysis, one can easily imagine the moment which comes where she perceives the presumption that leads her to practise her profession, that of being the healer — and this will be a moment in which she can perceive her own infatuation. As long as you don't do anything which goes in the sense of her repressions, she will come to understand things by herself. And if this moment comes she will come to perceive that this is built upon some identification with her mother — her mother as a doctor. She will not only perceive this presumption but she can even put her finger on this rule . . . her relation with herself. . . this is confirmed in some way or other. This will be only a moment — this will already be a knowledge from the unconscious.

This relates to the question of regression in analysis, I mean she will come to the moment that every regression is a progress, this is the whole point.

Well the more decisive point would be that first there is always something, this kind of object will come in the place, in order to fill the castration gap. I mean that she will come to the point in which she will apprehend its phallic value as an object of power and this will be an approximation. We don't know before hand how far she will agree to go.

Frances Moran: What do you mean by "agree to go"?

Moustapha Safouan: I mean how far she will be prepared to go in this exploration of her unconscious.

Frances Moran: Do you mean in terms of good will?

Moustapha Safouan: No, in terms of the fact that you can't avoid or neglect her resistances and of course in terms of her needs. Maybe at some moment she may get rid of one of her main symptoms. For example, well, she may get rid of her symptom, or her inhibition at a certain stage. And this practical end being realized, she may feel she has no need for further treatment. And that is why therapeutic analyses, because most of the time they end at the moment corresponding to the practical needs of the analysand, they don't usually give us most of the time, full insight into the process itself; into how it ends. Of course if she goes to the moment when she is able to see, to signify only the phallic value of this oral object, or its use as a cover for the castration gap, this would be a very decisive moment. You don't attain that sometimes, but that is analysis. For example it happens frequently that the analysand has some fears of castration and some mechanism to overcome these fears and that there may be some reduction in these mechanisms. He can be sufficiently relieved of the symptoms, for example in *ejaculatio praecox*, he may be ready even for the first time to have sexual relations, but with this it doesn't necessarily mean that regression goes to the object, which was really working for him as a pregenital object. He doesn't need that; it is enough for him to clarify for himself the problems related to the phallic phase and that is that. This already brings very much relief. It isn't necessary to push regression. . .

Oscar Zentner: In regards to regression as a way to make conscious the unconscious. Without regression, without topographical regression. . .

Moustapha Safouan: No, I didn't say regression was what makes the

unconscious conscious. I said that the depth of an analysis, as you talk about the depth. . . as how far one goes in an analysis, you can talk in other words as to how far that process of regression goes in an analysis. It is not the regression that makes conscious the unconscious.

Oscar Zentner: No, it is the lifting of the repression.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, the depth of regression is the measure of the depth of what you can know about what is in the unconscious.

Oscar Zentner: Yes, you used other words, you were saying that regression is the progress. I was referring in that way, I wonder if you can comment on which will be, if there is any, the connection between this that you have said, that the regression is the progression in the analysis, and Freud's statement of the regression as the only mechanism which changes the structure and relations of the unconscious? Because obviously that is the progression, apparently.

Frances Moran: Oscar I have always understood you to say that there is no progress in analysis.

Oscar Zentner: But I think we are using progress in a very different way. I think Dr. Safouan is saying all the time that an analysis will go as far as the patient will be the patient. When the patient says "goodbye". . .

Moustapha Safouan: As far as his resistance or his practical needs will permit him to go.

Oscar Zentner: Exactly, and from that point of view, to use the word progress is fine in so far as it is the progress in the direction of his unconscious.

Gayle Paull: Is the unconscious restructured Oscar, or is it just that it is revealed more with that progress?

Oscar Zentner: Freud says that with regression, the interrelation of the contents of the unconscious is modified. They modify their relationship. Which obviously will fit very well with what Dr. Safouan was saying as a progression. Because to put an example, a history known, is not any longer the same history. If I know my history, it is no longer the same history, because something else happens in that.

Moustapha Safouan: This is a very common notion in the psycho-

analytic literature, the only point which is important about it is not to assimilate it as some new form of infantilism and so on and the patient becomes dependent and then you will sometimes say, analysts say "the regression was profound, he was demanding, it was exacting etc." But maybe it was demanding and exacting because there is a point in all this. Instead of saying that it is regression and he became dependent and infantile and so on, it is going to move to new areas. If you take it just as regression you will not follow him. Suppose a man whose erotic life for example goes under the sign of what Freud called "the debasement of erotic life or of love". For example a man who can only have sexual relations with prostitutes, that's one of the forms that he enumerated. But suppose that he suffers from this, and that is why he is coming because he has problems and he has the feeling that there is something wrong. Maybe he will overcome this symptom, because in this case it is a symptom, and he himself considers it such by the very fact that he comes to be cured, or asks for analysis for this. His analysis may go to the point at which he may be capable of having love relations with one person of his own choice. And it is possible that the analysis ends but suppose that this person of his choice goes through some new kinds of problems. I mean he may be over jealous or demanding of the person or the person is not suffering from lack of love but the love which is given him leaves him unsatisfied. Well I mean we know these kinds of relations sometimes happen and you will say in French "*il m'en merde*", (he shits me). This much, even under these kinds of metaphors, there are some relations between people in love which are "*merde*" and that with each other. But the behaviour of each one of them is precisely calculated to frustrate the other. This is a very common phenomenon and even in the metaphors which come from the analysand's tongue are indicative enough. (I'm insisting on the function of the metaphor as indicative of the unconscious.)

Anyway we talk about the problem of the infantile sexuality. We simply forget that this infantile sexuality, we discovered in others. Which means that all these relations boil down to one single phrase which once articulated may be put in these terms: "I want you" that is the phrase addressed to the object. . . "I want her to give me everything, including her *merde*" (her shit). So even if she gives him total love, because there is no doubt that she loves him, still there is something

missing; which if it appears at that, with this invitation, implies defaecation with the mother, because she is the first person who asks for that. If that goes to that depth, I mean, that's what you call anal regression. But this is a tremendous progress in the analysis and you can be sure that the erotic life will be even more profoundly reorganized than in the first date of simply getting rid of the first symptom which he brought you. But there is absolutely no telling in the beginning.

Inès Zentner: Dr. Safouan at the beginning when you told us the dream of your patient, you made a remark about your interpretation of the dream and the truth. Could you please enlarge that a little bit in the context of transference?

Moustapha Safouan: Of course, this notion of truth, as far as you take truth in the sense of being adequate to the object, well this was at the bottom of the trials in order to verify the analytic concepts experimentally. They wanted to know if they are truth, which is, do they correspond to facts? So there were many attempts to try to verify that objectively which is a manifest oversimplification. But at the bottom of the simplification is this notion of truth as equivalent to or corresponding to something outside. What I said about this patient's? I said that. . . is the hypothetical interpretation true? If you take truth in the sense of an equation to what really is, where are we going to find this which really is? I mean you can't just open it and see what is in and to make the comparison between your interpretation and what *is*, what really *is*. What really *is*, is precisely what is signified in the dream itself. So that criterion is not the adequacy to something exterior. But the criterion rather in such a case, is simply that you take into consideration the details. The details are always the most important thing, that's what makes the particularity of the case. So, what I said in the beginning, was to that effect. I mean, I had reasons to say that the hypothetical interpretation was false, or let us say inexact, not because I knew the truth as something outside which is said, but as far as it didn't take full account of what was said, and that's all.

Oscar Zentner: Besides we know since Freud that the way in psychoanalysis of inferring if an interpretation is correct or not, is by an indirect way. By the way of associations, by the way of lifting of repressions, by the way. . . I would say, by the way of regression. As an

advance. It is interesting, by the way of regression, because Freud says "the lifting of repression installs perversions". To take even the example of the polymorphous perverse that you have given before, then of course the lifting of the repression installed perversion in so far as at the same time there was an advance constituted by that regression.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes but in the case I was giving as an example there is absolutely nothing bordering on perversion, not even in the distant form of say a typical position. . . Not even involving it, but still I mean all the relations of this subject were modelled by a point of fixation. This does not mean that every point of fixation leads to perversion. It's a polymorphous form. . . to say it is an anal unconscious desire which was dominating the erotic life that doesn't mean that because the unconscious desire was of anal. . . this doesn't mean that there was a perversion. There wasn't! . . . or that the uncovering of this repression would lead to perversion.

Oscar Zentner: I'm not trying to say that, no. What I'm trying to say is that Freud says that the lifting of the repression installs perversions.

Moustapha Safouan: This would be an error, a mistake of Freud.

Oscar Zentner: He says that in Civilization and its Discontents if I'm not wrong, perversion understood not psychopathologically, but in the way of regressions. But again regression in the way that you were describing. Regression not as something morally bad, but as a way of restructuring.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, of course, in the normal genital positions which are, say, well assumed, there is always the factor of what is called forepleasure, which involves the situation. Yes, it may comprise all his fantasms. The woman, for the man always comes in the place of some pregenital object. I mean the *objet la femme* always comes in the place of the *objet a*.

Oscar Zentner: And what about man in regard to women?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes that's what I'm saying. And then what about man from the point of view of women, I don't know. . . .

Oscar Zentner: We always reach the unknown land.

John Dingle: You said before about this woman, that you had a

suspicion that there may be an erotomania. Hearing this case makes me think of what Piera Aulagnier says about this being the equivalent of perversion in the woman to identify with the object of desire.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes! Anyway we started by saying that this, from the point that there is not a clear. . . I mean that the very fact that the image, the specular image always appears in some lack, and it is precisely this lack which determines the transduct of libido from this image towards the object. . .

The point is that there is a distinction between the object as an object of love and desire. I mean this one who loves the beautiful, what is his desire? It is precisely because in this object of love you don't find what you desire. This is the source of all the classical distinctions. The point here is precisely the fact that, there is this lack which cannot be annulled by possession. It is precisely this lack which is the condition without which it couldn't be constituted as an object. So you see now, the state of affairs.

Frances Moran: I'm not clear on that distinction between desire and love even in the terms you have expressed it in.

Moustapha Safouan: Well, I mean, say this gross example I gave, the man who realized so to say, the limit of the object as an object of love. That is, instead of prostitutes and so on, he had one object of love, well that was an example of something that remains unsatisfied in this situation.

Frances Moran: Then why does he keep loving?

Moustapha Safouan: Why, do you know people who are absolutely satisfied in love?

Frances Moran: No, but then you're saying that it is the desire that's not satisfied.

Moustapha Safouan: But that is what happens, love usually ends badly. I mean that is where you find that distinction. The object of love is very easily replaced. But what makes you love is always the same thing.

Frances Moran: Then love can be satisfied?

Moustapha Safouan: You can never find what you call full satisfaction, no, never.

Frances Moran: But isn't that the definition of desire that it can't be fulfilled?

Moustapha Safouan: No, it is an indicator, if you go back to the indication you started from, it is an indicator that all the libido is not invested in the object of love, that love is always partial. There is a part of the libido which remains invested in some other obscure object. The narcissistic structure of love was seen long before psychoanalysis. But as far as the question of desire is concerned, it is always a field for the moralist, with the insistence you know on its excesses, its frenzy, its untamed character and of course with its changes. As a matter of fact the moralists were mistaken, what changes is the object of love, and that is that. You can say the discovery of analysis is the partial character of love. The nature of love is always partial love. This is the whole contribution of psychoanalysis as far as the notion of love is concerned.

Oscar Zentner: We can also clarify perhaps more the difference between love and desire with, for instance, what Lacan says about love. He says love is a situation where a subject gives what he does not have to another being who is not. While for desire he will say that there is not an object of desire. Desire by definition does not have an object, but there is an object *in* desire. In other words *desire itself is object*. I don't know if this clarifies it or not.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes of course, and you can say that at the genital level, the sexual partner may come as an object of desire but in as far as it is put in the place of the object, which is *in* desire.

Frances Moran: But in terms of the Symposium can you make that distinction that you just made between love and desire?

Oscar Zentner: I think in terms of the Symposium, and I would like Dr. Safouan's opinion, for me, the question of love is that love allows desire to concede, that love concedes to desire in the Symposium. Because the whole talk really is about a special moment in which someone can see what Dr. Safouan was recalling earlier tonight in the *Agalma*. That is to say in something that the other presents as having or being without having or being. Something that is lacking or missing in the active subject.

Frances Moran: Are you saying that Socrates is deferring in stepping

away in favour of Agathon? Was an image of love conceding to desire?

Oscar Zentner: I didn't think of it in that way, but maybe it's alright.

Moustapha Safouan: The distinction is in the very question, "he who loves the beautiful, what does he desire?" You have the distinction between two libidinal orientations. One which has a point which it reaches — which is called the beautiful. But still, even in the beautiful, what do you desire of this? So the distinction in the formula is there, in the text, and what is more instructive is that there is the distinction and that with the question you find the frontier between what is within your reach and another object which is the point of ignorance. That is the whole bearing of this text. That you have the distinction and you have the corollary of the distinction. It is the demarcation between what you can say and the point beyond which you can say nothing. And in order to say something, there had to be some speculation which led us to beauty, etc. It is a question of filling the point of ignorance rather than really knowing. It is only analysis which permits some knowledge of this.

Frances Moran: So *the good* which is elaborated on in the ascending dialectic is what is elaborated on by Lacan as what someone is that you aren't — as trying to fill in what is not.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, there was a time when psychoanalysis was not invented. . . so you try to fill in by some creative effort, in as far as psychoanalysis leads us towards objects (in investigating the unconscious) which are in the desire. From this point on, these are objects which can never give satisfaction, but the only satisfaction is in interpretation. There is the knowledge you can have of them and that is that at the end of an analysis.

Frances Moran: This is really the story of Don Quixote, the man of la Mancha.

Moustapha Safouan: Don Quixote followed his search in reality — he tried to find it (the object) in reality.

Oscar Zentner: Which is the meaning, in this context, of what Lacan comments as love being always courteous love?

Moustapha Safouan: I think that where the formula of 'courteous love' comes in is that love is always reciprocal; which has always been

explained in a variety of ways. For example, when you say that nobody would love if it were not granted for him that he had some dignity or some worth to be loved. So it is an ironical formula. It doesn't mean that love is in reality always to be presumed on the level of intersubjectivity, with the answer you want. It always implies the answers, it is reciprocal in its very essence.

Even if you are in the situation of what we call in French *l'amoureux transise* (unrequited love), love which is not returned. It doesn't mean that this is not a very good condition because it is sufficient to love in order to have the value affirmed in the very principle itself. This is only the formula concerning love as substitution. I mean the moment you are the lover frustrates the moment in which you are the beloved. You take the two places together, and in this sense, considering not what happens really on the intersubjective level the formula is simply ironic. But as far as it brings before us the infra-structure of the intersubjective nature of love it is worth retaining. Love is always reciprocal.

Sabar Rustomjee: Are we talking about infatuation?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, it's the same thing.

Oscar Zentner: Dr. Safouan, honestly I must say that by now I have difficulties in distinguishing between love and desire. I wonder what happens if I formulate it in this way. Love is what is missing in me that I find in the other — this is why I love the other. If this is correct, suppose. . .

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, that is half of the truth.

Oscar Zentner: Fine, the other half of the truth, which is the problem, is, and I don't know that of course, the fact that I love the other because the other possesses for me what I am lacking.

Moustapha Safouan: This is the transduct.

Oscar Zentner: But for my desire, I do not have any object of desire. . . as a psychoanalytic premise. If I say "I desire" it is a conscious desire. Is this a way of making the difference.

Moustapha Safouan: Of course, yes this is the instructive side of the Symposium, the same point is given as the same point beyond which you can't say anything. It's the point where science leaves you. That's

the point where when I said it is half the truth, because once you love you will make the experience of the other's lack, as well as your own lack. Because the other doesn't contain what you need. Here comes in the narcissism of the subject. He can believe that he is well equipped to fill the lack of the other. That's the whole sense of the phallic phase in the man. He figures that the woman wants his business. Really this is the narcissism which comes here, and the whole problem is that you can describe the psychoanalytic experience as that experience which brings the experience of the lack of the other as one's own lack. I mean that he is not more equipped than the other.

Once the subject is taken in this passion, he will make the experience of the lack of the other, that it is beyond the power of the other to give him full satisfaction, to give what he desires. And of course he doesn't even know what. So as a matter of fact the whole thing boils down to the incapacity of the other of telling him what he wants — of telling him his unconscious. But as the experience had this facette of bringing the experience of the lack in the other, the subject may figure that he himself has what lacks in the other, and as far as the phallic stage is concerned in the man this is clear enough.

Oscar Zentner: This is very interesting because there is no such thing as love for knowledge in psychoanalysis, but rather desire which pushes knowledge. In philosophy there is love for knowledge.

Moustapha Safouan: In Greek it is *epithymia*.

Oscar Zentner: When in the phallic phase the subject makes the experience of finding, because in order to figure himself what the other lacks he must reduce the desire to a demand, he must make this confusion which is the hallmark of the neurotic condition. Coming back to your book, to the point where you mention Little Hans, he was a kind of researcher. From that point of view it is clear that what was pushing him was not love but desire. He was making the experience of discovering castration in himself through the lack in the other.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, and of course he was satisfied because the gift has a very important function. His fantasm was that he was giving the phallus to his mother, but it doesn't mean that he wants to give it really. He figures out that he has what the mother lacks and he is giving

it to her. So, to consent to accept the mother's castration, so to say, is to accept by the same token the absolute poverty, the inanity of one's efforts at oblativity, at giving. And of course, it doesn't mean that, when according to one's fantasm, the phallus appears separated and really given, it is in the hands of the other. In this of course, it is anxiety as happens sometimes in dreams. The vision which conforms to encountering one's fantasm coming in dreams as the penis in the hands of the other, is anxiety in the dreams. And this is one of the reasons which favour regression to the points of fixation because the phallus is not detachable, while the faeces are.

Oscar Zentner: Is this why women are better equipped in relation to the Real than men?

Moustapha Safouan: They are more sensible to desire as such, than men. Man makes the mistake of confusing sexual desire with the demand. The woman poverty, the mother of love is less liable to fall for and share the same error. In this capacity, I refer you to a short story 'The Beast in the Jungle' by Henry James. You must read that. It's profundity is incredible as far as the psychological intuition implied in it is concerned.

Oscar Zentner: To return to Socrates in the Symposium, it is no wonder that he lets a woman talk.

NOTE

¹ *Anna F. end, Er(d)beer, Hochbeer, Eier(s)peits, Papp.*

SEMINAR IV — TOPOGRAPHIC POINT OF VIEW OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

Moustapha Safouan

As we started our work by trying to convey an idea of what Freud meant by the unconscious . . . through concerning ourselves with the primary processes mainly, and then eventually language skills . . . we learnt that the unconscious is marked by ambiguities and the possibilities of language and so on. Afterwards we tried to tackle the subject of transference itself, which is the whole of analysis. I mean, you interpret a dream or a symptom but what you analyse in the last resort is always in the transference.

Tonight I thought that the best way to conclude would be to say in a very schematic and summary way how we envisage the unconscious from the Lacanian psychoanalytic schemes which are known as the topographic point of view . . . So let us go to the topographical problem. I must remind you that it all stems from the seventh chapter of the *Traumdetung*. In this, one reads what Freud gave as his first account or conception of topography, and his considerations go in two directions.

According to one direction the unconscious would constitute a system

within the psychic apparatus . . . the unconscious would represent the part of the unknown within the subject.

Another direction consists in presenting the unconscious as located, I would say in another place, a completely different place. I mean a different place from that in which our relations with the world are concerned.

These two directions are not easy to reconcile, in fact they are divergent . . . because in one, the unconscious constitutes an inside, the inside of the psychic apparatus of the subject and according to the other view it is an outside, outside the apparatus of the subject. It has to be one or the other.

So what are our options or our solutions if there is a third alternative?

Before coming to this problem, I will make two preliminary remarks. The first is that . . . *the unconscious is always synonymous with Freudian Desire*, that is, an unconscious desire. Now this unconscious desire means that this desire cannot be posited as an attribute of the subject. Say, for example, that I have an attribute, this attribute could not take my place.

If we say that desire is unconscious we cannot say that it can be attributed to the subject, as it is on the level of the unconscious. Desire is not an attribute of the subject it *is* the subject himself. Also I want to say that *desire cannot be preceded by a want*. If you say 'I want' to such and such a fellow, this 'I want' is a demand or a revindication, it is not a desire. That is why you can say the subject of the unconscious is a beheaded subject, acephalous; a humorous description, but it has its own meaning. It means that desire is a thought, in the sense that desire is not a thought, without the thought that thinks it.

That is why after all, that such a remark has its . . . reputation. For example, if you say to an analysand, "you want to take my place, or you want to take the place of your brother" — he simply is not there, so you see, to answer is nonsense. The target of an analysis, you can say, is not to communicate knowledge but it is rather to bring the subject to have knowledge, which is different.

Well, the second remark is from where we started our alternatives, either that it is an interior with unconscious or it is exterior. Now if you

chose the second alternative it means that by this very choice you posit the division of the subject — he will not be one.

Now to answer itself. From all that has been said, this is how some considered it, that the relation between the two systems, the *Cs.* and the *Ucs.* is like two rooms, with a separation between them, but as a matter of fact they are two rooms which are always in the same place, in the same house, the same world, etc. If you talk about a radically different place, that means we can say a radically different world. So all the metaphors that are borrowed from our everyday space are condemned to be deficient and we have to find models in some other kinds of space, as far as spaces can be considered as surfaces.

Now this is why we must go to some preliminary considerations of surfaces, and what I mean by that word. Now take a cube for example, we can consider it as volume . . . but you can neglect the fact of the cube's volume and consider only the metric characteristics of its surface, for example the number of sides or faces and the proportions of these. The same can be said of a sphere, and we can go further than making an extraction of the metric properties of the surface of the cube or sphere and put the question — can you transpose one into the other without cuts or breaks? You can easily grasp the idea that you can transpose a cube into a sphere. In this instance it means that they have the same properties. But take another surface, as you say in English, a doughnut (*taurus*) . . . you can see immediately that you cannot transpose a doughnut shape into a sphere or the other way around without some cuts. What are the properties that make it different? This is the kind of question we call a topological question. The characteristics of a sphere are that, if you draw a circle, or more precisely a closed curve onto a sphere or a cube, you can reduce this closed curve to a point, (of course we are not considering metric properties) but if you take a doughnut shape you will find that this is not possible. You have two kinds of circles which are not reducible to a point on the doughnut. Firstly, a circle that goes around the central hole, and if you reduce this circle to a point, you encounter the resistance of the hole or void, which hinders the reduction. The other kind of circle you can draw will be around here, this sausage part, and you will also encounter the hole. And as a matter of fact if you make a circle on a sphere and then cut all around it

you will have two separate parts, but if you make a circle on a doughnut and cut it (where I have said) it will not fall apart, but you will have a sausage shape. This makes it have topological characteristics which are different from those of a sphere.

Now when making a law to generate the law for the construction of a circle it is sufficient to make a point move at a fixed distance from another point. The law of construction of a doughnut now is another circle which moves around this first circle which is not reducible to a point, ie. you have to make the second circle repeat the first in order to generate a doughnut.


With this characteristic, I would say you have the most appropriate way of representing the relation between *desire and demand*. With this repetitive rotation around this other circle you can read the repetition of demands, and I would say, a repetition of 'void' demands. Void in what sense? Here I will have to make a remark. Suppose a subject who makes these rotations and who counts every circle. He will count say one hundred rotations as he goes, he will in fact have made one other rotation of a circle, but it will never get into his count. So as a matter of fact he will have made 101 repetitions. There will always be one more circle which is never brought into account.

This other circle which can never be formally articulated as such, is the very representation of desire.

So you can say the repetition of void demands, is the void of what is always left unstructured — always left out of the account. This circle of central void, which is always left out, you can see in the representation of the nothing, in the sense of the nothing put there in answer to any demand.

So now we are ready to approach the question of how we figure out the unconscious — for example the relation of desire to demands, which is exactly confirmed by Freud — the unconscious is not words, when Freud says that, sometimes the unconscious is not articulated in words.

Now suppose two doughnuts can be made so that one enfolds inside the other, like this,



What is here, the circle of demand, will be here in the other, as the circle of desire and vice versa. It is very simple to see by drawing it.

All this prepares us for the following answer, in the formula. You can say that *desire is always the desire of the Other, but in as much as it becomes the demand in the subject and in as much as the subject identifies with the Other on the point of desire*. He will figure out that the Other is demanding him to this desire. This is very easy to illustrate. For example, only last night I was talking about the common position in male sexuality: I mean for a man who wants to be the phallus, he will figure it out that the other, in this case the woman, is demanding this from him. So it is his unconscious desire which will be apprehended by him as a demand on the part of the other. At the same time, a woman characteristically an hysteric, may grasp the unconscious desire of the man, that is to be the master, and to be the father, and she demands him to be so. Very frequently we see this in a child's demand for a little brother or sister, which means the child perceives the signifier of the desire of the mother and it becomes a demand, he wants, it is as if he is saying — *give me the signifier of your desire*. And you know what the child symbolizes for the mother as far as it identifies with the unconscious desire of the mother. The little girl will figure this out, that the

Other of her demand wants a child from her ie. demands her to give him a child. As a matter of fact, this constitutes one of the main obstacles on the road to the realization of maternity in many women and it is very common. She figures out that the Other demands of her the ultimate good, and of course as far as the ultimate good is concerned you don't give it simply like *that!*

Now as far as obsessional and hysterical characteristics are concerned, the obsessional desires your demand, it is very focal, all that he desires is that you demand something from him, for the hysteric you can say it is the contrary, she demands your desire.

Now so far as our solution of an alternative is concerned, I would say we have come to the option of saying that *desire has its place in the Other* and it is in that place that desire is first constituted. This is why we can say desire ex-ists (dividing the word). The question comes now, what mode of ex-istence is this?

As psychoanalysts there is no place where you can pretend to know the desire beforehand. You catch it only in the moment of it being signified, and you must wait until it is sufficiently signified.

That is why as far as interpretation is concerned you can repeat this expression, that Freud liked so much, "The lion makes a single leap". It is a matter of nerves, making a signification before an act of signification — did it exist before this signification?

Once you grasp the measure of the import of the discourse of the text, you grasp it always in the register of a thought. These unconscious thoughts of desire present with the same structure as demands, exclamations, interrogations and sarcasms and so you have all the varieties. So *desire exists in the mode of (an unconscious) thought*. Our question is, did this thought exist before its own signification, at the very moment of its transportation to signify itself?

At least here is a question that indicates looking more closely at the Other because here, we talked about the other as being the woman for the male or the other as being the mother, the signifier for a child's demands and so on, so we were speaking about some particular Other. Anyway, there is more to this fundamental meaning in another dimension of this Other, in the sense that nobody talks a language of his own

invention. Talking supposes always a language, even the tongue which you receive. So it is in this capacity, that it is the mother who always is the first to occupy this place, which I have just formally characterized. She is the first to occupy it really — this formal place.

From this Other, this mother in this place, the subject not only receives his own message (if a child asks for food, it is because he was asked to feed), in relation to the Other and the one who occupies this place, but the Other makes the law of what to say or what not to say.

The first words from the Other not only have the power of oracles, but also that of jurisdiction in the sense of what to say and what not to say. So from this 'formal place' you are allowed to take some significance and not allowed to utter some other significance — that is what you call censorship. So censorship is a very basic mechanism, it even precedes, I would say, repression. So you can say the unconscious thoughts are in this very place, and it is from this place, in the sense of 'left utterances' that you take significance (from the left utterances) those that you are not allowed to articulate. And sometimes the signifiers follow different parts of the body, which in the case of hysterical symptoms are in the form of the return of the repressed . . .

. . . In the Seventh Chapter of the *Traumdeutung* and precisely under the title of The Fulfilling of Desire, Freud gives the example of a young woman whose friend recently married, and this friend was anxious to get her opinion about her bridegroom. . . . The friend said that he was a magnificent man or words to that effect, and the words that she would have liked to have said, were that he was the most common man, the like of which you can find by the hundreds or thousands but she just drew silence upon that. On that very night she had a dream in which a question was put to her, and she answered that for all ulterior comment it is sufficient to indicate the number. So this indicates that, the significance that you reject or leave has its own autonomy, and has its own function, (which is not communication, there is no communication in a dream), its function is to indicate the subjects position concerning truth, in as far as truth lies.

Even if I lie to somebody, I must postulate that he believes me, that is, that he is believing that I am telling the truth, otherwise I wouldn't even say the lies. So I would say that you can't make a theory of games,

without taking into consideration the Other, in the sense of the Other which includes you in your own calculations of postulations. Without this there is no theory of games possible. And at the same time I would say, there is no psychoanalytic theory possible, without the Other, as the position from where the operations both of language and of truth proceed. Without this, all descriptions, like Balint's, are condemned to just keep going around. In Leclaire for example, you find many descriptions of the double inscription which goes nowhere, precisely because in the very roots of his theory you find the complete absence of the notion of the Other. And this condemns his efforts.

Now, we will go back to one of the points mentioned worthy of further reflection. Why is this explanation possible, why say that all the thoughts, with their many varieties in the unconscious are desires? — especially if we say the unconscious has all the varieties, so why say that what is in the unconscious, is a desire? It is simply that desire is always implied in all that you say, even to such an extent in what logicians call alternative propositions or assertions. The logicians talk about them in terms of their voluntary element — there is some desire which indicates attribution itself, the putting of the attribute together with the subject.

Now we must try to explicate what is meant by this unconscious, which is unconscious desire, which is thought. We must comment a little on how there can be a thought without a thought without a thinker. It is not a matter of how can it be, you have already had explained its power of identity with that place. The question is how useful is it for us to consider some problems which are current in topology and psychoanalysis. I am referring to the notion of what we call in French *mentalité primitive*, the primitive mind. I am referring to a book by a Chilean, Ignacio Mate-Blanco in which there is a remark on which I have never heard a commentary in all the psychoanalytic literature. Ignacio has had all his education in the British Institute. His major work is titled, *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets — an Essay in Illogic*. In this book he starts from the assertion of Freud's, that the unconscious does not include any negations, which means it has no contradictions, so that logic is not in the unconscious thought. It is not subjected to the law of non-contradiction. It is this law of non-contradiction of course, in which resides the whole logic of oppositions because every position has a value

either true or false and you make it a law — that is the values. Anyway, if you imagine a mentality which does not admit this law, it would be a mentality which has its own logic.

What will be this mentality? All this effort, I would say is based on the postulate that the unconscious thinks — which is only a thought — if you assimilate the unconscious to a thought in this sense you will have two kinds of thoughts — which amounts to saying that there are two modes of beings. As a matter of fact, he effectively talks about the unconscious as a mode of being, but the mistake here is very erroneous and obvious. You can't be content with this definition of the unconscious, as a mode of being, precisely because being for psychoanalysis is an operation which is always built up in what we call identifications.

It is here that we touch the point where topography touches the question of identification. As a matter of fact if you look upon the kinds of identifications which are implied in the unconscious — suppose you make a list of the kinds of identifications which are implied in unconscious desires which you grasp from the unconscious during your work — in all their varieties — you will find that in spite of all this variety they pertain to 2 or 3 kinds of identifications. The first kind of identifications are identifications to the signifier of the desire of the Other. You have for example, in the *Traumdeutung* many kinds of instances, one of them in the *Maikafer* dream among the dreamers associations (which I did not mention), that when she was seeing to her daily occupation as a housekeeper she was struck by the image of her husband hanging. This image filled her with anxiety, but associations revealed that some hours before she was struck by this image, she had read somewhere the following, that men when hung get erections. So Freud had no difficulty in guessing that her wish was that her husband would get an erection at her *sight*, even if hanging. In Italian you say *vista* and in French you say *vue* which has two meanings, sight in the sense of *vue*, that is the thing I see, and *vue* the act of seeing.

This man was by inference from the associations of the dream, impotent. These things are the indications of her unconscious desire.

You can say also that the child reads the unconscious desire of his mother on her face, especially in those first few months — that is what

we call the paranoid position. A position in which the child is suspended in the mother's unconscious desire. Now we can say that this woman suspends her reading of the desire of her husband's unconscious desire. She was identifying her *vue* to the signifier of the desire of her husband. So this identification is to the signifier of the desire in so far as it is a question of the phallic desire. You have the same kind of identification on the level of say, regressive desires, anal, oral, etc.

The second kind of identification is the identification with the Other himself, not with the signifiers of his desire, as far as he is present or is the Other of love or of power. I recall even in that very first movement of life, the cry for help, the helpless being has no recourse except to become identified with the object which answers this cry, which by this very fact comes to represent or works as the sign of love of the Other, and as the power of the love of the Other, which in this case you can say is the breast, as it was in answer to the cry due to hunger.

So you have both these kinds of identifications, with the signifier of the Other's desire and with the other. There is a third kind of identification which we meet most often in psychoanalytic cases and from the words of the patient, etc., which is the identification with the father as a rival.

This identification takes place in the imaginary register, but still, where we observe this kind of identification you will always find unconscious thoughts or desires or expiatory wishes or wishes to exorcize the threat, of castration. These wishes I would say testify to another kind of register — the symbolic register, which means that wishes that testify to the presence of this place of the Other, or major principle or fundamental axiom which is the father as such. Not in his image, as an imago, but in his name, as such.

I think it is from this point on, that one can proceed to even more of the question of topography and I think this is the obscure point whose reconciliation may permit the construction of a second topography. As far as the first topography is concerned, it all depends on the notion of the Other as the place of language and truth, first as the notion of the Other occupying this place as a censor as a law giver and the notion of the identification with debt, both with this Other itself and with the signifier of this Other's desire and the presence in this Other of major

significance which is that of the father.

Well, I think that I have finished the work, except if there are any questions.

* * *

Oscar Zentner: Well, yes there is a question. You made a subtle and interesting differentiation between repression and censorship, which is very important because if I understood you correctly, you were saying: "I would put censorship even before repression". This opens many questions. First, if that is so, it is obvious that dreaming is a very archaic function. Second I wonder if by censorship you mean primary repression. Then there are two questions: If censorship in your words, means primary repression or if censorship is previous to repression or even before primary repression?

Moustapha Safouan: That is the question, the last question. I would say, in this affirmation that the formation of censorship is more radical than repression . . . I would say that in relation to the object of identification of the subject to the signifiers of desire of the Other, this is the mechanism which is at the root of the constitution of the object from which the subject is cut. Which, his lack arises. So as far as we mean by primary repression, the mechanism which is at the root of the constitution of what we could call Lacan's *objet a*, you can't say the censor plays its part, but in as far as you are considering the othernesses of the subject, then the fundamental mechanism is censorship. As far as primary repression is concerned, I would say censorship is a mechanism as radical as repression. It concerns the effects of identification from which you suffer. Censorship concerns the utterances from the very beginning.

Frances Moran: But why does primary repression occur?

Moustapha Safouan: Because the subject has no inborn desire. So the ways in which desire gets constituted is within the relation with the Other. The result of this relation is what the subject does not know. This is the meaning of the so called counter transference.

Frances Moran: But then it doesn't sound like the subject represses, but that something happens to the subject.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, of course.

Frances Moran: To repress sounds to me like the subject does something to itself.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, but the term is a mistake as you say it, it is an agent.

Frances Moran: Could you put it another way, that the subject is repressed by the Other?

Moustapha Safouan: You can say the subject is an object. That is why anthropological theory had some time ago the notion of a gift, which Levi-Strauss extended to the notion of exchange. The subject is exchanged as an object, as someone has commented, but it is even worse, the subject is an object, but what the object is, no-one can say as it is constituted in primary repression. It is the whole question of priority — the priority is the unconscious.

Oscar Zentner: You would remember Frances, that we were saying that the translation of repression has led us to a mistake in English, as *Verdrängung* has the meaning of putting something else in the place of something.

Moustapha Safouan: Yes that is so, I think in other languages also, and that is why we must distinguish between primary and secondary repression. Ah, now you have reminded me of another inconvenience of this word, as repression is always wrongly taken to mean social repression.

Oscar Zentner: Dr. Safouan what would the relation be between two concepts that Freud wonders about all the way through the *Traumdeutung*. He made a loose distinction between *Verdrängung* and *Unterdrückung* and I wonder if *Unterdrückung* is not close to what you mean by censorship?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, I would say there are two levels of censorship. Censorship in the sense that you draw silence upon something, which is the case of Freud in reference to Signorelli and also in the example of the dream of the woman, she had her opinion but she censored herself. There is a difference, you can say these are examples of *Unterdrückung*, of suppression. This is different from the sign in the Other.

Sometimes of course if you are protecting somebody you are protecting yourself. If you suppress, it comes back ... Suppression may be mostly a form of censorship to describe what you exercise upon yourself, but which is not the rule of the otherness as such.

Sabar Rustomjee: Is it at a more conscious level than repression?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, repression is a more radical mechanism.

Oscar Zentner: Can we say in our words that censorship is the way in which the Other takes place — by making unconscious in the subject, as if the entrance of the Other would occur through censorship?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes! this position of the Other, is the legislator of what is to be said and what is not to be said — it is not only specific to the child, you can see it in adult life — in the position of power. In the dream of the smoked salmon, you can't say, 'I want the money to eat this', so there are things to be said or not said and what is not said appears somewhere. This is the whole of the scheme of Leo Strauss in his book, *Writing and the Art of Persecution*, a comment on political theory. In the *Traumdeutung*, the Other is the dictator of the words.

Frances Moran: Could you say that what has not been said has nonetheless been spoken?

Moustapha Safouan: Yes, it is very nice, — and if not, outspoken.

Frances Moran: I am reminded of a book, *Deceit Desire and the Novel*, by Bernstein and his whole argument is that there is no good novel or worthwhile novel, unless it accommodates desire and intersubjectivity.

Oscar Zentner: At *L'Alliance Française* you were giving the example of *famillonaire* in Heine's "as true as God protects me, I was received in a *famillonaire* way". If that would be the only production of the subject and full stop, then the analysis would finish there. But as Heine wrote this, we know that he was denied the hand of his cousin by his millionaire uncle. I wonder if this case is not a magnificent example (not in the joke, but in the one who brought the joke), of the appearance of the real subject of the enunciation. It is as if the whole joke brought out the unconscious of Hyacinthe, namely Heine ... My question is if a joke can avoid censorship or not?

Moustapha Safouan: . . . It is an anecdote of a lapsus but in Heine he posits his uncle as the obstacle between him and the object desired. The girl didn't want him at all. The joke as a bitter joke probably came to his mind as containing this secret. In both cases as a lapsus or as a joke, the important thing is that it keeps the same structure — to show the structure of the different formations of the unconscious.

Frances Moran: Then whereabouts does the symbol fit into all of this?

Moustapha Safouan: It is one of substitution, of one for the other.

Frances Moran: Is that the same for a symptom?

Moustapha Safouan: Symptoms show the same structure except that symbolism is more common and symptoms have a more intimate connection with the repressed. When I speak of symbolism I subscribe to the difference described by Jones between the symbol and the metaphor

Frances Moran: I mean in terms of censorship and repression?

Moustapha Safouan: This is something we can cover by suppression

Frances Moran: Would a symbol be subject to the more radical censorship you have been talking about?

Moustapha Safouan: No, a symbol in the sense of symbolism is a different matter, houses as symbols, or snakes as symbols of the phallus, in analysis it is a different topic.

Inés Zentner: Do you consider the symbol to be one of the formations of the unconscious?

Moustapha Safouan: Of course it is, it takes a very strong part in the unconscious, it is the first appearance of the unconscious, in the symbol, in identification or in repression it is very profound. This is established in the relation between signifiers and their mechanism. In the mechanism of metaphor the motor is in the fact of substitution and displacement which has the mechanism of avoiding censorship. Symbolism has its part, not because it is something different from metaphor, but because the status of the signifier that is lacking, is not the same as metaphor. The signifiers as symbols in metaphor in the usual language are con-

scious, but the signifier or symbol that is lacking is unconscious. That is why the subject has no idea that he is losing a symbol. Say he leaves his umbrella and you laugh at it, he doesn't think it has a symbolic meaning at all, he doesn't suspect that he is using a symbol.

There is an American analyst who in an article talks about a patient who was tormented by the ideas about her new house and made her life and those around her a hell, where to put the light, etc. etc. The analyst knowing the symbolic meaning of the house told her that all these obsessions were related to her body. The woman thought that he was mad and she didn't come again. Of course her symptoms became unbearable and she returned. He gave her the same interpretation and talked of her breasts, etc., but she couldn't accept it. Anyway, finally in one session I don't remember in what context, he gave her a Japanese proverb, "the blind don't spear snakes", and afterwards finally she gave her own interpretation and admitted that perhaps all her torment about her house was a comment about the torment of her body. I mean it was such an effort to make her admit the interpretation, but once he used a metaphor in this way then the same interpretation was accepted — and he finishes by saying that maybe she had some Japanese, etc. — which was very funny for me. Anyway, I am not concerned with the meaning here, the point is that even without theory you can see how the subject is touched differently. As far as the symbol was concerned, the house, the symbolic value of it, the subject was not aware of that and this is one of the characteristics of symbols.

* • *

Moustapha Safouan: It may now be appropriate to say some words about some impressions of mine as far as this work is concerned. I have been to many places and I have seen many groups. I really worked with you with a feeling of pleasure, I mean I have the feeling that you listened and that you are impressed with the thing itself. And I just hope you proceed with Oscar Zentner and show determination in learning more and more of psychoanalysis and about psychoanalysis and I thank you very, very much.

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

Oscar Zentner: We are very pleased with your work with us. People at the School have been working hard and with perseverance. The School is no longer an illusion but a reality. A reality that exists since 1977 and that has allowed us to invite you, Dr. Safouan, in order for us to listen to your work and learn from it. We are glad that we have not disappointed you in your recognition of our work. We all thank you for this series of seminars which you shared with us.

PART III

THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE

Seminar transcribed from tapes.

AND THOU SHALT BE LIKE GODS¹

Ricardo Goldenberg*

“To push the blinking of what is known as the child pushes his toy, right up to the edge of the table and let it fall without reason, may be just to play with its empty place.”

Roberto Juarroz²

Analysed and educated (accept this term for a moment) by two generations of analysts, the shepherds of the I.P.A. and the misled sheep that went after Lacan, many of us are cast adrift, unable to accommodate our spirits to the military strictness with which the former imposed obedience on technical precepts, the blind faith with which they answered all questions but also unable to formulate anything to the lat-

* Ricardo Goldenberg, Argentinian analyst — member of the Freudian School of Buenos Aires.

ter who had erected themselves as celebrants of a New Word, letting their sharpened rhetorical scimitars fall on any infidel who dared to even think about any of the three Kantian questions: What can I know: What can I expect? What must I do?

In such a way a didactic analyst is overwhelmed interpreting the venomous farts of the maternal environment to a patient who questioned him about the smoke in his office, while all the time an electrical socket is burning away. Another one forbids his patients everything, even touching the doorknob on leaving; a task that is reserved for him, explaining that he would be responding to a demand. In one respect, I can't help remembering that C.I.A. director who used to interview with gloves and a surgeon's mask to prevent himself from being contaminated by the germs that his agents would bring.

These anecdotes, they explain nothing. I choose them to expose readers of Freud who employ a non-conventional method; they begin with the end.

Freud declares that it is necessary to abstain and they, visibly, do nothing else. What is the use of undertaking the task of disentangling threads until we find the pattern of their logic? Does the road matter if they all lead to Rome? (or to Vienna or Paris)? However the Professor was always cautious on the subject of short cuts. He always recommended that Ferenczi moderate his enthusiasm in relation to shortening treatments, anticipating obstacles. He thought that these were constituents of the analysis which could not be skipped over on pain of getting just about anywhere except where the analysis should have gone.

To say it in brief the *theory of transference* was constructed under the same obstacles that Freud had to overcome in analysis. It can't be used to spare anyone from them. Even the *rule of abstinence* carries within it a conception of the object radically different from what is implied in *suggestion*. Furthermore, "the rule of abstinence instead of suggestion", as an indication, does not have the least meaning outside a subjective position.

Having made these clarifications to which I shall return, let us review the 1914 article, *Observations on Transference — Love*. In it Freud says that love, far from being contingent, is inherent to analysis,

"... it is so unavoidable and so difficult to clear up, that a discussion of it to meet a vital need of analytic technique has long been overdue."

That being said, what is left for us is a choice between two roads; either we perform an amorous reading of psychoanalysis, or we perform a psychoanalytic reading of love.

Oscar Masotta commented that psychoanalysis begins with "the beautiful butcheress". (A resounding translation, poorly evoking Lacan's French subtleness in naming it, synthesizing in two words the hysteric's core: "*belle bouche*".) I wish then to introduce here some observations on transference love.

I shall remind you that you will find this analysis in the fourth chapter of, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, used to exemplify the way in which *resistance* to analysis is promoted by *ensorship*. It concerns a woman much closer it seems, to those nymphs who celebrated the God Bacchus, than to the, *The Lady of the Camellias*, very well served (in both senses) by her butcher-husband and also quite fond of him. Nothing in what Freud relates allows us to suppose that she was in love with her analyst, notwithstanding that there are some indicators there that Cupid had done his deed.

She says she dreamt and that her dream contradicts the theory of the *Herr Professor*. Her wish to offer a supper party is frustrated in the dream. Cunningly, he tells his readers that this does nothing but *confirm his thesis* — that every dream is the fulfilment of a wish; this one would carry out the desire that he, Freud, would be mistaken.

It is quite clear that those longings for him to be wrong are pre-conscious but if this were all, analysis would not be the least interesting. This is not all, since one does not dream just because one wants to but because one cannot avoid doing so. If what she declares is true — that she dreams to thwart him — then he must be in an eminent position in relation to this lady, so that her unconscious will work overtime on account of his mere remark.


Be that as it may, Freud requests her to associate. The analysis to come indicates the ways by which the unconscious leads this woman's discourse. To contradict he who boasts of possessing the secret, she will

reveal how she has been forced to promote her wish as unfulfilled, to such an extent that Freud does not hesitate in calling it "the desire of having an unsatisfied desire".

The dream presents her as frustrated in giving a supper party. She has nothing to offer but a slice of smoked salmon. Through her associations, Freud concludes that she desired to starve, to leave wanting a skinny friend of hers who had expressed her eagerness to gain weight and had asked the patient explicitly to invite her for supper. As the dreamer is jealous because her husband courts this friend more than would be expected, Freud interprets thus:

"A likely thing! I'm to ask you to come and eat in my house so that you may get stout and attract my husband still more!"

He likes them full, Goya-esque, he even confesses to us his fantasy, that is; "a piece of a pretty young girl's behind". Therefore, let the skinny one stay skinny. In such a way, she is no competition. In other words, if the object of her husband's desire is a fantasy, in order to be desired by him they must incarnate it. This puts the "beautiful butcheress" in a specular war, a game of envies with the other, the rival in her love's economy.



If we remain within this we have neither emerged from bourgeois morality nor from common sense. It would have to do with "He who has a love, let him look after it, look after it. . .";⁵ she would take care of it in dreams.

This is what I called an amorous reading of psychoanalysis. It becomes necessary to distinguish love from desire and the way to do it is the object's.

As a matter of fact, the butcher gets aroused by his butcheress who fills the requirements of his fantasy with her arse. We could concede even though it is not evident, that he is in love with his chubby com-

panion. All this, far from clearing things up, complicates all. Why is she jealous of another woman who she knows with her figure, cannot be her competitor? The text seems to answer, Aha! Because her husband flirts with her. Notice that this only displaces the question; why does he pay a compliment to someone he does not like?

Freud saw the problem with absolute clarity except that he could not give an account of it theoretically, since he was dealing with a conception of the *Wunsch* that carries implicitly the two notions that Lacan distinguished, demand and desire.

He not only saw it, but faithful to the discourse of his analysis and he encountered a discordance, a little enigma of which he must give account. If the *Wunsch* that the dream fulfills is that her rival's desire to gain weight is not accomplished, then why is she not the star of the dream, instead of the patient herself?

He explains that she has *identified herself with her friend*. As a proof of this he draws our attention to the fact that both women amuse themselves with their respective husbands in a rather absurd little game, that consists of the following. First they convince them that they are dying to have something, in this case it is a gastronomic 'something': *caviar* for one and *smoked salmon* for the other, warning them later to not even imagine bringing home that 'something' wanted. Women! Who understands them?

Freud gives this foolishness such an importance that to explain it he proposes a *second interpretation* of the dream "more subtle still", he says. He formulates it thus:

"... my patient put herself in her friend's place in the dream because her friend was taking my patient's place with her husband and because she (my patient) wanted to take her friend's place in her husband's high opinion."⁶

Nevertheless, what is this "would like to occupy" in the man's desire? In which place has the other been put? I emphasize in the man's *desire* not in his *fantasy*. That position she already has and to that she responds by means of the caviar trick, which Freud points to adequately, as being unconscious — a trick to show something she might well ask for, but does not expect to receive.

The two women are matched in a sisterhood in that case, not only in the fantasy of "the piece of . . . behind," but also in that amusement that starts a certain privation working, a privation which is delighted in, that something can be missed that seems to satiate itself on insatiability; the desire of having a desire — Freud calls it.

With this operation he seems to have coped with what is essential of the *Wunsch*: to achieve its object by means of another desire. There is, nevertheless, a remainder. The remainder belongs to Lacan.

The man who appears to be the cause of these desires and rivalries between women is not where he knows what he likes, in his fantasy, but where he does not know — where he makes his compliments, showing off his little lady, the other, from whom he asks what she could not give. It is not thinness that he wants, it is her *unfatness*! Like the ladies, he wishes what he does not want.


It is no use, the more he persists in his genital militancy, this "man of the piece of behind" will end up swallowing his woman's caviar. "You will never be able to", she tells him. "What I want, you cannot give me." And this is literally, a thing that never ends. The funniest thing is that the hysteric knows (her unconscious knows it) that he, the Viennese male, is also after the phallus like any common girl. This function, Lacan writes as $(- \Phi)$, the phallus as long as it is missing. There, he adds, is where the hysteric *identifies with the man* who looks at the other, to see how one is desired for what one does not have.⁷

A brief pause to recover our breath, an intimate reverence to the subtle ties of a reading that returns some Freudian things to their right place: it is not that the woman wants to have her husband for herself alone and that she cannot. It is due to having *too much* of a husband that her desire, in danger of being extinguished like a candle in the rain, gives way to the 'not-to-be-eaten' caviar.

But the dream is something else, the dream is for Freud. He causes it in a double sense. That is, on one hand it is directed to what he knows and believes; that a wish is fulfilled in the fantasy. In this way it is a *gift of love*. On the other hand it aims at what he does not know (that he knows), that the desire is not capable of accomplishing. . . in any substance, in any object in a positive sense, in anything whatsoever. By

this we mean there is no 'real' achievement of the object. So the dream itself is nothing but a metaphor of this desire. The analyst is its cause, there where his desire, properly, does not yield as such before the love it provokes in the patient.

The caviar, with which her demand is formulated in the metonymy is for her husband the displacement of the object, similarly in the 'not-to-be-eaten' smoked salmon in the dream for Freud her desire turns into metaphor. The desire is symbolized:



Freud is at this time very busily engaged in proving to his detractors that every dream is a fulfilment of a wish. He convinces them first that behind the apparent dream there is another genuine one, the *latent content* that the work of analysis must bring to light. As his critics refer only to the *manifest content*, he is satisfied in demonstrating that a desire is fulfilled in a *positive sense* in the latent content to consider his hypothesis out of danger.

This woman gives him his *latent content*, in the same way she gives her arse to the other one but not before giving proof that, in fact, it is not what one or the other desires. Freud accepts this offering by designating the object as possible. It's about your friend, he tells her. *This is the love from which he recommends us to abstain.*

As it is seen, there is no way to be on guard against this. It is Freud's position, the moment in which he was in his analysis, that makes it possible for him not to remain there fascinated and to pay attention to that discordance called "smoked salmon". *This is abstinence just as Freud practices it.* Its limits are those of the analyst's own analysis. Its operation is relative to the unconscious and not to the conscience, good or bad, nor to the will of the analyst. An analyst must abstain from being lovable. From desiring there is no abstinence. How could there be if the desire is unconscious?

The *rule of abstinence* has a close relation with amorous disappointment. Freud knows about it because he has suffered from it. This cannot be spared for anyone who wants to enter into being a psychoanalyst. The temptation to believe that "perhaps there might be an object after all", cannot be resolved except at the end of the analyst's personal analysis.

Let us remember purposely how he complained to his friend Fliess as far back as 1897:

"... I no longer believe in my neurotica (theory of the neurosis). This is probably not intelligible without an explanation; after all, you yourself found what I could tell you credible. So I will begin historically from the question of the origin of my reason for misbelief. The continual disappointments in my attempts in bringing my analysis to a real conclusion, the running away of people who had for a time seemed most in my grasp, the absence of complete success on which I had reckoned, the possibility of explaining the partial successes in other ways, on ordinary lines, this was the first group. Then came surprise at the fact that in every case the father, *not excluding my own,* had to be blamed as a pervert, the realization of the unexpected frequency of hysteria, in which the same determinant is invariably established, though such a widespread extent of perversity towards children is, after all, not very probable. (The perversity would have to be immeasurably more frequent than the hysteria, since the illness only arises where there has been an accumulation of events and where a factor that weakens defence has supervened). Then thirdly, the certain discovery that there has been *no indication of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth and fiction that has been invested.* (Thus, the

possibility remained open that the sexual fantasy invariably seizes upon the theme of the parents.)"

Try not to be immunized by 82 years of psychoanalysis and still wonder at Freud's steps. The efforts of a mind, wielded in the maximum ideals of positivism, that does not renounce when he discovers that all the episodes in which he believed he had found the cause, the aetiology of the hysteric symptoms were lies. The time was not yet ready for understanding that the hysteric's lie was the truth he sought — the truth of her desire. By this I mean to say he did not know it.

He did not know it but the discourse did, and that was why it was time to conclude and he concluded asking, What is, *meine Frau*, that smoked salmon that lies in your dream? I mean to say; that the two interpretations that Freud presents of this dream are not absolutely at the same level. That which he calls the *first* and which reduces the production of the dream to jealousy, arrives there as a resistance to unknow the effect that the other, which he calls the *second*, has produced. It arrives in a position to hide what that *smoked salmon* reveals; it acts by forcing the other, *caviar*, to represent to the subject. It is following this analysis' logic that I propose that this *second interpretation*, the one which names the identification with the other woman and the signifier of her desire, is logically previous to that which we have come to call the *first*.

For all this, it does not seem reasonable to me to act in our practice as if we believed that what Freud had in mind when he announced that a psychoanalysis had to be carried out in abstinence, was a command of the type of *you must not fornicate!* Such a categorical imperative and *a-priori*, could only install impotence, because it appeals to morality, to aesthetics and to the spiritual strength of the practitioner, forcing him thus to forget that it is the unconscious that interprets, not him.

On the contrary, when he warned that it is...

"just as disastrous for the analysis if the patient's craving for love is gratified as if it is suppressed,"

he implies that in the first case, the practitioner has given in, in his desire, to the narcissistic illusion that the patient's love proposes. Meanwhile, in the second case, to play the priest who absolves or even the censoring father, the analyst's desire has been trampled on by a reaction formation as in obsessional neurosis.

PAPERS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

Freud concludes the paragraph asserting that,

“The way that the analysis will follow is rather different and *it lacks antecedents in real life.*”

It is not far from his spirit to affirm that the only guide to that way is that confidence in the unconscious which only one's own experience of analysis permits one to achieve. He abstains then on behalf of himself, simply when he has listened.

NOTES

- ¹ MILTON'S Paradise Lost, Book 9.
- ² Poesia Vertical. 3rd Poesia Vertical 1965, B.A. Fragments, published 1978.
- ³ FREUD, S. Observations on Transference Love (1914), Stand.Ed., Vol.XII.
- ⁴ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Stand.Ed., Vol.IV, 148.
- ⁵ A popular Argentinian song.
- ⁶ FREUD, S. The Interpretation of Dreams, (1900). Stand.Ed., Vol.IV, 150.
- ⁷ LACAN, J. The Direction of the Cure, in *Ecrits*, Tavistock, 1977.
- ⁸ LACAN, J. The Four Fundamental Concepts, Hogarth Press, 1977.
- ⁹ Omitted in *Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse*, London, 1950.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

• * *

Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

* * *

- I — Homage to Freud — 1979
- II — On Perversion — 1980
- III — On *Angst* — 1981
- IV — The Freudian Clinic — 1982
- V — Clinical Psychoanalysis — 1983 (in print)

The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria, 3122
Australia

HOMAGE TO FREUD — 1979

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
INTRODUCTION	
A Note on Letter 52 of Freud and on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis; the Dissolution of L'Ecole Freudienne de Paris	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH	
The Word of Freud	Sigmund Freud 8
Presentation of the School	Oscar Zentner 9
A Reference to Freud and Lacan	
	María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner 13
The Entrance of Psychoanalysis in Australia	John Dingle 23
Ideal Objects and Repetition	Ruben Alejandro Cerutti 39
People of the Northeast Brazil Talk About Their Legends: "Joao Galafoice, in the Fishing World"	Jacques Laberge 45
Psychoanalysis and Cure	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 53
Psychoanalysis	Oscar Zentner 59
PART II	
ON FEMININITY	
The Woman and the Real as a Paradigm of Psychosis	
	Oscar Zentner 73
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
Sexuality and Science	
	Oscar Zentner and María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner 95
The Freudian Unconscious, Symbolism and Censorship	
	Oscar Zentner 113
Elementary Lessons	Oscar Zentner 131

Order from
The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia

HOMAGE TO FREUD/ON PERVERSION

1980

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
NACHTRÄGLICHKEIT	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 41ST ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH	
In the Knot of the Subject	Oscar Zentner 13
Retrospective Unconscious Logic and Perversion, the Moments of Perversion	Gayle Paull 29
Femininity and Perversion	John Dingle 37
The Offended Woman.	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 49
A Pseudonym, the Itinerary for a Perversion	María Inés Rotmiller de Zentner 65
The Brain as Accommodation of Desire	Graeme Crawford-Smith 79
Tod/Etcetera/Rat Man	Juan Davila 85
PART II	
THE WORD OF LACAN	
The Seminar, Paris, 10th July 1980	Jacques Lacan 97
The Seminar, Caracas, 12th July 1980	Jacques Lacan 103
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Comedy of the Bodies	Javier Aramburu and Juan Carlos Cosentino 109
A Case of Perversion?	Luz Freire 119
The Death of Freud	Isidoro Vegh 127
Aphanisis	Oscar Zentner 137

*Order from
The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia*

HOMAGE TO FREUD — ON ANGST

1981

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
LOGOS.....	1
PART I	
HOMAGE TO FREUD ON THE 42ND ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH	
The Death of Lacan	Oscar Zentner 9
Non-Libidinization and its Return	Oscar Zentner 15
The Secret Cause	Laurence Bataille 27
Lautreamont and the Uncanny	María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner 33
<i>Angst</i> , The Null Set Series and the ($-\varphi$)	Gayle Paull 65
Beyond the Pleasure of the Text	John Dingle 55
Psychoanalysis or Psychoanalyst	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 67
PART II	
SEMINARS OF THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE	
Seminar I — On Symbolism	Moustapha Safouan 83
Seminar II — On Jokes	Moustapha Safouan 103
PART III	
THE FREUDIAN DISCOURSE	
The Rhetoric of <i>Angst</i>	Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin 119
<i>Angst</i> and the Theatre of the Absurd	Frances M. Moran 123
Interview with Juan David Nasio	Miguel Kohan 129
Conversation in Paris Between Alain Grosrichard, Gloria Autino, Gustavo Etkin and Oscar Zentner	139

Order from
The Freudian School of Melbourne
P.O. Box 12, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122
Australia



3

FREUDIAN CLINIC
Readings
Carlton \$15.00